NTSB/HAB-02/18 

E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA S PORTAT OI N

BOARD

SAFE T Y

N

 National Transportation Safety Board Washington, DC 20594

 Highway Accident Brief

Accident No.: HWY-01-FH-033 

Accident Type: Single-vehicle motorcoach rollover 

Location: Interstate Highway 24 near Pleasant View, Tennessee 

Date and Time: August 19, 2001, about 7:20 a.m. 

Vehicle: 1992 MCI, 47-passenger motorcoach 

Operator: Greyhound Lines, Inc. 

Fatalities/Injuries: 1 fatality, 38 minor-to-serious injuries 

Accident Description 

On August 19, 2001, a Greyhound motorcoach departed St. Louis, Missouri, at 12:45 

a.m.

1

 for Nashville, Tennessee. About 7:20 a.m., the bus was traveling eastbound on 

Interstate Highway 24 near Springfield (Tennessee) exit 24 and the town of Pleasant 

View, Tennessee (about 25 miles from its final destination of Nashville, Tennessee). The 

bus was traveling at or near the 70-mph speed limit in the right-hand lane when it slowly 

drifted across the left-hand lane, over rumble strips,2 off the roadway, and into the grassy 

median. The bus continued forward for approximately 600 feet, then came back onto the 

pavement at a sharp angle, and began yawing3 to the left. Next, the bus began turning to 

the left and yawing to the right and departed the pavement on the right-hand side of the 

road, continuing into a broadside skid. The bus overturned onto its right side, slid 198 

feet on the grassy roadside, and came to rest. (See figure 1.) 

 1

 The bus was originally scheduled to depart at 12:15 a.m. 

2

 Rumble strips are bands of raised materials or indentations formed or grooved in roadway 

shoulders that alert drivers starting to drift off the road by transmitting sound and vibration through the 

vehicle. 

3

 To yaw is to turn by angular motion about the vertical axis. 
NTSB/HAB-02/18 

2 

Exit 24 

Springfield 

Interstate 24 

(eastbound lanes only) 

450 feet

 Area where

 vehicle returns

 to the roadway

Area where 

vehicle leaves 

the roadway 

Vehicle at 

final rest 

0 25 50 75 100 125

Figure 1. Accident diagram. 

During the overturn, an occupant in the aisle seat of row three on the right-hand side 

was partially ejected and fatally injured. The driver and the remaining 43 passengers 

received minor-to-serious injuries. The bus received extensive crush damage on the 

right-hand (nondriver) side. The driver reported no mechanical problems with the bus, 

and a postcrash inspection indicated no defects in the brakes, steering, tires, or 

suspension. According to the police report, no adverse weather conditions existed at the 

time of the accident.

Driver Information 

The 52-year-old driver was a full-time, extra-board4 driver for Greyhound. He 

possessed a valid Missouri commercial driver’s license (CDL), had successfully 

completed Greyhound driver training, and had accumulated 9 months of professional 

experience as a Greyhound driver at the time of the accident. The driver also possessed a 

valid Medical Examiner’s Certificate scheduled to expire on August 14, 2002. The driver 

stated that he was wearing prescription lenses at the time of the accident as required by 

the medical certificate and the driver’s CDL. Toxicology tests conducted by the 

Tennessee Highway Patrol and the Federal Aviation Administration’s Civil Aeromedical 

Institute showed no evidence that drugs, including alcohol, were present in the driver’s 

blood specimen. 

Table 1 shows the driver’s preaccident schedule. It is based on driver logbook entries 

and on a driver interview 2 days after the accident.

 4

 On-call drivers used as needed to provide extra capacity or substitute for regular drivers. 

According to Greyhound’s Director of Driver Operations, extra-board drivers constitute 35 to 45 percent of 

the carrier’s workforce, depending upon the season. 
NTSB/HAB-02/18 

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Table 1. Driver’s preaccident schedule based on logbook entries and driver interviews. 

Date Time On 

duty 

Off 

duty 

Event 

2:45 a.m. 9 On duty, not driving, St. Louis 

5:00 a.m. - 10:15 a.m. 9 Drove from St. Louis to Chicago 

10:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m. 9 Off duty, Chicago (activity 

unspecified) 

2:00 p.m. 9 Dead-headed on cushion (rode on 

a bus operated by another driver) 

to St. Louis 

Tuesday, August 14 

9:45 p.m. 9 Arrived in St. Louis, logged off duty 

Wednesday, August 15 10:30 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. 9 On duty, not driving, St. Louis 

11:00 p.m. - 3:45 a.m. 

(Thursday) 

9 Drove from St. Louis to Springfield 

3:45 a.m. - 4:45 a.m. 9 Break* 

4:45 a.m. - 6:30 a.m. 9 On duty, not driving 

6:30 a.m. - 10:45 a.m. 9 Drove from Springfield to St. Louis 

10:45 a.m. - 11:00 p.m. 9 Off duty, awake 

Thursday, August 16 

11:00 p.m. - 6:00 a.m. 

(Friday) 

9 Sleep 

Friday, August 17 6:00 a.m. - 1:00 a.m. 

(Saturday) 

9 Off duty, awake 

1:00 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. 9 Sleep 

9:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m. 9 Off duty, awake 

3:30 p.m. - 7:30 p.m. 9 Nap 

7:30 p.m. - 11:00 p.m. 9 Off duty, awake; driver notified by 

Greyhound of trip at 9:00 p.m. 

Saturday, August 18 

11:00 p.m. - 12:45 a.m. 

(Sunday) 

9 On duty, not driving 

12:45 a.m. 9 Departed St. Louis (late departure, 

trip originally scheduled to depart at 

12:15 a.m.) 

Sunday, August 19 

7:20 a.m. 9 Accident occurred 

*When interviewed, the driver stated that he slept for 2 hours on a couch in the Greyhound terminal before 

reporting on duty; logbook entries indicate that he was off duty for 1 hour. 

On Tuesday, August 14, 4 days before the accident, the driver worked an early 

morning trip (5:00 a.m. to 10:15 a.m.) from St. Louis to Chicago, Illinois. He deadheaded back to St. Louis and logged off duty at 9:45 p.m. The next day, Wednesday, 

August 15, the driver worked a nighttime round trip (11:00 p.m. to 10:45 a.m.) between 

St. Louis and Springfield, Missouri. He arrived home about noon on Thursday, August 

16. That night, he went to sleep at 11:00 p.m. and awoke at 6:00 a.m. On Friday, August 

17, he attended a funeral. He did not go to sleep until 1:00 a.m. Saturday, August 18, and 

slept until 9:00 a.m. He stayed at home on Saturday and took a 4-hour nap in the 

afternoon. At 9:00 p.m. Saturday evening, the driver was notified of his next trip. He 

departed the house at 10:30 p.m. for the St. Louis Greyhound terminal and departed the 

terminal for Nashville, Tennessee at 12:45 a.m., Sunday, August 19. 
NTSB/HAB-02/18 

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During his off-duty time (10:45 a.m. on Thursday through 11:00 p.m. on Saturday), 

the driver reverted to a daytime schedule and slept at night, as indicated by the shaded 

portions of figure 2. 

Thursday, August 16 

 12 

a.m. 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 noon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 

p.m. 

Friday, August 17 

 12 

a.m. 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 noon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 

p.m. 

Saturday, August 18 

 12 

a.m. 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 noon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 

p.m. 

Sunday, August 19 

 

12 

a.m. 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 

Accident 

Figure 2. Driver’s preaccident sleep schedule (shading indicates sleep times). 

Greyhound Extraboard Scheduling Practices 

Extra-board drivers are on call and are used, as needed, for extra runs, as 

replacements for sick or vacationing regular drivers, for charters, or to shuttle an empty 

bus to another terminal. Greyhound employs about 4,500 drivers, of whom 35 to 45 

percent are classified as extra board. 

Extra-board drivers are on call continuously, except for an 11-hour period following 

the completion of an assigned trip (9 hours off duty, plus 2 hours to report to work) or for 

a minimum of 12 hours after “booking off,”5

 or declining a trip assignment. Once a 

driver completes or declines an assignment, he or she rotates to the bottom of the 

assignment list or “board,” as required by the labor contract. Extra-board drivers are 

responsible for keeping themselves advised of their status on the extra board. To be 

considered ready for service, drivers must have sufficient rest and must be able to reach 

the home garage or terminal within 2 hours and away locations within 1 hour. 

 5

 Requesting extra time off when notified to report to work. Time off can be requested in 12-hour 

increments. 
NTSB/HAB-02/18 

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According to the labor contract, extra-board operators may book off sick or fatigued 

for a minimum of 24 hours and are placed on the bottom of the board when they are 

physically able to call in and perform work. If the extra board is depleted, operators may 

be placed on the extra board before the end of the 24-hour period. 

Although Greyhound’s scheduling practices meet, even exceed, the requirements of 

Federal hours-of-service regulations6 by permitting an 11-hour off-duty period (9 hours 

off duty plus 2 hours to report to work) following 10 hours of driving or 15 hours of onduty time, these practices do not necessarily provide a consistent, regular schedule. The 

hours-of-service regulations do not control variations in scheduling a driver’s work-rest 

time.7 

The National Transportation Safety Board previously addressed the dangers of 

Greyhound’s scheduling variability in its investigation of a fatal accident in which a 

fatigued Greyhound driver fell asleep while operating on the Pennsylvania Turnpike at 

Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania.8 The driver had been working an irregular schedule, with his 

on-duty time commencing anywhere between 9:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m. In addition, the 

driver worked a 4-days-on, 2-days-off schedule, reverting to nighttime sleeping hours on 

his days off. The Safety Board consequently recommended that Greyhound Bus Lines, 

Inc.: 

H-00-06

Revise your driver scheduling practices to reduce scheduling variability 

that results in irregular work-rest cycles. 

Greyhound responded that it did not believe that the driver’s work schedule had a 

causal relationship to the accident. Therefore, on April 11, 2000, the Safety Board 

classified this recommendation “Open—Unacceptable Action.” 

The driver in this accident had been awake for nearly 20 hours of the 24-hour period 

immediately preceding the accident and had reverted to an inverted work-rest cycle on 

his days off before the accident. However, in this instance, Greyhound’s scheduling 

practices did not prevent the driver from receiving rest, as evidenced by his reported 

4-hour nap that ended 12 hours before the accident. Passengers on the bus stated they 

observed the driver having difficulty staying awake during the trip. One passenger stated 

that just before the accident, he yelled at the driver to alert him and then the driver 

 6

 See 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 395, “Hours of Service of Drivers.” 

7

 The Safety Board has previously addressed needed revisions to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Regulations. See National Transportation Safety Board, Factors That Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck 

Accidents, Safety Study NTSB/SS-95/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1995) and Evaluation of U.S. 

Department of Transportation Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue, Safety Report 

NTSB/SR-99/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1999). 

8

 National Transportation Safety Board, Greyhound Motorcoach Run-off-the-Road Accident, 

Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania, June 20, 1998, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-00/01 (Washington, 

DC: NTSB, 2000). 
NTSB/HAB-02/18 

6 

oversteered the vehicle. The driver could not recall any events that occurred within 

approximately 50 miles of the accident site. 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 

accident was driver fatigue due to inadequate sleep in the 24-hour period preceding the 

accident. 

Adopted: December 11, 2002