U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–010 

" ! SENATE 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–297 

Calendar No. 553 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

INSIDER THREAT AND MITIGATION ACT OF 

2015 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

H.R. 3361 

TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO 

ESTABLISH THE INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM, AND FOR OTHER 

PURPOSES 

JULY 12, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

ELIZABETH MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Minority Chief Counsel 

MATTHEW R. GROTE, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 553 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 114–297 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

JULY 12, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 3361] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the act (H.R. 3361), to amend the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 to establish the Insider Threat Program, and 

for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 4 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 4 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 5 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 6 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported ........................... 6 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of H.R. 3361, the Department of Homeland Security 

Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2016, is to establish an Insider Threat Program (ITP) within the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS or ‘‘the Department’’). The act mandates an ITP 

structure that improves employee identification, prevention, and 

mitigation of risks to the Department’s critical assets. It also establishes an internal DHS Steering Committee to manage and coordinate DHS activities related to insider threat issues, includes employee education and training, and strengthens the Department’s 

ability to discipline employees found to be insider threats. The act 


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1GOV’T Accountability Office, GAO–13–187, Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively Implemented 1 (2013), available 

at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652170.pdf. 

2 Id. 3See id.; see also Ellen Nakashima & Julie Tate, Prosecutors Say Manning and Assange Collaborated in Stealing Secret Documents, Wash. Post (Dec. 22, 2011), https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/prosecutors-say-manning-and-assangecollaborated-in-stealing-secret-documents/2011/12/22/gIQARwAXCP_story.html. 4See generally Jordan Fabian, White House Stands Firm on Snowden Prosecution, The Hill 

(June 1, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/243643-amid-nsa-furor-white-housestanding-firm-on-snowden-prosecution; Safeguarding Our Nation’s Secrets: Examining the Security Clearance Process: Joint Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Efficiency and Effectiveness of 

Fed. Programs and the Fed. Workforce and the S. Subcomm. on Fin. and Contracting Oversight 

of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013); Open Hearing: 

Current and Projected National Security Threats Against the United States: Hearing Before the 

S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director 

of National Intelligence). 5Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–15–544, Insider Threats: DOD Should Strengthen Management and Guidance to Protect Classified Information and Systems 6 (2015), available at http:// 

gao.gov/assets/680/670570.pdf. 6 Exec. Order No. 13,587, 3 C.F.R. 63811 (2011), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/ 

policy-documents/eo-13587.pdf. 

requires the Secretary to report to Congress on implementation 

progress and the metrics-based effectiveness of the ITP. 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

As evolving computer technology becomes an increasingly pervasive part of everyday life, both government and private entities 

have grown dependent on information technology (IT) systems to 

process, maintain, and transmit sensitive information.1 This reliance on IT drives a persistent and evolving insider threat to Federal IT systems that manage national security critical assets.2

It has been ‘‘insiders’’ with trusted access within the United 

States Government who have conducted some of the most egregious 

releases of classified information and espionage in recent years. In 

2010, United States Army PFC Manning used access to classified 

databases to leak classified information that would ultimately be 

published online.3 Edward Snowden continues to evade criminal 

prosecution after he used his access to classified databases to steal 

and publish classified information related to sensitive national security programs.4

Publicized security leaks inspired the 2011 Executive Order 

13587 ‘‘Structural Reforms to Improve Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified 

Information.’’ 5 This Executive Order requires that ‘‘the heads of 

agencies that operate or access classified computer networks’’ shall 

‘‘implement an insider threat detection and prevention program.’’ 6

Although according to the Department, current efforts align with 

the requirements of these policies, H.R. 3361 ensures the Department will maintain a management structure for the ITP that is the 

most effective for the purposes of national security. This structure 

involves a multidisciplinary steering committee that coordinates 

Department-wide activities related to insider threats to its critical 

assets, including the identification of potential threats. The act also 

directs the Department to conduct a risk assessment of its critical 

assets, including its networks, facilities, workforce, and information. 

However, the 2011 Executive Order 13587 and a 2012 Presidential memorandum on ITPs only require the Department ITP to 


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7 Exec. Order No. 13,587, 3 C.F.R. 63811 (2011), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/ 

policy-documents/eo-13587.pdf; National Insider Threat Task Force, National Insider Threat Policy and the Minimum Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, National Counterintelligence and Security Center (Nov. 2012), https://www.ncsc.gov/nittf/docs/ 

National_Insider_Threat_Policy.pdf. 8GAO–13–187, supra note 1 at 10. 9 Communications between Dept. of Homeland Sec. staff and S. Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs Comm. staff (Feb. 1, 2016). 10Press Release, SolarWinds Survey Investigates Insider Threats to Federal Cybersecurity, 

SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC (Jan. 26, 2015), available at http://www.solarwinds.com/company/ 

newsroom/press_releases/threats_to_federal_cybersecurity.aspx. 11 Id. 12Press Release, Consolidation and Modernization Chief Among Federal IT Security Concerns, 

SolarWinds Survey Discovers, SolarWinds Worldwide, LLC (Mar. 1, 2016), available at http:// 

www.solarwinds.com/company/newsroom/press_releases/consolidation-and-modernization-chiefamong-federal-it-security.aspx. 13 Id. 

cover classified systems.7 Insider threats can affect both classified 

and unclassified systems, as the Department of Defense learned in 

2008 when malicious software on an infected flash drive spread 

through both system types at a military base in the Middle East.8

The intelligence and security communities recommended and 

strongly urged that the DHS ITP should cover the Department’s 

unclassified systems as well.9 H.R. 3361 will expand the ITP to 

cover both the Department’s classified and unclassified critical assets. 

In the event an employee is found to be an insider threat, the 

substitute amendment empowers the Secretary of DHS to further 

prevent and mitigate insider threats by requiring certain disciplinary actions against that employee. Overall, this act establishes an 

effective ITP structure to secure Department facilities, its workforce, and its critical assets—both classified and unclassified. 

The extreme cases of intentional insider threats mentioned above 

highlight the need for a strong ITP within departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Intentional attacks 

aside, unwitting employee data breaches also pose a significant 

risk to the security of Federal systems. Of the 200 Federal IT decision makers surveyed under a study published in 2015 to identify 

critical cybersecurity challenges, more than half (53 percent) ‘‘identified careless and untrained insiders as the greatest source of IT 

security threats at their agencies.’’ 10 This represented a 42 percent 

increase from the previous year.11

While the number of respondents that indicated careless and untrained insiders as the foremost cybersecurity issue dropped to 48 

percent in 2016, it is still tied for the top security threat.12 This 

means that for the third survey in as many years, over 40 percent 

of Federal IT professionals highlighted employee security training 

and education as a necessary investment for threat prevention. 

In 2015, a different survey of 150 Federal IT managers, as well 

as a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, identified the 

vulnerability of Federal systems to insider threats. Results of that 

survey revealed that nearly half of Federal agencies were targets 

of insider threats and nearly one in three (29 percent) suffered a 

loss of data due to an insider.13

Meanwhile, GAO reported steadily increasing information security incidents affecting Federal systems from fiscal year (FY) 2006 


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14 Is the OPM Data Breach the Tip of the Iceberg?: Joint Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 

Research and Tech. and the H. Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and 

Tech., 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Gregory Wilshusen, Director, Information Security 

Issues, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office). 15 Calvin Hennick, Commerce, State Departments Take Steps to Combat Insider Security 

Threats, FEDTECH MAGAZINE (Apr. 25, 2016), available at http://www.fedtechmagazine.com/ 

article/2016/04/commerce-state-departments-take-steps-combat-insider-security-threats. 

(5,503 incidents) to FY 2014 (67,168 incidents): an overall increase 

of 1,121 percent.14

Unfortunately, technology alone is often incapable of detecting 

insider threats. Patricia Larsen, co-director of the National Insider 

Threat Task Force, recently attested to this stating, ‘‘[t]raining is 

a huge piece of this. No technology tool in the world is going to be 

your silver bullet.’’ 15 In addition to requiring department-wide coordination on addressing insider threats, H.R. 3361 mandates employee education and training. 

Through employee education and training, this act seeks to create a Federal workforce that is aware of the risks posed by insider 

threats, and qualified to detect and report suspicious activity 

among colleagues. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Representative Peter King, along with Representatives Lou 

Barletta, Daniel M. Donovan Jr., Brian Higgins, and John Katko, 

introduced H.R. 3361 on July 29, 2015, which was referred to the 

House Committee on Homeland Security. The House Committee on 

Homeland Security considered H.R. 3361 at a business meeting on 

November 2, 2015. On the same day, the bill passed the House by 

voice vote and under suspension of the rules. 

The act was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on November 3, 2015. The Committee considered H.R. 3361 at a business 

meeting on February 10, 2016. 

Chairman Ron Johnson offered a substitute amendment that required certain discipline of employees found to be insider threats 

as well as a modified technical amendment. The technical amendment replaced the term ‘‘adjudicatory authority’’ with ‘‘appropriate 

entity.’’ Senator Claire McCaskill offered an amendment to clarify 

that nothing in this act would change existing whistleblower protections for Federal employees that are accused of being insider 

threats. 

The Committee adopted both the Johnson amendments and the 

McCaskill amendment, and ordered the act, as amended, reported 

favorably, en bloc by voice vote. Senators present for the vote on 

the amendments and the vote on the amended act were: Johnson, 

McCain, Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, 

McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE ACT, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the act’s short title, the ‘‘Department of 

Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2016.’’ 

Section 2. Establishment of the Insider Threat Program 

This section establishes DHS’s Insider Threat Program. 


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Subsection (a) requires the Secretary of DHS to establish a robust, centralized ITP within the Department. The ITP shall provide 

Department employee training and education related to insider 

threats to the Department’s critical assets, allow the Department 

to investigate such threats, and standardize risk mitigation of such 

threats. 

Subsection (b) creates a Steering Committee to manage Department-wide activities related to insider threats to the Department’s 

critical assets. This subsection further identifies the Steering Committee’s membership, frequency of meetings, and responsibilities. 

Due to the multidisciplinary aspect of Department-wide assets, a 

successful DHS ITP must be led by professionals with not only 

counterintelligence but also law enforcement and investigation authorities. For this reason, the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence 

and Analysis and Chief Security Officer shall serve as Chairperson 

and Vice Chairperson of the Steering Committee, respectively. This 

allows for longer retention of records against which system flags 

can be checked. The remaining members of the Steering Committee 

shall be comprised of representatives from other components or offices of the Department identified by the risk assessment as appropriate stakeholders. This ensures that components or offices with 

information, networks, or facilities at risk of insider threat activities participate in the program. 

The Steering Committee shall meet on a regular basis to discuss 

cases and issues related to insider threats to the Department’s critical assets. This subsection also identifies the Steering Committee’s 

responsibilities. 

Subsection (c) details the procedure to be followed when an insider threat is discovered. The head of an agency exploited by an 

insider threat is required to propose an adverse action against an 

employee engaged in insider misconduct that is not less than a 12- 

day suspension, with respect to the first instance; and removal, for 

any subsequent instance. That employee receives written notice 

and an opportunity to refute the accusation. 

An employee can face multiple adverse actions for the same incident of insider misconduct if another provision of law applies. 

Subsection (d) requires the Secretary of DHS to report to Congress on the status of Department-wide insider threat strategy implementation; the status of the Department’s critical asset insider 

threat risk assessment; the types of training the Department conducts as part of the ITP; the number of Department employees 

trained through the ITP; and analysis determining whether the 

program effectively protects the Department’s critical assets from 

insider threats. 

Subsection (e) clarifies that the act does not change existing 

whistleblower protections for Federal employees that are accused of 

being insider threats. 

Subsection (f) provides definitions for the following terms: ‘‘appropriate entity,’’ ‘‘critical assets,’’ ‘‘employee,’’ ‘‘insider,’’ ‘‘insider 

employee,’’ ‘‘insider misconduct,’’ ‘‘insider threat,’’ and ‘‘steering 

committee.’’ 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 


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the regulatory impact of this act and determined that the act will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that H.R. 3361 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

MARCH 21, 2016. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3361, the Department of 

Homeland Security Insider Threat and Mitigation Act of 2016. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 3361—Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and 

Mitigation Act of 2016 

H.R. 3361 would direct the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) to establish a program to protect the department’s critical 

assets from insider threats (that is, harmful activities by department employees and certain other persons with access to classified 

information). DHS is currently carrying out activities similar to 

those required by the act; thus, CBO estimates that implementing 

H.R. 3361 would not significantly affect spending by DHS. Because 

enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase 

net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

H.R. 3361 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

On October 23, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 

3361, the Department of Homeland Security Insider Threat and 

Mitigation Act of 2015, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Homeland Security on September 30, 2015. The two 

versions of the act are similar and CBO’s estimates of the budgetary effects are the same. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE ACT, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by H.R. 3361 as 

reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 


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is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

* * * * * * * 

Sec. 104. Insider Threat Program 

SEC. 104. INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish an Insider 

Threat Program within the Department, which shall— 

(1) provide training and education for employees of the Department to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to insider 

threat risks to the Department’s critical assets; 

(2) provide investigative support regarding potential insider 

threats that may pose a risk to the Department’s critical assets; 

and 

(3) conduct risk mitigation activities for insider threats. 

(b) STEERING COMMITTEE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.— 

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary shall establish a 

Steering Committee within the Department. 

(B) MEMBERSHIP.—The membership of the Steering Committee shall be as follows: 

(i) The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

shall serve as the Chairperson of the Steering Committee. 

(ii) The Chief Security Officer shall serve as the Vice Chairperson of the Steering Committee. 

(iii) The other members of the Steering Committee shall be 

comprised of representatives of the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office 

of the General Counsel, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties, the Privacy Office, the Office of the Chief Human 

Capital Officer, the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, the 

Federal Protective Service, the Office of the Chief Procurement 

Officer, the Science and Technology Directorate, and other components or offices of the Department, as appropriate. 

(C) MEETINGS.—The members of the Steering Committee 

shall meet on a regular basis to discuss cases and issues 

related to insider threats to the Department’s critical assets, 

in accordance with subsection (a). 

(2) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 

enactment of this section, the Under Secretary for Intelligence 

and Analysis and the Chief Security Officer, in coordination 

with the Steering Committee, shall— 

(A) develop a holistic strategy for Department-wide efforts 

to identify, prevent, mitigate, and respond to insider threats 

to the Department’s critical assets; 


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(B) develop a plan to implement the insider threat measures identified in the strategy developed under subparagraph (A) across the components and offices of the Department; 

(C) document insider threat policies and controls; 

(D) conduct a baseline risk assessment of insider threats 

posed to the Department’s critical assets; 

(E) examine programmatic and technology best practices 

adopted by the Federal Government, industry, and research 

institutions to implement solutions that are validated and 

cost-effective; 

(F) develop a timeline for deploying workplace monitoring technologies, employee awareness campaigns, and 

education and training programs related to identifying, 

preventing, mitigating, and responding to potential insider 

threats to the Department’s critical assets; 

(G) consult with the Under Secretary for Science and 

Technology and other appropriate stakeholders to ensure 

the Insider Threat Program is informed, on an ongoing 

basis, by current information regarding threats, best practices, and available technology; and 

(H) develop, collect, and report metrics on the effectiveness of the Department’s insider threat mitigation efforts. 

(c) DISCIPLINE OF EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN INSIDER MIS- CONDUCT.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In accordance with paragraph (2), the head 

of an agency or a component of an agency employing an insider 

employee shall propose— 

(A) for an insider employee whom an appropriate entity 

determines knowingly or recklessly engaged in insider misconduct, removal; and 

(B) for an insider employee whom an appropriate entity 

determines negligently engaged in insider misconduct— 

(i) an adverse action that is not less than a 12-day 

suspension, with respect to the first instance; and 

(ii) removal, for any subsequent instance. 

(2) PROCEDURES.— (A) NOTICE.—An insider employee against whom an adverse action under paragraph (1) is proposed is entitled to 

written notice. 

(B) ANSWER AND EVIDENCE.— 

(i) IN GENERAL.—An insider employee who is notified 

under subparagraph (A) that the insider employee is 

the subject of a proposed adverse action under paragraph (1) is entitled to 14 days following such notification to answer and furnish evidence in support of the 

answer. 

(ii) NO EVIDENCE.—After the end of the 14-day period 

described in clause (i), if an insider employee does not 

furnish evidence as described in clause (i) or if the 

head of the agency or component of the agency employing the insider employee determines that such evidence 

is not sufficient to reverse the proposed adverse action, 

the head of the agency or component of the agency 

shall carry out the adverse action. 


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(C) SCOPE OF PROCEDURES.—Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) and subsection (c) of section 7513 of title 5, United 

States Code, and paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) and 

subsection (c) of 7543 of title 5, United States Code, shall not 

apply with respect to an adverse action carried out under this 

subsection. 

(3) LIMITATION ON OTHER ADVERSE ACTIONS.—With respect to 

insider misconduct, if the head of the agency or component of 

the agency employing an insider employee carries out an adverse action against the insider employee under another provision of law, the head of the agency or component of the agency 

may carry out an additional adverse action under this subsection based on the same insider misconduct. 

(d) REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 2 years thereafter for the next 4 

years, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs and the Select Committee on Intelligence 

of the Senate a report on— 

(1) how the Department and its components and offices have 

implemented the strategy developed under subsection (b)(2)(A); 

(2) the status of the Department’s risk assessment of critical 

assets; 

(3) the types of insider threat training conducted by the Department; 

(4) the number of employees of the Department who have received such training; and 

(5) information on the effectiveness of the Insider Threat Program, based on metrics under subsection (b)(2)(H). 

(e) PRESERVATION OF MERIT SYSTEM RIGHTS.— 

(1) In general.—The Steering Committee shall not seek to, 

and the authorities provided under this section shall not be 

used to, deter, detect, or mitigate disclosures of information by 

Government employees or contractors that are lawful under and 

protected by section 17(d)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency 

Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 3517(d)(5)) (commonly known as the ‘Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998’), 

chapter 12 or 23 of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector 

General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.), or any other whistleblower 

statute, regulation, or policy. 

(2) IMPLEMENTATION.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Any activity carried out under this section shall be subject to section 115 of the Whistleblower 

Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (5 U.S.C. 2302 note). 

(B) REQUIRED STATEMENT.—Any activity to implement or 

enforce any insider threat activity or authority under this 

section or Executive Order 13587 (50 U.S.C. 3161 note) 

shall include the statement required by section 115 of the 

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (5 

U.S.C. 2302 note) that preserves rights under whistleblower 

laws and section 7211 of title 5, United States Code, protecting communications with Congress. 

(f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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(1) APPROPRIATE ENTITY.—The term ‘appropriate entity’ 

means— 

(A) the head of an agency or a component of an agency; 

(B) an administrative law judge; 

(C) the Merit Systems Protection Board; 

(D) the Office of Special Counsel; 

(E) an adjudicating body provided under a union contract; 

(F) a Federal judge; and 

(G) the Inspector General of the Department. 

(2) CRITICAL ASSETS.—The term ‘critical assets’ means the 

people, facilities, information, and technology required for the 

Department to fulfill its mission. 

(3) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘employee’ means an employee, as 

defined under section 7103(a), of title 5, United States Code. 

(4) INSIDER.—The term ‘insider’ means— 

(A) any person who has access to classified national security information and is employed by, detailed to, or assigned to the Department, including members of the Armed 

Forces, experts or consultants to the Department, industrial 

or commercial contractors, licensees, certificate holders, or 

grantees of the Department, including all subcontractors, 

personal services contractors, or any other category of person who acts for or on behalf of the Department, as determined by the Secretary; or 

(B) State, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector personnel who possess security clearances granted by the Department. 

(5) INSIDER EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘insider employee’ means 

an insider who is an employee. 

(6) INSIDER MISCONDUCT.—The term ‘insider misconduct’ 

means harm to the security of the United States, including 

damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, or 

the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities, through use of authorized access by an 

insider employee. 

(7) INSIDER THREAT.—The term ‘insider threat’ means the 

threat that an insider will use the authorized access of the insider, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the 

United States, including damage to the United States through 

espionage, terrorism, or the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities. 

(8) STEERING COMMITTEE.—The term ‘Steering Committee’ 

means the Steering Committee established under subsection 

(b)(1)(A). 

* * * * * * * 

Æ 


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