# Laos - United States Department of State

- Laos HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Laos				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Laos																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Laos during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government officials; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners; transnational repression against individuals in another country; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence against journalists, censorship, and the use of criminal defamation laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; refoulement of refugees to a country where it was believed they would face torture or persecution; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and child, early, and forced marriage; crimes involving violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and prohibiting independent trade unions.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Reports of human rights abuses, primarily involving forced or compulsory labor, by foreign investors (notably Chinese state-owned and private firms) were increasingly common.  These entities often operated in autonomous Special Economic Zones; some had links to transnational organized criminal actors.  Authorities generally did not investigate or prosecute such abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, of human rights defenders.  A former Lao activist who migrated to Thailand and was recognized formally as a refugee by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Bounsuan Kitiyano, was found shot to death on a roadside in Ubon Ratchathani Province on May 17.  Multiple social media commentators maintained that the Laotian government was complicit.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.  Observers noted, however, that the government made no effort to investigate or punish perpetrators of previous disappearances, such as those of Phetphouthon Philachanh in 2019 or of Sombath Somphone in 2012.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited such practices, yet there were credible reports that government officials employed them, including reports of mistreatment of prisoners and detainees.Impunity reportedly remained a problem.  The Ministry of Public Security’s Inspection Department allowed the public to submit written complaints via its website or through complaint boxes maintained throughout most of the country.  Observers noted the website was cumbersome to use; statistics on the utilization of the website and boxes were not available.  There was no known official body that investigated abuses by security forces.  There were no known cases against officials accused of abuses.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison and detention facility conditions varied widely and in some prisons were harsh and life threatening due to food shortages, gross overcrowding, physical abuse, and inadequate medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Prison cells were small, with beds no wider than 20 inches placed on the floor, often taking up all floor space to fit as many prisoners as possible.Generally, prisons did not provide adequate food, and families and friends of prisoners had to supplement prison rations.Although most prisons had a clinic, usually with a doctor or nurse on staff, medical facilities and care were usually deficient.  Prisoners had access only to basic medical care, and treatment for serious ailments was unavailable.Administration:  Regulations required authorities to permit prisoners and detainees to submit complaints to judicial authorities and to request investigation of credible allegations of problematic conditions.  There were no reports of such requests, possibly due to prisoners’ fears of exacerbating poor detention conditions, because the process was too lengthy to be effective, and because officials were uncooperative in facilitating the requests and sometimes demanded bribes to move the process forward.  In some cases, prisoners and detainees shared complaints with family and friends who reported the problems to their representatives in the National Assembly when it was in session, hoping their representative would question relevant authorities regarding the complaints.Independent Monitoring:  Government officials did not permit regular independent monitoring of prison conditions.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The law provided protection for individuals against arbitrary arrest and detention, but some government officials did not respect these provisions, and arbitrary arrest and detention persisted.  The law promised detainees the right to a prompt judicial determination of the legality of their detention, but this was not consistently observed.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Police, military forces, and the Department of Customs had arrest powers, although generally, only police exercised them.  The law required authorities to notify detainees of the charges against them and inform next of kin within 24 hours of arrest, but this did not always occur, especially in rural areas.  The law allowed detainees to be held for up to two months during an investigation period before announcing charges formally; this period could be extended for up to one year.  There was a bail system, but authorities implemented it arbitrarily.  The law provided detained, arrested, or jailed persons the right to legal representation upon request; however, authorities generally did not allow lawyers access to detainees until the investigation concluded and the case was passed to the prosecutor’s office.  The lack of access to detainees led observers to conclude some suspects were detained incommunicado.Arbitrary Arrest:  Police continued to exercise wide latitude in making arrests, relying on a provision of the law that permitted warrantless arrests in urgent cases.  At times authorities detained prisoners who had completed their sentences, particularly if they were unable to pay court fines.Savang Phaleuth, a Lao activist based in Thailand, was detained incommunicado from April until June in Savannakhet Province after returning to visit family in Laos.  Officials stated he was arrested for holding dual nationality, but observers reported his detention was due to his political campaign work.  He was allowed to return to Thailand after his release.Pretrial Detention:  Pretrial detention was a problem due to limited judicial capacity to bring cases to trial in a timely fashion, as well as official malfeasance.  Observers reported officials in some cases took bribes to shorten or lengthen pretrial detentions.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution and law subordinated the judiciary to the ruling party.  Moreover, corruption and judicial action outside the law continued with impunity.  Some judges reportedly accepted bribes; others reportedly decided guilt or innocence in advance of trials, basing their decisions on police or prosecutorial investigation reports.  Most defendants chose not to have attorneys or trained representatives due to the general perception that attorneys could not influence court decisions.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial, although the judiciary seldom upheld these rights.  The law required authorities to inform persons of their rights, but defendants did not have a legal right to know promptly, or in detail, the charges against them.  Trials were public, except for those involving certain types of family law or children younger than 16 or cases related to national security or state secrets.A lack of qualified lawyers and lawyers’ occasional unwillingness to work on sensitive cases due to fear of retaliation undermined the right to counsel, in addition to the widespread belief that having a lawyer served no purpose.  Authorities provided defense attorneys at government expense only in cases involving children, cases likely to result in life imprisonment or the death penalty, and cases considered particularly complicated, such as those involving foreigners.  There was no legal right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense.The government charged a fee for interpreters for defendants who could not communicate in the Lao language.Most trials were largely pro forma examinations of the accused and reviews of the evidence.  Although according to the law defendants had the right to question and present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf, a defense attorney’s role was limited in most trials to such actions as asking the court for leniency in sentencing or appealing a technical matter, rather than arguing the merits of the case, challenging evidence, or mounting a true defense.  Defendants could refuse to testify, although authorities reportedly imposed harsher penalties on defendants who did not cooperate.There was no right of appeal.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						Human rights experts said the country had at least four political prisoners.  Three of them (Somphone Phimmasone, Soukan Chaithad, and Lodkham Thammavong) were convicted and sentenced in 2017 on multiple charges including treason, propaganda against the state, and gatherings aimed at causing social disorder.  The fourth (Houayheuang “Muay” Xayabouly) was arrested in 2019 and pleaded guilty to charges of defaming the country when she criticized the government’s response to flooding in Champasak and Salavan Provinces on Facebook, after using social media previously to criticize graft and greed among government officials.The government did not permit access to these prisoners by human rights or humanitarian organizations.																										f. Transnational Repression										Extraterritorial Killing, Kidnapping, Forced Returns, or Other Violence or Threats of Violence:  The government was alleged to have killed or kidnapped individuals in other countries for politically motivated reprisal.  The whereabouts of Od Sayavong, a Lao prodemocracy activist and refugee recognized by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees living in Thailand who disappeared in 2019, remained unknown.Threats, Harassment, Surveillance, and Coercion:  The government allegedly harassed individuals in other countries for political reasons.  A self-exiled online activist, Joseph Akaravong, who gained attention for reporting on the government’s mishandling of a 2018 dam collapse in Attapeu Province, fled to Thailand and then to France due to harassment by Lao and Thai authorities.  Since his 2022 arrival in France, observers reported continued harassment by Lao authorities trying to limit his online criticism of the government by removing content from his social media profile and deactivating his account.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The government continued to relocate villagers to accommodate development projects.  Families frequently reported the government displaced them without proportionate and timely compensation.  In Khong District, Champasak Province, only 35 of 235 families were compensated as of November after the government took their land in 2022 to accommodate Chinese investors planning to build a large-scale tourism development project in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ).  Those families compensated received approximately 370 million kip ($17,800) each but lost access to productive agricultural land and, therefore, their livelihoods.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, yet there were reports that the government failed to respect these prohibitions.The Ministry of Public Security monitored citizens’ activities through a surveillance network that included secret police.  A police auxiliary program in urban and rural areas, operating under individual village chiefs and local police, shared responsibility for maintaining public order and reported “undesirable” persons to police.  Members of organizations affiliated with the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), including the Lao Women’s Union, the Lao Youth Union, and the Lao Front for National Development, also monitored citizens.While the law allowed cohabitation, in some rural areas authorities fined unmarried couples found living together.The law allowed citizens to marry foreigners only with prior government approval.  Authorities could annul such marriages entered without approval, with both parties subject to arrest and fines.  The government normally granted such permission, but the process was lengthy and burdensome, offering officials opportunities to solicit bribes.  Premarital cohabitation with foreigners was illegal, although rarely prosecuted.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The law provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the government severely restricted this right through violence, intimidation, indirect censorship, control of the media, criminal defamation laws, and national security laws invoked to deter or punish criticism of the government.Freedom of Expression:  The law forbade slandering the state, distorting party or state policies, inciting disorder, or propagating information or opinions that weakened the state; taken together, these severely restricted the ability of citizens to discuss matters of public interest.The Ministry of Education tightly controlled school curricula, including in private schools and colleges, as well as opportunities for citizens to study abroad.  Both citizen and noncitizen academic professionals conducting research in the country could be subject to restrictions on access to information and publication.Violence and Harassment:  On April 29, an online commentator and activist who contributed to social media platforms critical of the government, Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom, was shot in the face and chest by an unknown gunman in a coffee shop.  The government did not investigate or prosecute the perpetrator of this attack.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  The state owned and controlled most domestic print and electronic media and closely controlled domestic television and radio broadcasts.  Officials reviewed all articles in privately owned newspapers and periodicals after publication and by law could penalize those whose articles did not meet government approval.  Publishers and journalists were generally aware of what content the government would approve for publication and practiced self-censorship.Libel/Slander Laws:  Defamation was a criminal offense and the laws were used.National Security:  Authorities cited laws protecting national security to deter or punish criticism of the government.																Internet Freedom						The law prohibited online anonymity and the government, which controlled domestic internet servers, sporadically monitored internet usage.  The government also reportedly operated a task force to monitor social media use specifically, including what it considered “fake news.”  The law prohibited deceptive statements on the internet as well as statements critical of the government and the LPRP.The Ministry of Technology and Communications could direct internet service providers to terminate internet services of users found violating the law.  Ministry instructions warned social media users could not post content or comments that contained criticism of the government.  Observers who reported articles or made comments on articles critical of the government suddenly disappeared from social media sites.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law did not provide for the freedom of peaceful assembly and prohibited participation in demonstrations, protest marches, or other acts that “cause turmoil or social instability,” without explicit government permission.  Nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives were denied government approval to host the Association of Southeast Asian Nations People’s Forum, which would have brought together more than 200 participants to discuss human rights in 2024.						Freedom of Association						The law tightly restricted freedom of association.  Political groups other than organizations approved by the LPRP were prohibited.  NGOs were restricted by onerous registration processes and reporting requirements.  The government occasionally influenced board membership of NGOs and forced some organizations to change their names to remove words it deemed sensitive, such as “rights.”Authorities restricted NGOs’ ability to disseminate information and conduct activities.  NGOs were required to obtain Ministry of Foreign Affairs approval to receive foreign funding greater than 500 million kip ($24,000).  NGOs also had to accept “advice and assistance” from the government to ensure their operations were in line with party policy and the law.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights with significant exceptions.In-country Movement:  On domestic flights, all travelers were subject to inspection by immigration officials, who ran a systems check before travelers were allowed to proceed to boarding.Citizens traveling for religious purposes, including to minister, give advice, or visit other religious communities, were required to seek permission from central, provincial, district, and village authorities depending on where they were traveling, a process that could take several weeks.  Christian groups reported problems obtaining permission to travel within the country, although many ignored the permit requirement.All residents had to have approval from the government to change their residence.Foreign Travel:  There were restrictions on foreign travel.  Citizens desiring to travel internationally for religious purposes had to obtain permission from the government.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of concern, except in two notable cases.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, but the government had no system for providing protection to refugees.  The Ministry of Public Security did not routinely grant asylum or refugee status, but dealt with individuals on a case-by-case basis.Refoulement:  The government returned at least two Chinese asylum seekers, free-speech activist Qiao Xinxin (born Yang Zewei) and human rights lawyer Lu Siwei, to China, where they could face abuse or torture.  During a raid by Chinese and Lao security officials in early June, Qiao Xinxin was reportedly taken from his apartment in Vientiane, where he had been living with a legal residence permit.  In August, his family reported that he was being held at a detention center in Hunan Province, China.  Lu Siwei was detained by Lao authorities in July when attempting to transit into Thailand with the ultimate goal of reuniting with his family in the United States.  He was returned to China in mid- to late-September, held at a detention center in Sichuan Province on charges related to violating his exit ban, and released on bail, pending trial, on October 28, according to media reports.  Observers reported Chinese authorities pressured the Lao government to return these individuals.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										The absence of comprehensive and timely monitoring by international organizations and independent observers made it difficult to verify the number and condition of internally displaced persons; their situation, protection, and reintegration; government restrictions on them; and their access to basic services and assistance.In July, media reported the presumed final round of compensation to the victims of a 2018 dam collapse was delayed.  Many of the estimated 6,000 persons made homeless remained inadequately housed and without their livelihoods.  Reconstruction efforts and compensation plans were significantly hampered by alleged corruption and lack of consultation with survivors.  Human rights observers reported that approximately 70 percent of the 1.9 trillion kip ($91 million) provided by the dam operator for compensation was paid directly to the government, ostensibly to be used for rebuilding infrastructure, utilities, schools, and medical facilities.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law did not provide citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  The 2021 National Assembly elections were neither fair nor free of abuses and irregularities, according to observers.  Of the 164 members elected, 158 were LPRP members; six identified as independent.  The National Election Committee was appointed by the National Assembly to manage the elections; its activities were not transparent.  The government prohibited independent observers from monitoring polling stations, claiming this was due to COVID-19 health restrictions.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Although the constitution outlined a system comprising executive, legislative, and judicial branches, the constitution granted the LPRP control of the state and leadership in all branches and at all levels.  The formation of other political parties was illegal.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  Women faced barriers to political participation, including limited access to justice and economic opportunities, and therefore their leadership roles were limited, especially in rural areas.  Of the population, 80 percent lived in rural areas where the village chief and council handled most routine matters, and fewer than 3 percent of village chiefs were women.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials; the government generally did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption:  Official corruption was widespread at all levels of government.  Observers reported poor fiscal and economic conditions exacerbated the problem.  Corruption was particularly problematic in government development and investment projects, especially those involving construction, natural resource extraction, and in the development of certain SEZs.  Most offenders enjoyed impunity.Observers reported the June 2022 removal of the former governor of the central bank for alleged corruption exemplified this impunity.  He was reassigned as a minister to the Prime Minister’s Office and faced no punishment.  In October, 55 party members in Huaphan Province were cited for corruption after a targeted inspection of five provincial government agencies.  Punishments for these officials varied widely but were generally not rigorous; only 16 were formally removed from office.The government anti-corruption hotline reportedly was used often, and members of the public frequently reported government officials’ inappropriate or suspicious activities on social media; such postings were generally not censored or removed.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Domestic and international human rights groups could operate only under government oversight, and the government restricted their ability to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings.  Government officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to the views of these groups.The government maintained human rights dialogues with some foreign governments and continued to receive training in UN human rights conventions from international donors.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders:  NGOs and individual human rights defenders generally exercised self-censorship, particularly after the 2012 disappearance of an internationally respected civil society advocate.  NGOs also acknowledged avoiding saying anything that might delay government approvals needed to carry out their work.During the year, there were five known cases of retribution against human rights defenders, of whom three were Lao and two Chinese; the cases of Savang Phaleuth, Bounsuan Kitiyano, Anousa “Jack” Luangsuphom, Qiao Xinxin, and Lu Siwei were reported in detail above.  Observers noted a “chilling effect” on civil society in the wake of these five cases.The United Nations or Other International Bodies:  The government did not permit visits by UN special rapporteurs.  There were at least six pending visit requests by UN special rapporteurs that the government did not allow.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The government continued to support a National Committee on Human Rights, chaired by the deputy prime minister, who also held the position of foreign minister, and composed of representatives from the government, National Assembly, judiciary, and LPRP-affiliated organizations.  The Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acted as the secretariat for the National Human Rights Steering Committee and had authority to review and highlight problems in the protection of human rights.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law criminalized rape of “a person” and provided penalties of four years to life imprisonment; there was no law against spousal rape.  Sentences were significantly longer and could include life imprisonment if the survivor was younger than 18 or was seriously injured or killed.Domestic violence was illegal but often went unreported due to social stigma.  Penalties included both fines and imprisonment, but the law granted exemption from penal liabilities in cases of physical violence without serious injury.The government did not effectively enforce laws on rape and domestic violence.  Observers reported gender-based violence in rural areas was rarely investigated.  The Lao Women’s Union and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, in cooperation with NGOs, assisted victims of domestic violence by operating shelters, providing a hotline telephone number, and employing counselors.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law did not criminalize sexual harassment, but indecent sexual behavior toward another person was deemed illegal and was punishable by six months to three years in prison.  Survivors rarely reported sexual harassment, and its prevalence remained difficult to assess.Discrimination:  The law prohibited direct or indirect discrimination by employers against employees based on sex, provided equal rights for women and men, including equal pay for equal work, although a gender wage gap persisted, and prohibited discrimination in marriage and inheritance.  The law prohibited the employment of pregnant women and new mothers in occupations deemed hazardous to women’s reproductive health and required the transfer of women working in such jobs to less demanding positions, without a wage or salary reduction.  The law prohibited discrimination in hiring based on a woman’s marital status or pregnancy and protected women against dismissal on these grounds.The government did not enforce the law effectively.  In some regions, discriminatory attitudes regarding gender roles kept women and girls in subordinate positions and denied them equal access to education, employment, and business opportunities.  Varying degrees of culture-based discrimination against women persisted, with greater discrimination practiced by some ethnic minority groups in remote areas.Many women occupied decision-making positions in the civil service and private business, and in urban areas their incomes were frequently higher than those of men.  Poverty and economic hardship continued to affect women disproportionately, especially in rural and ethnic minority communities.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.The UN Population Fund reported that information on and access to sexual and reproductive health services were limited, especially for unmarried youth.  Social and cultural barriers and a lack of information restricted access to contraception.  Access to contraceptive means was also limited in rural areas; they were generally available only in provincial, not village, health centers and were often unaffordable.The government provided limited access to sexual and reproductive health services to survivors of sexual violence, including access to emergency contraceptives and postexposure prophylaxis, but such services were not widely available.According to the most recent UN estimates, in 2017 the maternal mortality rate was 185 deaths per 100,000 live births.  Pregnancy and childbirth remained leading causes of death among women of reproductive age due to limited prenatal and obstetric care and services as well as high rates of adolescent pregnancy, especially in rural areas.  According to the UN Population Fund, very few medical centers were equipped to deal with obstetric emergencies, especially in small or ethnic minority villages.  The adolescent birth rate remained high at 83 births per 1,000 girls between ages 15 and 19, largely due to lack of access to contraception.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law provided for equal rights among all national, racial, and ethnic groups and barred discrimination against them, including in employment.  The government did not enforce these laws effectively; societal and governmental discrimination persisted against minority ethnic groups.The country was home to many different ethnic groups; most did not consider themselves Indigenous.  The Hmong were one of the largest and most prominent of the 50 officially recognized ethnic groups in the country.  Hmong officials served in senior ranks of government and the LPRP.  Amnestied former Hmong insurgents were subject to official suspicion and scrutiny, and government leadership remained suspicious of the political objectives of some Hmong.Critics continued to charge that the government’s resettlement program for ending slash-and-burn agriculture adversely affected ethnic minority groups, particularly in the north.  Some minority groups not involved in resettlement, notably those in remote locations, maintained they had little voice in government decisions affecting their lands and the allocation of natural resources from their areas.																																				Children										Birth Registration:  Birth registration was available through village chiefs for children born in remote areas, but some parents did not register births immediately.  Lack of birth registration could result in denial of access to health care or education in more developed areas but was rarely a problem in rural or remote areas.  If parents failed to register a child at birth, they could request to add the child to the family registration book later.Education:  There were significant differences among ethnic groups in educational opportunities available to children.  Instruction was not offered in any language other than Lao, which discouraged ethnic minority children from attending school.  To increase elementary school attendance by ethnic minority children from remote locations, the government continued to support the establishment of boarding schools in rural areas countrywide.Child Abuse:  The law prohibited violence against children, and offenders were subject to re-education programs and unspecified penal measures in more serious cases.  There were no reports of cases brought to court under this law.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage was 18, but the law allowed marriage as young as 15 with parental consent.  No reliable recent data existed, but observers believed underage marriage to be a problem, particularly among certain ethnic minority groups and in poor rural areas.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  There was no legal age of consent for engaging in consensual sex.  In cases involving children, the law distinguished between possible consensual sex and rape and could impose penalties of between three and 20 years’ imprisonment depending on the ages of the survivor and the perpetrator.  The penalty for possession of child pornography was three months to one year of imprisonment; the penalty for the dissemination of such material was one to three years of imprisonment.  Authorities enforced the law.  The country was a destination for child sex tourism.  The government continued efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex through periodic raids and training workshops.																																				Antisemitism										There was no significant Jewish community in the country, and there were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.  There were no reports that seemingly neutral laws were disproportionately applied to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) persons.Violence and Harassment:  Security officials tolerated acts of violence against LGBTQI+ individuals.  In September, media reported a gay couple were killed in their home; however, following an investigation, authorities reported the killing occurred during a home robbery, rejecting any motive related to the sexual orientation of the victims.  Observers said societal stigma and concern regarding repercussions, such as harassment or loss of employment, led LGBTQI+ individuals to refrain from reporting incidents of abuse.Discrimination:  The law did not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics.  Societal discrimination in employment and housing reportedly persisted; there were no government efforts to address it.  Local activists said most openly LGBTQI+ persons did not apply for government or high-level private-sector jobs because there was tacit recognition that employers would not hire them.  Participants in focus group discussions described being denied interviews based on their appearance and a perception that they were members of the LGBTQI+ community.LGBTQI+ advocates said that while the country still had a conservative and traditional society, gay and lesbian persons were becoming more integrated, although the transgender population continued to face high levels of societal stigma and discrimination both at home and in the workplace.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Individuals were not able to change their gender identity marker on legal and government identification documents.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  There were no known reports of such practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There were no legal impediments specific to organized LGBTQI+ groups or activities, but local activists reported they did not attempt to hold activities they believed the government would deem sensitive or controversial.  In June, authorities refused to allow a planned awareness raising event to celebrate the International Day against Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Persons with disabilities could not access education, employment, health services, public buildings, or transportation on an equal basis with others.  Advocates for persons with disabilities said the law broadly defined the rights of such persons but did not indicate how outcomes such as accessible facilities and public transportation or increased employment opportunities could be achieved.  The law required construction projects to provide accessibility for persons with disabilities, particularly to buildings and public transportation services.Little information was available regarding discrimination in the workplace, although persons with disabilities reported it was difficult sometimes to access basic services and obtain employment.  Participants in focus group discussions described being denied interviews based on a perception that they were persons with disabilities.The government continued to implement its strategic plan to protect the rights of children with disabilities and enable them to study alongside other children in schools countrywide; however, children with disabilities attended school at significantly lower rates than other children, especially in rural areas.  The nongovernmental Lao Disabled People’s Association noted that in many cases students with disabilities lacked access to appropriate educational resources.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law permitted workers to form and join unions, but only within the framework of government control.  The government recognized only the Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), an organ of the LPRP.  There were no independent unions, and no legal means to establish them.  The law defined collective bargaining but did not set out conditions, and it required the approval of all collective bargaining agreements by the Labor Administration Agency.  The law did not provide for the right to strike and forbade striking during mediation of labor disputes.  The law did not address the legality of a strike if mediation or other legal mechanisms were unsuccessful.  The law did not permit police or members of the armed forces to form or join unions.  The law did not prohibit antiunion discrimination.The law allowed workers in the informal economy and self-employed workers to join LFTU-affiliated unions.  It also established rights and responsibilities for “laborer representatives,” which the law defined as “an individual or legal entity selected by the workers and laborers in labor units to be a representative to protect their legitimate rights and interest.”A dual system of representation effectively ensured government control over union activity.  The law required LFTU representation in all workplaces employing 10 or more workers.  Laborers who served as representatives of the LFTU were known as “grassroots representatives.”  The LFTU also employed district and provincial representatives, on government payroll, to train and organize the workplace (grassroots) representatives.  Both government-employed LFTU representatives and workplace (grassroots) representatives bargained collectively with employers on relevant matters.Given total government control of union activity, there were no reports of government enforcement of laws on their establishment or operation.  Labor-related NGOs did not attempt activities they believed would be restricted by the government.  The latter did support international labor-related NGO public affairs campaigns regarding workers’ rights to safety, fair pay, and representation.Penalties for violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining were less than those for other laws involving civil rights violations and were never applied against violators.Common employer practices that limited or violated worker rights included requiring employees to meet with LFTU representatives only during nonwork hours and offering bribes to LFTU staff to avoid interruptions to the workday.To obtain LFTU representation in a labor dispute, the grassroots representative in the enterprise had to first raise the issue with her or his supervisor and employer.  If this failed to resolve the dispute, district and provincial level LFTU officials could come to the workers’ aid.  Labor disputes were reportedly infrequent, and workers’ engagement with LFTU officials outside the workplace was rare.  The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare generally did not enforce the dispute resolution section of the labor law, especially in dealings with joint ventures in the private sector.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited all of the worst forms of child labor.  The law set the minimum age for employment at 14 and limited working hours to a maximum of eight per day, provided such work was not dangerous or difficult.  The law, however, also allowed children ages 12 to 14 to perform light work that did not affect their health or school attendance.  The law applied only to work undertaken in a formal labor relationship, not to self-employment or informal work.The government did not effectively enforce the applicable laws, reportedly due to a lack of inspectors.  Penalties of imprisonment and fines were less than those for analogous crimes and were rarely applied against violators.Child labor in the informal economy was prevalent throughout the country, mostly associated with family subsistence farming.There were no confirmed reports of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws:  The law set a minimum wage for some employees in the private sector, but it was below the official estimate of the poverty income level, and increases to the minimum wage did not keep pace with inflation.The law limited the workweek to 48 hours (36 hours for employment in dangerous activities).  The law limited overtime to 45 hours per month, and each period of overtime to no more than three hours.  Employers were allowed to apply to the government for an exception to the overtime rules, which the law stipulated workers or their representatives also had to approve.  Overtime pay was rarely granted.Alleged violations of wage and hour laws were common for some piecework employees, especially on construction sites, in small factories and microenterprises, who earned less than the minimum wage, and for workers in some SEZs, who were paid only 50 percent of the minimum wage.Occupational Safety and Health:  Occupational safety and health (OSH) standards existed and were appropriate for the main industries.  The law provided for higher compensation for dangerous work, but did not protect the right of workers to remove themselves from a hazardous situation.The law mandated extensive employer responsibility for workers who became disabled at work.  In case of injury or death on the job, employers were responsible for compensating the worker or the worker’s family.  The law also required employers to report to the government accidents that caused major injury or death, or required an employee to take four or more days off work to recover.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws, but did not effectively do so.  The law did not stipulate penalties for specific violations, but it stated that they could include warnings, fines, “re-education,” or suspension of a business license.  Penalties were less than those for similar crimes, such as fraud, and were never applied against violators.The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare’s Department of Labor Management was responsible for workplace inspections.  The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance.  Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.  The government partnered with international labor-related and other NGOs on “Know Your Rights” print and press campaigns as well as some radio advertisements.Both Lao workers and undocumented migrant workers from neighboring countries such as Vietnam, China, and Burma worked informally in the construction, logging, mining, online marketing, and agricultural sectors where wage and OSH violations were common.  The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare reported it was difficult for authorities to collect accurate data on workers inside some of the country’s SEZs.  Most SEZ by-laws permitted some relaxation of labor laws but not outright dismissal, although labor laws were rarely enforced either within or outside of SEZs.In January, the International Labor Organization estimated more than 83 percent of workers were employed in the informal sector, mainly in agriculture, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and household domestic work.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Laos
- Lao New Year 2024 Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I wish everyone in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic a happy, healthy, and prosperous Lao New Year.As you celebrate this special holiday, the United States looks forward to advancing our comprehensive partnership and working closely with Laos in support of its ASEAN chair year.  There is a great deal that unites us, including our shared desire to advance development objectives, economic growth, public health, and people-to-people ties.  Our commitment to growing a strong, peaceful, and secure future for our two countries, as well as for the larger Indo-Pacific region, remains as steadfast as ever.To everyone in Laos and to the Laotian American community in the United States: Congratulations on Lao New Year and enjoy the many celebrations ahead &#8212; Sok Di Pi Mai.
- Special Advisor on International Disability Rights Minkara’s Travel to Sri Lanka, Nepal, Laos, and Singapore Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Special Advisor on International Disability Rights (SAIDR) Sara Minkara traveled to Sri Lanka, Nepal, Laos, and Singapore from March 6 to 23 to engage with host government officials, civil society, and veterans with disabilities on how to integrate disability rights issues across government, industry, and society.In Sri Lanka, SAIDR Minkara met with government officials and civil society to learn about efforts to enhance physical accessibility and political participation for Sri Lankans with disabilities. She also met with demining personnel with disabilities to highlight the benefits of greater disability inclusion in recovery and reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of the Sri Lankan Civil War.In Nepal, she discussed accessible tourism with Nepalese tourism companies and expanding persons with disabilities’ access to legal protections with host government officials. She also gave remarks during a wheelchair marathon, where she emphasized the importance of sports in creating a community for persons with disabilities.In Singapore, she encouraged greater capacity-building ahead of the upcoming meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministers Responsible for Trade and the APEC Women and Economy Forum in Arequipa in May, building on discussions from when the United States chaired the forum last year.In Laos, she supported the government’s leadership to drive further integration of disability-inclusive policies during its host year of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
- Former Teacher Pleads Guilty to Sexually Exploiting Children in Laos For Immediate Release – December 20, 2023Click here to read more about this&nbsp;
- Laos National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I extend my best wishes to the people of Laos on the 48th anniversary of the founding of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.The United States looks forward to continuing its work with the Lao government to grow our relationship and support the Lao upcoming ASEAN chair year. We will continue to build strong ties through increased people-to-people exchanges, support for Laos’s development objectives, and further expansion of our U.S.-Lao PDR Comprehensive Partnership.The vibrant Lao-American community in the United States contributes to these efforts, as we seek to build a more prosperous, peaceful, and secure Indo-Pacific region. Congratulations to all in Laos on your National Day.
- Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs Russo Travels to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos																																		Media Note																														November 29, 2023																																							Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs William Russo will travel to Belgium, Brunei, Thailand, and Laos from November 29 to December 8, 2023.&nbsp; His trip will prioritize working with U.S. embassies on policy and messaging priorities and engaging with partners in the information space.&nbsp; Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with government officials, local and international media outlets, students, journalists, non-governmental organizations, and U.S. embassy staff.&nbsp;In Belgium, Assistant Secretary Russo will be the Head of Delegation for the United States to the 2023 NATO Senior Communicators Conference.&nbsp; This conference will focus on the challenge of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference and discuss Alliance communications efforts and messaging related to the NATO Washington Summit to be held in July 2024. &nbsp;While there, he will meet with several counterparts among our NATO Allies, in addition to engaging with tri-mission staff.&nbsp;&nbsp;In Brunei, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Bruneian officials, including the Minster of Primary Resources and Tourism. &nbsp;He will also speak with alumni of U.S. exchange programs and Bruneian journalists as we prepare to commemorate the 40th anniversary of U.S.-Brunei diplomatic relations in 2024.&nbsp;In Thailand, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Thai government officials, visit the Asia Pacific Media Hub, and meet with embassy staff. &nbsp;He will also speak with&nbsp;journalists and media partners to discuss modern communications and the media environment. &nbsp;&nbsp;In Laos, Assistant Secretary Russo will meet with Lao PDR officials and visit the embassy. &nbsp;He will also engage with journalists and media contacts to discuss the Lao PDR government’s plans and media preparations and support for the 2024 ASEAN Chair Year, as well as modern strategic communications and countering disinformation.&nbsp;Follow along on Twitter/X at @GPA_AS for more updates from the trip.&nbsp;						Tags																					Belgium																								Brunei																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs																								Bureau of Global Public Affairs																																Disinformation																																							Embassies and Consulates																															Laos																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Thailand
- United States Ambassador-at-Large Cindy Dyer’s Travel to Laos Office of the SpokespersonU.S. Ambassador-at-Large to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Ambassador Dyer, will travel to Laos on November 12-15 to discuss Laos’ anti-trafficking efforts and build understanding on anti-trafficking infrastructure with a wide range of government and civil society stakeholders.Ambassador Dyer will address the 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report and advocate for progress in the most critical areas, including improved provision of services to vulnerable populations such as men and boys and LGBTQI+ persons, and increased identification of cyber scam operation victims as human trafficking victims.  She will meet with senior Lao PDR officials including those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; National Committee on Anti-Trafficking in Persons; and the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor (OSPP).  Ambassador Dyer will also participate in discussions with anti-trafficking civil society organizations, including first responder organizations, legal experts, and service providers.Learn more about the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons or follow the office on Twitter , Facebook , and Instagram .  Read Understanding Human Trafficking to learn more about trafficking in persons.For additional information, contact the Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons at TIPOutreach@state.gov.
- Digital Press Briefing with David M. Turk, U.S. Department of Energy David M. Turk, Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of EnergyMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with David M. Turk, the Deputy Secretary for the U.S. Department of Energy.  Deputy Secretary Turk will provide an overview of his ongoing visit to Bali, Indonesia, and Manila, Philippines, for the third ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting and the United States Exchange and East Asia Summit Energy Ministerial Meetings. With that, let’s get started.  Deputy Secretary Turk, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much, Natalie, and it’s a pleasure to be with you all.  Thanks to all our reporter colleagues who are joining this call.  Just a few thoughts of framing and then happy to take any and all questions as well. As Natalie mentioned, I’m here in Bali for a meeting we just concluded with our ASEAN minister colleagues, between ASEAN and the U.S., and sitting down here in a few minutes with a number of the ministers for bilateral discussions as well, and of course meeting with our Indonesian host, Minister Tasrif, earlier today also.  And then this comes on the – just after a visit to the Philippines earlier this week as well, and really exploring additional bilateral opportunities of cooperation between the U.S. and the Philippines also. In addition, I had a chance not too long ago to visit Thailand and Vietnam and Indonesia again as well, and the reason we are spending – I am spending, we are spending so much time and effort on the region is because as we really step up and implement historic legislation in the U.S. on our clean energy transition – the Inflation Reduction Act, the bipartisan infrastructure legislation, truly groundbreaking efforts in the U.S. to walk the talk and get our own house in order – we also view a core, core part of our overall efforts to engage in partnership with key organizations like ASEAN, and I think ASEAN is an incredibly impactful organization that we are eager to support and to do what we can to help those countries and the ASEAN region more generally achieve its objectives; but also to make sure that if there are things we can be doing internationally, bilaterally, multilaterally, that we do that.  And we have a number of ongoing areas of collaboration with particular countries in the region but also with ASEAN as a group as well.  I’m happy to get into any particulars as there’s interest.  As the U.S. Government, we of course are working on JETP with Indonesia, with Vietnam.  We have our own flagship partnership at the Department of Energy called Net Zero World, where we try to bring terrific, independent, gold-standard technical expertise from our national laboratories – 10 of our national laboratories – to help Indonesia, to help Thailand, to help Singapore, and to help other countries as there’s interest as well, a variety of technical conversations working in particular technology areas; but also trying to help inform policymaking and decision-making as we make progress in the U.S., learn from others, and share examples from our end as well.  And we’re having incredibly fruitful and real-world conversations on that front, and we really try to strive to be a true partner for countries around the world and certainly in ASEAN, of course with our private sector partners as well helping to lead the way. We’re also having a range of conversations on clean energy supply chains and really trying to work with countries so that they benefit not only from the mining of their particular minerals and resources, but try to move up the value chain so that they get more economic benefit from those resources that they’ve been given.  We view that as a win for those countries and those people, assuming the mining and the manufacturing is done responsibly, but also a win for diversification of supply chains and making sure that we all can benefit from these technologies going forward.   So happy to get into any and all of that, and to certainly answer questions.  Back over to you, Natalie, to moderate.   MODERATOR:  Thank you, Deputy Secretary Turk.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  So our first question is from Diep Nguyen Thi Ngoc from BizLIVE in Hanoi, Vietnam.  “What are the obstacles that some Southeast Asian countries face on the way to net zero by 2050?  And what are the deputy secretary&#8217;s recommendations and key points for Southeast Asian countries to achieve the net-zero target?”  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks very much for the question.  And I think the biggest obstacle in terms of not only Southeast Asian countries but all our countries to get to net zero by 2050 and to have a pathway towards decarbonization that’s in line with what science is telling us we need to to avoid even worse consequences of climate change, and it’s clear that all our countries are already experiencing horrific consequences of climate change – just look at what happened in Hawaii not too long ago, but we’ve got droughts, we’ve got extended heat spells, all sorts of more violent typhoons and hurricanes, et cetera, et cetera.  And the biggest obstacle is just the scale and pace of what we need to do: transforming our economies, not just electricity but transportation, manufacturing, building, across the board to truly net zero within just a few decades, a couple decades’ period of time.  It’s already 2023, and not too far from 2024.  So you think of transforming our entire economy to net zero is a huge, huge undertaking, and we’re all part of this transition.   We all need to support each other, we all need to push each other, and we all need to of course have guiderails and incentives for the private sector to really take off and help get us there. So it’s just the scale and pace of what we need to do, and then there’s particular obstacles of course underneath that.   And then to the second part of the question – recommendations for Southeast Asian countries to achieve net-zero targets.  Our approach is to work with countries to try to support their own objectives.  Governments – especially democratically elected governments – represent the people, and it is not our job to question what their duly-elected leaders want for their country.  What we’re doing is, especially for those countries who have ambitious targets, is:  Are there things that we can do to help support the cause along the way?  Whether it’s leveraging our phenomenal national lab expertise in the U.S. that’s helping us on our own transition, but there’s expertise there and sharing back and forth that’s useful, as we support the objectives to all get us to where we need to go. So we’ve certainly heard some phenomenal opportunities and potential for different technologies.  In the Philippines we had some really good conversations on offshore wind – 170 gigawatts of offshore wind potential has been estimated just in the Philippines itself, and there’s huge offshore wind potential in Vietnam and other countries in the region.  Geothermal, solar, including floating solar.  Working on the grids and building out transmission is a shared challenge.  We’ve got that in the U.S. and other countries do as well.   So we’re all trying to move and help support each other along the way.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  The next question goes to Aditya Hadi from The Jakarta Post in Jakarta, and I see your hand is raised.  If you would like to unmute and ask, please go ahead.  Okay.  Yes, go ahead.  Go ahead, Aditya.   QUESTION:  Right, thank you.  Yeah, I just want to raise a question because recently the (inaudible) secretary in Indonesia said that there’s no money left for the – especially for early retirement in all (inaudible) plans, and Indonesia may not hit the target if there is no money or financing available for the country.  I just want to ask how the U.S. and IPG support for the 10 billion pledge in JETP, and is there any punishment for – from you, from the U.S. for the recent proposal of JETP from Indonesia?   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, Aditya, for the question.  And the JETP, which stands for Just Energy Transition Partnership for those who aren’t tracking this closely, is a really innovative way to help support countries like Indonesia, but there are a few other countries around the world as well, in a comprehensive fashion – not just from the U.S. Government side of things, but other key partners around the world as well.  And it’s really trying to join in a true partnership to think, to see what we can bring to the table to help countries like Indonesia to achieve their own objectives in line with what the science tells us we all need to do. I think it’s important to underscore that this is a partnership and there’s a lot of discussion back and forth.  It’s also a long-term partnership.  So there are opportunities and needs in the near term, but this is also trying to think through comprehensively in terms of a comprehensive investment and policy plan and having that back and forth to make sure that we’re doing what’s necessary.   I think important to really underscore the “Just” part of Just Energy Transition Partnership:  This is meant to be a way to support Indonesia and the other countries who are working in the JETP partnership to not only decarbonize, but to do it in a way that has a just transition taking care of communities, taking care of affordability, taking care of energy security, and doing it in a real-world kind of way.   So it’s a very ambitious partnership.  There will be challenges along the way, as there are in any kind of ambitious partnership, and that’s what’s being worked through right now.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And we’ll go to a question from Maki Iwasaki from the Jiji Press news agency in Tokyo, Japan.  “How do you see the role of Japan and other Asian countries in driving the growth of the hydrogen energy industry in the United States?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, well, thanks for the question.  And I don’t think there’s an international meeting that I’ve gone to recently in which the subject of hydrogen and clean hydrogen in particular didn’t come up.  And there’s an awful lot of work being done in a variety of countries around the world.  Certainly want to give a shout-out to Japan, who has been a leader in hydrogen for many, many years.  And we’re certainly trying to do our part to help move along a clean hydrogen economy, not only for the benefit of the U.S. but the benefit of countries around the world to take advantage of this very versatile fuel carrier.  In the U.S. we have a very robust set of incentives to try to move our clean hydrogen economy along.  One of our most generous tax incentives through the Inflation Reduction Act – up to $3 per kilogram for hydrogen production, a production tax credit – is in place and we’re putting together the final rules of that particular tax credit, helping to support Treasury, the U.S. Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service, IRS.   We also have – in the Department of Energy, the department I work for, helps coordinate this directly – is $8 billion, U.S. dollars, in hydrogen hubs to take advantage of existing hydrogen but not clean hydrogen, and industrial clusters to try to build out the hydrogen economy in a very cost-effective kind of way.   So I think there’s a role for the U.S. and U.S. Government and U.S. companies to help support Japanese and other goals on hydrogen, certainly within the ASEAN countries but the region as a whole, and vice versa as well.  And we need to have some standards; we need to have some interoperability.  There’s a great interest in international trade in clean hydrogen, and we have many partnerships to try to move that along as well.  So I think there’s a role in all of us trying to help move this along, of course with key private sector leaders really stepping up to the plate.  But this is a moment for hydrogen, but it’s beyond a moment – it’s really a shared momentum going forward, especially for hydrogen being able to help us decarbonize harder-to-decarbonize so-called sectors, like industry, a variety of industries, heavy-duty freight, et cetera.  Hydrogen holds some real potential in those areas in particular. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question was submitted by Rong Wei Neo from S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  “With the recent affirmation for nuclear power between the U.S. and the Philippines, would promoting nuclear as a viable renewable energy source in Southeast Asia be in the cards during your visit?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, thanks for the question.  And we in the U.S. and other countries around the world have had extensive experience with nuclear power for quite a few years.  Twenty percent of our own U.S. electricity production is from nuclear right now, and it ends up being a very significant part of our overall generation of decarbonized electricity in our country.  What we’re finding is, not only in the Philippines but other countries in the region and countries around the world, is because these climate objectives that we all have put on the table – net zero by mid-century – are so ambitious, there’s a real need to explore a variety of different technologies, and not only the traditional nuclear people think about – the big, huge nuclear power plants – but there’s a real interest, including in the Philippines, for what’s called small modular reactors.   So these are smaller, safer reactors.  There’s a number of really interesting models, companies in the U.S. and elsewhere who are putting together some different technologies.  And there’s an awful lot of interest in it, including because this is base power, baseload power that can help complement increasing number of renewables, whether solar or wind, as part of an overall decarbonized electricity generation mix.  So I think the interest is only going to grow and there’s some real opportunities for governments, societies to take advantage.  We are very much, as I said before, in the mode of true partner in helping to support countries.  And some countries are interested in exploring nuclear, including small modular reactors, going forward, and other countries are not interested.  For those countries who are, we’re certainly sharing our expertise and having some good conversations and seeing what we can do to support their ambitions. MODERATOR:  Okay, the next question comes from Nhu Nguyen, OEC, from Da Nang, Vietnam.  “Recently Vietnamese electric vehicle maker VinFast has joined NASDAQ.  What is your comment on the prospect of more Vietnamese companies like VinFast who will invest in the green economy in the U.S.?”   DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks for the question, and there’s no doubt that there’s a huge market opportunity and business opportunity for a variety of companies than what’s going on in the U.S. with the various tax incentives and all that we’re doing to really accelerate our clean energy transition.   The point I’d like to underscore is we think this a win-win situation for companies, including whether Vietnamese companies or other companies from the region.  They can help shore up their own bottom line – they can make money – as part of our clean energy transition in the U.S.  But that makes them stronger companies, more financially sound companies, reduces their prices that they need to charge for their products because they’re able to do things at scale in the U.S. that will help them make money and help the decarbonization process in Vietnam and other countries in the region as well.  So we really view this as a win-win situation, public and private partnerships in countries around the world, and certainly between the U.S. and ASEAN countries.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Deputy Secretary, we’re going to go back to a question also submitted by S&amp;P Global Commodity Insights in Singapore.  And you kind of touched upon this a little bit, but it’s a slightly different question:  “How do you think your visit to Indonesia may put pressure on them for the Just Energy Transition Partnership, seeing how the monetary injection has failed to shift the needle thus far?” DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Yeah, as I was mentioning earlier, the partnership – the JETP partnership with Indonesia, and we’ve got a few others around the region and around the world as well – really is a partnership.  And I think there’s a recognition that it’s very much a mutually beneficial partnership.  And we’re able to have very candid conversations back and forth and make sure that we’re all doing our parts in order for – in the Indonesia JETP context – for Indonesia to be successful, to the benefit first and foremost of the people in Indonesia, but for Indonesia to also be a responsible global player as well.   So I think it’s less pressure from my vantage point and more just having candid, real-world true partner conversations to all do our part in a partnership to Indonesia achieve the objective that it’s laid out.  So that’s the spirit, and I think that’s the modality of the conversations.  And I had a very constructive conversation with the minister of energy, Minister Tasrif, here in Indonesia just a few hours ago, including on JETP – all in that kind of spirit of true partnership.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And now, Deputy Secretary Turk, that’s it for the questions and answers.  If you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you.  DEPUTY SECRETARY TURK:  Well, thanks, again, Natalie, for moderating, and thanks to everyone who’s joined and had such terrific questions.  And we look forward to engaging with you all further.  As I mentioned at the outset, working hand-in-hand with countries in this region – ASEAN countries but other countries in this region – is a top, top priority from our end.  I hope you’ve heard that clearly from the President, the Vice President, others in the administration as well.   And so any number of us will be back in the region, available to talk further, and again trying to work in this true partnership mode to support the governments but support the people in the region to get the benefits from the clean energy transition and to all move along as quickly, as robustly as we need to from a climate perspective but also very much with an eye towards affordability and an eye towards resilience and reliability and making sure that we all have the energy sources, the energy supply chains that we need to be successful going forward.  So the U.S. – all of us in the U.S., not just the U.S. Department of Energy, all of us in the U.S. look forward to continuing to engage with you all, answering your questions but also working with public and private partners in the region for the long haul.  Thanks, everybody.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  And that is all we have time for today.  Thank you for your questions, participants, and thank you to Deputy Secretary Turk for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists and all of those who are RSVP’d as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon. # # # 
- Laos HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Investment Climate Statements&#8230;Laos				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Investment Climate Statements: Laos																																																																																												 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																																									Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																																											Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																																											Business Facilitation																																																																											Outward Investment																																																																																	2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																															3. Legal Regime																																																									Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																																											International Regulatory Considerations																																																																											Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																																											Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																																											Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																																											Expropriation and Compensation																																																																											Dispute Settlement																																																																			ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																																								Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																																								International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																																																		Bankruptcy Regulations																																																																																	4. Industrial Policies																																																									Investment Incentives																																																																											Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																																											Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																																																	5. Protection of Property Rights																																																									Real Property																																																																											Intellectual Property Rights																																																																																	6. Financial Sector																																																									Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																																											Money and Banking System																																																																											Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																																			Foreign Exchange																																																								Remittance Policies																																																																																																																		Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																																																	7. State-Owned Enterprises																																																									Privatization Program																																																																																	8. Responsible Business Conduct																															9. Corruption																															10. Political and Security Environment																															11. Labor Policies and Practices																															12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																															13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																															14. Contact for More Information																																																					EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Laos, officially the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), is a developing economy at the heart of Southeast Asia, bordered by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam. Laos’ economic growth over the last decade, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, averaged just below eight percent, placing Laos amongst the fastest growing economies in the world. Over the last 30 years, Laos has made slow but steady progress in implementing reforms and building the institutions necessary for a market economy, culminating in accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 2013. The government’s commitment to WTO accession and the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 led to major reforms of economic policies and regulations with the aim to improve Laos’ business and investment environment. However, international companies continue to report significant hurdles navigating Laos’ business environment. The Lao government is increasingly tying its economic fortunes to the economic integration of ASEAN and export-led development and has prioritized the digital economy, logistics, green growth, and more sustainable development, in addition to continuing to develop the agricultural and resource extraction.Although Laos reopened borders in 2022, the World Bank lowered Laos’ 2022 economic growth rate to 2.5 percent from its initial prediction of 3.6 percent. Limited fiscal and foreign currency buffers have posed a challenge to the government’s ability to mitigate the economic impacts of COVID-19 and by global economic disruptions, including Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Lao currency, the kip, depreciated more than 45 percent against the U.S. dollar at one point during 2022, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, and year-on-year inflation exceeded 40 percent in December 2022. These factors have exacerbated the country’s macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Compared to other countries in the region, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Laos have been relatively stable, driven primarily by infrastructure construction and power projects. In 2023, international and Lao economists project GDP growth will reach almost four percent, primarily due to the resumption of tourism and the reopening of China.The exploitation of natural resources and the development of hydropower has driven rapid economic growth over the last decade, with both sectors largely led by foreign investors. However, because growth opportunities in these industries are finite and employ few people, the Lao government has recently begun prioritizing and expanding the development of higher-value agriculture, light manufacturing, and tourism, while continuing to develop energy resources and related electrical transmission capacity for export to neighboring countries.The Lao government hopes to leverage its lengthy land borders with Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam to transform Laos from “land-locked” to “land-linked,” thereby further integrating the Lao economy with the larger economies of its neighbors. The government hopes to increase exports of agriculture, manufactured goods, and electricity to its neighbors, and sees significant growth opportunities resulting from the Laos-China Railway, which opened in December 2021 and connects Kunming in Yunnan Province, China with Laos’ capital city, Vientiane. A small number of businesses and international investors are beginning to use Laos as a low-cost export base to sell goods within the region and to the United States and Europe. The emergence of light manufacturing has begun to help Laos integrate into regional supply chains, and improving infrastructure should facilitate this process, making Laos a legitimate locale for regional manufacturers seeking to diversify from existing production bases in Thailand, Vietnam, and China. New special economic zones (SEZs) in Vientiane and Savannakhet have attracted manufacturers from Europe, North America, and Japan, and Chinese and Thai interests also have plans for additional SEZ projects. Investors should be aware, however, that some SEZs in Laos are associated with transnational organized crime and one, the Golden Triangle SEZ, is affiliated with entities subject to U.S. Treasury sanctions.Economic progress and trade expansion in Laos remain hampered by a shortage of workers with technical skills, weak education and health care systems, and poor—although improving—transportation infrastructure. Institutions, especially in the justice sector, lack independence, often operate without transparency, remain highly underdeveloped and have low regulatory capacity. Despite recent efforts and some improvements, corruption is rampant and is a major obstacle for foreign investors.Corruption, policy and regulatory ambiguity, and uneven application of laws are disincentives to further foreign investment. The multiple ministries, laws, and regulations affecting foreign investment in Laos creates confusion, and requires potential investors to engage either local partners or law firms to navigate an opaque and cumbersome bureaucracy.The government is making efforts to improve the business environment. In 2021, the former prime minister assumed leadership of a new administration with a stated focus on economic issues. Laos’ current development plan, the 9th NSEDP (2021-2025) focuses on graduating Laos from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2026. To achieve this goal, the government continues to prioritize diversifying the economy and improving the investment climate to encourage domestic and foreign investment to boost growth. Starting with the 8th five-year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) (2016-2020), the government has sought to formulate “policies that would attract investments” and to “begin to implement public investment and investment promotion laws.” In February 2018, and again in January 2020, the Office of the Prime Minister issued orders laying out specific steps ministries were to take to improve the business environment. These efforts have borne fruit; for example, due to streamlining of application processes, it now takes to less than 17 days to obtain a business license, compared to 174 days on average a few years ago.The government is focused on a post-COVID economic recovery through policies to achieve macro-economic stability, connectivity through improved infrastructure, and green, sustainable growth initiatives. The draft 9th NSEDP plan prioritizes sectors such as agriculture, natural resource development, and tourism.Table 1: Key Metrics and RankingsMeasureYearIndex/RankWebsite AddressTI Corruption Perceptions Index2022126 of 180http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overviewWorld Bank’s Doing Business Report2020154 of 190http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankingsGlobal Innovation Index2022112 of 132https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/analysis-indicatorU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, historical stock positions)2022N/Ahttps://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/World Bank GNI per capita2021USD 2,500http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD																																					1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment						    																																																Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment										The Lao government officially welcomes both domestic and foreign investment as it seeks to keep growth rates high and graduate from Least Developed Country status by 2026. The pace of foreign investment has increased over the last several years. According to Lao government statistics, mining and hydropower account for 95.7 percent of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and agriculture accounted for only 2 percent of FDI in 2019. China, Thailand, France, Vietnam, and Japan are the largest sources of foreign investment. The government’s Investment Promotion Department encourages investment through its website  www.investlaos.gov.la , and the government is attempting to further improve the business environment by facilitating a constructive dialogue annually with the private sector and foreign business chambers through the Lao Business Forum, which is managed by the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry LNCCI).The 2009 Law on Investment Promotion was amended in November 2016, with 32 new articles introduced and 59 existing articles revised. The new law, an English version of which can be found at  www.investlaos.gov.la , notably clarifies investment incentives, transfers responsibility for SEZs from the Prime Minister’s office to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), and removes strict registered capital requirements for opening a business, deferring instead to the relevant ministry. Foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or that have a negative impact on the natural environment. In December 2021, Laos amended the value-added tax (VAT) law following Presidential Decree no. 231/P, which reduced the VAT rate from 10 to 7 percent as part of the government’s effort to promote economic recovery. The decree also aims to provide a mechanism to facilitate investment towards activities that enable production and export. More importantly, the amended law indicates that more activities are exempted from VAT, while certain mineral and electricity-related activities are subject to a specific basis for VAT calculation. Nevertheless, even in cases where full foreign ownership is permitted, many foreign companies seek a local partner. Companies involved in large FDI projects in strategic sectors, especially in mining and hydropower, often find it advantageous to give the government partial ownership.Foreign investors are typically required to go through several procedural steps prior to commencing operations. Many foreign business owners and potential investors say the process is overly complex, and regulations are erratically applied. Foreign investors also express confusion about the roles of different ministries, as multiple ministries become involved in the approval process. In the case of general investment licenses (as opposed to concessionary licenses, which are issued by MPI, foreign investors are required to obtain multiple permits, including an annual business registration from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), a tax registration from the Ministry of Finance, a business logo registration from the Ministry of Public Security, permits from each line ministry related to the investment (i.e., MOIC for manufacturing, and Ministry of Energy and Mines for power sector development), appropriate permits from local authorities, and an import-export license, if applicable. Obtaining the necessary permits can be challenging and time consuming, especially in areas outside the capital.There are several possible vehicles for foreign investment. Foreign partners in a joint venture must contribute at least 30 percent of the company’s registered capital. Wholly foreign-owned companies may be entirely new or a branch of an existing foreign enterprise. Equity in medium and large-sized SOEs can be obtained through a joint venture with the Lao government.Reliable statistics are difficult to obtain, however the trend of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) shows an increase in recent years, mainly driven by large infrastructure projects. Total FDI in Laos increased from $5.7 billion in 2016 to $10 billion in 2019.																																				Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment										As discussed above, even though foreigners may invest in most sectors or businesses (subject to previously noted exceptions), many foreign companies seek a local partner to navigate complicated official and unofficial processes. Companies involved in large FDI projects, especially in mining and hydropower, often find it advantageous to give the government partial ownership.																																				Other Investment Policy Reviews										The OECD released its most recent investment policy review of Laos on July 11, 2017. More details can be found at  http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/oecd-investment-policy-reviews-lao-pdr-2017-9789264276055-en.htm 																																				Business Facilitation										Laos does not have a central business registration website yet, but the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC) has improved its online enterprise registration site,  http://www.erm.gov.la , to accelerate the registration process. Due to the government’s effort in supporting the ease of doing business, investors recently reported needing less than 17 days to attain an Enterprise Registration Certificate for general business activities, compared to 174 days on average in the past. Nonetheless, the timeline and process for controlled and concession activities (see  https://www.laotradeportal.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/Legal_1571216364.pdf  for a list) can vary considerably, as they require the engagement of different government agencies to issue an operating license. As a result, many investors and even locals often hire consultancies or law firms to shepherd the labor-intensive registration process.The Lao government has attempted to streamline business registration using a one-stop shop model. Registration for general business activities can be done at the Department of Enterprise Registration and Management offices, MOIC (see  http://www.erm.gov.la  for more details), while the service for activities requiring a government concession is through the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). For investment in special economic zones (SEZ), one-stop registration is run through the MPI or in special one-stop service offices within the SEZs themselves (under the authority of the MPI).To promote and facilitate domestic and foreign investment, the Prime Minister’s Office issued Order 02 and Order 03 in 2018 and 2019 respectively to reform the ease of doing business and improve services on investment and operational licenses. This includes the improvement of the One Stop Service system and conducting business implementation associated with transparency in a uniform and timely manner. The government also encouraged the participation of both domestic and foreign investors to develop infrastructure and public services delivery projects by issuing a public-private partnership (PPP) decree in 2020 aiming to boost economic growth.So far, business owners give the one-stop shop concept mixed reviews. Many acknowledge that it is an improvement but describe it as an incomplete reform with several additional steps that must still be taken outside of the single stop. Businesses also complain that there are often different registration requirements at the central and provincial levels.																																				Outward Investment										The Lao government does not actively promote, incentivize, or restrict outward investment.																																												2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties						    																						According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Laos has bilateral investment agreements with Australia, Belarus, Cambodia (not in force), China, Cuba, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia (not in force), Mongolia, Myanmar, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia Federation, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. On February 1, 2005, a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) entered into force between the United States and the Government of Laos that contains some investment provisions.Laos and the United States do not have a bilateral taxation treaty.																																		3. Legal Regime						    																																																Transparency of the Regulatory System										Regulations in Laos can be vague and conflicting, a subject that the private sector raises regularly with the government, including through official fora such as the Lao Business Forum. The 2013 Law on Making Legislation mandated that all laws be available online at the official gazette website,  www.laoofficialgazette.gov.la . Draft bills are also available for public comment through the official gazette website, although not all bills are posted for comment or in the official gazette, and the provinces seldom post their local legislation. Although the situation continues to improve, the realities of doing business in Laos can fail to correspond with existing legislation and regulation. Implementation and enforcement often do not strictly follow the letter of the law, and vague or contradictory clauses in laws and regulations provide for widely varying interpretations. Regulations at the national and provincial levels can often diverge, overlap, or contradict one another. Many local firms still complain about informal or gray competition from firms that offer lower costs by flaunting formal registration requirements and operating outside of government regulatory structures.The nascent legal, regulatory, and accounting systems are not particularly conducive to a transparent, competitive business environment. International accounting norms apply, and major international firms are present in the market, though understanding and adherence to these norms is limited to a small section of the business community. Eleven companies are listed on the Lao stock exchange. Regulations dictate that companies listed on the exchange must be held to accounting standards, but the government’s capacity to enforce those standards is low.The government now publicly releases the enacted budget, which includes the total amount of domestic and external debt obligations for the whole country.																																				International Regulatory Considerations										Laos is a member of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and is seeking to implement all AEC-agreed standards domestically. However, the local capacity to develop regulatory standards is weak, while enforcement of technical regulations is weaker still. The Lao government has been diligent at notifying draft technical regulations – such as its new law on standards – to the WTO committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).																																				Legal System and Judicial Independence										Laos currently has a poorly developed legal sector. The government adopted the Legal Sector Master Plan with an aim to become a rule of law state by 2020.The plan is now complete, but justice institutions continue to suffer from corruption, lack of capacity, and a lack of independence. To improve the country’s legal system, the government has pledged to continue working with development partners on comprehensive legal sector reform. From 1975 to 1991, Laos did not have a constitution, and government decrees issued by various ministries and officials only exacerbated the country’s poor legal framework. While there have been dramatic improvements in the legal system over the last decade, Laos has a dearth of lawyers, many judges lack formal training and experience, and laws often remain vague and subject to broad interpretation.The existing system incorporates some major elements of the French civil law system but is also influenced by the legal systems of the former Soviet Union and regional neighbors’ systems. Court decisions are neither widely published, nor do they necessarily affect future decisions. Despite being bureaucratically independent of the government cabinet, the Lao judiciary is still subject to government and political interference.Contract law in Laos is lacking in many areas important to trade and commerce. The law provides for the sanctity of contracts, but in practice, contracts are subject to political interference and patronage. Businesses report that contracts can be voided if they are found to be disadvantageous to one party, or if they conflict with state or public interests. Foreign businessmen describe contracts in Laos as being “a framework for negotiation” rather than a binding agreement, and even when faced with a judgment, enforcement is weak and subject to the influence of corruption. Although a commercial court system exists, most judges adjudicating commercial disputes have little training in commercial law. Those considering doing business in Laos are strongly urged to contact a reputable law firm for additional advice on contracts.In 2019, under the leadership of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MOIC), Laos became the 92nd State Party to join the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.																																				Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment										As discussed above, the 2009 Law on Investment promotion was amended in November 2016. The new law provides more transparency regarding regulations and procedures and provides greater detail about what specific responsibilities fall under the Ministry of Planning and Investment. The 2016 Law on Investment Promotion introduced uniform business registration requirements and tax incentives that apply equally to foreign and domestic investors. As noted above, foreigners may invest in any sector or business except in cases where the government deems the investment to be detrimental to national security, health, or national traditions, or to have a negative impact on the natural environment. Aside from these sectors, there are no statutory limits on foreign ownership or control of commercial enterprises. For reasons discussed above, despite changes in the law, many companies continue to seek a local partner.Most laws of interest to investors are featured on the Lao Trade Portal website,  http://www.laotradeportal.gov.la , with many laws and regulations translated into English, or the Lao Official Gazette,  http://laoofficialgazette.gov.la , or the official website of the Investment Promotion Department (MPI), www.investlaos.gov.la , or the newly created “Lao Law” App.In sum, neither the government’s investment bureaucracy nor the commercial court system is well developed, although the former is improving and reforming. Investors have experienced government practices that deviate significantly from publicly available laws and regulations. Some investors decry the courts’ limited ability to handle commercial disputes and vulnerability to corruption. The Lao government has repeatedly underscored its commitment to increasing predictability in the investment environment, but in practice, with some exceptions in the creation and operation of SEZs, and investments by larger companies, foreign investors describe inconsistent application of laws and regulations.																																				Competition and Antitrust Laws										There have been no updates since 2017. A new competition law was approved in 2015 that applies to both foreign and domestic individuals and entities. The law was drafted with the assistance of the German government and other donors. The competition law was one of the Lao government’s policy efforts to implement the ASEAN Economic Community, or AEC, before 2016. The law established two new government entities, the Business Competition Control (BCC) Commission and the BCC Secretariat. The BCC Commission is the senior body, and its membership is decided by the Prime Minister with the advice of the Minister of Industry and Commerce (MOIC). According to the legislation, it should include senior officials from multiple ministries as well as businesspeople, economists, and lawyers. The BCC Commission can draft regulations, approve mergers, levy penalties, and provide overall guidance on government competition policy and regulation. The BCC Secretariat, a lower-level institution equivalent to a MOIC department or division, can hear complaints, conduct investigations, and conduct research and reporting at the request of the Commission.																																				Expropriation and Compensation										According to law, foreign assets and investments in Laos are protected against seizure, confiscation, or nationalization except when deemed necessary for a public purpose. Public purpose can be broadly defined, however, and land grabs are feared by Lao nationals and expatriates alike. In the event of a government expropriation, the Lao government is supposed to provide fair market compensation. Nevertheless, a business relying on a specific parcel of land may lose its investment license if the land is in dispute. Revocation of an investment license cannot be appealed to an independent body, and companies whose licenses are revoked must quickly liquidate their assets. Small landholdings, land with unclear title, or land on which taxes have not been paid are at particular risk of expropriation.																																				Dispute Settlement																										ICSID Convention and New York Convention						The Decree on the Establishment of Private Economic Dispute Resolution as specified under Article 4 of the Law on Economic Dispute Resolution No.51/NA, (2018) provides for private arbitration bodies in Lao PDR. However, the regulatory framework to enable the private sector to establish an alternative channel for business arbitration is still under development with assistance from international donors such as USAID.Laos is not a member state to the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention). It is, however, a signatory to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958 New York Convention).						Investor-State Dispute Settlement						According to the Law on Investment Promotion, resolution of a dispute resolution should proceed through the following process: mediation, administrative dispute resolution, dispute resolution by the Committee for Economic Dispute Resolution, and finally, litigation. However, due to the underdeveloped state of the Lao legal system, foreign investors are generally advised to seek arbitration outside of the country. There are few publicly available records on international investment disputes. According to the 2016 investment promotion law, Article 96 on Dispute Resolution by the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution in the Lao PDR or international organization to which Lao PDR is a party states: &#8220;When there is an investment-related dispute, either party thereto shall have the rights to request the Office for Economic Dispute Resolution for resolution within the Lao PDR or abroad as agreed by the parties of the dispute. The Lao PDR recognizes and enforces the award of foreign or international arbitration subject to certification by the people’s court of Lao PDR.&#8221; However, in practice, the Embassy is not aware of this new article being successfully exercised by a foreign investor.						International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts						Beyond those listed above, there are no formal Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms provided in Lao law but based on the amended Investment Promotion Law and the law on Investment Resolution dated June 22, 2018, both parties can decide if they would like to have arbitration in Laos or abroad as mentioned in the contract. There is no known history of Laos enforcing foreign commercial arbitral decisions.																										Bankruptcy Regulations										The 1994 bankruptcy law permits either the business or creditor the right to petition the court for a bankruptcy judgment and allows businesses the right to request mediation. The law also authorizes liquidation of assets based upon the request of a debtor or creditor. However, there is no record of a foreign-owned enterprise, whether as debtor or as creditor, petitioning the courts for a bankruptcy judgment.																																												4. Industrial Policies						    																																																Investment Incentives										Laos offers a range of investment incentives depending on the investment vehicle, with particular focus on government concessions and special economic zones. Many of these incentives can be found at  www.investlaos.gov.la  and are generally governed by the Investment Promotion Law.																																				Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation										The new Foreign Investment Law allows for the establishment of special economic zones and specific economic zones (both referred to as SEZs). Special economic zones are intended to support development of new infrastructure and commercial facilities and include incentives for investment. Specific economic zones are intended for the development of existing infrastructure and facilities and provide a lower level of incentives and support than special economic zones. Laos has announced plans to construct as many as 40 special and specific zones, but as of 2022, it has established 23. Some, such as Savan Seno SEZ in Savannakhet and the Vientiane Industry and Trade Area SEZ, or VITA Park, in Vientiane, have successfully attracted foreign investors. Others are accused of harboring illegal activities, such as the Golden Triangle SEZ in Bokeo province that houses the Kings Roman Casino. The Department of Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control in early 2018 designated the Kings Roman Casino and its owners a Transnational Criminal Organization for engaging in drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, bribery, and wildlife trafficking. More Chinese-invested SEZs are expected to open in the coming years, especially along the Laos-China Railway line. Thai companies are also exploring new SEZ-style industrial parks in Laos.The Lao government generally places a high priority on trade facilitation measures in international fora, particularly as Laos relies upon trade moving across its neighboring countries to reach seaports. Since 2012, customs management has been modernized through the implementation of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) system assisted by the United Nations and the World Bank to operate customs declarations and border inspections across international check points, including airports and SEZs. The government has also developed a National Single Window to facilitate requests and issue permits for the import, export, and transit of all goods. These approaches reduced the use of paperwork and time involving customs’ clearance from two days in the past to less than eight hours in 2020.With assistance from Japan, the Lao government instituted a new system for electronic collection of customs fees at several major border crossings in 2016, which was a significant improvement, and in early 2019 the Department of Customs introduced electronic customs payments at the Lao – Thai Friendship Bridge. On several border crossings with Vietnam, Lao and Vietnamese officials jointly conduct inspections to facilitate movement of goods.On top of these actions, the government published a new version of the Tax Law (No. 81/NA) in late 2020 focusing on trade facilitation rather than revenue collection by eliminating required approvals by some agencies in the approval process. Nonetheless, Laos has struggled to harmonize its own internal processes. For example, customs practices vary widely at different ports of entry.																																				Performance and Data Localization Requirements										Laos does not have performance requirements. Requirements relating to foreign hiring are governed by the Labor Law, but in practice, large investors have been able to extract additional government concessions on use of foreign labor. Some foreign-owned businesses have criticized labor regulations for strict requirements that foreign employees not travel abroad during the first months of their Lao residency.Laos does not currently have enacted laws or regulations on domestic data storage or localization requirements.																																												5. Protection of Property Rights						    																																																Real Property										In 2020, the government published the revised Law on Land, which is available at  https://www.laoofficialgazette.gov.la/index.php?r=site/index . While restriction on the ownership rights of foreigners towards land remains unchanged, the revised law allows immovable properties to be owned and invested in by foreign nationals. This significant change in the regulatory framework is expected to accelerate development of the Lao PDR’s real estate sector. Laos hopes for an inflow of investment and foreigners because of the Lao-China railway which opened in December 2021.Apart from the Land Law, Article 16 of the 2016 Law on Investment Promotion allows investors to obtain land for use through long-term leases or as concessions and allows for the ownership of leases, the right to transfer leases, and to improve leasehold interests. Government approval is not required to transfer property interests, but the transfer must be registered, and a registration fee paid.Under existing law, a creditor may enforce security rights against a debtor and the concept of a mortgage does exist. The Lao government is currently engaged in a land parceling and titling project, but it remains difficult to determine if a piece of property is encumbered in Laos. Enforcement of mortgages is complicated by the legal protection given mortgagees against forfeiture of their sole place of residence.Laos provides for secured interests in moveable and non-moveable property under the 2005 Law on Secured Transactions and a 2011 implementing decree from the Prime Minister’s office. In 2013, the State Assets Management Authority at the Ministry of Finance launched a new Secured Transaction Registry (STR), intended to expand access to credit for individuals and smaller firms. The STR allows for registration of movable assets such as vehicles and equipment so that they may be easily verified by financial institutions and used as collateral for loans.Outside of urban areas, land rights can be even more complex. Titles and ownership are not clear, and some areas practice communal titling.																																				Intellectual Property Rights										Laos is not listed in USTR&#8217;s Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets report.Intellectual property protection in Laos is weak, but steadily improving. The USAID-funded Lao PDR-U.S. International and ASEAN Integration (USAID LUNA II) project assisted the Lao government’s efforts to increase its capacity for IPR protection and to progress on the IPR-related commitments undertaken as a part of Laos&#8217; 2013 WTO accession package. USAID LUNA II worked with the Ministry of Science and Technology’s Department of Intellectual Property to establish an online portal that provides detailed information regarding the registration of copyrights, trademarks, Geographic Indicators, and Plant Varieties at  https://dip.gov.la . Interested individuals can use the portal to complete the application forms online. The portal officially launched in February 2019. Additionally, the USAID LUNA II project provided technical support to the Lao government in amending the Law on Intellectual Property.The government announced the dissolution of the Ministry of Science and Technology in February 2021. Consequently, the MOIC is now responsible for the issuance of patents, copyrights, and trademarks. There is insufficient understanding of the copyright principles among the public. The MOIC has recently assigned administrative duties to relevant agencies attempting to ensure intellectual property rights are respected by individuals and businesses. Laos is a member of the ASEAN Common Filing System on patents but lacks qualified patent examiners. The bilateral Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) agreement between Thailand and Laos dictates that a patent issued in Thailand also be recognized in Laos.Laos is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Convention and the Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property but has not yet joined the Berne Convention on Copyrights.In 2011 the National Assembly passed a comprehensive revision of the Law on Intellectual Property which brings it into compliance with WIPO and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Standards (TRIPS). Amendments to the 2011 Law on Intellectual Property were made public in May 2018.For additional information about treaty obligations and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at  http://www.wipo.int/directory/en/ .																																												6. Financial Sector						    																																																Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment										Laos does not have a well-developed capital market, although government policies increasingly support the formation of capital and free flow of financial resources. The Lao Securities Exchange (LSX) began operations in 2011 with two stocks listed, both state-owned – the Banque Pour l’Commerce Exterieur (BCEL), and the power generation arm of the electrical utility, Electricite du Laos &#8211; Generation (EDL-Gen). In 2012, the Lao government increased the proportion of shares that foreigners can hold on the LSX from 10 to 20 percent. As of March 2023, there are eleven companies listed on the LSX: BCEL, EDL-Gen, Petroleum Trading Laos (fuel stations), Lao World (property development and management), Souvanny Home Center (home goods retail), Phousy Construction and Development (Construction and real estate development), Lao Cement (LCC), Mahathuen Leasing (leasing), Lao Agrotech (palm oil plantation and extraction factory), Vientiane Center (property development and management), and Lao ASEAN Leasing (LALCO) (financing and leasing). News and information about the LSX are available at  http://www.lsx.com.la/ .Businesses report that they are often unable to exchange kip into foreign currencies through central or local banks, particularly at times when the kip is depreciating against international currencies. Analysts suggest that concerns about dollar reserves may have led to temporary problems in the convertibility of the national currency. Private banks allege that the Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) withholds dollar reserves. The Bank of Lao PDR alleges that private banks already hold sizable reserves and have been reluctant to give foreign exchange to their customers to maintain unreasonably high reserves. Lao and foreign companies alike, and especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), note the lack of long-term credit in the domestic market. Loans repayable over more than five years are very rare, and the choice of credit instruments in the local market is limited. The Credit Information Bureau, developed to help inject more credit into markets, still has very little information and has not yet succeeded in mitigating lender concerns about risk.																																				Money and Banking System										The banking system is under the supervision of the Bank of Lao PDR, the nation’s central bank, and includes 38 banks, most of them commercial. Private foreign banks can establish branches in all provinces of Laos. ATMs have become ubiquitous in urban centers. Technical assistance to Laos’ financial sector has led to some reforms and significant improvements to Laos’ regulatory regime on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, but overall capacity within the financial governance structure remains poor.The banking system is dominated by large, government-owned banks. The health of the banking sector is difficult to determine given the lack of reliable data, though banks are widely believed to be poorly regulated and there is broad concern about bad debts and non-performing loans that have yet to be fully reconciled by the state-run banks. The IMF and others have encouraged the Bank of Lao PDR to facilitate recapitalization of state-owned banks to improve the resilience of the sector. Several banks operate digital payment services, which has facilitated domestic transactions, but also introduced new digital crime risks.While publicly available data is difficult to find, non-performing loans are widely believed to be a major concern in the financial sector, fueled in part by years of rapid growth in private lending. The government&#8217;s fiscal difficulties in 2013 and 2014 led to non-payment on government infrastructure projects. The construction companies implementing the projects in turn could not pay back loans for capital used in construction. Many analysts believe the full effects of the government&#8217;s fiscal difficulties have not yet worked their way through the economy. In 2022, Laos’ fiscal deficit is estimated to be about 1 percent of GDP higher because of lower spending and the absence of debt payment deferral. Total public and publicly guaranteed debt were estimated to surpass 100 percent of GDP which adds to concerns about Laos’ fiscal outlook and macroeconomic stability. In 2018 Laos passed a new law on Public Debt Management aimed at reducing Laos’ debt-to-GDP ratio, but most economic analysts anticipate Laos’s debt-to-GDP ratio will likely increase as the country navigates an economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.																																				Foreign Exchange and Remittances																										Foreign Exchange						There are published, formal restrictions on foreign exchange conversion and because the market for Lao kip is relatively small, the currency is rarely convertible outside the immediate region. Laos persistently maintains low levels of foreign reserves, which are estimated to cover approximately two months’ worth of total imports. The reserve buffer is expected to remain relatively low due to structurally weak export growth in the non-resource sector and to debt service payments. The decline in reserves was due to a drawdown of government deposits primarily for external debt service payments, some intervention in the foreign exchange market to manage the volatility of the currency, and financing the continuing current account deficit. The Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) occasionally imposes daily limits on converting funds from the Lao kip into U.S. dollars and Thai baht or restricts the sectors able to convert Lao kip into dollars. This can sometimes result in difficulties obtaining foreign exchange in Laos. The BOL issued Notice no.1026/BOL in December 2022 to order the closure of currency exchanges business associated with commercial banks response to the Lao kip’s depreciation against foreign currencies. This aims to regulate currency circulation and allow commercial banks to take lead in determining rates and policies aligned with BOL policies. Such effort significantly reduces the gap between official and gray-market currency rates. Though the gap is narrowing down to two percent, the current value of Lao kip against the dollar and Thai baht is still far below pre-Covid-19 rates.To facilitate business transactions, foreign investors generally open commercial bank accounts in both local and foreign convertible currency at domestic and foreign banks in Laos. The Enterprise Accounting Law places no limitations on foreign investors transferring after-tax profits, income from technology transfer, initial capital, interest, wages and salaries, or other remittances to the company’s home country or third countries if they request approval from the Lao government. Foreign enterprises must report on their performance annually and submit annual financial statements to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI).According to a recent report from Laos’ Lao Academy of Social and Economic Sciences (LASES), the increasing demand for dollars and Thai baht for the import of capital equipment for projects and consumer goods, coupled with growing demand for foreign currency to pay off foreign debts has resulted in a continued depreciation of the exchange rate in 2022. The official nominal kip/U.S. dollar reference rate depreciated by 32.04 percent year-on-year in February 2023, while the kip/baht exchange rate depreciated by 29.83 percent.						Remittance Policies						There have been no recent changes to remittance law or policy in Laos. Formally, all remittances abroad, transfers into Laos, foreign loans, and payments not denominated in Lao kip must be approved by the BOL. In practice, many remittances are understood to flow into Laos informally, and relatively easily, from a sizeable Lao workforce based in Thailand. Remittance-related rules can be vague and official practice is reportedly inconsistent.																										Sovereign Wealth Funds										There are no known sovereign wealth funds in Laos.																																												7. State-Owned Enterprises						    																						The Lao government maintains ownership stakes in key sectors of the economy such as telecommunications, energy, finance, airlines, and mining. Where state interests&#8217; conflict with private ownership, the state is in a position of advantage.There is no centralized, publicly available list of Lao State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The Lao government’s most recent figures report that there are approximately 152 SOEs in Lao PDR. 133 SOEs are 51-100percent owned by the state with registered capital at more than $26 billion. At the end of 2017 the total assets of 60 SOEs managed by the State Property Management Department of the Ministry of Finance was more than $13 billion (80.51percent of GDP). The net profit from SOEs was around $156 million of which $105 million was in government dividends. In 2021, the government announced SOE reform to address non-transparent issues related to executives and management methods. This reform also aims to evaluate state assets, identify strategic enterprises and underperforming ones, and identify which SOEs are economically inviable and need full reform.The government has not specified a code or policy for its management of SOEs and has not adopted OECD guidelines for Corporate Governance of SOEs. There is no single government body that oversees all SOEs. Several separate government entities exercise SOE ownership in different industries. SOE senior management does not uniformly report to a line minister. Comprehensive information on boards of directors or their independence is not publicly available. While there is scant evidence one way or the other, private businesses generally assume that court decisions would favor an SOE over another party in an investment dispute.																										Privatization Program										There is no formal SOE privatization program, though successive prime ministers have openly discussed subjecting some SOEs to greater competition and possible privatization. The government occasionally floats ideas for increasing private ownership in some SOEs through partial listings on the LSX, or through spinning off and privatizing parts of others.																																												8. Responsible Business Conduct						    																						There is low general awareness of responsible business conduct (RBC) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). There is no systematic government or NGO monitoring of RBC. RBC is not generally included in the government’s investment policy formulations. No concerns regarding human rights and their relation to RBC have been reported so far, however there are ongoing concerns about various forms of trafficking and labor abuse in the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone.Additional ResourcesDepartment of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices; Trafficking in Persons Report; Guidance on Implementing the &#8220;UN Guiding Principles&#8221; for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities; U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; and; Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory Department of the Treasury OFAC Recent Actions Department of Labor Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ; List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ; Sweat &amp; Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World  and; Comply Chain .Department of Commerce Country Commercial Guide for Laos 																																		9. Corruption						    																						Corruption is a serious problem in Laos that affects all levels of the economy. The Lao government has developed several anti-corruption laws, but enforcement remains weak. When he assumed office in early 2016, then Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith focused on government anti-corruption efforts. Lao media and the National Assembly now report on corruption challenges and the sacking or disciplining of corrupt officials with some regularity. In September 2009, Laos ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. In March 2021, Thongloun was named President of the Lao PDR and stated that he would continue to prioritize good governance. Laos is ranked 126th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), advancing eight spots since 2020.Domestic and international firms have repeatedly identified corruption as a problem in the business environment and a major detractor for international firms exploring investment or business activities in the local market.The Lao State Inspection and Anti-Corruption Authority (SIAA), a ministry-level body, oversees analyzing corruption at the national level and serves as a central office for gathering evidence of suspected corruption. Additionally, each ministry and province have a SIAA office that does not report to the organization in which it is housed. These SIAA offices feed into the SIAA’s central system.According to Lao law, both giving and accepting bribes are criminal acts punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. Nonetheless, foreign businesses frequently cite corruption as an obstacle to operating in Laos. Often characterized as a fee for urgent service, officials commonly accept bribes for the purpose of approving or expediting applications. Laos is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.In 2014, an asset declaration regime entered into force for government officials, which required them to declare income, assets, and debts for themselves and their family members; this was further strengthened in 2017 and 2018. Officials are now required to file a declaration on any assets valued over $2,500, including land, structures, vehicles, and equipment, as well as cash, gold, and financial instruments. These declarations are reportedly held privately and securely by the government. If a corruption complaint is made against an official, the SIAA can compare the sealed declaration with the official’s current wealth. To what extent this program has worked or is working remains unclear.Resources to Report CorruptionContact at government agency or agencies responsible for combating corruption:Mr. Sithone SouliyavongDirector GeneralInspection and Anti-Corruption Department, State Inspection and Anti-Corruption AuthoritySivilay Village, Xaythany District, Vientiane Capital, 13th South RoadTel: office: 021 715032; Fax: 021 715006; cell: 020 5957 7771																																		10. Political and Security Environment						    																						Laos is generally a peaceful and politically stable country. In 2021, Laos once again had an orderly change of administration under its one-party system. The risk of political violence directed at foreign enterprises or businesspersons is low. There has been little-to-no political violence in the last decade and Laos’ political stability is an attractive feature for foreign investors.																																		11. Labor Policies and Practices						    																						Despite Laos’ young population— the median age is 25 years old— employers report extensive labor shortages, particularly for skilled workers. Relatively low levels of education disqualify many workers from higher-skilled jobs and wages for all skill levels remain low. Economic migration to neighboring countries also limits the pool of available labor remaining.In late 2013, the government enacted a labor law containing new protections for workers, including provisions to increase the skills of the Lao labor force and stricter rules for the hiring of foreign workers.The Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU), which is associated with the ruling Lao People&#8217;s Revolutionary Party, is the primary representative of labor and represents workers in tripartite processes. Laos’ National Assembly passed a new Trade Union Law in November 2017 but the impact of the new law on the labor market and foreign investors has been gradual. No official English translations of the final Trade Union Law are publicly available.According to the Labor Law, labor units comprising ten or more employees must have an employee representative or trade union. Both government-employed LFTU representatives and other employee representatives may bargain collectively with employers on matters including working conditions, recruitment, wages, welfare, and other benefits. Collective bargaining is typically undertaken by representatives of the LFTU, though the Labor Law authorizes independent worker&#8217;s groups to elect their own leaders and to represent their interests and engage in collective bargaining on their behalf. The Labor Law authorizes strikes if several steps of dispute resolution fail; however, there is no record of strikes occurring in Laos.Child labor is outlawed except under very strict, limited conditions that ensure no interference with the child&#8217;s education or physical wellbeing. The Labor Law outlaws several forms of employment discrimination and provides standards for work hours. The law also established occupational health and safety standards, but inspections remain inconsistent. An International Labor Organization project undertaken in 2015 and 2016 trained labor inspectors in basic practices, with particular focus on the garment industry.The minimum wage is set by separate regulation, and in recent years has seen annual increases after a tripartite negotiation among LFTU, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In recent years, the minimum has seen some increases after tripartite negotiations among LFTU, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, and the Lao National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In 2022, the minimum wage was raised to approximately $69 per month (1,200,000 kip). The minimum wage is scheduled to rise again to $75 per month (1,300,000 kip) in May 2023 but local press reports suggest delays are likely.Employment contracts are required under the labor law but are not uniformly adopted in practice. In February 2018, the government promulgated the Decree on Labor Dispute Resolution No. 76, detailing four processes for employers and employees to resolve labor disputes and establishing the Committee for Labor Dispute Resolution (CLDR). The CLDR operates on both the central and provincial level to address disputes that cannot be resolved through compromise or administrative remedies. Claims brought to the central level CLDR that cannot be resolved, may be referred to the Lao People’s Court at the request of one of the involved parties.Foreign investors using a concession as an investment vehicle are reportedly able to negotiate the percentage of foreign labor to be used in the investment. However, labor standards such as minimum wage and health and safety standards should apply uniformly regardless of the investment vehicle or use of a special economic zone. In February and March of 2022, the government announced new labor regulations for SEZs to combat labor exploitation. The 2022 regulations mandated regular monitoring and reporting of work and living conditions to the SEZ management office as well as contracts for all workers be written and signed in the worker’s native language. The regulations explicitly forbid forced labor inside Laos’ SEZs, though enforcement remains a challenge.																																		12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs						    																						The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), in its previous iteration known as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Laos signed a bilateral agreement in 1996. The DFC currently has no exposure in Laos, but the organization is actively exploring options for programming in the country.																																		13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics						    																						Table 2: Key Macroeconomic Data, U.S. FDI in Host Country/EconomyHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or International Source of Data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherEconomic DataYearAmountYearAmount Host Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ($M USD)2021$18,830 2020$18,980 www.worldbank.org/en/countryForeign Direct InvestmentHost Country Statistical source*USG or international statistical sourceUSG or international Source of data:  BEA; IMF; Eurostat; UNCTAD, OtherU.S. FDI in partner country ($M USD, stock positions)2021N/A2021N/ABEA data available at https://apps.bea.gov/international/factsheet/Host country’s FDI in the United States ($M USD, stock positions)2021N/A2021N/ABEA data available at https://www.bea.gov/international/direct-investment-and-multinational-enterprises-comprehensive-dataTotal inbound stock of FDI as % host GDP2021N/A202119.1%UNCTAD data available athttps://stats.unctad.org/handbook/EconomicTrends/Fdi.htmlTable 3: Sources and Destination of FDIData not available.																																		14. Contact for More Information						    																						Souliyakhom ThammavongCommercial and Economic AssistantU.S. Embassy, Vientiane+856 21 487000ThammavongS@state.gov																										    							View report by:																				Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											The Bahamas											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Chile											China											Colombia											Costa Rica											Côte d’Ivoire											Croatia											Cyprus											Czechia											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France and Monaco											The Gambia											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guyana											Honduras											Haiti											Hong Kong											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iraq											Ireland											Israel											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kosovo											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Macau											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Netherlands											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											Timor-Leste											Togo											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Türkiye											United Arab Emirates											Uganda											Ukraine											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											West Bank and Gaza											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment																																							Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment																																																						Other Investment Policy Reviews																																																						Business Facilitation																																																						Outward Investment																																																			2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties																3. Legal Regime																																							Transparency of the Regulatory System																																																						International Regulatory Considerations																																																						Legal System and Judicial Independence																																																						Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment																																																						Competition and Antitrust Laws																																																						Expropriation and Compensation																																																						Dispute Settlement																																																				ICSID Convention and New York Convention																																												Investor-State Dispute Settlement																																												International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts																																																																																				Bankruptcy Regulations																																																			4. Industrial Policies																																							Investment Incentives																																																						Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation																																																						Performance and Data Localization Requirements																																																			5. Protection of Property Rights																																							Real Property																																																						Intellectual Property Rights																																																			6. Financial Sector																																							Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment																																																						Money and Banking System																																																						Foreign Exchange and Remittances																																																				Foreign Exchange																																												Remittance Policies																																																																																				Sovereign Wealth Funds																																																			7. State-Owned Enterprises																																							Privatization Program																																																			8. Responsible Business Conduct																9. Corruption																10. Political and Security Environment																11. Labor Policies and Practices																12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs																13. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment Statistics																14. Contact for More Information																						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Laos
- Laos HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2023 Fiscal Transparency Report&#8230;Laos				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Fiscal Transparency Report: Laos 																																					Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Government-by-Government Assessments: Laos 																																												Government-by-Government Assessments: Laos 				During the review period, the government made its executive budget proposal publicly available online, but not within a reasonable period.  It did not publish its enacted budget or end-of-year report.  The completeness and reliability of budget information could not be evaluated due to the lack of publicly available documents.  Limited information on debt obligations was publicly available, but not for major state-owned enterprise debt.  Publicly available budget documents were not prepared according to internationally accepted principles.  Military and intelligence budgets were not subject to parliamentary or civilian public oversight.  The supreme audit institution did not meet international standards of independence.  It reviewed only a portion of the government’s accounts and did not make its reports publicly available.  The government specified in law or regulation the criteria and procedures for awarding natural resource extraction contracts and licenses.  A moratorium on natural resource extraction awards has been in effect since 2012.Laos’ fiscal transparency would be improved by:Making its enacted budget and end-of-year report publicly available within a reasonable period;Preparing budget documents according to internationally accepted principles;Including in budget documents allocations to, earnings from, and debt information of major state-owned enterprises;Publishing comprehensive information on debt obligations;Subjecting military and intelligence budgets to parliamentary or civilian public oversight; andEnsuring the supreme audit institution meets international standards of independence, audits the entire annual executed budget, and publishes its reports within a reasonable period.																												    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Algeria											Angola											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Benin											Burma											Burundi											Cambodia											Cameroon											Central African Republic											Chad											China, People’s Republic of											Comoros											Congo, Democratic Republic of											Congo, Republic of the											Djibouti											Egypt											Equatorial Guinea											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Gabon											The Gambia											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Iraq											Laos											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Madagascar											Malawi											Mali											Maldives											Mauritania											Mongolia											Mozambique											Niger											Oman											Pakistan											Palestinian Authority											Papua New Guinea											Rwanda											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Sierra Leone											Somalia											South Africa											South Sudan											Sudan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Turkmenistan											Ukraine											Uzbekistan											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe																										On This Page				search													>																										Government-by-Government Assessments: Laos 																	Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs																								Division for International Finance and Development																								Laos