If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

VHS OF MICHIGAN, INC., doing business as 

DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

June 20, 2024

v No. 365479

Wayne Circuit Court

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY,

LC No. 22-002236-NF

Defendant,

and

MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 

PLACEMENT FACILITY and CURRENTLY 

UNNAMED ASSIGNEE OF THE MICHIGAN 

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT 

FACILITY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: YATES, P.J., and BORRELLO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In this action to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, plaintiff appeals as 

of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants Michigan Automobile 

Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF) and Currently Unnamed Assignee of the MAIPF under 
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MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact).1 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, 

we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of medical treatment plaintiff provided to Michael Dantzler after 

Dantzler was injured in a motor vehicle accident on February 28, 2021. According to Dantzler, he

was self-employed as a “street mechanic” and worked out of his home. Dantzler alleged that a 

frequent customer named Dee dropped off a 2014 Dodge Charger and the keys to the vehicle at 

Dantzler’s home for repairs on February 26, 2021. Dantzler repaired the vehicle on February 27, 

2021. Later that evening, two neighborhood children asked Dantzler to take them for a ride in the 

Charger. Although Dantzler had consumed alcohol earlier that evening and did not have a valid 

driver’s license, Dantzler agreed to take the children for a ride in the Charger. Just after midnight 

on February 28, 2021, while driving the children in the Charger, Dantzler crashed into a parked 

vehicle. He was injured and lost consciousness following the crash. Dantzler was taken by 

ambulance to plaintiff’s hospital, Detroit Medical Center Sinai-Grace Hospital, where he received 

treatment for his injuries. It was later determined that the vehicle Dantzler was operating when 

the accident occurred had been stolen from its owner, Anthony Martin, in October or November 

2020. Dantzler and Martin did not know each other.

Plaintiff filed this action to recover PIP benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et 

seq., for the medical treatment and services it provided to Dantzler for his injuries from the 

accident.

As relevant to this appeal, defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim was precluded by MCL 

500.3113(a), which provides that a person is not entitled to PIP benefits if, at the time of the 

accident, the person willingly operated a vehicle that was taken unlawfully and the person knew 

or should have known that the vehicle was unlawfully taken. Defendant argued that Dantzler 

unlawfully took the Charger because he was operating the vehicle without a license and while 

under the influence of alcohol above the legal limit when the accident occurred and, additionally, 

because he knew that he did not have permission to drive the vehicle at the time of the accident. 

Because plaintiff’s claim was predicated on Dantzler’s right to recovery of PIP benefits and if he 

was precluded from recovery under MCL 500.3113(a), plaintiff’s claim was also precluded.

After hearing oral argument on defendant’s motion, the trial court ruled that Dantzler 

unlawfully took the Charger within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a) when Dantzler operated the 

Charger while under the influence of alcohol in the early morning hours of February 28, 2021. 

The trial court, therefore, granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that 

MCL 500.3113(a) precluded plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff now appeals.

 

1 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) was dismissed from the case in 

the trial court and is not a party to the instant appeal. No appearance was filed on behalf of the 

Unnamed Assignee of the MAIPF in the trial court or in this Court. Thus, our use of the singular 

term “defendant” refers only to the MAIPF.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.” Parise 

v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 295 Mich App 25, 27; 811 NW2d 98 (2011). Summary disposition 

is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial 

judgment as a matter of law.” MCR 2.116(C)(10). “In reviewing a motion under MCR 

2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant 

documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine 

whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial.” Zaher v Miotke, 300 Mich 

App 132, 139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A genuine issue 

of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing 

party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. at 139-140 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Questions involving statutory interpretation present issues of law that 

this Court review’s de novo. Parise, 295 Mich App at 27.

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by determining that Dantzler unlawfully took the 

Charger within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a) and granting summary disposition in defendant’s 

favor, thereby precluding plaintiff from recovering PIP benefits for its treatment of Dantzler’s 

injuries. Plaintiff argues that the exclusion from PIP benefits contained in MCL 500.3113(a) 

requires an unlawful taking, not merely an unlawful use, for the exclusion to apply. Further, 

plaintiff argues that the relevant inquiry for determining whether an unlawful taking occurred must 

focus on how the person gained possession of the vehicle rather than how the vehicle was used 

after obtaining possession. Plaintiff maintains that Dee, the ostensible owner of the Charger, 

voluntarily gave Dantzler possession of the vehicle for purposes of making repairs and that 

Dantzler’s subsequent use of the vehicle while it was in his possession, even if his use was not 

authorized, could not somehow transform Dantzler’s possession of the vehicle into an unlawful 

taking for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a).

Resolution of this issue involves statutory interpretation. Our task when construing a 

statute is to discern the Legislature’s intent, and we begin with the statutory language. Whitman v 

City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013). “If the language of a statute is clear 

and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is 

permitted.” Id.

“The no-fault act permits an insurer to avoid coverage of PIP benefits under certain 

enumerated circumstances, such as those listed in MCL 500.3113.” Ahmed v Tokio Marine 

America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 9; 972 NW2d 860 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In relevant part, MCL 500.3113 provides as follows:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for 

accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following 

circumstances existed:
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(a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle 

or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have 

known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully. [MCL 

500.3113(a).]

The exclusion in this statutory provision “applies to any person (1) ‘willingly operating or 

willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle’ that (2) was unlawfully taken by someone, and (3) 

the person seeking benefits ‘knew or should have known’ that the motor vehicle was taken 

unlawfully.” Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 10. Hence, “a person who willingly operates or willingly 

uses a motor vehicle that someone took unlawfully is disqualified from eligibility for benefits if 

the person ‘knew or should have known’ that the taking of the motor vehicle was unlawful; stated 

differently, such a person is disqualified from eligibility for benefits unless the person had no 

reason to know that the taking was unlawful.” Id. at 23 (emphasis added). “ ‘The first level of 

inquiry when applying MCL 500.3113(a) always concerns whether the taking of a vehicle was 

unlawful, and if the taking was lawful, the inquiry ends because the statute is inapplicable.’ ” Id. 

at 19, quoting Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich App 738, 747; 896 NW2d 32 (2016).

In Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 492 Mich 503, 515-517; 

821 NW2d 117 (2012), our Supreme Court construed MCL 500.3113(a) and specifically 

ascertained the Legislature’s intended meaning of the phrase “taken unlawfully.” The Court held:

In determining the Legislature’s intended meaning of the phrase “taken 

unlawfully,” we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may 

consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the phrase. 

The word “unlawful” commonly means “not lawful; contrary to law; illegal,” and 

the word “take” is commonly understood as “to get into one’s hands or possession 

by voluntary action.” When the words are considered together, the plain meaning 

of the phrase “taken unlawfully” readily embraces a situation in which an individual 

gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law.

The Michigan Penal Code contains several statutes that prohibit “takings,”

including two that prohibit “joyriding,” MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414. MCL 

750.413 states that “[a]ny person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take 

possession of and drive or take away . . . any motor vehicle, belonging to another, 

shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” Similarly, MCL 750.414 provides in pertinent part 

that “[a]ny person who takes or uses without authority any motor vehicle without 

intent to steal the same, or who is a party to such unauthorized taking or using, is 

guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” Thus, both joyriding statutes make it unlawful to 

take any motor vehicle without authority, effectively defining an unlawful taking 

of a vehicle as that which is unauthorized.

Because a taking does not have to be larcenous to be unlawful, the phrase 

“taken unlawfully” in MCL 500.3113(a) applies to anyone who takes a vehicle 

without the authority of the owner, regardless of whether that person intended to 

steal it. [Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 515-518 (citations omitted; first emphasis 

added; alterations and ellipses in original).]
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The Court in Spectrum Health further explained that “[t]he ‘authority’ referred to in the 

joyriding statutes is obviously the authority of the owner of the vehicle” and that “[a]ccordingly, 

for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a), a vehicle is ‘unlawfully taken’ if it is taken without the authority 

of its owner.” Id. at 518 n 25. As the Supreme Court recognized, there must be both an unlawful 

act and a taking for the vehicle to have been “taken unlawfully.” Id. at 516-517. The Court defined 

the phrase “taken unlawfully” to “embrace[] a situation in which an individual gains possession of 

a vehicle contrary to Michigan law.” Id. at 517 (emphasis added). Accordingly, there must be a 

nexus between the unlawful act and the attainment of possession. As the Court recognized in 

Spectrum Health, a mere use of the vehicle that is unlawful but that is unconnected to attaining

possession does not satisfy the definition of “taken unlawfully” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a):

MCL 750.414 contains disjunctive prohibitions: it prohibits someone from 

“tak[ing]” a motor vehicle “without authority” and, alternatively, it prohibits 

someone from “us[ing]” a motor vehicle “without authority.” Thus, it is possible 

to violate MCL 750.414 without unlawfully taking the vehicle and, as a result, not 

all violations of MCL 750.414 necessarily constitute unlawful takings within the 

meaning of MCL 500.3113(a). Nevertheless, a taking that violates MCL 750.414 

qualifies for the exclusion under MCL 500.3113(a) because it is an unlawful taking. 

[Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517 n 24.]

Although MCL 500.3113(a) has been amended since the Supreme Court issued its opinion 

in Spectrum Health, this Court has already held that “the key term, ‘taken unlawfully,’ has the 

same meaning under the present version as it had under the old version.” Ahmed, 337 Mich App 

at 10. 

In accord with this Court’s obligation to follow holdings of our Supreme Court, Associated 

Builders & Contractors v City of Lansing, 499 Mich 177, 191-192; 880 NW2d 765 (2016), this 

Court has continued to recognize the distinction between using and taking for purposes of MCL 

500.3113(a), Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 5, 11-13 (stating that although there was no question that 

the plaintiff was unlawfully using and operating the rented vehicle at the time of the accident when 

he drove the vehicle without holding a valid license, contrary to the express prohibition in the 

rental agreement between the car rental company that owned the vehicle and the plaintiff’s spouse

who rented the vehicle, it was nonetheless necessary to “determine whether these facts amounted 

to an unlawful ‘taking,’ in other words, that plaintiff got the [vehicle] ‘into one’s hands or 

possession by voluntary action’ ”). This Court observed in Ahmed, “as Spectrum Health noted 

generally, any violation of the criminal law that leads to a taking of a motor vehicle will constitute 

an ‘unlawful taking’ for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a).” Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 11 n 5

(emphasis added); accord Swoope v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ 

NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 364924); slip op at 3. “MCL 500.3113(a) examines the legality of 

the taking from the driver’s perspective[.]” Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 12 (quotation marks and 

citations omitted; alteration in original). Again, because an “unlawful taking” for purposes of 

MCL 500.3113(a) occurs when a violation of the criminal law “leads to a taking of a motor 

vehicle,” there must be a nexus between the particular illegal act and obtaining possession of the 

vehicle.

Here, the record reflects that when Dantzler drove the Charger on the night of the accident,

he did not have a valid driver’s license and had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. The 
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traffic crash report indicates that his blood-alcohol content was .133. Plaintiff does not appear to 

contest this evidence. Undisputedly, these facts support a conclusion that Dantzler’s use of the 

vehicle was unlawful. See MCL 257.301(1) (stating in relevant part that “an individual shall not 

drive a motor vehicle on a highway in this state unless that individual has a valid operator’s or 

chauffeur’s license”);2 MCL 257.625(1)(b), as amended by 2017 PA 153 (generally prohibiting, 

at the time of the accident in this case, the operation of a vehicle by a person with “an alcohol 

content of 0.08 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood”). Thus, to determine whether Dantzler 

was disqualified from eligibility for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), the issue becomes

whether there was any taking of the Charger and whether there was a nexus between any taking—

i.e., how Dantzler gained possession—of the Charger and the unlawful acts committed by 

Dantzler. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 17; Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 10, 11 n 5. Hence, we must 

consider whether Dantzler’s particular violations of the criminal law actually led “to a taking of 

[the] motor vehicle” such that an “unlawful taking” for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a) occurred. 

Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 11 n 5; Swoope, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.

It is undisputed in this case that the Charger had been stolen from Martin, who was the 

actual owner. There is no evidence or allegation in this case that Dantzler was involved in the 

theft or that Dantzler and Martin knew each other. The current version of MCL 500.3113(a) 

requires a showing that the vehicle was unlawfully taken by someone; disqualification from PIP 

benefits under this statutory provision is not limited only to the person who actually took the 

vehicle unlawfully. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 10. The undisputed evidence thus reflects that there 

was an unlawful taking by someone because the Charger was taken from its owner, Martin, without 

Martin’s authority. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 518 (“[T]he phrase ‘taken unlawfully’ in MCL 

500.3113(a) applies to anyone who takes a vehicle without the authority of the owner, regardless 

of whether that person intended to steal it.”); Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 12 (citing Spectrum Health

for the proposition that there must be a threshold determination that the vehicle was taken from its 

owner without the owner’s authority). 

However, that does not end the analysis, because the statute also requires that the person 

who was operating the vehicle “knew or should have known that the motor vehicle . . . was taken 

unlawfully” in order for that person to be disqualified from PIP benefits. MCL 500.3113(a); 

Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 10. This Court discussed this scienter requirement in Ahmed, concluding 

that “a person who willingly operates or willingly uses a motor vehicle that someone took 

unlawfully is disqualified from eligibility for benefits if the person ‘knew or should have known’

that the taking of the motor vehicle was unlawful” and that such a person is not disqualified from 

benefits if “the person had no reason to know that the taking was unlawful.” Id. at 23. Here, there 

is no contention and we cannot find within the record any evidence that Dantzler knew that the 

Charger had been stolen or that he had any indication to suspect that it could have been stolen. It 

is the insurer’s burden to establish the requirements of MCL 500.3113(a) in order to disqualify a 

person from eligibility for PIP benefits. Monaco v Home-Owners Ins Co, 317 Mich App 738, 746; 

896 NW2d 32 (2016). Thus, because there is no evidence that Dantzler had “reason to know” that 

the Charger had been taken unlawfully from Martin at the time that the Charger was given to 

 

2 Although MCL 257.301 has been amended since the date of the accident at issue in this case, 

there were no changes to the language in Subsection (1). 2021 PA 71. 
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Dantzler by Dee to have repairs performed, Dantzler cannot be disqualified from eligibility for PIP 

benefits under MCL 500.3113(a) on the basis of the initial unlawful taking from Martin. Ahmed, 

337 Mich App at 23.

The next question becomes whether, as the trial court concluded, Dantzler’s unlawful use

of the Charger—driving it without a license and while intoxicated—after the Charger had already 

come into his possession constitutes an unlawful taking for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a) that 

could disqualify Dantzler from eligibility for benefits.

3

 Defendant argues that there was an 

unlawful taking because, in addition to the obvious fact that Dantzler did not have permission from 

Martin—the true owner—to use the Charger, Dantzler also did not have permission from Dee—

the Charger’s ostensible owner—to drive the vehicle in the middle of the night while intoxicated, 

unlicensed, and carrying two minor passengers. 

In Landon v Titan Ins Co, 251 Mich App 633, 635; 651 NW2d 93 (2002), the plaintiff was 

involved in a motor vehicle accident while driving a vehicle owned by her friend. The friend had 

left the vehicle parked in the plaintiff’s yard, with the plaintiff’s permission, while advertising the 

vehicle for sale. Id. The friend left the vehicle unlocked, with the keys under the floor mat, so the 

plaintiff could let potential buyers test drive the vehicle, but the friend did not expressly permit or 

prohibit the plaintiff’s use of the vehicle. Id. at 636. When the plaintiff drove the vehicle on the 

day of the accident, she believed that her friend would not have objected, but the plaintiff later 

conceded that her friend probably did not expect the plaintiff to drive the vehicle. Id.

This Court concluded that the plaintiff could not have taken possession of the vehicle 

without authority, in violation of MCL 750.413, because the plaintiff’s friend had voluntarily 

placed the vehicle in the plaintiff’s possession and had therefore made the plaintiff a bailee of the 

vehicle. Id. at 641-643. Furthermore, this Court also held that after being given lawful possession 

of the vehicle, subsequent use of the vehicle that exceeded the authority granted by the owner did 

not constitute an unlawful taking for purposes of 500.3113(a), even if it may have been a violation 

of MCL 750.414. Id. at 643-646. The Court reasoned that “it is the unlawful nature of the taking, 

not the unlawful nature of the use, that forms the basis of the exclusion under subsection 3113(a).” 

Id. at 646 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We concluded that the trial court had erred as a 

matter of law by ruling that the plaintiff had unlawfully taken the friend’s vehicle for purposes of 

MCL 500.3113(a). Id. at 650.

Similarly, in State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 115 Mich App 675, 

677; 321 NW2d 769 (1982), an employee was injured in a motor vehicle accident while he was 

using a vehicle that was owned by his employer. Although the employer had provided the vehicle 

to the employee to use “on company business during regular business hours” and did not authorize 

the employee to use the vehicle for personal reasons, the employee was using the vehicle for his 

own personal use and outside the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Id. at 677-

678. This Court held that the exclusion in MCL 500.3113(a) was inapplicable because “the 

original taking of the motor vehicle in which [the employee] was injured was not unlawful. Id. at 

682. The Court explained that the employee “took the vehicle lawfully and within the scope of his 

 

3 The trial court appeared to focus only on Dantzler’s unlawful act of driving while intoxicated.
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employment” but “continued to use the vehicle for his own purposes after working hours, and was 

injured while doing so.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the insurance 

company’s argument that the employee was ineligible for benefits under MCL 500.3113(a) 

because his use of the vehicle for personal reasons was unauthorized and, thus, unlawful. Id. at 

681-682.

In Monaco, 317 Mich App at 741, this Court held that “the phrase ‘taken unlawfully,’ as 

employed in MCL 500.3113(a), does not encompass the unlawful use or operation of a motor 

vehicle, just the unlawful taking of a vehicle.” In that case, a 15-year-old was injured when she 

lost control of the vehicle she was driving. Id. She was driving alone, even though she only had 

a permit allowing her to drive “if accompanied by a licensed parent, guardian, or 21–year–old.” 

Id. at 741-742. The vehicle was owned by the 15-year-old’s mother, and there was evidence that 

the 15-year-old had been given permission to drive the vehicle unaccompanied at the time of the 

accident. Id. at 742-743. This Court framed the issue presented on appeal as follows:

There is but one issue in this appeal that we must resolve. It concerns the legal 

question whether a person injured in a motor vehicle accident is barred from 

recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a)—which generally precludes 

coverage when a person used a vehicle that he or she had “taken unlawfully”—

when the owner of the vehicle permitted, gave consent to, or otherwise authorized 

the injured person to take and use the vehicle, but the injured person used the 

vehicle in violation of the law with the owner’s knowledge. [Id. at 741.]

This Court answered that question in the negative. Id. at 748-749. Citing Spectrum Health, 

492 Mich at 518 n 25, this Court stated that “the unlawful operation or use of a motor vehicle is 

simply not a concern in the context of analyzing whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully” for 

purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Id. Accordingly, this Court concluded that there was not an 

unlawful taking under MCL 500.3113(a) because the 15-year-old driver only used the vehicle 

unlawfully but did not “ ‘gain[ ] possession of [the] vehicle contrary to Michigan law.’ ” Id. at 

750, quoting Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517 (alterations in original). The Court in Monaco

further reasoned that, “with respect to the language in MCL 500.3113(a), ‘[c]learly, the terms 

“take” and “use” are not interchangeable or even synonymous; obtaining possession of an object 

is very different from employing that object or putting it into service.’ ” Monaco, 317 Mich App 

at 749 (citation omitted; alteration in original).

Reading Landon, State Farm, and Monaco together, the rule that emerges is that the 

pertinent question in determining whether there was an unlawful taking under MCL 500.3113(a) 

is whether there was a voluntary transfer of possession of the vehicle, even if for a temporary 

period of time, and not whether the subsequent use of the vehicle by the person seeking PIP 

benefits exceeded the scope of the use authorized by the owner. This is consistent with the wellsettled principle that there is a distinction between a “use” and a “taking” in this context. Spectrum 

Health, 492 Mich at 517 n 24; Monaco, 317 Mich App at 749; accord Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 

13. When possession has been transferred voluntarily, even if temporarily, there has been no 
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“taking.”4 Thus, in those circumstances, a person’s subsequent use, even if not authorized by the 

owner or if otherwise unlawful, does not constitute an unlawful taking under MCL 500.3113(a) 

because there is no nexus between that unlawful conduct and how the person gained possession of 

the vehicle. Landon, 251 Mich App at 641-646; State Farm, 115 Mich App at 681-682; Monaco, 

317 Mich App at 748-750.

Here, Dantzler received the Charger from Dee to perform repairs on the vehicle. It was 

only after Dantzler had gained possession that he committed the unlawful acts of driving without 

a license and while intoxicated. However, those unlawful acts had no connection to the manner in 

which Dantzler gained possession of the Charger. Therefore, there was no “unlawful taking” for 

purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). The trial court erred by concluding to the contrary and granting 

summary disposition in favor of defendant.

This Court’s recent decisions in Ahmed and Swoope do not require a different conclusion. 

In Ahmed, there was evidence that the vehicle’s owner had expressly prohibited the plaintiff driver 

from taking and operating the vehicle and that the driver knew or should have known about the 

prohibition. Ahmed, 337 Mich App at 5-6, 13-15. The vehicle had been rented by the plaintiff’s 

wife, and the terms of the rental agreement prohibited operation of the vehicle by a person without 

a driver’s license. Id. at 5-6. The plaintiff did not have a valid driver’s license, and he never read 

the rental agreement even though he knew that the car was rented and knew that the rental 

agreement existed. Id. at 5, 13. Nonetheless, the plaintiff drove the rental car and was involved 

in an accident. Id. at 5, 13-14. This Court held that the plaintiff took voluntary action to gain 

possession of the vehicle, drove the vehicle contrary to the owner’s authorization as stated in the 

written terms of the rental agreement, and unlawfully took the vehicle within the meaning of MCL 

500.3113(a). Id. at 13-15, 21. This Court further concluded that although the plaintiff was actually 

unaware of the terms of the rental agreement, he should have been aware of the term prohibiting 

unlicensed drivers such as himself from operating the vehicle because the plaintiff knew that the 

vehicle was rented, knew that a written rental agreement existed, should have known his driving 

status, and therefore was obligated to determine whether the rental agreement authorized a 

nonparty such as himself to take and operate the vehicle. Id. at 26.

In Swoope, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while driving a car owned 

by the plaintiff’s friend. Swoope, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1. The plaintiff did not have a 

valid driver’s license. Id. The vehicle’s owner did not give the plaintiff permission to drive the 

 

4

In Ahmed, the panel stated that “while it is possible to possess or ‘take’ a car without ‘operating’

or driving it, such as by placing it on a flatbed truck and moving it, or by using a tow truck,” then 

held: “it is not possible to drive it without also taking it; the act of driving a car can only be 

accomplished by someone who is in possession of it and operating the controls.” Ahmed, 337 

Mich App at 14. (emphasis added). Here, Dantzler received possession of the vehicle from Dee 

before he drove it and without “taking” it. When Dantzler drove the vehicle, he already had 

possession of the vehicle. “ ‘[P]ossession’ is not an act of limited duration; possession continues 

as long as someone exercises control over the thing possessed.” Id. Hence, when Dantzler drove 

the vehicle in this case, there was not a “taking” because he already had possession and did not 

need to “gain” possession. Spectrum Health, 492 Mich at 517. 
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vehicle. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. The plaintiff knew that her license was suspended, and she did

not take any steps to seek authorization from her friend to take the car. Id. This Court held that 

the plaintiff therefore unlawfully took the vehicle and should have known the taking was unlawful 

for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Id. at ___; slip op at 3-4.

Here, unlike the factual circumstances in Ahmed and Swoope, defendant has not cited any

evidence that suggested Dantzler taking of possession of the Charger when it was left with him by 

Dee, was somehow unauthorized or unlawful. Defendant also does not claim that there were any

factual indications that should have alerted Dantzler to the possibility that he had not been 

legitimately entrusted with possession of the Charger by the Charger’s actual owner. Accordingly,

the factual circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Ahmed and Swoope, and

our conclusions in this case are consistent with the holdings in Ahmed and Swoope.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not 

retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff having prevailed is entitled to costs. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Christopher P. Yates 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett