J-S37009-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

MICHAEL DAVID BRAMHALL

 Appellant No. 1383 MDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 15, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-49-CR-0001531-2011 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2014 

 Michael David Bramhall appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County, after a 

jury convicted him of simple assault1

 and aggravated assault.2 Upon review, 

we affirm. 

 On November 16, 2011, at approximately 6:50 p.m., several officers 

from the Northumberland County Probation Office arrived at Bramhall’s 

house looking for his daughter, Maryann. An arrest warrant was issued for 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(3). Following the imposition of sentence, the trial 

court granted the Commonwealth’s motion requesting this charge to be nolle 

prossed on February 14, 2013. 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(6). 
J-S37009-14

- 2 - 

Maryann after she absconded from supervision.3

 When the probation 

officers (“P.O.s”) arrived at Bramhall’s residence, they asked if Maryann was 

inside, to which Bramhall replied “no.” Bramhall asked the P.O.s to meet 

him at the back door because his front door was inoperable. At the back 

door, Probation Officer Dan Shoop explained to Bramhall that Maryann had 

absconded from supervision and they wanted to speak with him about her 

whereabouts. Without opening the door, Bramhall told the P.O.s that they 

should come back with a warrant. 

 Upon their return, the P.O.s explained to Bramhall that they just 

wanted to speak about Maryann. At trial, P.O. Shoop testified that Bramhall 

invited them in; however, Bramhall maintains that he never let the P.O.s 

inside. Officer Shoop also testified that when he opened the back door, he 

saw that Bramhall was holding a shotgun. The P.O.s instinctively drew their 

weapons, resulting in Bramhall becoming agitated. Bramhall then began 

thumping his gun on the floor while saying “[C]ross the line. See what 

happens. Cross this line.” N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at 44. Feeling fearful, the 

P.O.s backed their way out of the residence. Id. at 45, 150. 

Approximately ten minutes later, Bramhall received a call from 911, 

asking him to step outside and speak with the Coal Township Police Officers 

____________________________________________ 

3

 As a condition of her probation, Maryann was prohibited from contacting 

her father; however, the probation officers had exhausted their avenues of 

inquiry with all other relations and felt it necessary to follow up with 

Bramhall as next of kin.
J-S37009-14

- 3 - 

who had arrived on the scene. Bramhall acquiesced and exited the house 

with his hands above his head. The police officers placed Bramhall in 

handcuffs while the P.O.s executed a search of the residence in order to 

determine whether anyone was inside the house, if there were more 

weapons, and secure the house. The police officers released Bramhall 

approximately twenty minutes later. 

A criminal complaint was filed against Bramhall on November 16, 

2011. On October 25, 2012, a jury trial took place, with a guilty verdict 

rendered that same day. The court imposed a sentence of three to eighteen 

months’ imprisonment on January 14, 2013. On February 25, 2013, 

Bramhall filed post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law 

on June 26, 2013. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Bramhall presents the following issues for our review: 

1. Whether the court erred when it granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion in limine permitting the Commonwealth to present 

evidence of bad acts that did not demonstrate a common plan 

or scheme on the part of [Bramhall]. 

2. Whether the court erred when it denied [Bramhall] the 

opportunity to present his defense pursuant to the Second 

Amendment right to possess a firearm inside his household.

3. In consideration of the multitude of inconsistencies in the 

Commonwealth’s testimony, whether the court erred when it 

denied [Bramhall’s] demurrer at the conclusion of the 

Commonwealth’s evidence.

4. Whether the court erred when it denied [Bramhall’s] motion 

for judgment of acquittal following the jury’s verdict.

5. Whether the court erred when it failed to grant [Bramhall’s] 

motion for arrest of judgment at sentencing in consideration 
J-S37009-14

- 4 - 

of the numerous inconsistencies in the Commonwealth’s 

testimony. 

Brief of Appellant, at 3. 

 In his first issue, Bramhall argues that the trial court erred when it 

granted the portion of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine requesting 

admission into evidence of a letter that Bramhall had written to public 

officials about certain officers in the Northumberland County Adult Probation 

Department and the department in general. The letter alleged that on two 

occasions, Northumberland County Probation officers broke into his 

daughter’s apartment and beat her before arresting her. In his letter, 

Bramhall compared the Northumberland County Probation Department to 

Hitler’s gestapo and included a direct threat of physical violence to one P.O. 

in particular. Bramhall believes the trial court improperly admitted this 

evidence of a prior bad act because the subject matter of the letter was 

unrelated to what occurred on the night in question. 

The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed 

only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. In 

determining whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court 

must weigh the relevant and probative value of the evidence 

against the prejudicial impact of that evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009).

 Regarding the admission of evidence of prior bad acts of a defendant, 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide: 

(b) Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts. 

(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is 

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show 
J-S37009-14

- 5 - 

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with 

the character. 

(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another 

purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 

lack of accident. In a criminal case this evidence is admissible 

only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential 

for unfair prejudice. 

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). This list is not exhaustive. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) cmt. 

For instance, our Supreme Court has recognized a res gestae exception to 

Rule 404(b), “which allows admission of other crimes evidence when 

relevant to furnish the context or complete story of the events surrounding a 

crime.” Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa. 2007). 

 After extensive argument on the issue prior to trial, the court 

determined that the probative value of the letters outweighed any potential 

prejudicial effect, and admitted the letters into evidence for establishing 

state of mind of both parties on the night in question. N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, 

at 1-16 (emphasis added). Because the trial court properly applied the law 

regarding admission of evidence of prior bad acts, see Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), we 

find no abuse of discretion. 

 In his second issue, Bramhall argues that the trial court erred when it 

denied him the opportunity to raise a defense based upon the Second 

Amendment. Bramhall is mistaken and the record belies his argument. As 

the trial court explained, 

The Commonwealth’s motion in limine . . . contained a second 

portion, in which the Commonwealth sought to prevent 

[Bramhall] from raising the Second Amendment in front of the 
J-S37009-14

- 6 - 

jury. The [c]ourt denied this portion of the motion deliberately 

leaving [Bramhall] free to pursue this defense if he wished to do 

so. See N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at [11]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/14, at 2. Bramhall then proceeded to make specific 

reference to the Second Amendment during his opening statement without 

objection from the Commonwealth or interference from the bench. N.T. 

Trial, 10/25/12, at 227-28. As the record reflects, the trial court did not 

deny Bramhall the opportunity to present a Second Amendment defense.4

Bramhall’s three remaining claims all raise the same issue See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(1), (4), and (5) (allowing motions for judgment of 

acquittal at close of the Commonwealth’s case, after jury renders its verdict, 

and at sentencing).5

 Therefore, we will address them as a single challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Bramahall’s conviction for 

aggravated assault. 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Bramhall ultimately failed to make any meaningful attempt at a Second 

Amendment argument or defense. Therefore, when Bramhall requested a 

specific jury instruction on justification, the trial court denied it, noting that 

the facts presented during trial did not suggest that such an instruction 

would be appropriate. N.T. Trial, 10/25/12, at 304. 

5 We note that the terms “demurrer” and “motion in arrest of judgment” 

were discarded in 1993 in favor of the standardized term “motion for 

judgment of acquittal.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 606 cmt. Further, inadvertent use of 

“demurrer” does not affect an otherwise valid sufficiency challenge, and a 

defendant does not waive a sufficiency challenge by putting on his own 

evidence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(B). 
J-S37009-14

- 7 - 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559-60 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805-06 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). 

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts by physical 

menace to put any of the officers, agents, employees . . . while in the 

performance of duty, in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2702(a)(6). 

 Here, the trial court determined that the evidence was sufficient to 

reasonably support a finding of guilt by the jury. Trial Court Opinion, 

1/6/14, at 4. After reviewing all of the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we agree that 

the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find each element of 

aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. When Bramhall thumped his 

gun on the floor and dared the P.O.’s to “cross the line,” he physically 
J-S37009-14

- 8 - 

menaced the officers and placed them in fear of imminent serious bodily 

injury. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Bramhall’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/21/2014