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1

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATIO

N

B OARD

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Highway Accident Brief 

Accident No.: HWY-05-MH-023 

Accident Type: Frontal and sideswipe collision between a school bus and a 

trash truck 

Location: Columbia Pike near the intersection with Courthouse Road; 

Arlington, Virginia 

Date and Time: April 18, 2005; 8:40 a.m. 

Vehicle 1: 1999 Thomas Built 52-passenger school bus 

Operator 1: Arlington County, Virginia, School District 

Vehicle 2: 2003 Mack 4-axle truck with a Heil trash body 

Operator 2: AAA Recycling and Trash Removal Services 

Injuries: 2 fatal, 3 serious, and 4 minor 

Accident Description 

Shortly before 8:40 a.m., on Monday, April 18, 2005, a 52-passenger school bus 

was traveling westbound on Columbia Pike (State Route 244) in Arlington County, 

Virginia, transporting 15 elementary school children, grades pre-K through 5, to the 

nearby Hoffman-Boston Elementary School. On approaching the signaled intersection 

with Courthouse Road, the school bus driver began moving the bus into the left turn lane 

(from which it would turn south onto Courthouse Road) and slowed it nearly to a stop.1

As the driver turned the vehicle, its left front encroached slightly into the left lane of the 

eastbound side of Columbia Pike. The driver later stated2

 that distractions inside the bus 

might have affected her driving at this time. She said her attention was drawn to a student 

standing on a seat and to a clipboard that fell to the floor at her driving station. 

About 8:40 a.m., a 2003 Mack trash truck was traveling with the flow of traffic in 

the left eastbound lane on Columbia Pike, at a speed one witness who was traveling on 

the road in the same direction estimated to be approximately 30 mph. The truck reached 

the intersection with Courthouse Road, continued through it on a green signal and, 

according to several witnesses, deviated slightly leftward from its lane toward the yellow 

centerline. The truck collided with the school bus; the impact involved the front-left 

 1

 The signal for the left turn lane was permissive green, meaning that turning was permitted but that 

the turning vehicle had to yield to oncoming traffic. 

2

 The school bus driver made these statements during a brief interview conducted by the Arlington 

County Police at the hospital where she was treated following the accident. She declined to be interviewed 

by Safety Board investigators. 
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corners of both vehicles and a sideswipe. (See figures 1 and 2 for a map of the accident 

location area and a diagram representing the vehicles at the point of impact.) 

Figure 1. Map showing the area of Arlington, Virginia, where the accident occurred.
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Figure 2. Diagram showing the estimated positions of the school bus and the trash truck 

at the point of impact.

During the collision, the school bus was pushed backward, but it remained in the 

left turn lane following the accident. The trash truck continued eastbound about 200 feet, 

crossed the right eastbound lane, jumped the right curb of Columbia Pike, and came to 

rest. (See figure 3.) 
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Figure 3. Vehicles at rest postaccident. 

One student died at the scene and one student died 3 days later in the hospital. 

The truck driver, school bus driver, and one student on the bus sustained serious injuries; 

four students sustained minor injuries; and the remaining eight students were uninjured. 

The bus driver, who had been wearing her seat belt, was ejected through the broken 

windshield when the shoulder portion of the belt was sheared in half. Emergency 

responders needed approximately 1 hour to extricate the trash truck driver from the truck 

cab because of his legs being trapped in the wreckage. The students who suffered the 

most severe injuries were seated behind the driver on the left side, near the front, of the 

bus. (See figure 4.) 
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Figure 4. School bus seating and injury chart. 
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Weather conditions at the time of the accident were clear and dry. 

The school bus sustained impact damage to its front and left side. (See figure 5.) 

The damage continued along the left side of the bus to near the sixth passenger row 

behind the driver’s seat, approximately 20 feet rearward from the front bumper. Intrusion 

into the occupant compartment extended inboard to a depth of about 6 1/2 inches. 

Figure 5. Damage to the school bus. 

The trash truck sustained damage to its left-front corner and its hydraulic front 

loader arm assembly. The left fork of the trash truck’s hydraulic arm was bent outward 

and protruded to the left of the truck’s left side. (See figure 6.) 
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Figure 6. Damage to the trash truck. 

Vehicles 

School Bus 

The school bus was a 1999 52-passenger transit-style3

 school bus manufactured 

by Thomas Built Buses, Inc. The bus had a gross vehicle weight rating of 36,360 pounds, 

a body length of 36 feet, 3 inches, an overall body height of approximately 10 feet, and a 

body width of 8 feet. The accident bus met the applicable requirements of Federal Motor 

Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 221 for design strength.4

 

The tires were inflated within an acceptable range of manufacturer-recommended 

tire pressures and had adequate tread depths. During the postaccident inspection, 

investigators found the steering system of the school bus to be solidly connected. The bus 

was equipped with antilock brakes. The pneumatic braking system was configured 

 3

 A transit-style school bus consists of a body installed upon the chassis, with the engine mounted in 

the front, midsection, or rear. These vehicles have a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 

pounds and are designed to carry more than 10 passengers. The entrance door and driver’s seat are forward 

of the front axle. 

4

 FMVSS 221, “School Bus Body Joint Strength,” establishes requirements for the strength of the body 

panel joints in school bus bodies. The purpose of this standard is to reduce deaths and injuries resulting 

from the structural collapse of school bus bodies during crashes. 
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appropriately and was functional during the inspection. All brakes were within 

adjustment limits. 

The school bus did not have an event data recorder, and its engine’s electronic 

control module was not equipped with data recording features. 

Trash Truck 

The trash truck was a 2003 Mack Trucks, Inc., 4-axle truck with a Heil 

Environmental Industries, Ltd. (Heil), trash body. This type of vehicle undergoes a twostage manufacturing process in which the chassis is produced by a truck manufacturer 

(Mack) and then is sent to another manufacturer (Heil), which equips the vehicle with the 

refuse loading and hauling body. According to specifications, the vehicle had a gross 

vehicle weight rating of 77,000 pounds and was 33 feet long, 8 feet wide, and 14 feet, 

10 inches, high with the trash-loading arm assembly raised and 13 feet high with it 

lowered. The hydraulic arm’s width matched the width of the vehicle body, at 8 feet. 

The vehicle’s hydraulic front-loading arm assembly was designed to pick up 

dumpsters, raise them above the truck, and empty their contents into the back of the 

truck. According to Heil, the recommended in-transit position for this assembly was with 

the fork cross shaft (bottom) of the arm “slightly below cab windshield”5

 to ensure 

visibility through the windshield and enable the vehicle to meet road height restrictions. 

The recommended in-transit position for the forks (which retract down from the two sides 

of the arm) was that they be folded up into the arm. (See figure 7.) 

Figure 7. Diagram of an exemplar trash truck with loader arm positioned below cab 

windshield, as recommended by Heil for transit. The forks in this diagram are 

approximately halfway between being folded into the arm and being fully extended. 

 5

 Heil Operator’s Manual, MR-75029-305, p. 24. 
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The truck driver stated that he had positioned the truck’s arm above the 

headlights, which would put it forward of the bumper and a little below the windshield. 

Postaccident examination indicated that the forks were neither fully folded nor fully 

extended. (Damage to the forks made it difficult to determine their preaccident position.) 

The tires were inflated within an acceptable range of manufacturer-recommended 

tire pressures and had adequate tread depths. Postaccident disassembly of the steering 

gearbox showed no internal problems with the component. The pneumatic braking 

system, although damaged by the crash, was configured appropriately. The left second 

axle, left third axle, and right fourth axle brakes were out of adjustment.6

The trash truck did not have an event data recorder but was equipped with 

advanced electronic engine control technology capable of recording limited accident 

information. However, the recorded incident data available postaccident were unrelated 

to the collision and appear to concern routine operational procedures. The impact with the 

school bus probably did not produce a strong enough crash pulse to reduce the vehicle’s 

speed or generate a change in engine speed sufficient to trigger the incident-recording 

function of the installed technology. 

Motor Carriers 

AAA Recycling and Trash Removal Services 

AAA Recycling and Trash Removal Services (AAA), an authorized interstate, 

for-hire, motor carrier that operates in Virginia and the District of Columbia, owned the 

trash truck. AAA was incorporated in October 1974. The majority of the carrier’s 

business is intrastate trash removal operations in Virginia. At the time of the accident, 

AAA employed about 300 full-time drivers and had a fleet of about 300 trash trucks of 

various sizes. AAA drivers are assigned regular routes; they work 5 days a week and 

some half days on Saturdays. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s 

(FMCSA’s) Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS) roadside 

inspection data for AAA for the 12 months preceding the accident indicated a 4-percent 

out-of-service rate for drivers and a 12-percent out-of-service rate for vehicles. FMCSA 

roadside inspection data for 2004 indicate national out-of-service rates for drivers and 

vehicles as 6.7 percent and 23.6 percent, respectively.7

 AAA had not received a 

compliance review by the FMCSA or the State of Virginia before this accident.8

 The 

 6

 The brakes being out of adjustment would have placed the trash truck out of service had it been 

inspected; however, there is no evidence that the trash truck driver attempted braking prior to the crash. The 

brake adjustment levels would not have interfered with normal stopping ability. 

7

 From the FMCSA’s webpage for “Analysis and Information,” providing roadside inspection 

information at <http://www.ai.fmcsa.dot.gov/programmeasures/RI/NR/NAS/Report.asp?FC=C&RF=T>, 

accessed December 14, 2006. 

8

 MCMIS records indicated that safety evaluation area values from roadside inspections placed AAA 

in category H (the highest safety rating). Consequently, the FMCSA would not have prioritized AAA to 

receive a compliance review. 
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FMCSA conducted a postaccident compliance review of AAA on April 25, 2005, which 

resulted in a satisfactory rating. 

Arlington County School District 

The Arlington County School District operated the school bus. The district 

comprises 3 high schools, 5 middle schools, 22 elementary schools, 3 alternative schools, 

1 secondary program school, 1 family center, and 1 career center. At the time of the 

accident, the district employed 102 full-time bus drivers and 7 substitute drivers; drivers’ 

contracts were renewed annually. The school bus fleet consisted of 100 transit-style 

school buses (the configuration of the accident bus) and 24 special needs buses. 

Highway 

Columbia Pike in the vicinity of the accident is a straight, five-lane, undivided 

road.9

 The width of the paved portion is 58 feet, measured from the north curb face to the 

south curb face. The paved area consists of a 10-foot-wide center turn lane, four 11-footwide travel lanes (two for eastbound and two for westbound traffic), and two 2-foot-wide 

gutter pans, one adjacent to each curb face.10

A solid, double, yellow lane marking, approximately 1 foot wide, separates the 

center turn lane from the adjacent eastbound travel lane. The center turn lane pavement is 

marked with two solid, white left-turn arrow markers. 

According to the Virginia Department of Transportation, the average daily traffic 

on the section of Columbia Pike in the vicinity of the accident was approximately 30,000 

vehicles. 

The Arlington County Department of Public Works provided the traffic and fatal 

accident information for the intersection of Columbia Pike and Courthouse Road to 

Safety Board investigators. Table 1 summarizes this information, broken down by year, 

total accidents, injury accidents, fatal accidents, and pedestrian accidents. 

 9

 While eastbound on Columbia Pike approaching the Courthouse Road intersection, the trash truck 

was traveling over a crest vertical curve. According to postaccident sight distance testing, the truck driver 

would probably have been able to see the school bus when the two vehicles were about 362 feet apart. 

10 The roadway conformed to American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

(AASHTO) standards for urban principal arterial roads. 
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Table 1. Accident data summary for the accident intersection for the 3 years preceding 

the accident. 

Year Total accidents Injury accidents Fatal accidents Pedestrian 

accidents 

2002 5 1 0 0 

2003 3 2 0 1 

2004 6 2 0 2 

Total 14 5 0 3 

The speed limit for Columbia Pike in the vicinity of the accident is 30 mph. 

According to a postaccident speed survey of eastbound vehicles on Columbia Pike 

approaching the Courthouse Road intersection, conducted between noon and 1:00 p.m. on 

April 22, 2005, the 85th percentile speed11 in this area was 35 mph for passenger cars and 

40 mph for commercial vehicles. The Arlington County Police do not consider this 

location to have an unusual speeding problem. The speed of the eastbound trash truck at 

the time of the accident is unknown. 

Sideswipe Conditions 

At the time of the accident, the bus was entering the center left turn lane. A tire 

mark on the edge of the centerline closest to the bus indicated that the bus’s left front tire 

was touching this line, suggesting that the bus had initiated the movement into the turn 

lane but had not yet “straightened” the full body of the bus into and within it. If this 

movement were made later than would be optimal,12 a portion of the bus’s left front 

overhang might angle briefly over the centerline and into the eastbound lane. The 

incursion would last only until the sharp leftward movement was completed and the 

vehicle had fully readjusted its position back into and within the 10-foot-wide turn lane. 

(See figures 8 and 9.) 

 11 The 85th percentile speed is the speed at which or below 85 percent of surveyed vehicles are 

traveling. 

12 A late turn would have to be more acute than one made at the beginning of the turn lane (at the point 

farthest from the intersection). 
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Figure 8. View from the rear of an exemplar school bus positioned as the accident bus 

is likely to have been immediately preceding the accident. (Photograph taken during 

postaccident reconstruction.) 

Figure 9. View from the front of an exemplar school bus positioned as the accident bus 

is likely to have been immediately preceding the accident. Note that the bus’s left-front 

corner is encroaching upon the eastbound lane. (Photograph taken during postaccident 

reconstruction.) 
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Witness reports and physical evidence suggest that leftward deviation from their 

lanes occurred for both vehicles, and the bus probably encroached slightly into the trash 

truck’s lane, beyond the center lane marking. (See figure 10.) In other circumstances, 

such slight encroachment would probably have no consequences or, at worst, result in a 

minor sideswipe incident with few or no injuries. In this case, however, the outcome was 

different. The trash truck’s loading arm struck the bus above its bumper and engine 

compartment (which provide some structural protection in most front-end collisions) and 

entered the bus’s interior through the windshield. The destructive forces generated by the 

arm were small in terms of mass and had significant energy, which resulted in “tearing” 

damage to the bus’s sidewall. The arm penetrated the left side of the bus to a depth of 

several inches, causing the most severe injuries resulting from this accident. 

Figure 10. View of exemplar school bus and trash truck positioned as the accident 

vehicles are likely to have been immediately preceding the accident. (Photograph taken 

during postaccident reconstruction.) 

The truck’s loading arm was “down” with the fork cross shaft below the 

windshield, in general conformity with Heil’s recommendations for a trash truck in 

transit from one pickup site to another. The alternative to having the arm in the down 

position while the truck is traveling is to keep the arm above the truck, as it would be 

when raising and emptying a dumpster. However, the accident trash truck traveling with 

the arm in this position would have been 22 inches taller than it would have been with the 

arm lowered; it would have had a height of 14 feet, 10 inches. Such a height could 

conflict with road height restrictions and put the truck at risk of striking overhead 

obstacles such as signage and bridges. AASHTO recommends that vertical clearances at 
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underpasses be at least 14 feet over the entire roadway width.13 Some underpasses have 

less than the desired 14-foot vertical clearance. 

Trash Truck Driver 

The trash truck driver, age 41, held a valid, unrestricted Virginia class B 

commercial driver’s license (CDL), which had been renewed on June 25, 2003, with an 

expiration date of July 31, 2008. He had worked as a trash truck driver for 19 years. The 

driver’s record showed one conviction for exceeding the posted speed limit by 1–9 mph 

in 2001 while operating his personal vehicle. 

According to an October 22, 2003, medical certification examination report, the 

driver was in good general health and had no chronic or acute ailments, 20/20 vision, 

normal color vision, and normal hearing. The driver’s account of his 72-hour history 

indicated that he had slept 8 3/4, 12 1/2, and 8 1/2 hours, respectively, the 3 nights 

preceding the accident. 

Postaccident toxicology tests on blood specimens from the truck driver showed no 

evidence of drugs, including alcohol. 

The trash truck driver had two cellular telephones in the vehicle, which were 

recovered by police on the scene. The police downloaded the data stored in both 

telephones and determined that neither was in use at or near the time of the collision. 

During postaccident interviews, the truck driver stated that the school bus turned 

in to his vehicle. When informed that witnesses had indicated that the trash truck deviated 

from its travel lane toward the school bus, the truck driver stated that he believed his 

vehicle did not enter the bus’s lane. Additionally, he said that as the bus was entering his 

lane, he observed the bus driver looking up in her mirror, at the children on the bus. 

He stated that at the time of the accident he was not eating or drinking, he was not 

using a cellular telephone, and the sun was not blinding him.14

 13 “Vertical clearance at underpasses should be at least 14 feet over the entire roadway width, with an 

additional allowance for future resurfacing.” See AASHTO’s A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways 

and Streets, 5th edition (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2004) 427. 

14 During a postaccident reconstruction of the accident conducted at 8:40 a.m. on April 24, 2005, 

investigators examined the effect of the sun’s position on the view of the trash truck driver. The sun, which 

was above and to the right of the driver’s eye reference position, was concealed from the driver’s view by 

the structure of the truck cab above the windshield. 
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School Bus Driver 

The bus driver, age 37, held an unrestricted Virginia class B CDL, which had 

been renewed on January 27, 2003, with an expiration date of January 14, 2008.15 She 

had worked as a school bus driver for 11 years and was driving her usual route at the time 

of the accident. 

Arlington County school bus drivers receive behind-the-wheel training on both 

conventional and transit-style school buses before being permitted to drive for the county. 

They also receive annual refresher training before beginning work each school year. The 

training instructor for the school district stated that the accident bus driver had received 

her applicant training 11 years ago and that she had received her annual training before 

the beginning of the 2004–2005 school year. The training instructor also stated that 

drivers receive training about the implications of the dimensions of the transit-style 

school bus, especially the position of the driver with respect to the front wheel location 

during turning maneuvers. 

The driver’s record showed two previous convictions, one for exceeding the speed 

limit by 16–20 mph in her personal vehicle in 2003 and one for exceeding the speed limit 

by 11–20 mph (vehicle type was not identified) in 2001. 

A review of the 2003 medical examination record for the bus driver revealed that 

she reported no adverse medical history or use of medications, and the physician’s 

examination disclosed no disqualifying conditions. 

Postaccident toxicology tests on blood specimens from the school bus driver 

showed no evidence of drugs, including alcohol. 

The school bus was equipped with a two-way radio, which was disabled by the 

collision. The school bus driver had a personal cellular telephone in the bus. (Police did 

not recover the telephone following the accident.) No evidence was found to indicate that 

the driver was using either the two-way radio or the telephone at the time of the crash. 

Investigators identified two issues concerning the bus driver—her work/rest 

schedule and her medical certification. 

Work/Rest Schedule 

The school bus driver declined to be interviewed by Safety Board investigators. 

Lacking interview information from the school bus driver, investigators could not 

determine when or how many hours she slept during the weekend preceding the accident. 

 15 At the time of the accident, the school bus driver’s license was suspended for “financial 

responsibility infractions,” due to failure to maintain insurance on her personal vehicle. The suspension was 

lifted shortly after the accident. 
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On Saturday, April 16, 2005, the school bus driver had begun a second job as a 

night stocker at a grocery store in Arlington, Virginia. She worked at the grocery store 

Saturday and Sunday, the two nights before the accident, between 11:00 p.m. and 

6:00 a.m. On the day of the accident, a Monday, the school bus driver reported for her 

driving duties at 6:45 a.m. For the available information concerning the driver’s 72-hour 

history, see table 2. 

Table 2. School bus driver’s known activities in the 72 hours preceding the accident. 

Time Actions 

Friday, April 15 

6:45–9:45 a.m. On duty, driving for Arlington County schools 

2:00–5:00 p.m. On duty, driving for Arlington County schools 

Saturday, April 16, through Sunday, April 17 

11:00 p.m.–6:00 a.m. First night of work at grocery store 

Sunday, April 17, through Monday, April 18 

11:00 p.m.–6:00 a.m. Second night of work at grocery store 

Monday, April 18 

6:00–6:45 a.m. Travel/preparation between end of grocery 

store duty and beginning of school bus driving 

duty 

6:45–8:40 a.m. On duty, driving for Arlington County schools; 

accident occurred at 8:40 a.m. 

Because the school bus driver worked overnight shifts at her second job on the 

two nights preceding the accident, she may have been susceptible to the performanceimpairing effects of circadian disharmony16 at the time of the accident. Because any 

opportunity for the driver to rest during the 2 days before the accident would have been 

during daytime hours—a schedule the reverse of her previous nighttime sleep routine—

the quantity and quality of such rest could have been reduced due to circadian 

disharmony. The effects of circadian disharmony can include slowed reaction time, 

reduced vigilance, and cognitive slowing. Such factors, perhaps coupled with distractions 

within the bus, reportedly caused by a falling clipboard and a student standing on a seat 

in the moments before the accident, could have negatively affected her driving 

performance. 

 16 Circadian rhythm describes the regular recurrence, in cycles of about 24 hours, of biological 

processes or activities, such as sensitivity to drugs and stimuli, hormone secretion, sleeping, and feeding. 

This rhythm seems to be set by a “biological clock” that may be regulated by the recurring alternation 

between daylight and darkness. Circadian disharmony is experienced when the sleep/wake cycle is 

violated. (See M.R. Rosekind, Fatigue in Transportation: Physiological, Performance, and Safety Issues.

Prepared for the National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C., April 1999.) 
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The Arlington County School District was not aware that the bus driver had taken 

a nighttime job. The director of transportation for the district told investigators that at the 

time of the accident, the district had no policy requiring bus drivers to report outside jobs 

or to seek approval before accepting a second job with another employer. The director of 

transportation has since told Safety Board investigators that Arlington County school bus 

drivers are now required to report outside employment and that the district prohibits its 

school bus drivers from taking nighttime jobs. 

Because it lacks information about the accident bus driver’s 72-hour history, the 

Safety Board could not establish whether fatigue resulting from her nighttime job 

contributed to this accident. Nevertheless, it is concerned about the possible safety risks 

such jobs may pose for school bus drivers. The Board will provide articles for the 

publications of the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation 

Services and the National Association for Pupil Transportation about the circumstances 

of this accident and the potential danger that permitting school bus drivers to hold 

nighttime jobs could reduce drivers’ alertness and effectiveness as they perform their 

daytime driving duties. 

Medical Certificate 

During the investigation, Safety Board investigators identified an issue that did 

not have direct bearing on the accident17 but nonetheless was of concern—a lapse in the 

medical certification of the school bus driver. 

To drive a school bus in Virginia, an operator must possess a valid class B CDL 

and pass an annual physical examination. The Arlington County School District had 

contracted with a local health facility to conduct annual physical examinations of its bus 

drivers. At the time of the accident, the school bus driver possessed a Virginia 

physician’s certificate issued November 21, 2003, which had expired on November 21, 

2004, about 5 months before the accident. According to the records of the physician and 

school district, the driver had been scheduled to have an annual medical examination to 

renew her certificate on November 16, 2004, but the driver canceled the appointment. 

The appointment was not rescheduled. 

Virginia State law18 and the district’s bus driver contract stated that bus drivers 

were to complete their medical certifications by the annual renewal date of their 

contracts. Bus driver contracts are renewed at the beginning of the school year. The 

accident bus driver’s contract was renewed on August 30, 2004; consequently, her 

certification examination should have been conducted by that date. After the accident, the 

Arlington County School District transportation director told investigators that his 

 17 The Safety Board found nothing to suggest that medical factors negatively affected the school bus 

driver’s behavior on the day of the accident. 

18 According to the Code of Virginia, Section 22.1-178, “Requirements for persons employed to drive 

school buses,” Part D, medical examination documentation “shall be furnished annually prior to the 

anniversary date of the employment agreement as a condition to continuing employment to operate a school 

bus.” 
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understanding had been that the medical certification examination had to be completed by 

the end, rather than the beginning, of the school year.19

Since the accident, the Arlington County School District has implemented a 

policy requiring that its school bus drivers submit a form signed by their physicians 

documenting that the annual medical exam has been completed in accordance with 

requirements, so that the district can verify the medical certification status of its drivers. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

this accident was the school bus driver’s encroachment into the trash truck’s lane and the 

trash truck driver’s failure to maintain proper lane position, for undetermined reasons, 

causing the front-left sides of the two vehicles to collide and the vehicles to sideswipe 

each other. 

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 

MARK V. ROSENKER DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN 

Chairman Member

ROBERT L. SUMWALT KATHRYN O’LEARY HIGGINS 

Vice Chairman Member 

 STEVEN R. CHEALANDER 

 Member 

Adopted: December 21, 2007

 19 The transportation director had just returned after about a year of military service in Iraq when the 

accident occurred. During his absence, a temporary director had been carrying out his duties for the 

Arlington County School District.