J-S22023-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: W.S., JR., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.A.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2045 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2019-00750

IN RE: N.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.A.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2064 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2019-00751

IN RE: T.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.A.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2084 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2019-00752
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IN RE: F.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: W.A.S., SR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2085 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 2, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2019-00753

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JUNE 22, 2020

W.A.S., Sr., (Father) appeals from the decrees involuntarily terminating 

his parental rights to his four children, W.S., Jr., a male (born in November 

2008), N.S., a female (born in November 2011), T.S., a male (born in January 

2014), and F.S., a female (born in April 2015) (collectively, Children). In 

addition, Father’s counsel (Counsel) seeks to withdraw from representation 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth 

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. Super. 2009). Upon review, we grant 

Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the termination of Father’s parental 

rights.

Lancaster County Children and Youth Service Agency (Agency) first 

became involved with this family in 2013, due to domestic violence in the 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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home and J.R.’s (Mother) struggle with depression. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

11/21/19, at 2. The Agency created a safety plan and maintained an open 

file with this family until January 2016. Id. 

On June 7, 2016, Mother voluntarily placed the Children in the Agency’s 

custody due to her severe depression. Id. On June 8, 2016, the juvenile 

court placed the Children in the temporary custody of the Agency. The Agency 

placed W.S., Jr., and N.S. together in one foster home, and T.S. and F.S. 

together in a different foster home. Id. At the time of the subject proceeding, 

the Children remained in their respective foster homes, which “are potentially 

permanent placements for the Children.” Id.

At the time Mother voluntarily placed the Children, Father was in prison 

for committing aggravated assault against Mother. Id. Father was sentenced 

to a term of incarceration of two to four years, which he served at State 

Correctional Institution - Retreat. Id. Father was released from prison on 

April 1, 2018.1 Id. at 5. 

The orphans’ court adjudicated the Children dependent on June 20, 

2016. Id. The Agency first established a permanency plan for Father in 

August of 2017, when he remained incarcerated, and it included the following 

objectives: remaining free from drugs, the misuse of alcohol, crime, and 

____________________________________________

1 As best we can discern, Father was re-incarcerated for a parole violation 

from August 7, 2019 to August 22, 2019. N.T., 9/23/19, at 17.
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domestic violence; improving parenting skills; and obtaining a home 

appropriate for the Children. Id. at 3. 

Father attended a permanency review hearing in June 2018, after his 

release from prison. The orphans’ court found Father in moderate compliance 

with the permanency plan insofar as he had “completed a mental health 

evaluation, was in domestic violence treatment, tested negative for 

substances, and was regularly visiting the Children.” Id. at 5 (citation 

omitted). However, at a permanency review hearing in February 2019, the 

court found, “Father engaged in a violent conversation [with Mother] that 

involved some degree of physical abuse . . . .” Id. at 6 (citation omitted).

On April 1, 2019, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary 

termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). A hearing occurred on 

September 23, 2019, and October 28, 2019, during which Father and Mother 

were present and represented by separate counsel. Elizabeth A. Stineman, 

Esquire, the guardian ad litem (GAL), represented the best interests of the 
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Children. Pamela J. Breneman, Esquire, represented the legal interests of the 

older children, W.S., Jr., and N.S.2, 3

The Agency presented the testimony of Heather Lutz, Father’s probation 

and parole officer, and Kelsey Curcio, the Agency’s caseworker. Father neither 

testified nor presented any evidence. The court admitted into evidence a 

bonding evaluation performed by Karen M. Jaskot, ACSW, LCSW, CAADC, 

dated August 6 and 13, 2019, with respect to the Children’s bond, if any, with 

Father, Mother, and their respective foster parents. See N.T., 10/28/19, at 

6. The parties stipulated that, if Ms. Jaskot testified, she would opine

consistent with her report. Id. at 5-6. 

By decrees dated November 21, 2019, and entered on December 2, 

2019, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). On December 19, 2019, 

____________________________________________

2 Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested 

involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel who 

discerns and advocates for his or her legal interests, which our Supreme Court 

has defined as the child’s preferred outcome. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 

(Pa. 2018) (citing In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017)). The 

T.S. Court reaffirmed, “where a child’s legal and best interests do not diverge 

in a termination proceeding, an attorney-GAL representing the child’s best 

interests can also fulfill the role of the attorney appointed per Section 2313(a)

to represent the child’s legal interests.” T.S., 192 A.3d at 1088 (citing L.B.M., 

161 A.3d at 184, 188-89, 191). In this case, the record does not indicate that 

a conflict existed between the legal and best interests of the younger children, 

T.S. and F.S. 

3 Legal counsel for W.S., Jr., and N.S. filed an appellee brief in support of the 

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights.
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Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which 

this Court consolidated sua sponte.

4

 The orphans’ court filed its Rule 1925(a) 

opinion on January 17, 2020.

On March 6, 2020, Counsel filed with this Court a petition to withdraw 

his representation and brief pursuant to Anders and Santiago. Initially, we 

review Counsel’s request. See Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court 

may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on 

the request to withdraw.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 

1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)). This Court has “extended the Anders 

principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights.” In re X.J., 

105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a 

copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise 

the [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private 

counsel or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] 

deems worthy of the court’s attention.

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4 Mother also timely appealed from the decrees involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to the Children. We address Mother’s appeal by separate 

memorandum.
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Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc). With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court

has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the

letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth

v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, an Anders brief must comply with the following

substantive requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Here, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw certifying that he had 

reviewed the case and determined that Father’s appeal was frivolous. Counsel 

also filed a brief that includes a summary of the history and facts of the case, 

the issues raised by Father, the facts that arguably support the appeal, and 

Counsel’s assessment of why the appeal is frivolous with citations to relevant 

legal authority. Finally, Counsel attached to his petition a letter he sent to 
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Father pursuant to Millisock, supra. Therefore, Counsel complied with the 

requirements of Anders and Santiago.

We next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if on its face, there 

are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super.

2018) (en banc). Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issue: 

Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating [the] parental 

rights of Father where there was a history of past success and 

cooperation with the Agency after his release from incarceration, 

as factors that should have provided Father with additional time 

to remedy the condition for placement[?]

Anders brief at 1 (unpaginated).

Our standard of review is as follows: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, governs 

the termination of parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 
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termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In this case, we 

conclude that the record supports the decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) 

and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 
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to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

This Court has explained that the moving party must produce clear and 

convincing evidence with respect to the following elements to terminate 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2): (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003). 

Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), parents are required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002). A 

parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous. Id. Further, the grounds for termination of parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, 

are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. Id. at 

337. 
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With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also 

discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation 

omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Instantly, the orphans’ court found with respect to Section 2511(a)(2), 

as follows:

Father was incarcerated at the time these dependency 

proceedings began and was incarcerated for roughly twenty-two 

of the thirty-nine months these Children were in placement. While 

Father is currently not in prison, his continued behaviors of 

missing probation meetings, using drugs, and [physically] 

gripping Mother confirms that his incapacity to care for the 

Children that was present on June 8, 2016, has not been 

remedied, nor is it likely to be remedied. Therefore, the [c]ourt 

is satisfied that the Agency proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is warranted 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/19, at 14. The testimonial evidence supports 

the court’s findings.
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Father’s parole officer, Heather Lutz, testified that Father was under the 

supervision of Lancaster County Adult Probation and Parole for a felony he 

committed in 2013 involving criminal trespass. N.T., 9/23/19, at 5. Ms. Lutz 

testified that Father has not complied with the parole requirements to attend 

biweekly meetings with her, remain drug-free, complete all recommended 

domestic violence treatment services, have no contact with Mother, and to 

maintain an approved residential address. Id. at 6. 

Specifically, Ms. Lutz testified that Father did not attend his meeting 

with her the week before the termination proceeding. Id. at 6-7. In addition, 

she testified that Father admitted to using marijuana on August 27, 2019. Id.

at 7. With respect to domestic violence, Ms. Lutz explained that Father failed 

to complete an outpatient treatment program successfully. Id. at 7-8. 

Further, she testified that Father has not indicated that he is currently engaged 

in any outpatient treatment for domestic violence. Id. at 8. Moreover, Ms. 

Lutz has received reports that Father is having contact with Mother. Id. at 9. 

Finally, Ms. Lutz stated that she does not believe Father is living at his 

mother’s address, which was the approved address at the time of his release 

from prison. Id. at 8. Ms. Lutz explained, “if [Father] continues to use illegal 

substances[,] in addition to not reporting his appropriate [residential] 

address, in addition to not reporting [to] me, there will most likely be a [bench 

warrant issued for Father’s arrest for violating his parole].” Id. at 9. 
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Kelsey Curcio, the Agency permanency caseworker, testified that Father 

has admitted to his ongoing use of marijuana, and he tested positive for it on 

December 17, 2018, and April 11, 2019. Id. at 16. With respect to domestic 

violence, she testified that Father was incarcerated for a parole violation from 

August 7, 2019, to August 22, 2019. N.T., 9/23/19, at 17. Ms. Curcio 

explained that Father had ongoing contact with Mother and admitted to 

“gripping her up on a few occasions.” Id. Further, like Ms. Lutz, she was 

unable to confirm Father’s residential address. Id. at 18. Finally, Ms. Curcio 

testified that Father is granted visitation once per week with the Children. Id. 

Since June 27, 2019, Father had attended two out of a possible eight visits. 

Id. 

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the 

orphans’ court in concluding that Father’s conduct warranted termination of 

his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Father’s repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, or refusal to comply with his parole requirements 

and permanency objectives has caused Children to be without essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental 

well-being. Further, the causes of Father’s incapacity, abuse, or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied.

Regarding Section 2511(b), this Court has emphasized:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of 

relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond 

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)). 

Further, in considering the affection a child may have for his or her 

natural parent, this Court has stated: 

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent 

simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is 

not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s 

feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, 

the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics 

as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and 

abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and 

completely disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion 

that the biological connection between [the parent] and the 

children is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in 

connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to 

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The 

psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in 

terms of the development of the child and its mental and 

emotional health than the coincidence of biological or 

natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, our Supreme Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense 

dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the 

children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their 
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foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that, in 

weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must 

keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M.

Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we 

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts 

fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In this case, the orphans’ court ordered the above-described expert 

bonding evaluation performed by Ms. Jaskot, but Father refused to participate. 

Ms. Curcio testified that, on three occasions, Father was scheduled to 

participate in the evaluation, but he failed to attend each time. N.T., 9/23/19, 

at 21. 

Upon review, there is no record evidence that the younger children, T.S. 

and F.S., have a parent-child bond with Father. The orphans’ court found that 

a parent-child bond exists instead between T.S., F.S., and their foster parents. 

See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/19, at 17. The bonding evaluation

supports the court’s finding. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. 

With respect to the older children, W.S., Jr., and N.S., the court found

that a bond exists between them and Father; however, they desire to be 

adopted by their foster parents. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/19, at 

17. The court explained:

The two oldest children care deeply for both sets of parents, but 

overall expressed a desire for the three-year state of limbo to end 

and for them to be adopted. Within the Bonding Evaluation, Ms. 

Jaskot noted that all four children “have come to see their 
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resource homes, schools, neighborhoods and churches as part of 

their daily lives.” (Bonding Evaluation, p. 39). While the oldest 

children desire to have a relationship with Mother and Father, it 

was apparent from their conversations with Ms. Jaskot that they 

are also concerned for the safety of their Mother. It should be 

noted, that[,] upon learning that Mother and Father were once 

again in a relationship, the eldest child responded by crying, which 

the evaluator interpreted as an expressed concern for his 

Mother[,] whom he loves. Children should not have to deal with 

concerns for the safety of their Mother at the hands of their Father, 

nor would this [c]ourt allow the Children to return . . . to the 

parents who do not know how to maintain relational boundaries 

or sobriety for the safety of [the C]hildren.

At a point in the case where extraordinary effort by the parents 

was crucial, both individuals seemed to deteriorate and have 

themselves returned the case to the original need for placement. 

. . .

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/21/19, at 18.5 Based upon our review of the 

record, including the notes of testimony from the termination proceeding and 

____________________________________________

5 At the conclusion of the evidence, the orphans’ court inquired about the 

positions of the GAL and legal counsel for W.S., Jr., and N.S. They responded 

as follows:

[GAL]: [A]t this point all four children are indicating that they 

would like this to end and for them to be adopted. The two 

youngest children have really not wavered. That’s why I didn’t 

request legal counsel for them.

But since even requesting legal counsel for [W.S., Jr., and N.S.], 

they have changed their position.

THE COURT: Do you have any concerns these four children are 

not placed together?

[GAL]: [T]he two families have a very good relationship. And my 

understanding is they see each other quite a bit outside of -- I 

know the season for visits. . . . [M]y understanding [is] there’s 
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the bonding evaluation, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in 

concluding that the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare are served by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights.

Moreover, our independent review of the certified record reveals no 

preserved, non-frivolous issue that would arguably support this appeal. 

Therefore, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw, and affirm the decree

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) 

and (b).

Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed.

____________________________________________

not going to be any issue of them maintaining contact with each 

other.

THE COURT: [Legal counsel for W.S., Jr., and N.S.]?

[LEGAL COUNSEL]: That is my understanding too, Your Honor. I 

did meet with [W.S., Jr., and N.S.] at the school as well as in the 

foster home. And they’re looking forward to the [c]ourt making a 

final decision for them so they can move forward. They’ve actually 

made the comment to me they would like to be adopted[,] and 

stay where they are. They are safe in that home. They are sad 

that mom and dad have not been able to do what was needed to 

be done for them, but they indicated too they do see [their]

younger two siblings[,] and they enjoy those visits.

N.T., 10/28/19, at 25-26.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/22/2020