# Fiji - United States Department of State

- LGBTQI+ Special Envoy Stern’s Travel to Fiji Office of the SpokespersonFrom April 22 &#8211; 26, Special Envoy to Advance the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons Jessica Stern will visit Nadi, Fiji, to speak at the 3rd Pacific Human Rights Conference on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression and Sex Characteristics. Special Envoy Stern will address the unique opportunities and challenges that LGBTQI+ persons in all of their diversity, Indigenous persons, and other communities face in the Pacific, as well as pledge the United States’ commitment to supporting efforts to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons throughout the region.Special Envoy Stern was invited to participate by the Pacific Sexual and Gender Diversity Network, a regional LGBTQI+ organization that operates in 14 member countries across the South Pacific. Additionally, Special Envoy Stern will travel to Suva, Fiji, to meet with representatives from the Government of Fiji as well as hold senior-level dialogues with likeminded and multilateral partners on the margins of the conference.
- Fiji HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Fiji				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Fiji																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				The human rights situation in Fiji improved during the year, as the government elected in December 2022 repealed a restrictive media law that severely hampered freedom of the press.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of:  cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by government agents; substantial interference with freedom of peaceful assembly; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic and intimate partner violence; coerced abortion or forced sterilization of persons with disabilities and substantial barriers to accessing sexual and reproductive health services; and trafficking in persons.The government investigated and prosecuted some security force and other officials accused of human rights abuses; however, impunity was a problem in cases with political implications.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were no reports of such killings by or on behalf of the government during the year.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution and law prohibited torture, forced medical treatment, and degrading treatment or punishment.  The Public Order Act (POA), however, authorized the government to use whatever force it deemed necessary to enforce public order.  There were reports security forces abused persons.The police Internal Affairs Unit was responsible for investigating complaints of police misconduct.  As of October, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions charged 19 officers with various forms of misconduct, including assault, causing grievous harm, abuse of office, unlawful wounding, and theft.  Investigations into police abuse often took years to complete; judicial proceedings were equally prolonged and seldom resulted in convictions.The constitution and POA explicitly provided immunity from prosecution for members of the security forces for any deaths or injuries arising from the use of force deemed necessary to enforce public order.  The constitution also provided immunity for the president, prime minister, members of the cabinet, and security forces for actions taken related to the 2000 suppression of a mutiny at military headquarters, the 2006 coup, and the 2009 abrogation of the 1997 constitution.There was no independent oversight mechanism for the security forces.Slow judicial processes contributed to an impression of impunity, especially in police abuse cases.  For example, trials had yet to conclude for the alleged 2019 police beatings of citizens Pelasio Tamanikoula and Manasa Rayasidamu.  The three officers accused in the Rayasidamu case were suspended from duty and charged with causing grievous harm.  Other unresolved cases dated as far back as 2017.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						The national prison system was overcrowded, with deteriorating infrastructure and complaints concerning inadequate essential services.Abusive Physical Conditions:  Prisons were overcrowded but there was no recent data on the scale of the problem; the government, however, introduced an early release program to relieve overcrowding.  There were insufficient beds, inadequate sanitation and medical care, and a shortage of other necessities.  Some prison facilities reportedly were unsuitable for older inmates or those with disabilities.Administration:  Prisoners could submit complaints to the Human Rights Commission or judicial authorities.  Although the law prohibited authorities from reviewing, censoring, or seizing prisoner letters to the judiciary and the commission, authorities routinely reviewed such letters and, in most cases, seized them.  Authorities did not investigate or document credible allegations of problematic conditions in a publicly accessible manner.Independent Monitoring:  The Fiji Red Cross and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) visited detention facilities and interviewed inmates; prison authorities permitted such visits without third parties present.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court unless the person was detained under the POA.  The government generally observed these requirements.  The law detailed procedures for lawful arrest.  Except for arrests under the POA, prisoners had to be charged within 24 hours of arrest or released.  Under the POA, the minister of home affairs and immigration could authorize detention without charge for up to 14 days.The POA allowed authorities to suspend normal due process protections where “necessary to enforce public order.”  The POA explicitly disallowed any judicial recourse (including habeas corpus) for harms suffered when the government was acting under its provisions.  The POA also allowed for warrantless searches, restriction of movement (specifically international travel, immigration, or emigration), and required permits for political meetings.  Authorities used the POA’s wide provisions to restrict freedom of expression and of association in some cases.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The constitution provided that detained persons be charged and brought to court within 48 hours of arrest or as soon as practicable thereafter, and that right was generally respected.  Police officers could arrest persons without a warrant or in response to warrants issued by magistrates and judges.There was no legal requirement to bring to court persons detained under provisions of the POA for judicial review of the grounds for their detention, until and unless authorities charged them with an offense.The law provided for bail.  By law, both police and the courts could grant bail.  Although there was a legal presumption in favor of granting bail, the prosecution could object, and often did so in cases where the accused was appealing.  An individual had to apply for bail by a motion and affidavit that required the services of a lawyer.Authorities generally allowed detainees prompt access to counsel.  The Legal Aid Commission provided counsel to some indigent defendants in criminal cases, a service supplemented by voluntary services from private attorneys.  The First Hour Procedure required police to provide every suspect with legal aid assistance within the first hour of arrest.  In addition, police were required to record the “caution interview” with each suspect before questioning, to confirm police informed all suspects of their constitutional rights, and to confirm whether suspects suffered any abuse by police prior to questioning.Pretrial Detention:  Pretrial detainees comprised 24 percent of the prison population, resulting from a continuing pattern of courts refusing bail and resource shortages, including of prosecutors and judges.  Consequently, some defendants faced lengthy pretrial detention.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the constitution and law established a variety of restrictions on the judiciary.  For example, the courts could not hear challenges to government decisions on judicial restructuring, terms and conditions of remuneration for the judiciary, and to terminated court cases.  Various other decrees contained similar clauses limiting the jurisdiction of the courts with respect to decisions made by the cabinet, ministers, or government departments.The president could appoint or remove from office Supreme Court, appellate, and High Court judges on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission and in consultation with the attorney general.  The commission, following consultations with the attorney general, could appoint other judicial officers.																Trial Procedures						In most cases, defendants had the right to a fair trial, and the court system generally enforced this right.  The constitution, however, allowed limitations on the right to a public trial and although it stipulated trials should “begin and conclude without unreasonable delay,” they were not always timely.Defendants had the right to counsel, but some reportedly were unaware of their rights when detained or interviewed and, therefore, did not request legal counsel.  The right of appeal existed but was often hampered by procedural delays.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution prohibited such actions, but the POA permitted military personnel to search persons and premises without a warrant and to take photographs, fingerprints, and measurements of any person.  Police and military officers also could enter private premises to break up any meeting considered unlawful.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but it granted the government authority to restrict these rights for a broad array of reasons.  These included preventing hate speech and insurrection; maintaining national security, public order, public safety, public morality, public health, and the orderly conduct of elections; protecting the reputation, privacy, dignity, and rights of other persons; enforcing media standards; and regulating the conduct of media organizations.  Using POA powers to detain persons on suspicion of “endangering public safety” and to “preserve the peace,” authorities continued to restrict freedom of expression.Freedom of Expression:  The law included criticism of the government in its definition of the crime of sedition.  These included statements made in other countries by any person.The constitution provided for academic freedom, although government control over funding was used to exert influence over tertiary institutions.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media:  In April, parliament repealed the 2010 Media Industry Development Act which had wide restrictive powers of investigation over journalists and media outlets, including powers of search and seizure, and the power to refer any complaint received to a media tribunal.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content; there were no reports the government monitored private online communications without legal authority.The law on online safety penalized offenders with a substantial maximum fine and a maximum five years’ imprisonment for posting an electronic communication that caused harm to a person.All telephone and internet users had to register their personal details with telephone and internet providers, including name, birth date, home address, left thumbprint, and photographic identification.  The law imposed a moderate fine on providers who continued to provide services to unregistered users and a substantial fine on users who failed to update their registration information as required.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.  The government restricted these freedoms in some cases.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The constitution and POA allowed the government to limit this right in the interests of national security, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, and the orderly conduct of elections.  The constitution also allowed the government to limit freedom of assembly to protect the rights of others and imposed restrictions on public officials’ rights to freedom of assembly.The POA allowed authorities to use whatever force necessary to prohibit or disperse public and private meetings after “due warning” to preserve public order.						Freedom of Association						The constitution limited this right in the interests of national security, public order, and morality, and to provide for the orderly conduct of elections.  The government generally did not restrict membership in NGOs, professional associations, and other private organizations.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										Under the POA, to enforce public order, the government could restrict freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, it did not do so during the year.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in providing protection and assistance to refugees and asylum seekers.Access to Asylum:  The law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees.  The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees assisted officials in refugee status determination procedures.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution and electoral law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections generally held by secret ballot and based on universal and equal suffrage.																										Elections and Political Participation										The country held its most recent parliamentary election on December 14, 2022.  International observers deemed the electoral process as free and fair overall, despite some initial concerns with the pace of rolling results announcements and a glitch in the official reporting app that took it offline early in the count.  The Australian- and Indonesian-led Multinational Observer Group agreed the outcome broadly represented the will of voters.Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections:  National elections were widely reported to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities.Political Parties and Political Participation:  Civil service members and trade union officials were required to resign their offices if they sought to run for political office.  The law allowed deregistration of political parties for any election offense.The POA required permits for political meetings in both public and private venues, and these were granted in an open, nonpartisan way.The electoral law restricted any person, entity, or organization involved in an election campaign from receiving funding from foreign governments, government-recognized intergovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and it forbade international organizations such as the World Bank from involvement in any campaign, including in meetings, debates, panel discussions, interviews, publication of materials, or any public forum discussing the elections.  Maximum penalties for violations of the law were 10 years’ imprisonment, a substantial fine, or both.  The law allowed universities to hold panel discussions and organize inclusive public forums.In 2021 parliament approved three amendments to reform electoral laws.  The amendments granted wider discretionary powers over the electoral process to the supervisor of elections to monitor and order the removal of campaign content published by political parties deemed to be false, misleading, or designed to diminish public confidence in the office of the supervisor and the Electoral Commission.  The office of the supervisor could direct a political party or person (including an internet service provider) to remove or correct any statement or information published during the elections, under penalty of a substantial fine, imprisonment of up to five years, or both.Any appeals against a decision of the registrar of political parties (whose role was consolidated with that of the Office of the Supervisor of Elections) were routed to the Electoral Commission instead of the high court.  Critics maintained the High Court should remain the only judicial mechanism for redress, as was the case for every other constitutionally independent institution in the country.  Public officials previously prohibited from participating in political campaigns (such as permanent secretaries or senior military officers) could make political statements and, according to the amended law, could “conduct campaign activities” by providing information or security services.  Critics alleged this provision permitted the use of state apparatus and resources to campaign on behalf of the sitting government, while other public officers, including trade unionists, remained barred even from membership in a political party.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups:  No law limited participation of women or members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process, and they did participate.  In July, parliament repealed legislation dating from 2021 that required all persons registering to vote (or seeking other official identification documents) to use the name on their birth certificate, affecting the rights of women registered under their married name.  There were, however, no reports of voters being denied poll access on these grounds in the December 2022 elections.Cultural attitudes regarding gender roles restricted political participation by most Indigenous women.Indo-Fijians, who accounted for 36 percent of the population, were generally underrepresented in government and the military.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively.  There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption:  The Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption reported directly to the president and investigated public agencies and officials, including police.  Government measures to combat corruption within the bureaucracy, including public service announcements encouraging citizens to report corrupt government activities, had some effect on systemic corruption.  Media published articles on corruption commission investigations of abuse of office, and anonymous blogs reported on some government corruption.The government adequately funded the corruption commission.  Corruption cases often proceeded slowly.In March, authorities instituted legal proceedings against former Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama and suspended Police Commissioner Sitiveni Qiliho on abuse of office charges.  Bainimarama and Qiliho were accused of arbitrarily abusing their authority by directing police to discontinue a 2019 investigation into the controversial activities of former staff of the University of the South Pacific.  They were acquitted by the court in October; however, the state appealed the ruling.On May 1, former Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum was arrested on suspicion of abuse of his authority as acting prime minister in 2022 and of authorized payments to the former Supervisor of Elections, Mohammed Saneem, without proper approvals from the Constitutional Offices Commission.  The payments were allegedly paid to Saneem during the 2022 general election campaign.In June, the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption instituted legal proceedings against five former officers of the Land Transport Authority for issuing fraudulent driver’s licenses and fraudulently taking 128,322.79 Fijian dollars ($56,500) from private citizens.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restrictions, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.  Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their views.  The law, however, constrained NGO operations in several ways.  For example, the law included criticism of the government in its definition of sedition.Government Human Rights Bodies:  The constitution established the Fiji Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission, at which citizens could file reports of human rights abuses.  The constitution prohibited the commission from investigating cases filed by individuals and organizations relating to the 2006 coup and the 2009 abrogation of the 1997 constitution.  While the commission routinely worked with the government to improve certain human rights practices (such as prisoner treatment), observers reported it generally declined to address politically sensitive human rights matters and typically took the government’s side in public statements, leading observers to assess the commission as progovernment.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence:  The law recognized rape of any person, including spousal rape, as a crime, with a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.  Rape (including spousal rape), domestic abuse, incest, and sexual harassment were significant problems.  From January to August, the Fiji Women’s Crisis Center recorded 599 domestic violence cases.  This was an increase over the previous year.  A government-sponsored hotline allowed easy reporting of abuses.The law defined domestic violence as a specific offense.  Police practiced a “no-drop” policy, whereby they were required to investigate domestic violence accusations even if a victim withdrew the complaint.  Nonetheless, women’s organizations reported police did not consistently follow this policy.  Other reports indicated lax police enforcement of domestic violence laws.  Courts also dismissed some cases of domestic abuse and incest or gave perpetrators light sentences.  Traditional and religious practices of reconciliation among aggrieved parties in both the Indigenous and Indo-Fijian communities were sometimes utilized to mitigate sentences for domestic violence.  In past years, authorities released offenders without a conviction on condition they maintained good behavior.The NGOs Fiji Women’s Crisis Center and Pacific Women supported a wide range of educational, social support, and counseling measures for survivors of gender-based violence and advocated for legal reforms to strengthen protections for women and girls.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment:  The law prohibited sexual harassment, and the government also used criminal law against “indecent assaults on females,” which prohibited offending the modesty of women, to prosecute sexual harassment cases.  Sexual harassment was a significant problem.Discrimination:  By law, women had full rights of inheritance and property ownership, but local authorities often excluded them from decision-making on the disposition of Indigenous communal land, which constituted more than 80 percent of all land.  Women had the right to a share of the proceeds from the lease of Indigenous land, but authorities seldom recognized this right.  Women had the same rights and status as men under family law and in the judicial system.  Nonetheless, women and children had difficulty obtaining protection orders, and police enforcement of them, in domestic violence cases.The law prohibited employment discrimination based on gender, marital status (including living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage), or family status.  The law also stipulated every employer pay men and women equal pay for work of equal value, although employers generally paid women less than men for similar work.  The law prohibited women working underground but placed no other legal limitations on the employment of women.  Workers could file legal complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace.Reproductive Rights:  There were no reports of coerced abortion, but there were reports individuals with disabilities were not given the opportunity to provide informed consent to medical treatment affecting reproductive health, including sterilization.The government provided family planning services.  Women had access to contraceptives free of charge at public hospitals and clinics, and for a nominal fee if prescribed by a private physician.  Nevertheless, NGOs reported some women faced societal and family pressure against using contraceptives.  The government provided sexual and reproductive health services, including emergency contraception for survivors of sexual violence; there was no information on the availability of postexposure prophylaxis for them.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Tension between ethnic Fijians and the Indo-Fijian minority continued to be a problem.  Ethnic iTaukei Fijians comprised approximately 58 percent of the population and Indo-Fijians 36 percent; the remaining 6 percent was composed of Europeans, Chinese, Rotumans, and other Pacific Islander communities.  Indo-Fijians dominated the commercial sector and ethnic iTaukei Fijians the security forces.Land tenure remained highly sensitive and politicized.  Ethnic iTaukei Fijians communally held approximately 87 percent of all land, the government held 4 percent, and the remainder was freehold land held by private individuals or companies.  Most cash crop farmers were Indo-Fijians, the majority of whom were descendants of colonial-era indentured laborers.  Almost all Indo-Fijian farmers had to lease land from ethnic iTaukei Fijian landowners.  Many Indo-Fijians believed their dependence on leased land constituted de facto discrimination against them.  Many ethnic iTaukei Fijians believed the rental formulas prescribed in national land tenure legislation discriminated against them as the resource owners.By law all ethnic iTaukei Fijians were automatically registered upon birth into an official register of native landowners, the Vola ni Kawa Bula.  The register verified access for those in it to communally owned Indigenous lands.																																				Children										Child Abuse:  There were laws against child abuse.  The law required mandatory reporting to police by teachers, health-care workers, and social welfare workers of any suspected case of child abuse.Child abuse was, nonetheless, common.  Thirty-two child sexual abuse cases were reported to the Fiji Women’s Crisis Center through August.  Urbanization, the breakdown of extended family structures and neglect contributed to a reported rise in abuse cases and more children sought shelter at state-funded homes.  In most cases, however, these facilities were overburdened and unable to assist all victims.  The government continued its public awareness campaign against child abuse.Corporal punishment was common in schools, despite a Ministry of Education policy forbidding it in the classroom.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage:  The legal minimum age for marriage was 18.  Some NGOs reported that, especially in rural areas, girls often married before 18, preventing them from completing their secondary school education.  In ethnic iTaukei Fijian villages, pregnant girls younger than 18 could live as common-law wives with the child’s father after the man presented a traditional apology to the girl’s family, thereby avoiding the filing of a complaint with police by the girl’s family.  Girls frequently married the fathers as soon as legally permissible.Sexual Exploitation of Children:  Child sex trafficking continued, and increased urbanization and the breakdown of traditional community and extended family structures appeared to increase children’s vulnerability to commercial sexual exploitation.  It was a criminal offense for any person to buy or hire a child younger than age 18 for sex, commercial sex, or other unlawful purposes; these offenses were punishable by a maximum 12 years’ imprisonment.  There were reports of child trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation and prosecutions took place during the year.It was an offense for a householder or innkeeper to allow commercial sexual exploitation of children on their premises.  There were no known prosecutions or convictions for such offenses.Traffickers exploited some high school-age children and homeless and jobless youth in sex trafficking, and there were reports of child sex tourism in tourist centers, such as Nadi and Savusavu.  Child sex trafficking was perpetrated by family members, taxi drivers, foreign tourists, businessmen, and crew members on foreign fishing vessels.The minimum age for consensual sex was 16.  The court of appeals set 10 years as the minimum appropriate sentence for child rape, but police often charged defendants with “defilement” rather than rape because defilement was easier to prove in court.  Defilement or unlawful carnal knowledge of a child younger than age 13 had a maximum penalty of life imprisonment; the maximum penalty for defilement of children ages 13 to 15, or of a person with intellectual disabilities, was 10 years’ imprisonment.Production, but not possession or consumption, of child pornography was illegal.  The maximum penalty was 14 years in prison, a substantial fine, or both for a first offense; and life imprisonment, a larger fine, or both for a repeat offense.  Authorities generally enforced the law against production of child pornography.The law required mandatory reporting to police by teachers, health-care workers, and social workers of any suspected violation of the law.																																				Antisemitism										There was a small Jewish community composed primarily of foreign residents.  There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization:  No laws criminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults.Violence and Harassment:  NGOs reported violence against members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) community was common, and that strong and widespread social stigma contributed to a lack of trust in police and discouraged victims from reporting crimes to authorities due to fear of further violence or harassment.  Reports indicated transgender women continued to face extremely high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, including routine harassment and targeting by police.Discrimination:  The constitution prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, gender, and gender identity and expression.  The law prohibited discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation.  Nevertheless, NGOs reported complaints of discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in employment, housing, access to health care, and other fields.Research by the NGO Diverse Voices and Action for Equality found that a majority of lesbian and bisexual women, and of transgender persons, lived in poverty due to unemployment.  According to Diverse Voices, approximately 62 percent of this group were unemployed or involved in precarious casual work.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition:  Legal gender recognition was not available.  The lack of identification that aligned with their gender expression created significant problems for some persons in employment, education, housing, and other aspects of daily life.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices:  There were no known reports of involuntary or coercive medical or psychological practices on LGBTQI+ persons.  No law banned so-called conversion therapy practices, although health-care professionals were prohibited from attempting to change a person’s sexual orientation.  There were no known cases of enforcement action.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:  There were no known reports of restrictions on those speaking out concerning LGBTQI+ topics, although cyber bullying and hate speech against LGBTQI+ persons increased.  In June the country’s first “Pride in Sport” event took place; 300 athletes participated in mixed netball, mixed volleyball, and women’s rugby competitions.																																				Persons with Disabilities										Discrimination against persons with disabilities was illegal.  The Fiji National Council for Disabled Persons, a government-funded statutory body, worked to protect the rights of persons with disabilities.  The constitution provided persons with disabilities rights to reasonable access to all places, public transport, and information; to use of braille or sign language in official communications; to education; and to access to accommodations, including materials and devices related to the disability.  The constitution, however, allowed enabling legislation to limit these rights “as necessary,” and the law did not define “reasonable.”  There was little enforcement of legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.The law stipulated community, public, and general health-care systems treat persons with mental and intellectual disabilities, although families generally supported such persons at home.  Institutionalization of persons with more significant mental disabilities was in a single, underfunded public facility in Suva.  Public health regulations provided penalties for discrimination in or denial of access to health care.There was minimal enabling legislation on accessibility, and although building regulations required new public buildings to be accessible to all, only a few met this requirement.Although the law forbade disability-based discrimination in employment, persons with disabilities faced employment and wage discrimination.  The NGO Fiji Disabled People’s Association reported in 2020 most persons with disabilities were unemployed due in significant part to discrimination by employers.There were some government programs to improve access to information and communications for persons with disabilities, in particular for the hearing and visually impaired.  Parliament televised its sessions in sign language.  According to the UN Population Fund, sign language interpreters were not always readily available in health-care facilities.  The general lack of accessible communication devices made it difficult for women with sensory disabilities to seek out gender-based violence services.Several public schools specifically for children with disabilities offered primary education services; however, cost and location limited access.  Some students attended mainstream primary schools, and the nongovernmental Early Intervention Center monitored them.  Opportunities were very limited for secondary or higher education for persons with disabilities.The Fijian Elections Office maintained a website accessible to those with disabilities, including text-to-speech capability, large type, and an inverted color scheme.  The office also had procedures to facilitate voting by those with disabilities, including provisions that allowed voters with disabilities to vote from home.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided all workers the right to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and strike.The law prohibited some forms of antiunion discrimination, including victimizing workers or firing a worker for union membership.  The law prohibited employers from using violence, intimidation, stalking, or otherwise hindering the work of an employee who had exercised any legal right under the labor code.  Individuals, employers, and unions (on behalf of their members) could submit employment disputes and grievances alleging discrimination, unfair dismissal, sexual harassment, or certain other unfair labor practices to the Ministry of Employment, Productivity, and Industrial Relations (hereafter the Employment Ministry).The law limited who could be an officer of a trade union, barring noncitizen officers, for example.  The constitution prohibited union officers from becoming members of parliament.  The law also limited the ability of union officers to form or join political parties and engage in political activity, including expressing support for, or opposition to, a political party.All unions had to register with the government, which had discretionary power to refuse to register any union with a name that was “offensive or racially or ethnically discriminatory.”  By law the government could cancel the registration of existing unions in exceptional cases.By law any trade union with seven or more members in an industry not designated as essential could enter collective bargaining with an employer.  The law required that parties negotiate in good faith and outlined the basic requirements of collective bargaining.Unions could conduct secret strike ballots after giving 21 days’ notice to the Registrar of Trade Unions, and the strike could begin after the registrar supervised a secret ballot in which 50 percent of all members entitled to vote approved the strike.  Workers in essential services could strike but had to also notify the Arbitration Court and provide the category of workers who proposed to strike, the starting date, and the location of the strike.  The law designated “essential service and industries” to include corporations engaged in finance, telecommunications, public-sector services, mining, transport, and the airline industry.  The definition of essential services and industries also covered all state-owned enterprises, including the sugar refinery, statutory authorities, and local government authorities.The law permitted the minister of employment to declare a strike unlawful and refer the dispute to the Arbitration Court.  If authorities referred the matter to the court, workers and strike leaders could face criminal charges if they persisted in strike action.The government did not effectively enforce these laws.  Penalties under law for violations of freedom of association and of collective bargaining agreements included fines and imprisonment.  Penalties were not commensurate with those for other laws involving denial of civil rights.  The penalties were sometimes applied.There were no reports that the government used violence or threats of violence against union leaders.  On July 6, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution withdrew the state prosecution’s case against Fiji Trades Union Congress General Secretary Felix Anthony, charged in 2019 under the POA for false statements regarding the expiration of water authority employment contracts and other infractions.  The Fiji Trade Union Congress was the largest federation of trade unions in the country, representing 70 percent of the workforce.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings&nbsp;.																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wages and Hour Laws:  There was no official poverty level income figure, but the minimum wage did not typically provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.  The regulations stipulated all employers had to display a written national minimum wage notice in their workplace to inform employees of their rights.  The law provided for 48 hours for a six-day workweek or 45 hours for a five-day workweek.  There was no legal limit on overtime and employers generally paid overtime.The Employment Relations Tribunal and the Employment Court adjudicated cases of violations of wage and hour laws, particularly, common in wholesale and retail sectors.Occupational Safety and Health:  The government established appropriate workplace safety laws and regulations and places responsibility for identifying unsafe situations with experts, not workers.  Occupational safety and health (OSH) experts actively identified unsafe conditions in addition to responding to workers’ complaints.  It was unclear whether the law allowed workers to remove themselves from unsafe situations without jeopardy to their job.  Reports indicated most work-related accidents occurred in the construction, retail, restaurant, mining, tourism, and manufacturing sectors.  Media reported on workplace death cases.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement:  The Employment Ministry’s Office of Labor Inspectorate was responsible for enforcing the wage and hour laws but lacked the capacity to enforce the law effectively.  The Occupational Health and Safety Inspectorate monitored workplaces and equipment, investigated complaints from workers, and effectively enforced minimum wage, overtime, and OSH laws.  The number of inspectors was sufficient to enforce compliance.  Inspectors had the authority to conduct unannounced visits but could not enter without consent and had to inform the employer of their presence.  When inspectors believed informing the employer of their presence would prejudice the inspection, they could forgo this requirement.  Obstructing an inspection could lead to a fine.  Inspectors could suspend operations at businesses deemed to pose an immediate health or safety threat or risk.  Penalties were commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as negligence.  Delays in compensation hearings and rulings were common.  Penalties were regularly applied against violators.OSH in mines was the responsibility of the director of mines.The Employment Relations Tribunal and the Employment Court adjudicated compensation claims filed by the inspectorate on behalf of workers.Unions generally monitored safety standards in organized workplaces, but many work areas did not meet standards, and the Employment Ministry did not monitor all workplaces for compliance.  Workers in some industries, notably security, transportation, and shipping, worked excessive hours.The number of workers in the informal sector was estimated in 2019 at more than 66 percent of the workforce, including many workers on the tourism, aviation, and transport sectors.  Those informally employed did not enjoy the protections, including the rights to organize or to social protections, available to the formally employed.																																				    							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Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Fiji
- Trade and Investment – IPEF Supply Chain Agreement – Notification of Deposit of Instrument; Fiji, January 24, 2024 Office of Treaty Affairs
- Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources Verma’s Trip to  Australia, Fiji, and Indonesia Office of the SpokespersonDeputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Richard R. Verma will travel to Suva, Fiji; Canberra, Australia; Sydney, Australia; and Jakarta, Indonesia, from January 29 to February 2.  During his visit, Deputy Secretary Verma will focus on deepening critical relationships with U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.  He will also advance the United States affirmative vision for a secure and inclusive cyberspace while discussing efforts to meet demand for cyber and digital capacity building in the region.In Fiji and Australia, U.S. Ambassador at Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy Nathaniel C. Fick will accompany Deputy Secretary Verma.  In Suva, they will meet with government officials and digital industry representatives to discuss secure and trusted information and communications technology infrastructure.In Canberra, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet with senior Australian officials to coordinate U.S.-Australia efforts in the Indo-Pacific, including on cyber initiatives.  The Deputy Secretary will also meet with U.S. Embassy staff to hear their perspectives on what is important to them, as well as the salient bilateral and regional issues.In Sydney, Deputy Secretary Verma and Ambassador Fick will meet with academic and private sector leaders to enhance cooperation on emerging technologies and advanced telecommunications for the benefit of the region.In Jakarta, following the recent upgrade of U.S.-Indonesia ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Deputy Secretary Verma will meet senior Indonesian officials to discuss how to further capitalize on the strong U.S.-Indonesia partnership.  He will deliver remarks at U.S. Embassy Jakarta’s premier cultural center @america, highlighting the United States’ continuing commitment to the Indo-Pacific region as we commemorate the two-year anniversary of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.  He will also discuss our ongoing investment in Indonesia and the region’s success through initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Millenium Challenge Corporation Compacts, and a range of projects funded by the Development Finance Corporation.Also, while in Jakarta, as part of the ongoing U.S. commitment as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Deputy Secretary also will meet with several of the permanent representatives to ASEAN to highlight the U.S. support for the Laos Chair Year, including through cooperation on digital economy, artificial intelligence, and cyber issues and to reaffirm ASEAN centrality.
- Digital Press Briefing with Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023 Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023MODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023.  Captain Caluori will discuss this year’s Pacific Partnership, the largest annual multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the Indo-Pacific.  This year’s mission included stops in Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Fiji, Samoa, Palau, and Papua New Guinea, and will continue through the end of the year with a stop in Tonga.She will be joined today by Director of Medical Operations for Pacific Partnership 2023, U.S. Navy Captain Robert Carpenter and the Mission Engineer, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade Colby Gilbert.With that, let’s get started.  Captain Caluori, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you, and good afternoon.  I am U.S. Navy Captain Claudine Caluori.  I’m the Mission Commander for Pacific Partnership 2023.  When I’m not on mission, I am also the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 31, which is based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.First, let me start off by thanking you for being with us today and hearing about the great accomplishments that the 2023 Pacific Partnership mission is currently carrying out in the Pacific.  In my almost 25 years of service in the United States Navy, this has truly been one of the most astonishing missions of my career.So Pacific Partnership is the largest annual multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission in the Indo-Pacific.  Each year our mission team works with host and partner nations to enhance regional interoperability and disaster response capabilities.  We increase security and stability and we foster new and enduring friendships in the Indo-Pacific.  The relationship between the countries we have visited and our partners are deep and enduring.So on behalf of the U.S. Navy and the Pacific Partnership crew, we are honored to have visited so many wonderful countries, and we’re excited about our last mission stop on this incredible journey.  The Pacific Partnership 2023 team embarked on the Harpers Fairy-class dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor LSD 52 and was joined by the Independence-Class littoral combat ship USS Jackson, or LCS-6.As stated earlier, our mission began in August in Vietnam, and we’ve successfully completed stops in the Philippines, Malaysia, Samoa, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and we’re about to complete our stop here in Fiji.  And this is actually our second stop here in Fiji on this current mission.  A small crew of U.S. sailors had the opportunity to board the Japanese tank landing ship, the Japanese ship Shimokita, and they visited the Tailevu province just this past August, where they executed a mangrove revitalization project with other U.S. Navy and Army, the Royal New Zealand Navy and Air Force, the Japanese Maritime and Ground Self-Defense Forces, the Republic of Fiji Maritime Military Forces, and students of the Ballantine Memorial Secondary School.So as I mentioned earlier, the USS Jackson serves as a secondary platform for our mission, and they made their first stop in Fiji, where our team and the ship’s personnel visited the Lautoka School for Special Education, and they held a rugby match.  Unfortunately, they lost that match, but hey, they tried.  But it was at the Sangam Sadhu Kuppuswami Memorial College.  They also gave tours aboard the ship, and they were very grateful to have given this opportunity to visit Fiji not once but twice.And so this mission has allowed us to promote interoperability and multinational cooperation with allies and partners by highlighting multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief through medical and engineering projects, and it’s also in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.We continue our mission throughout the South Pacific until the end of the year.  We are now in its 18th year.  So Pacific Partnership 2023 consists of nearly 1,500 U.S. and partner nation personnel who will carry out this mission.  And it’s a joint effort on behalf of Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and the United States.And just for some background, Pacific Partnership was born out of the devastation wrought by the December 2004 tsunami that swept through parts of South and Southeast Asia, and began as a humanitarian response to one of the world’s most catastrophic natural disasters.So at the invitation of hosts and nations, our mission partners visit and conduct tailored humanitarian civic action preparedness activities in the areas such as engineering, disaster response, public health, and other outreach events.  And additional criteria are also considered, such as host nations’ objectives and desires.  The enduring goal of Pacific Partnership is promoting interoperability and multinational cooperation through multiple lines of effort to help be regional – help build, sorry, regional resilience and the capacity to respond to disasters.Our projects, as I said earlier, have been tailored at the request of host nations.  So while on our mission stops, we conduct these projects throughout cities and provinces that were selected.  And we have and we will continue to conduct subject matter expert exchanges in public health and preventative medicine, also in adult and pediatric medicine, basic life support, first aid lectures, dental care, and veterinary services.  These medical subject matter expert exchanges are designed to share expertise across participating nation providers to combine provider practices and bring cultural awareness.So Pacific Partnership transitioned from its primary focus of providing direct care to focus on collective capacity building.  So any direct care provided will be shoulder to shoulder with host nation and partner nations.  And the intent is that we share the knowledge and skills that are enduring and applicable well after the mission is completed.So military and civilian leaders agree about the necessity of collaboration to respond to disasters and emergencies quickly and effectively.  As we all know, storms and catastrophic events don’t know a country’s boundaries.  And this mission allows us to show response capabilities and show that we can prepare in calm to be able to respond to a crisis.As you are all very much aware, I’m sure, Indo-Pacific is within what the scientists call the Pacific Ring of Fire, and it’s not about if, but when we will need to work collectively to respond to natural disasters.  So the United States and our partners, we stand ready to assist when called upon.  Some recent relief efforts include the 2022 volcanic eruption and tsunami in Tonga; the 2018 Super Typhoon Yutu relief efforts in the Northern Mariana Islands; and the 2011 relief efforts during Operation Tomodachi in Japan, which followed the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.  So just to name few.So again, thanks for joining us and I’m happy to take your questions.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Captain Caluori.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.Our first question goes to Huizhong Wu of AP based in Bangkok, Thailand, who submitted their question in advance.  “I’d like to hear about U.S. military partnerships in the Federated States of Micronesia.”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you for your question.  So just recently, sailors and Marines assigned to Task Force Koa Moana 23 demonstrated their skills while bolstering U.S. alliances in the Pacific region.  So that task force, they worked on a series of construction projects in several Indo-Pacific nations over the summer.  The latest was the renovation of a – I can’t – of a municipal center on the island of Yap, Micronesia.  So just like Pacific Partnership, their mission helps to improve the health and safety of the communities, which in turn enhance U.S. relationships with its partners.Additionally, Pacific Partnership has visited the Federated States of Micronesia several times over the last years, to include 20 – 2008, ’11, ’15, most recently in 2019 with the USNS Brunswick, and they will also be visited in 2024, in January, with the USNS Mercy as a part of their mission coming up.MODERATOR:  Our next question goes to Bethany Allen of Axios based in Taipei, Taiwan.  And Bethany, I see that you also inputted your question in the Q&amp;A.  If you would like to unmute and pose your question, please do so now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Okay.  Yes, thank you.  I noticed that the Solomon Islands is not on the list of participating countries this year.  I know it has participated for several years in the past, including last year when it was supposed to participate and then in the ended up denying access to a U.S. Navy vessel but still allowed access to a U.S. hospital ship during the Pacific Partnership.  Why are they not on the list this year?  And is that related to their growing security partnership with China?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, Bethany.  Thank you for your question.  So to answer that, Pacific Partnership 24-1 is with the hospital ship USNS Mercy.  They will actually be going to the Solomon Islands.  Actually, they’re going to be arriving in the Solomon Islands – I think it’s on or around 18 November – and they’ll depart on 3 December.As far as the second part of your question, I can’t comment on any claims or hypothetical accusations on a previous mission.  However, last year from May through September, the USNS Mercy did stop in Palau and Philippines and Vietnam in addition to several events that included Federated States and Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, and Papua New Guinea.MODERATOR:  The next question goes to Vincent Choi from the South China Morning Post based in Hong Kong.  Vincent, if you could please unmute and please pose your question.QUESTION:  Hi, can you hear me?MODERATOR:  YesCAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, we can.  Thank you.QUESTION:  Yes.  Yeah, so there has been frequent clashes between Chinese and Philippine coast guard near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.  So how does the U.S. Navy observe the situation here and what are the plans you have regarding the cooperation with the Philippine navy in the in the region?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, can you say the second half of your question?  I think I caught the first half, but I didn’t quite grab the second one.QUESTION:  Oh yeah, okay.  So what are your – what are the plans you have regarding the cooperation with the Philippine navy in the South China Sea?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, great.  Thank you, Vincent.  I appreciate your question.  As far as – I’ll address the second one first, where we just talked about the cooperation.  And I just want to reiterate that our government has reaffirmed that a strong U.S.-Philippine alliance is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and that we’ll continue to partner closely with the Philippines.  And I know you’re aware that for more than 70 years the U.S. Navy has maintained a persistent maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is committed to continuing its forward presence, which is focused on stability and regional cooperation and economic prosperity for all nations.And then as far as the first part of your question, it’s like we’ll continue – the U.S. will continue to fly, sail, and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows.  And the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Joint Force, we remain dedicated to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and we expect all countries in the Indo-Pacific to operate in international waters safely and in accordance with international law.MODERATOR:  Our next question goes to Gordon Arthur from Naval News based in Christchurch, New Zealand.  Gordon, if you could please unmute and please ask your question now.QUESTION:  Hi there, Captain.  Thanks very much for this opportunity to listen and to ask you questions.  My question is to do with China, and I know the last few months in particular Chinese – China has been performing naval diplomacy in the South Pacific.  There have been hospital ships, training ships.  So just wondering, do you see the U.S. as complementing or competing with China for influence in the South Pacific?  And also during Pacific Partnership, have you had any encounters or contact with the PLA Navy?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you, Gordon, for your question.  So the U.S. Navy and our allies and partners, we value our growing cooperation with host nations and we look forward to enhancing the lines of communication and understanding that promotes greater cooperation and partnerships that benefit all nations.  And all Pacific Partnership 2023 operations are driven by host nation requests and approval.  As I stated earlier, the host nations invite the U.S. Navy and its mission partners to visit and conduct tailored humanitarian civic action preparedness activities in areas such as engineering, disaster response, public health and outreach events.  And all – again, all additional criteria are taken into consideration, such as the host nation objections and desires.  But I am not aware of any contacts at this time.MODERATOR:  Okay, we’re going to go to a question that was submitted in advance from Angie Chen of the Central News Agency based in Manila, Philippines.  “We are seeing higher tensions in the South China Sea, but some are worried that the U.S. is distracted by the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.  Will this concern be addressed in the Pacific Partnership this year?”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, thanks for the question.  Pacific Partnership is conducted yearly, so it’s not in response to any nation or current events.  Pacific Partnership does have an enduring history as a multinational mission designed to bring several nations together to build relationships, enhance interoperability, and elevate preparedness for responding to disaster emergencies in the region.So the focus is disaster relief preparation.  And as I stated earlier, for more than 70 years the U.S. Navy has maintained a persistent maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and we remain committed to continuing this forward presence, which is focused on stability, regional cooperation, and economic prosperity for all nations.  And as always, a free Indo-Pacific is vital to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question will go to Dat Duong Quoc from Trí newspaper in Vietnam.  If you could please unmute and ask your question now.QUESTION:  Hello.  Thank you for doing this.  So am I premature to ask about whether Vietnam will be included in the next year Pacific Partnership?  And has Vietnamese authorities made any invitation to you for the next year?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi.  Thank you for your question.  I am not aware if Vietnam is included in next year’s Pacific Partnership.  We have been going to Vietnam over the last several years, and the last time we were in Vietnam was – we were just in Phú Yên province, where we conducted over 119 events over 10 days.  And we’re looking forward to future collaboration with Vietnam.  And again, our relationship with Vietnam continues to grow stronger across an increasingly broad range of subjects, and Pacific Partnership is a way that we continue to develop these relationships.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to the Q&amp;A queue.  We have a correspondent from the Joongangilbo in South Korea.  If you would like to unmute and ask your question now, please do so.Okay, I will ask the question.  So this is from Joongangilbo from South Korea.  “We already have two wars in the Middle East and Europe, and there are many reports about military conflicts between the U.S. and China in Asia, especially around Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.  Do you think – do you think there is some possibility to occur another war in this area?  Thank you.”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you again for your question.  So our allies and partners are one of our greatest strengths and key strategic advantage.  We’re advancing a shared vision alongside our allies and partners of a free and open and secure Indo-Pacific, and we continue to deepen our connections with regional allies and partners, and we will continue to support our allies and partners as they strengthen those relationships with each other.  And we are committed – we remain committed to upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region where all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty, can pursue economic opportunity, and resolve disputes without coercion, and of course have the freedom to navigate and fly consistent with international laws and norms.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to Chino Gaston from the GMA Network Incorporated in Manila, Philippines, who submitted his question in advance.  “China has shown it will carry out law enforcement action against the Philippines to the extent of causing collisions with Philippine boats.  The Philippines is looking for help.  Will the U.S. help or will it continue to merely monitor the situation on the basis that gray zone operations do not bring about obligations under the MDT?”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, thank you for your question.  And so while I cannot comment directly on the U.S. response, again, I will say that the U.S. will continue to fly, sail, and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows.  These actions are destabilizing and they threaten the region’s security and prosperity.  And this is why our primary focus is on strengthening deterrence in collaboration with our growing network of allies and partners.  And we remain focused on building and strengthening international relationships both in preparation for and in response to disaster emergencies.MODERATOR:  We have just a few more minutes left for questions, so this next one will go to Joseph Thaddeus Morong.  Please unmute and ask your question.QUESTION:  Hi, good afternoon.  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes.QUESTION:  Hello?  Yeah, alright.  Cool.  Would the U.S. Navy be interested in joining the rotation and resupply mission of the Philippine coast guard?Hello?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, Joseph.  Sorry.QUESTION:  Yeah.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  I had the mute on.  (Laughter.)QUESTION:  That’s all right.  That’s all right.  Should I repeat my question?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, please do.QUESTION:  Okay.  So right now, the ones that are involved in the resupply missions in the Second Thomas Shoal are the Philippine coast guard primarily, but there have been ISR help from the U.S. State Department.  My question is:  Would the U.S. Navy be interested in a more proactive role in the sense that it will join the resupply missions in the Second Thomas Shoal just to send a message that the Philippines maybe is not alone in maintaining the (inaudible) there?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, Joe.  Thank you so much for your question.  And I just want to say that our government has reaffirmed that we have a strong U.S.-Philippine alliance, which is vital to the free and open Indo-Pacific region, and that we’ll continue to partner closely with the Philippines.  And I do want to say that our relations are based on strong historical and cultural linkages, and a shared commitment to democracy and human rights.  These strong people-to-people ties and economic cooperation provide additional avenues to engage on bilateral and regional and global issues.  And it’s like our alliance continues to contribute to the security of our two nations while also strengthening the rules-based order that benefits all nations within the Indo-Pacific.  Thank you again for your question.MODERATOR:  And our last question will go to David Santos from CNN Philippines.  Please unmute and ask your question.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for doing this.  I think we spoke to you, ma’am, in La Unión a few months back when Pacific Partnership was here.  I would like to ask, we are – the Philippines is marking the 10th year since Super Typhoon Haiyan hit the eastern Philippines, and we know that Pacific Partnership or the U.S. Government in general was part in that multinational response during that particular catastrophe.  I know that our security and defense alliance is largely focused on joint trainings, sharing of intelligence information, enhancing our defense capabilities.  But can you talk to us how HADR – humanitarian assistance and disaster response – has played a key role in enhancing that defense alliance?  Thank you very much.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, David.  Thank you.  And yes, I do remember our conversations when we were in San Fernando.  And thank you for your question.  I will say that having – having our continued cooperation through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is one of the ways that we can continue to promote greater cooperation and our partnership.  It’s one of those things where it’s almost a base level to continue and moving forward.  Because it’s something that we’re – no matter what we’re going to have to respond to it.  It’s like when we go out, we have this mission to where the hope is that we can become recovery and relief experts in order to better assist each other as we prepare for the next catastrophic events.  And the goal is that we continue to work together and respond in a crisis.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  If you have any closing remarks, Captain Caluori, I’ll turn it back over to you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, thank you so much.  I just want to kind of highlight a few of the things that we’ve done.  Well, multilateral missions like Pacific Partnerships are based on the common goal of enhancing regional stability with allies and partners, and it’s a unifying mission that fosters enduring friendships and cooperation among many nations.  And I just want to give a few statistics.I mean, so far over the last 3 months, we have conducted over 489 events, 316 of which were medical.  We’ve done 99 outreach events.  We’ve done 34 HADR symposiums and tabletop exercises.  And our engineers have conducted over 38 renovation and new construction projects so far.And I just want to say that having this Pacific Partnership continues to build trust among nations to work effectively together, and it’s crucial to maintaining peace and stability in the region.  Thank you again for everyone.MODERATOR:  Thank you to the participants for your questions today, and thank you to Captain Caluori for joining us, and thanks to your team as well from the Pacific Partnership 2023.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn’s Travel to Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn’s Travel to Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Acting Assistant Secretary Littlejohn’s Travel to Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji																																		Media Note																														October 19, 2023																																							Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Jennifer R. Littlejohn will travel to Australia, New Caledonia, and Fiji from October 21-31 to lead the U.S. delegation to the Pacific Community (SPC) conference and show strong U.S. support for the region and its climate resilience, oceans, and science and technology goals. The visit builds on strong U.S. engagement with partners in the region, including at the 52nd Pacific Island Forum Leaders Meeting and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s upcoming State Visit to Washington, D.C.While in Fiji, the Acting Assistant Secretary will launch a new Gender Equity and Equality Action (GEEA) Fund grant in support of Pacific women’s and girls’ crucial role in climate and clean energy solutions.For media inquiries, please contact OES-PA-DG@state.gov.						Tags																					Australia																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs																																Climate Change																																							Energy																															Fiji																																Gender																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Racial Equity and Justice																																																					The Ocean and Polar Affairs																																							U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit																																							U.S.-Pacific Island Forum Leader&#039;s Summit																																							Women’s Economic Empowerment
- Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Allen Travels to Fiji, Vanuatu, Australia, and Chile Office of the SpokespersonFrom October 11-19, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Liz Allen will visit Nadi, Fiji; Port Vila, Vanuatu; Sydney, Australia, and Santiago, Chile. The Under Secretary’s visit will demonstrate the United States’ ongoing commitment to key partners in the Pacific and South America; support open and free media environments; counter foreign malign influence; and strengthen and expand people-to-people ties.Under Secretary Allen will begin her travel in Nadi, Fiji, where she will meet with local partners and alumni of U.S. exchange programs to discuss their work in Fiji and the shared vision of a connected, prosperous, peaceful, and resilient Blue Pacific continent.The Under Secretary will then travel to Port Vila, Vanuatu, where she will meet with senior government officials to discuss shared climate priorities, regional cooperation, and the deepening U.S.-Vanuatu relationship in advance of the opening of the new U.S. embassy in Port Vila. The Under Secretary will also meet with media and civil society organizations in Vanuatu to discuss their work to increase transparency and promote democratic values.Under Secretary Allen will travel next to Sydney, Australia, to give opening remarks at the establishment of a Digital Communication Network (DCN) hub in East Asia and the Pacific. The DCN is a global NGO whose members collaborate across borders to promote independent storytelling, combat disinformation, and safeguard information integrity. She will also meet with senior Australian public diplomacy officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, local subject matter experts, and students to discuss methods for countering foreign malign influence, opportunities and challenges presented by artificial intelligence, and increasing research partnerships and collaboration in AUKUS-related cutting-edge fields. The Under Secretary will join Australia’s National Indigenous Culinary Institute, highlighting their modern approach to a time-honored way of learning about other cultures and forming new relationships. Under Secretary Allen will also visit The Guardian Australia to meet with staff working on their Pacific Project, which reports extensively across the Pacific Islands while training and mentoring up-and-coming journalists from those countries.The Under Secretary will conclude her trip with a visit to Chile for engagements with government officials, civil society leaders, and exchange participants to mark the 200th anniversary of bilateral relations and the 20th anniversary of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement. During sports and other cultural diplomacy events, she will promote social inclusion through exchange and highlight the value of English language learning. The Under Secretary will also visit an indigenous cultural center to discuss the value of economic inclusion, entrepreneurism, and climate activism, as well as reaffirm our appreciation for cultural heritage. During meetings with senior government officials and civil society leaders, the Under Secretary will underscore shared democratic values, the importance of countering foreign malign influence, and our commitment to economic cooperation, as well as announce new grants with strategic partners to advance shared goals.
- Fiji National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the United States of America, I want to congratulate the people of Fiji as you celebrate 53 years of independence on October 10.Since 1970, Fiji and the United States have worked together towards a free, open, and resilient Pacific.  Together, we are responding to the climate crisis; countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; addressing regional security concerns; and fostering economic development.  The United States appreciates the integral role Fiji plays as a leader in the Pacific region, and we value the decades-long friendship between our two countries.The United States is committed to friendship and partnership with Fiji for many years to come.  I wish the people of Fiji health, happiness, and prosperity on this important day.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsDr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and OceaniaMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists today to the on-the-record briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania.  The speakers will provide a readout on the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.With that, let’s get started.  Dr. Rapp-Hooper, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, and thanks to you all for being here this evening, this morning.  We’re glad to have the opportunity to read you out the President’s really consequential summit of Pacific Islands Forum leaders here in Washington just a few days ago, and thrilled to be joining my friend and colleague Dan Kritenbrink to do so.As you know, this week, leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum were all in Washington for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Island Leaders Summit.  By all accounts, this was an extremely successful and productive visit for the PIF leaders and for the President.  I’ll start with a brief recap of the leaders’ engagements over the past few days, and then I’ll discuss in brief some of the key deliverables that were announced over the course of the summit before handing the floor over to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.In advance of the formal meetings that took place in Washington, we got our summit started early on Sunday when Pacific Island Forum leaders took a trip from New York on a special Amtrak train down to Baltimore.  In Baltimore, the leaders attended a Baltimore Ravens game, where they were recognized for their role as American friends in the Indo-Pacific.  They even made it onto the field, where they were recognized before the game began.After the game, they toured a Coast Guard cutter ship in the Baltimore Harbor, the USS Forward, and had a meeting and opportunity to exchange views with Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Linda Fagan on key issues to Pacific Island leaders, including combating illegal fishing and effectively managing maritime domains.Following the Pacific Island Forum leaders’ trip to Baltimore, the leaders came to Washington, where they were hosted by President Biden at the White House on Monday for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Summit.  They also attended a climate roundtable hosted by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry as well as a dinner hosted by Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield about which Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will say more in just a moment.On Tuesday, the leaders also met with members of the philanthropic community, U.S. businesses, and members of Congress.  We closed out the summit with a reception hosted by our friends at the Australian embassy, emphasizing the depths of our people-to-people ties.  And I look forward to Dan speaking to those engagements in a bit more detail very soon.At the summit with PIF leaders on Monday, President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to shared regional priorities and to deepening our cooperation, including to tackling the climate crisis, advancing economic growth, promoting sustainable development, countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and expanding our people-to-people ties.Before getting into the deliverables that we unveiled on Monday, I’d first like to take a step back and recognize the milestones of engagement with PIF countries that we have passed over the course of the last couple of years.Just in the last year, we have opened new embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga in record time, thanks in no small part to the extraordinary work of our colleagues at the State Department.  We opened a USAID regional mission in Fiji and are returning the Peace Corps to the region after years of relative absence.  We are enhancing our engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum as the region’s leading institution, and we continue to expand U.S. cooperation and assistance programs throughout the region.At this year’s summit, we announced expanded ties with our recognition, our diplomatic recognition, of the Cook Islands and Niue, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with both of these Pacific Island nations.Since last year’s summit, this May, Secretary Blinken met with the Pacific Island Forum leaders in Papua New Guinea, and at this week’s summit, the Biden-Harris administration has continued to show that we are delivering on our promises.  All told, we have now announced a commitment to work with Congress towards over $8 billion in new funding and programs for the Pacific Island region.  And again, this is just in the last year.On Monday, President Biden announced a new slate of activities, including plans to work with Congress to request and provide nearly $200 million in new funding.  These programs seek to address the priority issues we hear about from Pacific Island leaders, including the climate crisis – which is existential for many of our Pacific Island friends – and we always stand shoulder to shoulder with them as they work to meet the challenge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.The President on Monday also reaffirmed his commitment to the security of the Blue Pacific Continent, and to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, the United States has announced that it will provide over $11 million to bring cutting-edge maritime domain awareness technology to the Pacific through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to help improve the maritime picture and law enforcement information analysis and provision amongst our Pacific Island friends.We’re also delivering on our promise to invest in the prosperity of the region.  As the President has announced, we will invest an additional $40 million working with Congress to expand our Pacific Islands Infrastructure Initiative.  Through this initiative, we’re bringing technical assistance and project preparation work needed to identify commercially viable projects through partners in the U.S. Government, including the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.These are just a few of the key initiatives announced as part of our summit.  One more that I’d flag that we’re happy to go into during our question-and-answer period involves a new microfinance facility that will offer small and micro loans to Pacific Island businesses so that entrepreneurs there have the chance to thrive.  And these deliverables we are working towards illustrate the depths of our collaboration with the Pacific Islands and the promise of expanding our partnership for many years to come.As President Biden has said, the United States is and will long remain a proud Pacific nation.  And as a Pacific nation, the United States is here for the long haul and will continue to deliver on our promises to our partners in the region.I’ll hand the floor over to Dan to talk more about Secretary Blinken’s consequential engagements with the PIF leaders throughout the summit.  Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, thanks so much, and good evening, everyone.  I think, as my esteemed colleague Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper has outlined, this was a tremendously successful summit that I think demonstrates further the breadth and depth of America’s commitment to the Pacific.  And Mira, I thought that was really a tremendous rundown of a momentous series of events related to the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.I thought that I would focus my remarks a bit more narrowly on some of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s significant engagements with the Pacific Island leaders here in Washington, and then also mention briefly the engagement involving the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry’s meetings during the summit as well.As Secretary Blinken put it, our engagements were designed to show that we’re seizing on the possibilities of this moment to build a more secure, resilient, inclusive, and prosperous Pacific region.As Secretary Blinken also said on Monday night, the fundamental fact is this:  Our fates are tied together.  We’ve long been committed development partners to the Pacific Islands, and we’re excited to bring new energy and resources to the Pacific, working with partners in the Pacific Islands on our shared goal of meeting Pacific priorities and supporting Pacific institutions.We saw this last week, last Friday at the UN – at the end of the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, when Secretary Blinken hosted a Partners in the Blue Pacific ministerial in New York.  And at that meeting on Friday, we aimed to highlight the tremendous work we’ve done to advance more effective and efficient cooperation and engagement with our Pacific partners, designed to strengthen Pacific regionalism and to facilitate and encourage other partners and institutions to engage and consult with the Pacific.  And of course those efforts flowed nicely into the Pacific Islands Forum Summit itself, which began, as Mira indicated, on Monday.I think a clear sign of our commitment to the Pacific region came through the establishment of diplomatic relations with both Niue and the Cook Islands.  Following an announcement from President Biden earlier on Monday, Secretary Blinken hosted Niue Premier Dalton Tagelagi and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown for two separate signing ceremonies here in the State Department Treaty Room to make these momentous occasions.  These historic announcements reaffirmed our joint commitments to deepen our cooperation as equal and sovereign partners, guided by respect, genuine engagement, and partnership.  We fully anticipate working even closer with Niue and the Cook Islands on our shared priorities, which include the climate crisis, renewable energy, Pacific regionalism, and good governance, among many others.Secretary Blinken then had the pleasure of joining the millennium compact corporation CEO Alice Albright and iKiribati President Taneti Maamau for a signing ceremony for an MCC-Kiribati threshold program grant agreement that will provide up to $29.1 million to promote safe, accessible, decent, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers, both in Kiribati and across the region.  This will be the United States’ largest direct grant investment in Kiribati to date, and it is an agreement that we believe will deliver clear results and benefits to people in the Pacific Islands and solve real challenges to shape our future.I wanted to mention, also on Monday evening, Secretary Blinken hosted really a spectacular dinner here at the State Department in the newly renovated Benjamin Franklin Room, which was an opportunity for the Secretary and other leaders across the U.S. Government to meet with all of the Pacific Island leaders and to discuss in more detail ways that we can expand our cooperation in the future.  The Secretary was delighted to host the banquet with his co-host, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield – of course, America’s Permanent Representative to the UN – and at the dinner, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced that she will be America’s representative to the next Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Summit in November of this year.I think the final event of the summit, the two-day summit, for Secretary Blinken was his meeting with representatives from the Freely Associated States.  Namely, he met with Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ading, he met with Federated States of Micronesia President Simina, and with Palau President Whipps.  That was on Tuesday, late Tuesday afternoon.During the meeting, the Secretary took the opportunity to underscore the strong people-to-people ties and shared history underpinned by the Compacts of Free Association between the U.S. and these three Freely Associated States.  The Secretary commended the dignitaries for the progress in the negotiations on the compact-related agreements, which we believe signals a new era in our partnerships that will help advance a secure, free, and open Pacific.  And we look forward to further progress on these Compacts of Free Association agreements in the months to come.Finally, of course, climate change, as Mira indicated, was a major topic of discussions since it is such an existential challenge, and we recognize it, as our partners do, as the single greatest threat facing the Blue Pacific.Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry met with Pacific leaders on Monday to discuss the climate crisis and ocean resilience.  Secretary Kerry reiterated the United States’ new policy on sea-level rise and statehood that President Biden had earlier announced as well as new investments in strengthening early warning systems and sustainable development.So in the interest of time, why don’t I stop there.  I know that Mira and I will be delighted to take your questions.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.  We’ll now turn it over to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  The first question will go to Ralph Jennings from the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, who sent his question in advance:  “How does the recent U.S. engagement with the South Pacific help offset China’s economic influence in the region?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, do you want to take that one first or you want me to dive in?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  I’m happy to take that one, Dan.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Please.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  And I’ll turn to you in just a moment to add your thoughts.  Thanks for the question.  I would say just as a topline matter, when we’re working with our Pacific Island friends, we’re really not focused principally on China.  We’re focused on what the United States can offer as a likeminded partner to this group of countries.  And we are very focused on delivering positive, attractive alternatives to these countries that can help them and their people thrive.  But it’s really about what we stand for together alongside our Pacific Island partners, not about who or what we’re against.But with that in mind, I will note that, as the President announced, our $200 million in new programs for Pacific Island Forum nations do include some really consequential new programs that we believe are going to help our friends in the Pacific to generate the economic dynamism that they’re looking for to offset and combat climate change and to continue their recovery from the pandemic, where they were especially hard-hit.Just as a few examples, we’re stepping up our infrastructure efforts.  Specifically, as I mentioned, the President announced $40 million to new infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands.  He also announced that the United States will be undertaking new submarine cable projects in the Pacific Islands to build secure, reliable connectivity amongst Pacific Island nations and to ensure that our friends there have the basic digital infrastructure that they need, like reliable, speedy internet on which so many businesses and individuals rely.  And of course, that submarine cable work builds on work we have been doing in recent years, including with the East Micronesia Cable, where we’ve already begun work to improve high-quality and more reliable secure communications for over 100,000 people in the Pacific Islands.  So infrastructure is a big part of our work.We are also delivering a new Millennium Challenge Corporation project with the Government of Kiribati, which is intended to advance economic growth in Kiribati in partnership with the International Labor Organization and American Councils of International Education to bolster and promote safe, accessible, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers.Through the Quad, we are partnering with the Government of Palau to implement the deployment of a new ORAN network that is a next-generation, secure mobile network to help Palau get the secure connectivity that it needs.  And as we mentioned at the top of the call, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency is working throughout the Pacific Islands to identify through its technical work opportunities for more viable projects in the months and years to come.So this is just a sampling of the work that we’re doing to try to bring the economic tools we have to bear to help Pacific economies thrive, but I’ll hand it back to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to see what he might like to add.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, that’s a brilliant answer.  I – all I could really do is foot-stomp what Mira has already said.  We approach the region from the perspective of advancing our affirmative agenda – the shared interests and values that we hold in common with our Pacific partners.That’s our focus, not any notion of focusing on a third party.  And as we often say, we have a regional strategy.  We’re focused on our affirmative agenda.  And I think if we continue to deliver benefits to our partners in the Indo-Pacific, I’m very confident and optimistic about our future together.In particular, as Dr. Rapp-Hooper has indicated, our entire approach to the Pacific is predicated on meeting our Pacific Island friends where they live.  In other words, in conversation with our Pacific partners, we have understood clearly what their needs and concerns and interests are, as outlined very clearly in the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.  And by design, our work and the work of our other partners through the Partners in the Blue Pacific is specifically designed to address the needs that they themselves have outlined in their strategy.Again, that is the focus of our efforts, not any third parties.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  The next question is going to go to Rurika Imahashi, who submitted the question on the chat, the Q&amp;A box here on Zoom.  “Our understanding is that the Marshall Islands parliament will soon certify the compact deal with the U.S.  What is the U.S. understanding on the development of the agreement?”  So we’ll answer that part.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, why don’t I take an initial stab at this one and we’ll ask you, obviously, to add anything else that you would like.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Sounds good.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I guess what I would say to any friends with questions about the compacts, I would just simply underscore that the compacts remain of vital importance to the United States.  I think they recognize our deep and historic ties to the three Freely Associated States.  I think they embody the strong ties between the peoples and the governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.  And we remain very optimistic about the progress that we’ve made in the compact-related negotiations.I know when Secretary Blinken sat down with the leaders of the three Freely Associated States, he really commended them for the progress that we’ve made.  I think as everyone is tracking, we signed COFA-related agreements with Palau in May and with the Federated States of Micronesia in May, and we’ve made tremendous progress with our friends in the Marshall Islands.  We’re confident that we will conclude all of these agreements very soon and we will continue to build out these incredibly significant relationships that are central to everything we hope to achieve in the Pacific.And I think, as friends are tracking, that these compacts really are extraordinary agreements that are 20-year agreements in duration, and again, we’re confident that we will conclude them and implement them very soon.But, Mira, would you like to add anything to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Not much that I could add, Dan, except just to foot-stomp the point that we believe we are well on our way; we’ll soon be at a successful conclusion and very much look forward to being able to mark that milestone after months of really terrific cooperation with all of the Freely Associated States.  That’s all for me.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Yeah, and maybe just one final comment.  I think Mira’s comments reminded me that I do want to recognize that obviously this work is all being done at the direction of President Biden and Secretary Blinken, but our Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joe Yun and his team have also done a brilliant job and I really commend them.  And as Mira indicated, we’re very close and look forward to implementing them very soon.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to Stephen Wright from Radio Free Asia’s BenarNews Service.  Stephen, I also see that your hand is up.  If you’d like to unmute and ask your question, please go ahead.  Yeah, please go ahead and unmute.QUESTION:  Yeah, thanks.  Prime Minister Sogavare didn’t attend the recent summit and subsequently he said the U.S. should show respect to Pacific Island leaders and not lecture them at summits.  What do you think that shows about the progress of U.S. and Solomon Islands relations?  And are there any plans to have an ambassador at the new but smaller embassy in the Solomon Islands?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks very much.  This is Mira; I’m happy to take a first crack at this, and Dan, perhaps I’ll pass to you just on the embassy piece.We were disappointed that Prime Minister Sogavare was unable to attend the summit in Washington.  We did reach out, including at the very highest levels, to encourage him to join us for this terrific conversation that we’ve been laying out for you here, this opportunity to engage amongst friends, and we’re disappointed that he declined to do so.I don’t have much to say about the specific comments except to note, I think as we have been throughout this call tonight, that the conversation with the President, with the Secretary of State, with every cabinet official and member of Congress at the Pacific Island Forum leaders met with was collaborative, constructive, forward-looking, and I think most importantly involved an incredible amount of listening by U.S. Government officials to continue to refine their understanding of what our Pacific Island Forum friends are most looking for from us.So that’s the approach that we’re going to continue to take.  We continue to believe that it’s the right approach.  We feel that our three really dynamic days of programming show that we’re on the right track, and we look forward to continuing that work on the road ahead.Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Mira.  Maybe specifically on the question regarding our presence in the Solomon Islands, I’ll just note that we were excited and honored to open our new U.S. embassy in Honiara in January of this year, which was less than one year after Secretary Blinken announced our intent to do so.  Really excited about the work that our embassy colleagues there, led by Chargé Russ Comeau – excited about the work that they’re doing, again, to build our friendship and our ties with the people of the Solmon Islands and ensure that we work to deliver tangible benefits to our partners there.Of course, any new first step in opening an embassy involves staffing it, and of course our chargé d’affaires currently leading our embassy efforts there, and we recognized him for his really stellar work there.I would simply say at this point we have taken a number of steps internally to identify the U.S. ambassador, the next U.S. ambassador to the Solomon Islands, and I don’t have anything to announce to you this evening.  But I hope we’ll have something to announce in the near future, but we are certainly working towards that end.  Thank you.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Dan, if I may just jump in really quickly to add one additional detail.  I did want to note, as Dan noted, the – our wonderful Chargé Russ Comeau in the Solmon Islands was given a really important inaugural award at the dinner so graciously hosted by Secretary Blinken during the Pacific Island Forum Summit.  That inaugural award commemorates intrepid diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, and Chargé Comeau really embodies that to a T.  He has been just absolutely indefatigable in working to build U.S.-Solomons ties.I underscore that because I do want to make clear that the purpose of an award like this is to continue to draw attention to and raise up Americans who are doing their utmost on the ground to build ties with the Pacific Islands.  And I think the fact that we’ve established this award this year, that it was given by the Secretary of State, is just yet another demonstration that we are continuing to create incentives, recognize achievements so that Americans continue to step up and deliver on our promises throughout the Pacific.MODERATOR:  Okay.  I realize that we’re running a little bit over.  We started a few minutes late, so we’ll take a couple more questions.  We have one from Daniel Hurst from The Guardian.  “To what extent is the United States concerned about the newly announced comprehensive strategic partnership between Timor-Leste and China?  Why or why not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Perhaps I can take an initial crack at that one and then ask Mira to chime in.  Look, I think as we indicated earlier, our message to partners in the region is that we’re not asking countries to choose.  We’re in the business of trying to ensure that countries have the ability to make their own sovereign decisions and their own choices free from coercion.My second point would be, as indicated earlier, we’re focused on our affirmative agenda in the region, including with friends in Timor-Leste, and we’ll continue to do that.  We’ll focus on how we can further build out our friendship and partnership with counterparts in the region, including Timor-Leste, and focus on the great work that we can do together.But again, we’re not in the business of asking countries to choose, and I don’t really think it’s beneficial to try to get into some kind of a comparison game or comment on engagement of other partners with the PRC.But, Mira, what would you like to add to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  I’m in violent agreement.MODERATOR:  Great.  We are – let’s see.  If the speakers are okay, can we take one more question?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Absolutely.  Please.MODERATOR:  Great.  Great.  And this one is from Mar-Vic Cagurangan from the Pacific Island Times, based in Tamuning, Guam, who sent it in advance:  “How will a federal shutdown affect the Compact of Free Association, COFA?  Will the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau continue to receive funds throughout the shutdown?  Do you think this affect – this will affect the U.S. credibility with the Freely Associated States?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, perhaps I could provide an initial answer on this one as well and then be happy to turn to you.  Yeah, I really do appreciate the question, and I’ll just underscore what I mentioned earlier.  We’re really excited about the progress we’ve made in the compact negotiations and we’re confident that all of these agreements will be concluded soon.The issue that you raised here was discussed in some detail in the meeting between Secretary Blinken and the three leaders from the Freely Associated States, and I can assure you that we are in very close and constant communication with our friends both in the Freely Associated States and with leaders on Capitol Hill to make sure that we have a plan going forward under all circumstances that will allow us to meet our obligations under the compacts.I think, as friends may be tracking, that the draft Compact of Free Association agreements, the draft legislation on the Hill includes authority to continue programs and services at the same levels provided under current agreements until the new agreements are in place so as to avoid a lapse in services.  And we’re also working very closely with our friends so that if there were to be any kind of a lapse in appropriations that we can take the appropriate mitigating steps wherever possible to minimize any possible impacts on our friends in the Freely Associated States.But I think that I can assure you we’re in close and frequent contact with our friends in the Freely Associated States and I’m confident we have a plan to work through any contingency.Mira, what would you like to add?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  Thanks so much.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And for our closing remarks, I’d like to turn it back to Dr. Rapp-Hooper.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, folks, for joining us this evening.  I think from this conversation you’ve gotten a pretty good lay of the land of the incredibly substantive set of conversations that took place in Washington this week.  The point I want to emphasize before we let you go is that for us, this project, this promise to renew our ties, renew our commitment to the Pacific Islands, is really about much more than a three-day summit.  It’s about delivery on the promises that we’ve made in the last two years, which I think we showed in spades this week, but on delivery on those new conversations and those new commitments that have been made just this week.We have clear instructions from the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and many others to move out expeditiously on everything that we announced alongside our Pacific Island friends earlier this week, and we intend to literally put our money where our mouth is and deliver on everything that we seek to do together in the Pacific, whether that is providing finance so that friends in the Pacific can more quickly and readily adapt to climate change or providing micro and small loans to entrepreneurs and small businesses so that women leaders in particular can get the financing they need to allow them to contribute to increasingly dynamic Pacific economies.So we’re really just still in the opening chapter of the new Pacific story that we’re writing here under the Biden administration, but we feel like we have made tremendous progress in just the last two years, and we are emerging from this week’s summit energized and ready to hit the ground running with this new set of programs and new set of promises, and we look forward to being back in touch to share more about how this exciting work is all going.MODERATOR:  And Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for any closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I can’t say it any better than that.  Beautifully summarized by Mira.  Really grateful to all of our friends in the media for joining us here tonight.  And as Mira indicated, we’re committed to now implementing all of the agreements and the objectives that we’ve set out flowing from this latest summit, and very optimistic, again, about our future ahead with friends in the Pacific.  Thanks again for joining us tonight.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time today.  Thank you for your questions and thank you to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink and Dr. Rapp-Hooper for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Digital Press Briefing with Michael Schiffer, USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia, and Anka Lee, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator and Senior Advisor Michael Schiffer, USAID Assistant Administrator for AsiaAnka Lee, USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator and Senior AdvisorMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with USAID Assistant Administrator for Asia Michael Schiffer and USAID Deputy Assistant Administrator and Senior Advisor Anka Lee.  The speakers will discuss USAID Administrator’s Samantha Power’s upcoming visit to Papua New Guinea and Fiji from August 13th to August 16th, USAID’s efforts in the Pacific Islands, and the U.S. Government’s commitment to the region. With that, let’s get started.  Assistant Administrator Schiffer, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks. MR SCHIFFER:  Terrific.  Thank you very much.  Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening depending on where you are, everyone.  Thank you very much for joining us today.  I&#8217;m Michael Schiffer, the Assistant Administrator for the Asia Bureau at the United States Agency International Development, or USAID, and I&#8217;m joined by our Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and Learning and Senior Advisor Anka Lee.   For those of you who are not familiar with USAID, since our founding more than 60 years ago, USAID has heled to tackle some of the toughest challenges of our time.  With development partners around the world, we&#8217;ve helped lift millions out of poverty and push back against oppression.  We&#8217;ve helped start the Green Revolution in the 1960s and avert an age of global and continuous famine.  We&#8217;ve helped eradicate smallpox, reverse the spread of AIDS, and dramatically decrease the incidence of malaria and tuberculosis around the world.  We have supported dozens of transitions from autocracy to democracy, enabled tens of millions of girls to attend school, and provided lifesaving aid to communities torn apart by disaster, war, or other crises.  Much of our work has happened alongside our partners in Asia and the Pacific region, and as we seek to deepen our partnership with the countries in this region and in the Pacific, the head of our agency, Administrator Samantha Power, will travel to Papua New Guinea and Fiji next week.   The administrator will be in Port Moresby on Sunday, August 13th, and Monday, August 14th.  While there, she will speak with people benefiting from clean and reliable energy for the first time because of USAID programming.  She&#8217;ll also have the chance to hear from women and civil society leaders about their vision for the future of Papua New Guinea, and she’ll meet with government leaders to discuss how USAID can further support democracy, human rights and good governance.  Underpinning all of this, Administrator Power will officially open USAID&#8217;s PNG Country Representative Office.  With this new and expanded office, our agency will be in a better position to listen, partner, and deliver lasting development progress for the people of PNG and the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.   She will then continue her trip to be in Fiji August 15th and 16th.  While in Fiji, she&#8217;ll engage with future leaders of the Pacific Islands at the University of the South Pacific, meet with Fijians in an HIV/AIDS clinic to discuss how we can continue to strengthen health systems, and she will see how USAID is creating greater economic opportunities and preparing villagers for future disasters as the climate crisis intensifies. While there, at the invitation of Admiral Aquilino, she will speak at the Chiefs of Defense Conference about underpinning U.S. engagement in the region based on defense, diplomacy, and development – our 3D concept, the three legs of the stool for U.S. foreign policy and national security engagement in the Indo-Pacific.   Critically and importantly, Administrator Power will also open USAID&#8217;s regional mission in Fiji, and we&#8217;ll be doing that ahead of the schedule promised by President Biden at last year&#8217;s Pacific Islands summit.  This new regional mission will cover nine Pacific Island nations so that we can work even more closely with our Pacific Island partners and neighbors to be a positive and constructive partner in the region and in the lives of Pacific Islands – Pacific Islanders.   I will be accompanying the administrator on this trip, and we are thrilled to be in the region and to have the opportunity to listen to our partners and to discover how we can more effectively deliver on the priorities set by the Pacific Islanders.  As the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific put it, a resilient Pacific region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion, and prosperity that ensures all Pacific peoples can lead free, healthy, and productive lives is the goal that we share with our partners in the Pacific.  Thank you, and with that, we look forward to answering your questions. MODERATOR:  Thank you, Assistant Administrator Schiffer.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today&#8217;s briefing.   Our first question was received in advance from Kirsty Needham of Reuters, based in Sydney, Australia, who asks:  “Can you update us on USAID to the Solomon Islands?  Recently, Ambassador Caroline Kennedy said in a TV interview that the U.S. had offered to provide hundreds of millions for infrastructure funding, but was waiting for approval from Solomon Islands Government.”  Over to you. MR SCHIFFER:  Thank you.  Very good question.  One of the reasons why we&#8217;re so excited about opening our Country Representative Office in PNG, which will cover PNG but also the Solomons and Vanuatu, is that it&#8217;s going to provide us with the footprint and the presence in the region and allow us to build the relationships that we need so that we can better listen to our Pacific Island partners as we engage in our shared and common problem-solving, and that obviously very much includes working in the Solomons. So having that presence is going to allow us to really step up as we look to better meet our partners where they are and to be able to work alongside them in fulfilling their own vision for their development pathways. Earlier this year, I was part of an interagency delegation that went out to the Solomons as well as PNG, Vanuatu, and Fiji, and we engaged in some very, very good and wide-ranging conversations with both local communities but also representatives of the of the Solomons Government, including Prime Minister Sogavare and others in his cabinet, where we were able to have a good conversation about their views on what their development needs were, and we offered to be able to engage in ongoing and continuous development dialogue to figure out how we could work better together.  And that includes possibly – and we talked about this directly with the prime minister – being able to expand the work that we&#8217;re doing in Malaita Province with our SCALE, our Strengthening Competitiveness, Agriculture, Livelihoods and Environment project, which is a 25 million, five-year project that USAID is undertaking in the Solomons; as well as other efforts.   I don&#8217;t want to get ahead of where that conversation is with both the government and local communities in the Solomons, but just to underscore that we are very, very open to ideas, thoughts for how we can go about better designing and implementing across a whole range of economic and governance and development initiatives in the Solomons, and looking forward to working closely with their government and local communities as we do so. MODERATOR:  All right.  Our next question goes to Marjorie Finkeo of The Post Courier, based in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.  Marjorie asks:  “How much does USAID in total offer in PNG?”  Over to our speakers. MR SCHIFFER:  Can I ask for clarification of that question?  Is that a dollar-figure issue, or is that – and I apologize if I’m – it&#8217;s early in the morning here for us – or is that the complexion of the types of programs that we offer?   MODERATOR:  Marjorie typed her question in the tab, so I don&#8217;t know if she&#8217;s able to unmute herself.  The – if I&#8217;m going to allow her to unmute herself, if she&#8217;d like to.  But maybe you could speak to both if you&#8217;re able to. MR SCHIFFER:  I can – I can certainly try to.  Since – over the past 20 years, total U.S. assistance to PNG, the Solomons, and Vanuatu have totaled close to $400 million, and we can get you an exact – loop back with an exact breakdown for PNG if that is – if that&#8217;s of interest.   In terms of the types of programming we do, we have been engaged in the – in electrification projects that there&#8217;s been a major focus of attention, and that will be part of the administrator’s trip through the PNG Electrification Partnership, our PEP activity.  We also have health and basic education programs that we work in PNG.  We have done considerable work helping to manage and protect, alongside local partners, tribal land with our “Look After the Environment” – not “Look After the Environment; it’s in quotes – activity.   So it&#8217;s a wide range of undertakings.  We&#8217;ll be happy to make sure that you get a fact sheet on all of our activities in the PNG – in PNG.  And again, I&#8217;ll just underscore that all of that work has been done in close consultation and collaboration with local partners so that we&#8217;re making sure that the work that we&#8217;re doing is responsive to the needs of people on the ground and fits with their vision for what they want their development pathways to look like. MODERATOR:  All right.  Our next question comes from – was submitted in advance and comes from Nicholas Ludlam of SBS, based in Sydney, Australia.  Nicholas asks:  “Australia recently signaled a shift in aid policy in the Pacific to combat China&#8217;s growing influence.  Is that something USAID is looking to do?” MR LEE:  Yeah, no, thank you.  I can go ahead and take that one.  And good morning and afternoon, evening, to everybody, too, and thank you so much for joining this call. I think the first thing I&#8217;ll say is I want to double down on everything that my colleague Michael Schiffer said, which is exactly right.  Our goal, really, there is really more about our partners and about us, and about us working with them, listening to them, demonstrating our resolve and commitment to the region, and I think making sure that we are answering to the needs of what they want us to be helping them to do when it comes to climate shocks, when it comes to electrification, when it comes to making sure that fishing is still open and transparent and are able to sustain livelihood and people can feed their families in the region.  But if the question is:  Is the United States truly there to be committed to the region?  And I think there’s nothing more demonstrative and I think nothing more that shows our true commitment to Asia and the Indo-Pacific than history. And I think I – last year, I actually went to Seoul, South Korea, and had a great conversation with our partners in the Korean Development Agency.  And if you’ve ever been to the headquarters building, you walk in the lobby, you notice there’s a museum.  And I noticed there was in the display case an old flour bag with the logo “From the American people.”  There was no USAID at the time yet, but it was an American flag and “From the American people.”   What really struck me was the extent to which the partnership we built really over 70, 80 years ago is enduring.  It lasts.  We no longer offer foreign assistance to South Korea today.  We stopped that in 1980.  But they have since become a donor partner to us.  They are now working with us.  They have given last year $3 billion globally to work with us to make sure that we’re able to advance open, transparent, and sovereign societies.  That is the kind of story that we want to be able to tell in the Asia Pacific.  This is our story in the region.  We are committed.  We are committed for the sake of our partners and of the long-term commitment, and that’s what we are there to do.   Now, you’ve all heard from our colleagues at the State Department – Secretary Blinken has said it before – China’s presence is growing in the region.  We have seen some problematic activities there from the way that investments are done and how that’s detrimental and potentially in some cases to sustainability and also to good governance issues.  China will do what it chooses to do, but the United States will also do and choose what we choose to do.   I think what we want to focus on, one, is making sure that we are answering the needs of our partners; and two, offer more choices so that they can make the right decisions and good decisions for themselves and what’s good and what’s best for them.  We want to make sure that we are offering assistance that are in grants, not in loans.  And our goal really is to be able to empower our partners to invest in their own futures.   And finally I’ll say what we want to do – and I think this is where we want to really just amp up the unique nature and the positive nature of the work that we do in our right – and that is we want to work with local partners.  There are so many great experts, as Michael knows who works in that region so long, who are having the greatest ideas and expertise and commitment to solving climate issues.  We want to reach down to the communities, not just at a high level, but reach down to the communities, work with the communities, and be able to find solutions that are good, that come from them, and ultimately will benefit their own interests.   So I’ll say it’s about our enduring commitment.  It’s about showing that we actually care and can deliver.  But in the end, it’s also about making sure that we’re answering to the needs and what our partners want us to be working with them so we can actually build a good community together going forward.   MODERATOR:  Okay.  Our next question comes from Takumi Kobayashi of Nikkei, who is based in Tokyo, who asks:  “Do you believe that PNG’s goal to achieve 70 percent regarding electrification by 2030 is achievable with the U.S. aid?  If so, what are the specific plans to achieve it?” MR SCHIFFER:  We do believe it is achievable, and at the very least we think that it is the right target for us to be shooting at.  And we are looking as we work through with our partners in PNG as well as other partners in the international community through the PEP project to help PNG achieve that goal.  If we come in at 69 percent, that won’t be a failure.  If we come in at 71 percent, that’ll be – that will be a little better than expected.   But I think the point is that helping PNG and working with PNG as they seek to provide electricity to 70 percent of their population by 2030 is a worthwhile goal.  It’s a good goal.  It’s the sort of aspiration that we should have together for how to better livelihoods and how to create opportunities for economic growth, and do so in a way that is environmentally sustainable given the challenges that we face with climate change.   So it’s precisely the sort of aspiration that we want to be able to engage in with our partners, so we intend to continue to work with the PNG and, as I said, other international partners on the PEP project in the years ahead.  And that’s precisely why one of the administrator’s stops, as I mentioned, is intended to highlight that activity while she is in PNG. MODERATOR:  All right.  Our next question goes to the live queue to Stephen Wright of BenarNews and Radio Free Asia, based in Brisbane, Australia.  Stephen, you should be able to unmute yourself now.   QUESTION:  Thank you.  Can you hear me?   MODERATOR:  Yes, we can. QUESTION:  Okay.  In Malaita Province in the Solomon Islands, with the SCALE project operates – there was frustration about the length of time that it was taking to provide benefits or expectations of benefits to the local community.  Will USAID efforts take – or need to take a different approach and scale in the future in the Solomon Islands or – and if so, how? MR SCHIFFER:  Yeah, I would offer that we – we have heard some of that frustration as well.  We’re trying to be responsive to it.  I think for scale, as with all of the work that we do at USAID around the world, we are trying to constantly listen, learn, course correct, and do better – and do better in ways that are, as I’ve said before, responsive to the voices and the needs that we’re hearing from our partners at – in local communities, at the provincial level, and at the national government level. There is no shame in titrating as you go and improving your programming so that you can be better.  We are constantly trying to be a learning organization that can work better to meet partner needs.  And that’s our intention with SCALE in Malaita Province or if we’re able to work with the government in the Solomon Islands and local communities in other provinces to expand its footprint.  We think – and I think there are voices in the local communities in Malaita that would agree – that even with the frustrations that may sometimes exist because people want, understandably, more – more progress, faster, better; we share that – even with that, we think SCALE has done a lot of good and delivered considerable progress in the Solomons, and we hope to be able to continue to do so. MODERATOR:  Our next question goes to Lawrence Fong.  Lawrence is joining us from The Post Courier in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.  Lawrence asks:  “PNG Prime Minister James Marape during all his engagements with foreign leaders who have visited his country promoted the need for committed economic development for his country by the bilateral partners, including the U.S., Australia, India, China, and, more recently, the French.  How can the U.S. help Mr. Marape achieve his desires of economic development apart from military cooperation?”   MR SCHIFFER:  Well, look, I think that very much gets to the heart of the administrator’s trip and the heart – and to the heart of our approach across the U.S. Government of making sure that we are knitting together diplomacy, defense, and development as the three D’s, the three legs of the stool for our engagement in the Pacific Islands and indeed in the Indo-Pacific more broadly.   Opening up the Country Representative Office we think represents a significant signal of our investment and our commitment in working with the PNG on economic development, social development, good governance, and other development programs that the government and local communities and partners are helping us to identify so that we can be responsive to their needs and their vision for their country.  That’s what we want to be able to support.  Projects like the PEP project that we’ve talked about to work on providing electricity – that’s obviously a key driver both to better livelihoods, but also energy is at the core of any economic development pathway.  We have supported the launch of the American Chamber of Commerce in PNG to seek to encourage greater private sector engagement and investment in PNG.  That’s essential for our model for what sustainable development looks like.   And critically for USAID, the work that we do with our partner countries is primarily grant-based, not loan-based, because we see saddling countries with unsustainable debt burdens as not being a contributing factor for sustainable economic growth.  I’ve also mentioned the work that we do in governance, because we see that as a critical enabler, again, for sustainable economic growth over time, not just an immediate hit or sugar rush but something that can last for years in helping to provide for beneficial livelihoods.   And the same goes for the health and education work that we do in PNG and elsewhere, which helps to provide the predicates for what successful and prosperous societies look like; the work we do on the climate resilience side of the house so that – literally and metaphorically – so that communities and countries are better able to weather natural disasters, particularly natural disasters that are getting more intense and more frequent as the climate crisis deepens so that societies and economies can be more resilient and weather – again, literally and metaphorically – the storms that might otherwise knock them off being able to achieve their development goals and move forward on their development pathways.   So that goal of helping PNG as it fulfills its own vision for what its economic development future looks like is at the very, very heart of why we’re opening the Country Representative Office and looking to deepen our engagement.   MR LEE:  And to just add something very quickly and just very briefly as well, I think this is why the work that we do for Michael and myself is so exciting, because I think if you think about where development really weighs in to this conversation and to the region – if you think about sort of the diplomatic front, that’s where you are forming some of these partnerships at a very high level.  You think about the fence – you’re guaranteeing security.  But development – I mean, Michael’s use of the word “heart” is absolutely right.  This is where the heart of our whole-government approach to demonstrate endurance, because this is where we meet people where they are. And I think the third leg, the development leg, is so critical and makes it so important but exciting – it’s because we’re actually reaching into the communities.  We are in many ways the ground game for the United States Government.  We’re there to meet the people and to meet where they are to address their needs.  So I think this is where – this is where we’re seeing increasing opportunities in leaning forward to demonstrate again, to show we’re committed to the region. MODERATOR:  So I’ll now ask Assistant Administrator Schiffer, if you have any closing remarks, I’ll turn it back over to you for last words. MR SCHIFFER:  Well, I guess just in closing I’ll just underscore how excited I know the administrator is that I – and that I certainly am to be able to travel out to PNG and to Fiji next week and to be able to open up our Country Representative Office in PNG, our full mission in Fiji, and to demonstrate, as my colleague Anka just put it, the endurance of our commitment and to be able to engage in further conversation so that we can better understand how our partners in the region are viewing their challenges so that we can work with them together in a spirit of genuine partnership, constant and consistent with the Pacific way, to see how we can be helpful in meeting those challenges. MODERATOR:  All right.  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  Thank you for your questions and thanks to Assistant Administrator Schiffer and Senior Advisor Lee for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also to love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thanks again for your participation, and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon. # # #