alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Abbott M. HERRING, Individually, and as State Attorney for the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, Appellant, v. Ernest ELLISON, Auditor General of the State of Florida, and Fred Dickinson, Comptroller of the State of Florida, Appellees.

No. 73-867.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 26, 1974.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.
Final Listing of Questionnaire Files for Steam Electric Rulemaking Record

Plant ID 03433

Removed 

from Public 

(Non-CBI) 

Docket1

Copyright 

Flag2

File Name Description

x 03433\03433_Checklist.xls EPA Technical Review Checklist Workbook

03433\03433_Completeness_Checklist.xls EPA Completeness Review Checklist

03433\03433_HardcopyLog.doc EPA log of hardcopy documents submitted

x 03433\03433_Part A.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part B.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part C.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part D.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part E.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part F.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part G.xls Plant submitted survey file

x 03433\03433_Part H.xls Plant submitted survey file

03433\Certification Statement Plant ID 03433.pdf Plant certification statement

03433\Supplemental Documents\03433 - 2010-09-15 Effluent Guidelines Certification.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartA_MAP-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartA_WB-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartC_FIGURE-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartC_FIGURE-2.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartD_D-1.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

x 03433\Supplemental Documents\03433_PartF_OVERHEAD DIAGRAM.pdf Plant submitted supplemental files to the survey

1

 Final reviewed survey responses are located in the Steam Electric Technical Questionnaire Database . 

2

 Copyright documents are available from the docket.
#### Clarke *v.*McClelland.

Trespass for mm. *con.*abates by tlie death of the defendant.

In error from the District Court of Alleghany.

The plaintiff brought trespass for debauching his wife. Pending the action'defendant died. The plaintiff then issued a *scire facias*to substitute his administrator as defendant. He pleaded the death of his intestate, and, on demurrer, the court gave judgment for the defendant.

*McQcmdless*and *Mahon,*for plaintiff in error.

*Hampton*and *McMahon,*contrA

*Sept.*11.

Burnside, J.

The common-law rule is, that personal actions die with the party, the maxim being that “ *actio personalis*
      *129
      *moritur cum*persona4 Inst. 315. In some particulars this rule was changed by the 4th of Edward 3d, chap. 7. This statute and those changes extended to Pennsylvania. The statute allowed the representatives to be substituted, or to -bring an action where the injury was done to personal property.: 1 Chit. PI. 68. We are informed by Blackstone, that all actions merely personal, arising *ex delicto*for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant, as trespass, battery, and slander, die with the party, and never shall be revived either by or against the executors or other representatives; for neither the executors of the plaintiff have received, nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any manner of wrong or injury: 3 Black. Com. 302. When the wrong-doer acquires no gain, though the other party has suffered loss, in these cases the death of either party destroys the right of action: 3 Mass. Rep. 321. This action is merely personal, and is a punishment: Heed *v.*Cist, 7 S. & R. 183-4.

But it is contended that the legislature have changed the law by the act of the 11th March, 1834, Dunlop, 515, relating to executors and administrators, and the 26th, 27th, and 28th sections of that statute are relied on for the change. The 26th section empowers administrators and executors of any person who at the time of his decease was a party, *if the cause of action survives,*to become a party. The 27th section changes the service of the writ of *scire facias*to compel substitution from sixty days, which was required by the act of 1791, 3 Smith, 30, to twenty days; and the 28th section authorizes executors and administrators to commence and prosecute all personal actions which the decedent, whom they, represent, might have commenced and prosecuted, excepf actions for slander, for. libels, and *for ivrongs done to the person.*This leaves the action of trespass for the criminal conversation with the wife of the plaintiff as it stood before the act of 1834 was passed. It being a wrong done to the person of the husband, it abated with the death of the defendant.

Judgment affirmed.
#### William Victor GRUMAN, Appellant, v. BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, a New York corporation and Bankers Trust International, a banking corporation created under the Statutes of the United States of America, Appellees.

No. 58837.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 21, 1981.

The Order of this Court dated September 26, 1980, 392 So.2d 1375, Fla., is hereby vacated and the Motion to Dismiss filed by the attorneys for Appellees is granted and it is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

SUNDBERG, C. J., and OVERTON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., dissent.
#### Alice Ratcliff FOLEY v. Joseph F. TATUM, Jr.

No. 51976.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 21, 1980.

William Harold Jones, Petal, for appellant.

Aultman & Aultman, Bruce C. Aultman, Hattiesburg, for appellee.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Forrest County; Michael Sullivan, Chancellor.

Before PATTERSON, C. J., and SUGG and WALKER, JJ.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. § 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Form 10-K of Henry County Bancshares, Inc. (the
Company) for the year ending December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), David H. Gill, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Thomas L. Redding, Chief
Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, each hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of his/her knowledge that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ David H. GillDAVID H. GILLChief Executive OfficerMarch 14, 2008/s/ Thomas L. ReddingTHOMAS L. REDDINGChief Financial and Accounting OfficerMarch 14, 2008


This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and
shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Overton Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

JACKIE COSTELLO INGRAM v. Record Nos. 0721-95-4 and MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY 0722-95-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA JANUARY 23, 1996 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY William L. Winston, Judge Conrad C. Gaarder, for appellant. John K. Bynum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General; Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Following a jury trial on October 12, 1994, appellant, Jackie Costello Ingram ("Ingram"), was convicted of distribution of an imitation controlled substance within 1000 feet of school property and distribution of an imitation controlled substance. Ingram was sentenced, respectively, to three years imprisonment and $1500 and one year and $500. On appeal, Ingram contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a certified photocopy of the original Certificate of Analysis. We disagree and affirm. Ingram sold imitation crack cocaine to an undercover police officer within 100 yards of an elementary school. At trial, the Commonwealth sought to introduce into evidence a certified

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.- 2 - photocopy of the original Certificate of Analysis, previously identified by a Commonwealth witness as a "xeroxed copy of the original certificate for analysis." Ingram's contention that the photocopy was hearsay and that only the original could be admitted is without merit. First, Ingram waived his claim because he did not accept the Commonwealth's offer to retrieve the original certificate after the court asked Ingram if he wanted it. See Rule 5A:18. Ingram cannot invite error and then take advantage of the situation he

created. See , e.g. , Manns v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 677, 679-80, 414 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1992). Second, even absent waiver, the trial court's decision must be affirmed. As a matter of law, official records shall be received as evidence when authenticated and certified by the clerk to be a true record. Code § 8.01-389(A). A copy of such a record is admissible if it is authenticated. Code § 8.01-391(C);

Proctor v. Commonwealth , 14 Va. App. 937, 938-39, 419 S.E.2d 867, 867-68 (1992). "Authenticated" and "certified" are synonymous terms in this context. Owens v. Commonwealth , 10 Va. App. 309, 311, 391 S.E.2d 605, 605-06 (1990) (concluding that clerk's certification of copy of record properly authenticated record pursuant to Code § 8.01-389). The clerk's certification that the document in this case is a true copy meets the statutory standard for admissibility. Accordingly, the appellant's conviction is affirmed.- 3 - Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 31.1CERTIFICATIONI, Ken L. Joines, Vice President, Secretary and Chief Accounting Officer of First EquityProperties, Inc. (“FEPI”), certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of FEPI; 2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in lightof the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this quarterly report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this quarterly report; 4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13(a)-15(f) and 15d-15(f) for FEPI and have: (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to insure that materialinformation relating to FEPI is made known to me byothers within those entities, particularly for the periods presented in this quarterlyreport;  (b) Designed such internal controls over financial reporting, or caused suchinternal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, toprovide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and thepreparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generallyaccepted accounting principles;  (c) Evaluated the effectiveness of FEPI’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and  (d) Disclosed in the report any change in FEPI’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during FEPI’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, oris reasonably likely to materially affect FEPI’s internal control over financialreporting; and5. I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financialreporting, to FEPI’s auditors and the audit committee of FEPI’s Board of Directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect FEPI’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in FEPI’s internal controls.Date: August 19, 2005     /s/ Ken L. Joines  Vice President, Secretary and Chief Accounting Officer
11
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule  contains summary  financial  information  extracted from the
consolidated   balance  sheet,   consolidated   statement  of  operations,   and
consolidated statement of cash flows included in the Company's Form 10-Q for the
period  ending March 31, 1998,  and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
                                                
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                              18,535   
<SECURITIES>                                        56,013
<RECEIVABLES>                                        1,471
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    24,089 
<PP&E>                                              69,296
<DEPRECIATION>                                      36,096
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     121,886
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               21,563 
<BONDS>                                             32,557
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   38  
<PREFERRED>                                              0 
<COMMON>                                                 0
<OTHER-SE>                                          67,728
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       121,886
<SALES>                                              8,430
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    14,290
<CGS>                                                4,805
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       21,117 
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     650
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      1,324
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  1,324
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0  
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         1,324
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         0.04
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0.03
        



</TABLE>
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 1425

_____________________________ G ENE A NTHONY E LSPERMAN , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Jan Shackelford , Judge

. October 17, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R AY , C.J., and M AKAR and K ELSEY , JJ., concur.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Gene Anthony Elsperman, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee
, f or Appellee.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

REGION IX 

James Goldstene 

Executive Officer 

California Air Resources Board 

1001 I Street, 6th Floor 

Sacramento, California 95814 

Dear Mr. Goldstene: 

75 Hawthorne Street 

San Francisco, CA 94105-3901 

OCT 2 2 2012 

I am writing to transmit the findings from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 2011 

Technical System Audit (TSA) of the California Air Resources Board's (hereafter referred to as 

"CARB") ambient air monitoring program. This audit was performed in accordance with 40 CFR Part 

58, Section 2.5, which requires that EPA conduct technical system audits of primary quality assurance 

organizations every three years. 

EPA reviewed CARB's ambient air monitoring program, including network management, field 

operations, laboratory operations, quality assurance, and data management procedures. While CARB's 

air monitoring program generally meets EPA requirements, this TSA uncovered some program areas 

within the agency that can be improved. Your agency has been very responsive to the audit findings and 

has already begun working informally with EPA on corrective actions. The formal corrective action 

response is due to EPA within 60 days of receipt of the final TSA report. 

I want to thank you and your staff for your full cooperation and participation during the audit. The 

results of this audit significantly .contribute to EPA's overall understanding of ambient monitoring in the 

State of California. 

Please contact me if you have questions, or your staff may contact Meredith Kurpius at (415) 947-4534 

or Matthew Lakin at (415) 972-3851. 

Sincerely, 

Enclosure 

cc: Brad Poiriez, Imperial County APCD 

Seyed Sadredin, San Joaquin Valley APCD 

Christopher Brown, Mendocino County AQMD 

Printed on Recycled Paper
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

June 26, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 130715 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 130715 

 COA: 256983 

Berrien CC: 2003-406255-FC 

CHARLES STEPHEN LEBLANC,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2006 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0619 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

June 26, 2006 

Clerk
#### Jenevieve B. Hill *v.*David Small.

Maltbie, C. J., Brown, Jennings, Ells and Dickenson, Js.

Argued January 7

decided February 3, 1943.

*Samuel Rosenthal,*with whom was *Abraham A. M. Schweitzer,*for the appellant (defendant).

*William M. Pomerantz,*for the appellee (plaintiff).

Per Curiam.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover an amount claimed to be due her upon the *605settlement of the accounts of a partnership between herself and the defendant under which she was to hatch eggs and both parties were to sell the chicks, the expenses and profits of the undertaking to be shared equally. The trial court rendered judgment that the defendant pay the plaintiff a certain amount found to be due her at the termination of the partnership, upon the basis that he had collected the price of certain chicks sold by him. The defendant has appealed. His sole claim is that the only evidence that he had collected these amounts was the plaintiff’s testimony that he had stated this to be so, and that since he denied this on trial the statement was no more than an attack on his credibility and could not be received as evidence of the fact itself.

The error into which the defendant has fallen is suggested by his citation of the case of *Meagher*v. *Colonial Homes,*109 Conn. 343, 146 Atl. 609. It is true that contradictory statements made out of court by a witness not a party to the action have no probative force, their effect being simply to attack the credibility of the witness; *Branford Trust Co.*v. *Prudential Ins. Co.,*102 Conn. 481, 485, 129 Atl. 379; but when the witness is a party to the action his extrajudicial statement may be more than a contradiction. It may be treated as an admission. *Davis*v. *Greenstein,*112 Conn. 530, 535, 153 Atl. 161. Jones, Evidence, Civil Cases (3d Ed.), §§236, 237; 31 C. J. S. 1091, § 317. We said of similar testimony in *Perrelli*v. *Savas,*115 Conn. 42, 44, 160 Atl. 311, that, “while it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of direct testimony, [it] is some evidence, circumstantial in its nature, of the truth, of the fact contained in it and under the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient evidence of that fact.” An unattacked finding in the instant action is that the defendant obtained *606orders of the value of $942.86 and made delivery of chicks on these orders, and this was under an arrangement that if payment was not made the chicks were to be repossessed. The defendant made no claim that the chicks had been repossessed and contented himself with a denial that he had collected their purchase price. His previous admission that he had collected this finds support in these circumstances and the trial court was warranted in its conclusion and judgment.

There is no error.