alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Lizzie Whitfield, Respondent, *against*The Broadway & Seventh Avenue Railroad Company, Appellant.

(Decided June 2d, 1890.)

An order of the General Term of the City Court of New York affirming a judgment of that court is not an “actual determination,” from which an appeal may be taken to this court, under section 3191 of the Code of Civil Procedure; the appeal lies from the judgment entered in accordance with the directions of the order, not from the order.

Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court of New York affirming a judgment of that court.

, The facts are stated in the opinion.

*Joseph Kunzman,*for appellant.

*Louis F. Doyle,*for respondent.

Bischoff, J.

The appeal herein is from an order of the General Term of the City Court of New York affirming a judgment of that court, and not from the judgment of affirmance.

Such an order is not appealable *(Mehl*v. *Vonderwulbeke,*46 N. Y. 539; *Ferris*v. *Aspinwall,*10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 137 ; *Hollister Bank*v. *Vail,*15 N. Y. 593).

Section 3191 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which regulates appeals from the General Term of the City Court to this court and upon the provisions of which the jurisdiction of this court to review the proceedings of the City Court depends, does not change the general practice. The actual determination referred to in that section comprehends eithei a judgment or final order, and an order is not final where it is but the preliminary step towards perfecting the determina*289tion of the court, upon a pending controversy. “In the sense of the Code an order is deemed final, which closes the subject matter to which it relates, or it is not final, when it is a preparation to other actions.” *(Clark*v. *Goodridge,*44 How. Pr. 234).

An “ actual determination ” in an action is the judgment rendered therein, and not an order for judgment. And this applies as well to the judgment entered upon the order of a general term as it does to a judgment in the first instance.

Subdivision one of section 3191 above referred to specifically permits an appeal to this court from a final judgment upon an appeal to the General Term of the City Court, and the general provisions of that section, allowing an appeal from an order affecting a substantial right or involving some part of the merits, are not controlling upon the specific provision for an appeal from a final judgment. An order for such a judgment is of an interlocutory nature, and an appeal from the judgment also brings up the order for review. The case is in all respects similar to an order for judgment upon a demurrer. In such a case it is not the order which determines the action, but the judgment entered in accordance with the directions of the order. And the appeal lies from the judgment and not the order *(JElwell*v. *Johnson,*74 N. Y. 80).

The omission to appeal from the judgment of affirmance upon the order of the General Term of the City Court leaves this court without authority to review its proceedings, and this appeal must therefore be dismissed, with costs.

Labbemobe, Ch. J., and J. F. Daly, J., concurred.

Appeal dismissed, with costs.
-  		Print	 

## WELCOME TO GLOBAL TRENDS 2040

Welcome to the 7th edition of the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends report. Published every four years since 1997, Global Trends assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades.

Global Trends is designed to provide an analytic framework for policymakers early in each administration as they craft national security strategy and navigate an uncertain future. The goal is not to offer a specific prediction of the world in 2040; instead, our intent is to help policymakers and citizens see what may lie beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possible futures.

Read more...

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This edition of Global Trends constructs its analysis of the future in several stages. First, we examine structural forces in demographics, environment, economics, and technology that shape the contours of our future world. Second, we analyze how these structural forces and other factors—combined with human responses—affect emerging dynamics in societies, states, and the international system. Third, we envision five plausible scenarios for the distant future in 2040. The key themes discussed above appear across these sections.

Read more...

## THE COVID FACTOR: EXPANDING UNCERTAINTY

The COVID-19 pandemic emerged globally in 2020, wreaking havoc across the world, killing more than 2.5 million people as of early 2021, devastating families and communities, and disrupting economies and political dynamics within and between countries. Previous Global Trends editions forecasted the potential for new diseases and even imagined scenarios with a pandemic, but we lacked a full picture of the breadth and depth of its disruptive potential. COVID-19 has shaken long-held assumptions about resilience and adaptation and created new uncertainties about the economy, governance, geopolitics, and technology.

Read more...

## STRUCTURAL FORCES

Demographics & Human Development

Environment

Economics

Technology

## EMERGING DYNAMICS

Societal: Disillusioned, Informed, and Divided

State: Tensions, Turbulence, and Transformation

International: More Contested, Uncertain, and Conflict Prone

## STRATEGIC FUTURES GROUP ON THE SCENARIOS FOR 2040

In the latest edition of the Global Trends report, the National Intelligence Council detailed five potential scenarios for how the world will look in 20 years. Learn more about the report from the Director of the NIC’s Strategic Futures Group, Maria Langan-Riekhof.

Read more... | More videos from ODNI...

## SCENARIOS FOR 2040

Renaissance of Democracies

A World Adrift

Competitive Coexistence

Separate Silos

Tragedy and Mobilization

## REGIONAL FORECASTS

Latin America

Europe

Russia & Eurasia

Middle East & North Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa

South Asia

North East Asia

South East Asia

Oceania
§ 416.163 General rules. ( a ) Payment is made under this subpart for ASC services specified in §§ 416.164(a) and (b) furnished to Medicare beneficiaries by a participating ASC in connection with covered surgical procedures as determined by the Secretary in accordance with § 416.166.
( b ) Payment for physicians' services and payment for anesthetists' services are made in accordance with part 414 of this subchapter.
( c ) Payment for items and services other than physicians' and anesthetists' services, as specified in § 416.164(c), is made in accordance with § 410.152 of this subchapter.
# C_2005300EN.01003801.xml

| 30.11.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 300/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.11.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 300/38

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.3885 — Apax/Barclays/Tchenguiz/Somerfield/JV)

(2005/C 300/10)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 18 November 2005, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3885. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3885. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex)

---
HomeSerbia

# Serbia

125 items

        -    TIAS  		Serbia (21-602) – Protocol to Amend and Extend Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement of April 23, 2010	  June 2, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Serbia	  May 12, 2021 
        -    DipNote: Refugee and Humanitarian Assistance  		Countering Gender-Based Violence – How U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Cultivates a Safe Space	  May 10, 2021 
        -    TIAS  		Serbia (21-506) – Investment Incentive Agreement	  May 6, 2021 
        -    Press Statement  		U.S. Commitment to the Western Balkans	  Ned PriceApril 26, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Serbia	  March 30, 2021 
        -    Press Statement  		Serbia National Day	  Antony J. BlinkenFebruary 15, 2021 
        -    Funding Opportunity Announcement  		DRL Balkans Media and Civil Society	  February 11, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Investment Climate Statements: Serbia	  September 8, 2020 
        -    Report  		The JUST Act Report: Serbia	  July 29, 2020 

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#### David Mitchell WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 80-2233.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 6, 1981.

Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Richard N. Staten, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was adjudicated guilty on a charge of sale of heroin and sentenced to five years in prison “with credit for the original 29 days given plus all credit earned since date of sentence imposed on February 13, 1980.”

The judgment and sentence in this case are affirmed. However, the orders are remanded so that the trial judge may specifically set forth the period of credit time to be allowed. § 921.161(1), Fla.Stat. *(1977); Xiques v. State,*369 So.2d 1007 (Fla.2d DCA 1979).

SCHEB, C. J., and GRIMES and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
#### STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, Appellant, v. James Allen MORRIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of James Harold Morris, Deceased, Appellee.

No. MM-369.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 4, 1979.

*829John H. Haswell of Chandler, O'Neal, Gray, Lang & Haswell, Gainesville, for appellant.

Harold Silver, Gainesville, for appellee.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

ERVIN, Judge.

This cause is before us upon appellee’s motion to dismiss appellant’s review of a non-final order. Appellee sought damages on behalf of the estate of James Harold Morris for the wrongful death of the latter caused by the alleged negligence of one Jack Page, who, at the time of the accident, operated decedent’s automobile with his apparent knowledge and consent. Both Page and State Farm were sued. It was alleged that State Farm had insured decedent’s automobile and, upon the death of the decedent, the insured, the policy inured to the benefit of his estate. State Farm moved for summary judgment, contending that the policy was designed to protect the decedent from liability to third persons caused by the operation of his insured vehicle and was not intended to provide bodily injury coverage to the insured.1 The motion for summary judgment was denied, the court holding that the exclusion had no application. The order also denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The order concluded by stating that it did not decide whether or not either defendant Jack Page or State Farm might still raise affirmative defenses, assumption of the risk and comparative negligence.

Fla.R.App.P. 9.130(a)(C)(iv) permits review of non-final orders which determine the issue of liability in favor of the party seeking affirmative relief. The committee note to the rule states that it permits “appeals from interlocutory orders which determine liability in *favor of a claimant.”*(e.s.) No liability has been determined as yet in favor of the claimant. Both appellant’s and appellee’s motions for summary judgment were denied. While the court held that State Farm’s exclusionary clause did not apply, it still made no ruling on an affirmative issue of liability. Such issues remain outstanding and are not ripe for review at this point. Appellee’s motion to dismiss the interlocutory appeal is granted.

MILLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH, J., concur.

1

. The policy excluded coverage “to any insured or any member of the family of an insured residing in the same household as the insured; . .
#### Frederick GRONEAU and Daniel Mazek, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 78-1605.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

May 2, 1979.

Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellants.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Michael A. Palecki, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

After reviewing the briefs and record on appeal, we find that appellants have failed to demonstrate any reversible error. Therefore, the judgments and sentences appealed are affirmed.

One point raised by appellants does merit discussion, however. Appellants contend that the trial judge erred in failing to specify on their sentences the amount of credit due to them for time spent in the county jail awaiting trial, as required by Section 921.161, Florida Statutes (1977). The judgment and sentence forms do indeed fail to provide for credit for time served. However, the record does not indicate that appellants were incarcerated prior to trial. Appellants therefore have not demonstrated that the failure to specify credit for time served was error.

Accordingly, we affirm without prejudice for appellants to raise this issue pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 with sufficient factual allegations to show that they are entitled to credit for time served under Section 921.-161.

BOARDMAN, Acting C. J., and RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur.
(logo)Rialto

CAPITAL

 

 

**2018 Annual Statement of Servicer Compliance (Item1123)**

 

 

Poolingand Servicing Agreement (the "Pooling and Servicing Agreement") datedas of June 1, 2017 by and among J.P. Morgan Chase Commercial MortgageSecurities Corp., as Depositor, Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank,National Association as Master Servicer, Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC asSpecial Servicer, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as CertificateAdministrator, and as Trustee and Pentalpha Surveillance LLC as OperatingAdvisor and as Asset Representations Reviewer relating to the JPMCC CommercialMortgage Securities Trust 2017-JP6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, Series 2017-JP6 **(JPMCC 2017-JP6)**

 

Theundersigned, a duly authorized officer of Rialto Capital Advisors, LLC, asspecial servicer (the “Special Servicer”) herein certifies to the following:

 

1.       All servicing activities and performanceof such servicing activities under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement areperformed on behalf of the Special Servicer.

 

2.     A review of the servicing activities andperformance by the Special Servicer for the period of January 1, 2018 toDecember 31, 2018 (the “Reporting Period”) in accordance with the Pooling andServicing Agreement has been conducted under my supervision.

 

3.     To the best of my knowledge, based on suchreview, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under theterms of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, in all material respects for theReporting Period and if there has been a failure to fulfill any suchobligations in any material respect, each failure and the nature and statusthereof has been specifically identified herein.

 

 

Certifiedby: /s/ Adam Singer

AdamSinger, Managing Director 

 

Date:March 1, 2019
#### Nathan WALKER, Jr., ex ux. v. UNION OIL MILL, INC., et al.

No. 62994.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Oct. 16, 1978.

In re: Nathan Walker, et ux., applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit. Parish of Concordia. 360 So.2d 894.

Writ denial rescinded as inadvertent clerical error, and writ granted.
#### The State *against*Thomas Jackson.

ON CERTIORARI.

Time of filing plea unvent laws.

JACKSON, applied to the Common Pleas of *Middlesex*ccmirfcy for the benefit of the insolvent laws of the state, The hearing was ordered on the 24th of *October,*1815, at which time *John R. Hamilton*and *Robert Davison,*two of his creditors, made affidavit according to the statute, that they believed and undertook to shew, that *Jackson*had not made a fair and honest surrender of all his estate to and for the use of his creditors. Whereupon *Jackson*was remanded to prison, with an order that he and his creditors appear before the court on the first day of the next *369term. On the 28th of *October, Jackson*filed his declaration, under the statute. On the 17th day of *November,*said creditors filed their plea. On the 20th of *November,*the court at a special meeting, ordered *Jackson*to be discharged, without any trial by jury, or trial and decision on the issue joined between the parties. Of this special meeting, no notice was given to the creditors. The creditors brought this certiorari, to remove the proceedings into this Court, that the judgment of the Pleas might be reversed: and the question presented, was whether the plea was filed in time ?

*Williamson*for the plaintiff.

By the Court.

By the statute, *Pat.*186, sec. 7, the creditors must file their plea, within twenty days after the debtor has filed his declaration. In calculating the time, one of the days on which the declaration and plea are filed, is included and the other excluded, (a) Here the declaration was filed on the 28th of *October,*the plea on the 17th of *November.*In*cluding one and excluding the other, the plea was filed in season, within twenty days. The court therefore erred in discharging the debtor. There ought to have been a trial of the issue by a jury. Let judgment and order of the court be reversed.

(a)

*Den, Bray vs. Fen, Drake, 3 Hal. 303. Day vs. Hall, 7 Hal. 203.*
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3183

To amend title 38, United States Code, to limit the amount of recoupment

from veterans’ disability compensation that is required in the case of

veterans who have received certain separation payments from the Department of Defense.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 28, 1996

Mr. MONTGOMERY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs

A BILL

To amend title 38, United States Code, to limit the amount

of recoupment from veterans’ disability compensation

that is required in the case of veterans who have received

certain separation payments from the Department of Defense.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON RECOUPMENT FROM VETER4 ANS COMPENSATION BENEFITS.

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—(1) Chapter 53 of title 38, United

6 States Code, is amended by inserting after section 5304

7 the following new section:
2

•HR 3183 IH

1 ‘‘§ 5304a. Recoupment of military separation pay2 ments from compensation: limitation

3 ‘‘(a) In the case of a veteran with a service-connected

4 disability who is entitled to compensation and who is paid

5 a benefit described in subsection (b), the amount of com6 pensation otherwise payable to that veteran that is de7 ducted pursuant to section 1174(h)(2) of title 10 (or a

8 similar provision of law) by reason of the payment to that

9 veteran of the benefit described in subsection (b) may not

10 exceed 75 percent of the total amount of the benefit de11 scribed in subsection (b) paid to the veteran.

12 ‘‘(b) Subsection (a) applies to any of the following:

13 ‘‘(1) Separation pay under section 1174 of title

14 10.

15 ‘‘(2) Special separation benefit under section

16 1174a of title 10.

17 ‘‘(3) Any similar benefit paid by the Secretary

18 concerned upon discharge or separation of an indi19 vidual from the armed forces with respect to which

20 there is a requirement that there be deducted from

21 disability compensation otherwise payable to the in22 dividual an amount equal to the total amount of the

23 benefit paid by the Secretary concerned.’’.

24 (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such

25 chapter is amended by adding at the end the following

26 new item:
3

•HR 3183 IH

‘‘5304a. Recoupment of military separation payments from compensation: limitation.’’.

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 5304a of title 38,

2 United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall

3 apply with respect to payment of compensation by the Sec4 retary of Veterans Affairs for months beginning on or

5 after October 1, 1996.

Æ
Regulatory Evaluation

Docket No. FAA-2012-0680 Directorate Identifier: 2011-NM-247-AD

If you make changes to the values in the table below, you must ensure the totals update 

accordingly. If they do not, click (or Tab) into and then out of the changed cell.

Estimated Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Do not include oncondition costs here

Costs per Product (e.g., aircraft, engine, 

propeller, appliance)

Work-hours

(include 

access, testing, 

and close-up)

Labor 

cost 

(@$85/h

our)

Parts Cost Total Costs 

(labor + 

parts)

Number of 

U.S. 

Registered

Products

Total Cost 

for U.S. Fleet

2.0 $ 170.00 $9,340 $9,510.00 17 $161,670.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00 $ 0.00

The known number of products in compliance:

Total Costs of compliance for U.S. fleet: $161,670

Costs covered under warranty (if known) $

On-Condition Costs:

Action

(e.g., Inspection, 

replacement)

Work-hours

(include access, 

testing, and closeup)

Labor cost 

(@$85/hour)

Parts Cost Cost per Product

$ 0.00 $0 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

$ 0.00 $ 0.00

Special considerations for Economic Analysis (Use this field to explain anything in the Estimated 

Costs table that was assumed or might not be obvious. This field can also be used to explain warranty costs):
Executive Order 12866:

Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action”?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures:

Is the AD significant? 

YES* NO 

*Explanation: 

Regulatory Flexibility Act:

Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Explain

for either a Yes or No answer.

YES NO 

Explanation: This AD will affect small number of transport airlplanes operated by large carriers, 

such as Federal Express.

Intrastate Aviation in Alaska:

This AD could affect intrastate aviation in Alaska. Is it appropriate to include specific requirements 

for aircraft operated in Alaska where aviation might be the only mode of transportation?

YES* NO 

*Explanation: