U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–010 

" ! SENATE 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–302 

Calendar No. 560 

SECRET SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 

2015 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

H.R. 1656 

TO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE SECRET 

SERVICE, AND TO IMPROVE PROTECTIONS FOR RESTRICTED 

AREAS 

JULY 13, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

DAVID S. LUCKEY, Director of Homeland Security 

CHRISTOPHER S. BONESS, Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Minority Chief Counsel 

STEPHEN R. VIN ̃ A, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security 

ABIGAIL A. SHENKLE, Minority Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 560 

114TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2d Session 114–302 

SECRET SERVICE IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2015 

JULY 13, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany H.R. 1656] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (H.R. 1656) to provide for additional 

resources for the Secret Service, and to improve protections for restricted areas, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 5 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 6 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 7 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 8 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Act, as Reported ........................... 9 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of H.R. 1656, the Secret Service Improvement Act 

of 2016, is to assist the United States Secret Service (Secret Service 

or USSS) in fulfilling its protective and investigative missions. The 

act codifies a number of recommendations of the 2014 United 

States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel (the Panel), including increasing training and hiring, evaluating additional weaponry, 

and codifying an ethics program office. The act requires the Secret 

Service to evaluate and report to Congress within a year on measures Secret Service can take to address security vulnerabilities at 

the White House and extends protection to former Vice Presidents 

and their families. The act requires an evaluation of vulnerabilities 


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1 USSS History, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ 

about/history/events/. 2The Investigative Mission, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, available at http:// 

www.secretservice.gov/investigation. 3The Protective Mission, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE, available at http:// 

www.secretservice.gov/protection. 4 Id. 

5 H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM: UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: AN AGENCY

IN CRISIS 55 (Dec. 2015), available at https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ 

Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf [hereinafter UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: AN AGENCY IN CRI- SIS]. 

6 Id. 7 Id. 8Office of the Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security. Investigation into the Incident at the White House Complex on March 4, 2015 (Redacted) 10–12 (May 6, 2015), available at https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mga/OIGlmga-050615.pdf. 9 UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: AN AGENCY IN CRISIS at 56. 10 Carol D. Leonnig and Craig Whitlock, Drone Incident at White House Highlights Long-Studied, Still-Unsolved Security Gap, WASH POST (Jan. 26, 2015), available at https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/politics/drone-incident-at-white-house-highlights-long-studied-still-unsolved-security-gap/2015/01/26/ed2e7f9e-a594-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440lstory.html. 

and threats, including unmanned aerial systems, to the White 

House complex, and imposes criminal penalties for operating an 

autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon on 

restricted buildings or grounds protected by the Secret Service. 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

The initial mission of the Secret Service was to investigate the 

counterfeiting of money under the Treasury Department.1 Since 

then, the agency has broadened its criminal investigations to encompass financial, banking, and cyber-related sectors of critical infrastructure.2 Additionally, the Secret Service’s mission expanded 

to include the protection of the President and the Vice-President of 

the United States and their families, the White House complex, 

former presidents, major presidential candidates, and visiting foreign heads of states.3 The Secret Service also serves as the lead 

agency for National Special Security Events, such as the Papal 

visit in September 2015 and the annual United Nations General 

Assembly.4

White House and U.S. Capitol security incidents 

The Secret Service has had a number of security incidents that 

highlight the need for changes within the agency. According to a 

congressional report, on March 4, 2015, an individual dropped off 

a suspicious package outside a guard booth at the White House 

complex.5 On-duty members of the Secret Service Uniformed Division cordoned off the area while waiting for a bomb squad from the 

Washington Metropolitan Police Department.6 While the investigation was ongoing, two special agents drove from a downtown Washington bar into a White House barricade, disrupting the investigation of the package.7 The supervisor on duty did not issue a field 

sobriety test despite signs of intoxication, and instead allowed the 

two agents to leave the scene. Both agents drove home in their assigned government vehicles.8 Additionally, the event was not immediately reported to senior leadership.9

In May 2015, a drone landed on the front lawn of the White 

House; in response, Secret Service officers initiated a lockdown of 

the White House Complex and a shutdown of the surrounding 

areas.10 Prior to the incident, Congress was warned that the Secret 


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11 Id. 12Letters from Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman, and Hon. Tom Carper, Ranking Member, S. 

Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, to Hon. Joseph Clancy, Dir., U.S. Secret 

Service; Michael Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; and Chief Kim Dine, 

U.S. Capitol Police (Apr. 24, 2016) (on file with Comm. staff). 13 Id. 14S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS: CAPITAL AIRSPACE SECURITY

BREACH: INQUIRY INTO THE LANDING OF A GYROCOPTER ON THE CAPITOL LAWN (Aug. 5, 2015). 15 Id. 16OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG–16–64, 2014 WHITE HOUSE

FENCE JUMPING INCIDENT 5 (Apr. 12, 2016). 17 Id. at 5–11. 18OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG–13–24, ADEQUACY OF

USSS’ INTERNAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN CARTAGENA, COLUMBIA (Jan. 

2013). 19 Carol D. Leonnig and David Nakamura, Secret Service Agents Sent Home from Netherlands 

Were Warned to Avoid Trouble, WASH POST (March 26, 2014), available at https:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/politics/secret-service-agents-on-obama-detail-sent-home-from-netherlands-after-night-of-drinking/2014/03/26/86d1a8a6-b4e6-11e3-8020-b2d790b3c9e1lstory.html. 20 JOSEPH HAGIN, THOMAS PERRELLI, DANIELLE GRAY, & MARK FILIP, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO

REPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE PROTECTIVE MISSION PANEL TO THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY 6 (Dec. 15, 2014) [hereinafter 

PANEL REPORT EXEC. SUMMARY]. 

Service lacked the ability to address the vulnerability of drones entering the White House grounds.11

Separately, on April 24, 2015, Chairman Ron Johnson and Ranking Member Tom Carper sent letters to several agencies, including 

the United States Park Police, United States Capitol Police, the 

Federal Aviation Administration, and the United States Secret 

Service, as part of an inquiry into an April 15 incident in which 

a lightweight aircraft entered restricted airspace and landed on the 

lawn of the United States Capitol Building.12 The Chairman and 

Ranking Member sought to gain an understanding of the protocols 

agencies have in place to prevent a breach of this nature.13 USSS 

is the agency with primary authority to grant permits to those requesting to lawfully enter the P–56 prohibited airspace.14 Following this inquiry, Committee staff released a bipartisan report 

with findings and recommendations to improve coordination relating to airspace security in the National Capital Region.15

In September 2014, a man was able to scale the White House perimeter fence and successfully enter the White House through the 

front door, bypassing Secret Service officers.16 Numerous levels of 

security including a K–9 unit, Emergency Response Team (ERT), 

and alarms placed inside the front doors, were not properly triggered when the fence-jumper ran across the North Lawn and into 

the White House.17

In addition to security incidents, ethical misconduct has been a 

persistent issue at USSS for the past couple years, highlighted by 

the events that took place in Cartagena, Columbia,18 as well as reports of alcohol-related misconduct during protective missions.19

United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel 

In the aftermath of the fence-jumping incident, the Secretary of 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Panel 

on October 15, 2014, to undertake a review of security issues related to the White House compound and a more encompassing review of the Secret Service’s protective mission—including recommendations regarding potential new directors.20 The Panel consisted of former White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, 

former Associate Attorney General of the United States Thomas 

Perrelli, former Assistant to the President and White House CabiVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:29 Jul 17, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR302.XXX SR302

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21See generally, Letter from Joseph Hagin, Thomas Perrelli, Danielle Gray, Mark Filip, 

United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec. (Dec. 15, 2014) (on file with Comm. staff) (accompanying the report, signed by 

the panel members). 22PANEL REPORT EXEC. SUMMARY at 2. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 5. 27 Id. 28 Id. 

net Secretary Danielle Gray, and former Deputy Attorney General 

Mark Filip.21

The Panel publicly released an executive summary of its report 

on December 15, 2014, along with a summary of recommendations 

in the areas of training and personnel management; technology, perimeter security, and operations; and leadership.22 A number of the 

recommendations touched on how to effectively train, hire, and retain personnel in the Secret Service. Per the public summary, 

training and personnel recommendations included: reintroducing a 

‘‘fourth shift’’ training regimen for agents and officers, integrating 

training between different teams protecting the White House, replicating the environment that officers and agents operate in to reflect a more realistic training experience, and increasing the number of positions in the Uniformed Division and Presidential Protective Division.23

The Panel stated that the Secret Service should identify and update security systems that guard the White House.24 Additionally, 

the Panel recommended that the Secret Service develop ways to 

improve perimeter security at the White House, if needed, such as 

increasing the height of the White House perimeter fence.25

The Panel also expressed concern that Secret Service members 

were not receiving adequate training to fulfill their protective missions.26 Uniformed Division officers were spending on average 25 

minutes each on training in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013.27 Accordingly, 

the Panel recommended that ten percent of an officer’s time should 

be spent in training.28

Proposed legislation 

The Secret Service Improvements Act of 2016 would codify some 

recommendations of the Panel and strengthen the Secret Service’s 

ability to investigate threats against protectees and their immediate families. It would require the agency to evaluate potential 

vulnerabilities at the White House complex, improve security technology, and consider the use of additional weaponry for agents. 

This legislation is intended to assist the Secret Service in addressing security gaps and personnel issues that were the catalyst for 

creating the Panel. 

The act would also impose a criminal penalty for ‘‘knowingly 

throwing, operating, or placing an autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon in a restricted building or 

grounds.’’ 

The act also codifies the recommendation of the Panel that the 

Secret Service increase its training requirements. The act includes 

a provision authorizing the Director of the Secret Service to improve and construct additional training facilities at the Rowley 

Training Center in Laurel, Maryland. 


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29 Id. 30 UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE: AN AGENCY IN CRISIS at 150. 31 Id. 32 Id. 

The act also codifies the Panel’s recommendation that the Secret 

Service increase the Uniformed Division by 200 positions and the 

Presidential Protective Division by 85 positions from the number of 

officers and agents employed by the agency as of December 15, 

2014.29 According to a congressional report, Secret Service staffing 

peaked in FY 2011, and by FY 2015, staffing levels significantly decreased to 6,315.30 This is 52 fewer positions than when the Panel 

issued their report recommending additional staffing, despite increased hiring by the agency.31 The loss of agents and officers over 

the past couple of years has overworked the current workforce, resulting in longer and more frequent shifts.32

Events in Cartagena, Columbia in 2012 and other recent alcoholrelated misconduct highlight the need for an ethics office within 

the Secret Service. The Office of Integrity was established within 

the agency in December 2013. The act would specifically authorize 

this office. 

As amended by the Committee, the act removes the House provision that would require the Senate to confirm the President’s nominee for the Director of the Secret Service. The Committee has 

worked to limit the number of presidential appointees that require 

confirmation by the Senate. Additionally, the Committee feels that 

the importance the Director of the Secret Service plays in protecting the President, his or her family, and the White House complex, should allow the President to choose the head of the agency 

tasked with such a mission. The amended act would also strike a 

Sense of Congress that the National Capital Planning Commission 

should defer to the Secret Service, and update language referring 

to protection of ‘‘the wife of a former vice president’’ to refer instead 

to spouses of former vice presidents. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Representative Bob Goodlatte, along with Representatives John 

Conyers Jr., Sheila Jackson Lee, Michael McCaul, and James F. 

Sensenbrenner Jr., introduced H.R. 1656 on March 26, 2015, which 

was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. The House 

Committee on the Judiciary considered H.R. 1656 at a business 

meeting on July 27, 2015. The House of Representatives passed the 

bill under suspension of the rules by a vote of 365–16 (Roll no. 468) 

on July 27, 2015. 

The act was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on July 28, 

2015. The Committee considered H.R. 1656 at a business meeting 

on February 10, 2016. 

Chairman Johnson offered a modified amendment in the nature 

of a substitute, which removed the clause that provided for the advice and consent of the Senate to the Presidentially-appointed Director of the Secret Service, removed a Sense of Congress relating 

to security enhancements to the White House, and required the 

Government Accountability Office to report on the implementation 

of this bill and the implementation of recommendations by the 

United States Secret Service Protective Missions Panel Report no 


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later than two years after enactment. The substitute also more 

clearly defines what constitutes a restricted building or grounds 

and extends Secret Service protection of former Vice Presidents 

and their immediate families, and replaces the term ‘‘wife’’ with 

‘‘spouse’’ where it occurs in describing the families of former Vice 

Presidents. The Committee adopted the modified substitute amendment and ordered the act, as amended, reported favorably, both by 

voice vote. Senators present for both the vote on the amendment 

and the vote on the act were: Johnson, McCain, Portman, Paul, 

Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE ACT, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the act’s short title, the ‘‘Secret Service Improvements Act of 2016.’’ 

Section 2. Restricted building or grounds 

Section 2 amends Title 18 of the United States Code to ensure 

the Government can arrest and prosecute those who operate unmanned aerial devices over the White House and other restricted 

grounds. Specifically, it criminalizes the throwing, operating, or 

placing of an ‘‘autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon’’ within a restricted building or grounds that disrupts Government business or official functions. This section also 

clarifies that otherwise entering the restricted building or grounds 

with a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm is punishable under 

Title 18. The section amends the definition of ‘‘restricted building 

or grounds’’ in Title 18 to encompass properties designated as nongovernmental by the President or another Secret Service protectee 

(such as the President’s secondary residence, for example). 

Section 3. Threats against former Vice Presidents 

Section 3 authorizes the Secret Service to investigate threats 

against former Vice Presidents and their immediate families, and 

extends the criminal penalties that apply to threats against Presidents and their families, former Presidents and their families, and 

others, to include former Vice Presidents and their immediate families. The section also changes the definition of the immediate family from the wife or widow of a former President to the spouse or 

widow or widower of a former President or Vice President to make 

the section gender neutral. 

Section 4. Increased training 

The purpose of this section is to require training for United 

States Secret Service Protective Division Agents and Uniformed Division Officers per the recommendation of the Panel. The section 

requires the Secret Service to increase the number of training 

hours for officers and agents so that no less than ten percent of 

their time is spent on training, beginning the year after enactment. 

Additionally, USSS shall maintain enough staff to provide agents 

and officers a ‘‘fourth shift’’ of training. This is based on recommendations from the Panel. 


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Section 5. Training facilities 

Section 5 authorizes the Director of the Secret Service to construct facilities at the Rowley Training Center to improve training 

for Uniformed Division officers and Secret Service agents. 

Section 6. Hiring of additional officers and agents 

Section 6 requires the Secret Service to implement the hiring requirement recommended in the Panel report. The section requires 

the Secret Service to hire 200 additional Uniformed Division officers and 85 additional agents for the Presidential Protective Detail. 

Section 7. Evaluation of vulnerabilities and threats 

Section 7 requires the Secretary of DHS to adopt improved procedures for evaluating vulnerabilities and threats, including unmanned aerial systems, to the White House and other buildings or 

grounds protected by the Secret Service. This section also requires 

the Secretary to report these findings to the appropriate congressional committees within one year. 

Section 8. Evaluation of use of technology 

Section 8 requires the Secret Service to work with the Science 

and Technology Directorate within DHS to evaluate new technology aimed at improving the security of the White House as well 

as Secret Service protectees. This section also requires the Secret 

Service to evaluate evidence retention procedures and report its 

findings to Congress. 

Section 9. Evaluation of use of additional weaponry 

Section 9 requires the Secret Service to evaluate outfitting its officers and agents with additional weaponry including the use of 

non-lethal weapons. 

Section 10. Security costs for secondary residences 

Section 10 allows the Secret Service to make necessary security 

upgrades to secondary residences of former Presidents. 

Section 11. Establishment of Ethics Program 

Section 11 requires the creation of an Ethics Program Office 

under the Chief Counsel of the Secret Service. 

Section 12. Report on implementation 

Section 12 requires the Comptroller General of the United States 

to report to Congress on the implementation of this act, as well as 

the implementation of recommendations reported from the Panel 

report. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this act and determined that the act will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 

Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the act contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 


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(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

MARCH 3, 2016. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 1656, the Secret Service 

Improvements Act of 2016. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 1656—Secret Service Improvements Act of 2016 

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1656 would increase 

spending subject to appropriation by less than $500,000 annually. 

Because enacting H.R. 1656 would affect direct spending and revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures apply, but CBO estimates that any 

such effects would be negligible. CBO also estimates that enacting 

the legislation would not increase net direct spending or on-budget 

deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 

2027. 

H.R. 1656 would authorize the United States Secret Service to 

hire additional law enforcement personnel and construct facilities 

for training those individuals. The act also would direct the agency 

to establish an office to provide ethics training for employees. According to the Secret Service, the agency is already hiring the personnel and constructing the facilities that would be specifically authorized by the act. Consequently, implementing H.R. 1656 would 

not affect spending for those activities. Based on information from 

the Secret Service, CBO estimates that it would cost less than 

$500,000 annually to operate the ethics office required by the legislation; such spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

H.R. 1656 also would broaden the coverage of current laws 

against accessing restricted buildings and threatening a Vice President of the United States. Because CBO expects that the legislation 

would apply to a relatively small number of offenders, any increase 

in costs for law enforcement, court proceedings, or prison operations would not be significant. 

Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 1656 could 

be subject to criminal fines, the federal government might collect 

additional fines under the act. Criminal fines are recorded as revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, and are available to 

spend without further appropriation action. CBO expects that any 

additional revenues and subsequent direct spending would not be 

significant because of the small number of cases likely to be affected. 


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H.R. 1656 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

On July 31, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 

1656, the Secret Service Improvements Act of 2015, as passed by 

the House of Representatives on July 27, 2015. The two versions 

of the act are similar and CBO’s estimate of the budgetary effects 

are the same. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE ACT, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by H.R. 1656 as 

reported are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in brackets, new matter is printed in italic, and existing 

law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

UNITED STATES CODE 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 18—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL 

PROCEDURE 

* * * * * * * 

PART I—CRIMES 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 41—EXTORTION AND THREATS 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 879. THREATS AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENTS AND CERTAIN 

OTHER PERSONS 

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to kill, kidnap, or 

inflict bodily harm upon— 

(1) * * * 

(2) a former Vice President or a member of the immediate 

family of a former Vice President; 

ø(2)¿ (3) a member of the immediate family of the President, 

the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice Presidentelect; 

ø(3)¿ (4) a major candidate for the office of President or Vice 

President, or a member of the immediate family of such candidate; or 

ø(4)¿ (5) a person protected by the Secret Service under section 3056(a)(6); 

(b) As used in this section— 

(1) the term ‘‘immediate family’’ means— 

(A) with respect to øsubsection (a)(1)¿ paragraphs (1) 

and (2) of subsection (a) of this section, øthe wife of a 


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former President during his lifetime, the widow of a former 

President until her death or re-marriage, and minor children of a former President¿ the spouse of a former President or former Vice President during the lifetime of the 

former President or former Vice President, as the case may 

be, the widow or widower of a former President or former 

Vice President until the death or remarriage of the widow 

or widower, and minor children of a former President or 

former Vice President until they reach sixteen years of age; 

and 

(B) with respect to øsubsection (a)(2) and (a)(3)¿ paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a) of this section, a person 

to whom the President, President-elect, Vice President, 

Vice President-elect, or major candidate for the office of 

President or Vice President— 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 84—PRESIDENTIAL AND PRESIDENTIAL 

STAFF ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, AND ASSAULT 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 1752. RESTRICTED BUILDING OR GROUNDS 

(a) Whoever— 

(1) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(3) knowingly, and with the intent to impede or disrupt the 

orderly conduct of Government business or official functions, 

obstructs or impedes ingress or egress to or from any restricted 

building or grounds; øor¿ 

(4) knowingly engages in any act of physical violence against 

any person or property in any restricted building or grounds; 

or 

(5) knowingly causes any autonomous or remotely operated 

vehicle or dangerous weapon to enter any restricted building or 

grounds, with the intent for such autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon to enter a restricted building 

or grounds, when, or so that, such autonomous or remotely operated vehicle or dangerous weapon, in fact, impedes or disrupts the orderly conduct of Government business or official 

functions; 

or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished as provided in 

subsection (b). 

(b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is— 

(1) A fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 

10 years, or both, if— 

ø(A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, 

uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm; 

or¿ 

(A) during and in relation to the offense, a deadly or 

dangerous weapon or firearm is used, carried, or otherwise 

enters the restricted building or grounds; or 

(B) * * * 

(2) * * * 

(c) In this section— 


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(1) the term ‘‘restricted buildings or øgrounds’’ means¿ 

grounds’’— (A) means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— 

ø(A)¿ (i) of the White House or its grounds, or the 

Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; 

ø(B)¿ (ii) of a building or grounds where the President or other person protected by the Secret Service is 

or will be temporarily visiting; øor¿ 

(iii) of a building or grounds that the President or 

other person protected by the Secret Service has designated as a non-governmental property in accordance 

with the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976 

(18 U.S.C. 3056 note); or 

ø(C)¿ (iv) of a building or grounds so restricted in 

conjunction with an event designated as a special 

event of national significance; and 

(B) includes the airspace above any posted, cordoned off, 

or otherwise restricted area described in subparagraph (A); 

and 

(2) * * * 

* * * * * * * 

PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1976 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 3. 

(a) * * * 

(b) A protectee may thereafter designate a different non-Governmental property in lieu of the non-Governmental property previously designated under subsection (a) (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the ‘‘previously designated property’’) as the one nonGovernmental property to be fully secured by the Secret Service on 

a permanent basis under subsection (a). Thereafter, øany expenditures by the Secret Service to maintain a permanent guard detail 

or for permanent facilities, equipment, and services to secure the 

non-Governmental property previously designated under subsection 

(a) shall be subject to the limitations imposed under section 4¿ any 

expenditures by the Secret Service for permanent facilities, equipment, and services to secure the non-Governmental property previously designated under subsection (a) are subject to the requirements set forth in section 4. 

(c) * * * 

øSEC. 4. Expenditures by the Secret Service for maintaining a 

permanent guard detail and for permanent facilities, equipment, 

and services to secure any non-Governmental property in addition 

to the one non-Governmental property designated by each protectee 

under subsection 3(a) or 3(b) may not exceed a cumulative total of 

$10,000 at each such additional non-Governmental property, unless 

expenditures in excess of that amount are specifically approved by 

resolutions adopted by the Committees on Appropriations of the 

House and Senate, respectively.¿ 

SEC. 4. Notification regarding expenditures on non-governmental 

properties. The Secret Service shall notify the Committees on Appropriations of the House and Senate, the Committee on Homeland SeVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:29 Jul 17, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR302.XXX SR302

rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with HEARING
12 

curity and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on 

the Judiciary of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives, and the Committee 

on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives of any expenditures 

for permanent facilities, equipment, and services to secure any nonGovernmental property in addition to the one non-Governmental 

property designated by each protectee under subsection (a) or (b) of 

section 3. 

SEC. 5. 

(a) * * * 

(b) * * * 

(c) In the event that any non-Governmental property becomes a 

previously designated property and Secret Service protection at 

that property has not been terminated, all such improvements and 

other items which the Director determines are not necessary to secure the previously designated property øwithin the limitations imposed under section 4¿ shall be removed or compensated for in accordance with the procedures set forth under Subsection (b) of this 

section. 

* * * * * * * 

Æ 


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