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38-315 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–84]

FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

AUGUST 2, 2007

(II)

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California, Chairwoman

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

KEVIN COUGHLIN, Professional Staff Member

JEANETTE JAMES, Professional Staff Member

JOE HICKEN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, August 2, 2007, Further Inquiry into Marine Corps Policies and

Procedures Regarding Next-of-Kin Notification ................................................ 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, August 2, 2007 ....................................................................................... 25

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2007

FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Chairwoman, Military Personnel Subcommittee ............................................................................. 1

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member,

Military Personnel Subcommittee ...................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Magnus, Gen. Robert, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S.

Marine Corps ........................................................................................................ 3

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Davis, Hon. Susan A. ....................................................................................... 29

Magnus, Gen. Robert ........................................................................................ 36

McHugh, Hon. John M. .................................................................................... 33

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Questions submitted.]

(1)

FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, August 2, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in room

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Susan Davis (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, MILITARY

PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. DAVIS. The meeting will come to order.

I want to thank you all for being here.

This hearing is being held today because the subcommittee was

not satisfied with the information provided to us on June 27, 2007,

in our hearing on the policies and procedures regarding the notification of next of kin of deceased service members.

At that hearing, the Marine Corps provided testimony that was

not accurate. So, as a result of that, Ranking Member McHugh, Dr.

Snyder, myself met with Lieutenant General Ronald Coleman, the

Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, on July 17, 2007, to discuss some of the issues and questions

that arose from that hearing.

But as a result of that particular briefing, we still unfortunately,

did not feel comfortable that the casualty notification process that

the Marine Corps had in effect was sufficient, especially concerning

those Marines who were either wounded or killed as a result of

friendly fire.

So the purpose of this hearing today is to correct any inaccurate

or incorrect information that was previously provided to this committee and to the public, and allow the Marine Corps to set the

record straight on this issue.

I look forward to the discussion that we will have here regarding

the issue to ensure that the procedures and the tracking system

that the Marine Corps has in effect are sufficient to ensure accurate and timely notification to our service members and their families.

Before I introduce our witness, I just wanted to give Congressman McHugh an opportunity for any opening remarks that he may

wish to make.

And I certainly want to welcome here General Magnus. We welcome you. We thank you for your service to the country, and we

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know that we will want to move forward with this hearing today.

Thank you.

Mr. McHugh.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Let me join you in welcoming our distinguished panelist here

today. General Magnus is to be thanked by every American for the

great leadership he brings and, quite honestly, for showing some

pretty significant courage for being here today as we look back over

the history as you defined it, Madam Chair.

I would ask, Madam Chair, that my prepared statement be entered into the record in its entirety. Let me just make a couple of

comments.

I really, when we started out here, wondered if another hearing

was necessary. But as we have gone forward, and as the data continuously changes, including as recently as last night, as I understand it, where we were provided yet with another incident of—at

least insofar as we are aware—unreported incident, I just have

found myself in a position of really doubting virtually everything

we have heard. And I find it difficult to find much veracity in what

we might hear. And that is a hard thing for me to say, and it is

a terrible place for us to be.

I think we have actually come to the point—and I don’t want to

pre-judge anything General Magnus says. And I am not in any way

questioning his honesty. I know the caliber of the man, and I know

he will be here today providing the best data that he possibly can.

But given the very difficult road we traveled to this point, I really fear that, particularly amongst the families of those who have

suffered, either wounded in action, or of course at the extreme,

killed in action, can possibly have in the process that have supposedly assured them of how their loved one met whichever fate

they may have encountered.

And I think, Madam Chair, we may be at a point where it would

be almost impossible to avoid soliciting the help of an outside organization, be it the GAO, Government Accountability Office, or some

other, to take a look at the entire range of incidences, starting with

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF), as to how the reporting has been done.

None of us want to see a circumstance—and I know the Marines

are right at the head of this line—none of us want to see a circumstance where a loved one receiving notification or not receiving

a notification makes an incorrect assumption based on a system

that, for whatever reason, has not worked well and hasn’t filled its

challenge.

So with that, Madam Chair, I do look forward to General

Magnus’s comments. And, again, none of what I have said is in any

way intended to cast aspersions upon his outstanding record of

service—we are so lucky as a country to have individuals such as

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he—but as to a system that, frankly, I think has caused doubts in

all of us.

So I will yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

We are honored today to be joined by the Chairman of the Armed

Services Committee, Mr. Ike Skelton, who was previously, quite a

number of years ago, chairman of the Personnel Committee. And

he tells me every day that he wants to watch and be sure that I

handle this committee just the way he did, and I am working to

do that.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here, and we look forward

to your participation if you so choose. And I appreciate your being

here.

As I mentioned earlier, we have one witness today, General Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the United States Marine

Corps.

As I said earlier as well, we thank you very much for your service to our country. And we know that this has been difficult going

back and trying to understand why, in fact, some of the reporting

did not occur as it should have, trying to correct that, and to move

forward.

We are concerned, as I know you are as well, with how change

of notices impact our families. The initial notice is very difficult,

but further notices make it especially hard on them. And so we

want to be certain that we have it right. And I know that the Marine Corps is working to do that as well.

Your written comments and statements, of course, will be made

part of the hearing record, so we encourage you to summarize your

remarks if you would like.

We are going to try and keep, I think, today, Mr. McHugh, perhaps to five minutes so people have an opportunity to go around.

And I appreciate everybody being very patient with me yesterday

as well.

So, we will get started. General Magnus, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, ASSISTANT

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Chairwoman Davis, Congressman

McHugh, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and Chairman Skelton. Thank you very much for this opportunity to correct

the record on next of kin notification.

I deeply regret that information the Marine Corps officials provided at the hearing on June 27th and the subsequent briefing on

July the 17th was inaccurate. On behalf of the Commandant of the

Marine Corps, I offer our sincerest apology to the subcommittee.

Also, for our Marines and families, the Commandant and I are

personally and professionally distressed that we have not always

provided timely and accurate information to them, which did not

alleviate their stress or help them to come to closure.

However, the Commandant and I thank the subcommittee for

bringing this problem to light. I solemnly assure you that we will

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do the right thing for our Marines, sailors, and their families, making every effort to preclude future errors.

We previously reported that next of kin of Marines killed by

friendly fire on the 12th of April, 2004, had been notified. That report was unintentionally inaccurate, although late notifications

have been made by general officer visits to those families on the

20th and 23rd of July to the Marine families that were involved.

We also incorrectly reported the number of friendly fire incidents

and casualties. That number, as we understand it today, is 23 suspected friendly fire incidents with 19 of those confirmed, including

6 deaths and 38 wounded due to friendly fire.

It is important to note that we are not confident that this is definitive because a preliminary review of our processes has revealed

inconsistencies in our record.

That preliminary review revealed deficiencies in three key processes related to notification, processes that we now realize are

interrelated.

The first process is the command casualty reporting process,

which includes a telephonic report followed by initial and any supplemental personnel casualty reports or PCR’s. These reports were

not uniformly accurate or complete. While we understand that this

was probably due to the stresses of intense combat on reporting

commands, increased emphasis on and possibly changes to our casualty reporting process are needed to ensure accuracy and timeliness.

Second, the command casualty inquiry and investigation process

may not have been consistently documented, including completion

of any actions requested by higher command endorsements to those

investigations.

Third, our process for notifications to next of kin was not always

in compliance with statute or our own policies and procedures. As

a result of these deficiencies, our command reporting information,

inquiry and investigation, and casualty notification processes have

not always been consistent, accurate, or timely. Timely delivery of

accurate information to the next of kin is our responsibility.

Although we believe investigations were conducted on all suspected friendly fire cases, our preliminary review revealed that the

PCR’s have not uniformly reported all friendly fire investigations

as required by regulations.

Although notifications were made to next of kin, in some cases

they were late and did not indicate that friendly fire was suspected

or determined.

Clearly, the three processes need improved emphasis, training of

personnel, and linkages, as well as appropriate oversight measures.

The Inspector General (IG) of the Marine Corps has been

charged with providing recommendations to ensure that we have

definitive information in order to take effective remedial actions.

The Commandant has directed the Inspector General to conduct a

detailed and thorough investigation into our casualty reporting and

notification processes with full access to all records and personnel.

This subcommittee will be provided a copy of the completed investigation.

We are working with the United States Army to ensure uniform

and consistent casualty procedures. We believe that the U.S. Army

5

has an effective model which can be rapidly adopted by the Marine

Corps.

We are also working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) and the Navy Secretariat to ensure compliance with the requirements of National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year

2006 and fiscal year 2007.

We are taking action without waiting for results of the IG’s investigation. We will issue guidance to commanders, reemphasizing

the need for timely, accurate reporting, inquiries and investigations, and the linkages to ensure proper notifications are made.

Our duty is to ensure notification is conducted in accordance

with statute and casualty procedures. I accept responsibility for the

process failures that negatively affected the families of our fallen

and wounded warriors. On behalf of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I apologize for our errors.

We thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to correct the

record. We also thank the Congress for its abiding concern for the

welfare and care of our Marines, sailors, and their families. Caring

for them is simply the right thing to do. It is part of our ethos as

Marines, and we will do it.

I am prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in the

Appendix on page 36.]

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, General.

What I would like to do, because I think it would be for the benefit of the members, if we could go through several of the hearings

that we have had, to try and go back a little bit on those numbers.

On the 27th of June, when the Marine Corps testified, they said

there were only 19 friendly fire casualties from 2 incidents.

And then on the 17th of July, we were briefed that actually there

were 77 friendly fire casualties from 20 incidents.

And then, of course, yesterday we learned that, in fact, there

were actually 82 friendly fire casualties from 23 different incidents.

So I would hope that you could go back and help us out a little

here. Where did the Marine Corps get the numbers that we received on July 17th?

General MAGNUS. The numbers we received from July 17th were

as a result of a first preliminary review, not by the Inspector General, of the records that we had at Headquarters Marine Corps of

these three processes and in telephonic contact with Marines in

Marine Central Command Headquarters in California.

That preliminary review, particularly subsequent to my review of

the briefing that was conducted on the 17th of July, led me to immediately go to the Commandant and indicate that not only had

the numbers changed between the 27th of June and the 17th of

July, but the reason why the changes gave me pause as to the accuracy of the records that were being cross-referenced.

And subsequent to that, a second review—not by the Inspector

General—was done, which gave us the best information that I

have, which as I have noted earlier, Madam Chairwoman, I am not

confident it is definitive. And it is based upon direct contact between the 17th of July and the date of my letter to the subcommittee between senior officers in Marine Corps Central Command,

Camp Pendleton, and officials at Headquarters Marine Corps.

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I will be confident in the definition of the process deficiencies we

have and in the numbers of incidents and, most importantly of

course, in the numbers of killed and wounded casualties on completion of the Inspector General’s report.

Ms. DAVIS. If we go beyond the 17th then, and we go to August

1st, what is it then about the new number—where did you look for

that information then? Was that also going back to the preliminary

review?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, the first review gave us

the numbers which were still not complete and correct that you received in the briefing on the 17th of July.

A second, more in-depth review, but not by the Inspector General, not with a methodical investigative process, revealed updated

numbers. Those numbers were provided, and when I reviewed, subsequent to the briefing, the method by which the numbers were derived, serious questions arose, not as to the professionalism or intent of Marines that were providing the numbers, but simply in the

way these numbers were accounted.

And in fact, as you indicated, the number of cases of wounded

Marines increased and gave us great pause as to the accuracy of

these processes and the checks and balances that would give us

numbers. I think the numbers are, of course, different numbers,

but we will only be confident when we are 100 percent accurate

and are able to change our processes in the future.

Ms. DAVIS. When do you think that the IG’s investigation will be

completed?

General MAGNUS. Within a matter of weeks.

I have spoken to the Acting Inspector General of the Marine

Corps, Mr. Holmgren. He has been given full latitude to go through

all of our major subordinate commands that have had casualties,

including our reserves. And to ensure that we have access to all the

records to be able to cross-reference all of the documents, to ensure

that we know each individual by name, their status, the determination of whether or not there was friendly fire, and also to determine our process for ensuring notification.

Notifications, ma’am, are ongoing right now with some of the

wounded that were identified in the 12 April, 2004, investigation.

Lance Corporal’s Zurheide and Shuder were killed in action and

that, I think, was covered in the earlier testimony, ma’am.

Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you, General.

So that we can get around to members and have several rounds,

Mr. McHugh? Would you like to pick it up?

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.

I would also note, Madam Chair, in your very thorough review,

that on the 17th of July briefing, not only were the numbers wrong,

we were also misinformed that two families had been notified of

the circumstances of their loved ones’ death when, in fact, what

they had received were letters that an investigation was being

done. They could receive those investigations if they asked for it.

So there were really two layers in this information, just to fill out

the record.

General Magnus, I heard you describe in part the Marine Corps

IG’s process of reviewing those cases, but tell me again: Is he trying to coordinate the data and the information strictly between the

7

headquarters of the Marine Corps and Marine Central Command?

Is that the extent of his look-see?

General MAGNUS. No, sir. I wasn’t clear——

Mr. MCHUGH. You probably were. I probably just didn’t——

General MAGNUS. The Inspector General is going wherever he

needs to go. He is going, of course, to Marine Forces Central Command, but he will go to each one of the major subordinate commands that provided Marines since this war began.

So he will be going to all four divisions, all four wings, all four

Marines logistics groups, to ensure that we not only have got an

accounting for those commands that were deployed, but also that

we have taken the effective actions in terms of notifications to next

of kin back here, which is mainly in the continental United States

and Hawaii.

Mr. MCHUGH. And I appreciate that, and that is what a good Inspector General does, but it may not take him everywhere that perhaps we would like to see it done.

For example, after the very tragic case of Corporal Pat Tillman,

the Army really initiated a review from top to bottom and went

back to all of the battalions to direct a specific investigation that

were done at friendly fire incidences to see if there were any inaccuracies.

Has the Marine Corps done anything like that, contemplated

anything like that? Because it seems to me that the Inspector General is going to be subject to whatever data he may be provided

that may not be corrected back enough.

General MAGNUS. Again, Congressman McHugh, I must not have

been clear. We are doing precisely that. We are going back to every

single investigation.

We are also going back to all of our casualties. In other words,

this is broader than just friendly fire. This is about the casualty

notification and reporting process, a very important part of that, of

course, is regarding actual or suspected friendly fire.

So it is the overall process that needs to be looked at and with

specific emphasis on the notification of next of kin. So we are doing

exactly what the Army is doing.

Mr. MCHUGH. So the place where I was a little unclear, not that

he would go to that level, but indeed every case at the battalion

level has been directly ordered to be revisited.

General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay.

Can you help us understand what it was in the system, for example, that caused the discrepancies between the two numbers, with

respect to Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Central Command? I understand you had some reconciliation, some kinds of

problems in the system, but do you have any preliminary information as to how those two numbers could have been so disjointed?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, it would be speculative, and so

therefore I will go there because it is the reason why I advised the

Commandant that we needed an Inspector General’s investigation.

When I reviewed the terminology that was used in charts and in

information papers that I was provided with terminology in statute

and in our regulations and on the documents, people were using

different words to describe certain conditions. So there is the termiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:14 Jul 29, 2008 Jkt 038815 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-84\214020.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
8

nology, but that doesn’t account for the fact that even when you

add up the numbers, the numbers changed.

In fact, there were five of the wounded that apparently had just

not been correctly accounted for. Those five wounded in the personnel casualty records were in Headquarters Marine Corps.

The system for ensuring that we had a rigorous accounting did

not have the checks and balances that I know we need now.

Mr. MCHUGH. I just have a moment left.

When General Downs came before the committee the first time

on June 27th, I assume he was taking data from one source. Otherwise, he would have known there was a conflict. Which source was

he deriving the data from?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I can’t answer what source the

general would have used.

I can tell you that the Marine Corps is in compliance with the

Department of Defense (DOD) instructions. There is one casualty

reporting and responsible section in each one of the military services. Our casualty section is under Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

I believe retired General Mike Downs testified before the committee. He is the senior officer in that section. That is the one section where these processes need to come together.

Mr. MCHUGH. I see my time has expired.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General, the hearing on June 27th was my last hearing in which

I participated in as the chairman of this committee, and all of us

got really uncomfortable as the hearing proceeded with what we

were hearing. But one of them was the very strong testimony from

General Downs that there had only been two incidents, two incidents with multiple casualties, but two incidents.

And we challenged him on that: Has anyone ever wondered perhaps, and given everything the Marine Corps has done since spring

of 2003, that there couldn’t possibly be other incidents? And some

very firm statements were made.

Subsequent to that, I think we have gotten information that

there had been discussions prior to the hearing that perhaps that

is not accurate. Perhaps there had been more than two incidents.

I mean, issue number one is to get this information and get a

system right that will work for these families for the Marine Corps,

but a lesser issue is this Congress, as a representative for the

American people, deserves accurate information.

And this is pretty close to a man sitting there being asked a

question, ‘‘Did you have any uncertainty about this information?’’,

and had been told before the hearing that there was uncertainty

about that information and did not pass it on to this committee.

Have you looked into that aspect of things at all?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I have not looked into that, and

that is part of the——

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I would encourage you to do that.

General MAGNUS. Sir, yes, sir, and that is part of the charter of

the Inspector General. If in fact, information was incorrectly deVerDate 22-MAR-2001 14:14 Jul 29, 2008 Jkt 038815 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-84\214020.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
9

rived, we will find out why. If, in fact, there was any intentional

violation, that will also be reported.

To the best of my understanding, sir, I believe General Downs

incorrectly understood what he was preparing for, but I cannot account for why there was literally almost an order of magnitude difference between the numbers.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, it is also my understanding that he was put

on notice, that there may well have been——

General MAGNUS. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Some problems with more junior Marines saying, ‘‘We think there may be more than two, and you are

about to testify before Congress very firmly there is only two.’’ And

we were informed within less than 24 hours by well-meaning Marines that they thought that they were going to need to come and

give us a briefing because their information was incorrect.

So my second question is: We were also informed that one of the

incorrect things that we were informed was that the Marine Corps

did not investigate or have any kind of a preliminary investigation

of all deaths. And in fact, when we challenged that a little bit because the Army does that now, probably as a result of the Corporal

Tillman case amongst others, we are told that would be a waste of

time to do that, that it would be real clear in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosion of what had occurred.

Well, it turned out, as we were subsequently told, that you do indeed do a preliminary investigation on all deaths. Is that correct

information?

General MAGNUS. Neither of those, I believe, is correct, but I will

talk for the Marine Corps, sir.

The regulation does not require a preliminary inquiry in accordance with our Judge Advocate General’s manual which is the same

as Army Regulation 15–6, when on the scene it is clear to the senior official there that a death or injury was due to enemy fire.

When there is any doubt of the cause of any casualty including,

of course, a mishap—and in this case, we are talking about a hostile action—a preliminary inquiry is done to ascertain that. And

then, of course, if in fact that suspicion sustains after a preliminary

inquiry, which simply could be a commissioned officer looking at

the scene and determining that there is some doubt, then of course,

a formal investigation will be undertaken.

The regulations do not require, when there is certainty at the

scene that the casualty was caused by friendly fire, for there to be

an inquiry.

Dr. SNYDER. Maybe what we have is a terminology problem because I would perhaps argue in defense of your system that, in

fact, that was the preliminary inquiry.

General MAGNUS. And, Congressman, that is a great point because we have had that discussion with our service judge advocate,

in fact, if there is in fact a questioning, an inquiry at the site—and

it is determined by competent authority that it was enemy fire—

to their certainty, then what we have to do is document that that

took place. Right now, the only documentation of that is the line

in the personnel casualty report that indicates enemy fire.

10

It turns out that, subsequently, that may not be good and sufficient documentation. We are reviewing that along with what the

Army does.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. I will have other questions

later.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Dr. Snyder.

And I want to move to Mr. Kline. Mr. Kline, would you yield one

second?

Could you define ‘‘preliminary inquiry’’ for us? What does that

entail—reporting, telephone call? I mean, it can be a range of

things—is that correct? So it is not a written-down report necessarily?

General MAGNUS. Not necessarily, and that is one of the aspects

that we are looking at because, to have checks and balances, you

have to have some kind of record or documentation to have an

audit trail.

Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, General, for being here and sort of stepping up to the

plate, as it were, to answer the questions which in our minds were

unanswered and had risen our concern to quite high levels and, I

am sure with great confidence, yours and the Commandant’s.

I know that there are very good professionals trying to do their

very best in very tough circumstances. There is no doubt that in

my 25 years, and I am sure in your 35 years, there is nothing harder than going and informing a next of kin that a Marine has been

killed.

And so in the process, I think that the Marine Corps has developed in making sure that there is an officer in uniform who shows

up to do that and does that very hard job, does a very good one,

and is taken very, very seriously for many years, certainly all the

years since you and I came into the court.

But clearly, the system had some flaws in it. You have mentioned some of them today, and in your written testimony—I have

got it all marked up here—some of them jump out. Obviously, the

personnel casualty report, as you indicated, is sometimes disconnected from the investigation.

And so without those two things together, well-meaning, hardworking, serious officers and enlisted can just make a mistake because the information is not accurately recorded onto the PCR, for

example.

So I applaud the four of you and the Commandant for getting the

IG in it, and I trust that the IG will dig far and wide and deep

as we go forward on this.

I see some of your remedies in your written testimony. One of

them says, ‘‘We will change higher headquarters reporting procedures.’’ I am not sure what that is. I don’t know if you know what

it is either, but I would like to see those very solid, and perhaps

you can tell us when this is done what those might be.

One of your remedies is, ‘‘We must and will ensure tight links

between the investigation and reporting processes.’’ Again, I don’t

11

know what that is, but I trust those will be written down in Marine

Corps order and will be visible to you and to us.

And then with that, you say that you are going to ensure training is ‘‘rigorous and effective’’ and therefore, I trust, ongoing as all

training is, that it maintains from commanding officer to commanding officer to commanding officer. Because no matter how good the

training is, if it is not done consistently, you won’t maintain those

links.

And similarly, I have a little bit of a concern when your number

seven—it says, ‘‘there will be proactive coordination between Head

Quarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and our subordinate command elements to strengthen oversight of reporting compliance.’’ Unless

that is a documented procedure, proactive coordination often

doesn’t last past the Marine who is in the office at the time.

So all this is to say that at the end of this process, I presume,

when the IG completes the investigation, Headquarters of the Marine Corps will be writing these down and promulgating these

changes. And I would ask that this subcommittee see what those

are as we go forward. Because I know that you are appalled by

this, and the Commandant and every Marine, that this could be so

confusing, that the testimony here could be so wrong over the period of time that the chairman has indicated, but more importantly,

that families didn’t know.

And so I don’t have a question except to ask that we be allowed

to see what these procedures are when the Marine Corps promulgates them.

General MAGNUS. We will ensure, Congressman Kline, that the

subcommittee receives copies of all the correspondence, including

the Commandant’s letter to his commanders, as well as any

changes we make in our procedures and, of course, the changes

that will be made, that are ongoing right now, and to update the

DOD instruction on casualty reporting and notification in general,

and we are——

Mr. KLINE. Is there a white letter out now?

General MAGNUS. No, the Commandant is in Iraq right now, and

when the Commandant gets back, we will sit down and make sure

that we have a letter that does more than simply exhort for reemphasis on the system.

Because we know that there are potential deficiencies in these

systems. So we want to make sure that the systems are being reported and done by Marines; they are human beings like everyone

else. And so we need more than just reemphasizing the procedures

we have.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

I yield back.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

The question I have, General, is two-fold. First of all, wouldn’t

it help if we had some standard operating procedure across the

branches of military? And why don’t we at this point; and would

you recommend it?

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General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, the answer is yes.

We are now actively working—I literally met with the Army three

times in the past week.

We believe that the Army has a good if not outstanding model,

and we are going to make recommendations to change our procedures. If we believe that the Army procedures need clarification, we

will recommend that to them, and we are going to.

And I have already met this morning with the principal deputy

undersecretary for personnel and readiness, Mike Dominguez. And

he is directing the new overarching DOD instruction so that we are

consistent. And I believe that not only uniformity, accuracy, and

timeliness within the Marine Corps, but uniformity across the four

military services and DOD, is essential.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How quickly do you think you would be able

to implement a joint policy?

General MAGNUS. I believe that the Army and the Marine Corps

can implement the changes within a matter of weeks. The signing

out of a DOD instruction might take a bit longer.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And the other question I had was: What impact has this had on any of your troops at all? Can you speak to

that? Has there been an increased anxiety level? Has there been

any kind of blow-back from families? Has there been a negative impact, basically, on Marines from within the ranks?

General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, I am not aware of a

negative impact.

On the other hand, I am a dad. I have gone to the Intensive Care

Units (ICUs), and I have hugged the moms whose Marines were

expectant. I know that this cannot have eased their grief, could not

have calmed their uncertainty, and could not have brought them to

closure. So we are mindful of our responsibility to take care of our

troops and their families. So I just have to take this as seriously

as it is.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Have you spoken to them? Has the letter gone

out, or has there been any kind of communication with everybody

to state that yes, you know, it was wrong, it is going to be fixed,

and to reassure?

General MAGNUS. In the cases that were investigated determining suspected friendly fire, in the case of Lance Corporal Shuder’s

and Lance Corporal Zurheide’s family, which were the April 12,

2004, incident, that a general officer visited the family at the time

of their choosing. That happened on the 20th and the 23rd of July.

We believe we have made contact with the family of every Marine who has been killed in action. I spoke to Lieutenant General

Mattis, the commander of Marine Forces Central Command, last

night, and he is re-doubling efforts to go back and ensure that we

make contact with every Marine who has been seriously injured, or

is very seriously injured, as a result of wounds received in hostile

fire.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you think it would be helpful to address

everybody and all family members, stating that this situation is

being remedied for those who have family members who have not

been injured but wonder what would happen to them?

General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, that will be the purpose of the Commandant’s white letter to all of his commanders,

13

which will be followed up by appropriate broader distribution instructions to Marines. And we will make sure that the communication is broad and effective. We don’t want any Marine or family to

feel that we are not going to take good care of them, and to accurately, and in a timely manner, inform their families of the circumstances of their injury or their death.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

I yield back.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Madam Chairman, thank you.

And, General Magnus, it is good to see you again here in August.

I am having lunch with—I am looking forward to seeing

Lieutentant Ilario Pantano, sir.

General, I want to thank you and the Marine Corps as well as

the services. It is a very difficult war, trying to make sure that the

families are as well-informed as they can be, and whether that be

friendly fire or killed by the enemy.

The casualty officer that goes to tell the family that the loved one

has been killed, how long does the casualty officer—and let me tell

you, this deals with the Army, and I have already got this settled,

but it has raised a lot of questions for me at least—if a Marine is

killed in action, how long does it take before the Marine Corps can

bring that case to a close?

And the reason I am asking is I have a constituent whose son

was killed five months ago. She has requested the autopsy report.

She has requested the investigation report as to—and again, he

was killed by an IED.

And I have been a little bit amazed, not disappointed, because

war is war and you just can’t run to a computer and get on a computer and say, ‘‘This happened.’’

How long, generally, should it take for a family to have total closure, meaning that questions they might ask about the death of

that loved one, before the Marine Corps can say that the family

has received everything that they have requested and we are now

ready to close the case?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, thank you for the question.

Unfortunately, it varies depending upon the circumstances of the

casualty. Our instructions require that a family be notified within

hours of receipt of the casualty report at Headquarters of the Marine Corps.

And the only caveat to that is that we go to family, the next of

kin that is identified by the Marine normally in their record of

emergency data, during the hours of 5 in the morning and midnight, so that if we are not able to get the right kind of people and

they can’t get the family members to them in the event that they

need other support.

That normally happens within hours or within one day, and it

is not a working day; it is one day. And very frequently that happens, literally, within hours.

That information provided is the information that is as good as

in the initial personnel casualty report. The initial casualty report

in the case of hostile action may indicate enemy fire determined by

the official on the scene, or it may indicate that it is indeterminate.

14

I have not seen one that indicated in the first casualty report

that it was friendly fire.

So that is provided to the family within hours.

If there is some doubt as to the circumstance of a Marine’s injury

or death, the family is notified as soon as we know that there is

some doubt. And then there is an investigation process that proceeds that is a legal process as the Judge Advocate General’s

manual’s determination.

And when that is finally endorsed—and for killed in action, those

go to the commander of U.S. Central Command for his endorsement. At that point, we will then give the final results of the investigation and its endorsements, including a redacted copy of the investigation as appropriate to the family.

We are required to update the family every 30 days if that investigation has not completed within 30 days of our initial notification.

And that should be backed up by not only a telephonic notification

of the status, but backed up by a letter.

That is all of the smaller procedures that are in these processes

I talked about, which create a series of documents and checks and

balances that we need to ensure take place.

Mr. JONES. General, thank you very much.

And, Madam Chairman, I will yield back.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. Boyda.

Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you for coming and for your testimony.

And thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

I just had a question about process. Generally, and my background is in the pharmaceutical industry, so zero tolerance is pretty much the name of the game there.

And I was just wondering from the Marines’ standpoint, when

you do something, and when you check something, who is the person who is ultimately responsible for that process? Is it the person

who does it or the person who checks it, or do you determine that?

Is that part of your ethos?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman.

Ultimately, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible

for ensuring these processes come. The checks and balances should

be periodic examinations of the process, and it is required by regulation by the Inspector General of each service.

Mrs. BOYDA. May I just ask then, is there—maybe I made an assumption—with each one of these friendly fires, is each one processed? And then, is it also checked by someone? Is there a one-toone, somebody does it, somebody checks it?

General MAGNUS. There should be, yes, ma’am. That is in accordance with the regulations.

Mrs. BOYDA. I am just curious, is that currently the process?

General MAGNUS. That is correct.

Mrs. BOYDA. Is there something that says in our procedures or

in our process—and again, in the industry that I have come from,

guess who is the one who is responsible for it? Not the person who

did it, the person who checks it. And they are the one whose job

is on the line, whose performance review is on the line. The person

who does the checking is the person who takes it, and it is very

clear to everyone whose name is on the line what that means.

15

So just again, it doesn’t sound like that is necessarily a written

procedure, and I just wondered if it might, in fact, be something

that is helpful or something that you have ever considered.

General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, I think it is in the

regulation that each service have a casualty office that is responsible. Those responsibilities are not delineated; they are implied. I

know what they are.

But we need to make sure in the checklist of each office that Mr.

Downs represents the senior officer that is responsible for casualty

reporting, that he is also aware that he has to be mindful of whether or not the status of a friendly fire legal investigation is complete,

and if not, why not, so that from the personal casualty report on,

we are constantly checking the completeness of the actions we may

take.

If an action is not taken at the beginning, if something is not reported, there is no action that we can take. If an investigation is

not correctly done, then it is the responsibility of the endorsers to

challenge that.

But as each process comes to its milestones, there needs to be

someone who is checking that it has actually been done and that

we transmit that information to the families.

Mrs. BOYDA. And I yield back. I don’t have any other additional

questions.

Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Boyda.

I just wanted to check, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I have no questions.

Ms. DAVIS. All right, great. Thank you.

Just going back for a second, General, if I may, I think one of

the concerns, and I am recalling the meeting that we had also on

the 17th of July, because I think we had a clear sense then that

that was kind of all there was.

And then as you mentioned earlier, going back and taking another look I think that, from our standpoint, I think it is appropriate to characterize that as still a work in progress essentially,

rather than something that is pretty definite as I think the impression of those of us who were at that meeting had. Conveying that,

is that a better way to move forward?

Obviously, we want to have definite numbers, but on the other

hand, it is unsettling to come back and have different numbers as

time moves on.

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, it is unsettling to us, not

only in leadership positions but anyone that has been associated

with us, including the officials that are responsible for the processing. We believe that we will have definitive information, definitive

numbers when the Inspector General is complete with his investigation.

Hope is not a principle of war. I hope that our numbers that we

have done on our initial accountings turn out to be definitive. I am

not confident in that as I sit here. And we will provide the subcommittee a copy of the Inspector General’s investigation.

Ms. DAVIS. A follow up as well, on the 17th, when the Marine

Corps stated that 24 Marines—Marine Corps Central Command

(MARCENT) had reported—that were killed from friendly fire in

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the Nazaria incident. And then they stated that all 18 were included because they were killed as part of the friendly fire incident.

But then we learned that actually eight of the 18 were killed by

hostile fire.

So I am wondering why the eight would be grouped with the remaining 10 if, in fact, they were not part of the friendly fire incident?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, that incident that you

are referring to, the 23rd of March, 2003, was the 1st Battalion,

2nd Marines. The investigation on that, which I believe was complete, was done by CENTAF, the Air Forces’ Component Central

Command.

The troops in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines were engaged in

fierce combat with Iraqi Army forces on Nazaria. Unbeknownst to

the company that was literally behind them, they were in front,

and when the fires were authorized by their fellow company, that

company thought that they were part of the Iraqi Army.

The Air Force was cleared in on a mission when U.S. troops were

in fierce, close contact, already receiving numerous casualties. As

a result of the fact that the A–10’s then conducted a strike on that

vicinity, the Air Force then became the suspected afflicting agency

of the friendly fire and therefore it was their responsibility, according to regulations, to conduct a full and complete investigation.

A full and complete investigation, as you can imagine, is quite

extensive, including medical forensics.

It turns out that eight of the 18 killed in action were determined

to have been killed by the Iraqis and, in fact, the vicinity of the

A–10 attack was a casualty collection point for that infantry company.

The other 10 of the 18 casualties were literally ‘‘indeterminate

cause’’ of their death. And you can imagine the tremendous amount

of damage that was being done in fierce close-combat, plus the ordinance that was delivered by the A–10, made it medically impossible for the investigating officer to determine the exact cause of

death.

Likewise, that battalion also reported 17 wounded in action that

day. Of the 17, 15 were due to wounds from enemy fire; 2 seemed

to be indeterminate, and I know for a fact that 1 of them actually

received wounds—this is a living, wounded Marine—from both

Iraqi fire and apparently from shrapnel delivered by the A–10.

The actual timing of the fatal injuries and the timing of the

wounds can only be determined by the living. The wounded can tell

you when they believe they got wounded. It is very difficult to determine the timing of deaths.

Ms. DAVIS. I think the question is why the eight were listed on

the friendly fire list at all, though.

General MAGNUS. Because they were part of a friendly fire investigation. And in fact, because the fires were delivered in support

of and believed to be against the enemy—so the investigation determines whether or not we can determine whether it is friendly

fire, enemy fire, or in some cases here as I have discussed, it is indeterminate.

17

Ms. DAVIS. So in other instances where there are sizable numbers and there is a friendly fire investigation, all the others would

come under that investigation?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, in a given incidence. So

in other words, at a certain time and place, if there are a number

of casualties and friendly fire is suspected, that will all be done in

one investigation with determinations made for each and every one

of the suspected wounded or killed. If the same unit has a separate

operation going on, there would be, if necessary, a separate investigation.

Ms. DAVIS. Does that designation change, though, after the full

investigation is done and it is determined that that was not the

cause? Should that change in the listing of casualties?

General MAGNUS. Ma’am, no. The reason for the investigation

won’t change. The determination of the causal factors of the injury

of death, they will change upon final determination of the investigating officer and the endorsers.

Ms. DAVIS. But when someone goes back and looks at the lists

then, they would still see not the final determination on that list.

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, it depends on who

makes up the list. As I might have indicated earlier, there were 23

total suspected friendly fire incidents, only 19 of which had actual

friendly fire determinations for the casualties, 4 of which did not.

Ms. DAVIS. I see. But I think still, for our viewing, when we go

back and when we look at the list that we had asked for, those are

still listed in that framework. And that is our concern, how that

gets changed so that we have that appropriate information. Maybe

we can review that.

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, we will review that. I

tried to correctly characterize that in my written letter response

back to the subcommittee. If there is a way we can improve it so

there is no misunderstanding; accuracy and timeliness of a response to the families and, of course, to the Congress, is essential.

Ms. DAVIS. Okay, certainly. We are just looking for the system

to essentially reflect that, and if that is what we are given, that

is what we see. And we would like to try to figure out a way to

make certain that that isn’t there.

Thank you.

Mr. McHugh, did you have any more questions?

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes.

Of course, the comment, General,—well, he is back. I want to associate myself with the comments of the great Marine warrior to

my left, Mr. Kline. You spoke about the Army, and the Army, I

would tend to agree with you at least in the comparative sense, has

a pretty good system. On paper, it looks great, and they have had

it in place for a number of years now.

But I think as we look at what did or didn’t happen in the Corporal Pat Tillman case where, although the regulations and directive out of the Army required notifications to occur while an investigation was ongoing, virtually every one of the officers with the exception, apparently, of one, were operating under the assumption

that that wasn’t the policy. They weren’t aware even though it was.

So while changing the structure and redefining it through directives is important, as Mr. Kline said, we have got to get that word

18

out to the field or at least in that one case with Corporal Tillman,

it may not work.

So I just wanted to add my one and a half cents onto that.

The only other thing I want to pursue right now is just for my

own edification.

General, when you spoke about the evolving data that we have

received over the first hearing of June 27th, the briefing of July

17th, and then last evenings letter of August 1st from you, there

was apparently—for lack of a better description—a disconnect between MARCENT and Headquarters Marine Corps.

Did I hear that correctly?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I don’t necessarily have the information that MARCENT did not correctly report. What I do know

is the records that we have at Headquarters Marine Corps are inconsistent.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, that is why I said ‘‘disconnect.’’ I am not trying to characterize. They weren’t the same for whatever reason.

That is what you are trying to determine.

General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. When General Downs—and I agree pretty much

with Dr. Snyder’s comments in the beginning about General

Downs’ kind of attitude, but I don’t know if that is fair, but it is

certainly the impression that many of us got.

But as I look through the transcript of that hearing, I mean, I

can at least understand the source of his certainty when we are

going through the processes, the two incidences since OEF/OIF as

query to the defense casualty system.

He was certain that his data was correct because, as he put it,

and I am reading from the comments on the transcript, ‘‘this, the

data, includes all updated reports, Ms. Davis.’’ He was responding

to the Chair. ‘‘The casualty information processing system includes

the original personnel casualty report and any supplements that

have been issued, so the information is updated as each PCR is received.’’

Where does that process, the defense casualty processing system,

fit into this continuum, if you will? Where do the PCR’s come in?

Where is it then transmitted to, and where did you look to give us

the latest updated figures of the 82 casualties, comprised of 23

incidences?

General MAGNUS. The command reporting system that I spoke of

as the first of those three processes includes a telephonic report

normally within an hour of the command realizing a casualty. It

is followed immediately, probably within minutes in most cases, by

a digital electronic personnel casualty report.

At the same time, data is entered by the command into DCIPS,

the Defense Casualty Information Processing System, which also

feeds into a thing called defense casualty system, which is a registry or record that has been accumulated, I believe, going back to

at least Vietnam if not before. But those are simply feeder systems.

They are taking the data that is originally in the PCR as it is reported, and as it is modified by supplemental PCRs from the command.

19

Mr. MCHUGH. So it is transmitted initially from the field, as I

hear you say it, almost simultaneously to both the defense casualty

processing system, sent into that, but also into MARCENT. True?

General MAGNUS. The command in the field will begin to enter

casualty information processing as the Marine is evacuated from

the battlefield, assuming he has to be evacuated. And at each time

there is a change in his casualty information, if he goes from Al

Anbar to Balad to Landstuhl, the defense casualty information updates that status.

Now of course, if in fact, there is a fatality, that information

stops there. That then feeds into the other system which is the defense casualty system, but each time there is a change in status

by the command, they are supposed to indicate a supplemental personnel casualty report until the time that that individual either becomes fatal or the injury is lowered to the status of what is called

‘‘not seriously injured.’’ That determination of that status is made

by a competent medical authority.

Mr. MCHUGH. The discrepancy, the numbers, was really rectified

at least in the moment, and I have heard you say that you are not

entirely confident, and I understand that, and you have got an ongoing review.

But that ongoing review really deals between whatever the two

data sets are held by the Headquarters of the Marine Corps and

MARCENT, yes? What I am concerned about, and I don’t know if

this is strictly the Marine Corps’ duty here, but I am concerned

about the quality of data entered across the board into the defense

casualty processing system.

Is there any assurance that those data are accurate or jibing

with anything else? Did anybody look at that in your case or not?

General MAGNUS. That is going to be part of the deeper review

by, basically, a professional investigator. That is what their job is.

I think from my cursory look at this—and I know you have emphasized, Congressman, that I am not yet confident in our information or our numbers—my cursory review is that any error in system has a tendency to be perpetuated inside that system. The

Judge Advocate General’s investigation is about as close to the

flawless process that the congresswoman mentioned that is similar

in the pharmaceutical profession, because that is rigorously gone

over by lawyers and vetted at each chain.

But it is the casualty reporting chain that is the one that is subject to having either incorrect information later corrected. If it is

never entered into that system, it may not have the checks and balances to be corrected.

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank you, General. General, thank you for being

here today.

I yield back.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

General, you said, I think in response to Ms. Shea-Porter, that

you thought that a DOD-wide policy is essential, was your words,

and that Secretariat Dominguez is working on putting that together.

20

Now the Commandant’s going to come out with a white letter to

disseminate to everyone. Is the timing of that potentially going to

be that the Commandant comes out with a white letter, then DOD

comes out with a policy, and you are going to have to say, ‘‘Well,

our white letter is not quite consistent with DOD policy, and we

are going to have to adjust it?’’

I mean, the Army is very satisfied with their procedures now

after going through some real heartache, primarily because of Corporal Tillman’s case. The Navy and the Air Force are satisfied;

they have recognized their numbers are lower than the Army and

Marine Corps.

Do we have the potential that everyone is going to have to adjust

in order to follow along this DOD-wide policy that you think is

coming?

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman.

While I can’t guarantee that we might not have a disconnect, we

are working closely with the Navy Secretariat and OSD to ensure

that their higher level guidance is consistent with what the Army

and the Marine Corps will be doing.

And our job is going to have implementing instructions far beyond that that is going to be in the white letter to the commanders

that will literally guide the training, the checklists, and if necessary, any modifications to our process, to ensure that we take

note of the Army model and make appropriate changes for the Marine Corps procedures.

Dr. SNYDER. I got you.

You said earlier that it is the inflicting force that is responsible

for the investigation. Is that correct?

General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. Is that true, then, if it is the inflicting force that

causes casualties of DOD civilians that are in Iraq or Afghanistan?

General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir. The DOD instructions

cover DOD civilians and DOD contractors that were killed or injured by hostile fire.

Dr. SNYDER. And what if the inflicting force—your responsibility

would be a Marine Corps incident in which other government agency other than DOD civilians are casualties of a friendly fire in

which the Marine Corps is inflicting force, are you responsible for

that investigation?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I am not aware of any circumstance, but of course, that potential exists particularly in this

war. A determination would be made by the appropriate command

as to who is going to do the investigation. And in the event that

it was classified—and we have done classified investigations, I just

looked at one today—that appropriate unclassified parts of that

were transmitted back into the systems that go to track casualties.

Dr. SNYDER. And then you have the potential issues of—I am focusing now on just U.S. citizens—U.S. citizens who would get hurt

by a friendly fire incident, which may have no connection with government. They may be missionaries, they may be business people.

That is a third potential level of investigation.

My final question is, I would assume that when these incidents

occur, they are always heart-breaking for the soldiers and Marines

that are a part of them, that there is a learning experience that

21

goes on at some level, perhaps multiple levels. What could we have

done different to avoid this?

And if you had asked me before Mr. McHugh, and I, and Ms.

Davis participated in this hearing at the end of June, I would have

thought that there would have been, perhaps fairly high level,

maybe in the Commandant’s office somewhere, someone responsible for—‘‘Yes, we have got a file on each one of these incidents;

we are looking for common links; we think it is because, I don’t

know, the uniforms we were wearing; we think it is poor communication, but there seem to be some links.’’

But the fact that this has taken literally weeks of gathering

these different incidents together, I mean, it is pretty firm evidence

there is no one looking at these incidents saying, ‘‘Is there a commonality that we can avoid this in the future?’’ Is that a fair statement?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, I would say that as of today,

that is not a correct statement. There are lots of folks looking at

this.

Dr. SNYDER. As of a few weeks ago, it was a fair statement.

General MAGNUS. Unfortunately, that is true.

Dr. SNYDER. Because it would have seemed like that would have

been the first place you would have gone to is we have got this

overt colonel who is responsible for looking at all these just like we

have an office that looks at all IED—that we are looking for ways

to prevent things from occurring in the future, but there hasn’t

been any of that occurring in the Marine Corps as near as we can

tell. And that is probably unfortunate.

But thank you, General, for being here. We appreciate your time

and your service and working on this issue.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. DAVIS. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General, I would suspect that, following up on Dr. Snyder’s questions and remarks, if there are, over time, organizations that look

at things like this: the Center for Naval Analysis, the folks down

at Quantico who are looking at lessons learned, and so forth.

But that is different from the sort of on-the-spot taking a look

at the casualty reports that come in and the investigation. I don’t

know that to be true, but I know that historically, it is true.

Dr. SNYDER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. KLINE. Oh, happy to.

Dr. SNYDER. But if the official word six weeks ago was that there

had only been two incidents, that means that those groups that you

cited would have probably been only informed of two incidents.

Mr. KLINE. Entirely possible. I am not disagreeing at all. I am

just saying that as a matter of course, that sort of after-action investigation has gone on conflict after conflict and I am sure it

would here, too. I am not excusing all the discrepancies.

And as I said in my earlier comments, there is no doubt that

processes have to be changed, and that is what you are moving forward with.

And I just want to get clear for our understanding, for the record,

that in the Inspector General’s effort, as he looks at everything

that happened, should there be an indication that something other

22

than courage, honor and commitment was demonstrated by someone involved. That there was an expectation in this process that

such person would then be moved to administrative or legal, Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), that there will be—if misconduct of any kind occurred—that will be addressed as well? Is

that correct?

General MAGNUS. Congressman, that is absolutely correct.

Mr. KLINE. I thought I heard that in an earlier question. I just

wanted to make it perfectly clear that as part of this process goes

forward, you are not only looking at what happened to an end of

change in processes, but if there were misbehavior of any sort, that

will be brought to light as well. You have answered it. Thank you.

And I yield back.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Kline.

All right, thank you.

General, we really appreciate the fact that you have been here

and answering the questions and trying to help us clarify a number

of issues.

One of the concerns that we heard as we sat in the meeting on

the 27th centered around the term, ‘‘suspected friendly fire,’’ and

it was our understanding that the family wasn’t notified of that initially, but that that has changed. And I just wanted to clarify that.

At what point is a family notified of a suspected friendly fire incident?

General MAGNUS. A family is required to be notified of suspected

friendly fire or indeterminate cause of either a fatality, a very serious injury, or serious injury. They are required to be notified at the

same time frames as our preliminary personnel casualty report; in

other words, within the hours of 0500 until midnight.

If that status changes, if for good reason it was incorrectly reported as enemy fire, subsequently determined to be indeterminate,

we are to immediately do the same thing and then to update that

family in 30 days unless there has been a completion backing that

up with a letter to let them know what the status is.

Ms. DAVIS. So it is correct to say that families are notified earlier

today than they were before we started to take a look at this incident. Is that correct? Because it was our understanding that actually they weren’t notified until after an investigation was done, if

it was indeterminate.

Are you saying that now it is that they are notified, if it is indeterminate, early on?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, that is correct. And they

should have been notified in accordance with statute and regulation previously.

In the case of Lance Corporals Shuder and Zurheide, that incident on the 12th of April, that was not even in accordance with our

regulations. Literally, it was over two years to the notification.

Ms. DAVIS. Right, okay.

And finally, just to focus on the educational process for those

that are part of this process and are part of the notification process. What do you see in terms of changes, reforms, that would be

taking place at the adjutant schools as a result of changes in the

white letter, which we understand has not come out yet, and you

are suggesting that it is going to be more than a reemphasis. It is

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going to be more specific in terms of the standard of procedures

that follow that, which we hope are in line with that—there is still

this educational process over here.

What changes do you foresee? And is it a matter of time spent

in trying to retrain, difference of emphasis? What do you anticipate

will be taking place?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, first off, I think this will

take place quite rapidly. I actually think that our procedures, although they need to be reviewed and there will probably be some

changes, they were more than adequate if people understood the

necessity to cross check.

But the commanding officers and the commanding generals will

be advised of not only the reemphasis, but the changes that we

want to put in place immediately and any changes that come subsequently with the DOD instruction and changes in Marine Corps

order.

The judge advocates will be advised. And quite frankly, I think

they do their process quite well. But of the connectivity, again, of

these systems, and perhaps most importantly, the noncommissioned officers and officers that manned the command operational

centers which do the initial and update reporting, they need to be

ensured that the procedures they are trained by and their reports

are consistent.

Quite frankly, the lynchpin on this, though, Madam Chairman,

is the casualty section itself. To be ensured that they are aware

and get the information on all three of these processes, that they

rigorously cross-check and question things that don’t match up.

And, ultimately, the Inspector General’s checklist has to be modified to ensure that we periodically go back and check this process,

which can’t be something that you only check once every 12

months.

So there are other things the IG, himself, is going to do to ensure

that we have appropriate checks and balances.

Ms. DAVIS. What do you think is a fair amount of time for us to

allow these changes to take place, whatever training is required,

the white letter to move forward, and to bring either you back,

General, or your representative to take a look at this and see how

we are doing? Is it six months? Is it a year? What is a fair amount

of time to take a look?

General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, after you receive the results of the IG’s investigation with our endorsements for actions on

it, I believe we will have made the necessary changes within the

Marine Corps within 30 to 60 days, to get it promulgated across

the core. Obviously, the focus will be on the deployed and deploying

combat units.

Any changes that may become from changing orders and directives may happen later, but I think the ones that are going to address everyone’s correct concerns about the deficiencies in these

systems, they will be done within 30 to 60 days.

Ms. DAVIS. I appreciate that.

Can I assume that if there are some problems that arise, that

you will let us know about those so that we have an

opportunity——

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General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, we are going to provide

the committee staff copies of every single directive document, including the Commandant’s letter that occurs as a result of this.

Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you very much, General.

Again, thank you very much for your service. Thank you for your

frankness here, today. We appreciate it.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

AUGUST 2, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

AUGUST 2, 2007

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