# Sudan - United States Department of State

- Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 30, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 30, 2024																																																					April 30, 2024																																																								1:17 p.m. EDTMR PATEL: Good afternoon, everybody.QUESTION: Good afternoon.MR PATEL: Let’s see. I have – I don’t have anything off the top, so Daphne, do you want to kick us off?QUESTION: Yes, thank you so much.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Prime Minister Netanyahu said today that Israel will carry out an operation against Hamas in Rafah regardless of whether or not &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Sorry.MR PATEL: (Laughter.) Go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, regardless of whether or not a ceasefire and hostage release deal is reached. Is it still the case that the U.S. hasn’t seen a credible plan for entering Rafah? And what will you do if they go ahead, as Netanyahu is warning?MR PATEL: That is correct. We – it continues to be the case that we have not seen a credible plan that would address the varying areas of concerns that you’ve heard me talk about a number of times from up here and others, primarily the ability to address the serious humanitarian concerns surrounding – again, Rafah is a region with more than 1 million people seeking refuge, so that an area that continues to be an important conduit for humanitarian aid as well as the safe departure of foreign nationals. And so any kind of operation that’s – that does not address some of these key concerns would certainly be opposed by us.I’m not going to get into any hypotheticals, but this is something we’re continuing to engage with our partners in Israel. Conversations continue to be happening at all levels, and we continue to press forward on those conversations and asking for what their plans may or may not be as it pertains to Rafah.QUESTION: And are you concerned that this warning that they would go ahead with whether or not a ceasefire and hostage deal is reached could derail hostage talks?MR PATEL: I’m not going to speculate on that. What I can say, Daphne, is that we remain committed to reaching a deal for the immediate – for an immediate ceasefire that secures the release of hostages and allows for additional steps to be taken in terms of surging humanitarian aid, and something that we hope will help bolster the protection of civilians as well.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?QUESTION: A follow-up on that?MR PATEL: Leon, go ahead.QUESTION: Israel’s track record in heeding to the U.S. statements or calls could be arguably not great. What gives you confidence or what makes you think that Israel would, in fact, listen and hear your calls not to go into Rafah?MR PATEL: I’d dispute, though, the premise of that a little bit, Leon. Over the course of this conflict, there have been a number of endeavors in which the United States has pressed for that we have seen our partners in Israel undertake, dating back to the beginning of this conflict even in the early days of this conversation that we were having around humanitarian aid. We also continue to see steps being taken as it relates to their cooperation on a number of other lines of effort in the humanitarian aid space.But both – look, when it comes to humanitarian aid, when it comes to the protection of civilians, and when it comes to a potential operation in Rafah, our answer continues to be we need to see more, we need to see more steps being taken. And as it relates to an operation in Rafah, we have yet to see a credible plan that would address the underlying concerns that I laid out to Daphne.QUESTION: Can I follow up on that?MR PATEL: Olivia, go ahead, yeah.QUESTION: Just because the Secretary was also asked about this not long ago. He said that the U.S. views on this were well known. But he didn’t address part of the question that – whether Israel had in fact committed to present a military and humanitarian plan. So absent the plans themselves, has there been a formal commitment from the Israeli Government to present those plans before launching any – an invasion?MR PATEL: I am not going to be a spokesperson for the Government of Israel. Through the Strategic Consultative Group that you have seen National Security Advisor Sullivan and Secretary Blinken undertake their consultations with counterparts in Israel, discussions at those levels and through other interlocutors as part of those engagements, those conversations are ongoing. As the Secretary said, the United States position on this could not be clearer. For how long we’ve been talking about this, we have expressed our serious concern about any kind of operation that does not address some of these key pieces, and we’ll continue to stress and raise these very important issues.QUESTION: Thank you. I mean, I totally appreciate not asking you for the Israeli perspective on this, only whether the U.S. has actually received a commitment from the government to have formal plans presented prior to any invasion.MR PATEL: I am just not going to speak to further specificity about this process.QUESTION: Okay. Two others on the region, if that’s okay.MR PATEL: Mind if I jump to Gillian?QUESTION: Sure.MR PATEL: And then we can – we’ll – I’m sure we’ll get to everybody. Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay, thanks. I’m just wondering if State has any comment or any information, anything today on the anti-Israel protests across the nation now, really going from California all the way to New York. A lot of these student protesters are accusing the Biden administration of being complicit in genocide. Wondering if you – if diplomatically &#8212;MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: &#8212; foreign-policy-wise, you guys have &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah, so I’ve spent a number of the last few daily press briefings talking about this, and I’m happy to reiterate what I said before. First, I will echo what the Secretary said in talking to one of your colleagues on the margins of his trip to Beijing. Demonstrating – demonstrations, I should say, expressing your opinion about any kind of government action, expressing your opinion about foreign policy, exercising your First Amendment right – none of those things are problematic or antisemitic or Islamophobic, in their own right. It is when those things are coupled with the use of certain language, and rhetoric, and insults that we have seen and have been part of some of these demonstrations.Beyond that, those kinds of things of course we would condemn and take issue with. But we believe that every American has every right to express their points of view, to exercise their First Amendment right. When it comes to policies that are – that as it relate to any particular campus, those campus officials are better suited to speak to those policies that they have in place both in terms of dealing with expressions of First Amendment rights or otherwise. I am not in a space to speak to that.But of course, everyone has every right to make their point of view heard, and from our perspective across this administration we’ve made clear that we insist that these happen in a peaceful, nonviolent manner. And any kinds of these demonstrations, when they are paired with or coupled with rhetoric, language that is antisemitic, Islamophobic, essentially insults or target someone for just who they are, that’s deeply problematic.QUESTION: A quick follow-up.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: One thing that’s kind of new as far as I’m aware is you’re seeing regimes now like the Iranian regime, China has started to weigh in – the government, and criticize the Biden administration’s response to these protests. We saw overnight the Chinese saying that the way the U.S. Government is responding is violating these students’ rights. Do you have a comment on these adversaries kind of using it as an opportunity to criticize?MR PATEL: Look, the policies and procedures as it relates to demonstrations, protesting, things like that that may or may not exist on a particular college campus, or may or may not exist in a particular town, city, or municipality, it is certainly not in the remit of the State Department so I am not going to even delve into that.QUESTION: Isn’t it hypocritical though &#8212;MR PATEL: There’s other agencies that are better suited to speak to that. But what I can say broadly, we of course support anybody to be able to express themselves and to exercise their First Amendments rights. They should not and cannot become violent, not peaceful. And in those particular circumstances, we believe it is the right of the appropriate law enforcement and – enforcement and security officials to take appropriate actions consistent with the policies of that jurisdiction. Again, we are delving far away from foreign policy and into law enforcement, which is not the remit of this – of this department.QUESTION: No, because what I’m asking really is: Is it not from a foreign policy, foreign relations, diplomacy perspective, isn’t it, I mean, hypocritical of the Chinese and the Iranians, some of the worst human rights violators in the world, to be criticizing the Biden administration’s policy response to America?MR PATEL: I don’t think anybody in this administration is interested in taking a human rights lesson from the Iranian regime, or the People’s Republic of China for that matter. And both of those regimes’ crackdowns on self-expression, on free and fair press, on basic human rights, is clear.Said, go ahead.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving &#8212;QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up on a couple of things.MR PATEL: Hold on, hold on, hold on, hold on.QUESTION: The image that it’s giving of the United States with the protesters being arrested is not necessarily the one you would want to have.MR PATEL: Leon, there are laws in this country. Again, we are delving away from the topics that are discussed in this department. But if laws are being broken on certain college campuses, in certain municipalities, in certain towns, in certain cities, in certain counties, it is will within the right for the officials of those jurisdictions to enforce whatever laws that are so appropriate as it relates to that region. Beyond that, we fully support anybody’s ability to exercise their First Amendment right and make their opinions as it relates to any action or policy the government may or may not be taking and making their points of view heard.QUESTION: Vedant &#8212;MR PATEL: Said.QUESTION: Thank you, I just have quick follow-ups and then I have a couple questions of my own.Now, in response to Gillian, you said there are certain things that are being said in these protests that you have issue with. Could you share some of those with us?MR PATEL: I’m not going to repeat them from up here, Said, but &#8212;QUESTION: But you made an assertion that you are obviously in command of. What are these statements?MR PATEL: Said, there have been a number of these demonstrations in which the imagery, in which the language that has been written on some of the poster material, has either been akin to what I would believe to be antisemitism. But we’ve also seen expressions, rhetoric, signage that is akin to Islamophobia and the targeting of Arab Americans and Palestinian Americans, as well. Of course any kind of language or rhetoric in that space is concerning, troubling, and unacceptable. But again, we fully support people’s ability to peacefully make their – express their First Amendment rights.QUESTION: Now on the statement by the Israeli prime minister on Rafah, I mean, he is saying very plainly that whether there is a deal or there is no deal, I am going storm Rafah. And you don’t have a position on this? I mean, he’s not waiting for a deal to be arrived at.MR PATEL: I think our position on Rafah – I really don’t appreciate you, Said, twisting my words or the words &#8212;QUESTION: I’m not.MR PATEL: &#8212; of the Secretary or other officials up here. We have made our point of view &#8212;QUESTION: I am quoting what the prime minister of Israel said. I’m not &#8212;MR PATEL: I understand. I understand your question. And in response to your question, and Daphne’s question, and the number of times that we have asked – been asked about a potential operation into Rafah from up here, we have been unambiguous about the concerns that we have when it comes to the more than a million people seeking refuge in that region, when it comes to this region in particular in Gaza being an important conduit for the delivery of humanitarian aid, it being a region in which foreign nationals at least at the beginning of this conflict were able to use, are able to use consistently for safe departure.So any kind of operation that does not address these concerns would be a non-starter for us. And you’ve heard me say this. You’ve heard the Secretary say this. You’ve heard Matt say this; you’ve heard Admiral Kirby, Karine, the President. We have been consistent on this.QUESTION: Yeah. So would it be appropriate for the United States of America to say, whether there is a deal or not a deal, we find that the storming of Rafah is unacceptable?MR PATEL: I – we have been pretty clear about that, Said.QUESTION: Very clear?MR PATEL: We have been very clear that many – any kind of military operation into Rafah that does not address these concerns would be unacceptable to the United States.QUESTION: Right. Now I have a question on the humanitarian situation. Officials at the United States Agency for International Development, USAID, leaked a – they leaked a document that says that the Israeli Government intently sort of put obstacles in the way of these humanitarian aid convoys or whatever, getting food to Gaza. Now are you aware of that report?MR PATEL: So I’m just not going to comment on leaked documents, Said.QUESTION: Why won’t you comment on this document?MR PATEL: I’m not going to comment on leaked documents, on things that continue to exist under a deliberative process. I will just say that the Secretary and the leaders of this administration, they hear a diverse range of views from across this department, from across the interagency. When it comes to processes that are within the deliberative process, we take those points of view into consideration, but beyond that, I am just not going to speak to purportedly leaked documents.QUESTION: Okay. Would you agree that there is a – almost a common opinion among professionals and experts and so on that Israel is in fact – and the prime minister of Israel are in fact – take measures day after day to sort of make these humanitarian aids, including American – large portions of American aid &#8212;MR PATEL: I would disagree with your characterization.Julia.QUESTION: Thank you. I know the State Department and Secretary Blinken have made clear that the ICC doesn’t have jurisdiction in your view over the Palestinian conflict. But I wanted to get your response to remarks from Netanyahu just today, especially in context of the conversation we just had about the campus protests. He said, “Branding Israel’s leaders and soldiers as war criminals will pour jet fuel on the fires of antisemitism, those fires that are already raging on the campuses of America and across capitals around the world.”Do you agree with that assessment that it’s antisemitic for the ICC to pursue Netanyahu? And what do you make of him connecting this to the campus protests?MR PATEL: So fundamentally, at the heart of this, Julia, we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction over this issue, and that’s the crux here. Beyond that, I’d let the prime minister and officials within the Israeli Government clarify or offer any commentary on his comments.But at the crux of this for the United States is that we do not believe that the ICC has jurisdiction on this. That being said, we work closely with the ICC on a number of key areas. We think that they do important work – important work as it relates to Ukraine, Darfur, Sudan. But again, on this particular incident – instance – in this particular instance, I’m sorry, they just do not have jurisdiction.QUESTION: If I may, another on Saudi Arabia.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: There have been reports that Saudi Arabia has decided to normalize relations with Israel but is waiting to determine when they do that based on the U.S. election and the results of the election. What do you make of Saudi Arabia potentially weighing this presidential election so much, when the urgency is now?MR PATEL: So I would – I’d defer to officials in the Saudi Government to speak to their position. I’m not a spokesperson for them. What I can say from the United States is that we also have been unambiguous about how we feel that a greater – a more integrated Middle East region is better for not just the interests of the United States, but it is better for peace and stability in the Middle East region. It is also something that we believe other officials across the Middle East region and Arab world view this as well.We are continuing to work this. We think that Israel’s further integration in the Middle East region can unlock additional benefits. It can offer greater security, which is in the interests of the United States. It’s in the interest of the people of Israel, and it’s also in the interest of other partners as well.But of course, we also are continuing to stress and underline the importance of doing everything we can to reaching a deal for an immediate ceasefire – one that releases the hostages, one that allows a surge of humanitarian aid into the region as well.Go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: I don’t know if somebody asked you about this or not, but I want to ask you about the Amnesty International report.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: Okay. So basically, Amnesty just published its report. I don’t know if you’ve seen it in details. But they say there is a reasonable evidence that Israel has committed war crimes, a gross violation of international – of human rights and violation of international humanitarian law. I’m just wondering – I mean, with something as serious as this from a very reputable organization, that normally use it to talk about rogue states, et cetera, when they finding and they publish their reports – why the State Department still now has not published anything to either contradict or to support other human rights organizations been talking about what’s happening in Gaza? Basically &#8212;MR PATEL: So first, I’ve not seen that specific report, Nadia. But I think you were in the briefing room just about a week and a half ago in which we – when we unveiled the 2024 Human Rights Report, in which there was, in fact, a section outlining Israel and the Palestinian territories.When it comes to the current conflict in Gaza – and I have spent a number of days talking about this – we are continuing to assess what is happening on the ground. We have a number of tools at our disposal to look into what is happening on the ground and, if required, hold appropriate and relevant parties accountable. You’ve heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about Leahy. You have heard us talk a great deal in this briefing room about the CHIRG process. We continue to have those options as well as other avenues under the Foreign Assistance Act to look into these things. And as in any conflict zone, Nadia, this work is ongoing and we are feeding into that process in close coordination with not just our embassies and consulates, but also civil society, independent media reporting of such things, and, of course, NGOs as well.QUESTION: Can you just assure us that, actually, you treat Israel the same way as you treat any other country that found in violation of international law? Because what we hear from you is all the statements and some actions, like we see with the settlers, but many believe that when the prime minister of Israel pick up the phone, call the White House, the finding is changed and delayed and pushed, just like we heard about – even the Secretary, we were together in Italy when he assured us that we’re going to hear about this report – about the Leahy report and the violation of using U.S. weapons. But we haven’t heard about it. So I just wanted an assurance from you that actually you’re taking these things seriously.MR PATEL: Well, I spent about 50 percent of the daily press briefing yesterday talking about it, so I would take issue with how you laid that out. There are absolutely – we hold Israel to the same standard that we hold any country with, and that is with – in Gaza, outside of Gaza, anywhere. International law, international humanitarian law needs to be followed, and it needs to be abided by. And when we find violations or when we find issues that are concerning, not only do we raise them with the Israeli Government, we will take appropriate actions consistent with the systems and tools that we have in the United States to take appropriate actions.I spent a great deal of yesterday talking about the Leahy process in which we found five violations of – gross violations of human rights. So when we see issues, we will not hesitate to take appropriate action. There is no different standard or different set of rules when it comes to any country on which we have a relationship with.QUESTION: Okay. Just one final clarification.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary said that the offer they gave to Hamas is generous. Who decide what is generosity? Is it the United States and Israel? What is it – is it Arab partners in the Saudi summit that they decided it was generous? I mean, I guess my question: How do you define what is generous and what is (inaudible)?MR PATEL: So Nadia, over the course of this conflict, we have seen Hamas move the goal post, renege on agreements that they have made as it – as relates to part of this deal. And so the Secretary was simply underlining the fact that we are in this position in which Hamas has a generous offer on the table, and it’s imperative for them to move and to act on it as swiftly as possible.Olivia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Just one point of clarification on Leahy, which I know you amply addressed yesterday, but you mentioned yesterday that the process was open-ended, right? It was subject to the MOU that exists between the Israeli Government and the United States. This new information that Israel has provided with regard to the fifth unit, is – can it continuously supply new information with regard to that unit until the U.S. sort of adjudicates in a particular direction? Or is this a finite set of information on whose basis the U.S. will decide whether to take punitive action?MR PATEL: I would say the information is definitive and it is more that, consistent with the memorandum of understanding that we have, we are bound by that to consult and engage with officials in Israel on the process, on steps that they may or may not be taking, and we are assessing all of those things to ensure that they are in standard with what is laid out in the Leahy Law. And if not, as I said yesterday, there will, of course, be a resistance of applicable – a restriction on applicable U.S. assistance.QUESTION: Okay. And then a separate question on aid.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: The Secretary from Jordan earlier mentioned the opening of new crossings into northern Gaza. I was hoping you could just update us on the overall metrics, on the volume of aid that’s going in, and how that compares to what the U.S. believes is necessary.MR PATEL: So look, we are still very much in the same place that we were when David Satterfield came and talked to you all. We have seen some measurable steps in the right direction. Northern crossings including Erez and Zikim are preparing to reopen. We are seeing that routes from Jordan and Ashdod are showing progress, but not fully yet realized. And southern crossings, specifically Kerem Shalom and Rafah, have seen some fluctuating numbers of trucks, but trending in the right direction.This is all to say that we still need to see more. And some metrics that I can offer is that April – on April 25th, approximately 303 trucks entered Gaza according to the UN; 282 trucks via Kerem Shalom, and 21 trucks via Rafah. That is not nearly enough, but it is a step in the right direction. We want to continue to see more. And I know also we spend a lot of time up here talking about trucks and their inflows and outflows, possibly because it might be the most digestible metric out there when talking about this issue.But ultimately, when we talk about humanitarian aid, it is great to see trucks enter Gaza; it is even better when the humanitarian aid that enters Gaza is getting to the Palestinian people, to Palestinian civilians who need it. And we will continue to work closely with the Government of Egypt, Government of Jordan, Government of Israel, and relevant NGO partners, including the United Nations, to ensure that that final step is happening and it’s getting to the places it needs to go.Go ahead.QUESTION: I’ve asked several times about the right to defend one’s self for Palestinians, and out of this room we’ve heard that the U.S. does not exhibit any double – double standards. And today in the West Bank there – the Israelis’ occupation forces chased, beat, and threw off a roof a 32-year-old man – Palestinian man, Hassan Mansiya, near – in the Hebron district. Also, the Israeli forces attacked at least two schools with tear gas, two – inside and outside schools in the Hebron and Jenin districts, where students were, and teachers, and some of them experienced some suffocation. Since October 7th, we’ve – I mean, we’ve had, like, what is it, 95 minors that have been killed in the West Bank. I asked before: Do Palestinians have a right to defend themselves? I’m not talking about rogue individuals. I’m talking about as far as a legal authority to defend Palestinians. Do they – does the State Department view that Palestinians have a right and duty to defend themselves?MR PATEL: So look, I have not seen those reports that you outlined. I’m happy to look into them, and I have no doubt our partners in the IDF may be able to share more. What I can say is that actions like these, if true, they are destabilizing. They contribute to a deteriorating security situation, and they are not in the interest of Israel’s own security. And when we have seen actions like this, when we see actions from – we believe quite strongly that these kinds of activities take us away from a two-state solution, and they feed into further instability.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: That &#8212;QUESTION: But does – does the Palestinian Authority have the right to defend its citizens?MR PATEL: Absolutely it does. Absolutely it does.QUESTION: It does? Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: A follow-up on the campus protests.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have a question. The U.S. Government, everybody from President Biden on down to here at the podium has been quick to call out antisemitism at these protests, but there’s also been an enormous number of examples of Islamophobia and racism from counterprotesters. Why doesn’t the administration denounce that as well, and would you do that here?MR PATEL: I did. You can check the transcript. I did.QUESTION: Well, and let me ask you about Netanyahu’s – the news on Netanyahu today &#8212;MR PATEL: Mm-hmm.QUESTION: &#8212; where he said that even if there’s a hostage deal, they’re still going into Rafah.MR PATEL: Ryan, you’ve got to be on time. You’ve got to come to the briefing on time.QUESTION: Did you get asked about that this morning?MR PATEL: I spoke to that too. Come on, man.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead.QUESTION: All right.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Today photos of pier in Gaza were published. My question: Will the Palestinian Authority, PA, be the one who will control this pier?MR PATEL: Sorry, you &#8212;QUESTION: The port.MR PATEL: Uh-huh.QUESTION: Today I – there is photos of this port published. I wonder if the PA, the Palestinian Authority, will control this port in Gaza.MR PATEL: I do not believe that the Palestinian Authority has a role in the maritime corridor, but I am happy to defer you to my colleagues at the Defense Department and USAID to speak to this process in a little bit more specificity.QUESTION: Don’t – just one – don’t you think this port will build over the Palestinian territories, and should Palestinian people have the authority over this port?MR PATEL: So broadly, when we are talking about the future of Gaza and the future of a two-state solution and ensuring that Gaza is no longer a launch pad for terrorism against the Israeli people, part of that for us, of course, includes a Gaza that is reunited under the Palestinian Authority. But as it relates to this maritime corridor, I do not believe that they have a specific role. But that being said, my colleagues at the Pentagon and USAID may be in a better place to speak to some of the more logistical components of this.QUESTION: Okay.MR PATEL: Go ahead, in the back.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant. I just wanted to ask about the Erez border crossing.MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: It’s also reopening in the north weeks after POTUS’s call with Netanyahu. What should we read into the timing of this opening considering that Blinken is now there to request more aid, and also this ceasefire deal hangs in the balance?MR PATEL: I would not read anything into the timing of this beyond us just stressing, again, that all of these things need to happen as swiftly as possible. But we also fully understand that there may be steps that need to be taken in when factoring in vetting, safety, other things as it relates to crossings that are used for the inflow of aid. We are not naive to the fact that this is a process, but look, we have been clear that we need this to happen as swiftly as possible.QUESTION: And I just want to touch on some of the other questions as well.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Was it the U.S.’s aim to try to beat the clock on a Rafah invasion by getting the ceasefire deal in place beforehand? And if so, have Netanyahu’s comments this morning altered that at all?MR PATEL: It’s not about beating any clock. We – if you go back and look at the history and trajectory of this conflict, there have been a number of instances in which we have been hoping, encouraging, working tirelessly for a deal that would release the hostages that we hope would be partnered with some kind of ceasefire. That has been our position for quite some time. And simultaneously, as it relates to Rafah, it has also been our position for quite some time that any kind of operation that does not address the sort of various components of humanitarian concern that we have would be unacceptable to us.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah. Go ahead in the back. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Any comment on John Bass’ trip to Doha and Islamabad? Was the meeting with Taliban official in his schedule?MR PATEL: So, as you so noted, acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs John Bass is on travel to Doha and Islamabad. In Doha he’ll meet with senior Qatari officials and other diplomatic missions to discuss support for Afghanistan and other shared security interests in the region, and in Islamabad we expect him to meet with senior Pakistani officials and discuss a range of regional and bilateral issues as well.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR PATEL: Go ahead next. Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I know the State Department already talked about the Kurdistan Region’s local elections &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; some time ago, as it has been scheduled for June 10th. So now there’s a discussion that should be postponed for at least three months, so what’s your comment?MR PATEL: So we understand that President Barzani and various Iraqi authorities and other political parties are actively considering next steps. From our point of view, we would encourage them to schedule free, fair, and timely elections, and we hope that process takes place, but I don’t have anything to offer beyond that.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: I have two questions on two separate topics.MR PATEL: Great.QUESTION: At the White House Correspondents Dinner on Saturday, the President called on Putin to release RFE/RL journalist Alsu Kurmasheva. I was wondering if the State Department is following up her case into seeing whether she’s been – she can be identified as wrongfully detained.MR PATEL: So first, let me just say we have no higher priority than the safety and security of U.S. citizens overseas, and in the case of Alsu Kurmasheva, we remain deeply concerned about her detention in Russia. And to echo the President, we believe she should be released, and we condemn in the strongest possible terms the Kremlin’s continued attempts to intimidate, repress, and punish journalists and other civil society actors.In terms of a wrongful detention designation, I’m just not going to get ahead of our process. There is a deliberative and fact-driven process underway. That process continues to be ongoing, and we constantly review circumstances surrounding detentions of U.S. nationals, so I don’t have anything to offer there.QUESTION: How often – can you tell us how often you may review cases?MR PATEL: I – we – I am not going to speak to the specifics of this process.QUESTION: Okay, another one on Burkina Faso.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Voice of America and BBC have been banned there. I was wondering if the State Department is doing anything in that regard.MR PATEL: So we are very alarmed that Burkina Faso’s Superior Council of Communication has suspended multiple independent outlets, including Voice of America and BBC, for covering the Human Rights Watch report about some recent massacres. You’ve heard the Secretary say, and including from this very podium, that far too many governments use repression to silence free expression, particularly against journalists and media organizations, for simply doing their jobs. Freedom of expression, particularly for media, is critical for accountable and transparent governance.Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: You should allow more journalists as well, Mr. Vedant.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Alex.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: I mean, one is – when you talk about free journalism, are you going to give a chance (inaudible) &#8212;MR PATEL: You’re interrupting your colleague, Jalil.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.QUESTION: This is my third time and you have not given me a chance. Is this free journalism?MR PATEL: You’re – I’m happy to come to you – I’m happy to come to you after.QUESTION: Please.MR PATEL: Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks so much, Vedant. Can you please clear up – either validate or keep alive – some of the reports claiming that the U.S. has eased some of the sanctions on Russian banks, including central bank, to allow some energy-related operations? Why?MR PATEL: I’m not sure what reports you’re referring to, Alex. What I can just say broadly, though, is that when it comes to our efforts to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its infringement on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our Ukrainian partners, we have not taken our foot off the gas, going back to February of 2022 since this invasion occurred. And we will continue to take steps both to continue to support our Ukrainian partners, but also through sanctions, export controls, and other measures hold the Russian Federation accountable.QUESTION: So there is no shift at all in that policy?MR PATEL: There is no policy shift at all.QUESTION: Thank you.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: On Poland, Poland today handed official request to United States to host nuclear weapons in Poland. Do you have any reaction?MR PATEL: I don’t have any comment for you on that. I’m sure my colleagues at the Pentagon can speak to that greater.QUESTION: Sure, thank you. And final topic on Armenia-Azerbaijan. The Secretary spoke with both leaders over the weekend. Any reason to why he called this – any, like, intel or any concern did he want to convey? And separately on Azerbaijan and human rights, a portion of the discussion was about human rights, but hours after that call Azerbaijan arrested another civil society leader. So how much is it the reflection of functional relationship?MR PATEL: So first let me just say, Alex, it should come to no surprise to you that this is an area of the world that the Secretary himself is personally deeply engaged on. And over the course of his time as Secretary, he has had regular engagements at regular intervals with both of these countries. And our engagements with both of them are ongoing, and we continue to believe that a peace and – is possible here. And that’s something that we’re going to continue to work towards.On the second question that you raised, we are deeply troubled by the continuing arrests of members of Azerbaijani civil society, most recently Anar Mammadli. And we urge the Azerbaijani Government to immediately release all individuals who are unjustly detained.Jalil, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Vedant, and thank you very much, State Department, for bearing with me these nine years. Just one question, and then if you’ll allow me, I’ll ask another question.How do you feel – when journalists here are friends with the same podium people from the U.S. since last two decades, and you guys – this administration since last two years – if a journalist doesn’t agree – agree with you, you just ignore them. I mean, this is the beauty of this newsroom. This is the beauty of this press room. Why you guys like – you guys not feel bad to be treating somebody like this? Like, what’s the reason?MR PATEL: I’m sorry. Who are we treating in what way?QUESTION: I’m talking about this gentleman right here. Since last two years &#8212;MR PATEL: Did something happen to you?QUESTION: Sir, I feel very ignored. I ask one question, and you pass me, you are &#8212;MR PATEL: First of all, it is never a guarantee that everyone gets a question every day. We try our best to get to everybody, but sometimes we’re dealing with the confines of time. And I will just say, Jalil, in my time up here and Matt’s time and Ned’s time, we have taken questions from you pretty regularly.QUESTION: I don’t agree. But anyway, thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: I just have a question about &#8212;MR PATEL: You just used your one question, so I’m going to move – I’m going to move on now. Go ahead.QUESTION: Sir, I had a follow-up question on Kabul expansionism.MR PATEL: That’s fine.QUESTION: Under secretary is going there. The region has terrorism going on.MR PATEL: Then you should ask that question, Jalil.QUESTION: Half of the country is &#8212;MR PATEL: Then you should &#8212;QUESTION: Half of Afghanistan is under no education for girls. The under secretary is going. How do you feel talking to a nation where terrorism is once again growing up? Today in Kabul, six people were killed. Every week there is terrorism. Why is the under secretary holdings talks with the Taliban if the girls do not have education and what’s your interest there?MR PATEL: So let me just say a couple things. First, I will just – since you’ve gotten us way off topic, if you have a question, you should ask a question, not waste your colleagues’ time about other things.Secondly, I’m not aware of any travel to Afghanistan by any undersecretary, but let me just say that when it comes to our engagements with the Taliban, we engage when it is in the United States interest to do so. This is the best way to not just protect U.S. national interests but also support the Afghan people. Engagement allows us to speak directly with the Taliban, and it’s an opportunity for us to continue to press for the immediate and unconditional release of U.S. nationals in Afghanistan including those who we have determined to be wrongfully detained. We’ll also use those opportunities to directly talk about the Taliban’s commitments to counterterrorism, and of course, as always, human rights is also on the agenda.QUESTION: Thank you very much.MR PATEL: Rabia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much.QUESTION: A quick one: Do you have anything on the talks between Türkiye and the U.S. – U.S. energy firm ExxonMobil? A Turkish energy minister said that they are interested in diversifying Türkiye’s national gas supplies. What is your comment on this? And was this a topic of discussion between the two countries?MR PATEL: So I don’t have any more specifics to offer as it relates to the Secretary’s engagement with Foreign Minister Fidan, but let me just say I’ve seen those public reports, and I’m not going to offer anything additional on potential commercial negotiations, but from our vantage point we would encourage any country to diversify its energy supply and curb dependence on Russian energy. And to just broaden the aperture a little bit, Türkiye has played a very important role as the host of the Southern Gas Corridor in helping diversify European energy supplies and European gas supplies away from dependence on Russia, and as the host of multiple LNG liquification facilities which have received a lot of American LNG since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine.QUESTION: Can I have a quick one on Middle East?MR PATEL: Sure.QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Hamas and Fatah leaders meeting in Beijing at the invitation of China? What is your comment on dialogue between Hamas and Fatah?MR PATEL: So our message on this has been what it was since October 7th. If any country purports to have influence or relationships with Hamas, the message is quite clear: release every single hostage and it can no longer be business as usual. They should call on Hamas to lay down their arms, and that is the best and fastest way to get us where we need to be.Taka, go ahead.QUESTION: So the family of the Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea met State official this morning. Do you have any detail about the meeting? Who met the families? How do you describe the meeting?MR PATEL: So I’m happy to check if there’s any specific officials that we can share, but the U.S. stands with the long-suffering relatives of Japanese abductees, and we continue to urge the DPRK to right this historic wrong and provide full accounting of those that remain missing. And we don’t have any other meetings on this to announce at this time.QUESTION: Details?MR PATEL: I’m happy to check some more specifics but I don’t have anything for you at the – go ahead, Diyar.QUESTION: Thank you, Vedant.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: You talked about the Kurdistan Region’s election &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; but I need a clarification on that. What do you mean when you say that you encourage them to schedule a free and fair election? Because it’s already been scheduled for June 10. Does the U.S. support rescheduling that election?MR PATEL: Our understanding is that President Barzani and various other authorities are actively considering next steps, and we will let that process play out before commenting further.QUESTION: Do you support rescheduling this election?MR PATEL: That’s not for us to decide. What we would encourage is for these elections to be scheduled and for them to be free, fair, and credible. But beyond that, our understanding is that President Barzani and various other entities are actively discussing additional next steps.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir.MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: Pakistani ambassador in Washington, D.C., (inaudible) Masood Khan, recently talked about the importance of Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation and the need to bolster Pakistan’s defense capabilities due to regional challenges. Do you have any – something to tell us, what kind of strategy or initiative both of our countries are working on to enhance security cooperation?MR PATEL: Yeah. So the United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in combating threats to regional security. And we support Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and ensure the safety and security of its citizens in a manner that promotes the rule of law and protection of human rights. Our partnership with Pakistan on security issues includes, of course, a high-level counterterrorism dialogue, funding robust counterterrorism capacity, and building programs and supporting a series of U.S. and Pakistan military-to-military engagements.QUESTION: Sir, The Washington Post’s latest article revealed that Indian Prime Minister Modi inner circle, including spy chief Samant Goel and even the national security advisor, were aware of the assassination plot on a Sikh activist in New York. So how concerning is this for you?MR PATEL: So we continue to expect accountability from the Government of India based on the results of the Indian inquiry committee’s work, and we are regularly working with them and enquiring for additional updates. We’ll also continue to raise our concerns directly with the Indian Government at senior levels, but beyond that I’m not going to parse into this further and will defer to the Department of Justice.Julia, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. On Sudan, I had a follow-up on &#8212;MR PATEL: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; the UN Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield’s comments calling it a – the potential for a large-scale massacre. And she also said that the U.S. is appealing to countries, including the UAE, to stop support for the warring parties. Has any progress been made with the UAE and other countries, and what is the U.S. doing to try to prevent this catastrophe?MR PATEL: So to put it bluntly, as Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield said yesterday, this – we certainly do not view this as conjecture, and we are seeing the possibility of history repeating itself in Darfur in the worst possible way. There are credible reports that the RSF and its allied militias have razed multiple villages west of El Fasher and are planning an imminent attack on El Fasher, putting 500,000 internally-displaced persons at risk on top of the 2 million Sudanese who call El Fasher home. We also know, as the ambassador said, that both sides are receiving weapons and other support to fuel their efforts. And we’ve directly raised our concerns about reports of UAE support to the RSF with our Emirati partners, and we have made clear that the provision of arms to either side only deepens and prolongs the conflict.Go ahead, Daphne, and then we’re going to wrap.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: You said all – you said you’d take everybody’s questions.MR PATEL: That’s not what I said. I said I would get to as many people as I &#8212;QUESTION: You didn’t even &#8212;MR PATEL: I said I’d get to as many as I can.QUESTION: That’s not what you said.MR PATEL: Go ahead, Daphne.QUESTION: The Philippines today said a coast guard ship and a fisheries vessel were damaged by water cannons used by Chinese coast guard ships. This comes right after Blinken’s trip to China. Do you have any comment on this, concerns?MR PATEL: So the repeated harassment of Philippine vessels near Scarborough Reef is detrimental to regional peace and stability, and our belief is that the Chinese coast guard installation of these barriers also endangers Philippine fisherfolk’s livelihoods and prevents them from exercising their legal rights to fish in those waters. These are rights that were set out in 2016 in a final and legally binding judgment in the Philippines-China arbitration brought to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, and consistently – and this is something that the Secretary made clear on his travels as well – is that we urge the PRC to respect the navigational rights and freedoms guaranteed to all states under international law.All right. Thanks, everybody.QUESTION: Thank you.(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Armenia																								Azerbaijan																								Burkina Faso																								China																								India																								Iraq																								Israel																								Japan																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Philippines																								Qatar																								Russia																								Saudi Arabia																								Sudan																								Turkey																								Ukraine
- The United States Calls for an Immediate Cessation of Attacks in El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;The United States Calls for an Immediate Cessation of Attacks in El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										The United States Calls for an Immediate Cessation of Attacks in El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan																																		Press Statement																														April 24, 2024																																							The United States calls on all armed forces in Sudan to immediately cease attacks in El Fasher, North Darfur.  We are alarmed by indications of an imminent offensive by the Rapid Support Forces and its affiliated militias.  An offensive against El Fasher city would subject civilians to extreme danger, including the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons who have taken refuge there.  The United States is deeply troubled by credible reports that the RSF and its affiliated militias have razed multiple villages west of El Fasher.  We also condemn reported indiscriminate aerial bombardments in the region by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their continued limitations on life-saving humanitarian aid access.The leaders of the SAF and RSF and their affiliated militias face a choice – escalate the violence and perpetuate the suffering of their people while risking the disintegration of their country, or cease attacks, allow unhindered humanitarian access, and prepare in good faith for negotiations to end this war and restore power to the people of Sudan. &nbsp;&nbsp;						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Sudan
- G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships Office of the SpokespersonThe text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.I. INTRODUCTIONAs the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAWe will continue to deepen the partnership with African countries and regional organizations, including the African union (AU). We welcome the AU participation in the G20 as a permanent member and reiterate our support for the G20 Compact with Africa. The G7-Africa partnership is guided by the objectives of the AU Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.The consequences of the Russian aggression and its weaponization of food supplies and energy resources have affected notably many vulnerable countries, particularly in Africa. In this perspective, Russia’s war is proving not just a war against Ukraine but against the world’s poorest and most vulnerable.We reiterate our strong partnership for just, green transitions to net zero emissions as core to sustainable development, and we are ready to inject new momentum into the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Together with the entire international community and stakeholders beyond government, we need to urgently work in partnership to accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda and SDGs, consistent with the unanimous commitment reaffirmed at the UN General Assembly last September.Debt vulnerabilities are a significant challenge. We fully support the G20’s effort to improve the implementation of the “Common Framework” in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, providing clarity to participants. We recognize the importance of effective and long-term solutions, promoting coordination between official bilateral and private creditors. We call upon Multilateral Development Banks and development finance institutions to continue to play a key role to foster sustainable development through increased financing, policy advice and technical assistance for the benefit of developing countries, particularly the poorer and more fragile countries across the continent. In particular central to economic development is ensuring access to sustainable and resilient food systems, health care and health security, and clean, affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.We reiterate our commitment to supporting African governments as they address conditions leading to terrorism, violent extremism, and instability, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. Development and democracy are mutually reinforcing, and we underscore the importance of free and fair elections to meet the citizens’ needs and expectations.We are concerned about the activities of the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group and other emerging Russia-backed forces, which are producing a destabilizing impact, notably in North Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel. We call for accountability of all those responsible for human rights abuses.1. LibyaWe will continue to help Libya put an end to its protracted internecine conflict, also fueled by foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries, in order to build a more peaceful and prosperous future and support its stability, independence, territorial integrity and national unity. The political stalemate leaves Libya extremely vulnerable to third state actors pursuing control over Libya’s security, politics and economy, sowing instability throughout the country and wider region.We therefore call on all Libyan political actors to engage in meaningful dialogue in order to break the current impasse and move towards a credible roadmap to free, fair and inclusive national presidential and parliamentary elections without delay. The international community must also be united in the pursuit of these goals.We take note with regret of the recent announcement by UN Special Representative of the Secretary General, Abdoulaye Bathily, regarding his decision to resign. We thank him for his dedicated service and renew our full support to the United Nations and the key role it continues to play in Libya. We call on the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint his successor without delay.2. SahelWe express our grave concern for the deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel, compounded by the backsliding of the principles of constitutional rule of law, democracy and good governance and regression in the regional cooperation frameworks.Such an increasingly precarious and unpredictable political scenario requires renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders in reconfiguring international and regional responses to the challenge of growing political tension, confrontation, and instability in the Sahel.We are also deeply concerned by the spread of terrorist threats and activities, leading to conflict and causing widespread misery and displacement of the civilian population. We are appalled by the grave human rights violations committed by multiple parties, including Russian proxies in the region.We look forward to strengthening further our cooperation with the African Union, regional organizations and the UN in fostering stability, security, good governance and development in the Sahel, preventing a “spill-over” of insecurity towards the Gulf of Guinea and North Africa, as well as irregular migration flows towards North Africa, Europe and the Western Hemisphere.We congratulate Mauritania on its taking over the rotating Presidency of the African Union and we commend its commitment to the rule of law, good governance, refugee inclusion and constitutional values. We stand ready to assist States of the Sahel in accelerating the pace of the transition towards the return of the constitutional order.3. Horn of AfricaWe reaffirm our strong commitment to promoting peace, security, and stability in the Horn of Africa. We continue to provide humanitarian support to those most affected by food insecurity, widespread poverty, armed violence, the impact of extreme weather events and displacement.We express our concern regarding the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and the Somaliland region of Somalia announced in January 2024. We encourage both the Ethiopian and the Federal Government of Somalia to keep all channels of dialogue open to prevent further escalation, working with regional partners, in the framework of the African Union and through bilateral contacts, in accordance with international law and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the UN Charter.4. SomaliaWe commend the important progress in the institutional, macroeconomic and security sector in Somalia. We encourage the Somali Authorities to continue to make meaningful progress in the fight against Al Shabaab and in the consolidation of the institutional framework, including completion of a transparent and inclusive constitutional reform process.The process of transitioning security responsibilities to the Somali security forces needs to be closely followed, especially in view of the termination of the mandate of the African Union Transitional Mission (ATMIS) in Somalia at the end of 2024. We welcome planning underway by Somalia and the African Union for a multinational mission to follow ATMIS to help maintain stability while Somalia continues to develop its security capabilities.5. EthiopiaWhile we welcome developments in the implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, we express concern for the persistent and violent tensions in many areas of the country, as well as reports of human rights violations and abuses, the severe economic crisis and widening food insecurityWe encourage further and lasting developments in the protection of human rights, protection of civilians, political dialogue to resolve tensions, reconciliation and national dialogue, transitional justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict.We call for a similar commitment by those involved in conflicts in other regions of Ethiopia to pursue peace through dialogue.We underscore the importance of delivering peace dividend quickly for conflict-affected populations through recovery and reconstruction support, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, and implementation of durable solutions for Internally Displaced People (IDPs).6. SudanWe strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan, where the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate more than one year into the war. We especially note the impact of the crisis on women and girls, and condemn the ongoing atrocities being committed by both sides of the conflict, including using rape and other forms of gender-based violence including conflict-related sexual violence. We are concerned by the increasing numbers of displaced people.Obstruction of humanitarian access by the Sudanese Armed Forces and rapid Support Forces is resulting in the starvation of the Sudanese people. We urge both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces to agree and implement a lasting ceasefire without pre-conditions and to establish safe and stable humanitarian cross border and cross line access channels, including from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas of Sudan. We urge all actors to return to negotiations and to engage in a national dialogue inclusive of women and the composite Sudanese civil society and aimed at re-establishing civilian and representative institutions. An active African role and the continued support of the international community remain essential to help Sudan to restore the democratic transition process.We commend the outcomes of the Paris Conference for Sudan and the Neighbouring countries during which over 2 billion Euros have been pledged to support civilian population in Sudan and those who sought refuge in neighbouring countries in 2024.7. Democratic Republic of the CongoWe strongly condemn the resumption of attacks by the March 23 Movement (M23) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We are very concerned by the worsening of the humanitarian situation, and the increasing serious human rights violations and abuses the population is being subjected to. We also condemn all armed groups operating in the country. We demand the immediate cessation of hostilities and of any further advances by the M23 and its withdrawal from all occupied areas as agreed through the African Union-endorsed Luanda process. We demand all armed groups to cease hostilities, withdraw from the areas they are controlling and disarm.We expressed deep concern at the reports of the Group of Experts on the DRC on foreign military support for M23 and direct military interventions on DRC territory. We condemn any such support provided to M23 and any other armed group operating in the DRC and demand its cessation and the immediate withdrawal of any unauthorized foreign military presence from the DRC. We also condemn support, notably provided by military forces, to certain armed groups such as the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), and demand the cessation of such support.We stress that any violations of the UN arms embargo is unacceptable and urge all States to stop any support to these armed groups.We remain committed to the Luanda and Nairobi processes to reach a negotiated diplomatic solution to the conflict. We encourage an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization programme and the meaningful participation of women and youth in all their diversity. We also stand ready to work with the nations of the Great Lakes region to address the root causes of the cycles of violence in eastern DRC in a manner that takes into account the concerns and interests of the whole region, including by promoting accountability for all actors responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITYWe recognize that forced displacement and irregular migration have to be addressed in an integrated, comprehensive, and balanced manner, in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, and in accordance with international law and in full respect of human rights.We will support our partners in addressing the root causes of instability in Africa and other regions and countries of origin, while promoting a cycle of growth grounded in the huge potential of the Continent, particularly in view of the just and clean transition and growth in access to electricity, offering alternative solutions to irregular migration. Collectively, we will address migration drivers including through: better leveraging and coordinating our development and climate finance; supporting fragile and conflict afflicted states; and strengthening international capacity to address climate change, conflict, learning poverty and other drivers of migration. We are ready to build synergies among initiatives from all partners and institutions. We will also continue to support African countries hosting large number of displaced populations.We acknowledge that climate change is a risk multiplier already having a strong impact on human mobility. We see the need to further strengthen disaster risk reduction, adaptation, and resilience measures to counteract the drivers of involuntary displacement in the context of climate change.Human traffickers and people smugglers must be stopped from continuing their nefarious activities and we need to disrupt their business models. We recognize that women and girls are especially impacted by human trafficking, particularly trafficking for sexual exploitation. The UN and its Agencies have a role to play in this respect. Countries of origin, transit and destination must work together to stop migrant smuggling and human trafficking and uphold the dignity and worth of the human person – in line with the UN Charter.We will work towards reducing irregular migration and envisioning regular, safe and orderly migration on the basis of relevant national sovereign regulations. We are committed to find ways to better address challenges posed by irregular migration, within the framework of our international obligations.  We will enhance cooperation against migrant smuggling and human trafficking. In this respect, we acknowledge the “Rome Process” started in July 2023 with an International Conference on Migration and Development” with the dual objective of fighting human traffickers and smugglers and supporting economic development. We also acknowledge the “Mattei Plan for Africa” launched by Italy. We also recall the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and protection and the multilateral legal framework on migration and refugee protection. Legal migration pathways can contribute to economic growth and decent work in line with international standards in countries of origin and destination.We need to inject consistency and coherence in our investment in areas of shared priority for Africa, including food security, nutrition, sustainable rural development, energy transition, sustainable, inclusive, resilient, and quality infrastructure development, bridging digital divides, education, training and skilling, gender equality and good governance. Based on a mutually beneficial exchange, approaching issues on an equal footing, and ensuring alignment with Africa’s needs and priorities as identified by the African Union, African Governments and their peoples, we must step up efforts to achieve concrete sustainable development outcomes, contribute to the stabilization of areas of crisis, fight fundamentalism and address the root causes of irregular migration flows.IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIAThe Indo-Pacific region is a key engine for global growth, with more than half of the world’s population.  We reiterate commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, based on the rule of law, which is inclusive, prosperous, secure, grounded on respect for international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms, and human rights. We underscore that peace and stability of the region also contributes to prosperity and development of the entire international community. Developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.We reaffirm individual initiatives of the G7 members and welcome those of our partners, such as ASEAN, IORA, Australia, Republic of Korea, India and other South Asian as well as Pacific Island countries, to enhance their engagement in the region. We underscore our commitment to further strengthening our coordination among the G7. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of working together with all regional partners.We reaffirm our thorough support to ASEAN centrality and unity, as well as to initiatives aimed at fostering regional cooperation in line with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.We underscore our commitment to further strengthen our partnership with the Pacific Island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We look forward to the 4th International Conference on Small Island Developing States under the theme “Charting the course towards resilient prosperity” (St. John’s, Antigua and Barbuda 27th-30th May 2024). We will broaden our support to civil society, private sector, and academia’s plans for the promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific.8. ChinaWe recognize the importance of constructive and stable relations with China.  We reaffirm the need to engage candidly with and express our concerns directly to China. China is a key interlocutor in addressing global challenges, and we stand ready to cooperate with China on areas of common interest.We reaffirm our interest in a balanced and reciprocal collaboration with China aimed at promoting global economic growth, with a view to enabling sustainable and fair economic relations and strengthening the international trading system. Our policy approaches are not designed to harm China, nor do we seek to thwart China’s economic progress and development. However, we are concerned that China’s non-market policies and practices are leading to harmful overcapacity that undermines our workers, industries, and economic resilience. A growing China that plays by international rules would be of global interest. We are not decoupling or turning inwards.We reiterate the importance of ensuring a level playing field and a transparent, predictable, and fair business environment. Respect for the rules-based multilateral trading system based on market principles needs to be the hallmark of our relations, to protect our workers and companies from unfair and non-market policies and practices, including forced technology transfer or illegitimate data disclosure, which distort the global economy and undermine fair competition. We will protect our workers and business communities from unfair practices, including those that lead to overcapacity, create supply chain vulnerabilities and increase exposure to economic coercion, as we recognize that economic resilience requires de-risking and diversification where necessary.We reaffirm the need to uphold the principles of the UN Charter in their entirety.  In this respect, we call on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression. We express our strong concern about transfers to Russia from business in China of dual-use materials and components for weapons and equipment for military production.We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to oppose China’s dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia in the South China Sea and its repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation and we express serious concern about the increasing use of dangerous maneuvers and water cannons against Philippines vessels in this regard. There is no legal basis for China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and we oppose China’s militarization, coercive and intimidation activities in the South China Sea. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and reaffirm UNCLOS’s important role in setting out the legal framework that governs all activities in the oceans and the seas. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.We restate the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to security and prosperity for the whole international community and we call for peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including in the World Health Assembly and WHO technical meetings, as a member where statehood is not a prerequisite and as an observer or guest where it is. There is no change in the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated one China policies.We remain concerned about the human rights situation in China, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. We express our concerns about the deterioration of pluralism and civil and political rights in Hong Kong since the 2020 National Security Law. We reemphasize these concerns following the recent passage of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which will further erode autonomy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong. The new law will make it harder to live, work and do business in Hong Kong and undermine the ability of Hong Kong people to maintain free and open exchanges with the wider world. We reiterate our call on China to uphold its commitments under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, which enshrine rights and freedoms and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong. Furthermore, we urge China and the Hong Kong authorities to act in accordance with their international commitments and applicable legal obligations.We call on China not to conduct or condone activities aimed at undermining the security and safety of our communities and the integrity of our democratic institutions, and to act in strict accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. We encourage China to uphold its commitments to act responsibly in cyber space.9. North KoreaWe reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.10. MyanmarWe reiterate our strong condemnation of the military coup in Myanmar and reaffirm our support and solidarity with the people of Myanmar in their quest for peace, freedom, and democracy. The continuing attacks by the military destroying civilian infrastructure (including homes, schools, places of worship and hospitals), the repeated and serious violations of human rights and the alarming humanitarian situation &#8211; which particularly affect those in most vulnerable situations, including children, women and members of minority religious and ethnic groups &#8211; are unacceptable. We also condemn the recent implementation of the 2010 conscription law by the military regime. The forced recruitment of young people can only lead to further violence and trigger a massive exodus to neighboring countries.We urge the Myanmar military to immediately cease any violence, release all prisoners arbitrarily detained &#8211; starting from the democratically elected leaders- and establish an inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in view of restoring the path towards a meaningful and durable democratic process. We also reiterate our call on the Myanmar military to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, to desist from any form of forced labour and to allow prompt, safe and unhindered humanitarian access to all displaced persons and people in need.We continue to support ASEAN’s efforts to promote a credible and inclusive process to achieve the swift implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We highlight the importance of a comprehensive implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) and support the UN’s further engagement in the crisis, including through the leadership of the newly appointed UN Special Envoy on Myanmar and through the designation of a Resident Coordinator in country. Accountability for serious crimes committed in Myanmar remains essential.We reiterate our call on all States to prevent or to cease the flow of arms and other dual-use materiel, including jet fuel, into Myanmar. We stress the need to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of all Rohingya refugees and displaced persons and justice and accountability for atrocities committed against Rohingya and other ethnic communities.V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES11. Development Finance and InfrastructureWe reaffirm our commitment to promoting sustainable, resilient, inclusive, and quality infrastructure as a key element for achieving sustainable development by addressing the infrastructure investment gap in low- and middle-income countries. The G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway offer a framework we will use to promote our vision of sustainable and economically viable infrastructure, underpinned by transparent project selection, procurement and finance.We reaffirm our commitment to advancing high standards for quality infrastructure as a means to spur sustainable and inclusive economic development.We intend to work together to accelerate progress towards the commitment to mobilize up to 600 billion USD by 2027 by enhancing the strategic dimension of the Partnership for the Global Infrastructure and Investment  We propose to act in close cooperation with partner countries, multilateral development banks and development finance institutions, including through de-risking, co-financing initiatives and enhanced coordination mechanisms, including at country/regional level, to further promote the development of a pipeline of bankable projects in close cooperation with the private sector, as well as to reinforce project preparation.Infrastructure development should also encompass a wide range of initiatives (i.e. on regulatory frameworks, jobs market, energy access, training and research and health systems) to support partners in order to offer opportunities to the most marginalized and vulnerable and with a view to strengthening social cohesion and inclusion.We will promote a transformative shift towards quality investment, in key areas that drive inclusive and sustainable development and resilience, including food security, climate and clean energy, biodiversity and reducing pollution, connectivity including ICT and transport networks, global supply chain resilience, health and education, and mainstreaming gender equality. We will prioritize efforts to deepen partnerships with Africa and based on the continent’s investment needs, consistent with the goal of accelerating progress towards the SDGs, through concrete deliverables, such as ongoing work along the Lobito Corridor.  Given its global mandate, G7 countries will also continue to deploy investment while bringing forward the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment global strategy in other strategic regions, such as work on the Luzon Economic Corridor.Recognizing the insufficient progress towards the 2030 Agenda and the urgency to address the financing gaps in the context of a growing number of low-income countries and middle-income countries facing higher risk of debt distress and constrained fiscal space to invest in their own development and futures, we will work together with our partners and with international finance institutions to create the conditions to scale up long-term financing for the countries in need.  In that regard, we welcome the launch of infrastructure certification schemes, such as the Blue Dot Network and the Finance to Accelerate the Sustainable Transition Infrastructure initiatives, which aim to mobilize increased private investment in emerging markets. We will strive to enhance the development finance toolkit, to mobilize additional financing from international financial institutions, bilateral partners and the private sector to more effectively reduce poverty and protect the planet.12. Food Security and Nutrition SecurityWe express concern about rising food insecurity and malnutrition stemming from the combined impact of climate change, loss and degradation of ecosystems, the growing number of conflicts, inflationary pressures, and the reduced fiscal space in many developing economies. We are committed to addressing, with partners, the worsening hunger crisis affecting parts of Africa. Strengthening the resilience of agri-food systems is necessary to effectively address food insecurity and malnutrition. That makes internationally coordinated action more urgent than ever. Ensuring food and nutrition security remains a challenge for the international community and affected countries, especially in known hunger hotspots in Africa and beyond, that are vulnerable to climate and conflict-related shocks.We reaffirm our intention to increase investments to build more resilient and sustainable food systems, to help mitigate against future food shocks and diversify food supply chains. To that end, we reaffirm our commitment to contributing to sustainable and resilient food systems transformation, in the spirit of the Roadmap for Global Food Security-Call to Action and the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action for Accelerated Food Systems Transformation, issued at the UN Food Systems Summit +2 held in July 2023 in Rome. We recall the Hiroshima Action Statement for Resilient Global Food Security, issued by G7 Leaders and invited countries. We also reaffirm our support for the G20 Matera Declaration on Food Security, Nutrition and Food Systems and the G7 Global Alliance for Food Security. We acknowledge the importance of supporting fertilizer use efficiency and value chains, including local fertilizer production. The G7 is committed to the success of the next Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2025.We also reaffirm our commitment to work with the Rome-based agencies FAO, IFAD and WFP. We recognize the role of the Committee on World Food Security as an inclusive and multi-stakeholder platform to work together on food security and nutrition.In continuity with the UAE Leaders Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action, endorsed at the COP28 by 159 Countries, including all the G7, we will enhance our efforts to address the food security-climate change nexus in a coherent and pragmatic manner, including through initiatives like the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS).We stress the need for better coordination of international initiatives and projects aimed at countering food insecurity and malnutrition in order to maximize the delivery and impact of already existing resources. We continue to need innovative financial solutions for food systems, especially involving responsible private investment.13. Economic Resilience and Economic SecurityEconomic resilience and economic security are critical for the proper functioning of the G7 and wider global economies. We will foster cooperation in accordance with the G7 Leaders’ Statement on economic Security issued at Hiroshima last year. To this end, we remain committed to making global supply chains more resilient and reliable especially for critical products and technologies.We will continue to co-ordinate work on de-risking, diversification and reduction of critical dependencies and systemic vulnerabilities, actively engaging the private sector.We emphasize the importance of honoring international norms and obligations to safeguard global economic security and resilience and reaffirm our commitment to building global economic resilience and responding to harmful practices that undermine the rules-based multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We will continue working within the G7 and with trusted partners towards resilient supply chains, built in a transparent, diversified, secure, sustainable, trustworthy, and reliable manner.We reiterate our concern about increasing threats to economic security for all global economies, notably economic coercion, and comprehensive strategies that use non-market policies and practices, as well as other practices in the pursuit of market dominance that lead to harmful overcapacity and supply chain concentration, thereby creating vulnerabilities and dependencies. We remain committed to enhancing our coordination and cooperation within the G7, while at the same time engaging other interested international partners about joining our efforts. We will continue work, principally through the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion to improve our assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response to economic coercion, in accordance with our respective legal systems and in conformity with international law.We acknowledge the key role of semiconductors as a critical part of supply chain resilience and economic security. To that end, we welcome the establishment by the G7 Industry, Technology and Digital Ministers of a semiconductors Point of Contact (PoC) Group dedicated to facilitating information exchange and sharing best practices among G7 members.14. Climate, Energy Security and EnvironmentWe are facing the unprecedented triple global crises of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution that are mutually reinforcing and intrinsically linked, as well as an ongoing global energy crisis, health threats, and environmental damage, including those caused or exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.The international community needs to come together and act decisively, irrespective of geographic or political divides, taking concrete steps collectively to achieve the global target to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and achieve global net zero (CHG) emissions by 2050.To this end, we reaffirm our commitment, and we reiterate the call on all countries to contribute to global efforts to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, sustainable and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science and to accelerate low and zero-emission technologies.We recognize the primary need to accelerate the transition to net-zero emissions by 2050, while ensuring policies to diversify energy sources and supplies to address potential security risks to energy systems, in a manner consistent with our climate and sustainability goals.We are determined to promote energy efficiency as the “first fuel”, and fast-track clean, safe, and sustainable energy development and deployment, while reducing our dependency on fossil fuels. Moreover, actions must be taken to increase access to electricity and clean cooking as well as to accelerate sustainable, just and inclusive clean energy transitions in emerging and developing countries and to continue efforts to swiftly implement the Just Energy Transition Partnerships.We are determined to promote affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy in Africa. With this objective, under the Italian Presidency we look forward to continuing discussions on how the G7 can concretely advance and contribute to Africa’s industrial advancement and to its sustainable, resilient, and inclusive growth.The connection between climate, environment and energy is critical to making progress towards our climate change and environmental goals while implementing economically sustainable, just, and rapid transitions. Seizing the opportunities presented by innovative technological solutions and the alignment of global financial flows to support the goals of the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework will be critical to ensuring prosperity and environmental sustainability, while simultaneously fostering development and poverty alleviation, especially in developing countries.We underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort to triple renewable energy capacity globally and double the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, globally by 2030, considering national circumstances, and welcome the consensus reached at CMA5 calling on all Parties to contribute to its achievement.We need to play a key role in defining secure, sustainable, and affordable energy systems, ensuring just and inclusive clean energy transitions. We therefore commit to achieving concrete steps forward in strategic areas. Among these, we recognize the key role of renewables, including from sustainable biological origin, nuclear energy for those who opt to use it, including advanced and small modular reactors, energy efficiency, methane emissions reduction in line with the Global Methane Pledge, industrial de-carbonization, most innovative technologies such as renewable and zero-emission hydrogen, and carbon management technologies.  We will pursue secure, resilient, affordable and sustainable supply chains for critical minerals and raw materials, including through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and MSP Forum, and pursue implementation of the Five Point Plan for Critical Minerals Security adopted by G7 Climate Energy and Environment Ministers. We also underline the opportunities offered by circular economy, including recycling and resource efficiency, as well as innovative technologies. Investing in innovation should also help us in addressing the key topic of reducing GHG emissions in heavy-emitting sectors and promoting the development of a circular economy.Leveraging private sector financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms are important steps to support energy transitions in developing countries, increase resources for adaptation and resilience and enable actions for responding to loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially SIDS and LDCs.The transition to a net zero-emissions, sustainable, climate resilient and nature positive, pollution free and circular economy will necessarily need to involve all the members of society, to ensure just and inclusive transitions, leaving no one behind. Women, youth, and Indigenous Peoples s tend to bear the brunt of climate change-related disasters. In this context, we place particular emphasis on need to empower these societal sectors and include them in efforts to address climate change and environmental degradation. We highlight the importance of nature-based solutions in this context. Plastic pollution is a global problem that requires urgent attention. We look forward to an ambitious and effective global agreement to end plastic pollution.Biodiversity loss is an equally serious threat. Climate, biodiversity, and human health are interrelated and interdependent. We recall our commitment to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework fully and swiftly and to achieve each of its goals and targets, which is the landmark plan to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. We also underline the G7 role in advancing implementation of the CMA5 global effort halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.We will work to mobilise nature finance from all relevant sources and to align financial and fiscal flows, as appropriate, including international development assistance, with the GBF. We also call on Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to increase and report nature finance by CBD COP16.  We welcome the Global Stocktake Decision’s recognition of the importance of nature for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through halting, and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030.Given the risk of a global water crisis and continued lack of universal access to water and sanitation, we call for stronger collaboration at multilateral level in line with the UNEA-6 Resolution on Water. We welcome the UN System-wide Strategy on Water and Sanitation and are committed to the implementation of the Water Action Agenda as a key outcome of the UN Water Conference 2023. We also call for prompt appointment of a UN Special Envoy on Water.15. Global HealthGlobal health is a pre-requisite for sustainable development. Building on the lessons learned during the COVID -19 pandemic, we will continue to promote global health, knowing that health emergencies are a global challenge that need a global response.We support a reform of the Global Health Architecture fostering a more coordinated approach, strengthening Pandemic Prevention Preparedness and Response (PPR) including sustainable financing for capacity strengthening and for health emergency response, especially through the Pandemic Fund. We recognize the importance and reiterate our commitment to reaching a successful, equitable outcome of the ongoing negotiations for a new WHO convention, agreement, or other international instrument on pandemic PPR and targeted amendments to the International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005) by May 2024. Completing the negotiations in time is critical to leverage political attention, strengthen future pandemic responses and improve equity.We commit to redouble our efforts to advance universal health coverage, including by supporting countries to restore access to essential health services and reduce mortality rates to be better than pre-pandemic levels by 2025. We also reaffirm our commitment to invest in resilient health systems, primary health care service delivery, and a skilled health workforce &#8211; including through the WHO Academy &#8211; as essential to reclaiming lost ground due to COVID-19 and promoting Universal Health Coverage as essential elements of pandemic preparedness.We acknowledge that climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are   having a dramatic impact on global health and both noncommunicable and infectious disease threats. We are therefore addressing these challenges in a coherent and strategic manner, through the “One Health” approach that recognizes that the health of people is linked to the health of animals, plants and our shared environment.In this framework, we reaffirm that antimicrobial resistance is a key priority, and we will work closely for a successful upcoming UN High Level Meeting on AMR in September 2024.16. Gender EqualityWe reiterate our commitment to give a new impetus to gender equality. We recall the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the outcome documents of its review conferences and confirm our determination to deliver on the 2030 Agenda relevant Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the G7’s continued global leadership on gender equality and the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls in all their diversity as well as LGBTQIA+ persons. We express our strong concern over the global rollback of all women’s and girls’ rights, including sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the disproportionate impact of conflict and crisis on them.Gender equality and women’s empowerment is a fundamental pre-requisite to eradicate poverty, to stimulate prosperity and sustainable and inclusive growth, and to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies.  We recognize that unpaid care and domestic work are major obstacles to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women and negatively impact women’s economic empowerment by impairing their ability to work full-time or in leadership positions.  We reaffirm the significant value of the World Bank Invest in Childcare initiative and aim by 2035 to support 200 million more women to join the workforce by investing in efforts to close the global childcare gap.We must pursue gender equality as a cross cutting priority to promote and protect the rights of women and girls and members of minority groups, including their ability to exercise their human rights, by ensuring freedom from all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.  We need to strengthen their economic security and empowerment by increasing and addressing barriers to their participation and building their resilience against the impacts of climate change, including by advancing their access to jobs in green and blue industries critical to our future and the future of our planet. We will promote comprehensive sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR, including at the UN General Assembly and Summit of the Future.Women and girls are disproportionately affected by conflicts and crises which can exacerbate existing gender inequalities and expose women and girls, to heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and discrimination. The involvement of women and girls in all areas related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts as well as disaster risk reduction is crucial to creating and ensuring sustainable and inclusive peace and address the root causes of conflicts. In line with UNSCR 1325 and subsequent Resolutions on Women Peace and Security (WPS), we underscore the importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in all areas of policy decision-making spaces and tangible implementation, and through women’s civil society organizations, non-government partners, and throughout the political, security and development spheres. We remain committed to protecting women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence before, during, and after conflicts, ensuring accountability for perpetrators, and providing support and services to survivors.17. Disaster and Risk ReductionWe reaffirm our commitment to strengthen and accelerate the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the &#8220;Early Warning for All&#8221; Initiative by scaling up international cooperation.We acknowledge the interrelated causes and effects of disasters, particularly climate change-induced disasters, on different aspects, including peace and stability, local, regional, and international security, health, education, gender equality, and vulnerability. We renew our commitment to act ahead of disasters by working across the Humanitarian, Development Peace Nexus. Our aim is to reduce risks, anticipate and prepare for disasters, minimize the impacts of disasters on communities and infrastructure in order not to hamper development progress.We stress the importance of the outcome of COP28 in terms of operationalizing new funding arrangements to respond to loss and damage, including the fund. We welcome the pledges to the fund that have already been made and we encourage further support, to be provided on a voluntary basis and from a wide variety of funding sources. This is part of our wider commitment to assist those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.19. Global GovernanceWe reiterate the significance of maintaining and strengthening the free and open international order based on the rule of law, respecting the UN Charter, and the paramount importance of international and multilateral cooperation in promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. We share the UN Secretary General’s ambition for inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism, as outlined in the “Our Common Agenda” Report. We look forward to the UN Summit of the Future as an opportunity to accelerate these efforts, to tackle global challenges and accelerate progress on the SDGs.To restore a sense of common purpose among UN Members States and to make international and multilateral cooperation stronger, more effective, more inclusive, more democratic, more efficient and more transparent, we commit to actively contribute to the Summit of the Future as an opportunity to foster dialogue and to find shared solutions to common problems. Human rights as one of the founding pillars of the UN system will be our common compass throughout the Pact for the Future. We welcome the latest report of the UN Secretary General on human security. We are committed to working with all UN Member States to strengthen the roles of the UNSG as well as the UNGA. We also recommit to the reform of the UNSC.We reaffirm the need for strengthened international financial institutions and underscore the role of multilateral developments banks (MDBs) in the SDGs achievement, including in crisis affected contexts. We support the ongoing efforts for MDBs reform, including the World Bank Group (WBG) evolution roadmap, to better address global challenges. In this respect, we look forward to the WBG and International Monetary Fund annual meetings.We stress the key role of MDBs in addressing global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and fragility and conflict, which are critical to achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development that is inclusive and resilient.19. Conflict Prevention and Management, Support to UN Peace OperationsWe renew our commitment to strengthening peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts to address increasingly complex and interconnected security challenges. We need to build resilient societies, uphold human rights, support good governance, and invest in people to achieve sustainable peace. We condemn sexual and gender-based violence, especially when related to armed conflict situations.We highly value the role of the UN and support an integrated approach to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. We support the Peacebuilding Commission in its role as a convener of relevant stakeholders and an advisory body to other UN organs and we support the Peacebuilding Fund as a critical tool to help to ensure adequate financing for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.We reaffirm that the UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions are valuable tools to prevent escalation and the recurrence of conflicts and to protect civilians where mandated to do so.We further reaffirm our general support for the UN Secretary General’s ‘’New Agenda for Peace’’, “Action for Peacekeeping” and “Action for Peacekeeping Plus” to reform and strengthen such operations, based on a conflict prevention approach to crises. We will enhance capabilities and work to ensure the safety and security of those deployed, for example through the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.We underscore the importance of strengthening the global implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas.20. A Global Resilient Cyberspace, Artificial IntelligenceWe reiterate our commitment to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure cyberspace. We highly value the role of the Ise-Shima Cyber Group to define common ground.While relying on the leadership of governments and international organizations, we recognize the importance of the multistakeholder model, with the invaluable contribution of the private sector in promoting technological development and of civil society in advancing a common understanding of threats and providing solutions to improve cybersecurity.As the international community is increasingly confronted with disruptive activities carried out through Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, we reiterate that international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, apply in cyberspace. We call for the full implementation of existing norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace, and we encourage States to deepen their understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace.We condemn malicious cyber activity, and we will continue to work together at the national level and in multilateral fora to increase accountability in cyberspace. We will increase our cooperation against malicious cyber activities, including state-sponsored ones. We are determined to protect our democratic systems and critical infrastructures from malicious cyber threats. We express our concern for the increasing number of ransomware attacks , particularly  targeting hospitals and healthcare facilities, and in this regard we recall relevant norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, which emphasize states’ commitment to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICT and to respond to appropriate requests to mitigate malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory aimed at  the critical infrastructure of another state.  We welcome significant international initiatives, such as the Counter Ransomware Initiative and the Pall Mall Process, which contribute to increase awareness and improve oversight coordination.We urge countries to enact legislation in line with the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (Budapest Convention) and engage in accession to the treaty. We also urge countries to fully utilize the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as a tool to combat cybercrime.We call on the international community to be guided by the framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace to reduce risks to international peace and stability and make cyberspace a less contested domain. We underline the importance of confidence building measures, international cooperation, and capacity building. We affirm our support for the “Programme of action to advance responsible State behavior in the use of ICTs in the context of international security”, as the permanent and action-oriented mechanism to hold discussions on cybersecurity at the UN from 2025 onward.We reaffirm the G7 support to Ukraine’s cyber resilience, and we welcome multilateral initiatives aimed at providing assistance, such as the Tallinn Mechanism.We will continue to coordinate and, where possible, unite our efforts to assist countries to improve their capacity to address the multiple challenges of cybersecurity and resilience. Exchanging information on respective national projects may help identify best practices. We will be inspired by a demand driven approach and aim to fully integrate cybersecurity into digital development, as highlighted by the Accra Call for Cyber Resilient Development. To this end, we will continue to cooperate where it is relevant with International Financial Institutions, for instance the World Bank, and the private sector.Malicious cyber activities are disrupting critical services in G7 countries – including hospitals, energy companies and water companies – and costing our economies billions of dollars in disruptions. We commit to taking concrete steps to improve our collective cyber resilience.Considering the key and complementary role played by high-level policy makers and the National Agencies for Cybersecurity in ensuring a safe cyberspace and in fostering international collaboration at a policy and technical level, we also welcome the first meeting at G7 level, scheduled in Rome on 16-17 May, and we look forward to the outcome of their discussions.  We resolve to keep analyzing the multifaceted applications of artificial intelligence and other new and emerging technologies, in such a way as to strike an effective balance between the advantageous uses for people and the need to mitigate the potential negative impacts in certain domains, including cyberspace. With this regard, we acknowledge the importance of advancing our efforts to ensure safe, secure and trustworthy AI, which is human-centric and human rights-based, including through advancing the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, and foster interoperability between AI governance frameworks to support our common vision.As new technologies are defining the future of our societies, we endorse the UN General Assembly resolution “Seizing the Opportunities for Safe, Secure and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Systems for Sustainable Development” that was adopted by consensus and co-sponsored by 123 countries. We will also endeavor to provide contributions to the Global Digital Compact and  WSIS+20 Review and the UN Pact for the Future, in order to protect an open, free, secure and inclusive Internet for future generations, governed through multi-stakeholder processes, and by protecting the ability  for all to share information and communicate freely and securely, making sure the voices of younger generations, emerging economies and developing countries are properly heard.We recognize the nexus between AI and cybersecurity, and we commit to countering the risks posed to cybersecurity by AI. We also underscore the importance of ensuring the cybersecurity of AI systems and note the publication of the Guidelines for secure AI system development.21. Countering hybrid threats, including foreign information manipulation and interferenceMalign foreign influence operations, including malicious cyber activities, and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), are a growing challenge to democratic societies around the world, threatening to undermine democratic values, human rights, governmental processes, political stability, and international partnerships. These operations aim at misleading and deceiving our citizens, interfering in our democratic processes, destabilizing our governments and democratic institutions, and undermining our shared values, creating, and exploiting cultural and societal frictions, as well as negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign and security policy. FIMI threatens to destabilize the very fabric of our rules-based international system and is exacerbated by the exploitation of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).We are committed to addressing the potential risk of the misuse of new technologies for purposes of disinformation, and the role of AI in FIMI, especially in the context of forthcoming elections.AI has the potential to strengthen democracy by advancing resilience, openness, civic engagement and participation, and access to government services and information. But AI can also be used as a tool to undermine democracy, including through voter suppression, information manipulation and curtailment of civic engagement. We are concerned with the potential for authoritarian states and non-state actors to misuse current and emerging technologies to undermine democracy and confidence in elections and to erode the information environment.FIMI negatively affects the ability of citizens to take rational, informed decisions, which lies at the very heart of our democratic institutions and aims at undermining confidence in democratic governments and societies. Disinformation can be used to polarize society; it often supports violent extremist activities and is fuelled by malicious foreign players. Online disinformation campaigns are being widely used by a range of malign actors to create or exacerbate tensions.State and non-state actors are increasingly adopting hybrid tactics, also through their proxies. In particular, Russia, since beginning its war of aggression against Ukraine, has been augmenting military efforts on the ground with hybrid tactics, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference. We condemn the widespread use of FIMI and AI by the Russian Government and its proxies to support its war of aggression against Ukraine and fuel further tensions globally. Building our resolve to promote information resilience, we will enhance coordination to establish a common operating picture and develop coordinated responses to information manipulation. A whole-of-society and whole-of-government effort is required to combat FIMI and foster information integrity.We are committed to protecting our information environment and democratic values against any attempt of foreign manipulation. We commit to championing free and independent media at home and around the world and promote pluralism and freedom of expression. Together we seek to strengthen public resilience to and awareness about FIMI, through education, including digital, media and information literacy initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns, also addressing gendered disinformation.We plan to strengthen our coordinated effort to better prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate FIMI threats, addressing the impact of hybrid threats at the earliest stage possible. As billions of citizens will cast their ballots globally in 2024, the protection of free and fair elections from foreign interference is a central focus of the G7 Agenda.We also call on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and to reduce the potential abuse of AI technology for this purpose, also by increasing their transparency.Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) we are strengthening our coordination to identify and respond to diverse and evolving threats to our democracies. We are determined to intensify our efforts, to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign information manipulation and interference, including through sharing information and analysis, and identifying opportunities for coordinated response.22. Digital and Transnational RepressionAdvances in surveillance technology, including AI and commercial spyware, can enable foreign governments and their proxies to monitor, track, and target individuals more effectively and invasively. We are committed to countering the misuse of technology to target human rights defenders, journalists, perceived political opponents, and other civil society members.Transnational repression (TNR), which involves reaching across state borders to intimidate, silence, attack, and/or murder dissidents, human rights activists, and others for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms, has a detrimental impact to free speech, freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms. It is one of the most harmful manifestations of authoritarian governments that aims to export repressive forms of governance extraterritorially.  We strongly condemn the targeting of activists, critics and journalists in this respect.23. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Outer SpaceWe remain firmly committed to uphold the international non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We intend to maintain and strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation efforts for a more secure, stable, and safer world and endorse the statement of the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group.We are greatly concerned by Russia’s continuing war of aggression against Ukraine and its irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and actions, North Korea’s and Iran’s continued advancement of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. These developments pose serious challenges for international peace and security and require our united resolve in defense of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.Recalling the G7 Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic, and responsible approach.In this spirit, we remain resolved to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advance the NPT’s implementation across all three of its mutually reinforcing pillars. We reaffirm the centrality of the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force and to provide sufficient resources to ensure the continued operation and the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification system. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states that have not yet done so to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We deeply regret Russia&#8217;s withdrawal of its ratification of the Treaty and we are gravely concerned by Russian statements with respect to nuclear explosive testing. We urge Moscow to continue to adhere to its moratorium on nuclear tests.We call for the immediate commencement of long-overdue negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT)  while urging all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of such material.We adhere to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We underscore the IAEA&#8217;s crucial role in upholding the international non-proliferation architecture, enhancing nuclear safety and security, and safeguards, and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology for the benefit of all Member States. We recall the G7 Leaders’ commitment to evaluate measures to reduce reliance on civil nuclear-related goods from Russia and to assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies. We support Japan’s safe, transparent and science-based process to responsibly manage the discharge of Advanced Liquid Processing System treated water and in proactively coordinating with scientists and partners as well as the IAEA.The G7 is committed to working with all States to further identify and implement measures to minimize the risk of nuclear weapons use and to strengthen arms control. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on January 3, 2022, on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. We welcome the transparency of G7 nuclear-weapon States in providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenals. We call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit.We reiterate our deep regret over Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty and we call on Russia to return to its full implementation and to engage with the U.S. on reducing nuclear risks. We are also concerned about China’s ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without transparency – including providing data and objective size of its nuclear arsenal &#8211; or good faith arms control and risk reductions measures. The G7 urges China to engage in concrete strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. to promote stability through greater transparency of China’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.We underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, while encouraging other leaders, youth and others to also visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We recognize the important role that f conventional arms control, confidence-building measures and regional risk reduction have in reducing the risk of armed escalation or miscalculation, improving trust and transparency, and promoting strategic stability between states.Conventional weapons continue to be used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that have resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties.  This highlights the urgency of implementation agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors.Reaffirming our strong commitment to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, we underline the need for the universalization and full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).We will actively seek to advance efforts in the working group on the strengthening of the BTWC to examine and develop concrete measures to enhance the implementation of the Convention.We recognize the high priority of addressing biological threats worldwide as an utmost priority. With rapidly advancing technology and more acute biological risks, it is crucial to ensure that biological research, development, and innovation are conducted in a safe, secure, responsible, transparent, and sustainable manner. Strengthening domestic measures, engaging international organizations, academia, and the private sector remains paramount to promote and establish effective regulatory biosafety and biosecurity measures for the life sciences and global health.We reaffirm the key importance of addressing biosecurity challenges in the African continent, strengthening preparedness, and empowering the African scientific community, involving women and youth. We recognize the important progress made through the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa (SIMBA), a flagship effort pf the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity, national frameworks, surveillance and epidemic intelligence and non-proliferation capacities in Africa.In this overall effort, we will work together across the G7, the G7-led 31-member Global Partnership against the spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the BTWC, the WHO and other appropriate international fora to raise the bar globally on biosafety and biosecurity.We commit to maintaining and updating export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including through multilateral export control regimes and in cooperation with all responsible international actors.We reaffirm the key role of the G7 Global Partnership in addressing threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and CBRN materials and supporting vulnerable countries around the world in to build security capacity to better mitigate all manner of CBRN threats. We welcome the launch of the Global Partnership’s new initiative to counter WMD disinformation.Working with partners, we e will continue to assess the risks posed by exports of rapidly advancing dual-use technologies.  Where necessary and according to our respective legal frameworks, we will cooperate and promote efforts to implement export controls to address risks to international security.We celebrate in 2024 the tenth anniversary of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), in which all G7 members participate. The development of realistic processes and technologies by IPNDV will help ensure future agreements contain robust verification provisions.Space-related services, data and activities are increasingly key for the functioning of our economies and the implementation of public policies for the welfare of our citizens. However, we see globally an intensification of threats and the development of capabilities directed at disrupting the peaceful use of space.We reiterate the importance of upholding the existing legal framework for activities in outer space, notably the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the “Outer Space Treaty”). We remain committed to fostering international cooperation, transparency, and confidence-building measures to promote responsible behavior with the goal of improving space security for all states. In parallel, we will also remain vigilant and invest in the resilience of space-related services against potentially hostile activities.We affirm the obligation of all States Parties to fully comply with the Outer Space Treaty, including not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.24. Countering terrorism and transnational crimeWe condemn terrorism in all its forms, and we reiterate our determination to protect freedom and security in our societies, upholding democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights &#8211; including the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy &#8211; freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief.Terrorist networks know no borders and countering terrorism requires a strong collective and internationally aligned approach that includes combating the financing of terrorism and terrorist propaganda. We need to recognize and tackle new threats emanating from malign actors’ use of emerging technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, while the risk of chemical, biological, and radiological attacks remain a serious threat. The potential use of technologies to counter terrorism and violent extremism must be recognized as well.Countering terrorism needs a holistic approach, aimed also at preventing violent extremism. It is imperative that we prevent radicalization to violence online and offline, in prison as well as in societies, through work with civil society, women-led organizations, local leaders and communities. We should work to promote rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for former terrorists in order to reintegrate them back into society with a reduced risk of recidivism. We intend to step up information sharing and international cooperation, promoting capacity building domestically and with partners, including in border management. All our efforts are based on respect for human rights and the principles of the rule of law.Organized crime is also a major threat to our societies and citizens and also knows no borders. Organized crime can take advantage of the insecurity, instability and conflicts caused by terrorism and it can also be a way that terrorist groups support their activities. Terrorism can leverage organized crime, too. Human trafficking, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, crimes that affect the environment, trafficking of cultural property, money laundering and corruption can find a fertile ground when exploiting war and conflicts. Capacity building in justice and security measures to counter the illicit economy can help to foster inclusive and peaceful societies.We reaffirm our commitment to fight organized crime and its illegal profits, focusing on new risks such as cybercrime. Trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants have become major sources of income for organized crime, together with drug trafficking. We are firmly committed to stop the criminal exploitation of vulnerable peoples, breaking the business model of organized criminal groups.We also reaffirm our commitment to fight against the illicit production and distribution of synthetic drugs including fentanyl. Trafficking of illicit fentanyl and other synthetic drugs props up large, adaptable, and resilient transnational criminal organizations that operate across the globe – with the financial means and capacity to corrupt society, undermine governance, and weaken government institutions around the world.  Together, we reaffirm our commitment to countering the production, distribution, and sale of illicit narcotics; to sharing threat information and engaging in joint investigations and enforcement efforts; to scheduling precursor chemicals and other drugs, in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations and other international entities; to collectively coordinating efforts with key international partners, especially with countries where synthetic drugs  are produced; to participating in multilateral fora, such as the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats, that unite countries and key institutions in fighting the scourge of deadly drugs; and to advancing public health interventions and services to those who need it.  Individually and collectively, we will crack down on the global criminal networks that fuel overdose deaths, disrupt the illicit financial mechanisms that support these networks; seize deadly drugs before they enter our communities; and deliver life-saving medication and care. We are ready to work with other governments to tackle these transnational challenges and to support the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats.We welcome the valuable input of the G7 Roma-Lyon Group’s work on preventing and combating terrorism and transnational organized crime.25. Fight against CorruptionWe recognize that corruption and related illicit finance and proceeds of crime drain public resources, can often fuel organized crime and undermine democratic governance. Corruption and illicit finance also undermine progress across all the Sustainable Development Goals.We reaffirm the fundamental role that the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and its supporting bodies play in the global fight against corruption. We will strive to further support and enhance the effectiveness of its Implementation Review Mechanism, especially with a view to its next review phase.We also reaffirm our commitment to timely and effective implementation of the FATF standards on transparency of beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements, underscoring the importance of accountability tools that will deny corrupt actors access to our territories and our financial systems.We also recognize the challenges faced by some developing countries in meeting international standards designed to combat corruption and illicit finance, and we encourage the international financial institutions to coordinate and increase their efforts to support countries in their efforts across their operations, particularly in fragile and conflict affected countries.26. Threats to maritime securityWe reiterate our commitment to promoting a cooperative system of international governance for the ocean and seas and to maintaining the rules-based maritime order based on international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, fundamental freedoms and human rights. In this context, we recognize the importance of the role of international courts and tribunals including the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.We firmly reiterate our condemnation for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism and transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking of weapons and narcotics, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and other illegal maritime activities. We reaffirm the importance of national and regional ownership in pursuing the fight against illegal activities at sea.V1.  TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES27. Western BalkansWe reaffirm our shared commitment to the security, economic prosperity, and European perspective of the six Western Balkans countries as a crucial investment for peace and stability. We emphasize the importance of advancing the necessary internal reforms, particularly on rule of law, including tackling organized crime, illicit finance, and corruption.We fully support further progress on regional cooperation and integration, including by implementing the Common Regional Market, and we encourage local political elites to make decisive progress on regional reconciliation. To this aim, we call on Kosovo and Serbia to implement without further delay the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and its Implementation Annex adopted in 2023. We urge both sides to engage constructively in the framework of the EU-facilitated dialogue, refraining from provocations, inflammatory rhetoric, and uncoordinated actions.We firmly reject any attempt from internal or external actors to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and multiethnic character of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We fully support the executive mandate of the EUFOR ALTHEA operation to support the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the country.We urge all parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina to put aside divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, to avoid any act that could destabilize the country and to focus on internal reforms that would move the country closer to realizing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.We welcome the European Council’s decision in March 2024 to open negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the European Union.  We support the mandate of High Representative Christian Schmidt.28. South CaucasusWe urge Armenia and Azerbaijan to remain fully committed to the peace process to achieve a dignified and durable peace based on the principles of non-use of force, respect for sovereignty, the inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity. We recall the Joint Statement issued by the sides on December 7th, 2023, and encourage them to uphold that spirit of cooperation in their future interactions. Further escalation would be unacceptable.We call on Azerbaijan to fully comply with its obligations under international humanitarian law and encourage appropriate steps to ensure the safe, dignified, and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons wishing to come back to their homes.The G7 and its members are ready to facilitate further constructive contacts at all levels, notably within the established negotiating frameworks provided by the EU and the USA, whose enduring efforts we commend.We reiterate the importance of the commitment to the Alma Ata 1991 Declaration through which Armenia and Azerbaijan recognize each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We encourage greater regional cooperation and the re-opening of all borders, including the border between Armenia and Türkiye.29. Central Asian countriesWe remain resolved to support the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and the right of self-determination of the Central Asian countries.We are committed to enhancing our cooperation with the Central Asian countries to tackle regional challenges, including the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the enduring impact of the situation in Afghanistan, the regional terrorist threat, as well as managing water resources and climate change and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.We encourage the further strengthening of regional cooperation, especially in the field of connectivity and infrastructure, including the Middle Corridor, to improve ease of trade between the Central Asian countries, bolster global supply chains, foster trade, forge investment and energy links, provide economic diversification and enhance resilience, while upholding labor rights and environmental protection.We will continue to support the implementation of the socio-economic and political reforms announced in the Central Asian countries. Throughout the region, we support the expansion of civic and political participation, the strengthening of the rule of law, and the safeguarding of human rights.30. AfghanistanWe remain committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. We condemn the continued and systemic abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Taliban, notably of the political, economic and social rights of women and girls, as well as the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities. We deeply regret that the Taliban has taken no serious step to initiate an inclusive political process with fellow Afghans regarding the future of the country. Peace and stability in Afghanistan will require the establishment of an inclusive and representative political process which allows Afghanistan to fulfill its international obligations and includes full, equal, safe, and meaningful participation of Afghan women, upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms.We intend to remain vigilant against the risk of Afghanistan serving as a base for hosting or exporting terrorism to other countries.The safe and secure departure of all Afghans wishing to leave the country must be guaranteed, as well as humanitarian access and the possibility to effectively provide humanitarian aid.We support the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan.We are committed to the swift appointment of a UN Special Envoy in line with the recommendations of the UN’s Independent Assessment and as mandated by Security Council Resolution 2721.VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANStronger cooperation with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean is of paramount importance as we have common values and shared interests. We commit to further partner with the Region to address global challenges, including by protecting the international system based on international cooperation and international law, tackling natural disasters and climate change, countering transnational organized crime, and promoting trade and investments aimed at improving socio-economic resilience.31. HaitiWe express our solidarity to the Haitian population, which is suffering from unprecedented levels of gang violence. We reiterate our support to the ongoing international efforts aimed at strengthening public institutions and law enforcement, as well as combating criminal gangs, whose illegal activities have led to a marked deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation of the country.We encourage the international community to scale up its humanitarian support to the Haitian population. We note the urgent need to protect women and children in Haiti, who are suffering disproportionately from the recent and rapid escalation in violence.We welcome UNSCR 2699, authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, in close cooperation and coordination with the Government of Haiti, to support the efforts of the Haitian National Police to re-establish security in Haiti and build security conditions conducive to holding free and fair elections. We commend the Government of Kenya for its readiness to lead the mission. Every effort should be made to expeditiously provide robust financial support to the mission so that it may deploy as soon as possible.  The people of Haiti cannot wait.We also welcome UNSCR 2700, which renews the sanctions regime for Haiti for an additional year. The sanctions regime promotes accountability by extending the territorial arms embargo and ability to sanction individuals and entities who are responsible for, or complicit in, actions that threaten the peace and security in Haiti.We commend the outcome of the CARICOM Summit held in Kingston, Jamaica, on March 11 and the commitment taken by Haitian stakeholders to implement an inclusive transitional governance arrangement.We support the ongoing efforts of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti and call on the political actors to bridge their differences and commit in a forward-looking, transparent, and fair national dialogue, which is essential to stabilize the Country.We reiterate the importance that the process to find lasting solutions to the ongoing security and humanitarian crisis be Haitian-led and owned.32. NicaraguaWe call on the Nicaraguan government to end its human rights violations as well as widespread repression and related violations and abuses against civil society, Indigenous Peoples, academics, students, the independent press, and political and religious actors.We urge authorities to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners and abide by their international obligations. We condemn the closure of CSOs and the systematic attacks on religious institutions and organizations, including the Catholic Church and its ministers, many of whom have been arrested and then sent into exile, along with hundreds of political actors and civil society members – and moved to strip them of their citizenship.  We call on the Government to restore their citizenship under international conventions.We further call on the Nicaraguan Government to hold free and fair elections, allowing the members of the opposition to exercise their rights to the freedom of assembly, and to free speech.33. VenezuelaWe are deeply concerned about the ongoing political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. We call on Venezuela to swiftly implement the Barbados Agreements of October 2023, with particular regard to electoral guarantees, and the deployment of international electoral observations missions in order to ensure free and fair elections.We are deeply worried by the recent decisions to prevent members of the opposition from exercising their core political rights and the continued detention and harassment of opposition members. We call for the immediate release of political prisoners still detained.We follow closely developments between Venezuela and Guyana over the Essequibo region and we demand Venezuela to refrain from destabilizing initiatives. The matter must be resolved in line with international law.
- Securing the Red Sea: A Global Response Timothy A. Lenderking, U.S. Special Envoy for YemenThe Houthis’ reckless and indiscriminate attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are creating even worse food shortages in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Sudan, affecting the most vulnerable people.  This is because the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are a high-traffic global shipping route used to deliver food, fuel, humanitarian assistance, and other essential commodities to destinations all over the world, including Yemen. You may not realize that Houthi attacks against commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea are directly impacting people’s lives. Ships taking longer journeys increase the cost of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as life-saving aid to people who need it most. ⤵️ pic.twitter.com/YIkX1numQa&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) February 2, 2024The Red Sea&#8217;s Strategic Significance The Red Sea holds immense strategic importance, serving as a vital maritime route for global trade. Fifteen percent of international commerce and 30 percent of global container traffic flows through the Red Sea.  Locator map for Yemen. Impacts on Yemen and Beyond The Houthis’ attacks, enabled by Iran, are not limited to U.S. or Israeli ships. Houthi rebels have struck ships and crews with ties to more than 50 different countries, resulting in enormous impacts on international shipping. The situation not only affects Yemen but also reverberates across the globe, affecting food, medicine, and fuel supplies for millions, including those in the Middle East, East Africa, and even the United States.  Shipping companies are changing routes to avoid the Red Sea, requiring boats to travel around the Cape of Good Hope. This often adds about 10 days to journey times and requires more fuel and crew-time, significantly raising shipping costs, which are then passed on to the customers and aid-providing organizations. Houthi attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea are doubling shipping costs to the United States and having real human impacts—increasing the costs of food, medicine, and fuel. pic.twitter.com/8D7nyEI0cE&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) March 2, 2024Response from the International Community The Houthis’ reckless assaults on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are clear violations of international law. In response, the United States and the international community have taken action to counter these attacks and protect the lives of innocent mariners. In December, the United States launched Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of more than 20 nations committed to defending international shipping and deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.  Sailors stand ready in the Red Sea! 🚢 Dedicated maintenance and drills ensure peak operational capabilities for Operation Prosperity Guardian. Led by Combined Task Force 153, this international effort promotes maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. pic.twitter.com/Enm8XGN6SZ&mdash; Department of Defense 🇺🇸 (@DeptofDefense) December 28, 2023In January, together with 13 allies and partners, the U.S. issued an unequivocal warning that Houthi rebels would face consequences if their attacks did not cease. Additionally, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the Houthis end attacks on merchant and commercial vessels. Yemen: “The resolution unequivocally demands that the Houthis cease their brazen attacks which violates international law&quot; &#8211; Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Permanent Representative of the United States to the UNRead the story➡️:https://t.co/JVIdieimAN pic.twitter.com/6vk99ku0cX&mdash; UN News (@UN_News_Centre) January 11, 2024Disrupting Houthi Activities To disrupt the flow of funds to the Houthis for their terrorist activities and to limit their access to financial networks, the United States has designated them as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.  This is a significant step to prevent financial support from reaching the Houthis and to ensure they are held accountable for their actions. If the Houthis stop their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will review this designation. The United States has also sanctioned entities that are enabling Iran’s financial assistance to the Houthis’ destabilizing activities. Today, we announced the designation of the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. pic.twitter.com/NFYOaUrm8G&mdash; Department of State (@StateDept) January 17, 2024&nbsp;Condemning Houthi Actions These aggressive actions not only endanger innocent lives but also disrupt the free flow of global commerce — including in nations that are already experiencing challenges — exacerbating already dire humanitarian crises across the region.  The United States remains committed to combating Iranian support to the Houthis and calls for international unity against their destabilizing activities. 
- Sudan HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Sudan				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																											d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																											i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				On April 15, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces resulted in a protracted conflict across the country and reports of serious and widespread abuses. Based on a careful analysis of the law and available facts, on December 6, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken determined that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces committed war crimes in Sudan. The Secretary also determined that members of the Rapid Support Forces and allied militias committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. As of October, UN and international media reported more than 10,500 civilian deaths. Although the conflict originated in Khartoum, the fighting quickly spread into Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan states (the Two Areas), and eastern Sudan, and rampant abuses were reported. As of year’s end, fighting between Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces continued to intensify and spread to new areas of the country.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners or detainees; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious abuses in a conflict, including unlawful or widespread civilian deaths or harm; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence and threats of violence against journalists, unjustified arrests and prosecutions of journalists, and censorship; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental and civil society organizations; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child, early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and other forms of such sexual violence; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting members of national/racial/ethnic groups or Indigenous peoples such as the Massalit; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; and prohibiting independent trade unions or significant or systematic restrictions on workers’ freedom of association.The government did not take credible steps to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.Militias affiliated with the Rapid Support Forces reportedly continued to commit killings, abductions, rape, sexual slavery, and other physical abuses and mistreatment of civilians in Darfur and across the country. Arab militias allied with the Rapid Support Forces conducted unlawful killings of ethnic Massalit civilians as they fled violence in West Darfur. Local militias maintained substantial influence and acted with widespread impunity. Intercommunal violence originating from land-tenure disputes and resource scarcity continued to result in civilian deaths, particularly in East, South, and North Darfur, as well as the Two Areas. There were also human rights abuses reported in Abyei, a region that Sudan and South Sudan both claimed. These abuses generally stemmed from local clashes regarding cattle and land between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya Indigenous groups. Reports were difficult to verify due to access impediments. Weak rule of law persisted in Darfur, where fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, banditry, criminality, and intercommunal violence were the main causes of insecurity.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										According to the United Nations, international human rights organizations, national civil society organizations, and media, the government or its agents committed numerous arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), armed militias affiliated with the government and the RSF, and ethnically based groups were responsible for widespread extrajudicial killings.On February 28, security forces fired live ammunition at prodemocracy protesters in Khartoum, killing Ibrahim Mazjoob, age 16, and injuring dozens. Mazjoob’s death drew significant public attention as a video on social media captured a Central Reserve Police officer charging him with an assault rifle and shooting him in the chest. Following a statement by the Ministry of Interior acknowledging Mazjoob’s death, the public prosecutor indicted the police officer for premeditated murder on March 15. The case remained pending at year’s end.On June 14, following the outbreak of conflict and weeks of targeted killings of ethnic Massalit by the RSF and its allied-Arab militias, West Darfur Governor and Massalit leader Khamis Abbaker was executed by RSF troops after accusing them of committing genocide in El Geneina, according to Amnesty International. Videos on social media showed Abbaker being forced into a building by RSF soldiers, followed by a second video hours later showing Abbaker’s dead body and troops in RSF uniforms celebrating around it.Reuters reported at least 1,000 bodies, primarily of Massalit civilians, were buried in Al Ghabat cemetery in El Geneina following RSF and Arab militia attacks. The United Nations added that it received credible reports regarding the existence of at least 13 mass graves of Massalit and non-Arab tribe civilians in El Geneina and surrounding areas.According to victim testimonies, there were numerous credible reports of extrajudicial killings and executions of SAF and RSF prisoners of war from both sides.There were several reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings through exchanges with rogue security force elements in Darfur and the Two Areas.																																				b. Disappearance										There were numerous reports of disappearance by or on behalf of government authorities.On July 19, an RSF intelligence unit reportedly detained Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) member Abdelbagi Murad in Khartoum and took him to an unknown destination. SCP member Ali Hussein remained missing since his abduction by the RSF in April. Local civil society organizations, including the Sudanese Group for Victims of Enforced Disappearance and Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, reported 430 cases of missing persons since April 15, reportedly perpetrated by the security forces and armed militias. Human rights defenders, resistance committee members, journalists, and activists were among those missing.As of early November, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was monitoring 715 cases of disappearance in Khartoum, North and South Kordofan, and Darfur. In addition, reportedly 22,000 cases of missing persons had been filed with SAF-affiliated authorities in Port Sudan.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The 2019 constitutional declaration prohibited torture or inhuman treatment or punishment. Nevertheless, there were numerous credible reports of government forces, the RSF, and armed militias associated with both warring sides committing abuses, including torture, beatings, and harassment.Security forces used live ammunition, tear gas, water cannons, and stun grenades against peaceful protesters. During these incidents, security forces reportedly killed protesters and injured hundreds.The OHCHR reported that persons arrested following demonstrations were routinely and severely beaten with pipes, sticks, and batons, and were kicked by security forces, including when restrained. Severe beatings carried out by security forces at detention centers resulted in broken bones.On August 22, local and international media reported civilian detainees, including Walid Mohamed, Khaled Abdel Mahmoud, and Sidahmed Omer, were freed from SAF detention centers after nearly three months of detention at the Shajjara Armored Corps base. The detainees were reportedly subject to severe beatings, burnings of limbs, and deprivation of medical attention and food and water for extended periods. The accounts of the detainees at Shajjara Armored Base received significant media attention as they recounted their experiences in videos that were shared widely on social media. Ten detainees reportedly died during their detention at the Armored base. There were numerous reports of security forces committing sexual violence against women and girls across the country, including Darfur. In June, the OHCHR reported 18 verified cases of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, in Khartoum, involving 65 victims, of whom 10 were girls. According to the OHCHR, most attacks occurred in RSF-controlled territory by men wearing RSF uniforms.Prison and Detention Center Conditions: Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding, food shortages, inadequate sanitary conditions or health care, and physical abuse.Abusive Physical Conditions: The most significant problems included gross overcrowding and inadequate access to quality food, potable water, sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, or medical care.Since April, the RSF had reportedly established 44 centers for holding kidnapped persons in Khartoum and surrounding areas, while the SAF continued to operate eight detention centers, according to civil society groups and human rights organizations. Persons in these centers were reportedly subjected to starvation, sexual assault, beatings, and cruel treatment, with credible reports that scores died in the detention centers.Authorities failed to maintain control of the detention centers in Khartoum, as police and correctional officers fled the detention centers during RSF attacks on the facilities in April, according to international media. Hundreds of prisoners escaped Kober Prison in Khartoum, including former President Omar al-Bashir — who as of late December was believed to be in a military hospital in Omdurman — Ahmed Haroun, and other former senior National Congress Party officials who were arrested following the 2019 revolution.Administration: The police inspector general, the minister of justice, and the judiciary were authorized to inspect prisons, although it was unclear whether inspections were conducted during the year.Independent Monitoring: The International Committee of the Red Cross was generally denied access to prisons, apart from installing water points and distributing hygiene products during the COVID-19 pandemic. International monitors were not allowed access to detainees. Following the start of the conflict in April, there was no access to detention facilities.																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The 2019 constitutional declaration prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. The military government issued a decree in 2021 to expand the arrest, search, and seizure powers of the country’s security forces, which upended the constitutional declaration’s prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention.Security forces, the RSF, and armed militias regularly arrested and detained individuals arbitrarily, including protesters, human rights activists, journalists, resistance committee members, and civilians accused of supporting the opposite warring side.According to the OHCHR, as of early November, the SAF and RSF had arbitrarily arrested thousands of civilians in Khartoum, Darfur, and the Two Areas, detaining them in official and unofficial detention centers.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						Under the law, warrants were not required for an arrest. The law permitted police to detain individuals for 24 hours for the purpose of inquiry. A magistrate could renew detention without charge for up to two weeks during an investigation. A superior magistrate could renew detentions for up to six months for a person who was charged. The General Intelligence Service was not allowed to detain individuals without permission of the attorney general, although the military government worked with Sudanese National Police to detain individuals based on its own investigations.The law provided for an individual to be informed in detail of charges at the time of arrest, with interpretation as needed, and for judicial determination without undue delay. Following the October 2021 military takeover and especially after the outbreak of conflict, authorities routinely disregarded these laws.The law allowed for bail, except for those accused of crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. There was a functioning bail system; however, persons released on bail often waited indefinitely for action on their cases.Suspects in common criminal cases, such as theft, were compelled to confess guilt while in police custody through physical abuse and police intimidation of family members.By law any person could request legal assistance and had to be informed of the right to counsel in cases potentially involving the death penalty, imprisonment lasting longer than 10 years, or amputation if convicted. Accused persons could also request assistance through the legal aid department at the Ministry of Justice or the Sudanese Bar Association. The government was not always able to provide legal assistance, although legal aid organizations and lawyers partially filled the gap. Detainees arrested in connection with protesting the military takeover were routinely denied access to their families and to legal counsel.Arbitrary Arrest: Following the October 2021 military takeover, hundreds were detained without charge, including high-level political actors and activists. Some were subsequently charged. Security forces detained resistance committee members, activists, and protesters, releasing most the same day or the day following the protest. Since April, the United Nations and human rights organizations reported a marked increase in arbitrary detentions of human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, civil society leaders, political activists, and resistance committee members.In January, the OHCHR reported four instances of security forces in civilian clothing arresting resistance committee members in Khartoum and detaining them incommunicado from 12 hours to 30 days. The detainees reported being interrogated, subjected to electric shocks, and beaten with iron bars and hoses.In September, African Center for Justice and Peace Studies reported a military intelligence unit in Blue Nile State detained and interrogated 30 human rights activists and defenders for reporting on the conflict and human rights violations. Additionally, the SAF reportedly arbitrarily arrested civilians in Khartoum and Blue Nile State, accusing them of having familial ties to RSF members and supporting the force.Pretrial Detention: The law stated that pretrial detention could not exceed six months; however, the attorney general could authorize a second six-month period. Lengthy pretrial detention was common. The large number of detainees and judicial inefficiency resulted in trial delays.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitutional declaration and relevant laws provided for an independent judiciary, but the government often did not respect judicial independence and impartiality.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for the right to a fair and public trial as well as a presumption of innocence; however, this provision was rarely respected. In cases of national security and offenses against the state, trials were usually closed.By law, criminal defendants had to be informed promptly of the charges against them at the time of their arrest and charged in detail and with interpretation as needed.Defendants generally had the right to present evidence and witnesses, be present in court, confront accusers, and have access to government-held evidence relevant to their cases. Throughout the year some defendants reportedly did not receive legal counsel, and counsel in some cases could only advise the defendant and not address the court. Defendants were not always permitted time and facilities to prepare their defense. Persons detained in connection with prodemocracy protests were routinely denied counsel. Persons in remote areas and in areas of conflict generally did not have access to legal counsel. The government sometimes did not allow defense witnesses to testify.Military trials, which sometimes were secret and brief, lacked procedural safeguards. The law prescribed military trials for any civilians in SAF-controlled areas believed to be armed opposition or members of the RSF.Three-person security courts dealt with violations of constitutional decrees, emergency regulations, and some sections of the penal code, including drug and currency offenses. Special courts primarily composed of civilian judges handled most security-related cases.Due to long distances between court facilities and police stations in conflict areas, local mediation was often the first resort to resolve disputes. In some instances, tribal courts operating outside the official legal system decided cases. Such courts did not provide the same protections as regular courts.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were credible reports that authorities held political prisoners and detainees from a few days to months prior to release. In February, the OHCHR assessed the December 2022 release of Dismantling Committee members Wagdi Saleh and Abdulla Sulieman as being the last of the prominent political detainees associated with the October 2021 military takeover. Since April, however, human rights organizations and the United Nations reported numerous cases of political party members, resistance committee members, and political activists being detained and held without charge.The Africa Center for Justice and Peace Studies reported that on August 17, members of the SAF military intelligence unit dressed in plain clothes raided the offices of the Sudanese Communist Party in Blue Nile State, detaining 20 members of the party. The detainees were reportedly interrogated and beaten for being supporters of the RSF.Local human rights organizations reported that in July, SAF military intelligence personnel arrested several resistance committee members and political activists in Northern State, including prominent activist Shareef El Hamdabi. The detainees reportedly were beaten and interrogated for their work on political matters.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The law prohibited such actions, but the military government increasingly accessed, collected, or used private communications or personal data arbitrarily. There were also reports of security forces entering homes without judicial or other appropriate authorization in search of individuals believed to be involved in organizing protests or supporting opposing forces. There were extensive reports the RSF forcibly evicted civilians from homes and other civilian buildings in areas it occupied, especially in Khartoum and greater capital region.																																				i. Conflict-related Abuses										Following the outbreak of the conflict in April between SAF and RSF forces, violence increased and spread across the country, especially in Khartoum, Darfur, Blue Nile, and Kordofan states. In addition to the fighting between the SAF and RSF, and its allied-Arab militias, armed movements such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-N) clashed with both the SAF and RSF and rival armed groups.Killings: SAF personnel, RSF forces, and tribal groups committed killings in Khartoum, Darfur, and the Two Areas. The United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and local human rights organizations documented and produced credible reports of targeted killings based on ethnicity committed by the RSF and allied militias in Darfur.The RSF and allied-Arab militias conducted unlawful and reportedly extensive killings of ethnic Massalit civilians as they fled violence in West Darfur. HRW reported in August that there had been repeated deliberate attacks on civilians, most by RSF forces and allied-Arab militia targeting the ethnic Massalit population. According to HRW, thousands of RSF members and allied-Arab militias attacked members of the Massalit community in Misterei on May 28, reportedly killing 28 and injuring hundreds. The attackers reportedly targeted neighborhoods that were predominantly Massalit, making clear their intentions to kill ethnic Massalit, especially men and boys.A September 22 Reuters report claimed that between April 24 and June 9, more than 4,000 civilians, primarily Massalit, were killed and at least 10,000 injured in El Geneina. The violence forced more than 290,000 individuals to flee El Geneina for Chad, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).There were widespread media reports that the SAF at times engaged in indiscriminate shelling and aerial bombardments in highly populated residential areas, including Khartoum, killing numerous civilians and destroying vital infrastructure. According to the OHCHR, the September 10 SAF airstrikes on Kubu Market in South Khartoum killed 51 civilians and injured an additional 50.In June, international media reported that SAF shelling and airstrikes on a market in Nyala killed 24 civilians. Caught between SAF and RSF clashes, an additional 30 civilians, mostly women and children, were killed when the bridge they were hiding under collapsed due to the fighting.In early June, fighting erupted between SPLM-N forces loyal to Abdelaziz al-Hilu and the SAF in South Kordofan and later spread to Blue Nile State, where forces loyal to opposing factions of SPLM-N Malik Agar clashed. Nearly 300,000 individuals fled their homes in the Two Areas because of the fighting. The general political and security situation of Abyei, the disputed territory between the country and South Sudan, continued to remain fragile and was marked by instances of violence between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities, and by violence between the Ngok Dinka and the Twic Dinka communities.Abductions: According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the OHCHR, there were numerous reports of abductions by the RSF and tribal groups in Darfur, Khartoum, and Blue Nile States. Amnesty International reported that in late June, RSF members abducted 24 women and girls in Khartoum and took them to a hotel, where they were raped and used as sexual slaves.There were numerous reports of SAF military intelligence units abducting human rights activists, protesters, and civilians accused of supporting the RSF or opposition forces.There were also numerous criminal incidents involving kidnapping for ransom.Abduction remained a lucrative method adopted by various tribes in Darfur to coerce the payment of diya (“blood money” ransom) claimed from other communities.Physical Abuse, Punishment, and Torture: There were numerous reports that government security forces, progovernment and antigovernment militias, and other armed persons raped women and children.Following the outbreak of the conflict in April, the United Nations and the Unit for Combatting Violence Against Women reported a marked increase in gender-based violence in Khartoum, West Darfur, and South Darfur, reportedly committed by the RSF and armed militias. As of early November, the OHCHR had received more than 170 allegations of conflict-related sexual violence, verifying 53 cases consisting of 129 victims (108 women, 20 girls, and one man). In the first few weeks of the conflict, the OHCHR observed a pattern of RSF troops and affiliated members committing conflict-related sexual violence while looting and breaking into civilian homes in Khartoum and targeting women and girls at checkpoints as they attempted to flee conflict areas. Later RSF troops conducted targeted abductions of women and girls in Khartoum, transporting them across the country to Central and South Darfur. While such incidents were difficult to verify, the OHCHR reported on firsthand accounts and observations of handcuffed women and girls on the back of trucks traveling west. Human rights organizations and the United Nations also reported increased risk of sexual violence against women and girls as armed men raided villages and camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and attacked them while they were traveling to safer areas.The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa and international media reported an estimated 24 women and girls as young as 14 were kidnapped from South Darfur’s Otash IDP camp and sexually assaulted in April, while 30 cases of sexual assault occurred in southern Khartoum as of mid-May, with women and girls being increasingly targeted and sexually assaulted by armed actors, particularly RSF personnel. International NGOs further noted a significant number of unconfirmed reports of conflict-related sexual violence committed by RSF soldiers, especially in Khartoum City’s Mamoura area and the nearby city of Bahri’s Kafouri District.According to Amnesty International, on August 3, RSF members and allied fighters abducted 24 women and girls, some as young as 12, who were repeatedly raped by RSF personnel. Similar abductions and sexual violence reportedly committed by the RSF were reported in North Kordofan.HRW reported that between April 24 and June 26, there were 78 victims of rape in West Darfur. In interviews with HRW, survivors accused the RSF and Arab men in civilian clothing of committing the abuses.As of early October, the UN Joint Human Rights Office reported 52 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, involving 106 victims in Khartoum, Darfur, and the Two Areas.There were reports that both the SAF and RSF committed sexual abuse and other forms of mistreatment of detainees held in the reportedly 50 unlawful detention centers set up during the year.The UN Panel of Experts reported that in areas of Jebel Marra under government control, bordering Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid al-Nur (SLA-AW) areas, some civilians, in particular traders, were harassed and sometimes unlawfully detained by security forces on the assumption that they supported the SLA-AW. Armed opposition groups in Darfur and the Two Areas reportedly detained persons in isolated locations in prison-like detention centers.The extent to which armed opposition groups committed human rights abuses could not be accurately assessed due to limited access. The state of detention facilities administered by the SLA-AW and SPLM-N in their respective armed opposition-controlled areas also could not be assessed for the same reason.Child Soldiers: The law prohibited the recruitment of children and provided criminal penalties for perpetrators.There were credible reports the RSF and SAF recruited unaccompanied children and children from poor families and used child soldiers in the conflict since April 15. In June, SAF Commander General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan called on the young and those capable of fighting to join the armed forces to fight the RSF. As a result, more than 50 recruitment camps were established in Northern, River Nile, and Khartoum states, with human rights organizations reporting children were among the new recruits. According to the United Nations, the RSF and SAF forcibly recruited children in the outskirts of Khartoum. During the year, the RSF posted several videos to social media that appeared to show children in RSF uniforms serving as drivers or holding machine guns. As of early November, the OHCHR had verified 1,194 cases of recruitment and use of child soldiers, predominately in Khartoum and North Darfur, attributed to both RSF and SAF elements.UNICEF reported an estimated 19 million children were out of school due to more than 10,000 school closures, increasing the risk of forced recruitment by armed groups.Allegations persisted that armed opposition movements conscripted and retained child soldiers within their ranks. Many children continued to lack documents verifying their age. Children’s rights organizations believed armed groups exploited this lack of documentation to recruit or retain children. Due to access problems, reports of the use of child soldiers by armed groups were limited and often difficult to verify.Other Conflict-related Abuse: The environment for humanitarian operations across the country remained difficult and dangerous, only increasing in difficulty following the outbreak of the conflict in April. The SAF and RSF and armed groups severely restricted the ability of the United Nations, international organizations, and NGOs to deliver humanitarian assistance to areas severely impacted by the conflict. Access was impeded by bureaucratic barriers, including denial of visas, travel permits, and lengthy inspections of humanitarian assistance. Additionally, direct fighting in areas where humanitarian needs were most dire prevented humanitarian actors from delivering assistance.The security environment remained dangerous for humanitarian aid workers, as more than 19 humanitarian aid workers had been killed and 24 detained between April and October, according to OCHA. On April 15, three World Food Programme (WFP) staff members were killed in the fighting between the RSF and the SAF in North Darfur. According to the WFP, more than 53 humanitarian warehouses were looted, resulting in a loss of 40,000 tons of WFP food assistance, and 87 UN agency offices destroyed across the country.Both the RSF and SAF were reported to have deliberately targeted civilian property, including schools and health-care facilities. According to Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition, at least 195 attacks on health-care facilities occurred as of September, including SAF bombing destroying Abulhol Medical Center in Khartoum State on September 30 and the RSF attacking staff at Al-Nau Hospital in Omdurman on September 21.According to OCHA, as of November, more than 4.9 million individuals were internally displaced, and more than 1.2 million persons had fled the country since April 15.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The 2019 constitutional declaration provided for the unrestricted right of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as regulated by law, but the military government, SAF, and RSF violated these rights and committed abuses, including killings of journalists, arbitrary detention of activists, and censorship.Freedom of Expression: There were numerous reports of reprisals against individuals who criticized the government, with the primary exception of criticism of the security services. Prodemocracy protesters frequently faced excessive use of force in protests; the security services claimed this was to protect sensitive government sites.Violence and Harassment: Government security forces intimidated or detained journalists whose reporting they perceived as unfavorable. They confiscated or damaged journalists’ equipment and restricted their movements. During the year, security forces interrogated, harassed, detained, and imprisoned journalists, forcing some to go into hiding. On October 10, the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate and the Committee to Protect Journalists reported RSF members killed Sudan Bakra journalist Halima Idris Salim by running her over with a vehicle while she was reporting on the conflict in Omdurman.On May 16, RSF soldiers reportedly abducted Al Jazeera journalists Ahmed Fadl and Rashid Gibril in Khartoum, where they were held overnight, beaten, and threatened before having their cars stolen. According to the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate, SAF troops briefly detained and physically assaulted BBC journalist Muhammad Othmam on April 15.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government sought to maintain strict control of media, both print and electronic. Civil society organizations and the Sudanese Journalists Syndicate reported numerous incidents of abuses.On January 26, military intelligence officers arrested Ali Mohammed Hajo, a human rights activist, for publishing a report on Facebook that alleged mistreatment and torture of detainees at a military intelligence detention center in Blue Nile State. The governor of Blue Nile State ordered Hajo imprisoned, without trial or legal representation, for three months. Media practiced self-censorship, especially with respect to reporting on corruption and the security services.Libel/Slander Laws: The law held editors in chief criminally liable for libel or slander for all content published or broadcast. There were no reported prosecutions under this law during the year.																Internet Freedom						The government restricted and disrupted access to the internet during prodemocracy protests and military campaigns. Following the outbreak of the conflict, SAF and RSF forces struck critical telecommunications infrastructure, severely damaging or destroying the equipment. This led to communication blackouts in conflict areas such as West Darfur. There were credible reports the government monitored private online communications of human rights and civil society activists, often targeting and intimidating these individuals for content critical of the government.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The law provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government generally did not respect these rights.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The law provided for freedom of peaceful assembly, but the government restricted this right. Peaceful protests were violently suppressed by security forces throughout the year.On April 6, resistance committees organized protests across the country in opposition to the signing of an anticipated political agreement, with the largest crowds gathering in Khartoum, Omdurman, and Port Sudan. Security forces used live ammunition and deployed tear gas and other violent crowd control measures to disperse the crowds. Hundreds were reportedly injured, many from security forces firing tear gas cannisters at point blank range. Human rights organizations also reported that security forces in Port Sudan, Red Sea State, chased protesters to their lodgings.Prior to the outbreak of conflict in April, after which street protests became rare, security forces killed and injured protesters during violent crackdowns. To prevent protesters from peacefully gathering in sensitive locations, including the Presidential Palace, security forces blocked bridges with shipping containers and closed roads with barbed wire.						Freedom of Association						Although the 2019 constitutional declaration provided for the freedom of association, the law included many restrictions on civil society organizations and NGOs, and the country lacked labor union laws. Since the onset of the conflict, government forces used the threat of RSF repression as an excuse to deny civil society groups the ability to gather or demonstrate.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The law provided for the freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, and emigration, and while the government largely respected these rights, restrictions remained on travel to conflict areas.The OHCHR reported that both the RSF and SAF denied civilians safe passage to flee the fighting or to evacuate the injured in Khartoum and Omdurman. In El Geneina, the RSF and allied militias targeted members of the Massalit community as they attempted to flee violence in Darfur. Amnesty International and HRW reported that hundreds, including women and children, were killed as they attempted to cross the border.In-country Movement: Armed opposition groups reportedly restricted the movement of citizens in conflict areas.Internal movement was generally unhindered for citizens outside conflict areas prior to April 15. For domestic travel outside of Khartoum, foreigners needed travel permits, which were difficult to obtain. Foreigners were required to register with the Ministry of Interior’s Alien Control Division within three days of arrival and were limited to a 15.5-mile radius of Khartoum. Once registered, foreigners were allowed to move beyond this radius, but travel to conflict regions required additional approval.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										Humanitarian organizations reported the government increased bureaucratic processes following the outbreak of the conflict, inhibiting efforts to provide protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.In late March, more than 1.1 million registered refugees and asylum seekers were in the country, with more than 800,000 from South Sudan. As some South Sudanese and Syrian refugees and asylum seekers did not present themselves to the government’s Commission on Refugees (COR) or to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for registration, the total number of refugees and asylum seekers was generally assumed to be higher. In addition, UNHCR reported there were many South Sudanese in the country who were unregistered and at risk of statelessness. By the end of September, after more than four months of fighting, UNHCR reported the registered refugee and asylum seeker population was just less than 960,000.Since the start of the conflict in April, more than 4.4 million persons were displaced as of the end of September, including hundreds of thousands of refugees who were seeking safety in the country. As of late October, UNCHR reported nearly 192,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Khartoum, were secondarily displaced to 11 states within the country. The majority moved to White Nile State, and as a result, the state housed the largest number of refugees in the country. Since the government did not waive travel authorization requirements, refugees previously residing in Khartoum who fled the conflict in Khartoum were at risk of being detained by government authorities and could face problems obtaining assistance in their new displacement locations.Access to Asylum: The law provided for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for protecting refugees. The law nominally required asylum applications to be submitted within 30 days of arrival in the country. This time stipulation was not strictly enforced. The law also required asylum seekers to register both as refugees with the COR and as foreigners with the Civil Registry (to obtain a “foreigner” number).The government granted asylum to asylum seekers primarily from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Syria; it sometimes considered individuals registered as asylum seekers or refugees in another country, mostly in Ethiopia, to be illegal migrants. Government officials routinely took up to three months to approve individual refugee and asylum status claims.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Asylum seekers and refugees who did not possess identification cards while awaiting government determination of refugee or asylum status were vulnerable to arbitrary arrest and harassment outside camps. Refugees registered in Khartoum who fled the conflict were reportedly also vulnerable to arrest and harassment for traveling without prior authorization. There were reported abuses, including sexual exploitation and abuse, rape, and other forms of gender-based violence, in COR-managed refugee camps.Following the outbreak of the conflict, many South Sudanese refugees left Sudan to return to South Sudan, but there were reports of sexual violence, extortion, and theft along the route to South Sudan.Prior to the conflict refugees often relied on smuggling networks to leave camps. Smugglers routinely abused refugees if ransoms were not paid.Freedom of Movement: The government’s encampment policy required asylum seekers and refugees to stay in designated camps; however, 65 percent of South Sudanese refugees (the great majority of refugees in the country) lived with local communities in urban and rural areas. The government did not actively push for South Sudanese living outside Khartoum to relocate to refugee camps, but reports indicated these refugees were facing challenges after fleeing Khartoum. Refugees who left camps without permission and were intercepted by authorities continued to face administrative fines despite widespread conflict. Refugees and asylum seekers in urban areas remained subject to arrest and detention. UNHCR continued to work with legal partners to visit immigration detention centers and to provide persons of concern with legal assistance, such as release from detention centers and help in navigating court procedures.Employment: The government allowed refugees to work informally but rarely granted work permits (even to refugees who obtained university degrees in the country). The government required refugees to apply for a “foreigner number” to obtain a work permit, but most refugees did not have one, which resulted in a low number of issued work permits. Some refugees found informal or seasonal work as agricultural workers or laborers in towns. Some women in camps reportedly resorted to illegal alcohol production and were harassed or arrested by police. In urban centers, most refugees worked in the informal sector (for example, as tea sellers, house cleaners, and drivers), leaving them at heightened risk of arrest, exploitation, and abuse.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Following the outbreak of the conflict in April, more than 4.9 million persons were internally displaced according to OCHA. Countrywide, there were more than 7.1 million IDPs as of October, according to OCHA. In addition, more than 1.1 million individuals fled the country, crossing into neighboring countries, including Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, Central African Republic, and Ethiopia.OCHA reported the majority of IDPs, more than three million, were from Khartoum State and the Darfur region, coinciding with the locations where the heaviest fighting between the warring sides occurred.IDP camps in Central and South Darfur were either attacked or caught in the crossfire between the warring sides, leading to the deaths of six IDPs in El Hasaheisa IDP camp on September 26.Since April, humanitarian workers received an increasing number of reports of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, particularly against IDPs and women and girls in conflict areas. In January, an estimated 3.1 million women, girls, and other individuals were at risk of sexual violence, according to the original 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan; however, after the eruption of the conflict, the number of persons threatened with sexual violence increased to 4.2 million, according to the revised 2023 plan. There were reports of widespread abuse committed by government security forces and armed opposition groups against IDPs in Darfur, including rapes and beatings.Outside IDP camps and towns, insecurity restricted freedom of movement. Women and girls who left the towns and camps risked sexual violence. Insecurity within IDP camps was also a problem. The government provided little assistance or protection to IDPs in Darfur. Most IDP camps had no functioning police force. International observers noted criminal gangs aligned with armed opposition groups operated openly in several IDP camps.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																				g. Stateless Persons										Many South Sudanese refugees in the country not registered with the government risked statelessness.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The 2019 constitutional declaration provided that every citizen had the right of political participation and the right to participate in public affairs in accordance with the law.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National executive and legislative elections took place in 2015 under the regime of former President Bashir and were not deemed to be free or fair. The main opposition parties at that time – National Umma Party, National Consensus Forces, Sudanese Congress Party, Sudanese Communist Party, and Popular Congress Party – boycotted the elections, leaving only the ruling National Congress and National Unity Parties to participate.Under the Bashir regime, general elections for president and the National Assembly were scheduled to be held every five years. Under the political agreement and the constitutional declaration signed in 2019, elections were scheduled to be held in 2022, but the October 2020 signing of the Juba Peace Agreement and amendment to the constitutional framework postponed elections until 39 months after the signing, delaying planned elections until early 2024.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption during the year.Corruption: The law provided the legislative framework for addressing official corruption. The civilian-led transitional government (CLTG), before the October 2021 military takeover, used existing law and the constitutional declaration to combat official corruption, and in 2021, it established the Anti-Corruption and Public Asset Recovery Commission. The commission was charged with investigating, detecting, and preventing a wide range of corrupt acts; however, it was dissolved following the 2021 military takeover, and several of its leaders were charged with crimes or faced intimidation.A special anti-corruption attorney investigated and prosecuted corruption cases involving officials, their spouses, and their children. Punishments for conviction of embezzlement included imprisonment or execution for public-service workers, although these sanctions were almost never carried out.For additional information concerning corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Following the civilian-led transitional government through April, domestic and international human rights groups generally operated with limited government restriction, monitoring and investigating human rights conditions and cases and publishing their findings, although some restrictions existed, especially in areas experiencing violence, and some human rights groups feared government retribution. Since April, there were numerous credible reports of SAF and RSF forces killing, abducting, arbitrarily arresting, and intimidating organizations engaged in monitoring or investigating human rights.On September 3, the Darfur Bar Association reported that RSF and affiliated militia members killed 10 lawyers and human rights activists in Nyala and El-Geneina for their work documenting human rights abuses.On August 30, SAF officers reportedly detained 10 activists from Mothers for Sudan in Damazine for organizing a vigil for the victims of the conflict and criticizing the SAF for failing to protect civilians and committing sexual violence against women.The United Nations or Other International Bodies: Access by UN agencies to Darfur, the Two Areas, and other conflict-affected regions remained difficult, as travel into and around such areas was curtailed during periods of violence. Since April, insecurity and bureaucratic impediments, including visa and travel permit restrictions, issuance of residency permits, and other obstacles impeded UN agencies’ ability to monitor and report on human rights. Humanitarian actors also faced severe interference. In November the government asked the UN to immediately terminate the mandate of the UN Integrated Transitional Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS).In January, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor reported to the UN Security Council that cooperation with government authorities deteriorated due to continued visa restrictions for ICC staff, lack of access to documentation and witnesses, and other bureaucratic impediments. Authorities failed to transfer wanted individuals to The Hague, and those in government custody escaped from prison in the wake of the conflict.Government Human Rights Bodies: Human rights defenders were allowed to file complaints with the National Human Rights Commission, although the commission remained inactive during the year.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape and sexual harassment were criminal offenses, and a rape survivor could not be prosecuted for adultery. Marital rape was not recognized. Domestic violence was a crime.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): FGM/C remained a problem, and the procedure continued to be used on women and girls throughout the country. In 2020, the CLTG formally criminalized FGM/C. The law provided a penalty of three years’ imprisonment for anyone convicted of practicing FGM/C. There were no reports of the law criminalizing FGM/C being enforced under the military government. According to UNICEF and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the prevalence rate of FGM/C experienced by girls and women between ages 15 and 49 was 87 percent. Its prevalence varied geographically and depended on the local ethnic group.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Following the outbreak of the conflict in April, the United Nations and the Unit for Combatting Violence Against Women reported a marked increase in gender-based violence in Khartoum, West Darfur, and South Darfur, reportedly committed by the RSF and allied armed militias.The OHCHR received regular reports of incidents of rape and gender-based violence. Human rights organizations cited substantial barriers to reporting gender-based violence, including cultural norms, police reluctance to investigate, and the widespread impunity of perpetrators.Discrimination: The law, including many traditional legal practices and certain provisions of Islamic jurisprudence, continued to discriminate against women. In accordance with common Islamic judicial interpretation, a Muslim widow should inherit one-eighth of her husband’s estate; of the remaining seven-eighths, two-thirds should go to the sons and one-third to the daughters. In certain probate trials, a woman’s testimony was not considered equal to a man’s; the testimony of two women was required. In other civil trials, the testimony of a woman equaled that of a man.By law, a Muslim man could marry a Jewish or Christian woman. A Muslim woman could not marry a non-Muslim man and could be charged with adultery if she did so. Although the CLTG abolished the previous discriminatory Public Order Law, individual officers reportedly still applied it ad hoc.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Prior to the start of the April conflict, the Ministry of Health in coordination with international organizations provided access to sexual and reproductive health services for survivors of sexual violence in conflict areas. By law, abortion for pregnant survivors of rape was limited to individuals who were raped in the country and required verification, which impacted refugees fleeing from Ethiopia, according to humanitarian organizations. The ministry also provided preventive treatment for sexually transmitted infections and emergency contraceptives, depending on the public-health infrastructure and availability of medications. The government relied on international organizations to provide contraceptive supplies and certain essential medicines.As of the end of September, the health system was on the verge of collapse with approximately 70 percent of hospitals in conflict-affected states nonfunctional due to violence and insecurity, shortage of medical supplies, and lack of cash to meet operational costs and salaries. The World Health Organization verified 60 attacks on hospitals and clinics. Those hospitals and clinics that did function were overwhelmed by the influx of IDPs.Women living in rural areas did not always have access to contraceptives, skilled medical attendance during childbirth, and obstetric and postpartum care.In 2020, the UNFPA estimated the maternal mortality rate was 270 deaths per 100,000 live births and skilled health-care personnel attended 78 percent of births. The high maternal mortality rate stemmed in large part from the convergence of the following factors: early child marriages; lack of access to reproductive health and emergency obstetric care, particularly in rural areas; lack of access to family planning services; poor sanitation; lack of transportation in rural areas; and poor public-health infrastructure in rural areas where the population experienced chronic undernourishment, malaria, hemorrhagic fevers, and anemia.The UNFPA estimated that 10 percent of girls and women between ages 15 and 49 used a modern method of contraception.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The population included more than 500 ethnic groups speaking numerous languages and dialects. Some of these ethnic groups self-identified as Arab, referring to their language and other cultural attributes. There were several cases of interethnic violence in conflict regions.On April 5, clashes between Funj and Hausa tribe members in Blue Nile State resulted in the deaths of five individuals. The violence reportedly originated when Funj members attacked a Hausa farm, initiating retaliatory attacks. There were multiple reports of hate speech and discriminatory language during the year. Reports increased following the outbreak of the conflict. The United Nations and international human rights organizations reported the RSF and allied militias used hate speech to polarize communities in West Darfur and justify the targeted killings of members of the Massalit community, including the Governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abbaker.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Failure to present a valid birth certificate precluded enrollment in school. Access to health care was similarly dependent on possession of a valid birth certificate, but many doctors accepted a patient’s verbal assurance that he or she had one.Child Abuse: There were laws criminalizing child abuse, but the government did not enforce them effectively, especially following the outbreak of conflict.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal age of marriage was 10 for girls and 15 or puberty for boys. According to UNICEF and the UNFPA, 12 percent of women were married before age 15, and 34 percent were married before age 18. In some cases, men married girls to exploit their labor.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Penalties for conviction of sexual exploitation of children varied and included imprisonment, monetary fines, or both. There was no minimum age for consensual sex and no statutory rape law. Pornography, including child pornography, was illegal. Statutes prescribed a fine and period of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years for conviction of child pornography offenses.																																				Antisemitism										The known Jewish community in the country consisted of two individuals in the Khartoum area, who left the country after the start of the conflict. Societal attitudes were generally not tolerant of Jewish persons, although antisemitic acts were rare.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized sodomy for men, which was punishable by five years in jail for an initial offense, and it criminalized other same-sex sexual conduct for both men and women as “indecent acts,” punishable by up to one year in prison and fines. The law was enforced. In 2020, the CLTG abolished corporal and capital punishment for sodomy, although NGOs reported flogging was still conducted.Violence and Harassment: According to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) community leaders and organizations, intimidation and physical attacks against the community continued. LGBTQI+ members and civil society organizations also reported increased hate speech targeting LGBTQI+ persons.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Anti-LGBTQI+ sentiment was pervasive in society. There were some reports of medical professionals refusing to provide medical services to LGBTQI+ persons following the disclosure of their sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. There were no reports of official action to investigate or punish those complicit in discrimination or abuses of LGBTQI+ persons.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no reports of involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices targeting LGBTQI+ individuals.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: LGBTQI+ organizations reported restrictions on their freedom of assembly and increased pressure to suspend or curtail activities due to fear of harassment, intimidation, or abuse. Some LGBTQI+ activists reported they left the country due both to violence associated with the war and because of targeting for violence or harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity or expression.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Although the law and the constitutional declaration provided protections for persons with disabilities, social stigma and a lack of official support hindered the government’s enforcement of disability laws. The law did not specifically prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities.Social stigma and lack of official support often prevented government and private entities from accommodating persons with disabilities in education and employment. Appropriate support remained especially rare in rural areas.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Clashes often resulted from conflicts concerning land rights, mineral ownership, and use of gold-mining areas, particularly in the Jebel Amer area in North Darfur. Observers believed those clashes resulted in deaths and displacement in past years. Largely unregulated artisanal gold-mining activities continued in every Darfur state, although it was a lesser source of tension among communities than in previous years. Claims to land rights continued to be mostly ethnic and tribal in nature. Other clashes took place in the states of Red Sea, Kassala, Blue Nile, West Kordofan, and South Kordofan.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										In November 2022, a court ruled to affirm labor protections in the constitution, labor laws, and the trade union act. This ruling lifted the ban on the Sudan Worker Trade Union Federation and its affiliated unions and professional associations that the CLTG enacted in 2019 and military leaders placed into effect in 2021. The constitution, labor laws, and the trade union act provided for workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The trade union act prohibited antiunion discrimination.In November 2022, the Sovereign Council issued a decree suspending the activities of trade unions, professional unions, the Sudanese Business Union, and Federation of Employers. Government reports indicated the intention was to prevent reinstatement of unions with close ties to the Bashir regime and curb the return of previous regime figures to positions of influence. The decree ordered government authorities to create a steering committee to enforce the Sovereign Council decision. Some legal restrictions limited these rights, and the government did not effectively enforce laws protecting freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike. Penalties for violation were commensurate with those under other laws involving denials of civil rights but were never applied against violators.On January 8, the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court suspended implementation of the November 2022, decree, which in turn suspended the activities of all trade unions pending an appeal.Military leaders detained and assaulted union and association members during prodemocracy protests. These alleged violations affected the right to organize and bargain collectively by appointing unelected steering committees to take control of unions, syndicates, and professional associations. Employees could form their own independent unions in companies with a minimum number of employees or join preexisting unions.Labor codes and the trade union act established a single national trade union federation and excluded police, military personnel, prison employees, Ministry of Justice legal advisors, and judges from membership. In some cases, membership in international unions was not officially recognized. The law excluded domestic servants, most agricultural workers, and casual workers. The right to strike was prohibited, instead stipulating that workers had to use a cumbersome bureaucratic process to resolve labor disputes, including compulsory arbitration or complex conciliation and mediation procedures. Workers who engaged in labor outside the provisions of the labor code could legally be penalized with prison and compulsory labor.Credible reports indicated that government and military officials discriminated against unions, using the state of transition and subsequent military takeover to delay and avoid enforcement of existing laws protecting the freedom of association and the right of collective bargaining. There were credible reports that military leaders continued to take illegal action against trade union freedoms including dissolutions, arrests, property confiscation, and intimidation.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										The constitution and the law prohibited forced labor and set the minimum age for work at 14 in most sectors, with some light work permissible at age 12. The law specified that no child under 18 years of age shall be recruited in the army and imposed penalties in cases of recruitment. Despite these prohibitions, the government did not enforce the law. International organizations and civil society groups reported that armed forces and groups persisted in recruiting and using children under 18, with instances of forced labor. Penalties were not applied against violators. The law provided occupational safety and health restrictions for children but the government did not enforce them; penalties were not applied.The law provided that primary education be free and compulsory from ages 6-13 years, but international organizations reported that one third to half of all children did not attend school. School associations imposed fees to supplement the low level of government funding for education. Students were also required to pay the costs of uniforms, textbooks, and basic school supplies like pen and paper, in order to attend. Many schools remained closed since the COVID-19 pandemic or were severely understaffed.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for minimum wage for some sectors. The government set a minimum wage, which was below the poverty line.Employers generally respected the minimum wage law in the formal sector. Wages in the informal sector were often significantly less than the official rate.The law limited the workweek to 40 hours (five eight-hour days, not including a 30-minute to one-hour daily break), with days of rest on Friday and Saturday. Overtime could not exceed 12 hours per week or four hours per day. The law provided for paid annual leave after one year of continuous employment and paid holidays after three months. Women were limited to certain occupations and shifts. For example, women were prohibited from working in hazardous occupations and forbidden to work between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. except in administrative or technical jobs.Occupational Safety and Health: The laws prescribed occupational safety and health (OSH) standards, but workers in the country’s major industry, agriculture, were expressly excluded from OSH protections. Any industrial company with 30 to 150 employees was required to have an industrial safety officer. A larger company was required to have an industrial safety committee that included management and employees. Committees and officers were required to report safety incidents to the Ministry of Labor and Social Development. OSH experts did not actively identify unsafe conditions or respond to worker complaints.The law required the owner of an industrial company to inform workers of occupational hazards and provide means for protection against such hazards. Management was also required to take necessary precautions to protect workers against industrial accidents and occupational diseases. The law did not recognize the right of workers to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without loss of employment. Some heavy industry and artisanal mining operations, notably gold extraction, reportedly lacked sufficient safety regulations.Safety laws did not apply to domestic servants, casual workers, or agricultural workers other than those employed in the operation, repair, and maintenance of agricultural machinery. Safety laws covered enterprises that processed or marketed agricultural products, such as cotton gins or dairy product factories, and jobs related to the administration of agricultural projects, including office work, accounting, storage, gardening, and livestock husbandry. Family members of an employee who lived with the employee and who were completely or partially dependent on the employee for their living received no protections.Representatives of the Eritrean and Ethiopian communities in Khartoum stated that undocumented migrants in the capital were subjected to abusive work conditions. They also reported many undocumented workers did not report abuse due to fear authorities might deport them to Eritrea because of their illegal status.Little data were available on workplace accidents, but media reported significant injuries occurred in gold mines. In South Kordofan, activists protesting the toxic mercury and cyanide waste dumped during mining closed at least 10 gold-mining plants during the past few years. Despite the transitional government’s 2019 prohibition on the use of mercury and cyanide in gold mining, artisanal gold mining using these hazardous methods continued to injure workers; enforcement was ineffective.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce wage, hour, and OSH laws, and penalties were not sufficient to deter violations. Penalties were less than those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were rarely applied against violators.The Ministry of Labor and Social Development maintained field offices in most major cities and was responsible for enforcing wage, hour, and OSH standards. The ministry employed labor inspectors, including specialists on labor relations, labor conflicts, and vocational, health, and recruitment practices, but the number of inspectors was insufficient to enforce compliance.Almost 90 percent of citizens were employed in the informal sector, according to reports by economists. IDPs were also among informal-sector entrepreneurs. They were a source of cheap, casual labor in areas ranging from labor in the construction industry to selling tea or cooked food along the streets. Some informal-sector work was illegal, such as the production and sale of alcohol and commercial sexual exploitation. Another activity was the exchange of hard currency into Sudanese currency, either in the country or in currency markets outside the country. The remitted income was redistributed through family networks and supported a substantial portion of the population. The government tried to suppress, control, or tax the informal sector but without success. No government entity provided social protections for workers in the informal economy.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											The Bahamas											Tonga											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																						d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																						i. Conflict-related Abuses																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Sudan
- Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing – April 11, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing – April 11, 2024																																																					April 11, 2024																																																								2:16 p.m. EDTMR MILLER: Good afternoon, everyone. We have a couple of guests today. Run of show: Our Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield is here along with our Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello. Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield is going to kick it off with some open remarks. They’ll take a few questions about the conflict in Sudan, and then I will return for the remainder of the briefing.So, Ambassador.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you very much and good afternoon everyone. Let me just start by welcoming Special Envoy Tom Perriello back from Chad just last week but also welcome him back to the State Department. Last week, Tom traveled to Adré Refugee Camp right along the border of Sudan. It’s a trip that I know quite well. I was at that same refugee camp just a few months ago in September. I also visited the camp 20 years ago.Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese refugees had fled for this camp in the months prior – 90 percent of them women and children. And among those refugees was a six-month-old baby, born only days before the fighting broke out in Sudan. When I saw her, she was suffering from acute malnutrition – so small, so fragile, I thought she was a newborn. There is so much about her story that I don’t know: how she arrived at the MSF hospital, whether she ever left the hospital. But I think about her today as the world nears a grim milestone: one year of horrific civil war in Sudan; how she was born as her country spiraled into conflict; how she was carried into Chad, her protectors walking miles and miles to reach a semblance of safety; how she spent those formative few months in a hospital too small and weak to even cry as doctors tried desperately to nurse her back to health; and how now she reaches her first birthday having only known violence, hunger, and displacement.April 11th should be a historic occasion as we mark the five-year anniversary of the revolution that toppled the Omar al-Bashir’s regime, 30 – his 30-year reign. Five years ago, you could practically taste the spirit of freedom, peace, and democracy in the air as women and young people took to the streets demanding change. And yet that baby I met in September is not growing up in a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan. Instead, she’s one of millions whose lives have been upended and forever altered by this war.Today, nearly 25 million Sudanese people live in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection; three-quarters of them face acute food insecurity. Nearly 8 million have had to flee their homes in what has become the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. We’ve seen reports of gang rape, mass murder at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces militia, of girls sold into sexual slavery, boys being made into child soldiers, of urban areas destroyed by arial weapons, and entire villages burned to the ground. And yet, as communities barrel toward famine, as cholera and measles spread, as violence continues to claim countless lives, the world has largely remained silent. And that must change and it has to change now. The international community must give more, it must do more, and it has to care more.And let’s start with the funding piece because that’s critical. To date, just 5 percent – 5 percent – of the UN’s humanitarian appeal for Sudan has been met. Already, the World Food Program has had to cut assistance to over 7 million people in Chad and South Sudan, and that includes 1.2 million refugees like the ones I met in Adré, people who were already struggling to feed themselves and their families.This is a matter of life and death. Experts warn that the coming weeks and months, over 200,000 more children could die of starvation. The United States, for our part, plans on significantly increasing our funding in the days to come.More than just lacking aid, however, humanitarian workers have been systematically obstructed from delivering aid to those in need. From the beginning, brave people have been on the ground, often putting their lives at risk, to save people in Sudan. But at every turn, combatants on both sides of the war have undermined their work. That includes the Sudanese Armed Forces, which has impeded the major humanitarian aid crossings from Chad into Darfur.And that’s where doing more comes in. Should the SAF not reverse course immediately, the Security Council must intervene to ensure lifesaving aid is delivered and distributed, including, if necessary, through a cross-border mechanism. What’s more, we must continue urging the warring parties to stop the fighting and get back to the negotiating table, as well as urge those outside supporters prolonging this conflict and enabling these atrocities to stop sending weapons to Sudan.Finally, I want to talk about the lack of care, the lack of attention, the world has paid to Sudan. Just five years after a revolution that offered a glimpse at a free, peaceful, democratic Sudan, people are losing hope. Aid workers have begun calling this conflict the forgotten war. Sudanese children are asking why the world has forgotten them. And let’s be clear: I don’t believe the dearth of attention is because people are ignorant or unfeeling. In fact, I believe it’s the opposite. I believe it’s because there are so many terrible crises, so much violence and pain, that people don’t quite know which way to turn.And this is where I need the help of all of you – the members of the press who join me in this briefing. As we mark one year of this conflict, please don’t let it go uncovered. Don’t let stories like the ones I heard in Chad go unheard. Don’t let perpetrators of this horrific violence go unexposed, from the generals who started the war to the backers who continue to fuel it. Don’t let the feeling that we have forgotten Sudan become a reality, because we need – we need to reignite that spirit of revolution, the hope and promise that characterized this day five years ago. I’m counting on you, and the people of Sudan are counting on you as well.So thank you, and Special Envoy Perriello and I will now take a few questions.MR MILLER: Matt, do you want to – do you have anything?QUESTION: I don’t really have anything.MR MILLER: Shaun.QUESTION: Sure, thanks. Thanks, Ambassador and Special Envoy. Could I ask you two things?Tom, you’ve said before that you’re hopeful with the end of Ramadan that the talks could resume. Do you think that that’s on the cards now? Do you see an interest – a strategic decision by both sides – to resume talks?And Ambassador, you mentioned a cross-border mechanism. I know you’ve spoken about that before. How close do you think we are to that becoming reality? Do you see that as realistically something that the Security Council with the vetoes there can push through?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: You want to come first?MR PERRIELLO: First. We do sense a great deal of urgency to resume talks. And in fact, talks are already ongoing in the sense that we are negotiating every day and trying to align key actors inside and outside with a plan that would end this war. We appreciate that Saudi Arabia has committed to hosting a new round of talks and that those will be inclusive talks. We hope that that will be a date that we can be able to announce soon and build momentum coming out of the gatherings in Paris and start to have a sense of when that date will be. But in the meantime, we are not waiting to continue to try to put pressure on the parties to come to the table, and we do think that there are some signs – while many, many signs point to the war getting even worse, in some ways it’s gotten so bad and it’s starting to have such regional implications that it’s also increased, I think, some of the diplomatic appetite to try to find an end to this war. And we’re going to try to use every lever we have to build that into enough political momentum and political will to end this war.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Look, on the cross-border concept, we know that it is a concept that can work. It worked in Syria. We hope we don’t have to go there. We hope we don’t have to push for a resolution to go there. And for that reason, we’re engaging very actively with the SAF as well as the RSF and other parties on the ground to see how we can work with all of them to facilitate getting needed humanitarian assistance into these areas that is so desperately needed.But if we’re not able to work with them, if we’re not able to get their cooperation, then we have to find another way. We can’t sit back and not look for other opportunities to see – to get humanitarian assistance to people who are in desperate need.MR MILLER: Michele Kelemen in the back.QUESTION: Hi, thanks for taking my question. You talked about other countries fueling the conflict. I wonder if you can name them. What are you telling them? Because I think some of them are U.S. partners.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Yeah, we &#8212;QUESTION: And what more can the U.S. do to put pressure on the political players in terms of sanctions?AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: With all of the countries who have been identified as possibly fueling this conflict, we have had direct conversations with every single one of them to press them to cease their support and fueling of this war. They’ve been named in the press. We’ve seen the Emiratis be named in the press. We’ve seen Egypt be named in the press. There are others who have been identified in the press as well. And with all of them we have constant engagements, and I know that Tom has had those engagements as well.MR MILLER: (Off-mike.)QUESTION: Thank you. Just to elaborate a little bit more on that, to what extent is the UAE – can you talk about them helping the RSF and refusing to listen to U.S. messages to stop its weapons shipments? Can you speak about that at all?MR PERRIELLO: I think we’ve been making very clear to all partners across the region that escalating the war at this time is something that is going to not only have increasing humanitarian costs but actually risks destabilization of the entire region. We see a conflict that in some ways has been between two sides that shows signs of being increasingly factionalized in ways that brings in some of the tribal militias that have stayed neutral and affects the ability of some of the neighboring countries to – that have tried to stay – be constructive and not get more involved to get pulled in. And right now is a time that every arms shipment, every bit fueling this conflict, is something that pushes us closer to not only famine, but to a failed state. And the flip side is this is a situation in which everyone in the region can benefit from a peaceful and stable Sudan. The Sudanese people are extremely clear about what they want. They want a return to the constitutional transition begun with great courage just a few years ago. They want to see a unified professional military that is accountable to the people. They want to see not a return of extremists and former corrupt officials. And they want that full humanitarian access.And I think they’re going to be looking across the region at who stood with the Sudanese people at this time of great crisis, and who was pouring fuel on the fire. And those consequences for those that are making the situation worse need to increase, and I think we are seeing particularly around this anniversary on the 15th that finally some attention is being paid to this issue, and we need those actors to know that the world is watching. And we need that not to just be one day, but that people continue to cover the sheer scale of this – this tragedy, but also cover the inspiring stories. If you look at the emergency response rooms, you see young Sudanese who’ve created cash apps in local kitchens to completely disrupt the kind of barriers being set up by the belligerent actors to get food into some of the hardest-hit areas. These are stories of courage and of innovation, and ones that are literally a lifeline for many of the Sudanese left behind.MR MILLER: We have time for one more. Simon.QUESTION: Just to follow up on this point about the direct conversations with countries fueling the conflict, does that include Iran? And we’ve reported that Iranian-made armed drones have had a big impact on the course of the war. Is – so is that something that you’re – you’ve communicated directly with Iran on? Are they included in those countries? And what would be the message &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: We’ve had numerous discussions with countries in the region. And in those discussions with countries in the region, we’ve encouraged them to encourage other countries like Iran not to engage. I won’t get into what discussions we may or may not have had with Iran, but in our discussions with other countries in the region we’ve also asked for their assistance in pressing each other as well as others to stop fueling this war.QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR PERRIELLO: And the one thing I would just – sorry – add on that is I think this speaks to the idea that for people in the region, there are many, many reasons to become pro-peace right now. The continuation of this conflict and the introduction of additional actors and additional negative elements only takes the situation into a more destabilizing direction in addition to the human costs of this. And we think it’s very important for people to notice those trend lines and see that this is an opportunity and a moment to switch from either not paying attention, or playing a not-constructive role, to realizing we all benefit, everyone in the region will benefit from finding a path to peace.MR MILLER: Thank you &#8212;AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Thank you.MR MILLER: &#8212; to you both.AMBASSADOR THOMAS-GREENFIELD: Okay, thank you.MR MILLER: Ambassador.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Okay. So before we get to questions, I have just a couple opening comments about the situation in the Middle East.We continue to be concerned about the risk of escalation in the Middle East – it’s something we have been working to mitigate and contain since the attacks of October 7th – and specifically about the threats made in recent days by Iran against the State of Israel and the Israeli people. You saw the President make clear yesterday that we stand in strong support of Israel’s security against these threats. Secretary Blinken has been engaged in diplomacy over the past 24 hours through a series of calls to foreign counterparts, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan to make clear that escalation is not in anyone’s interest, and that countries should urge Iran not to escalate. We have also engaged with European allies and partners over the past few days and urged them as well to send a clear message to Iran that escalation is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in the region’s interest, and it’s not in the world’s interest.Separately, the Secretary spoke yesterday to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to reiterate our strong support for Israel against these threats. On that call, the Secretary also emphasized the importance of Israel meeting the commitments that Prime Minister Netanyahu made to President Biden last week to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance into Gaza, and to put in place enhanced deconfliction and coordination measures. Our teams, including our Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues David Satterfield, have been meeting with Israeli, UN, and private relief organizations this week to push forward on all of those fronts. And while we have seen progress, it is critical that that initial progress continue and that it be sustained. And that is the message we have been delivering consistently to the Government of Israel.And with that, Matt.QUESTION: Right. Thanks, Matt. Just to – logistically, the calls that you just mentioned with the Turk, the Chinese, and the Saudi foreign ministers were all today?MR MILLER: He talked to the Turkish foreign minister last night, he talked to Wang Yi this morning, and then – early this morning, and then talked to the Saudi foreign minister later this morning.QUESTION: Okay. Are there others planned as well?MR MILLER: I don’t have any calls to announce, but we have been engaged in a series of contacts – not just at his level, but at other levels too – to talk to foreign counterparts to send this very clear message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict.QUESTION: All right. I didn’t want to raise this with the previous two speakers, because obviously the Sudan situation is a situation in and of itself. But so much of what they said very powerfully about the conflict in Sudan could also – or does also apply to what’s happening in Gaza. And when they say – when the ambassador and special envoy talk about how every arms shipment leads us closer to famine and a failed state, do you not think that that same logic applies in Gaza?MR MILLER: I would &#8212;QUESTION: Just because it’s you who are supplying the weapons as opposed to whoever it is – the Iranians, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, whoever it is that’s supplying the weapons in Sudan – doesn’t the same thing apply?MR MILLER: I would say that we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and that’s why you’ve seen the United States Government working to get more humanitarian assistance in and it’s why we’ve been pushing the Israeli Government so hard to let more humanitarian assistance in and to improve their deconfliction and coordination measures so there isn’t such a loss of political life.And then on the political front, it’s why we have been pushing with partners in the region to develop a plan for post-conflict governance in Gaza so we don’t see a failed state, so we don’t see anarchy in Gaza, so we see a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate aspirations. That is very much the policy that we are trying to pursue and that we have been engaged in in this administration from the President on down.QUESTION: But is it correct then, though, that the administration believes that every arms shipment to Sudan leads us closer to famine and a failed state – that that does not apply &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; in Gaza?MR MILLER: You have a very &#8212;QUESTION: I get that, but &#8212;MR MILLER: You have a very – it is – they’re – it is a very different situation in Sudan, where you have a brutal civil war, two warring parties trying to seize control of the government; and in Israel, where you have Israel responding to a terrorist attack against its people and trying to achieve a legitimate counterterrorism and military purpose. That does not change at all the severity of the humanitarian situation, which is why we have been working so hard to improve that humanitarian situation for the people in Gaza.QUESTION: So you don’t think that arms shipment to Israel leads us closer to famine and &#8212;MR MILLER: We have continued to support Israel’s right to &#8212;QUESTION: Is that correct?MR MILLER: We have &#8212;QUESTION: I just – I don’t know.MR MILLER: Let me say &#8212;QUESTION: It doesn’t matter to me one way or the other what you say, but &#8212;MR MILLER: They are different conflicts, but the – I’d say &#8212;QUESTION: I know they are, but I’m just asking you &#8212;MR MILLER: I would say &#8212;QUESTION: They made the point in Sudan &#8212;MR MILLER: And I’m answering the &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; and I just want to know if you have – if you feel the same way about Gaza.MR MILLER: They are very different conflicts, but the humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire, and that is why we are working so hard from the President on down to get more humanitarian assistance in, and it’s why we are working to improve deconfliction and coordination so we don’t see such a high number of civilian casualties as we have seen over the past six months.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I just press you briefly on the – what – on the opening comments on calling Wang Yi and others? I realize you’re probably not going to give a full readout, but how successful was that? I mean, do you think there’s an interest from these other countries as well to see Iran not escalate?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak for any of those other countries. I will let them speak for themselves. But the point that the Secretary has been making to each of these counterparts – foreign counterparts, both those in the region and foreign counterparts outside of the region – is that further escalation of this conflict doesn’t just hurt Israel, doesn’t just hurt Iran, doesn’t just hurt the countries in the region, but that it harms every country in the world. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional conflict. Every country in the world would be hurt by wider regional war, both economically, diplomatically. And so the Secretary has been making clear to every country that has any semblance of a relationship with Iran that it is in their interest to use that relationship to send a message to Iran that they should not escalate this conflict. But I will let those countries speak for themselves about what action they may or may not take.QUESTION: And I have to ask – I know this has been asked before – but Iran, of course, argues that a diplomatic facility was struck in Damascus. Has there been an assessment at this point from the United States whether this was indeed a strike on a diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: We do not have a final determination. It’s something we’re still assessing.QUESTION: Is it – do you think there will be an assessment at some point from the U.S. on that?MR MILLER: I do, but it’s something we’re continuing to work through.QUESTION: Matt, on this.MR MILLER: Yeah, Michel, go ahead.QUESTION: Reports say today that Iran delayed or changed plans to attack Israel at the last moment due to U.S. warnings. Can you confirm that? And do you still expect an Iranian reaction to the attack on Damascus?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to what Iran may or may not do, or what our assessments are. You don’t need an Intelligence Community assessment to see the threats that Iran has been making. They’ve been making those threats quite publicly and quite loudly over the past few days. So we will continue to send the message to them that it is not in their interest to escalate this conflict and it’s not in the region’s broader interest, and we hope other partners will send that same message.QUESTION: Can I follow on Iran?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead, Nadia.QUESTION: Sure. I wanted to ask this question actually to the ambassador, but the Iranian mission at the UN said that basically if the U.S. – or the Security Council, rather, condemn the attack on the consulate in Damascus, this could – any retaliation could’ve been avoided. So is this your understanding, that actually you don’t condemn it because you cannot verify whether it is a diplomatic mission or not? And also, do you think that Israel can go and attack any other diplomatic mission if this is proved to be actually a diplomatic mission, and you don’t expect any country to retaliate? Just explain those points.MR MILLER: So a few – a few things in order. First of all, I think that’s a pretty flimsy excuse from the Iranian Government. If they don’t want to widen this conflict and they don’t want to attack Israel, they don’t need permission from anyone else either at the United Nations or – they just have to make the decision not to do that, and that’s the decision that they should make.Now, with respect to your second question, no, we do not want to see attacks on diplomatic facilities. We oppose attacks on diplomatic facilities. We continue to assess the exact status of that facility in Damascus, and don’t have a final determination on that question.QUESTION: Okay.QUESTION: Can I do a follow-up on Iran?MR MILLER: Said, go ahead.QUESTION: Can I – yeah. I – not Iran, but &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Like Matt, I was struck with what the ambassador said, the similarity. You could change the word “Sudan” for “the Palestinians” or “Gaza” and it’d be exactly the same, with one difference. I mean, you don’t have any control over the conflict in Sudan, but you certainly have control &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, that’s – let me just say &#8212;QUESTION: Can I just finish my question? I have not asked my question.MR MILLER: Fine, fair enough. Go ahead.QUESTION: So my question to you is: Why has the United States not taken its – the moral high ground and its ability and its leverage to end this conflict, as it can? We have seen this happen in the past. We’ve seen it happen in 1982. We’ve seen it happen with this administration in May – in 2021. So my question to you: Why has not this administration taken that step to end this conflict now?MR MILLER: So first of all, Said, they are very different conflicts and very different situations, and that’s incredibly important. The conflict in Sudan is two warring military factions, following a coup that overthrew a democratic government, who are fighting for control of Sudan. That is a different question than the conflict in Gaza that was started not by Israel, but by Hamas – Hamas launching a brutal terrorist attack that killed over 1,200 Israelis and citizens of other foreign countries. And Israel has the right to hold Hamas accountable for those attacks, as the United States would, as other countries in the region would, as any country in the world if it were the victim of such a brutal terrorist attack.That said, we are trying to bring this conflict to an end. You have seen us work to try to achieve a ceasefire, an immediate ceasefire of at least six weeks that would bring the hostages home and that we have said consistently we would like to see widen into a broader end to the conflict. You have seen us work on post-conflict governance to try to find a path forward for the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. And you have seen us work to address the very, very severe needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza. So we are working to try and do exactly that.QUESTION: Okay, let let me just follow up.QUESTION: A follow-up?MR MILLER: Please don’t interrupt.QUESTION: Let me just follow up.MR MILLER: Just let me go – I’ll go through the questions and get to who I get to.QUESTION: If I may, I just want to follow up. I mean, you talked about Palestinian legitimate aspirations and so on, but insisting that this conflict began on October 7th does not recognize that, does it? Does it recognize that this – that the Palestinians have legitimate aspirations that go back 75 years, not just to October 7th?MR MILLER: So they do have legitimate political aspirations that go back decades. It has been the policy of the United States for decades to try to achieve two states. But, Said, I don’t want to – not only I don’t want to, I fundamentally degree – or disagree that October 7th had anything to do with trying to answer the Palestinian people’s legitimate political aspirations. It was a terrorist attack targeting civilians, that killed civilians, by a terrorist group that does not recognize the existence of the State of Israel. So when you look at trying to achieve a peaceful resolution to the decades of violence and the decades of political conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, it is Hamas that has firmly rejected a political solution to that decades-long dispute.QUESTION: Yeah, but do you – do you acknowledge that Gaza was under siege for basically 17 years and &#8212;MR MILLER: Said &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; every other year there would be an attack and a war by Israel, time after time after time, killing hundreds and thousands of Palestinians?MR MILLER: Said, there – there have been incidents going back in this dispute, in this conflict for decades. Nothing that happened in – on either side justifies the attacks of October 7th.QUESTION: Can I just have a quick question on Iran before we &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Just one, there are reports of the Iranian foreign minister coming to New York City next week to visit the UN. I’m wondering how the U.S. assesses the likelihood of an Iranian attack happening during that period of time, if it would have any attack – any impact at all?MR MILLER: I don’t want to speak to a timeframe. We’re obviously very concerned about the threat of an Iranian attack. We’ve made that clear from the President on down, but I don’t want to put any kind of timeframe on it. We were hoping, of course, to avoid such an attack in the first place.QUESTION: Do you think it’s moving in the direction of avoiding one?MR MILLER: I don’t want to give any type of assessment. As I said, it is not in Iran’s interest, it’s not in anyone’s in the region – anyone the region’s interest for Iran to escalate this conflict. And that’s the message we are sending to them.QUESTION: Wait, you were hoping to avoid an attack in the first place? Has one happened?MR MILLER: An attack by Iran. Yeah, we’re – no, one has not happened. We are &#8212;QUESTION: Well, weren’t you hoping to avoid the Israelis attacking an Iranian diplomatic facility?MR MILLER: I – her question – her question was – her – hold on.QUESTION: I know, but you – but you made it &#8212;MR MILLER: No, hold on, let me just answer the question.QUESTION: Your answer to her seemed to suggest &#8212;MR MILLER: My &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; that you thought the Iranians had already retaliated.MR MILLER: No, my – well, that’s not what I was suggesting.QUESTION: Okay. All right.MR MILLER: My answer was in the context of the question she asked me, which was about an attack coming next week.QUESTION: Fair enough.MR MILLER: So let’s go – let me – just in – yeah.QUESTION: On that call, just – the call with the Turkish foreign minister, was it purely Iran call or did they have a chance to discuss Ukraine, the Caucasus, President Erdogan’s upcoming trip? And why Türkiye? Do you guys believe that Türkiye has enough leverage to move the needle on Iran – they have Iran’s ear?MR MILLER: It’s not just Türkiye; it’s a number of countries. It’s other countries as well that have relationships with Iran – Saudi Arabia, China. And we have made other – have had other diplomatic engagements with countries in Europe and other countries in the world because we want to send a very unified message. With respect to the call itself, the primary purpose of the call was to discuss Iran’s threats against Israel. There were other issues discussed, but I don’t want to get into those any further.QUESTION: Last thing, because we have a statement from Khamenei last night saying that any Islamic countries supporting Israel or not supporting their narratives, they’re engaged in treason.MR MILLER: Any countries that what?QUESTION: Any Islamic countries that do not fall in line with their narratives, they are engaged – they’re engaged with treason. I’m just wondering how much this – your calculation of calling Türkiye in this case is part of &#8212;MR MILLER: So it doesn’t &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; fits into this &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; have anything to do with the with those comments. Obviously, his comments are not – are ones that wouldn’t be – just be rejected by the United States but would be rejected by other countries in the region.QUESTION: I have different coverage of questions. Please come back to me.MR MILLER: Let me stay in the region and then we’ll – yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks. On the hostage talks, can you give any update on whether there’s been a response from Hamas? And also, is there a level of concern in the U.S. Government about the Israeli strike that killed Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh’s family members and how that might affect the talks?MR MILLER: I’m not going to give any update on the talk – excuse me – the talks themselves, other than that we continue to engage in them and try to pursue a successful resolution.With respect to those strikes, I certainly hope that it will not, but I wouldn’t want to make any kind of assessments.Stay – want to stay in the region? Nadia, go ahead. And then we’ll come back.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: There is a record number of land that has been confiscated in the West Bank that came out today. It’s like between 2018 and 2023 is 5,900 acres have been confiscated. The administration has always talked about this two-state solution, and the major – one of the major obstacles is settlements. So if this land has been taken and there’s – just like condemnation from the administration but actually there is nothing practical that we see that will stop this land from being taken, that will undermine the President’s vision. So what – or how can you go forward when actually there’s not even base for to have a state in the future?MR MILLER: So two things. First, we have made consistently clear that we oppose further settlement activity in the West Bank. We think they are a barrier to peace; we think they are inconsistent with international humanitarian law.And I will just say, to put those actions in the larger context, there have been a number of things that the Government of Israel has done over time that we have said are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security. Obviously, settlements in the West Bank are one of them. There are other actions that it has taken in Gaza that we think are detrimental to Israel’s long-term security.So what fundamentally it comes down to is we are working, as you know, with partners in the region to develop a path forward for Israel and the Palestinian people that we would present to them, that would provide for post-conflict governance in Gaza, that would have a component to reconstruct Gaza, that would provide further assurances for Israel’s security by its partners in the region, and there are other countries ready to step up.And so I’m making this a broader answer, because all of this relates to that very question. It’s not just about settlements; it’s about what kind of future the Israeli people see for them in the region. And ultimately – and we’re not there yet, because we’ve not finished this plan and we’ve not presented it to the people of Israel and the Government of Israel – but ultimately, this is a choice that Israel’s going to have to make.QUESTION: Okay, just very quickly, the ambassador made a passionate appeal to us, the press corps, to cover Sudan, not to forget civilians, rightly so. But we haven’t hear from any senior officials the same appeal about Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Number one, we have many journalists who’ve been killed, including our colleagues. We don’t hear any – apart from condemnation, nothing is being done to protect them. And second, why can’t the United States allow independent journalists to go to Gaza, since you don’t have anybody on the ground, so they will have access and tell us what’s happening there?MR MILLER: So a few things. First of all, the reason you heard the ambassador make that appeal with respect to Sudan – and this is not for me to play editor or segment producer – but it is that we don’t see as much coverage about atrocities in Sudan. We don’t see as much coverage about the plight of the Sudanese people. We do see a lot of coverage of the Palestinians in Gaza, appropriately so, but I think her point was that we would welcome seeing coverage of this very difficult conflict that we are trying to resolve in Sudan.When it comes to journalists in Gaza, we have made clear on a number of occasions that we want to see journalists protected. And the coordination and deconfliction measures that we have been pushing the Government of Israel on so hard, that the President pushed the Government of Israel on in his call on Friday, would ultimately help with journalism and make it safer for journalists to operate inside Gaza.And I’ll just make it very clear that we have pressed the Government of Israel directly to allow journalists to go into Gaza. It’s not something that we control, but we have made clear that we all benefit from seeing what’s happening on the ground, that we know what’s happening there – not because we have U.S. officials there, many other countries don’t have officials there, but because of journalists who are putting their lives on the line to bring us those stories. And we’ve made clear to the Government of Israel that we think they ought to let more journalists in.QUESTION: Israel?MR MILLER: Yeah. Go ahead. And then I’ll come to you, and then we’ll start taking other ones. I’m going to come to you, Janne, but I know – I doubt it’s an Israel question, so that’s why I’m moving around the room first.QUESTION: There’s some &#8212;MR MILLER: You may surprise me, so I’ll just &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, yes. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. Thank you, Matt. America has a number of allies. What message do they receive when America harangues one its closest allies, Israel, and their democratically elected leader Benjamin Netanyahu? And a follow-up.MR MILLER: I think the message they should see is that we want Israel to live up to its values, that we want to see Israel live up to the same standards that we expect every country in the world, including ourselves, to live up to.QUESTION: Thank you. Benjamin Netanyahu is the longest serving prime minister in Israel’s history. Clearly a majority of Israelis agree with his policies, since the majority of voters keep re-electing him. How does this mesh with what President Biden seems to be calling for, which is essentially a rejection of Israeli democracy?MR MILLER: So first, I think that is a vast conflation of two very different things. So it is up to the Israeli people to choose their leaders. We strongly support their right to choose their leaders, as we do for the people of every country in the world. But we are going to engage with the governments that they choose to talk with them about what we think are the policies that are in our interest, what are the policies that are in their interest.And you have heard – the President himself spoke to this in the week right after October 7th, when he made the point – these aren’t the exact words, but it’s the general gist – that sometimes in the aftermath of a horrific event your vision can be clouded, and you can make mistakes. And we are there to offer them our very best advice as a country that’s made mistakes in the aftermath of horrific events and try to keep them from making some of those same mistakes.QUESTION: Well, it seems like there is an attempt to demonize the current Israeli Government, there are efforts to support the overthrow of the Israeli Government with a lot of protests and so forth.MR MILLER: So that is not – and that is not what you’ve seen from this administration. We’ve traveled to Israel – the Secretary has been there – eight times I believe since October 7th meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. The President has been there and talks to Prime Minister Netanyahu all the time. The Secretary just talked to the defense minister yesterday. We fully support the right of the Israeli people to decide who their leaders are.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. As Secretary Blinken spoke with the regional leaders about sending a message to Iran, were there any connections with Iraqi leaders to send any message to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: I don’t have any – I don’t have any engagements to read out today.QUESTION: Okay. And have you received any signals from the Iranian Government that they taking these messages into their consideration?MR MILLER: I’m just not going to speak for the Iranian Government at all.QUESTION: And in the past few times the Iranian use it to – use its baseless accusation to attack the Erbil and also Kurdistan region in their response to the threats from Israel. Is there something that you’re concerned maybe Iran this time use the same justification and to attack the U.S. allies and U.S. friends in the region in their retaliation for that attack?MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear to them that they shouldn’t escalate this conflict in any way – with respect to Israel, with respect to others in the region, with respect to U.S. forces. One of the first messages we sent to them when the Iranians were making these baseless claims that the U.S. was involved in the strike in Damascus is that that is not true, we weren’t involved, we didn’t know about it, and you should not use this as a pretext to strike U.S. forces in the region, including in Iraq, as we have seen their proxy groups do over the past few months and the past few years.QUESTION: And last thing. Have you granted visa for the Iranian foreign minister to attend the Security Council?MR MILLER: We never speak to visa records. They’re confidential by law, and so I can’t speak to visa records from here. But as has long been the case, we take our obligations as the host of the United Nations very seriously.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Janne.QUESTION: So when he shows up in New York, we can just assume that that’s confirmation that he got a visa?MR MILLER: Well, you can’t travel here without one. So I can’t speak to it, but you can’t travel here without one. But I would note that Iranian foreign ministers have traveled to New York &#8212;QUESTION: Yes, they have.MR MILLER: &#8212; under administrations of both parties, including the last one.QUESTION: Yes. No, I’m not suggesting that there’s anything inappropriate or untoward about it. It’s just that I just – I mean, it’s ridiculous. The guy shows up in New York, if he shows up in New York, it’s pretty damn clear that he got a visa.MR MILLER: I would welcome your advocacy to the United States Congress to change the law and allow me to speak more about any number of things from here, not just visa records.Janne, go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I didn’t surprise you today that I had to ask this. (Laughter.) Yeah, I had to ask Ambassador Greenfield and I hope you can answer this, all right?MR MILLER: I’ll do my best.QUESTION: Okay, are you ready? Ambassador Greenfield will be visit South Korea this weekend. What agenda will she discuss with the South Korea? Also she will visit to Panmunjom this time?MR MILLER: So I said I’d do my best. I’m afraid I’m going to disappoint you. I am not in a position to preview her trip. She does have a press office in New York, and I would urge you to send the inquiry there. Go ahead.QUESTION: That’s why you didn’t give me any chance to ask it?MR MILLER: She had a limited time. Sorry.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: I would have loved her to stay longer. The more questions she takes, the fewer I have to – not that I don’t enjoy our lengthy engagements.QUESTION: She can take – all right, second question quick. The United Nations Security Council’s expert panel on sanctions against North Korea was disconnected. Will the U.S. submit a report together with the other countries, and do you expect to discuss with the South Korea or Japan about the continuation of this report?MR MILLER: So as I’ve said in the past from this podium, we are incredibly disappointed that Russia chose to block that panel from going forward. And I don’t have any specific actions to preview today, but we are engaged with our allies and partners in other ways to continue to monitor North Korea’s nuclear aspirations.QUESTION: Have you any discussion when the – I mean, Prime Minister Kishida was here? Do you have any chance to discuss it?MR MILLER: I would defer to the White House to speak to those engagements.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Hey, Matt. I’m going to ask you about your new Diversity and Inclusion Chief Zakiya Carr Johnson. She’s drawing new criticism for past comments. In a 2019 piece she claimed America’s organizations and institutions were, quote, “riddled with racism, patriarchy, and exclusion,” that they refused to reconcile with the colonizing past, and called them a, quote, “failed historic model.” Do you find those comments problematic?MR MILLER: So I would say that, first of all, our new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer Zakiya Carr Johnson is one of the most qualified experts in this field. She has 20 years of experience working to expand diversity, and it’s something that we see as important here at the State Department that the Secretary has put a premium on because he believes that when our workforce looks like America and reflects the full diversity of America, our workforce is stronger and our ability to protect America’s national security is improved and enhanced. And that’s why he selected her to do this incredibly important job.Second of all, with respect to her quote, I have seen that people have used excerpts, have not used the full context of it. But I would say a lot of this criticism seems to be from individuals. I saw former officials tweeting about this.QUESTION: Secretary Pompeo took the hardest &#8212;MR MILLER: Certain former officials who don’t seem – for whatever reason – to support our work to expand diversity inside the State Department. And that’s just where we have an honest agreement – disagreement where we think that’s work that we ought to do and we ought to hire experts who have experience in doing that. And that’s what we’re going to continue to do, and I think we’re just going to have to disagree with some of those critics.QUESTION: Can I just lastly read you – Secretary Pompeo obviously worked here in the building. He said, quote, “The State Department should be staffed by individuals who love America and believe in our core principles, not ideologues who think that America represents a ‘failed historic model.’” Do you want to respond to that?MR MILLER: Well, apparently, he believes there are different ways to love America, because one of the ways we believe you can best love America is to love its full diversity and build a workforce that reflects that full diversity.Alex. I’ll come to you next. Alex, sorry.QUESTION: Okay. Thank you so much. Turning to Ukraine &#8212;MR MILLER: Sorry, I should not mumble my &#8212;QUESTION: No, no, no. Thank so much. Let’s turn to Ukraine if I may. Going back to last night’s strikes, which Ukraine believes that was designed to maximize attacks on infrastructure, what is your reaction and what is your take of the state of play on the battlefield? And do you still believe that Ukraine doesn’t have a right to retaliate?MR MILLER: So we have seen Russia, unfortunately, continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. That’s something they’ve done not just overnight but over the past couple of years. And I would say for us it comes back to the need for Congress to fully fund, fully pass the President’s supplemental request. And it goes directly to this question you asked me about the situation on the battlefield where we have seen Ukrainian armed forces having to ration artillery shells, having to ration ammunition. And of course that has an effect on their ability to fight the war and an effect on their ability to repel Russian troops, and it’s why it is so urgent for Congress to act.QUESTION: Is any active restrictions on Ukraine imposed from the U.S., by the U.S., to prevent them from retaliating &#8212;MR MILLER: So &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; this obvious steps will take it back to Russia.MR MILLER: So two things. We have made clear that we do not encourage strikes outside of Ukraine, and we do not enable those strikes with U.S.-provided weapons and that we don’t want to see U.S.-provided weapons used for strikes outside Ukraine. Ultimately, when it comes to deciding how to prosecute this war, those are Ukrainian decisions, but we do not encourage or enable such strikes.QUESTION: Can I have one more if may on Georgia? So what – as you have learned during the past couple of days since Georgia – Georgia Government – moved forward and submitted the Russian law, I’m just curious, like, what – you made it clear this is taking Georgia away from European path. Do you witness democratic backsliding in Georgia? Is that your analysis?MR MILLER: I don’t want to make any broader assessment than the assessment I made the other day that pertains to this specific law that we believe would harm civil society organizations working to improve the lives of Georgian citizens and would derail Georgia from its European path. It’s still draft legislation, and I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Has anyone from this building reached out to Georgia or &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me move on just because we’re running short of time.Michel.QUESTION: On Bahrain, Matt, do you have any comments on the release of more than 1,500 prisoners?MR MILLER: We did see that step by the Government of Bahrain. We welcome very much the decision by the king to pardon over 1,500 prisoners along with the government’s announcement April 9th that they will work to help the recently released find employment.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead.Shaun, I’m sorry – well, go ahead, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: That’s all right.MR MILLER: This time I promise I’ll come back to you.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. In meeting alongside President Biden with President Kishida, did the pending deal between U.S. Steel and Nippon Steel come up?MR MILLER: I will let the White House speak to those comments. In fact, I believe the President addressed them yesterday. Or speak to that question, I should say.QUESTION: And on Wednesday, President Xi held a meeting with former president of Taiwan Ma, who supports closer ties with China. Does the department have any reaction to this meeting?MR MILLER: No, I do not.Shaun, go ahead.QUESTION: Two things, one going back to Ukraine. The Swiss have announced a conference on Ukraine. This is in light of Zelenskyy’s visit in Davos and the peace formula he has. Russia has had some strong words about it, saying that it was part of – it’s part of the Biden re-election campaign, I think; that the U.S. is behind it. Does the U.S have any comment on this – on whether the U.S. will participate or whether it sees utility in the conference?MR MILLER: So I don’t speak to campaign matters &#8212;QUESTION: I realize &#8212;MR MILLER: &#8212; but that doesn’t show a lot of confidence in the Swiss Government’s ability to conduct their own foreign policy matters. I would say obviously that is an absurd allegation by the Russian Government. I can’t preview – I believe that conference is still several weeks away. I can’t preview what the U.S. participation would be, but we have supported Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts. We have supported Ukraine’s peace formula. We have support President Zelenskyy making his case to other countries in the world, and we will – that will continue to be our policy. But we have seen consistently that Russia has not been willing to engage in real diplomacy about a path forward for Ukraine. Ukraine has made clear that at the right time they would welcome that, and they have not had a willing partner in Russia.QUESTION: And just briefly – I mean, do you generally speaking think it’s useful for the Swiss to hold this – your support of – regardless of the participation of &#8212;MR MILLER: Look, so our policy on this has always been nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. If this is a diplomatic meeting that the Ukrainian Government supports and wants to engage in, we certainly support their right to do so. I don’t have any further comment on the conference itself as it – or how it’s going to shape up.QUESTION: Sure. Just one completely separate issue briefly, Mali. I don’t know if you’ve followed the latest developments there – a ban on activities of political parties and then the ban on media coverage of political parties.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Anything to say about that?MR MILLER: We are deeply concerned about the Malian transition government’s decree suspending all political activities until further notice. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are critical to an open society. The transition government has already made a decision not to hold an election in February 2024 to return to a civilian-led, democratic government despite the commitment that it made publicly in 2022 to do so. We call on Mali’s transition government to honor its commitments to its citizens and hold free and fair elections. In Mali and elsewhere, democracy remains the best foundation for stability and prosperity.Simon.QUESTION: I want to ask about another conflict which is often getting forgotten, which is in Myanmar – Myanmar or Burma. The rebel – alliance of rebel forces have taken one of the – well, the main border crossing with Thailand recently. The situation is very fluid in this conflict. Wondering – this is right up against, obviously, a U.S. ally. Are you having any – is there any diplomacy going on from the U.S. with Thailand about how they should be dealing with this? They’ve got refugees coming across the border, the junta forces reportedly trying to sort of use Thailand as a – taking flights into Thailand to try to sort of push back the rebels in this case. So I’m wondering if – if the U.S. has any new sort of actions that you’ve been taking as this has been developing.MR MILLER: So we have been incredibly concerned about potential spillover this – of this conflict. It’s something that we have been focused on. With respect to any engagements with Thailand, let me take that back and get you an answer. I don’t have anything to read out.QUESTION: Matt?MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Due to situation in Gaza, there is too much hate spreading all around the world, even here in U.S. as well. Is it a concern?MR MILLER: It’s absolutely a concern. You’ve heard the Secretary speak to this on a number of occasions, including in Israel, when he said that we – the worst thing that can happen is people dehumanizing each other, and that once you see people on either side of this conflict dehumanizing each other, it gives license – not actual license, but gives them – they give themselves license to do any sorts of things that we would oppose and that are not in anyone’s interests. So it’s absolutely one of our concerns.We have unfortunately seen a rise in antisemitism. We have seen a rise in anti-Muslim summit, and the President has spoken to this. It’s something we’ve been incredibly concerned about both here at home and around the world.QUESTION: Sir, many religious scholars and others trying to portray this situation as a war between Muslims and Jews, while many others believe it is just a territorial conflict. What is your position on this? And what are we going to say to those spreading hate in our communities?MR MILLER: So I don’t want to – we would – obviously don’t want to see anyone spreading hate in any form, and I would just say that we are trying to bring an end to this conflict as soon as possible and find a durable solution to this conflict, because it is in the interests of Muslims and Jews and Christians, Israelis, other countries in the region alike. It is in the interest of all parties to see this conflict end, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Sir, one last question, if I may. Sir, you always talk about two-state solution, but whatever is happening right now, it seems impossible. So is United States, partners, and mediators trying to explore other options to bring peace in the region?MR MILLER: So I spoke to this a little bit in response to an earlier question. We think ultimately that is the path forward, and I know it’s incredibly difficult and it looks incredibly bleak, but it is our assessment that at the end of this conflict – it is going to end – that if there is not a path forward, Israel is going to be back with the same security risks it has had since before October 7th. It is going to be in the same position with respect to a lack of relationships with all of its neighbors. And it is in Israel’s broader security interests to find a path forward for reconciliation with the Palestinian people, as difficult as that seems, and so that’s why we’re going to continue to pursue it.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you very much, Matt. Just three questions. One is – come on, it’s my sixth briefing. Three questions is not too bad.MR MILLER: Oh, just go ahead.QUESTION: So with regard to Iran, please correct me if I am wrong that this administration has basically made Iran more stronger in these past few years till now, this threatening that has started. But can you confirm whether Pakistan and Iran – you have information that Iran is supporting the ISIS in Pakistan right now, these recent terrorist activities? Do you have any information that it’s the Iranian regime that is doing this or no?MR MILLER: So I would obviously disagree with your characterization. I’m not going to get into a long rebuttal about something we’ve spoken to a number of times, but no, I do not have information to suggest that.QUESTION: Okay, sir. My second question is about ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, who is – was prime minister from this ruling family where Shehbaz Sharif is prime minister. He said himself just last week that this current regime has stolen the mandate. Basically, Shehbaz Sharif should not be a prime minister of Pakistan. Do you agree with him on that or no?MR MILLER: Ultimately, as you’ve heard me say once or twice from this podium, decisions about the Pakistani Government are for the Pakistani people to make.QUESTION: Just last one: A few days ago, U.S. officials from Islamabad embassy went to meet this gentleman named Zahir Jaffer, who was convicted on a – murdering his wife. He’s a U.S. citizen. He’s on death row now. The U.S. official went to Adiala Jail to meet him. Just a few blocks down there was Imran Khan in jail as well. Thousands of American – Pakistani Americans have asked to go and meet him as well. Why is the U.S. not going to meet the guy in jail?MR MILLER: I would defer to the – our embassy in Pakistan for – answer that question.Go ahead, Shannon. I’ll come to you next, Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. On the State Department’s latest Travel Alert for the U.S. embassy in Israel, it details how American personnel have now been limited from traveling within the country. It says it’s been done out of a, quote, “abundance of caution.” Just wondering if you can say definitively whether this is linked to the threat to Iran &#8212;MR MILLER: So obviously, there – we have seen Iran making public threats against Israel in the past few days. Israel’s in a very tough neighborhood, and we have been monitoring the security situation. You saw us slightly adjust our travel warnings at the beginning of this conflict, and we conduct ongoing assessments all the time about the situation on the ground.So I’m not going to speak to the specific assessments that led to us to restrict our families – employees and family members’ personal travel, but clearly we are monitoring the threat environment in the Middle East, and specifically in Israel, and we – that’s what led us to make – give that warning to our employees and their family members, and to make it public so all U.S. citizens who either live in Israel or are traveling there are aware of it.Ryan.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. President Biden said this week that the U.S. is considering Australia’s request that it drop its extradition attempt against Julian Assange and instead allow him to go back to Australia. Normally when we ask about Assange you say “refer you to the Department of Justice,” but now that the President has said that there’s a – there are diplomatic talks going on, that seems like it would be squarely in the State Department. So are – is the State Department involved in these conversations with Australia, and what can you tell us about these talks?MR MILLER: That is a good way to try to get me to violate that rule about not commenting on extradition matters, but I am going to refrain from doing so. I don’t have any comment. I would refer to the Justice Department for comment on this.QUESTION: Does it broadly raise concerns for you about free speech and free press? Because you often will see dictators say, why is the U.S. lecturing us about press freedoms when they are trying to extradite a foreign citizen to their own maximum security prison?MR MILLER: So I will let the Justice Department largely speak to this issue. But as you’ve heard me say here before, one of the crimes that Julian Assange is charged with is helping Chelsea Manning hack into government systems – not receiving classified information, but helping her actually break into government systems to retrieve classified information, which as far as I’m aware has never been considered a legitimate journalistic practice, and is not the kind of practice that journalistic organizations typically engage in.QUESTION: Well, technically he offered to help her cloak her identity so that she wouldn’t be discovered. We as journalists do that all the time with sources –MR MILLER: I – you – so &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; talk with them on Signal and other devices to try to make sure that sources are protected. Is that considered helping steal information?MR MILLER: So I am now a little bit probably further than I ought to go about facts that still are contained, or alleged facts that are contained in a pending indictment.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you so much. Two questions. Saudi Arabia joined Pakistan in addressing Jammu and Kashmir dispute while engaging with India to dialogue. Will United States encourage any mediation from Saudi Arabia between Pakistan and India? Because from very recent past, we see – we observed that United States encouraged all those engagements that goes according to the regional interest of U.S., including the Houthis and Saudis talks. After October 7th, U.S. stressed Saudi Arabia to halt their talks; before October 7th, U.S. was encouraging that. At first &#8212;MR MILLER: Let me take you that – that one back and get a complete answer.QUESTION: And number second &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: National Security Advisor had scheduled visit to Saudi Arabia for talks on Israel normalization. Is it rescheduled, or with the ongoing circumstances in Middle East, there is some policy change expected from United States?MR MILLER: So I will let the White House speak to the National Security Advisor’s travel, but I did see him at the White House podium two days ago saying that he does intend to reschedule that trip.Go ahead, and then we’ll go here, and then wrap up for the day.QUESTION: Thank you. What is the State Department’s position regarding Israel possibly conducting an offensive attack on Iran or Iranian interests, as Netanyahu today – he said they’re ready for a defensive or offensive attacks. Wouldn’t an offensive attack be part of that escalation that you say that we’re trying to prevent?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to hypotheticals, other than to say we don’t want to see this conflict escalated in any way.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. The Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, said that he will recognize the state of Palestine before this summer, and that he wants other European countries to join him. Do you have any comment on that?MR MILLER: Every country has to make its own decision with respect to when and where it recognizes entities in this regard. I will say on behalf of the United States, we have always believed – we have always strongly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state, but we believe that that’s something that is best achieved through dialogue and negotiation between the two parties, as well as other countries in the region, and that’s something we’re actively pursuing.And with that, wrap for &#8212;QUESTION: And on &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have one more? Yeah, go ahead.QUESTION: Yeah, also Mexico asked today to suspend Ecuador’s membership of the United State after their raid on the Mexican embassy. Do you have any answer?MR MILLER: I don’t have anything, other than what we’ve said previously, which is we have asked Ecuador to work with Mexico to find a resolution to this dispute.And with that, wrap for today.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Thanks, everyone.(The briefing was concluded at 3:15 p.m.)# # #						Tags																					Bahrain																								Burma																								Ecuador																								Iran																								Israel																								Mali																								Mexico																								North Korea																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Sudan																								Ukraine
- FY 2024 Notice of Funding Opportunity for NGO Programs in South Sudan Responding to the Ongoing Sudan Crisis Bureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationFunding Opportunity Number: DFOP0010737Assistance Listings (CFDA) number: 19.517 &#8211; Overseas Refugee Assistance Programs for AfricaAnnouncement issuance date: March 26, 2024Announcement type: Cooperative AgreementProposal application submission deadline: May 10, 2024 at 11:59:59 p.m. EDT (23:59:59). Proposals submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Anticipated timeframe to award for selected proposals: Pending the availability of funds, PRM anticipates, but makes no guarantee, that awards will be made less than five months from the proposal submission deadline.Advisory: All applicants must submit proposal application packages through the website Grants.gov. PRM strongly recommends submitting your application packages early to allow time to address any technical difficulties that may arise on the Grants.gov website.If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher.PRM strongly recommends application narratives be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations when transmitted. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents. Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the concept note score. All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Organizations can retrieve PRM’s-recommended templates and NGO guidelines on PRM’s website and in this opportunity’s grants.gov page.Program DescriptionSummaryThis announcement is designed to accompany PRM’s General NGO Guidelines, which contain additional information on PRM’s priorities and NGO funding strategy with which selected organizations must comply. Please use both the General NGO Guidelines and this announcement to ensure that your submission is in full compliance with PRM requirements and that the proposed activities are in line with PRM’s priorities. Submissions that do not reflect the requirements outlined in these guidelines will not be considered.Geographic Regions / PopulationsProposed activities must be undertaken in South Sudan in response to the ongoing emergency in Sudan, to include support for emergency response operations for new arrivals at the border in reception and transit centers, and in official refugee sites in South Sudan. (Note: PRM will not fund projects in Yida). Because of PRM&#8217;s mandate to provide protection, assistance, and sustainable solutions for refugees and victims of conflict, PRM will consider funding only those programs that include a target program participant base of at least 50 percent refugees or refugee returnees. PRM will not consider activities outside of South Sudan for this funding opportunity.Program area (For PRM Use)Proposals must align with one or more of the following program areas.Humanitarian Protection and AssistanceInterim and Durable SolutionsProgram Sectors and ModalitiesProposals must focus on one or more of the following programmatic sectors (see PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for sector descriptions). Multi-sectoral proposals are encouraged and should include PRM’s required indicator for each sector or sub sector included in the proposal.Health, may include but is not limited to any of the following:Primary HealthSexual and Reproductive HealthMaternal and Child HealthMental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS)NutritionProtection, may include but is not limited to any of the following:LegalChild ProtectionGBVSocio-cultural Inclusion and Social CohesionNote: In order to ensure greater accountability for protection outcomes in all overseas assistance program proposals, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector. If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Note: Cash and Voucher Assistance programs must include the relevant indicator(s) from the selection contained in the NGO Guidelines Appendix D.Number of Proposal ApplicationsOrganizations may submit a maximum of one application only. Any subsequent submissions received will be disqualified. (Note: Submissions by organizations as a sub-awardee do not count toward an individual organization’s submission limit.) Applications may cover multiple sites and multiple sectors.Country-specific GuidelinesSouth Sudan Country-Specific GuidanceGeneral GuidanceProposed activities in South Sudan must be in response to the ongoing Sudan emergency and aim to assist refugee or South Sudanese refugee returnee populations located in South Sudan affected by the Sudan crisis. Activities can include support for emergency response operations for new arrivals at the border in reception and transit centers, and in official refugee sites. (Note: PRM will not fund projects in Yida). In established refugee sites PRM will only review proposals for a target population base of at least 50 percent refugees. For proposed activities focused on border response, including assistance in transit and reception centers, PRM will only consider proposals for a target population that is combined at least 50 percent refugee or refugee returnees. Programs should, whenever possible, pursue a community-based approach that also benefits host communities. It is strongly encouraged that programs mainstream protection activities, including gender-based violence (GBV) risk mitigation, inclusion of marginalized groups, mental health and psychosocial support, and prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment measures (i.e., continuous training for all staff, volunteers, and program participants), across proposed sectors and activities. Two or more NGOs working in complementary sectors may choose to submit joint proposals with a prime applicant and one or more sub-awardees. Organizations may also consider project designs that allow activities to be scaled up or scaled down based upon funding availabilities.Duration of ActivityProgram plans for one year will be considered.Period of PerformancePrograms period of performance of 12 months will be considered.Funding limitsProgram proposals must not be less than the funding floor and not more than the funding ceiling or they will be disqualified.Funding floor (lowest $ value): $300,000Funding ceiling (highest $ value): $2,000,000Anticipated Number of AwardsThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined once final FY 2024 appropriations have been made. This NOFO will be cancelled if FY 2024 appropriations are insufficient to support new awards.Anticipated Amount to be Awarded TotalThe amount of funding available per award for this NOFO will be determined as part of the application review process based on applications received and funding made available through appropriations.Federal Award InformationProposed program start dates: September 1, 2024Duration of Activity: See country-specific guidelines above.Eligibility InformationEligible Applicants:Nonprofits having a 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (U.S.-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of non-profit tax status).Nonprofits without 501(c)(3) status with the IRS, other than institutions of higher education (overseas-based NGOs must be able to demonstrate proof of registration in country of domicile); andInternational Organizations. International multilateral organizations, such as United Nations agencies, should not submit proposals through Grants.gov in response to this NOFO. Multilateral organizations that are seeking funding for programs relevant to this announcement should contact the PRM Program Officer (as listed below) on or before the closing date of the funding announcement.Cost Sharing or Matching: Cost sharing, matching, or cost participation is not a requirement of an application in response to this funding announcement.Proposals for consideration should describe the sources and amounts of additional funding that may be utilized to complement PRM funding, and meet the following criteria:Are not paid by the Federal Government under another Federal award.Are verifiable from the non-Federal entity&#8217;s records.Are not included as contributions for any other Federal award; andAre necessary and reasonable for accomplishment of project or program objectives.Please include this information in the Budget Summary, Budget Detail, and Budget Narrative of the proposal, and separated from the PRM share of the proposed budget.Note: Though favorably looked upon, inclusion will not result in a competitive ranking increase when evaluated.OtherProposals must have a concrete implementation plan with well-conceived objectives and indicators that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and reliable, time-bound, and trackable (SMART), and have established baselines; objectives should be clearly linked to the sectors.Proposals must adhere to relevant international standards for humanitarian assistance, especially Sphere Standards. See PRM’s General NGO Guidelines for a complete list of sector-specific standards including guidance on proposals for programs in urban areas.PRM strongly encourages programs that target the needs of vulnerable and underserved groups among the program participant population (such groups may include women; children; adolescents; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+) individuals; older persons; the sick; persons with disabilities; and members of minority communities) and can demonstrate what steps have been taken to meet the specific and unique protection and assistance needs of these vulnerable groups effectively.PRM will accept proposals from any NGO working in the above-mentioned sectors although, given budgetary constraints, priority will be given to proposals from organizations that can demonstrate:a working relationship with UNHCR.a proven track record in providing proposed assistance both in the sector and specified location.evidence of coordination with international organizations (IOs) and other NGOs working in the same area or sector as well as – where possible – local authorities.an emphasis on the outcome or impact of program activities.a strong sustainability plan, involving local capacity building, where feasible.where applicable, adherence to PRM’s Principles for Refugee Protection in Urban Areas; andan understanding of and sensitivity to conflict dynamics in the program location.Application and Submission InstructionsWhere to Request Application Package: Application packages may be downloaded from the website www.Grants.gov.Content and Form of Application: PRM strongly recommends using the proposal and budget templates that are available on PRM’s website.Single-Year Proposals:Single-year program proposal page limitsSingle-year proposals using PRM’s templates must not exceed 15 pages in length (Times New Roman or Calibri 12-point font, letter sized paper, one-inch margins on all sides). If the applicant does not use PRM’s recommended templates, proposals must not exceed 10 pages in length. Organizations may choose to attach work plans, activity calendars, and/or logical frameworks as addendums/appendices to the proposal but are not required to do so. These attachments do not count toward the page limit total; however, annexes cannot be relied upon as a key source of program information. The proposal narrative must be able to stand on its own in the application process.PRM strongly recommends application narrative be submitted in Adobe PDF, as Microsoft Word documents may sometimes produce different page lengths based on software versions and configurations. Tables and budget documents should be submitted as Excel documents.Page limits are strictly adhered to, and PRM will not review pages of the narrative beyond the stated limit, which may negatively impact the proposal’s score.All documents must be in English and should avoid the use of jargon and should spell out all acronyms upon first use.Application PackageTo be considered for PRM funding, organizations must submit a complete application package, including:Proposal Narrative not exceeding stated page limits.Indicator Table: Including all required PRM indicators and targets for each year (if multi-year).Cash and voucher assistances (CVA) modality must report on CVA indicatorsCompleted Budget table including summary and detail tabsdisaggregated by year and for each year of the program period (for multi-year proposals).Include total costs by objective and estimated costs by sector,Total costs divided by country (if applicable)Budget Narrative disaggregated by year and for each year of the program period.Completed and signed SF-424 andSF-424A. PRM requires that Box 21 of the SF-424 be checked.If the applicant organization has an active registration in SAM.gov that was either created or updated on or after February 2, 2019, then the applicant does NOT need to submit the SF-424B as they will be prompted to complete the representations and certifications in SAM.gov.Risk Assessment and Security Plan.Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) Code of Conduct and a country or regional implementation plan specific to the country of region of the applicationNote: Codes of Conduct must be consistent with the updated 2019 IASC Task Force’s Six Core Principles. The country/regional implementation plan should outline how employees are trained and otherwise made aware of the Code of Conduct, how violations of the Code of Conduct against program participants are reported and followed up on in a safe and confidential manner, how program participants are made aware of the Code of Conduct and a mechanism to report any violations, and whether there is a focal point in the country or regional office for the Code of Conduct.Key Personnel for award applicant and sub-recipient(s)Applicants must furnish names, titles, and brief biographical information on the education and experience of key personnel in implementing the program and key supervisory personnel; (i.e., the members of the professional staff in a program supervisory position engaged for or assigned to duties under the award).A Market Analysis and a Participant Competency/Capacity Assessment for all proposals that include at least one livelihoods sector objective (or will be disqualified), if applicable. Please see the General NGO Guidelines for more details.Most recent Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA), if applicable, or a de minimis rate calculation of Modified Total Direct Costs (MTDC) if the applicant is eligible and elects to use the de minimis rate.Most recent external audit report is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation.Information in support of any cost-sharing/cost-matching arrangements, if applicable.Information detailing the source of any in-kind contributions, if applicable.Details on any sub-agreements associated with the program including the budget detail (must be part of the budget submission as noted above), if applicable.Organizational Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP) Framework (is required prior to issuance of an award, if proposal is chosen for implementation)Additionally, organizations must consider the following as part of their proposal package:To be considered a competitive proposal, the Proposal Narrative, Indicator Table, and Budget Detail should include the following information:Focus on outcome or impact indicators as much as possible. At a minimum, each objective should have one outcome or impact indicator.Include specific information on locations of programs and participants (GPS coordinates highly recommended) to increase PRM’s ability to track the impact of PRM funding.Outline how the NGO will acknowledge PRM funding. If an organization believes that publicly acknowledging the receipt of USG funding for a particular PRM-funded program could potentially endanger the lives of the program participants and/or the organization staff, invite suspicion about the organization&#8217;s motives, or alienate the organization from the population it is trying to help, it must provide a brief explanation in its proposal as to why it should be exempted from this requirement.PRM expects each proposal, regardless of sector, to demonstrate protection mainstreaming, including by identifying potential protection risks associated with the program and how they will be mitigated. Assistance activities should mainstream protection by analyzing the protection risks in relation to each specific programming sector. An analysis of the risks should inform how assistance is designed to minimize them and maximize protection of program participants. Applicants may introduce gender-specific risks in this section but should provide a full analysis in the gender analysis.PRM partners must complete a gender analysis in the proposal narrative that briefly explainsexperiences of men, women, boys, and girls with a focus on the different familial roles, community privileges, and gender dynamics within the target population;associated risks and threats experienced by women, girls, and other vulnerable populations based on their gender;power imbalances and needs that arise based on gender inequalities that exist within the family or community; andproposed responses that will address the above and mitigate any gender differences in access, participation, or decision-making that may be experienced by at-risk groups, particularly women and girls. The gender analysis should aim to specify and target specific at-risk sub-populations of women and girls, such as women and girl heads of households, out-of-school girls, women and girls with disabilities, women and girl survivors of violence, married girls, adolescent mothers, as well as people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or intersex (LGBTQI+), and those who are often unaware of and excluded from programs and services and who may be the hardest to reach based on their gender.The budget should include a specific breakdown of funds being provided by UNHCR, other USG agencies, other donors, and your own organization.Applicants whose proposals address gender-based violence (GBV) through their programs must estimate the total cost of these activities as a separate line item in their proposed budgets (see PRM’s budget template). Proposals and budgets must include details of any sub-agreements associated with the programs.For consortia only, a description of how the partnership will be organized and how lines of authority and decision-making will be managed across all team members and between the lead applicant and associate awardees should be included in the proposal.Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) and System for Award Management (SAM)Note: On April 4, 2022, the formerly used DUNS Number was replaced by the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) UEI. For more information on the process, visit GSA&#8217;s website on the UEI transition.Each applicant is required to:be registered in SAM before submitting its application.provide a valid UEI number in its application; andcontinue to always maintain an active SAM registration with current information during which it has an active PRM award or an application or plan under consideration by PRM.No federal award may be made to an applicant until the applicant has complied with all applicable UEI and SAM requirements and, if an applicant has not fully complied with the requirements by the time the PRM award is ready to be made, PRM may determine that the applicant is not qualified to receive a PRM award and use that determination as a basis for making a PRM award to another applicant.Applications must be submitted via Grants.gov. Grants.gov registration requires a UEI number and active SAM.gov registration. If you are new to PRM funding, the Grants.gov registration process can be complicated. We urge you to refer to PRM’s General NGO Guidelines “Application Process” section for information and resources to help ensure that the application process runs smoothly. PRM also strongly encourages organizations that have received funding from PRM in the past to read this section as a refresher. Applicants may also refer to the “For Applicants” page on Grants.gov for complete details on requirements.Do not wait until the deadline to attempt to submit your application on Grants.gov. Organizations not registered with Grants.gov should register well in advance of the deadline as it can take several weeks to finalize registration (sometimes longer for non-U.S. based NGOs to receive required registration numbers). We also recommend that organizations, particularly first-time applicants, submit applications via Grants.gov no later than one week before the deadline to avoid last-minute technical difficulties that could result in an application not being considered. PRM has extremely limited ability to correct or facilitate rapid resolution to technical difficulties associated with Grants.gov, SAM.gov or UEI number issues. PRM partners must maintain an active SAM.gov registration with current and correct information at all times during which they have an active federal award or an application under consideration by PRM or any federal agency.When registering with Grants.gov, organizations must designate points of contact and Authorized Organization Representatives (AORs). Please note that as of December 2022, organizations based outside of the United States that do not intend to apply for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) awards are no longer required to have a NATO CAGE (NCAGE) code to apply for non-DoD foreign assistance funding opportunities. If an applicant organization is mid-registration and wishes to remove an NCAGE code from their sam.gov registration, the applicant should submit a help desk ticket (“incident”) with the Federal Service Desk (FSD) online to seek guidance on how to do so. Applicants experiencing technical difficulties with the SAM.gov registration process should contact the Federal Service Desk online or at 1&#8211;866-606-8220 (U.S.) and 1-334-206-7828 (International).Applications must be submitted under the authority of the Authorized Organization Representative at the applicant organization. Having proposals submitted by agency headquarters helps to avoid possible technical problems.If you encounter technical difficulties with Grants.gov please contact the Grants.gov Help Desk at support@grants.gov or by calling 1-800-518-4726.Applicants who are unable to submit applications via Grants.gov due to Grants.gov technical difficulties and.who have reported the problem to the Grants.gov help desk.received a case number.have completed UEI and SAM.gov registrations.and had a documented service request opened to research the problem.Applicants may contact the PRM NGO Coordinator before the submission deadline to determine whether an alternative method of submission is appropriate. However, PRM makes no guarantee to accept an application outside of the grants.gov system.It is the responsibility of each applicant to ensure the appropriate registrations are in place and active. Failure to have the appropriate organizational registrations in place or are experiencing issues resulting from discrepancies across registration platforms is not considered a technical difficulty and is not justification for an alternate means of submission.In accordance with 2 CFR §200.113, Mandatory disclosures, the non-Federal entity or applicant for a federal award must disclose, in a timely manner, in writing to the Federal awarding agency or pass-through entity all violations of Federal criminal law involving fraud, bribery, or gratuity violations potentially affecting the Federal award. Non-Federal entities that have received a federal award including the term and condition outlined in Appendix XII—Award Term and Condition for Recipient Integrity and Performance Matters are required to report certain civil, criminal, or administrative proceedings to SAM. Failure to make required disclosures can result in any of the remedies described in 2 CFR §200.338 Remedies for noncompliance, including suspension or debarment. (See also 2 CFR part 180, 31 U.S.C. 3321, and 41 U.S.C. 2313.)Submission Dates and TimesAnnouncement issuance date: March 26, 2024Proposal submission deadline: Friday, May 3, 2024 at 11:59:59 p.m. EDT (23:59:59) Applications submitted after this deadline will not be considered.Intergovernmental Review: Not ApplicableFunding Restrictions: Federal awards will not allow reimbursement of Federal Award costs without prior authorization by PRM.Other Submission RequirementsBranding and Marking StrategyThe following provisions will be included whenever assistance is awarded:The Recipient shall recognize the U.S. Government’s funding for activities specified under this award at the project site with a graphic of the U.S. flag accompanied by one of the following two phrases based on the level of funding for the award:Fully funded by the award: “Gift of the United States Government”Partially funded by the award: “Funding provided by the United States Government”PRM highly encourages recognition of U.S. Government funding on social media and website platforms to be included in proposals branding and marking strategy. Recipients should tag PRM’s Twitter account @StatePRM and/or Facebook account @State.PRM (rather than using hashtags). Additionally, the applicable U.S. Embassy should be tagged as well. Updates of actions taken to fulfill this requirement must be included in quarterly program reports to PRM.All programs, projects, assistance, activities, and public communications to foreign audiences, partially or fully funded by the Department, must be marked appropriately overseas with the standard U.S. flag in a size and prominence equal to (or greater than) any other logo or identity. The requirement does not apply to the Recipient’s own corporate communications or in the United States.The Recipient must appropriately ensure that all publicity and promotional materials underscore the sponsorship by or partnership with the U.S. Government or the U.S. Embassy. The Recipient may continue to use existing logos or project materials; however, a standard rectangular U.S. flag must be used in conjunction with such logos.Do not use the Department of State seal without the express written approval from PRM.Sub non-Federal entities (sub-awardees) and subsequent tier sub-award agreements are subject to the marking requirements and the non-Federal entity shall include a provision in the sub non-Federal entity agreement indicating that the standard, rectangular U.S. flag is a requirement. Exemptions from this requirement may be allowable but must be agreed to in writing by the Grants Officer. (Note: An exemption refers to the complete or partial cessation of branding, not use of alternative branding). Requests should be initiated with the Grants Officer and Grants Officer Representative. Waivers issued are applied only to the exemptions requested through the Recipient’s proposal for funding and any subsequent negotiated revisions.In the event the non-Federal entity does not comply with the marking requirements as established in the approved assistance agreement, the Grants Officer Representative and the Grants Officer must initiate corrective action with the non-Federal entity.PRM Standardized Indicators: Partners must refer to PRM’s indicator list in Appendix D of the NGO Guidelines and include any mandatory and required indicators as part of the application. PRM has two categories of indicators:Required: Indicators marked as “required” in Appendix D must be included in the proposal as applicable. Each sector and sub-sector has at least one required PRM indicator; these must be included in the indicator table if the partner is proposing any activities or budget for that sector/sub-sector. In addition, three indicators are required for all programs regardless of design or sector. If the proposed program will not contribute to one or several of these mandatory indicators, the indicator must still be included in the proposal indicator table but with a target of zero.PRM-1. Number of individuals directly reached through PRM funding.PRM-2. Amount of humanitarian funding distributed to local, national, or refugee-led organizations (in USD) – This amount should include any sub-awards or contracts with local, national, or refugee-led organizations. If the prime applicant is a local, national, or refugee-led organization, they should put the full proposal budget total as the target value. Refer to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) working definition of “local” and “national” organizations. Applicants should put a target of zero for this indicator if it does not apply to them; it will not affect their eligibility.PRM-3. Percentage of participants who report that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a safe, accessible, accountable, and participatory manner – This is a protection mainstreaming indicator developed by the Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and adopted by the Grand Bargain. Research or coordination awards that don’t involve community implementation are exempt from this indicator. Please refer to the PRM Performance Indicator Reference &amp; Definition Sheets (PIRS) for a sample questionnaire and analysis guidance.Recommended if applicable: Partners may consider using these indicators to monitor any related activities as they are aligned with humanitarian standards and best practices. However, inclusion of recommended indicators is not mandatory and will not affect the proposal scoring. Please note that in rare cases PRM may request for a partner to use a particular recommended indicator if there is a strong technical/thematic need to track information on that indicator, or if a similar custom indicator was proposed by the partner.Application Review InformationPRM will conduct a formal competitive review of all proposals submitted in response to this funding announcement. A review panel of at least three people will evaluate submissions based on the above-referenced programmatic criteria and PRM priorities in the context of available funding.Department of State review panels may provide conditions and recommendations on applications to enhance the proposed program, which must be addressed by the applicant before further consideration of the award. To ensure effective use of limited PRM funds, conditions or recommendations may include requests to increase, decrease, clarify, and/or justify costs and program activities.Eligible submissions will be those that comply with the criteria and requirements included in this announcement. In addition, the review panel will evaluate the proposals based on the following criteria:Gap/Analysis (10)Profile of Target Population (5)Program Description (25)Objectives &amp; Indicators (10)Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Plan (10)Accountability to Affected Populations (5)(Note: The AAP section of a NOFO proposal narrative is specific to the program being proposed, is the criterion listed above being evaluated, and is distinct from the organization-level AAP framework.)Coordination (5)Sustainability and Capacity-Building (5)Management and Past Performance (5)Risk Management (10)Budget/Budget Narrative (10 points)Prior to making a Federal award with a total amount of Federal share greater than the simplified acquisition threshold, PRM is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is in the U.S. government designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM.gov (see 41 U.S.C. 2313);An applicant, at its option, may review and comment on any information about itself that a Federal awarding agency previously entered. Currently, federal agencies create integrity records in the integrity module of the Contractor Performance Assessment and Reporting System (CPARS) and these records are visible as responsibility/qualification records in SAM.gov;The Federal awarding agency will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant&#8217;s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under Federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in §200.206 Federal awarding agency review of risk posed by applicants.Federal Award Administration InformationFederal Award Administration.A successful applicant can expect to receive a separate notice from PRM stating that an application has been selected before PRM actually makes the federal award. That notice is not an authorization to begin performance. Only the notice of award signed by the Grants Officer is the authorizing document. Unsuccessful applicants will be notified following completion of the selection and award process.Administrative and National Policy Requirements.PRM awards are made consistent with the following provisions in the following order of precedence:applicable laws and statutes of the United States, including any specific legislative provisions mandated in the statutory authority for the award;Code of Federal Regulations (CFR);Department of State Standard Terms and Conditions of the award;the award’s specific requirements; andother documents and attachments to the award.ReportingSuccessful applicants will be required to submit:Program Reports: PRM requires program reports describing and analyzing the results of activities undertaken during the validity period of the agreement. A program report is required within thirty (30) days following the end of each three-month period of performance during the validity period of the agreement. The final program report is due one hundred and twenty (120) days following the end of the agreement. The submission dates for program reports will be written into the cooperative agreement. Partners receiving multi-year awards should follow this same reporting schedule and should still submit a final program report at the end of each year that summarizes the NGO’s performance during the previous year.The Bureau suggests that NGOs receiving PRM funding use the PRM recommended quarterly program report template and annual/final report template. The suggested PRM NGO reporting templates are designed to ease the reporting requirements while ensuring that all required elements are addressed.Financial Reports: Financial reports are required within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar year quarter during the validity period of the agreement (January 30th, April 30th, July 30th, October 30th). The final financial report covering the entire period of the agreement is required within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the expiration date of the agreement. For agreements containing indirect costs, final financial reports are due within sixty (60) days of the finalization of the applicable negotiated indirect cost rate agreement (NICRA).Reports reflecting expenditures for the recipient’s overseas and United States offices should be completed in accordance with the Federal Financial Report (FFR SF-425) and submitted electronically in the Department of Health and Human Services’ Payment Management System (HHS/PMS) and in accordance with other award specific requirements. Detailed information pertaining to the Federal Financial Report including due dates, instruction manuals and access forms, is provided on the HHS/PMS website.Audit Reports: When a recipient-contracted audit is not required because the Federal award amount is less than the $750,000 threshold, the Department may determine that an audit must be performed, and the audit report must be submitted to the responsible grants office(r) for review, dissemination, and resolution as appropriate. The cost of audits required under this policy may be charged either as an allowable direct cost to the award or included in the organizations established indirect costs in the award’s detailed budget.PRM Points of ContactApplicants with technical questions related to this announcement should contact the PRM staff listed below prior to submission. Please note that responses to technical questions from PRM do not indicate a commitment to fund the program discussed.PRM Program Officer: Mellisa Nelson NelsonML@state.gov, Washington, D.C.Regional Refugee Coordinator: Andrew Ellis EllisAJ@state.gov, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.DisclaimerExternal websites linked above may not be supported or accessible by all web browsers. If you are unable to link to a referenced website, please try using a different browser or update to a more recent one. If you continue to experience difficulties to reach external resources, please contact PRM NGO Coordinator.Section 508Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794d), as amended by the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, charges the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (US Access Board) with developing and promulgating standards address that access to information and communication technology (ICT) Accessibility Standards (36 CFR part 1194). Section 508 requires that when Federal agencies develop, procure, maintain, or use ICT. Federal employees with disabilities have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to the access and use by Federal employees who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. Section 508 also requires that individuals with disabilities, who are members of the public seeking information or services from a Federal agency, have access to and use of information and data that is comparable to that provided to the public who are not individuals with disabilities, unless an undue burden would be imposed on the agency. These standards are part of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The complete text of the Section 508 Final Provisions can be accessed at https://www.access-board.gov/ict/.The Section 508 accessibility standards applicable to this contract or order are identified in the following paragraph. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense.The Section 508 standards applicable to this contract are: 1194.205 WCAG 2.0 Level A &amp; AA Success Criteria302 Functional Performance Criteria502 Inoperability with Assistive Technology504 Authoring Tools602 Support Documentation603 Support ServicesIn the event of a modification(s) to this contract or order, which adds new ICT supplies or services or revises the type of, or specifications for, supplies or services, the Contracting Officer may require that the contractor submit a completed Voluntary Product Accessibility Template (VPAT) 2.4 or greater, 508 revision (Rev 508) or another format approved by the Department, and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards. If it is determined by the Government that ICT supplies and services provided by the Contractor do not conform to the described accessibility standards in the contract, remediation of the supplies or services to the level of conformance specified in the contract will be the responsibility of the Contractor at its own expense. Information about VPAT can be accessed at https://www.itic.org/policy/accessibility/vpat.If this is an Indefinite Delivery contract, a Blanket Purchase Agreement or a Basic Ordering Agreement, the task/delivery order requests that include ICT supplies or services will define the specifications and accessibility standards for the order. In those cases, the Contractor may be required to provide a completed VPAT and any other additional information necessary to assist the Government in determining that the ICT supplies or services conform to Section 508 accessibility standards.
- Digital Press Briefing with Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Assistant Secretary of State, Julieta Valls Noyes Julieta Valls Noyes, Assistant SecretaryBureau of Population, Refugees, and MigrationMODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic: U.S. Official Travel to Ethiopia and Chad/The Growing Humanitarian and Migration Challenges in Central and Eastern Africa.Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the U.S. Department of State’s Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Julieta Valls Noyes.  Assistant Secretary Noyes will discuss her meetings with senior government officials, humanitarian leaders, and refugees in Ethiopia and Chad on the growing humanitarian and migration challenges in both Central and Eastern Africa.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from Assistant Secretary Noyes and then we will turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of them as we can during the briefing.With that, I would like to turn it over to Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Julieta Valls Noyes, for her opening remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thank you, Johann, and thanks to all the journalists joining us today.  I’m pleased to be with you to speak about my visit last week to Ethiopia and Chad.  As Johann mentioned, during my trip, I met with senior government officials, humanitarian leaders and partners, and refugees in both countries.  I focused on the growing humanitarian and migration challenges in both Central and Eastern Africa.So to that end, I was proud to announce in my meeting with Chad’s Prime Minister Masra more than 47 million in humanitarian assistance for the emergency response in Sudan and neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan.  That amount of money brings the total U.S. humanitarian assistance for people in Sudan and neighboring countries to more than $968 million since last fiscal year.  The United States is the leading humanitarian donor to the Sudan emergency response.  Now, we are committed to working with other members of the international community to help alleviate the suffering of over 1 million refugees forced to flee their homes due to violence, with more arriving daily, as I saw during my visit.Both Ethiopia and Chad are regional leaders, playing essential roles in the Sudan response and broader humanitarian efforts.  Since early 2023, Ethiopia has welcomed nearly 50,000 refugees from Sudan.  At a time of great instability in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s support for displaced populations remains absolutely critical.While I was in Ethiopia, I met with senior government officials to discuss the humanitarian response to the crisis in Sudan.  The Government of Ethiopia has worked closely with humanitarian actors to establish new refugee sites and provide essential, life-saving aid to the tens of thousands of new refugee arrivals.  Their support for the Sudanese people escaping violence in their country is invaluable.During my visit, I also visited an urban refugee center in Addis Ababa, operated by PRM partner Jesuit Refugee Services, where I spoke with refugees in the center’s classrooms and recreational facilities.  Sites like that one provide opportunities, particularly for young refugees, to learn English, gain vocational skills, and express themselves through art and music.  This support, made possible through U.S. and other international donor contributions, advances refugee resilience and helps new arrivals integrate into their new communities.From there I went to Chad.  Now, I want to stress the U.S. – the United States’ deep appreciation for the generosity of the people and the Government of Chad throughout their long history as a refugee host country.  Most recently, Chad has embraced the immense challenge of welcoming over half a million refugees – and over 100,000 returnees – in less than a year.We remain steadfastly committed to supporting vulnerable people in Chad, in particular the over 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers.  U.S.-supported programs, made possible by the more than $47 million that I announced – $18 million of which will go to programs in Chad – those programs will support – those funds will support protection, shelter, water and sanitation, education, and more, for refugees, host communities, and others affected by the crisis in Sudan.Now, one unique feature of the Sudan emergency is that women and children represent some 90 percent of the more than 550,000 refugees who have arrived in Chad since the beginning of the Sudan conflict in April of last year.  To address the long-lasting impact of mental health distress experienced by gender-based violence survivors, our partners in Chad are working to integrate mental health support throughout their programs, but resources are very limited, and the needs are overwhelming.  I was personally devastated to hear from so many survivors of gender-based violence who remain profoundly traumatized by their experiences.As the conflict in Sudan shows little sign of abating, the United States will continue to prioritize the needs of Sudanese refugees across the region, particularly in Chad, where the burden is especially acute and the host government is struggling to meet the basic needs of its own citizens.  Now, no one country or organization can meet these historic needs alone.  In Chad, I called on other donors to help alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people and over 1 million refugees forced to leave their homes due to violence and the communities that host them.The United States also calls on all parties to the Sudan conflict to end hostilities immediately.  We urge all parties to find a peaceful resolution that promotes the safety and resilience of impacted communities and allows for the return of forcibly displaced individuals and families.  Meanwhile, we also call for unhindered humanitarian access, including both cross-line and cross-border access from multiple points of entry to the most devastated areas in Sudan.So just in closing before we get to your questions, I want to reiterate our gratitude to the governments and people of Chad and Ethiopia for their leadership as they continue to welcome refugees fleeing violence in Sudan and beyond.  Specific to the Sudan emergency, preventing famine and long-term catastrophe will require both a ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access.  We in the United States are committed to work with the governments of Ethiopia and Chad, and with international and local partners, to provide life-saving support to the millions of people affected by the devastating conflict in Sudan.And with that, Johann, thank you very much.  That concludes my opening statement, and I’m happy to turn to questions.MODERATOR:  Well, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  We do ask that you limit yourself to one question only and that it be related to the topic of today’s briefing, which is:  The Growing Humanitarian and Migration Challenges in Central and Eastern Africa.So we do have a first question today submitted by a freelance journalist in South Sudan named Mr. Richard Sultan, and Mr. Sultan asks:  “What is the difference in the immediate needs of the refugees in Chad to those in Ethiopia?”  Interesting question.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thanks.  Thank you, Mr. Sultan, for that question.  Well, both countries have been enormously generous and the people of both countries have been enormously generous for a long time in receiving and supporting refugees.  But the responses are different and the situation in both countries are different.Ethiopia has hosted for years refugees from a broad range of countries – Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria.  I met refugees from all of those countries while I was in Ethiopia.  Ethiopia currently hosts about 1 million refugees and 4 million internally displaced persons.  The Government of Ethiopia has received – or Ethiopia has received about 50,000 Sudanese refugees over the past year who have been added to those who are already in the country.  Ethiopia is a country with greater resources of its own that it can devote to these efforts.Meanwhile, Chad is a country that – where one in three people require support for their own survival, and that’s Chadian nationals.  And they have received, as I mentioned earlier, about 560,000 refugees over the past year, plus over 100,000 returnees, and that’s to a country that is dealing with a great deal of internal poverty.  In fact, in my meeting with the prime minister, Prime Minister Masra, he told me something that I’m going to carry with me a long time.  He said that in the country of Chad they are dealing with shared poverty and shared – let me – I wrote it down, and now I’m blanking out as I’m speaking to you.  But it was shared poverty – let me come back to that, because I’m blanking out on the phrase now, even though I mentioned that I will – that it is staying with me.Anyway, sorry.  Chad is incredibly generous and is – but a country of great poverty and great needs, and there the response is primarily focused on what’s been happening in Sudan over the past year.  And the issue with the Sudan situation is that as the crisis and the conflict continue, everyone expects more refugees to arrive in Chad.  So the needs – there are real needs in both countries.  There are welcoming governments and peoples in both countries.  But the populations of refugees in both countries are different, and the ways that they are responding are different.So I’m going to check my notes here to go back to what the prime minister said.  Oh, I’ve got it.  It was shared poverty and shared humanity.  And I thought that that was an excellent way of describing how both Chad and, for that matter, Ethiopia are responding to their respective refugee situations.  So thanks, Mr. Sultan.  And sorry for that mental lapse as I was trying to recall the prime minister’s statement.  I’m still a little jet lagged.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary.  So I see that we do have a hand up from Pearl Matibe of Premium Times in Nigeria.  Pearl, would you like to – you’ve put your question into the Q&amp;A box, and I appreciate that, but would you like to ask your question live if we open your mic?QUESTION:  Thank you so much.  I really do appreciate the opportunity and, Assistant Secretary Noyes, your availability.  It’s really concerning what’s happening in Chad.  In fact, I met the prime minister when he was here in Washington just recently.So my question to you is this:  Considering Chad&#8217;s recent efforts to enhance its development and stability, including prime minister&#8217;s recent visit to the U.S.A., how do you see Chad&#8217;s potential for leapfrogging in terms of – I know he was concerned.  He wants economic growth, regional security, as well as this humanitarian response, so doing these things in parallel to the refugee crisis in Sudan.  Given the interplay between migration flows from Sudan and the security challenges posed by terrorism in Chad – because how do we know how the people have been filtered with – so to avoid any terrorism flows into Chad?  What role can the international community play in supporting Chad’s aspirations for progress and stability?  I know those were key concerns of the prime minister, Dr. Succès.  If you could address that, I’d really appreciate it.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Thanks, Ms. Matibe.  That’s a really interesting question and one that I can respond to in part.  In terms of the specific issues related to Chad’s development and stability, I would defer to my colleagues in the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as the Department of Commerce and Treasury and the DFC.  However, it is also clear that as Chad works to meet the needs – and works with partners to meet the needs – of refugees and its own people in this terrible conflict and at this very, very difficult moment, it is clear that international sources of humanitarian assistance are not sufficient to meet all of the needs.  We’re seeing this situation all over the world, where humanitarian resources are simply not keeping pace with humanitarian needs.And so we are taking a long, hard look at the international infrastructure for dealing with humanitarian needs and coming up with innovative new solutions that involve bringing together humanitarian assistance funding and development funding, working with partners like the World Bank – indeed, I met with the World Bank director in Chad when I was there – and looking for more work in the space of the peace-development nexus and in the space of sort of relief and development coherence.  We’re putting together the humanitarian dollars, but planning for what is likely to be not a quick emergency response but a prolonged response, where many of those people are likely to be in Chad for years.  Indeed, I met when I was there with some refugees who had arrived from Darfur in 2004 and who are still there.So it’s clear that the international community and the international humanitarian infrastructure need to pivot and find new ways of working and finding ways to combine humanitarian and development initiatives and funding in ways that can deal with issues, to meet the emergency needs, but also to provide prolonged support for communities that are likely to be there for a long time, as well as for the host communities where they are living.And so this is a space where we see a lot of potential.  It is an area of growing focus for the World Bank, the multilateral development banks, frankly, the private sector.  We’re looking at some issues like innovative financing for things like energy projects.  We’re doing a lot of work on this in this space in Kenya.  So I think that the potential for these new partnerships in the humanitarian space can also create opportunities for development along the lines of what you were talking about.  And all of this, of course, would also contribute to stability.  So I thank you for the question.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much for that answer.  We have another hand raised from Emmanuel Igunza, a freelance journalist for NPR Radio.  Emmanuel, would you like to ask your question live?QUESTION:  Yeah.  Thank you very much.  I just want to ask, in your engagement with the Ethiopian Government, did you raise the issue about their own thousand – tens of thousands of people who have been displaced within the country due to the conflicts in Oromia and in Amhara regions?  Because the criticism of particularly the U.S. has been that it is not quite strong in trying to deal with the government in addressing these issues.  Thank you very much.ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  I had wide-ranging discussions with Ethiopian officials about a variety of humanitarian issues.  It was – because my trip was broadly focused on the Sudan response, that was the primary focus of our discussions.  But we also talked about how the United States remains the largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia for a variety of populations, including internally displaced persons.  And in fact, we provided over a billion dollars last fiscal year and nearly $89 million to date this fiscal year to provide life-saving support for refugees, asylum seekers, the internally displaced people that you’re asking about, stateless persons, and others who are affected by conflict, drought, food instability.So I hope that answers your question.  Thank you, Mr. Igunza.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you.  So switching gears a little bit, we have a question from Mr. Aggrey Mutambo of The EastAfrican in Kenya.  And his question is:  “Could you speak generally about how the U.S. Government is helping countries in the East African region address the problem of labor migration, especially to Gulf countries?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Sure, that’s a – it’s a great question.  It was something we had a lot of conversations about, so thanks, Mr. Mutambo, for that question.Look, the U.S. policy is to support safe, orderly, and humane migration and the opportunities that it provides globally.  That is our global position.  In Africa in particular, PRM, the bureau that I lead, funds the Africa Regional Migration Program, and we also fund the International Organization for Migration and its regional migration response plan.  Beyond that funding that is supportive of the labor migration – lawful, safe, humane labor migration – we facilitate dialogue between countries related to migration and to facilitate discussions about migrants who wish to return home from countries where they have been living.  And in particular, we have been doing that for migrants wishing to return home from Yemen or Djibouti.So it is an area where we are engaging, and it is an area of growing interest in this region, but as I’m sure all of you are following all over the world, these are issues of interest all over the world.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  All right.  I think we might have time for just one more question.  And so there was a question submitted by Ms. Lucia Blanco of the EFE Spanish News Agency based in Kenya.  And her question is:  “One year after the war started in Sudan, what is the situation of the refugees that arrive in Chad?  What is the displacement situation in the country related to the conflict in Oromo and Amhara?  And what did authorities tell you about those conflicts?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  Okay, so let me start with Chad.  The situation of refugees arriving to Chad is devastating.  They are arriving with almost nothing but the clothes that they are wearing.  They are arriving after having been victimized on the route.  They are arriving with immense needs and profound trauma; many, many of them survivors of gender-based violence, sexual violence.  As I mentioned earlier, 90 percent of them women and children with profound needs and very few resources of their own.  Moreover, I met with refugees while I was there who had arrived in 2004 fleeing from the situation in Darfur, and they unanimously said that as terrible as the situation that they had lived was, the situation of refugees arriving today is much worse.So it is a profound challenge.  It is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world right now, and it is a crisis that requires a response by many countries, many organizations to help support the people and the Government of Chad as they try to deal with this immense challenge with a great deal of humanity.Ethiopia, as I mentioned earlier, has a different set of issues.  It has refugees from I believe 27 other countries currently living in Ethiopia, and as I mentioned earlier, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and many others.  They have also received Sudanese refugees, but nowhere near the scale or the number of those who have been arriving to Chad.But in Ethiopia, the issue remains – the larger humanitarian issues – remains the issue of internally displaced persons, including those from Amhara and Oromo.  And we did talk about those situations while I was there, and I was proud to reinforce U.S. support for all vulnerable people, including with the funding that we are providing across the humanitarian needs in Ethiopia, which are different from those in Chad but which the United States is proud to support and which, like the situation in Chad, also requires support and contributions from other governments, other organizations, and new and innovative solutions like working in this peace development nexus space, getting the participation of the World Bank or the private sector.So there is more than enough work to do to meet all of the needs in both countries, and it was – I was grateful to have the opportunity to visit both countries and to see the response, and to thank the governments of both countries.  But I have to say I’ve returned a bit traumatized myself by the suffering that I witnessed while I was there, and hopeful of being able to do more and to persuade my partners in other countries to do more to respond more forcefully or at greater scale to meet the scale of the needs.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  Do you have any final thoughts or words to share with the group?ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES:  I just want to thank everyone for their attention.  I want to thank you for all that you (inaudible) you do to publicize these (inaudible) and the more that we can all do to bring the attention of the world (inaudible) that we’ll be able to find the support needed to meet them.  So I thank you for your work and for your attention and humanity.  And my apologies, again, for my jetlag and my memory lapse earlier in thinking about the statement.  But I think I’d like to close with the statement from the Chadian prime minister that this is a situation that truly is one of shared poverty and shared humanity.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Well, thank you very much, Assistant Secretary Noyes.  You’ve been very generous with your time, and we do understand that you just returned from that very important trip.So that concludes today’s briefing.  I’d like to thank the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Assistant Secretary of State Julieta Valls Noyes for joining us.  Thank you to all the journalists for participating.  A recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFmediahub@state.gov.  I would also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you very much.# # #
- Special Online Briefing with Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello Special Envoy for Sudan Tom PerrielloLondon HubMODERATOR:  Greetings to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s London International Media Hub.  I would like to welcome our participants dialing in from around the world for this on-the-record briefing with U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello.  Special Envoy Perriello will discuss urgent U.S. efforts for peace and an immediate end to the war and humanitarian crisis in Sudan.  We are pleased to offer this briefing with simultaneous translation into Arabic.  We therefore ask everyone to keep this in mind and speak slowly.  We will have some opening remarks from our speaker and then he will take questions from participating journalists.  I will now turn it over to Special Envoy Perriello for his opening remarks.  Sir, the floor is yours.  MR PERRIELLO:  Thank you, Liz, and I want to thank all of you for being on this call, because the scale of the crisis in Sudan has not been met by global attention and, frankly, media attention, whether that’s in the Western, African, or Arab world press and beyond.  So all of you being here means a great deal to me. My name is Tom Perriello.  I am the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, and it was a tremendous honor to be asked by President Biden and Secretary Blinken to take on this role at a time of incredible urgency.  On this trip we have been visiting with Sudanese across Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Egypt, as well as meeting with our African counterparts and now visiting with our counterparts in Saudi Arabia and finally the United Arab Emirates.  And the Sudanese people could not be more unified and clear.  They want an end to this war now.  They want full humanitarian access.  And they want their future back.  And it is our job, all of us who care about the people of Sudan – around the world, around this neighborhood and beyond – to be urgently seized with the project of ending this war, preventing the worst of this famine, and giving the Sudanese people a chance to determine their own future.  And with that, I look forward to your questions and the conversation ahead.  Thank you.  MODERATOR:  Thank you, Special Envoy Perriello.  We will now begin the question-and-answer portion of today’s call.  Our first question is a pre-submitted question and it comes from Juanita Sallah of Business and Financial Times in Ghana.  And Juanita asks:  “What are the priorities of your diplomatic engagements in Sudan, especially with the spillover effects across the Horn of Africa?” MR PERRIELLO:  Thank you for the question, Juanita.  The goal of this mission, and I think the goal we have found of all the Sudanese civilians we’ve spoken with and our counterparts in governments around the region, is peace – and peace now.  This is an urgent situation where we are seeing signs of famine already across the country of Sudan.  We have known about horrific atrocities, particularly against women and children, forced recruitment, even slavery in this conflict that must end.  And now we’re seeing a situation as we head into the rainy season that could quickly get much worse, and the humanitarian crisis is already at a breaking point.  So the only true solution here is to silence the guns, and that is going to require not only General Burhan and General Hemedti to reach that deal but also for all of us across the region to be partners in peace.  And particularly for those who have been fueling the conflict rather than fueling the peace efforts, we need that alignment now.  And I think that’s the message first and foremost that we’ve been hearing from the Sudanese people and certainly something we’ve been hearing from our counterparts across the region.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question goes to Mohamed Maher from Al-Masry Al-Youm in Egypt, and Mohamed asks:  “How does the United States plan to coordinate with global and regional partners to advance peace efforts in Sudan?” MR PERRIELLO:  Thank you.  Oh, you’re not throwing it to – sorry, yes.  Thank you for the question, Mohamed.  We believe that the – we have seen several really important efforts across the region.  And the role that the Saudis, Saudi Arabia has played in hosting the Jeddah talks, I think, can be an area that brings together pieces that have been emerging in Cairo and in Manama and other places.  But we need to restart formal talks.  We hope that will happen as soon as Ramadan is over, that those are inclusive talks of key regional actors as well as key voices from the inside, and that we can reach that agreement not just to end the violence but to really open up to full humanitarian access.  So we are looking forward to, hopefully, a restart of those talks as soon as Ramadan has ended.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Next, we’ll take a question live from Mahmoud Abobakr with Asharq News.  Mahmoud, please ask your question.   MR PERRIELLO:  I’m not hearing a question if one’s being asked.  MODERATOR:  I’m not either.  Let’s come back to &#8212;  MR PERRIELLO:  Elizabeth, I think you’re muted now.   MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll come back to Mahmoud.  And we’ll take a pre-submitted question from Jamal Badawi from the Independent Arabia.  And Jamal asks:  “There are too many initiatives and proposals to resolve the crisis.  How do you view this problem?” MR PERRIELLO:  We see it as an opportunity.  I think the fact that there have been many different initiatives reflects the fact that there is growing concern across the region and a new sense of urgency.  Frankly, we wish that urgency had been there before, but the clear message I’ve been getting, again, from Uganda to Ethiopia to Kenya to Djibouti to Egypt, is everybody understands that this crisis is barreling towards a point of no return.  And that means everybody needs to put whatever differences aside and be united in finding a solution to this conflict.  I’m speaking to Sudanese every day who’ve just escaped and describe, quote, “hell on Earth,” talk about imminent death.  We have a communications blackout in many areas that means people haven’t been able to speak to family members in ages or get good data on how many people are dying of malnourishment.   So what we need to do is take the greatest hits, the lessons from these initiatives, see it as a good thing that so many people want to try to solve this conflict, bring that together back into formal talks and get this war ended.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll now go back to Mahmoud from Asharq for his question.  Mahmoud, please go ahead.  Please go ahead, Mahmoud.  Your line is open.  Okay.  We will take &#8212;  MR PERRIELLO:  Mahmoud, you might try putting the question into the chat as well if that’s another approach.  Liz.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll take a pre-submitted question, this time from Thamo Kapisa from SABC Channel Africa in South Africa, and Thamo asks:  “Several women have come forward in the past week about abuses being inflicted on them by the RSF because of their ethnicity.  What is the U.S. reaction and response to this?” MR PERRIELLO:  The treatment of women in Sudan is a horrific situation.  It has been since the beginning of this conflict.  And sadly, we’ve seen that before.  My first time in Sudan in 2004 was during the genocide in Darfur, where we saw both ethnic and gender-based violence, and sometimes combined.  We know that we’ve had moments where populations like the Masalit have been targeted, and we know that women have borne the brunt of this through sexual violence and targeting and also through the way in which the humanitarian crisis continues to play out.  I spoke to a woman recently who escaped and described how women would have to go out to the field to find any amount of food for their family and often be raped, come home, and have to go back to that same field the next day.  These abuses are horrific.  They not only need to end, but we need accountability for those who have conducted these atrocities and those who’ve had command-and-control structure over the people committing the atrocities.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And Mahmoud has typed his question into the chat.  He asks:  “Do you have plans to meet with the leadership of the army or with the RSF?”  MR PERRIELLO:  We think it’s important to engage with all voices and we certainly think the leaders of those forces have a key role to play, and I think where we see partners who are ready to be part of the peace process, that is a very important thing.  I think General Burhan in particular has a role to play in ensuring humanitarian access and a peace process goes forward.  We know that there is opportunities there to build that.   And the thing is, I think there’s alignment here about the decide for a unified Sudan, for a strong, unified professional army, and for a Sudan where the Sudanese people get to determine their future.  And we’ll be sitting down with all actors who are prepared to help make that future a reality.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll next take a question from the chats, and it comes from Sara Elareifi, a journalist at the Sudan Broadcasting Corporation.  And Sara asks:  “Has the recent imposition of sanctions by the U.S. administration had any direct impact or change in the trajectory of the war?”  MR PERRIELLO:  We believe that they have.  We think the sanctions have been significant, and both on individuals but also on some of the banks and other entities that have been supporting those individuals.  And I think all of those involved in this conflict, both inside Sudan and outside Sudan, are very aware about the U.S. willingness to ensure that there is a cost to those who are supporting and conducting these horrific abuses of rape, starving the population, other atrocities, and an effort to work with those who instead are trying to build a better and more peaceful Sudan.  Do we think that it has ended the war?  No, and that is why these peace efforts are important.  But it is also important for those actors to know there are consequences of doing this horrific – these horrific atrocities.  And this comes back to where I started, which is there’s really been so little coverage of this horrific situation.  It is growing, and I think the more the world pays attention and the region pays attention to the horrible things happening to the Sudanese people, that also is something that will be a consequence and reinforce both the sanctions that have already happened and those sanctions that could come if this kind of – these kind of horrors continue.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll take a related pre-submitted question on sanctions, and it comes from Aya Sayed of Roayah News.  And Aya asks:  “The U.S. announced sanctions on militia leaders who committed crimes against Sudanese civilians, but it’s clear that those sanctions didn’t stop the atrocities.  So what other measures could the U.S. adopt to hold accountable those who committed war crimes?” MR PERRIELLO:  Well, it’s not just the United States.  I think the whole world has to be part of this accountability process, and a lot of it also will rest on what the Sudanese people decide as part of their future.  Certainly there are ongoing investigations that could end up in the International Criminal Court or other areas, and I think people really want to see a ceasefire now and a peace process.  And there are so many questions that the people of Sudan will need to be deciding over the coming years.   But the U.S. has, I think, been a constructive player in putting consequences on the table for those who’ve been committing these atrocities, and we’ve made clear that those certainly could continue.  And we believe it has deterred some actors, both inside and out.  But we’re not satisfied, and we won’t be, satisfied until we see an end to this conflict and a chance for the Sudanese people to return, for those inside to feel safe, and for there to be a return to the very inspiring vision of a Sudan that was being built just a few years ago based on the inspiring and courageous work of Sudanese civilians and demanding that they control their future.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll take a pre-submitted question from Mahamout Issa Terda Mahamat from Tribune Echos in Chad.  And Mahamout asks:  “What are the priorities of the U.S. administration in Sudan?”  MR PERRIELLO:  Number one is get a peace deal that ends the violence, immediately ensures full humanitarian access to all citizens, and returns the country to the civilian transition process that the Sudanese people risked so much to create just a couple of years ago.  We believe that future is possible, and we think that it is something that really is what we’ve heard from the Sudanese people.  There’s some chatter now about there being a lot of disagreement among the Sudanese.  And it’s true that when – in any country, when you get to a level – a certain level of politics, we will always have active disagreements that happen over many years.  But underneath that, there’s an incredible unity among the Sudanese people about what they want.  I’ve met with over a hundred Sudanese from across all regions in civil society on this trip, and every single one wants the same thing, and that’s how we’re informing our U.S. policy – an end to the war, the access to basic humanitarian goods, and the dignity to define a future that includes a strong, unified Sudan armed force going forward as well as an opportunity for people to determine their future.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  We’ll next go to a pre-submitted question from a freelance journalist in South Sudan, Richard Sultan, who asks:  “In the case of future peace talks between the warring parties, will you include their outside backers?” MR PERRIELLO:  We have been very clear that we think that peace talks should be inclusive.  That includes making sure that our African partners, both key African leaders in the region and our multilateral actors, including both IGAD and the African Union, should be part.  We also think that our colleagues here in the Gulf states – I’m in Saudi Arabia now, going to United Arab Emirates – need to be part of conversations about the future.   And so we do believe that this next round of formal talks should be inclusive, but it also has to be people who are truly serious about ending the war and handing the country back to the Sudanese people and its future.  And we believe if we can get that group together, it can help end this war in a matter of weeks, not months.  But it is going to take a much higher level of political will among many of us, and it can’t be the U.S. alone – and shouldn’t be.  But we are hoping that all actors, including those who have been involved in Sudan historically and today, need to be part of the solution.  MODERATOR:  Our next question is a pre-submitted question and it comes from Charbel Barakat from Aljarida newspaper in Kuwait.  And Charbel asks:  “What is the U.S. Department of State’s assessment of the impact of Iranian presence in the Sudan conflict?” MR PERRIELLO:  There’s been significant public reporting about Iran’s role in this, and certainly the message we’ve gotten from the Sudanese people is that this is not something that they want to see – this kind of external engagement – and including with some extremist elements that had been present in the country before.  I think that is something that is of great concern.  It’s certainly something we will monitor and it’s something we’ve heard both from our Sudanese conversations and across the region, that this is just an – one example of something that could take an already disastrous situation and be fuel on the fire that helps turn this into even a regional war.  And I think that’s actually part of what has increased the political will of leaders in the region to realize this is a crisis we need to come together and work with the Sudanese to solve.  And I think that is everything from the level of the atrocities, the proximity to famine that we get closer to each day – some think we are already at that level – and also this increased role of external actors that are definitely not the future that the Sudanese people want to see.  MODERATOR:  Next, we’ll go to a question in the chat from Simon Marks of Bloomberg News.  And Simon asks:  “How concerned are you about hardline Islamist factions of Sudanese society joining SAF’s ranks as well as the involvement of Iran in backing the army?”  MR PERRIELLO:  Well, our starting point is what do the Sudanese people want?  And what is very clear: there is consensus.  For all of the chattering-class chatter about divisions, there could not be more consensus among the Sudanese people about what they want.  They want an end to this war.  They want a silencing of the guns.  They want full humanitarian access.  Those who’ve escaped want the ability to return, and they want to return to a civilian transition that gets them to the kind of democracy and future that they all want.   And it’s something that benefits the whole region.  The idea of a stable and inclusive democratic Sudan with a strong, unified army is something that can be an anchor of stability in the region.  And instead we are hurtling right now towards a situation where more and more actors appear to be getting involved, where we could see a return of extremist elements that the Sudanese people, with great courage and over much time, had mostly eradicated from the area.  And I think this is something where all of us need to come together and try to bring this war to an end, first and foremost to prevent the current humanitarian catastrophe and the violence, but also to make sure that Sudan gets to reclaim that future that they deserve.  MODERATOR:  Next we’ll go to a pre-submitted question, and it comes from Suzy Elgeneidy Alahram in Egypt.  And Suzy asks:  “How can the United States cooperate with Egypt and other countries in the region to deal with the food shortage and the bad humanitarian situation?”  MR PERRIELLO:  Oh, we – I had a very positive visit with our Egyptian counterparts just a couple of days ago, and of course they are a country that knows how serious this crisis is because they have already taken in half a million refugees from this crisis.  They understand what it means to have instability not just on the border, but really across the Red Sea area.  And I sensed a deep seriousness among the Egyptian Government about bringing this war to an end and ensuring that there is a stable transition forward, and I think that we can be constructive partners and we have said for a while that they need to be part of the resumption of talks going forward.  MODERATOR:  Next we’ll go to a question in the chat, and it comes from Mohamed Osman from the BBC.  And Mohammed asks:  “Do you plan to speak to Islamists, including NCP party, who are active in the fighting?”  MR PERRIELLO:  Well, we’re hearing from a wide range of folks, and I think that’s a term that means a lot of different things to a lot of different people in this context.  And I think we are trying to hear from people all over the country about what they want.  In general, I think that there is a lot of concern about leaders from previous regimes coming back in.  But I think there’s also an interest in putting together the elements that get us to a peace process.  So in this round it’s been important for me to primarily be hearing from women and youth and so many of the courageous people who’ve been standing up emergency response rooms and other efforts to keep people alive, their neighbors and friends back home, some of whom they haven’t heard from in forever.  And I think there’s an interest here in not letting this be an opportunity for any elements to take advantage of this to reclaim power, but instead to have this be something where the Sudanese people are coming together to reclaim the trajectory that they were on before.   And I think we should be informed in this process first and foremost by those voices from across Sudanese communities, and I think that that is something where we have a strong sense of the fact that they want these horrors to stop.  We saw just another report on CNN, I think it was CNN yesterday or two days ago, about forced recruitment of men and boys by the RSF at a systematic level.  We have heard people coming out of Darfur describing it as hell on Earth.  And this is what we need to focus on, is what ends that, not which elements want to try to be part of a power-sharing arrangement or get back in power.  We need to be empowering the Sudanese people to create a process forward where they can answer a bunch of the questions that should really be on the Sudanese people to decide, and not be part of this peace process.  MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Our next question is from the chat, and it comes from Khalid Elnour from Sudanese ELAFF:  “You mentioned that the United States will negotiate with all active parties, but you previously said in press statements that you will not communicate with members of the former regime and Islamists.  How can the war be stopped without negotiating with them?” MR PERRIELLO:  I think that they – that there’s – there are many ways to do that.  I think we see an opportunity right now where the leadership of RSF and SAF can come together and find that agreement.  I think we have regional actors who can come together and help the Sudanese people demand the future that they want.  And I think that those who are meddling around with – as extremist or other parties are not constructive to this process.  I don’t think they’re serious about a peace process.  So where we see people who are serious about being part of a peaceful and democratic future for Sudan, we will absolutely want to engage.  But where people are exploiting this opportunity and exploiting Sudanese people, those elements will be counter to.  So I think some of this is going to be about seeing the behavior of all the actors, but I think this is a moment that people are going to see negotiations accelerate because we’re getting so close to a crisis.  And I think it will be an opportunity to see who’s serious about peace and who’s serious about that future that the Sudanese people want and deserve.   MODERATOR:  So we have time for one more question, and we’ll go to Aya Sayed of Roayah News, who asks:  “What are the prospects of reaching a political settlement for this conflict?  Can you bring all parties to the negotiating table?” MR PERRIELLO:  We believe now is the time to do that.  We hope that we will be in a position to relaunch formal talks soon.  We think those are likely to be coming out of the Jeddah process, but also drawing on lessons and progress that has been made in Manama and in Cairo and in Addis and in IGAD and other elements.  And we think this is a crucial time for those elements to come together.   And I think if there’s any seed of hope from this trip – and certainly this trip has been very tough because we understand just how horrific the situation is for the Sudanese people – but if there is a sliver of hope, it’s that that sense of urgency seems to be shared so strongly, certainly by the Sudanese people, but also by our African counterparts and our Gulf counterparts.  And we believe that gives us a new opportunity to find a path to peace, and a peace that is reflective of what the Sudanese people want.  And we think that there is – that this is the time to do that.  Every week we wait without a peace deal makes that the potential for famine more protracted, and the atrocities that we know that have been documented continue.   So we do believe this is the time for inclusive talks.  We do believe that there is an opportunity given some of the changing dynamics that are there to have room for a peace deal that could hold and provide a path forward that meets the interests of the Sudanese people.  MODERATOR:  And that concludes today’s call.  I would like to thank Special Envoy Perriello for joining us, and I would like to thank all of our journalists for participating.  If you have questions about today’s call, you may contact the London International Media Hub at MediaHubLondon@state.gov. # # #
- United States to Provide Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Sudanese People and Host Communities Matthew Miller, Department SpokespersonToday, the United States, represented by Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration Julieta Valls Noyes, met with Chadian Prime Minister Succès Masra and announced more than $47 million in humanitarian assistance for the emergency response in Sudan and neighboring countries, including Chad and South Sudan.Sudan is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, with more than eight million people newly displaced since the conflict began last April, and nearly 25 million people – half of Sudan’s population – needing aid, according to the United Nations. This includes more than one million Sudanese refugees who have fled to neighboring countries, including Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.Through the generosity of the American people, this U.S. humanitarian assistance provides critical life-saving assistance including food, water and sanitation facilities, shelter, medical services including mental health support, and protection to Sudanese fleeing the conflict.  This announcement brings total U.S. humanitarian assistance for people in Sudan and neighboring countries to more than $968 million since FY 2023.  The United States will continue to work with international and local partners to provide life-saving support to the millions of people affected by the devastating conflict in Sudan.The United States is the leading humanitarian donor to the Sudan emergency response and calls on the international community to help alleviate the suffering of over one million refugees forced to flee their homes due to violence.  The United States urges the parties to the Sudan conflict to allow unhindered humanitarian access including both cross-line and cross-border, engage in direct talks, agree to a ceasefire, and end hostilities immediately.  Preventing a famine and long-term catastrophe will require both a ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access.