# Bahrain - United States Department of State

- Secretary Blinken’s Call with Bahraini Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa Office of the SpokespersonThe following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:  &nbsp;&nbsp;Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke today with Bahraini Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa.  Secretary Blinken and the Crown Prince discussed the situation&nbsp;in the Middle East and reinforced their shared commitment to preventing the spread of regional conflict. &nbsp;Secretary Blinken expressed appreciation for Bahrain’s contributions to maritime security. The Secretary and Crown Prince also discussed how cooperation under the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) continues to strengthen the strategic partnership between the United States and Bahrain.						Tags																					Bahrain																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State
- Bahrain HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Bahrain				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Bahrain during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, censorship, and enforcement or threat to enforce criminal libel laws to limit expression; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and on the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; and serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations.The government took credible steps to identify and punish officials accused of human rights abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited such practices, but domestic and international human rights organizations, as well as detainees and former detainees, maintained that abuse and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government security officials continued during the year.Prisoners, including prominent human rights defenders Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and Abduljalil al-Singace, alleged that prison authorities refused to refer them to specialists and denied them access to necessary medicines. On September 1, Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated authorities repeatedly denied al-Khawaja essential health care, despite his life-threatening cardiac problems. Prisoners and their advocates alleged unreasonable periods of solitary confinement for some prisoners. On September 15, Mary Lawlor, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, released a statement expressing alarm regarding the deteriorating health conditions of detained human rights defenders Abduljalil al-Singace, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, and Naji Fateel. She stated, “Medical negligence and lack of adequate care has left them in a worrying state. Both their detention and the ill-treatment they have suffered in prison violate the rights to free expression, opinion and assembly that must be guaranteed to human rights defenders.” She also noted the three human rights defenders had been subjects of opinions issued by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which found their detention to be arbitrary and pointed to a pattern of ill-treatment of detainees, including lack of access to adequate medical treatment.On June 20, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published an opinion calling for the release of six imprisoned students whom the Group maintained were being held arbitrarily after confessing to crimes under torture and undergoing unfair trials. The students – Ahmed Yusuf, Alaa Ansaif, Husain Matar, Husain Abdulla, Mohamed Baddaw and Sayed al-Khabbaz – were arrested separately, in unrelated cases, between 2013 and 2020. At the time of their arrests, three were children.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Human rights activists reported conditions in prisons and detention centers were harsh and, at times, life threatening due to physical abuse, unjust application of solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure, and inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: In August, prisoners in Jaw prison began a month-long hunger strike to protest prison conditions. On September 1, HRW reported that in their demands, Jaw prisoners stated they were in some cases forced to spend 23 hours a day in their cells. Inmates demanded an end to prolonged solitary confinement, more than one hour daily outside of their cells in the prison yard, prayer in congregation at the prison mosque, family visits without glass barriers, and improved access to health care. According to international media, on September 12, the prisoners suspended the hunger strike until September 30 to see if promised changes by the government would materialize. These changes included limiting isolation, extending inmates’ hours of daylight, and improving health care at the prison. As of the end of the year, the strike was still suspended.On September 27, the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) reported that the courts sentenced 12 prisoners to an additional three years and one prisoner to one additional year regarding a 2021 prison sit-in protesting medical negligence. BIRD stated that the convictions stemmed from a mass trial of 65 defendants, the rest of whom were acquitted. According to BIRD, the group of 65 was held incommunicado for more than a month after security forces and prison officers broke up the April 2021 sit-in in Jaw prison. BIRD also shared notes from interviews with prisoners conducted by the public prosecution in which the prisoners said they were beaten with metal objects and tear gas cannisters.Inmates also claimed authorities delayed scheduling or denied offsite medical treatment, especially for those needing follow-up care for complex or chronic conditions.Administration: The ombudsperson investigated allegations of misconduct by police and other Ministry of Interior personnel and referred cases to the ministry’s Special Investigations Unit, which investigated and referred cases of misconduct to appropriate courts, including civilian criminal courts and the ministry’s military court. Authorities allowed prisoners to file complaints to judicial authorities without censorship, and officials from the Ombudsperson’s Office were available to respond to complaints or meet with prisoners in private at the prison.On January 31, four police officers were sentenced to one year in prison for mistreating a prisoner. From April to June, the Interior Ministry investigated 15 complaints of mistreatment of prisoners by security forces and interviewed 45 witnesses. As a result, one officer was referred to the ministry’s military court and received disciplinary action. Four other police officers were fired due to misconduct, and 19 others were sentenced to prison on charges unrelated to ill-treatment of prisoners.Authorities permitted prison access for the ombudsperson and her office staff, as well as for the National Institute for Human Rights and the Prisoners and Detainees Rights Commission (PDRC), all of which were parastatal national human rights monitoring organizations. The ombudsperson also served as chair of the PDRC, which maintained an office at Jaw prison to conduct regular investigations and meet privately with inmates and their families. The government permitted the PDRC to conduct unannounced visits to detention centers.Independent Monitoring: In June, the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent visited Jaw prison as part of its recurring engagement with the government.Improvements: In September, under the government’s agreement with Jaw prisoners to suspend their hunger strike, the Ministry of Interior agreed to implement most prisoner demands, including more time in the outside prison yard, an expanded visitor list beyond immediate family, the removal of a physical barrier between prisoners and their visitors, increased access to education, a new library, and a reduction in telephone call fees.The Ombudsperson’s Office reported in August that the American Correctional Association accredited the Ministry of Interior’s Reformation and Rehabilitation Directorate as meeting international quality standards.The Open Prison program, which opened in December 2022, allowed 48 prisoners to reunite with their families while serving their sentence in a new facility during the year. The Open Prison program sought to reintegrate select prisoners as productive members of society. Thirteen individuals released under the program’s alternate sentencing got full-time private-sector jobs during the year pursuant to an agreement signed on March 29 between the Ministry of Interior and the nonprofit group INJAZ Bahrain, to offer hands-on training and immersive learning on employment, financial literacy, entrepreneurship, sustainability, STEM, and digital literacy to Open Prison program participants.Civil society organizations such as Taa’fi Drug Recovery Association partnered with the Ministry of Interior and held educational programs for inmates of all prisons. The ministry granted some organizations a supervisory role to promote the effective implementation of alternative sentencing.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, and the law provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The government did not always observe these requirements. There were no reports of courts finding individuals to have been unlawfully detained and recommending compensation.On March 15, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published an opinion finding that prodemocracy activist Naji Fateel – who was arrested in May 2013 for protest activities and allegedly was tortured severely for days in 2013, during which time he lost consciousness and twice needed hospital treatment – never should have been arrested and called for his immediate release and an investigation of his arbitrary detention and alleged torture.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law stipulated law enforcement officers could arrest individuals without a warrant only if the individuals were caught in the act of committing certain crimes and there was sufficient evidence to press charges. Additionally, before the public prosecutor could summon an individual, an arrest warrant had to have been executed.The law required the arresting authority to interrogate arrested individuals within seven days following their arrest. A lower criminal court judge could extend detention of a suspect for no more than 30 days or the suspect had to be released. The public prosecutor could extend the suspect’s detention for 30 days if the investigation was still pending, in coordination with the higher criminal court. Suspects could be held in pretrial detention for up to three months, after which the case was referred to the attorney general. Pretrial detention should not exceed six months, according to the law. The High Criminal Court had to authorize any extensions beyond that period and any renewals at 30-day intervals. Detained suspects had the right to legal counsel during questioning. A functioning system of bail provided maximum and minimum bail amounts based on the charges; the law allowed the presiding judge to determine the bail amount within these parameters on a case-by-case basis.Attorneys reported difficulty in gaining access to their clients in a timely manner through all stages of the legal process. They also complained of difficulty registering as a detainee’s legal representative because of bureaucratic hurdles and lack of official government notaries, questioning of credentials by police, lack of notification of clients’ location in custody, requirements to seek court orders to meet clients, prohibitions on meeting clients in private, prohibitions on passing legal documents to clients, questioning of clients by the public prosecutor on very short notice, lack of access to clients during police questioning, and lack of access to consult with clients in court. While the state reportedly provided counsel to indigent detainees, there were reports detainees never met with their state-appointed attorney before or during their trial.According to reports by local and international human rights groups, authorities held some detainees for a week or more with limited access to outside resources.Arbitrary Arrest: Human rights groups reported the Ministry of Interior summoned and questioned individuals for attending protests and demonstrations, expressing their opinion in public or on social media, and calling for an end to the monarchy (which authorities considered a terrorist act). In publicly reported cases, individuals detained for questioning were released after a few days without charges.In May, international media reported Shia cleric Sheikh Mohamed Sanqour was arrested after delivering a sermon during Friday prayers in which he raised concerns about the mistreatment of political prisoners and called for their release. He was questioned and then released a few days later after protesters and scholars called for his release.On December 20, international media and Human Rights First reported Ebrahim Sharif, an opposition figure, was arrested for “supporting a terrorist organization” due to a series of social media posts criticizing the government’s participation in Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational maritime security coalition in the Red Sea. Sharif’s posts encouraged support for Houthi actions and the “blockade” on the ports of the “Zionist Entity.” On December 27, local media sources reported Sharif had been released.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										Although the constitution provided for an independent judiciary, human rights groups and political opposition figures asserted executive authorities had near-complete control over the judicial system and the judiciary was subject to political pressure, especially in high-profile or politically sensitive cases, citing a lack of fair trial guarantees and harsh sentences given to political opposition figures. The king appointed all judges and headed the Supreme Judicial Council, which administered the courts and proposed judicial nominees. The judiciary was divided into civil law courts (for commercial, civil, and criminal cases, and family matters of non-Muslims) and family law courts (for personal status cases for Muslims, with separate courts for Sunni and Shia sharia-based family law proceedings). Family status law varied according to Shia or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, especially for women.Some judges were foreign citizens, serving on limited-term contracts and, according to some observers, subject to government approval for contract renewal and residence permits, creating a situation where they were or were perceived to be subject to government pressure to render certain verdicts. Led by the king, the Supreme Judicial Council was responsible for supervising the work of the courts, including judges, and the public prosecutor’s office.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, although there were reports the judiciary did not always enforce this right.Defendants had the right to consult an attorney of their choice within 48 hours; however, there were reports that defendants and their lawyers had difficulty getting police, public prosecutors, and courts to recognize or register legal counsel.While defendants had the right to question witnesses against them, judges could declare questions to be irrelevant and prohibit a line of questioning without providing reasoning. Prosecutors rarely presented evidence orally in court but provided it in written and digital formats to judges in their chambers.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of political prisoners or detainees.The government claimed to hold no political prisoners. According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), however, the government held an unverified number of political prisoners. International media reported in August that the government held approximately 1,200 political prisoners, most of them in Jaw prison. Charges against individuals identified by NGOs as political prisoners included terrorism, treason, espionage, and attempting to overthrow the monarchy. Prisoner advocates asserted that the requirement that prisoners not pose a threat to public security was used to limit eligibility for alternative noncustodial sentences of prisoners of conscience or political prisoners.Former University of Bahrain professor Abduljaleel al-Singace, whom many human rights NGOs called a political prisoner and was charged in 2011 with “plotting to topple” the government, remained incarcerated in a private medical facility as of year’s end. He continued a limited liquid diet hunger strike begun in 2021 to protest his incarceration. In July, human rights groups stated al-Singace suspended his communications with contacts outside the medical facility until being granted more family visits.Prominent human rights defender and political opposition figure Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, a dual Danish-Bahraini citizen, started a water-only hunger strike in August in protest against his life imprisonment and denial of adequate medical treatment, including access to a cardiologist to treat his heart problems. He ended his strike in September after receiving the requested medical treatment.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but NGOs reported the government failed to respect these prohibitions.The law required the government to obtain a court order before monitoring telephone calls, email, and personal correspondence. According to Freedom House, security services were believed to employ networks of informers, and the government monitored the personal communications of activists, critics, and opposition members. Researchers with Toronto-based Citizen Lab detected Pegasus spyware on the devices of at least 12 activists since 2020.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of speech, including for members of the press and other media, only “provided that the fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not prejudiced, and discord and sectarianism are not aroused.” The government limited freedom of expression and press freedom through prosecutions of individuals under libel, slander, and national security laws that targeted both professional and citizen journalists.According to an HRW report, authorities arrested four persons regarding their social media posts in March. One of those arrested, Ebrahim al-Mannai, a lawyer and prominent activist on X, had called for reform of the country’s parliamentary system ahead of an assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, a global organization of national parliaments, which was held in Manama. On March 9, the Public Prosecutor’s Office posted a statement that the four had been arrested for “abusing social media platforms.” All four individuals were released the following week.Freedom of Expression: The law prohibited any speech authorities considered a challenge to public order or accepted morals. While individuals openly expressed critical opinions regarding domestic political and social matters in private settings, those who shared such opinions publicly, including in traditional or social media, could face questioning. The Ministry of Interior acted on complaints from individuals or groups about certain posts and brought “offenders” in for questioning. Depending on the complaint, investigation, and assessed violation of the law, individuals were released without charge or charged and tried. The penal code allowed penalties of no less than one year and no more than seven years of imprisonment, plus a fine, for anyone who “offends the monarch of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the flag, or the national emblem.” According to an October Freedom House report, in 2022 at least 41 activists and journalists were arrested, detained, interrogated, or prosecuted for speech-related matters, including their online activity.On March 15, Ministry of Interior officials arrested an individual for insulting lawyers in a video he circulated online, which drew a formal complaint from the Bahrain Bar Society. He was held for seven days pending investigation, then released; his case was pending trial as of year’s end.Violence and Harassment: According to opposition social media accounts, authorities sometimes summoned citizen journalists active on social media to account for their reporting. Authorities claimed, however, that some individuals who identified themselves as journalists and photographers were associated with violent opposition groups and produced propaganda and recruitment videos for these groups, but this could not be verified. International media representatives also reported difficulty obtaining visas to work as journalists.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Government censorship regularly occurred. Ministry of Information Affairs personnel monitored media reports on matters deemed sensitive, especially those related to religious sects, national security, criticism of the ruling family or the judiciary, and the Saudi royal family. Media reported government officials contacted editors directly and told them to stop publishing articles on certain subjects.The government did not own any print media, but the ministry and other government entities exercised considerable control over privately owned domestic print media. The private owners of the country’s main newspapers had close ties to the government or held positions in the government.The government owned and operated all domestic radio and television stations. Audiences could access some radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and English from stations based outside the country, including by satellite. The government blocked foreign television stations it considered critical of the country.The Ministry of Information Affairs reviewed all books and publications prior to issuing printing licenses. The Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments also reviewed books that discussed religion.The law prohibited anti-Islamic content in media and mandated imprisonment for “exposing the state’s official religion to offense and criticism.” The law stated, “Any publication that prejudices the ruling system of the country and its official religion may be banned from publication by a ministerial order.”According to Freedom House, in February, two leaders and one member of the Al-Tajdeed Society, a cultural organization with a sizeable social media following, were arrested because of videos posted to their YouTube channel in which they discussed and questioned some tenets of Islam. They were charged with “insulting” religious texts and “violating foundations of Islam.” In May, the three individuals were sentenced to one year in prison each. In December, they received commuted sentences.Libel/Slander Laws: The government enforced libel and blasphemy-related laws restricting freedom of the press. The penal code prohibited libel, slander, and “divulging secrets,” and stipulated a punishment of imprisonment of no more than two years or a fine.On March 28, the Court of Cassation sentenced to one month in prison an individual who posted an allegedly defamatory statement about a government official on Instagram. The court rejected the defendant’s appeal.National Security: National security laws provided for substantial fines and prison sentences of at least six months for criticizing the king or inciting actions that undermined state security, as well as fines for 14 related offenses. Punishable activities included publicizing statements issued by a foreign state or organization without prior government approval, publishing reports that adversely affected the value of the dinar (the local currency), saying anything offensive against a head of state that maintained diplomatic relations with the country, and publishing offensive remarks concerning accredited representatives of foreign countries.According to Freedom House, in May, the public prosecutor ordered the arrest of Sheikh Mohamed Sanquor, a Shia cleric with a large social media following, after he shared a video of a weekly prayer on social media that called on the government to address domestic economic problems and asked viewers to reject normalization of diplomatic relations between the country and Israel. According to the public prosecutor, the speech contained “false news” that could “disturb civil peace.” The cleric was released one week later.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted access to the internet and censored online content, and there were credible reports it monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority. The government blocked access to some websites from inside and outside the country, including political opposition-linked websites.On March 8, the Interior Ministry’s General Directorate of Anti-Corruption and Economic and Electronic Security warned against retweeting, endorsing, or promoting “subversive” comments on social media that harm the country’s security and stability.According to the government, the public prosecution arrested 10 individuals during the year for posting illegal content on social media; six of them were tried and convicted. The other cases were pending as of year’s end.Several media reports alleged the government worked with other foreign governments and private companies to monitor political opposition leaders and human rights activists’ social media accounts, mobile telephones, and other forms of local and international electronic communications.Activists reported security forces interrogated them, sometimes repeatedly, about their social media posts and threatened their physical safety, livelihood, families, and access to social services such as housing. According to social media, some individuals were summoned to police stations and required to sign pledges to cease posting political content. Several activists said they shut down social media accounts or stopped posting to their accounts after being threatened.The Ministry of Information’s Anti-Cybercrime Directorate monitored social media for indecency, blasphemy, incitement to sectarianism, and offenses to the sanctity of religion.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The government restricted the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution provided for the right of peaceful assembly, but several laws and actions by authorities restricted the exercise of this right in practice. The antiterrorism law prohibited unlicensed gatherings of more than five persons, and the Ministry of Interior maintained a prohibition on public demonstrations to “maintain public order.” In practice, the government allowed many peaceful protests, often in support of Palestinian rights or political prisoners, on an almost nightly basis.To license a public gathering, the law required an organizing committee consisting of a head and at least two other members who were responsible for supervising the function and preventing any illegal acts during it. According to the law, the Ministry of Interior was not obligated to justify its approval or denial of permits for demonstrations.The law outlined locations where public gatherings were prohibited, including areas close to hospitals, airports, commercial locations, security-related facilities, and downtown Manama. According to the law, the Ministry of Interior was not obligated to justify its approval or denial of permits for demonstrations.The law prohibited mourners from turning funeral processions into political rallies and allowed security officials to be present at any public gathering, including funerals.Authorities prohibited the use of vehicles in any demonstration, protest, or gathering unless organizers obtained special written permission from the head of public security.Organizers of unauthorized gatherings (gatherings without a permit) could face prison sentences of three to six months. Participants in an illegal gathering (including gatherings near hospitals, airports, or commercial complexes) could face sentences ranging from one month to two years in prison. According to the government, the Ministry of Interior arrested 63 individuals during the year for participating in illegal gatherings, 20 of whom were convicted. There were reports the Ministry of Interior summoned individuals who participated in illegal gatherings and released them after interrogation.The law regulated election campaigning and prohibited political activities at worship centers, universities, schools, government buildings, and public institutions. The government did not allow individuals to use mosques, maatams (Shia religious halls), or other religious sites for political gatherings.According to London-based website Middle East Eye, on March 5, four individuals – Hajer Mansoor, Najah Yusuf, Ali Muhana, and Muneer Mushaima – were arrested for peacefully protesting against the Formula One Grand Prix race in the country while calling for the release of political prisoners. After the four signed a statement that they would not take part in any further unauthorized protests, they were released from custody.						Freedom of Association						The constitution provided for freedom of association, but the government limited this right. The government required all civil society groups and labor unions to register with the Ministry of Social Development, and political societies to register with the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowments. The law allowed the government to dissolve and ban political societies. The government decided whether a group was social or political in nature, based on the group’s proposed bylaws. The law prohibited any activity by an unlicensed society or group, as well as any political activity by a licensed civil society group. Despite this, some unlicensed civil society associations were active in the country (see section 3).A civil society group applying for registration had to submit its bylaws and the minutes of the founding committee’s meetings containing the names, professions, places of residence, and signatures of all founding members. The law granted the Ministry of Social Development the right to reject the registration of any civil society group if it found the group’s services unnecessary, already provided by another entity, contrary to state security, or aimed at reviving a previously dissolved civil society association. Associations whose applications were rejected or not acted upon could appeal to the High Civil Court.NGOs and civil society activists asserted the ministry routinely exploited its oversight role to restrict the activities of such organizations. Local NGOs reported officials actively sought to undermine some groups’ activities, including interference in board elections or imposition of burdensome bureaucratic procedures on NGO board members and volunteers.Under government regulations, the Ministries of Justice and Interior were required to vet proposed organization funding from international sources, and often did not authorize such funding.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. In felony or misdemeanor cases, the attorney general and the competent court decided whether defendants should be subject to a travel ban, a decision that could be appealed to the Supreme Criminal Court. Authorities imposed travel bans on 74 individuals during the year but subsequently lifted 39 of them.In-country Movement: According to Freedom House, authorities sometimes restricted movement inside the country to prevent protests by residents of largely Shia villages outside Manama. According to a July HRW report, some state universities required women to show they had the permission of male guardians before they could go on field trips or stay at or leave campus accommodations or grounds.Foreign Travel: The law allowed the government to reject for “reasonable cause” applications to obtain or renew passports, but the applicant had the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court.The government maintained a website enabling individuals to check their status before travel, although some individuals claimed the website’s information was unreliable. Authorities cited “defense of national security” when denying passport applications and could prevent citizens perceived as openly critical of the government from leaving the country. According to Freedom House, the government obstructed foreign travel by numerous opposition figures and activists.Exile: On September 15, according to Amnesty International, Maryam al-Khawaja was denied boarding in London for a flight to Manama to visit her father, prominent human rights defender Abdulhadi al-Khawaja.Citizenship: The government could revoke citizenship of defendants in both criminal and political cases, including for natural-born citizens, regardless of whether individuals might become stateless by these actions. There were no reports of punitive citizenship revocations during the year.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law did not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had not established a system for providing protection to refugees. The government at times provided protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Such protection was mostly limited to those who were able to obtain and maintain employment. Such individuals generally had access to health care and education services while employed but were at risk of deportation if they became unemployed or their country of origin revoked their passports.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Not applicable.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country contributed to statelessness, including through arbitrary or discriminatory denationalization and discrimination against women in nationality laws or their administration in practice. Individuals derived citizenship only from the father, but the king could also confer or revoke citizenship. The law did not grant citizenship to children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers, even if the birth took place within the country. Similarly, the law did not provide a path to citizenship for foreign men married to citizen women but allowed foreign women married to citizen men to become citizens.Human rights organizations reported these laws resulted in stateless children, particularly when the foreign father was unable or unwilling to secure citizenship for the child from the father’s country of nationality, or when the father was stateless, deceased, or unknown. The number of stateless persons residing in the country was unknown. Stateless persons had limited access to social services, education, and employment.According to Freedom House, after a mass citizenship revocation in 2019 prompted international outcry, the monarch and courts restored the citizenship of hundreds of individuals, but those left out of the restoration included the most prominent opposition activists, and the government retained the authority to revoke citizenship without meaningful due process.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						Citizens did not have the ability to choose their political system or their government. The constitution provided for an elected 40-member Council of Representatives, the lower house of parliament. The constitution permitted the king to dissolve the Council of Representatives after consulting the chairpersons of both houses of parliament and the head of the Constitutional Court. The king could not dissolve the Council of Representatives for the same reasons more than once in a term. The king had the power to amend the constitution and to propose, ratify, and promulgate laws.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: Free participation in the political process was restricted by several measures, including the lack of power of the elected body, banning of the country’s principal opposition political groups in 2017 and 2018, laws restricting former members of banned political groups from running for office, the absence of an independent press, and the criminalization of online political criticism. On August 28, the National Institute for Human Rights issued its 2022 elections monitoring report and asked authorities to review the political rights law, which banned former members of dissolved political societies from participating in parliamentary elections, and to lift the ban on political participation. There were no updates to report as of year’s end.Political Parties and Political Participation: The government did not allow the formation of political parties, but some existing political societies developed political platforms, held internal elections, and hosted political gatherings. Bans on the two most prominent opposition political societies, Wa’ad and al-Wifaq, dating to 2017 and 2018, respectively, were in effect.To apply for registration, a political society had to submit its bylaws signed by all founding members, a list of all members, copies of members’ residency cards, and a financial statement identifying the society’s sources of funding and bank information. The society’s principles, goals, and programs could not run counter to sharia (religious law) or the national interest, as interpreted by the judiciary, nor could the society base itself on sectarian, geographic, or class identity.The government authorized registered political societies to nominate candidates for office and to participate in other political activities. The law banned practicing clerics from membership in political societies (including in leadership positions) and involvement in political activities, even on a voluntary basis.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: According to observers, Shia and Sunni citizens had equal rights before the law but Sunnis, despite being in the minority demographically, dominated political life through manipulation of electoral districting, voter registration, restrictions on freedom of expression, and drafting of laws.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, and the government generally implemented the law effectively. There were isolated reports of government corruption.Corruption: According to GDN Online, 11 government officials faced prosecution for corruption during the year. In addition, two border control employees at the King Fahd causeway were convicted of bribery, sentenced to five and seven years in prison, respectively, and fined 7,000 dinars ($19,000).The National Audit Office, an arm of the Prime Minister’s Office, was responsible for combating government corruption.The Interior Ministry’s General Directorate of Anticorruption and Economic and Electronic Security held workshops for various ministries throughout the year.Significant areas of government activity, including the security forces and the Bahrain Defense Force, and their off-budget government expenditures, lacked transparency. The privatization of public land for profit remained a concern among political opposition groups. Human rights advocates contended the security forces employed opaque and discriminatory employment practices, including nepotism.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s  HYPERLINKError! Hyperlink reference not valid. for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						The government restricted domestic human rights groups, and some human rights activists were imprisoned, exiled, or coerced into silence, according to international human rights organizations. Local leaders, civil society organizations, and activists reported harassment, including police surveillance and delayed processing of civil documents. The government disqualified candidates for board elections based on their prior membership in a political opposition society. Activists reported forgoing international travel, particularly to human rights-related events, fearing attendance would result in travel bans.Noncitizens affiliated with international human rights and labor organizations, or who were critical of the government, reported authorities indefinitely delayed or refused their visa applications for travel to the country, or at times refused to admit individuals who possessed a valid visa or qualified for the country’s visa-free entry program.In March, the government revoked the visas of two HRW representatives to attend an International Parliamentary Union international assembly in Manama, two days after HRW, a permanent observer to the organization, issued a joint statement with 21 other NGOs urging assembly delegates to raise concerns regarding the lack of political freedom in the country. Authorities also blocked an international NGO official from entering the country to attend the meeting despite having a valid visa and prior assurances that the visa was in order.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: On February 28, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women published concerns regarding the shrinking civic space for women human rights defenders in the country and reports of intimidation, harassment, threats, physical abuse, sexual violence, travel bans, and arbitrary detention against them. It urged the government to further strengthen and enforce measures to protect women human rights defenders, including journalists and political opposition members, from acts of reprisals.A Front Line Defenders report released April 5 stated authorities persistently withheld necessary medical treatment from human rights defenders in prison.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: On August 30, the government invited the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to visit the country following the hunger strike in Jaw prison earlier that month; the government postponed the visit without giving a reason and had not rescheduled it as of year’s end.Government Human Rights Bodies: The foreign minister chaired the National Human Rights Committee, which coordinated human rights policy with 18 ministries and public entities. The Ombudsperson’s Office, the National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR), the Ministry of Interior’s Special Investigation Unit and Child Protection Unit, the General Directorate of Verdict Enforcement and Alternative Sentences, the PDRC, the Ministry of Social Development’s Child Protection Center, and the Expatriate Workers’ Shelter worked with one another throughout the year. The Ombudsperson’s Office maintained a hotline for citizens to report police abuse via telephone, email, WhatsApp, or in person. The National Intelligence Agency’s inspector general also worked with the Ombudsperson’s Office.The PDRC monitored prisons, detention centers, and other places where persons could be detained, such as hospital and psychiatric facilities. It was empowered to, and did, conduct inspections of facilities, interview inmates or detainees, and refer cases to the Ombudsperson’s Office or the Ministry of Interior’s Special Investigations Unit. The NIHR conducted human rights workshops, seminars, and training sessions, as well as prison visits, issued public reports, and referred complaints to the public prosecutor. It also operated a hotline for citizens and residents to file human rights-related complaints, as well as a walk-in option.Human rights groups questioned the independence and credibility of investigations by government-sponsored organizations and asserted investigations into police abuse were slow and ineffective.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape, including of men, was illegal. The law did not address spousal rape. Penalties for rape included life imprisonment or execution when the survivor was younger than age 16, the rapist was the survivor’s custodian or guardian, or the rape caused death. The government enforced this law.On June 26, the king signed legislation to repeal a penal code provision that had allowed rapists to evade criminal prosecution if they agreed to marry their victims. Regional media reported the change was welcomed by women’s rights activists, who had fought for years to eliminate the provision.The law criminalized gender-based violence. Nevertheless, domestic violence against women was common, according to several women’s rights organizations. Government leaders and women’s organizations participated in awareness-raising activities during the year. The government maintained a shelter for women and children who were survivors of domestic violence. The law provided that local police officials should be contacted in cases of domestic violence and that the public prosecutor could investigate if police passed information to the Public Prosecutor’s Office.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: The law prohibited sexual harassment, including insulting or committing an indecent act towards a woman in public or in the workplace, with penalties of imprisonment and fines. Although the government sometimes enforced the law, sexual harassment remained a widespread problem for women, especially foreign women domestic workers.Discrimination: The constitution guaranteed gender equality in “political, social and economic spheres, without breaching the provisions of Islamic law.” Laws were derived from sharia (Islamic jurisprudence).Women had the right to initiate divorce proceedings in family courts, but unlike for men, both Shia and Sunni religious courts could refuse a woman’s request for divorce. In divorce cases, Shia women retained custody of daughters until age nine and sons until age seven, after which time Shia fathers typically gained custody. In contrast, Sunni women could retain custody of daughters until age 17 and sons until age 15. Regardless of custody decisions, the father retained guardianship, or the right to make all legal decisions for the child, until the child reached age 21. A noncitizen woman automatically lost custody of her children if she divorced their citizen father “without just cause.” Citizen women could file for divorce for reasons stated in their marriage contract, as well as for physical harm, lack of financial support, abandonment, or imprisonment. Any divorced woman who remarried lost custody of her children from a prior marriage. Lawyers expressed concern regarding the long waiting periods for final judgments in Shia courts, particularly in divorce cases.The basis for family law was sharia, as interpreted and enforced by separate bodies of Sunni and Shia religious experts. In instances of mixed Sunni-Shia marriages, families could choose which court heard the matter.Women could own and inherit property and represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the absence of a direct male heir, Shia women could inherit all their husband’s property, while Sunni women inherited only a portion, with the brothers or other male relatives of the deceased also receiving a share. The government, however, respected wills directing the division of assets according to the wishes of the deceased.Women encountered employment discrimination, including wage discrimination. The government did not effectively enforce antidiscrimination laws in the workplace.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.There were no known legal barriers or penalties for accessing contraception. Health centers did not require women to obtain spousal consent for provision of most family planning services but did require such consent for women seeking sterilization procedures.Contraceptives were available without prescription throughout the country regardless of nationality, gender, age, or marital status. The government provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence, although emergency contraception was not available. Postexposure prophylaxis for HIV and syphilis was available locally.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The law did not specifically provide for the protection of members of racial or ethnic minority groups against violence and discrimination. It granted citizenship to ethnic Arab applicants who had resided in the country for 15 years and non-Arab applicants with 25 years’ residency. There were numerous reports that authorities did not apply the citizenship law uniformly.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Individuals derived citizenship only from their father or by decree from the king. Women could not transmit their nationality to their children, rendering stateless the children of citizen mothers and noncitizen fathers if the children could or would not claim citizenship through the father’s nationality.Authorities did not register births immediately. Children not registered before reaching their first birthday had to obtain a registration by court order. The government did not provide public services to a child without a birth certificate. Mothers giving birth out of wedlock in public or government-run hospitals often faced difficulties in obtaining birth certificates for their children.Education: Schooling was compulsory for children until age 15 and was provided free of charge to citizens and legal residents through grade 12. Authorities segregated government-run schools by gender, although girls and boys used the same curricula and textbooks. Islamic studies based solely on Sunni doctrine were mandatory for all Muslim students and optional for non-Muslim students.Child Abuse: Laws against child abuse existed and the government enforced them effectively. In May, the Ministry of Interior established a cyberspace protection unit for children younger than 15 and a hotline to report online blackmailing incidents against children. On July 11, the NIHR established a child rights commissioner tasked with promoting the rights of children, investigating crimes against children or allegations of systemic abuse against them and reinforcing existing protections, among other duties.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: According to the law, the minimum age of marriage was 16 for girls and 18 for boys, but special circumstances allowed marriages at younger ages with approval from a family court. The government enforced the law effectively.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited exploitation of a child for various crimes, including in commercial sex and child pornography; authorities enforced the law. The law imposed penalties, including a mandatory minimum two-year prison sentence for child pornography, on adults who sexually exploited children or incited or coerced children to commit crimes.The age of consent was age 21 and there was no close-in-age exemption.																																				Antisemitism										The Jewish community was estimated at approximately three dozen persons. Antisemitic media statements and protests by local citizens occurred regularly. No incidents of antisemitic violence were reported.In May, religious leaders publicly criticized the Ministry of Education’s curriculum reforms aimed at eliminating antisemitic language and misinformation about the State of Israel in K-12 curricula, forcing the government to halt its planned revision of the curriculum.The region’s oldest synagogue, the House of Ten Commandments, openly observed Jewish traditions and held prayers in the downtown area of the capital. In October, Ministry of Interior officers assigned to protect the synagogue halted attempts to deface its door and walls. No arrests or prosecutions were reported.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law did not criminalize same-sex sexual conduct between consenting adults. It prescribed fines, imprisonment, deportation, or a combination thereof for persons engaging in “debauchery” or “public indecency.” The government used this provision against individuals suspected of being lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) or of “cross-dressing.”Violence and Harassment: There was a societal pattern of harassment against LGBTQI+ persons, although no official cases of violence were available for citation.Discrimination: The law did not extend antidiscrimination protections because of sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. The law did not recognize LGBTQI+ couples and their families, nor grant them rights equal to rights of other persons. Discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity occurred, including in employment and obtaining legal identity documents.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Courts permitted individuals to change their gender identity markers on legal and identifying national documents to bring them into alignment with their gender identity (as male or female). Individuals had to provide medical documentation of a “sex change operation” or medical necessity. Nonbinary, intersex, or gender nonconforming options were not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: The law did not ban so-called conversion therapy or involuntary psychological treatment for suspected LGBTQI+ individuals. There were no known reports of such practices being employed during the year, or of medically unnecessary surgeries performed on children or nonconsenting adult intersex persons.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no official or licensed organizations that advocated for the LGBTQI+ community. Societal norms restricted the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to form and to openly convene events publicly supportive of the LGBTQI+ community.In June, international media reported authorities abruptly and without explanation removed the movie Spider-Man:  Across the Spider-Verse from cinema screenings. The government’s motivation for removal of the movie was believed to be over the inclusion of a transgender flag printed with the words “Protect Trans Kids” in the background of one frame.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities, including in employment, and provided for fines in cases of job-related discrimination. The government did not enforce these provisions effectively, and did not prosecute any cases of offenses against persons with disabilities during the year. The government did not provide information and communications in accessible formats. Persons with disabilities encountered employment discrimination, including wage discrimination. The government did not effectively enforce antidiscrimination laws in the workplace.The constitution provided for social security, social insurance, and health care for persons with disabilities. Children with disabilities attended public and private schools through the secondary levels, although physical and curriculum accessibility remained a challenge for some. Schools appointed teacher assistants and helpers to assist them.Building codes required accessible facilities in all new government and public buildings in the city of Manama. The law did not mandate access to private, nonresidential buildings for persons with disabilities.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Human rights organizations reported that Shia citizens faced systemic discrimination and faced barriers to equal participation in society and government, especially certain government and security-sector jobs. Human rights advocates contended the security forces employed discriminatory employment practices, including rarely hiring Shia citizens.In July, HRW reported authorities blocked Shia worshippers from attending Friday prayers at the country’s largest Shia mosque on two Fridays in June, following local protests against Saudi Arabia’s execution of two Shia Bahrainis. The Ministry of Interior imposed traffic control and access restrictions, and interviewees told HRW that authorities set up checkpoints at every entry point to al-Diraz neighborhood starting on June 2, with riot and traffic police present at the checkpoints. According to those who spoke with HRW, authorities checked the identity documents of those seeking to pass through the checkpoints and police continued to allow non-Bahrainis and residents of al-Diraz and nearby neighborhoods to enter the area.HRW reported in July that authorities arrested a prominent Shia cleric, Sheikh Mohammad Sanqoor, on May 22. He often gave sermons at the country’s largest Shia mosque. A few days before his arrest, Sanqoor called on authorities to share information with the families of persons detained at Jaw prison, saying the families had recently heard detainees at the prison had been abused. After protests, authorities released Sanqoor on May 25.There were no known cases involving societal violence or discrimination against persons based on HIV or AIDS status, but medical experts acknowledged that discrimination existed in the form of social stigmas that delayed or prevented patients from seeking medical care for fear of public disclosure of their medical condition. The government screened newly arrived migrant workers for infectious diseases, including HIV and AIDS. The government provided medical care to individuals with HIV and AIDS with no reports of discriminatory practices.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The constitution and labor code recognized the right to form and join independent trade unions, as well as the right to strike, but with significant restrictions. The law did not provide for the right to collective bargaining. The government did not effectively enforce all applicable laws, including prohibitions on antiunion discrimination. Penalties for violations of law protecting freedom of association and the right to strike were less than those under other laws involving denials of civil rights and were sometimes applied against violators.The law prohibited trade unions in the public sector. The law also prohibited members of the military from joining unions. Public sector workers could join private sector trade unions and professional associations, although these entities could not bargain on their behalf. There were two licensed, multisectoral trade union federations, the General Federation for Bahrain Trade Unions and the Bahrain Free Labor Unions Federations.There was a right to strike but according to the law, only trade union organizations could organize and announce strikes. According to the law, strikes were prohibited in vital facilities such as hospitals, airports, and commercial outlets, and in front of locations with a security nature.The law prohibited strikes in 12 “vital” sectors, the scope of which exceeded International Labor Organization standards, including the oil, gas, education, telecommunications, transportation, and health sectors, as well as pharmacies and bakeries. The law made no distinction between “vital” and “nonvital” employees within these sectors. Workers were required to approve a strike with a simple majority and provide 15 days’ notification to the employer before conducting a strike.The law allowed trade unions and federations of unions. In practice the existing union federations represented unions from different sectors, although the legal text stipulated that union federations should include only “similar,” not multisector, unions. An individual convicted of criminal acts that led to the dissolution of a trade union was prohibited from holding any union leadership position. The law gave the labor minister, rather than the unions, the right to select the federation to represent workers in national-level bargaining and international forums. The law did not require reinstatement of workers fired for union activity. The law prohibited unions from engaging in political activities.On June 16, the country’s first trade union for domestic workers was established during a conference to commemorate International Domestic Workers’ Day.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The law prohibited the worst forms of child labor. There were no confirmed reports during the year of the worst forms of child labor.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: There was no national private sector minimum wage law. A standardized government pay scale covered public sector workers, with a set minimum monthly wage. While the minimum wage for citizens was generally considered a living wage, there was no minimum wage for foreign workers in the public sector; however, government-issued guidelines advised employers in the public and private sectors to pay a minimum monthly wage. There was no official poverty level.Subject to the provisions of the private-sector law, employers could not employ a worker for more than 48 hours per week without including contract provisions for overtime pay. Employers could not employ Muslim workers during the month of Ramadan for more than six hours per day or 36 hours per week.Occupational Safety and Health: The Ministry of Labor set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards that were appropriate for the main industries in the country. The law outlined protections that applied to citizens and noncitizens alike, except for domestic workers. The law stipulated that companies in violation of occupational safety standards could be subject to fines. The Ministry of Labor employed general inspectors and occupational safety inspectors. Their roles were to inspect workplaces, occupational health and safety conditions, and the employer/employee work relationship. The ministry used a team of six engineers from multiple specialties to investigate risks and inspect standards at construction and outdoor sites, where most violations of OSH standards took place. Workers reported fear of retaliation and risked jeopardizing their employment for reporting situations that endangered their health or safety, refusing to work in hazardous conditions, or taking legal action against employers who retaliated against them for exercising their right to remove themselves from such conditions.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not regularly or proactively identify unsafe conditions but did respond to workers’ OSH complaints. The government did not effectively enforce OSH laws or the minimum wage and overtime laws. Violations of OSH laws were rarely reported. Penalties were regularly applied against OSH violators but never applied against minimum wage violators. Penalties for wage and hour violations were not commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud. Labor inspectors had the authority to make unannounced inspections and could initiate sanctions. Law 51, issued in June, granted inspectors of the Labor Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) the status of judicial police officers during labor inspections, with enhanced authority to inspect workplaces and implement labor law.In February, the LMRA partnered with Amazon Web Services to implement the final phase of the Wage Protection System, allowing the government to monitor payments from employers to private-sector workers.The LMRA threatened employers who confiscated passports with administrative violations and prohibited at-fault employers from hiring new workers. Recruitment agencies complicit in illegal practices could be subject to license revocation, legal action, shutdown of business operations, or a forfeit of license deposits. During the year the government shut down recruitment agencies and revoked licenses of others for infringing on workers’ rights.The LMRA’s inspectors were sworn officers of the court, with the authority to conduct official investigations. Inspector reports could result in fines, court cases, loss of work permits, and termination of businesses. These inspectors focused on the legal and administrative provisions under which individuals fell, including work permits, employer records, and licenses.Inspectors had the authority to levy fines and close worksites if employers did not improve conditions by specified deadlines. A judge determined fines per violation, per worker affected, or both. A judge could also sentence violators to prison. For repeat violators, the court could double the penalties. NGOs expressed concern that resources for enforcement of the laws were inadequate for the number of worksites and workers, that worksites would not be inspected, and that violations would continue. The number of labor inspectors was not sufficient to enforce compliance.A ministerial decree prohibited outdoor work between noon and 4 p.m. during July and August because of heat conditions. Authorities enforced the ban with regard to large firms, but according to local observers, violations by smaller businesses were common and without consequences. Employers who violated the ban were subject to up to three months’ imprisonment, fines, or both, but enforcement was inconsistent. From July 1 to August 31, the Ministry of Labor documented 16 companies and 31 workers who violated the summer heat ban.In April, the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments and the LMRA signed a joint initiative to provide administrative assistance in filing labor lawsuits, following up with labor cases, connecting workers with lawyers, offering experts’ advice, and providing translators for workers who were registered with the migrant workers registration centers. The government published pamphlets on foreign workers’ rights in several languages and provided manuals on these rights to local diplomatic missions. Workers could file complaints with the government via email, in person, or through government hotlines. Most cases involving abused domestic workers, however, did not reach the ministry or the public prosecutor.Violations of wage, overtime, and OSH standards were common in sectors employing informal foreign workers, such as construction, automotive repair, and domestic service. According to NGOs, workplace safety inspection and compliance were substandard. Because the law did not fully protect domestic workers, this group was particularly vulnerable to exploitation due to the difficulties of oversight and access to private residences.The Ministries of Labor and Interior acknowledged severe underreporting of abuse and labor exploitation in the informal sector. The informal sector was estimated to make up approximately one-third of the labor force.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. 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- Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 11, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024																																																					April 11, 2024																																																								2:16 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. We have a couple of guests today. Run of show: Our Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield is here along with our Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is going to kick it off with some open remarks. They’ll take a few questions about the conflict in Sudan, and then I will return for the remainder of the briefing.So, Ambassador.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you very much and good afternoon everyone. Let me just start by welcoming Special Envoy Tom Perriello back from Chad just last week but also welcome him back to the State Department. Last week, Tom traveled to Adré Refugee Camp right along the border of Sudan. It’s a trip that I know quite well. I was at that same refugee camp just a few months ago in September. I also visited the camp 20 years ago.Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees had fled for this camp in the months prior – 90 percent of them women and children. And among those refugees was a six-month-old baby, born only days before the fighting broke out in Sudan. When I saw her, she was suffering from acute malnutrition – so small, so fragile, I thought she was a newborn. There is so much about her story that I don’t know: how she arrived at the MSF hospital, whether she ever left the hospital. But I think about her today as the world nears a grim milestone: one year of horrific civil war in Sudan; how she was born as her country spiraled into conflict; how she was carried into Chad, her protectors walking miles and miles to reach a semblance of safety; how she spent those formative few months in a hospital too small and weak to even cry as doctors tried desperately to nurse her back to health; and how now she reaches her first birthday having only known violence, hunger, and displacement.April 11th should be a historic occasion as we mark the five-year anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Omar al-Bashir’s regime, 30 – his 30-year reign. Five years ago, you could practically taste the spirit of freedom, peace, and democracy in the air as women and young people took to the streets demanding change. And yet that baby I met in September is not growing up in a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan. Instead, she’s one of millions whose lives have been upended and forever altered by this war.Today, nearly 25 million Sudanese people live in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection; three-quarters of them face acute food insecurity. Nearly 8 million have had to flee their homes in what has become the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. We’ve seen reports of gang rape, mass murder at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces militia, of girls sold into sexual slavery, boys being made into child soldiers, of urban areas destroyed by arial weapons, and entire villages burned to the ground. And yet, as communities barrel toward famine, as cholera and measles spread, as violence continues to claim countless lives, the world has largely remained silent. And that must change and it has to change now. The international community must give more, it must do more, and it has to care more.And let’s start with the funding piece because that’s critical. To date, just 5 percent – 5 percent – of the UN’s humanitarian appeal for Sudan has been met. Already, the World Food Program has had to cut assistance to over 7 million people in Chad and South Sudan, and that includes 1.2 million refugees like the ones I met in Adré, people who were already struggling to feed themselves and their families.This is a matter of life and death. Experts warn that the coming weeks and months, over 200,000 more children could die of starvation. The United States, for our part, plans on significantly increasing our funding in the days to come.More than just lacking aid, however, humanitarian workers have been systematically obstructed from delivering aid to those in need. From the beginning, brave people have been on the ground, often putting their lives at risk, to save people in Sudan. But at every turn, combatants on both sides of the war have undermined their work. That includes the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has impeded the major humanitarian aid crossings from Chad into Darfur.And that’s where doing more comes in. Should the SAF not reverse course immediately, the Security Council must intervene to ensure lifesaving aid is delivered and distributed, including, if necessary, through a cross-border mechanism. What’s more, we must continue urging the warring parties to stop the fighting and get back to the negotiating table, as well as urge those outside supporters prolonging this conflict and enabling these atrocities to stop sending weapons to Sudan.Finally, I want to talk about the lack of care, the lack of attention, the world has paid to Sudan. Just five years after a revolution that offered a glimpse at a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan, people are losing hope. Aid workers have begun calling this conflict the forgotten war. Sudanese children are asking why the world has forgotten them. And let’s be clear: I don’t believe the dearth of attention is because people are ignorant or unfeeling. In fact, I believe it’s the opposite. I believe it’s because there are so many terrible crises, so much violence and pain, that people don’t quite know which way to turn.And this is where I need the help of all of you – the members of the press who join me in this briefing. As we mark one year of this conflict, please don’t let it go uncovered. Don’t let stories like the ones I heard in Chad go unheard. Don’t let perpetrators of this horrific violence go unexposed, from the generals who started the war to the backers who continue to fuel it. Don’t let the feeling that we have forgotten Sudan become a reality, because we need – we need to reignite that spirit of revolution, the hope and promise that characterized this day five years ago. I’m counting on you, and the people of Sudan are counting on you as well.So thank you, and Special Envoy Perriello and I will now take a few questions.MR MILLER: Matt, do you want to – do you have anything?QUESTION: I don’t really have anything.MR MILLER: Shaun.QUESTION: Sure, thanks. Thanks, Ambassador and Special Envoy. Could I ask you two things?Tom, you’ve said before that you’re hopeful with the end of Ramadan that the talks could resume. Do you think that that’s on the cards now? Do you see an interest – a strategic decision by both sides – to resume talks?And Ambassador, you mentioned a cross-border mechanism. I know you’ve spoken about that before. How close do you think we are to that becoming reality? Do you see that as realistically something that the Security Council with the vetoes there can push through?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: You want to come first?MR PERRIELLO: First. We do sense a great deal of urgency to resume talks. And in fact, talks are already ongoing in the sense that we are negotiating every day and trying to align key actors inside and outside with a plan that would end this war. We appreciate that Saudi Arabia has committed to hosting a new round of talks and that those will be inclusive talks. We hope that that will be a date that we can be able to announce soon and build momentum coming out of the gatherings in Paris and start to have a sense of when that date will be. But in the meantime, we are not waiting to continue to try to put pressure on the parties to come to the table, and we do think that there are some signs – while many, many signs point to the war getting even worse, in some ways it’s gotten so bad and it’s starting to have such regional implications that it’s also increased, I think, some of the diplomatic appetite to try to find an end to this war. And we’re going to try to use every lever we have to build that into enough political momentum and political will to end this war.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Look, on the cross-border concept, we know that it is a concept that can work. It worked in Syria. We hope we don’t have to go there. We hope we don’t have to push for a resolution to go there. And for that reason, we’re engaging very actively with the SAF as well as the RSF and other parties on the ground to see how we can work with all of them to facilitate getting needed humanitarian assistance into these areas that is so desperately needed.But if we’re not able to work with them, if we’re not able to get their cooperation, then we have to find another way. We can’t sit back and not look for other opportunities to see – to get humanitarian assistance to people who are in desperate need.MR MILLER: Michele Kelemen in the back.QUESTION: Hi, thanks for taking my question. You talked about other countries fueling the conflict. I wonder if you can name them. What are you telling them? Because I think some of them are U.S. partners.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Yeah, we &#8212;QUESTION: And what more can the U.S. do to put pressure on the political players in terms of sanctions?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: With all of the countries who have been identified as possibly fueling this conflict, we have had direct conversations with every single one of them to press them to cease their support and fueling of this war. They’ve been named in the press. We’ve seen the Emiratis be named in the press. We’ve seen Egypt be named in the press. There are others who have been identified in the press as well. And with all of them we have constant engagements, and I know that Tom has had those engagements as well.MR MILLER: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Thank you. Just to elaborate a little bit more on that, to what extent is the UAE – can you talk about them helping the RSF and refusing to listen to U.S. messages to stop its weapons shipments? Can you speak about that at all?MR PERRIELLO: I think we’ve been making very clear to all partners across the region that escalating the war at this time is something that is going to not only have increasing humanitarian costs but actually risks destabilization of the entire region. We see a conflict that in some ways has been between two sides that shows signs of being increasingly factionalized in ways that brings in some of the tribal militias that have stayed neutral and affects the ability of some of the neighboring countries to – that have tried to stay – be constructive and not get more involved to get pulled in. And right now is a time that every arms shipment, every bit fueling this conflict, is something that pushes us closer to not only famine, but to a failed state. And the flip side is this is a situation in which everyone in the region can benefit from a peaceful and stable Sudan. The Sudanese people are extremely clear about what they want. They want a return to the constitutional transition begun with great courage just a few years ago. They want to see a unified professional military that is accountable to the people. They want to see not a return of extremists and former corrupt officials. And they want that full humanitarian access.And I think they’re going to be looking across the region at who stood with the Sudanese people at this time of great crisis, and who was pouring fuel on the fire. And those consequences for those that are making the situation worse need to increase, and I think we are seeing particularly around this anniversary on the 15th that finally some attention is being paid to this issue, and we need those actors to know that the world is watching. And we need that not to just be one day, but that people continue to cover the sheer scale of this – this tragedy, but also cover the inspiring stories. If you look at the emergency response rooms, you see young Sudanese who’ve created cash apps in local kitchens to completely disrupt the kind of barriers being set up by the belligerent actors to get food into some of the hardest-hit areas. These are stories of courage and of innovation, and ones that are literally a lifeline for many of the Sudanese left behind.MR MILLER: We have time for one more. Simon.QUESTION: Just to follow up on this point about the direct conversations with countries fueling the conflict, does that include Iran? And we’ve reported that Iranian-made armed drones have had a big impact on the course of the war. Is – so is that something that you’re – you’ve communicated directly with Iran on? Are they included in those countries? And what would be the message &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: We’ve had numerous discussions with countries in the region. And in those discussions with countries in the region, we’ve encouraged them to encourage other countries like Iran not to engage. I won’t get into what discussions we may or may not have had with Iran, but in our discussions with other countries in the region we’ve also asked for their assistance in pressing each other as well as others to stop fueling this war.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PERRIELLO: And the one thing I would just – sorry – add on that is I think this speaks to the idea that for people in the region, there are many, many reasons to become pro-peace right now. The continuation of this conflict and the introduction of additional actors and additional negative elements only takes the situation into a more destabilizing direction in addition to the human costs of this. And we think it’s very important for people to notice those trend lines and see that this is an opportunity and a moment to switch from either not paying attention, or playing a not-constructive role, to realizing we all benefit, everyone in the region will benefit from finding a path to peace.MR MILLER: Thank you &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; to you both.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Okay, thank you.MR MILLER: Ambassador.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. So before we get to questions, I have just a couple opening comments about the situation in the Middle East.We continue to be concerned about the risk of escalation in the Middle East – it’s something we have been working to mitigate and contain since the attacks of October 7th – and specifically about the threats made in recent days by Iran against the State of Israel and the Israeli people. You saw the President make clear yesterday that we stand in strong support of Israel’s security against these threats. Secretary Blinken has been engaged in diplomacy over the past 24 hours through a series of calls to foreign counterparts, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to make clear that escalation is not in anyone’s interest, and that countries should urge Iran not to escalate. We have also engaged with European allies and partners over the past few days and urged them as well to send a clear message to Iran that escalation is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in the region’s interest, and it’s not in the world’s interest.Separately, the Secretary spoke yesterday to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to reiterate our strong support for Israel against these threats. On that call, the Secretary also emphasized the importance of Israel meeting the commitments that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to President Biden last week to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to put in place enhanced deconfliction and coordination measures. Our teams, including our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues David Satterfield, have been meeting with Israeli, UN, and private relief organizations this week to push forward on all of those fronts. And while we have seen progress, it is critical that that initial progress continue and that it be sustained. And that is the message we have been delivering consistently to the Government of Israel.And with that, Matt.QUESTION: Right. Thanks, Matt. Just to – logistically, the calls that you just mentioned with the Turk, the Chinese, and the Saudi foreign ministers were all today?MR MILLER: He talked to the Turkish foreign minister last night, he talked to Wang Yi this morning, and then – early this morning, and then talked to the Saudi foreign minister later this morning.QUESTION: Okay. Are there others planned as well?MR MILLER: I don’t have any calls to announce, but we have been engaged in a series of contacts – not just at his level, but at other levels too – to talk to foreign counterparts to send this very clear message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict.QUESTION: All right. I didn’t want to raise this with the previous two speakers, because obviously the Sudan situation is a situation in and of itself. But so much of what they said very powerfully about the conflict in Sudan could also – or does also apply to what’s happening in Gaza. And when they say – when the ambassador and special envoy talk about how every arms shipment leads us closer to famine and a failed state, do you not think that that same logic applies in Gaza?MR MILLER: I would &#8212;QUESTION: Just because it’s you who are supplying the weapons as opposed to whoever it is – the Iranians, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, whoever it is that’s supplying the weapons in Sudan – doesn’t the same thing apply?MR MILLER: I would say that we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and that’s why you’ve seen the United States Government working to get more humanitarian assistance in and it’s why we’ve been pushing the Israeli Government so hard to let more humanitarian assistance in and to improve their deconfliction and coordination measures so there isn’t such a loss of political life.And then on the political front, it’s why we have been pushing with partners in the region to develop a plan for post-conflict governance in Gaza so we don’t see a failed state, so we don’t see anarchy in Gaza, so we see a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. That is very much the policy that we are trying to pursue and that we have been engaged in in this administration from the President on down.QUESTION: But is it correct then, though, that the administration believes that every arms shipment to Sudan leads us closer to famine and a failed state – that that does not apply &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in Gaza?MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: I get that, but &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very – it is – they’re – it is a very different situation in Sudan, where you have a brutal civil war, two warring parties trying to seize control of the government; and in Israel, where you have Israel responding to a terrorist attack against its people and trying to achieve a legitimate counterterrorism and military purpose. That does not change at all the severity of the humanitarian situation, which is why we have been working so hard to improve that humanitarian situation for the people in Gaza.QUESTION: So you don’t think that arms shipment to Israel leads us closer to famine and &#8212;MR MILLER: We have continued to support Israel’s right to &#8212;QUESTION: Is that correct?MR MILLER: We have &#8212;QUESTION: I just – I don’t know.MR MILLER: Let me say &#8212;QUESTION: It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other what you say, but &#8212;MR MILLER: They are different conflicts, but the – I’d say &#8212;QUESTION: I know they are, but I’m just asking you &#8212;MR MILLER: I would say &#8212;QUESTION: They made the point in Sudan &#8212;MR MILLER: And I’m answering the &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I just want to know if you have – if you feel the same way about Gaza.MR MILLER: They are very different conflicts, but the humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire, and that is why we are working so hard from the President on down to get more humanitarian assistance in, and it’s why we are working to improve deconfliction and coordination so we don’t see such a high number of civilian casualties as we have seen over the past six months.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just press you briefly on the – what – on the opening comments on calling Wang Yi and others? I realize you’re probably not going to give a full readout, but how successful was that? I mean, do you think there’s an interest from these other countries as well to see Iran not escalate?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak for any of those other countries. I will let them speak for themselves. But the point that the Secretary has been making to each of these counterparts – foreign counterparts, both those in the region and foreign counterparts outside of the region – is that further escalation of this conflict doesn’t just hurt Israel, doesn’t just hurt Iran, doesn’t just hurt the countries in the region, but that it harms every country in the world. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional conflict. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional war, both economically, diplomatically. And so the Secretary has been making clear to every country that has any semblance of a relationship with Iran that it is in their interest to use that relationship to send a message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict. But I will let those countries speak for themselves about what action they may or may not take.QUESTION: And I have to ask – I know this has been asked before – but Iran, of course, argues that a diplomatic facility was struck in Damascus. Has there been an assessment at this point from the United States whether this was indeed a strike on a diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: We do not have a final determination. It’s something we’re still assessing.QUESTION: Is it – do you think there will be an assessment at some point from the U.S. on that?MR MILLER: I do, but it’s something we’re continuing to work through.QUESTION: Matt, on this.MR MILLER: Yeah, Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Reports say today that Iran delayed or changed plans to attack Israel at the last moment due to U.S. warnings. Can you confirm that? And do you still expect an Iranian reaction to the attack on Damascus?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to what Iran may or may not do, or what our assessments are. You don’t need an Intelligence Community assessment to see the threats that Iran has been making. They’ve been making those threats quite publicly and quite loudly over the past few days. So we will continue to send the message to them that it is not in their interest to escalate this conflict and it’s not in the region’s broader interest, and we hope other partners will send that same message.QUESTION: Can I follow on Iran?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: Sure. I wanted to ask this question actually to the ambassador, but the Iranian mission at the UN said that basically if the U.S. – or the Security Council, rather, condemn the attack on the consulate in Damascus, this could – any retaliation could’ve been avoided. So is this your understanding, that actually you don’t condemn it because you cannot verify whether it is a diplomatic mission or not? And also, do you think that Israel can go and attack any other diplomatic mission if this is proved to be actually a diplomatic mission, and you don’t expect any country to retaliate? Just explain those points.MR MILLER: So a few – a few things in order. First of all, I think that’s a pretty flimsy excuse from the Iranian Government. If they don’t want to widen this conflict and they don’t want to attack Israel, they don’t need permission from anyone else either at the United Nations or – they just have to make the decision not to do that, and that’s the decision that they should make.Now, with respect to your second question, no, we do not want to see attacks on diplomatic facilities. We oppose attacks on diplomatic facilities. We continue to assess the exact status of that facility in Damascus, and don’t have a final determination on that question.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I do a follow-up on Iran?MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I – yeah. I – not Iran, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Like Matt, I was struck with what the ambassador said, the similarity. You could change the word “Sudan” for “the Palestinians” or “Gaza” and it’d be exactly the same, with one difference. I mean, you don’t have any control over the conflict in Sudan, but you certainly have control &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, that’s – let me just say &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just finish my question? I have not asked my question.MR MILLER: Fine, fair enough. Go ahead.QUESTION: So my question to you is: Why has the United States not taken its – the moral high ground and its ability and its leverage to end this conflict, as it can? We have seen this happen in the past. We’ve seen it happen in 1982. We’ve seen it happen with this administration in May – in 2021. So my question to you: Why has not this administration taken that step to end this conflict now?MR MILLER: So first of all, Said, they are very different conflicts and very different situations, and that’s incredibly important. The conflict in Sudan is two warring military factions, following a coup that overthrew a democratic government, who are fighting for control of Sudan. That is a different question than the conflict in Gaza that was started not by Israel, but by Hamas – Hamas launching a brutal terrorist attack that killed over 1,200 Israelis and citizens of other foreign countries. And Israel has the right to hold Hamas accountable for those attacks, as the United States would, as other countries in the region would, as any country in the world if it were the victim of such a brutal terrorist attack.That said, we are trying to bring this conflict to an end. You have seen us work to try to achieve a ceasefire, an immediate ceasefire of at least six weeks that would bring the hostages home and that we have said consistently we would like to see widen into a broader end to the conflict. You have seen us work on post-conflict governance to try to find a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. And you have seen us work to address the very, very severe needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza. So we are working to try and do exactly that.QUESTION: Okay, let let me just follow up.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Please don’t interrupt.QUESTION: Let me just follow up.MR MILLER: Just let me go – I’ll go through the questions and get to who I get to.QUESTION: If I may, I just want to follow up. I mean, you talked about Palestinian legitimate aspirations and so on, but insisting that this conflict began on October 7th does not recognize that, does it? Does it recognize that this – that the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that go back 75 years, not just to October 7th?MR MILLER: So they do have legitimate political aspirations that go back decades. It has been the policy of the United States for decades to try to achieve two states. But, Said, I don’t want to – not only I don’t want to, I fundamentally degree – or disagree that October 7th had anything to do with trying to answer the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. It was a terrorist attack targeting civilians, that killed civilians, by a terrorist group that does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. So when you look at trying to achieve a peaceful resolution to the decades of violence and the decades of political conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, it is Hamas that has firmly rejected a political solution to that decades-long dispute.QUESTION: Yeah, but do you – do you acknowledge that Gaza was under siege for basically 17 years and &#8212;MR MILLER: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; every other year there would be an attack and a war by Israel, time after time after time, killing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians?MR MILLER: Said, there – there have been incidents going back in this dispute, in this conflict for decades. Nothing that happened in – on either side justifies the attacks of October 7th.QUESTION: Can I just have a quick question on Iran before we &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just one, there are reports of the Iranian foreign minister coming to New York City next week to visit the UN. I’m wondering how the U.S. assesses the likelihood of an Iranian attack happening during that period of time, if it would have any attack – any impact at all?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to a timeframe. We’re obviously very concerned about the threat of an Iranian attack. We’ve made that clear from the President on down, but I don’t want to put any kind of timeframe on it. We were hoping, of course, to avoid such an attack in the first place.QUESTION: Do you think it’s moving in the direction of avoiding one?MR MILLER: I don’t want to give any type of assessment. As I said, it is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in anyone’s in the region – anyone the region’s interest for Iran to escalate this conflict. And that’s the message we are sending to them.QUESTION: Wait, you were hoping to avoid an attack in the first place? Has one happened?MR MILLER: An attack by Iran. Yeah, we’re – no, one has not happened. We are &#8212;QUESTION: Well, weren’t you hoping to avoid the Israelis attacking an Iranian diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: I – her question – her question was – her – hold on.QUESTION: I know, but you – but you made it &#8212;MR MILLER: No, hold on, let me just answer the question.QUESTION: Your answer to her seemed to suggest &#8212;MR MILLER: My &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that you thought the Iranians had already retaliated.MR MILLER: No, my – well, that’s not what I was suggesting.QUESTION: Okay. All right.MR MILLER: My answer was in the context of the question she asked me, which was about an attack coming next week.QUESTION: Fair enough.MR MILLER: So let’s go – let me – just in – yeah.QUESTION: On that call, just – the call with the Turkish foreign minister, was it purely Iran call or did they have a chance to discuss Ukraine, the Caucasus, President Erdogan’s upcoming trip? And why Türkiye? Do you guys believe that Türkiye has enough leverage to move the needle on Iran – they have Iran’s ear?MR MILLER: It’s not just Türkiye; it’s a number of countries. It’s other countries as well that have relationships with Iran – Saudi Arabia, China. And we have made other – have had other diplomatic engagements with countries in Europe and other countries in the world because we want to send a very unified message. With respect to the call itself, the primary purpose of the call was to discuss Iran’s threats against Israel. There were other issues discussed, but I don’t want to get into those any further.QUESTION: Last thing, because we have a statement from Khamenei last night saying that any Islamic countries supporting Israel or not supporting their narratives, they’re engaged in treason.MR MILLER: Any countries that what?QUESTION: Any Islamic countries that do not fall in line with their narratives, they are engaged – they’re engaged with treason. I’m just wondering how much this – your calculation of calling Türkiye in this case is part of &#8212;MR MILLER: So it doesn’t &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; fits into this &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; have anything to do with the with those comments. Obviously, his comments are not – are ones that wouldn’t be – just be rejected by the United States but would be rejected by other countries in the region.QUESTION: I have different coverage of questions. Please come back to me.MR MILLER: Let me stay in the region and then we’ll – yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. On the hostage talks, can you give any update on whether there’s been a response from Hamas? And also, is there a level of concern in the U.S. Government about the Israeli strike that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh’s family members and how that might affect the talks?MR MILLER: I’m not going to give any update on the talk – excuse me – the talks themselves, other than that we continue to engage in them and try to pursue a successful resolution.With respect to those strikes, I certainly hope that it will not, but I wouldn’t want to make any kind of assessments.Stay – want to stay in the region? Nadia, go ahead. And then we’ll come back.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: There is a record number of land that has been confiscated in the West Bank that came out today. It’s like between 2018 and 2023 is 5,900 acres have been confiscated. The administration has always talked about this two-state solution, and the major – one of the major obstacles is settlements. So if this land has been taken and there’s – just like condemnation from the administration but actually there is nothing practical that we see that will stop this land from being taken, that will undermine the President’s vision. So what – or how can you go forward when actually there’s not even base for to have a state in the future?MR MILLER: So two things. First, we have made consistently clear that we oppose further settlement activity in the West Bank. We think they are a barrier to peace; we think they are inconsistent with international humanitarian law.And I will just say, to put those actions in the larger context, there have been a number of things that the Government of Israel has done over time that we have said are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security. Obviously, settlements in the West Bank are one of them. There are other actions that it has taken in Gaza that we think are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security.So what fundamentally it comes down to is we are working, as you know, with partners in the region to develop a path forward for Israel and the Palestinian people that we would present to them, that would provide for post-conflict governance in Gaza, that would have a component to reconstruct Gaza, that would provide further assurances for Israel’s security by its partners in the region, and there are other countries ready to step up.And so I’m making this a broader answer, because all of this relates to that very question. It’s not just about settlements; it’s about what kind of future the Israeli people see for them in the region. And ultimately – and we’re not there yet, because we’ve not finished this plan and we’ve not presented it to the people of Israel and the Government of Israel – but ultimately, this is a choice that Israel’s going to have to make.QUESTION: Okay, just very quickly, the ambassador made a passionate appeal to us, the press corps, to cover Sudan, not to forget civilians, rightly so. But we haven’t hear from any senior officials the same appeal about Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Number one, we have many journalists who’ve been killed, including our colleagues. We don’t hear any – apart from condemnation, nothing is being done to protect them. And second, why can’t the United States allow independent journalists to go to Gaza, since you don’t have anybody on the ground, so they will have access and tell us what’s happening there?MR MILLER: So a few things. First of all, the reason you heard the ambassador make that appeal with respect to Sudan – and this is not for me to play editor or segment producer – but it is that we don’t see as much coverage about atrocities in Sudan. We don’t see as much coverage about the plight of the Sudanese people. We do see a lot of coverage of the Palestinians in Gaza, appropriately so, but I think her point was that we would welcome seeing coverage of this very difficult conflict that we are trying to resolve in Sudan.When it comes to journalists in Gaza, we have made clear on a number of occasions that we want to see journalists protected. And the coordination and deconfliction measures that we have been pushing the Government of Israel on so hard, that the President pushed the Government of Israel on in his call on Friday, would ultimately help with journalism and make it safer for journalists to operate inside Gaza.And I’ll just make it very clear that we have pressed the Government of Israel directly to allow journalists to go into Gaza. It’s not something that we control, but we have made clear that we all benefit from seeing what’s happening on the ground, that we know what’s happening there – not because we have U.S. officials there, many other countries don’t have officials there, but because of journalists who are putting their lives on the line to bring us those stories. And we’ve made clear to the Government of Israel that we think they ought to let more journalists in.QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. And then I’ll come to you, and then we’ll start taking other ones. I’m going to come to you, Janne, but I know – I doubt it’s an Israel question, so that’s why I’m moving around the room first.QUESTION: There’s some &#8212;MR MILLER: You may surprise me, so I’ll just &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, yes. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. America has a number of allies. What message do they receive when America harangues one its closest allies, Israel, and their democratically elected leader Benjamin Netanyahu? And a follow-up.MR MILLER: I think the message they should see is that we want Israel to live up to its values, that we want to see Israel live up to the same standards that we expect every country in the world, including ourselves, to live up to.QUESTION: Thank you. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Clearly a majority of Israelis agree with his policies, since the majority of voters keep re-electing him. How does this mesh with what President Biden seems to be calling for, which is essentially a rejection of Israeli democracy?MR MILLER: So first, I think that is a vast conflation of two very different things. So it is up to the Israeli people to choose their leaders. We strongly support their right to choose their leaders, as we do for the people of every country in the world. But we are going to engage with the governments that they choose to talk with them about what we think are the policies that are in our interest, what are the policies that are in their interest.And you have heard – the President himself spoke to this in the week right after October 7th, when he made the point – these aren’t the exact words, but it’s the general gist – that sometimes in the aftermath of a horrific event your vision can be clouded, and you can make mistakes. And we are there to offer them our very best advice as a country that’s made mistakes in the aftermath of horrific events and try to keep them from making some of those same mistakes.QUESTION: Well, it seems like there is an attempt to demonize the current Israeli Government, there are efforts to support the overthrow of the Israeli Government with a lot of protests and so forth.MR MILLER: So that is not – and that is not what you’ve seen from this administration. We’ve traveled to Israel – the Secretary has been there – eight times I believe since October 7th meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. The President has been there and talks to Prime Minister Netanyahu all the time. The Secretary just talked to the defense minister yesterday. We fully support the right of the Israeli people to decide who their leaders are.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. As Secretary Blinken spoke with the regional leaders about sending a message to Iran, were there any connections with Iraqi leaders to send any message to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any – I don’t have any engagements to read out today.QUESTION: Okay. And have you received any signals from the Iranian Government that they taking these messages into their consideration?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak for the Iranian Government at all.QUESTION: And in the past few times the Iranian use it to – use its baseless accusation to attack the Erbil and also Kurdistan region in their response to the threats from Israel. Is there something that you’re concerned maybe Iran this time use the same justification and to attack the U.S. allies and U.S. friends in the region in their retaliation for that attack?MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear to them that they shouldn’t escalate this conflict in any way – with respect to Israel, with respect to others in the region, with respect to U.S. forces. One of the first messages we sent to them when the Iranians were making these baseless claims that the U.S. was involved in the strike in Damascus is that that is not true, we weren’t involved, we didn’t know about it, and you should not use this as a pretext to strike U.S. forces in the region, including in Iraq, as we have seen their proxy groups do over the past few months and the past few years.QUESTION: And last thing. Have you granted visa for the Iranian foreign minister to attend the Security Council?MR MILLER: We never speak to visa records. They’re confidential by law, and so I can’t speak to visa records from here. But as has long been the case, we take our obligations as the host of the United Nations very seriously.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Janne.QUESTION: So when he shows up in New York, we can just assume that that’s confirmation that he got a visa?MR MILLER: Well, you can’t travel here without one. So I can’t speak to it, but you can’t travel here without one. But I would note that Iranian foreign ministers have traveled to New York &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, they have.MR MILLER: &#8212; under administrations of both parties, including the last one.QUESTION: Yes. No, I’m not suggesting that there’s anything inappropriate or untoward about it. It’s just that I just – I mean, it’s ridiculous. The guy shows up in New York, if he shows up in New York, it’s pretty damn clear that he got a visa.MR MILLER: I would welcome your advocacy to the United States Congress to change the law and allow me to speak more about any number of things from here, not just visa records.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I didn’t surprise you today that I had to ask this. (Laughter.) Yeah, I had to ask Ambassador Greenfield and I hope you can answer this, all right?MR MILLER: I’ll do my best.QUESTION: Okay, are you ready? Ambassador Greenfield will be visit South Korea this weekend. What agenda will she discuss with the South Korea? Also she will visit to Panmunjom this time?MR MILLER: So I said I’d do my best. I’m afraid I’m going to disappoint you. I am not in a position to preview her trip. She does have a press office in New York, and I would urge you to send the inquiry there. Go ahead.QUESTION: That’s why you didn’t give me any chance to ask it?MR MILLER: She had a limited time. Sorry.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I would have loved her to stay longer. The more questions she takes, the fewer I have to – not that I don’t enjoy our lengthy engagements.QUESTION: She can take – all right, second question quick. The United Nations Security Council’s expert panel on sanctions against North Korea was disconnected. Will the U.S. submit a report together with the other countries, and do you expect to discuss with the South Korea or Japan about the continuation of this report?MR MILLER: So as I’ve said in the past from this podium, we are incredibly disappointed that Russia chose to block that panel from going forward. And I don’t have any specific actions to preview today, but we are engaged with our allies and partners in other ways to continue to monitor North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.QUESTION: Have you any discussion when the – I mean, Prime Minister Kishida was here? Do you have any chance to discuss it?MR MILLER: I would defer to the White House to speak to those engagements.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Hey, Matt. I’m going to ask you about your new Diversity and Inclusion Chief Zakiya Carr Johnson. She’s drawing new criticism for past comments. In a 2019 piece she claimed America’s organizations and institutions were, quote, “riddled with racism, patriarchy, and exclusion,” that they refused to reconcile with the colonizing past, and called them a, quote, “failed historic model.” Do you find those comments problematic?MR MILLER: So I would say that, first of all, our new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer Zakiya Carr Johnson is one of the most qualified experts in this field. She has 20 years of experience working to expand diversity, and it’s something that we see as important here at the State Department that the Secretary has put a premium on because he believes that when our workforce looks like America and reflects the full diversity of America, our workforce is stronger and our ability to protect America’s national security is improved and enhanced. And that’s why he selected her to do this incredibly important job.Second of all, with respect to her quote, I have seen that people have used excerpts, have not used the full context of it. But I would say a lot of this criticism seems to be from individuals. I saw former officials tweeting about this.QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo took the hardest &#8212;MR MILLER: Certain former officials who don’t seem – for whatever reason – to support our work to expand diversity inside the State Department. And that’s just where we have an honest agreement – disagreement where we think that’s work that we ought to do and we ought to hire experts who have experience in doing that. And that’s what we’re going to continue to do, and I think we’re just going to have to disagree with some of those critics.QUESTION: Can I just lastly read you – Secretary Pompeo obviously worked here in the building. He said, quote, “The State Department should be staffed by individuals who love America and believe in our core principles, not ideologues who think that America represents a ‘failed historic model.’” Do you want to respond to that?MR MILLER: Well, apparently, he believes there are different ways to love America, because one of the ways we believe you can best love America is to love its full diversity and build a workforce that reflects that full diversity.Alex. I’ll come to you next. Alex, sorry.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you so much. Turning to Ukraine &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, I should not mumble my &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Thank so much. Let’s turn to Ukraine if I may. Going back to last night’s strikes, which Ukraine believes that was designed to maximize attacks on infrastructure, what is your reaction and what is your take of the state of play on the battlefield? And do you still believe that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to retaliate?MR MILLER: So we have seen Russia, unfortunately, continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. That’s something they’ve done not just overnight but over the past couple of years. And I would say for us it comes back to the need for Congress to fully fund, fully pass the President’s supplemental request. And it goes directly to this question you asked me about the situation on the battlefield where we have seen Ukrainian armed forces having to ration artillery shells, having to ration ammunition. And of course that has an effect on their ability to fight the war and an effect on their ability to repel Russian troops, and it’s why it is so urgent for Congress to act.QUESTION: Is any active restrictions on Ukraine imposed from the U.S., by the U.S., to prevent them from retaliating &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; this obvious steps will take it back to Russia.MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear that we do not encourage strikes outside of Ukraine, and we do not enable those strikes with U.S.-provided weapons and that we don’t want to see U.S.-provided weapons used for strikes outside Ukraine. Ultimately, when it comes to deciding how to prosecute this war, those are Ukrainian decisions, but we do not encourage or enable such strikes.QUESTION: Can I have one more if may on Georgia? So what – as you have learned during the past couple of days since Georgia – Georgia Government – moved forward and submitted the Russian law, I’m just curious, like, what – you made it clear this is taking Georgia away from European path. Do you witness democratic backsliding in Georgia? Is that your analysis?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make any broader assessment than the assessment I made the other day that pertains to this specific law that we believe would harm civil society organizations working to improve the lives of Georgian citizens and would derail Georgia from its European path. It’s still draft legislation, and I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Has anyone from this building reached out to Georgia or &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me move on just because we’re running short of time.Michel.QUESTION: On Bahrain, Matt, do you have any comments on the release of more than 1,500 prisoners?MR MILLER: We did see that step by the Government of Bahrain. We welcome very much the decision by the king to pardon over 1,500 prisoners along with the government’s announcement April 9th that they will work to help the recently released find employment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.Shaun, I’m sorry – well, go ahead, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: That’s all right.MR MILLER: This time I promise I’ll come back to you.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. In meeting alongside President Biden with President Kishida, did the pending deal between U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel come up?MR MILLER: I will let the White House speak to those comments. In fact, I believe the President addressed them yesterday. Or speak to that question, I should say.QUESTION: And on Wednesday, President Xi held a meeting with former president of Taiwan Ma, who supports closer ties with China. Does the department have any reaction to this meeting?MR MILLER: No, I do not.Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Two things, one going back to Ukraine. The Swiss have announced a conference on Ukraine. This is in light of Zelenskyy’s visit in Davos and the peace formula he has. Russia has had some strong words about it, saying that it was part of – it’s part of the Biden re-election campaign, I think; that the U.S. is behind it. Does the U.S have any comment on this – on whether the U.S. will participate or whether it sees utility in the conference?MR MILLER: So I don’t speak to campaign matters &#8212;QUESTION: I realize &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; but that doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the Swiss Government’s ability to conduct their own foreign policy matters. I would say obviously that is an absurd allegation by the Russian Government. I can’t preview – I believe that conference is still several weeks away. I can’t preview what the U.S. participation would be, but we have supported Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts. We have supported Ukraine’s peace formula. We have support President Zelenskyy making his case to other countries in the world, and we will – that will continue to be our policy. But we have seen consistently that Russia has not been willing to engage in real diplomacy about a path forward for Ukraine. Ukraine has made clear that at the right time they would welcome that, and they have not had a willing partner in Russia.QUESTION: And just briefly – I mean, do you generally speaking think it’s useful for the Swiss to hold this – your support of – regardless of the participation of &#8212;MR MILLER: Look, so our policy on this has always been nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. If this is a diplomatic meeting that the Ukrainian Government supports and wants to engage in, we certainly support their right to do so. I don’t have any further comment on the conference itself as it – or how it’s going to shape up.QUESTION: Sure. Just one completely separate issue briefly, Mali. I don’t know if you’ve followed the latest developments there – a ban on activities of political parties and then the ban on media coverage of political parties.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Anything to say about that?MR MILLER: We are deeply concerned about the Malian transition government’s decree suspending all political activities until further notice. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are critical to an open society. The transition government has already made a decision not to hold an election in February 2024 to return to a civilian-led, democratic government despite the commitment that it made publicly in 2022 to do so. We call on Mali’s transition government to honor its commitments to its citizens and hold free and fair elections. In Mali and elsewhere, democracy remains the best foundation for stability and prosperity.Simon.QUESTION: I want to ask about another conflict which is often getting forgotten, which is in Myanmar – Myanmar or Burma. The rebel – alliance of rebel forces have taken one of the – well, the main border crossing with Thailand recently. The situation is very fluid in this conflict. Wondering – this is right up against, obviously, a U.S. ally. Are you having any – is there any diplomacy going on from the U.S. with Thailand about how they should be dealing with this? They’ve got refugees coming across the border, the junta forces reportedly trying to sort of use Thailand as a – taking flights into Thailand to try to sort of push back the rebels in this case. So I’m wondering if – if the U.S. has any new sort of actions that you’ve been taking as this has been developing.MR MILLER: So we have been incredibly concerned about potential spillover this – of this conflict. It’s something that we have been focused on. With respect to any engagements with Thailand, let me take that back and get you an answer. I don’t have anything to read out.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Due to situation in Gaza, there is too much hate spreading all around the world, even here in U.S. as well. Is it a concern?MR MILLER: It’s absolutely a concern. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this on a number of occasions, including in Israel, when he said that we – the worst thing that can happen is people dehumanizing each other, and that once you see people on either side of this conflict dehumanizing each other, it gives license – not actual license, but gives them – they give themselves license to do any sorts of things that we would oppose and that are not in anyone’s interests. So it’s absolutely one of our concerns.We have unfortunately seen a rise in antisemitism. We have seen a rise in anti-Muslim summit, and the President has spoken to this. It’s something we’ve been incredibly concerned about both here at home and around the world.QUESTION: Sir, many religious scholars and others trying to portray this situation as a war between Muslims and Jews, while many others believe it is just a territorial conflict. What is your position on this? And what are we going to say to those spreading hate in our communities?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – we would – obviously don’t want to see anyone spreading hate in any form, and I would just say that we are trying to bring an end to this conflict as soon as possible and find a durable solution to this conflict, because it is in the interests of Muslims and Jews and Christians, Israelis, other countries in the region alike. It is in the interest of all parties to see this conflict end, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Sir, one last question, if I may. Sir, you always talk about two-state solution, but whatever is happening right now, it seems impossible. So is United States, partners, and mediators trying to explore other options to bring peace in the region?MR MILLER: So I spoke to this a little bit in response to an earlier question. We think ultimately that is the path forward, and I know it’s incredibly difficult and it looks incredibly bleak, but it is our assessment that at the end of this conflict – it is going to end – that if there is not a path forward, Israel is going to be back with the same security risks it has had since before October 7th. It is going to be in the same position with respect to a lack of relationships with all of its neighbors. And it is in Israel’s broader security interests to find a path forward for reconciliation with the Palestinian people, as difficult as that seems, and so that’s why we’re going to continue to pursue it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just three questions. One is – come on, it’s my sixth briefing. Three questions is not too bad.MR MILLER: Oh, just go ahead.QUESTION: So with regard to Iran, please correct me if I am wrong that this administration has basically made Iran more stronger in these past few years till now, this threatening that has started. But can you confirm whether Pakistan and Iran – you have information that Iran is supporting the ISIS in Pakistan right now, these recent terrorist activities? Do you have any information that it’s the Iranian regime that is doing this or no?MR MILLER: So I would obviously disagree with your characterization. I’m not going to get into a long rebuttal about something we’ve spoken to a number of times, but no, I do not have information to suggest that.QUESTION: Okay, sir. My second question is about ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who is – was prime minister from this ruling family where Shehbaz Sharif is prime minister. He said himself just last week that this current regime has stolen the mandate. Basically, Shehbaz Sharif should not be a prime minister of Pakistan. Do you agree with him on that or no?MR MILLER: Ultimately, as you’ve heard me say once or twice from this podium, decisions about the Pakistani Government are for the Pakistani people to make.QUESTION: Just last one: A few days ago, U.S. officials from Islamabad embassy went to meet this gentleman named Zahir Jaffer, who was convicted on a – murdering his wife. He’s a U.S. citizen. He’s on death row now. The U.S. official went to Adiala Jail to meet him. Just a few blocks down there was Imran Khan in jail as well. Thousands of American – Pakistani Americans have asked to go and meet him as well. Why is the U.S. not going to meet the guy in jail?MR MILLER: I would defer to the – our embassy in Pakistan for – answer that question.Go ahead, Shannon. I’ll come to you next, Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. On the State Department’s latest Travel Alert for the U.S. embassy in Israel, it details how American personnel have now been limited from traveling within the country. It says it’s been done out of a, quote, “abundance of caution.” Just wondering if you can say definitively whether this is linked to the threat to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: So obviously, there – we have seen Iran making public threats against Israel in the past few days. Israel’s in a very tough neighborhood, and we have been monitoring the security situation. You saw us slightly adjust our travel warnings at the beginning of this conflict, and we conduct ongoing assessments all the time about the situation on the ground.So I’m not going to speak to the specific assessments that led to us to restrict our families – employees and family members’ personal travel, but clearly we are monitoring the threat environment in the Middle East, and specifically in Israel, and we – that’s what led us to make – give that warning to our employees and their family members, and to make it public so all U.S. citizens who either live in Israel or are traveling there are aware of it.Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. President Biden said this week that the U.S. is considering Australia’s request that it drop its extradition attempt against Julian Assange and instead allow him to go back to Australia. Normally when we ask about Assange you say “refer you to the Department of Justice,” but now that the President has said that there’s a – there are diplomatic talks going on, that seems like it would be squarely in the State Department. So are – is the State Department involved in these conversations with Australia, and what can you tell us about these talks?MR MILLER: That is a good way to try to get me to violate that rule about not commenting on extradition matters, but I am going to refrain from doing so. I don’t have any comment. I would refer to the Justice Department for comment on this.QUESTION: Does it broadly raise concerns for you about free speech and free press? Because you often will see dictators say, why is the U.S. lecturing us about press freedoms when they are trying to extradite a foreign citizen to their own maximum security prison?MR MILLER: So I will let the Justice Department largely speak to this issue. But as you’ve heard me say here before, one of the crimes that Julian Assange is charged with is helping Chelsea Manning hack into government systems – not receiving classified information, but helping her actually break into government systems to retrieve classified information, which as far as I’m aware has never been considered a legitimate journalistic practice, and is not the kind of practice that journalistic organizations typically engage in.QUESTION: Well, technically he offered to help her cloak her identity so that she wouldn’t be discovered. We as journalists do that all the time with sources –MR MILLER: I – you – so &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; talk with them on Signal and other devices to try to make sure that sources are protected. Is that considered helping steal information?MR MILLER: So I am now a little bit probably further than I ought to go about facts that still are contained, or alleged facts that are contained in a pending indictment.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Two questions. Saudi Arabia joined Pakistan in addressing Jammu and Kashmir dispute while engaging with India to dialogue. Will United States encourage any mediation from Saudi Arabia between Pakistan and India? Because from very recent past, we see – we observed that United States encouraged all those engagements that goes according to the regional interest of U.S., including the Houthis and Saudis talks. After October 7th, U.S. stressed Saudi Arabia to halt their talks; before October 7th, U.S. was encouraging that. At first &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me take you that – that one back and get a complete answer.QUESTION: And number second &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: National Security Advisor had scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia for talks on Israel normalization. Is it rescheduled, or with the ongoing circumstances in Middle East, there is some policy change expected from United States?MR MILLER: So I will let the White House speak to the National Security Advisor’s travel, but I did see him at the White House podium two days ago saying that he does intend to reschedule that trip.Go ahead, and then we’ll go here, and then wrap up for the day.QUESTION: Thank you. What is the State Department’s position regarding Israel possibly conducting an offensive attack on Iran or Iranian interests, as Netanyahu today – he said they’re ready for a defensive or offensive attacks. Wouldn’t an offensive attack be part of that escalation that you say that we’re trying to prevent?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to hypotheticals, other than to say we don’t want to see this conflict escalated in any way.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, said that he will recognize the state of Palestine before this summer, and that he wants other European countries to join him. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: Every country has to make its own decision with respect to when and where it recognizes entities in this regard. I will say on behalf of the United States, we have always believed – we have always strongly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but we believe that that’s something that is best achieved through dialogue and negotiation between the two parties, as well as other countries in the region, and that’s something we’re actively pursuing.And with that, wrap for &#8212;QUESTION: And on &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have one more? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, also Mexico asked today to suspend Ecuador’s membership of the United State after their raid on the Mexican embassy. Do you have any answer?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything, other than what we’ve said previously, which is we have asked Ecuador to work with Mexico to find a resolution to this dispute.And with that, wrap for today.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Bahrain																								Burma																								Ecuador																								Iran																								Israel																								Mali																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Sudan																								Ukraine
- Bahrain (23-1020) – Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement Office of Treaty AffairsDefenseSigned at Washington September 13, 2023; entered into force October 20, 2023.
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Bahraini Crown Prince-Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Bahraini Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa in Manama.  The Secretary and the Crown Prince discussed efforts to achieve a ceasefire of at least six weeks in Gaza as part of an agreement to secure the release of hostages.  Secretary Blinken pledged to continue close coordination with regional and international partners to promote calm during the holy month of Ramadan and prepare for the post-conflict phase.  The Secretary and the Crown Prince also discussed the reckless and dangerous Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and reaffirmed their shared commitment to international law and freedom of navigation. Secretary Blinken expressed appreciation for Bahrain’s important contributions to maritime security and recognized how the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) has and will continue to strengthen the strategic partnership between the United States and Bahrain.
- Taking Coordinated Actions with Bahrain against Supporters of Al-Ashtar Brigades Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson													HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Taking Coordinated Actions with Bahrain against Supporters of Al-Ashtar Brigades				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Taking Coordinated Actions with Bahrain against Supporters of Al-Ashtar Brigades																																		Press Statement																														March 12, 2024																																							In coordination with the Kingdom of Bahrain, the United States is today designating three Iran- based operatives and a financial facilitator linked to Al-Ashtar Brigades, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.Today’s action underscores the U.S. government’s commitment to target destabilizing forces and threats emanating from Iran, including those threatening our regional partners. We will continue to target Al-Ashtar Brigades operatives and financial sources wherever they are located.These designations highlight the critical role Iran plays in providing support to Al-Ashtar Brigades. In 2018, the government of Bahrain prosecuted numerous individuals for terrorism-related activities. A number of these individuals fled Bahrain to evade prison sentences and settled in Iran, which has long supported and continues to serve as a safe haven for terrorist groups.The Department of State designated Al-Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.  The Department of the Treasury designations were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups and their supporters.  For more information on today’s action, see Treasury’s press release. 						Tags																					Bahrain																								Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs																																														Countering Terrorism																															Iran																								Office of the Spokesperson																																Sanctions
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Office of the SpokespersonThe following is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met today with Bahrain’s leader, His Majesty King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, in Manama.  The Secretary and the King discussed the reckless and dangerous Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and reaffirmed their shared commitment to international law and freedom of navigation through Operation Prosperity Guardian.  Secretary Blinken praised the role of the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement (C-SIPA) in expanding the enduring strategic partnership between the United States and Bahrain. Secretary Blinken underscored the need to urgently address the humanitarian situation in Gaza and welcomed efforts to protect civilian lives, free hostages, increase humanitarian assistance, and prevent further spread of the conflict.  The Secretary and the King reaffirmed their shared commitment to promoting a more secure, prosperous, and integrated region, including through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, to sustain a lasting peace.
- Secretary Blinken’s Remarks to the Press Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateManama, BahrainSECRETARY BLINKEN:  Well, good evening, everyone.  We’re here in Bahrain as part of what has been an intensive diplomatic push across the region.  Bahrain, of course, is a critical partner for the United States, home to the Fifth Fleet, and I want to thank His Majesty King Hamad for receiving us today and for the very good conversation. We were focused on making sure that the conflict ongoing now in Gaza doesn’t spread to other places.&nbsp; That’s been our focus since October 7th, and it remains our focus today.&nbsp; That makes it particularly important that we respond when we see something like the aggression coming from the Houthis that continues to be repeated, directed at shipping in the Red Sea.&nbsp; There have been hundreds of attacks now since November on shipping in the Red Sea affecting more than 40 countries tied to ships with 40 different countries.&nbsp; And we had the biggest attack – UAVs, missiles – just yesterday.&nbsp; These attacks have been aided and abetted by Iran with technology, equipment, intelligence, information; and they are having a real-life impact on people.&nbsp;We talk about concepts like freedom of navigation and the importance of upholding it, and I know that can sound a little bit abstract, but it means something very real in the lives of people.&nbsp; What’s happened because of these Houthi attacks against commercial shipping is that thousands of ships have had to divert, take longer routes, pay more for insurance, and that gets translated into higher prices for people for everything from fuel, to medicine, to food.&nbsp; It’s disrupting supply chains and so it’s having a real impact on people around the world in their daily lives.We know all about the hostages in Gaza; well, the Houthis have taken more than 25 hostages from the ships that they’ve seized since this fall.&nbsp; So all of this has required us – this challenge, this threat to the interests of countries around the world, has required us to respond.&nbsp; We put together Operation Prosperity Guardian with more than 20 countries, including Bahrain, to do everything we can to preserve freedom of navigation, freedom of shipping in the Red Sea.&nbsp;And in fact, the United States and the United Kingdom – two participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian – responded effectively to the attacks just yesterday.&nbsp; We also had some 20 countries come together to make clear that if these attacks continue as they did yesterday, there will be consequences.&nbsp; Again, this represents a clear threat to the interests of countries around the world, and it’s important that the international community come together and respond to that.&nbsp;We also talked here in Bahrain, of course, about the conflict in Gaza.&nbsp; And we discussed the efforts that are underway to try to make sure that civilians are better protected, that we get humanitarian assistance to people who need it, and at the same time make sure that Israel can succeed in ensuring to the best of its ability that October 7th never happen again.&nbsp;But we also focused on the day after this conflict in Gaza and the important work that needs to be done to help Gaza get back on its feet as well as efforts that countries around the region are clearly prepared to make based on the trip this week to bring countries together, to integrate the region, and to do so in a way that provides for the security of Israel and also provides a pathway for Palestinians to a state of their own.&nbsp;Earlier today I had an opportunity to meet with President Abbas in Ramallah, and we talked about those efforts.&nbsp; We talked as well about the importance of reforming the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian governance so that it can effectively take responsibility for Gaza that – so that Gaza and the West Bank can be reunited under a Palestinian leadership.&nbsp; It’s very clear to me from President Abbas that he’s prepared to move forward and engage in all of these efforts.&nbsp;Indeed, as we speak, I think, President Abbas is with President Sisi of Egypt, with King Abdullah of Jordan, talking about these very issues.&nbsp; And I can say that after this week in the region, it’s clear that countries around the region are seized with the need, first of all, to prevent the conflict from spreading, but also to design a better path forward for the region as a whole and particularly for Israelis and Palestinians alike.&nbsp;All of this work is going to continue in the days and weeks ahead.&nbsp; There’s a real sense of urgency.&nbsp; I’m feeling that from countries around the region, and we, the United States, will continue to be very actively engaged in trying to move things forward.&nbsp;With that, happy to take some questions.&nbsp;QUESTION:&nbsp;&nbsp;Yes, Mr. Secretary.&nbsp; You talk about responding; you talk about consequences.&nbsp; Given that the Houthis have claimed credit for this attack – they said it was targeted towards an American warship – have we reached the point where talk of consequences have to turn into action?SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp;&nbsp;Look, I’m not going to telegraph or preview anything that might happen.&nbsp; All I can tell you is, again, we’ve made clear, we’ve been clear with more than 20 other countries that if this continues as it did yesterday, there will be consequences.&nbsp; And I’m going to leave it at that.QUESTION:&nbsp;&nbsp;And you also talked about the Iranians being behind this, that they’ve been supporting the Houthis.&nbsp; Do the consequences extend to the Iranians as well?&nbsp;SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp;&nbsp;Again, all I can tell you is that, as we’ve made clear and many other countries made clear, there’ll be consequences for the Houthis’ actions.&nbsp; We’ve also repeatedly tried to make clear to Iran, as other countries have as well, that the support that they’re providing to the Houthis, including for these actions, needs to stop.&nbsp; It’s not in their interest to see the conflict escalated, and we’re not the only ones who sent that message to Iran.&nbsp;MR MILLER:&nbsp;&nbsp;Leon.QUESTION:&nbsp;&nbsp;Mr. Secretary, it’s quite the trip again.&nbsp; I wanted to come back with your – to your meeting with the President Abbas.&nbsp; You said that he engaged himself to Palestinian reform.&nbsp; Could you – did he really commit to reforming the Palestinian Authority?&nbsp; Could you give us some specifics on that?&nbsp; And more generally speaking, given – you called for today tangible steps on both sides, and specifically Israel also, looking forward to the creation of a Palestinian state.&nbsp; Given that Israel is opposed to the very idea of a Palestinian state, how is that going to play out?&nbsp;SECRETARY BLINKEN:&nbsp;&nbsp;So Leon, in terms of reform to the Palestinian Authority, look, I don’t want to speak for President Abbas, but I think what I take away from this meeting is that he is committed to that and is very much prepared to move forward.&nbsp; And he’s going to – I know having conversations with other leaders in the region, and it’s I think very important for the Palestinian people that they have governance that can be effective, that can help deliver results for them.&nbsp; And I believe that President Abbas is committed to doing that.&nbsp;When it comes to the broader path forward, as I said, even in this incredibly dark time, what’s so powerful in all our conversations throughout the – throughout this trip is that countries do see a way forward, a way forward through greater integration that actually provides real security for Israel and guarantees for that security, and a pathway to a Palestinian state.&nbsp; Now, to get there, leaders have to make hard decisions, hard choices.&nbsp; We can’t do that for them.&nbsp;But I think the more we can show what the future could look like and how it would clearly benefit people throughout the region, but notably Israelis and Palestinians, I think as that picture becomes sharper and as it’s clearer, that countries throughout the region are prepared to themselves make commitments, give guarantees, give assurances in ways that they weren’t in the past.&nbsp; Then I think that the choice becomes sharper, and hard decisions may be a little bit easier to make.&nbsp;But a lot of hard work remains.&nbsp; No one believes any of this will be easy, no one believes any of this can happen overnight.&nbsp; But there is a clear and better vision for what the future could bring.&nbsp; There are countries that are committed to try to help deliver it.&nbsp; The United States is one of them.&nbsp;Thank you.						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- Bahrain National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I extend our best wishes to His Majesty King Hamad and the people of the Kingdom of Bahrain on their National Day.This year the United States and Bahrain further strengthened our historic partnership and friendship through our third Strategic Dialogue and the signing of the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement. I look forward to deepening our security and economic ties as we work together to create a more peaceful, prosperous, and interconnected Middle East through security cooperation, trade, investment, transportation ties, and joint technological advancements.Please accept my warmest congratulations on your special occasion.
- Bahrain HomeReportsBureau of CounterterrorismCountry Reports on Terrorism 2022&#8230;Bahrain				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							Country Reports on Terrorism 2022: Bahrain																																					Bureau of Counterterrorism																																																																																																				 In this section																																												Bahrain																																												Bahrain				Overview:  There were no terrorist attacks in Bahrain in 2022, and domestic security forces conducted numerous operations to preempt and disrupt attack planning.  The Public Prosecution Office’s 2022 annual report announced that its Terrorism Crimes Unit prosecuted seven terrorism cases during the year, including criminal cases in appeals courts.  The Government of Bahrain (GOB) is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and the regional Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC) and supports U.S. government counterterrorism efforts.  Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, and participates in U.S.-led military coalitions, including the International Maritime Security Construct and the Combined Maritime Forces.  The United States and Bahrain signed several agreements to enhance cooperation on countering terrorism and border security.  Bahrain continued to provide support for countering Iran’s malign activities in the region.  The GOB initiated numerous programs intended to improve relations between the citizen community and security forces, and to counter violent extremism.  The Department of State funded training and capacity building opportunities for Bahraini officials.2022 Terrorist Incidents:  There were no terrorist attacks reported in Bahrain in 2022.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  During the second U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue in March, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior signed instruments to formalize the implementation of a) Automated Targeting System-Global to enhance airport passenger security and b) Foreign Electronic Cargo Data Exchange Program to identify high-risk cargo shipments.On April 18, according to Government of Bahrain press statements, the Court of Cassation upheld a 15-year prison sentence against two defendants who were found guilty of having links to the U.S.-designated terrorist group al-Ashtar Brigades and attempting to plant explosives at two bank ATMs in February 2021.  The court also upheld a 10-year prison sentence for a third defendant in the same case.  According to the Ministry of Interior, 13 other defendants were tried in the same case and received prison sentences ranging from three years to life in prison.On June 27 the Supreme Criminal Court of Appeals upheld guilty verdicts against Hasan Mubarak, Jasim Muhammed, and Salman Ali Salman, charged with burning an ATM machine in Samaheej in September 2021.  According to the Bahraini government, the three defendants set fire to the ATM machine because the bank signed an agreement to cooperate with an Israeli bank.  The three defendants were sentenced to three, 10, and 15 years in prison, respectively.In October the Supreme Criminal Court of Appeals upheld guilty verdicts against six former Future Bank officials.  They were sentenced to between five and 10 years in prison and were each fined one million Bahraini dinars ($2.66 million) for money laundering and carrying out 166 illegal transactions.  According to the Bahraini government, the former Future Bank officials were third-country nationals and will be deported following completion of their prison sentences.  Bahrain-based Future Bank, which was controlled by the National Bank of Iran (Bank-e Melli) and Iran’s Export Bank (Bank-e Saderat), laundered more than a billion U.S. dollars between 2008 and 2012 and shielded Iranian entities that financed terrorism from international sanctions.There were reports that the Bahraini government used counterterrorism laws to restrict freedoms of expression, association, assembly and religion or belief by prosecuting law-abiding government critics.  According to NGOs, the government held an unverified number of political prisoners, and charges against individuals identified by NGOs as political prisoners included terrorism, treason, espionage, and attempting to overthrow the monarchy.  The antiterrorism law prohibits unlicensed gatherings of more than five persons, and the Ministry of Interior maintained a prohibition on public demonstrations to “maintain public order.”Countering the Financing of Terrorism:  Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.  Its FIU, the Financial Intelligence Directorate, is a member of the Egmont Group.  Bahrain is also a member of the regional TFTC.In collaboration with other TFTC member states, Bahrain in June sanctioned 16 individuals, entities, and groups affiliated with a variety of regional terrorist organizations, including IRGC-QF, ISIS, and Boko Haram.  The targets also included Bahraini U.S.-designated terrorist groups al-Ashtar Brigades and al-Mukhtar Brigades.Countering Violent Extremism:  The Government of Bahrain continued public outreach initiatives such as the community police program that works to bridge the divide between the Bahraini Shia community and police force in neighborhoods and public schools.  The Ministry of Interior continued to implement the Bahrainuna (“Our Bahrain”) initiative to promote a shared, national Bahraini identity.Al-Mukhtar Brigades and al-Ashtar Brigades seek to destabilize Bahraini society and pave the way for Iran to exert greater influence in Bahrain.  A UN Counterterrorism Center’s 2020 report recommended that the Bahraini government enhance civil society’s capacity to adhere to countering terrorism finance regulations in a manner that is commensurate to the risk posed to civil society organizations by terrorist groups.In September the Ministry of Interior’s drug abuse and CVE prevention program, Ma’an, in partnership with DARE USA, introduced curricula in public and private schools that focused on CVE and promoting coexistence, as well as cybersecurity.  Ma’an worked in partnership with the University of North Carolina and DARE USA to develop a tolerance and CVE student curriculum as part of the National Action Plan to Combat Extremism.International and Regional Cooperation:  As of December, small elements of the Bahrain Defense Force continue to support the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.  Bahrain is a member of the GCC, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.  Bahrain participates in and hosts the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) — the largest maritime partnership in the world.  CMF is a 34-nation maritime partnership that upholds the rules-based international order by countering illicit nonstate actors carrying weapons, narcotics, trafficking victims, and other contraband on the high seas, thus promoting security, stability, and prosperity.In February, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken and Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani convened the second U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue, which included a working group to discuss bilateral and regional efforts to counter terrorism and transnational threats.On July 2, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Interior Minister General Shaikh Rashid bin Abdulla Al Khalifa signed three MOUs to enhance cooperation in countering terrorist financing, cybersecurity, and unmanned aerial vehicles systems.The U.S. Mission in Manama facilitated nine Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) courses with the Ministry of Interior:Social Media Investigations ConsultationAdvanced Social Media Investigations ConsultationExplosives Detection Canine Handler Course (EDCHC)Critical Infrastructure Security and ResilienceBehavioral Observation Skills-Countering Lebanese Hizballah ConsultationSocial Media Investigations Consultation Train the TrainerDigital Forensics Lab MentoringFraudulent Document Recognition Behavioral Analysis Advanced Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience ConsultationAdvanced Travel Document Recognition Countering Lebanese Hizballah ConsultationATA conducted a two-week Assessment Monitoring Unit visit in June and published a report that focused on border security, crisis management, and cyber functional areas.  Embassy Manama facilitated several predeployment site surveys by ATA subject-matter experts to facilitate and enhance the training deliveries.  The February EDCHC course in the United States included an equipment grant of 10 explosive-detection canines to the Ministry of Interior.In May and September, the Department of Justice’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) and the Department of State’s ATA program successfully completed the second and third of five phases in the Counter-Lebanese Hizballah Training Program, which builds terrorism investigations and prosecution capabilities through information integration and capacity building for investigators, prosecutors, and judges.In March the OPDAT Resident Legal Advisor, funded by Department of State’s CT Bureau, hosted a three-day regional conference in Manama, attended by prosecutors, investigators, and FIUs from 10 Middle Eastern and North African countries.  The conference discussed strengthening international judicial cooperation and equipping judges and prosecutors with Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism knowledge to fight international organized crime and money laundering, and outlined the challenges in investigating and prosecuting money-laundering cases.																												    							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