FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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NO. 1D2022-3155 

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WILLIAM KIEFER BRADLEY EGAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Timothy Register, Judge.

January 17, 2024

RAY, J.

A jury convicted William Kiefer Bradley Egan of two counts of 

aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer with special 

findings that he possessed a firearm during the commission of the 

crimes (counts I and II) and possession of a bulletproof vest while 

committing the aggravated assaults (count III). The trial court 

adjudicated him guilty on all counts and sentenced him to fifteen 

years in prison on each of counts I and II and five years in prison 

on count III.

On appeal, Egan argues that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion for judgment of acquittal on count III and by imposing

a $100 cost of prosecution without a request from the State. We 

affirm his judgment and sentence in all respects.
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To begin, we find that the argument raised on appeal as to the 

denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal has not been properly 

preserved for appellate review by this court. Thus, it is waived.

Section 775.0846(2), Florida Statutes, proscribes the 

possession of a bulletproof vest while a person commits one of 

various felonies, including aggravated assault, and “such 

possession is in the course of and in furtherance of any such crime.”

At the close of the State’s case at trial, defense counsel moved for 

a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The argument presented to 

the trial court on count III was that the State failed to prove a 

predicate offense:

[T]hey have failed to prove the main charge on Counts I 

and II of aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer 

in that the facts and circumstances that have been 

testified to don’t indicate that any weapons that were 

definitively fired at, towards or near either officer. The 

facts may support a lesser included charge of improper 

exhibition of a firearm, but not the main charge alleged. 

And based on that, Count III would also fail because he 

would not be—have been engaged in the main charge 

and, therefore, wearing a vest would not be illegal under 

those circumstances.

Egan now argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal on count III because the State 

failed to prove that he wore a bulletproof vest “in furtherance of”

committing an aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer. 

Contrary to his argument at trial, his argument on appeal 

presupposes that he committed the aggravated assaults and 

instead claims there was a lack of evidence that his act of wearing 

a bulletproof vest furthered, advanced, or assisted the commission 

of the crimes. He points to his testimony at trial that he wore the 

vest “[a]ny time [he] went out” and submits that this odd habit did 

nothing to further or escalate his encounter with law enforcement.

Without proof of mens rea, he argues that his conviction on count 

III cannot be sustained based on mere possession of the bulletproof

vest alone.

Egan’s appellate argument is based on an entirely different 

theory than the one he advanced at trial. It is therefore not 
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preserved for our review. See Morales v. State, 170 So. 3d 63, 66 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“Appellate courts have repeatedly declined to 

review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal where the 

motion failed to make the specific argument raised on appeal.”); 

see also Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) 

(explaining that “in order for an argument to be cognizable on 

appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground 

for the objection, exception, or motion below”). 

Egan next argues that the trial court erroneously imposed a 

$100 cost of prosecution under section 938.27, Florida Statutes, 

without first receiving a request from the State. This argument 

was preserved through his motion to correct sentencing error filed 

under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). But as this 

Court has recently explained, “the [$100] cost for the state attorney 

is a minimum cost that is mandated by subsection (8) and not an 

‘investigative’ cost incurred by an agency, as described in 

§ 938.27(1), which can only be imposed ‘if requested’ by the 

agency.” Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392, 392–93 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2023). Thus, the State need not request the cost. Id. at 393.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Robert David Malove, The Law Office of Robert David Malove, P.A., 

Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.