IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-1806

Filed November 25, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LARRY DALE HOMMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Martha L. Mertz, 

Judge.

Larry Dale Hommer appeals his convictions for conspiracy to manufacture 

more than five grams of methamphetamine and conspiracy to deliver more than 

five grams of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.

Joey T. Hoover of Hoover Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Winterset, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Tabor, JJ.
2

VOGEL, Judge.

Larry Dale Hommer appeals his convictions for conspiracy to manufacture 

more than five grams of methamphetamine and conspiracy to deliver more than 

five grams of methamphetamine, in violation of Iowa Code section 

124.401(1)(b)(7) (2011). He contends there is insufficient corroboration of his 

coconspirators’ testimony and insufficient evidence to support his convictions. 

He also challenges the admission of evidence he alleges is exempt from the 

public records exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, he contends his trial 

counsel provided ineffective assistance regarding his prior conviction for 

conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.

We conclude there is sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of 

two of Hommer’s accomplices, and this testimony along with other record 

evidence is sufficient to support Hommer’s convictions. We further conclude the 

challenged evidence was admissible under the business records exception to the 

hearsay rule. Because the record before us is insufficient to allow us to 

determine Hommer’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we preserve them 

for possible postconviction-relief proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

A conspiracy to manufacture and deliver methamphetamine in Warren 

County first came to light in 2012, after law enforcement obtained data from the 

National Precursor Log Exchange (NPLEx). The NPLEx tracks purchases of 

products containing pseudoephedrine, an ingredient used in the manufacture of 

methamphetamine. An analysis of the NPLEx data revealed that the “top 

pseudoephedrine buyer” in Warren County was Randy Crow. 
3

Randy Crow and his brother, Rodney Crow, own neighboring cabins in an 

area referred to as “Crow Park.” Law enforcement conducted a two-week 

surveillance of Crow Park and noticed a pattern of visitors. The license plate 

numbers of those visitors’ vehicles were used to obtain the visitors’ names, which 

were then checked against the NPLEx records. A pattern of purchases made by 

these individuals indicated they were using a technique called “smurfing,” in 

which many people gather pseudoephedrine pills in small quantities to 

manufacture methamphetamine. Based on that information, law enforcement 

obtained and executed search warrants on a number of Crow Park locations. 

Randy and Rodney Crow were arrested along with their brother, Brent Crow, and 

Regina Vaught-Rudich. 

Hommer was one of the individuals identified as a frequent visitor to Crow 

Park. Investigators observed Hommer arriving at Crow Park the morning after 

those purchasing pseudoephedrine had come and gone. A GPS tracking device 

was placed on Hommer’s vehicle as part of the investigation. The tracking 

device data shows that Hommer’s vehicle was driven to the Walmart store in 

Oskaloosa on September 29, 2012. The NPLEx records show Brock Burgdorf 

purchased pseudoephedrine on that date. Surveillance video shows Burgdorf 

exiting Hommer’s vehicle, entering Walmart, and purchasing pseudoephedrine. 

Investigators reviewed Burgdorf’s pseudoephedrine purchases and 

discovered a pattern of purchases with four other individuals. Burgdorf and those 

four individuals were arrested as part of the conspiracy to manufacture and 

deliver methamphetamine. Law enforcement eventually arrested eight others in 

connection with the conspiracy, including Velda Crosby and Rhonda Dawson. 
4

The NPLEx records show those identified as being involved in the conspiracy 

purchased pseudoephedrine 650 times between July 2010 and August 2012. 

Hommer was arrested in connection with the conspiracy on October 15, 

2012. After his arrest, pseudoephedrine purchases from all but two of the 

identified coconspirators stopped. Crosby, one of the two coconspirators who 

made a purchase after Hommer’s arrest, testified she did so to help exculpate 

Hommer.

Before trial, Hommer filed a motion in limine to exclude the NPLEx 

records. He argued they were public records and investigatory reports, and 

therefore, the records were inadmissible as hearsay under Iowa Rule of 

Evidence 5.803(8)(B). He also objected to the records’ admission at trial. The 

trial court ruled the records were admissible under the business record exception 

to the hearsay rule. 

The State called four of Hommer’s accomplices to testify at trial: Randy 

Crow, Rodney Crow, Dawson, and Crosby. Randy Crow testified that Hommer 

had asked him to purchase Sudafed to manufacture methamphetamine in order 

to support their drug habits. In return, Hommer gave Randy approximately one 

gram of methamphetamine per box of Sudafed. Randy purchased Sudafed 

every ten days as allowed by law. During the course of the conspiracy, he 

purchased Sudafed a total of sixty-nine times and gave the Sudafed directly to 

Hommer on all but three occasions. On those three occasions, Randy gave the 

pills to his brother, Brent Crow, who knew how to manufacture 

methamphetamine and did so with Hommer. Randy also collected Sudafed from 

others who purchased it as part of the conspiracy. He gave the pills to Hommer 
5

or Brent Crow and, in turn, delivered each person their share of the 

manufactured methamphetamine after receiving it from Hommer. 

Rodney Crow testified that Brent Crow asked him to purchase 

pseudoephedrine pills and to collect them from other people in order to 

manufacture methamphetamine. Rodney recruited Dawson and others to 

purchase the pills every ten days. Although Brent usually arrived to collect the 

pills alone, Hommer came with him on occasion. Rodney then gave the pills to 

Brent with the expectation that he would be compensated with 

methamphetamine the next day. Although Brent usually provided Rodney with 

the methamphetamine, Rodney testified that Hommer did so on at least one 

occasion. 

Dawson testified she initially provided pseudoephedrine to Robert Vaught 

in exchange for methamphetamine but did not know where the 

methamphetamine came from. Later, she gave the pills to Rodney Crow, who at 

some point informed Dawson he was giving the pills to Brent Crow. Although 

Dawson provided the pills directly to Brent a couple times, she never provided 

them directly to Hommer. Dawson did not know Hommer well, but she knew 

Hommer and Brent were friends and saw them hanging out together a couple of 

times.

Crosby testified she became friends with Hommer and used 

methamphetamine with him. Hommer asked Crosby to purchase 

pseudoephedrine—specifically, Sudafed—and provided her with the money to 

buy it, which she did every ten days. Because Crosby did not have a vehicle, 

Hommer sometimes drove her to purchase it. She also rode along with Hommer 
6

when he went to gather pills from other people and witnessed Hommer give 

Burgdorf money to purchase pseudoephedrine. Crosby enlisted friends who 

used methamphetamine to purchase pseudoephedrine, which was then given to 

Hommer in exchange for methamphetamine. Crosby received approximately 

three-quarters of a gram of methamphetamine in exchange for purchasing 

pseudoephedrine, but she testified that sometimes it was less because, as 

Hommer told Crosby, “it didn’t make as much.” After Crosby provided Hommer 

with the pseudoephedrine, Hommer would put the pills into a small black box with 

a magnet on the back and secure it inside the wheel well of his vehicle. Crosby 

testified that she heard what sounded like Hommer running the pills through a 

grinder in his bedroom. She also observed that Brent Crow would come to 

Hommer’s home every ten days and the two would leave the home together after 

midnight.

At the close of the State’s evidence and again at the close of trial, 

Hommer moved for judgment of acquittal based primarily on the lack of evidence 

corroborating the accomplice testimony. Without that testimony, Hommer 

argued, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on either charge. 

The trial court denied both motions. 

The jury found Hommer guilty of conspiracy to manufacture more than five 

grams of methamphetamine and conspiracy to deliver more than five grams of 

methamphetamine. Hommer filed a motion in arrest of judgment, alleging there 

lacked evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony and that without the 

accomplice testimony there was insufficient evidence to convict him. He also 

filed a motion for new trial, urging the trial court erred in admitting the NPLEx 
7

records into evidence. Both motions were denied, and Hommer was sentenced 

to a term of not more than twenty-five years in prison. 

II. Accomplice Testimony. 

On appeal, Hommer again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

corroborating the accomplice testimony presented at trial. Specifically, he argues 

the district court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and his 

motion in arrest of judgment because the testimony of Randy Crow, Rodney 

Crow, Dawson, and Crosby was not corroborated by evidence tying him to the 

conspiracy.

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) provides that a conviction may 

not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is 

corroborated by other evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the 

commission of the offense. The purpose of this rule is twofold: “First, it 

independently tends to connect defendant to the crime. Second, it supports the 

credibility of an accomplice whose motives are clearly suspect because of the 

accomplice’s self-interest in focusing blame on the defendant.” State v. Brown, 

397 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 1986).

While the corroborating evidence need not be strong or confirm each 

material fact testified to by the accomplice, it must corroborate some material 

aspect of the accomplice’s testimony and tend to connect the defendant with the 

offense. Id. at 694-95; State v. Hutchinson, 341 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 1983). 

“[C]orroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense 

or the circumstances thereof.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3). The testimony of one 
8

accomplice is also insufficient to corroborate the testimony of another 

accomplice. State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Iowa 2010).

The existence of corroborative evidence is a question of law to be 

determined by the trial court. Hutchinson, 341 N.W.2d at 37. The sufficiency of 

that evidence is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Id. We review a 

challenge to the court’s determination of the existence of corroborative evidence 

for correction of errors at law. State v. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Iowa 

1997). In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State 

and indulge in every legitimate inference that may be fairly and reasonably 

deduced from it. Id.

There is no question here that Randy Crow, Rodney Crow, Dawson, and 

Crosby are accomplices. The State admits as much, and the four were charged 

with commission of the same crime. The question is whether their testimony is 

corroborated by other evidence connecting Hommer to the crime. 

Randy Crow’s testimony was corroborated by NPLEx data and 

surveillance evidence showing Hommer visited Crow Park at regular intervals

immediately following the dates pseudoephedrine was purchased by those 

involved with the conspiracy. Randy’s testimony that Hommer drove him to 

Walmart to purchase pseudoephedrine is also corroborated. Surveillance video 

of the Walmart in Indianola shows Hommer’s vehicle pulling up to the door and 

Randy exiting the vehicle at 4:27 p.m. on August 15, 2012. At 4:29 p.m., the 

video shows Randy purchasing Sudafed. The purchase is confirmed in the 

NPLEx records. The surveillance video then shows Randy exit the store and get 
9

back into Hommer’s vehicle at 4:35 p.m. This evidence connects Hommer to the 

crimes by showing he took action to further the conspiracy.

Similar evidence corroborates Crosby’s testimony. Crosby testified she 

witnessed Hommer give Burgdorf money to purchase pseudoephedrine and was 

with Hommer when Burgdorf purchased pseudoephedrine. Surveillance 

evidence shows Hommer’s vehicle was at the Walmart in Oskaloosa at 5:48 p.m. 

on September 29, 2012. Video surveillance shows Burgdorf exiting Hommer’s 

vehicle and purchasing pseudoephedrine, which is confirmed by NPLEx records. 

Again, this evidence corroborates Hommer’s participation in the crimes by 

showing Hommer took action to further the conspiracy.

There is also evidence to corroborate part of Rodney Crow’s and 

Dawson’s testimony. For instance, the NPLEx records corroborate their claims 

about the other individuals who were involved in purchasing pseudoephedrine for 

the conspiracy. However, very little of their testimony relates to Hommer or his 

role in the conspiracy.1 Rodney’s testimony that Hommer provided him with 

methamphetamine at least one time tentatively connects Hommer to the 

conspiracy, but there is no independent evidence to corroborate it. Dawson did 

not provide testimony to adequately connect Hommer to the conspiracy. 

Therefore, neither the testimony of Rodney Crow nor Dawson is corroborated.

 

1 With regard to Hommer, Rodney Crow testified only to the following: he had known 

Hommer since third grade, he knew Hommer to drive a white Dodge SUV, and he 

received methamphetamine directly from Hommer at least once. Dawson’s testimony 

mainly concerned Brent Crow, with whom she had a relationship. With regard to 

Hommer, she testified: she had seen Brent and Hommer hang out a couple times, she 

didn’t know Hommer “that well,” she knew Hommer and Brent had been friends since 

they were in school, she had seen Hommer in a silver Durango, and she had used 

methamphetamine with Hommer on two occasions.
10

Corroboration of accomplice testimony is not necessary if “the conviction 

could have been sustained without the testimony of the accomplice.” State v. 

Hobbs, 107 N.W.2d 238, 242 (Iowa 1961); see also State v. Huntington, 80 

N.W.2d 744, 746 (Iowa 1957) (holding accomplice testimony is admissible and 

requires no corroboration to be considered as evidence that the crime was 

committed by someone). The testimony of Rodney Crow and Dawson provided 

the jury with an overview of the size and scope of the conspiracy, as well as how 

it worked,2but very little from their testimony relates to Hommer or his 

involvement in the conspiracy. Because the testimony of Rodney Crow and 

Dawson is not evidence upon which a jury could convict Hommer of either 

conspiracy to manufacture or conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, 

corroborative evidence was not required under rule 2.21(3). 

Because there is sufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of Randy 

Crow and Crosby, and corroboration is not needed for the testimony of Rodney 

 

2 From our review of the evidence, it appears the conspiracy had three tiers. At the 

bottom were Dawson and Crosby, as well as others who obtained pseudoephedrine to 

be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and, in exchange, received a portion 

of the methamphetamine manufactured from it. In the middle were Randy and Rodney 

Crow, who not only purchased pseudoephedrine but also acted as intermediaries by 

collecting the pseudoephedrine from the bottom tier individuals and delivering it to those 

manufacturing the methamphetamine. Once the methamphetamine was manufactured, 

they received the finished product and delivered each individual purchaser their share of 

the methamphetamine. At the top of the operation were Hommer and Brent Crow, who 

manufactured the methamphetamine. 

It also appears the operation was divided into two branches. Randy Crow 

functioned as an intermediary between half of those obtaining pseudoephedrine and 

Hommer, while Rodney Crow acted as an intermediate between the other half and Brent 

Crow. While there was occasional exchanging of duties between Hommer and Brent 

Crow, presumably when one was unavailable, it appears there was little interaction by 

one half with the other. As a result, the evidence of Hommer’s involvement comes 

primarily from Randy Crow and Crosby, who worked on Hommer’s side of the operation. 

Rodney Crow and Dawson worked on Brent Crow’s side of the operation and 

had limited knowledge of, or interaction with, Hommer. Their testimony alone is 

insufficient to convict Hommer; instead, it shows how the conspiracy operated as a 

whole. 
11

Crow and Dawson, we affirm the denial of Hommer’s motions for judgment of 

acquittal and motion in arrest of judgment. 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Hommer also contends there is insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions. We review this claim for a correction of errors at law. State v. 

Sandford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). We consider all the evidence in the 

record in the light most favorable to the State. Id. If there is substantial record 

evidence to support the verdict, we uphold it. Id. Evidence is substantial if it can 

convince a rational jury the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

We recognize the jury is free to reject certain evidence and credit other evidence. 

Id. 

Hommer was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine 

and conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine. Because conspiracies are 

clandestine affairs by nature, there is rarely direct evidence of an agreement to 

form a conspiracy. See State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 159 (Iowa 2013). 

Therefore, circumstantial evidence and the inferences drawn from it may support 

a conviction on a conspiracy charge. Id. However, circumstantial evidence of an 

agreement must be based on more than suspicion. Id.

A. Conspiracy to Manufacture.

In order to convict Hommer of conspiracy to manufacture 

methamphetamine, the State was required to show the following:

1. Between August 2010 and October 15, 2012, the 

Defendant agreed with one or more other persons that:

a. One or more of them would manufacture 

methamphetamine; or

b. Attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.
12

2. The Defendant entered into the agreement with the intent 

to promote or facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine.

3. The Defendant or one or more other persons committed 

an overt act.

4. None of these other people were law enforcement agents 

investigating the manufacturing of methamphetamine or assisting 

law enforcement agents when the conspiracy began.

Hommer challenges the evidence of an agreement and the evidence of 

manufacturing. 

A jury could reasonably find an agreement existed between Hommer and 

the other members of the conspiracy. Randy Crow and Crosby testified they 

provided pseudoephedrine directly to Hommer and, in exchange, received 

directly from Hommer an amount of methamphetamine manufactured from it. In 

addition, the evidence shows Hommer drove Randy Crow to Walmart, where he 

purchased pseudoephedrine before getting back into Hommer’s vehicle. 

Hommer also gave Burgdorf money to purchase pseudoephedrine and drove him 

to Walmart to make the purchase. Coupled with the patterns of 

pseudoephedrine purchases and Hommer’s appearance at Crow Park the day 

after the pseudoephedrine was collected, there is substantial evidence Hommer 

entered into an agreement to manufacture methamphetamine and had the intent 

to do so.

Hommer argues there is no evidence of manufacturing because he was 

never found in possession of methamphetamine or any of its precursors. Both 

Randy Crow and Crosby testified they received methamphetamine directly from 

Hommer. Crosby testified that after receiving pseudoephedrine from Randy 

Crow, she heard Hommer grind the pills in his bedroom. He would then leave 

with Brent Crow for an hour or two in the middle of the night. The following day, 
13

Hommer provided Randy Crow with methamphetamine to compensate him and 

others for purchasing the pseudoephedrine. Crosby testified that when the 

amount of methamphetamine received was smaller than normal, Hommer 

explained “it didn’t make as much.” Viewing the foregoing in the light most 

favorable to the State, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support 

Hommer’s conviction of conspiracy to manufacture more than five grams of 

methamphetamine.

B. Conspiracy to Deliver.

Hommer also contends there is insufficient evidence by which a jury could 

find him guilty of conspiracy to deliver more than five grams of 

methamphetamine. In order to secure a conviction for conspiracy to deliver 

methamphetamine, the State was required to prove the following:

1. Between August 2010 and October 15, 2012, the 

Defendant agreed with one or more other persons that:

a. One or more of them would deliver methamphetamine; or

b. Attempt to deliver methamphetamine.

2. The Defendant entered into the agreement with the intent 

to promote or facilitate the delivery of methamphetamine.

3. The Defendant or one or more other people committed an 

overt act.

4. None of these other people were law enforcement agents 

investigating the manufacture of methamphetamine or assisting law 

enforcement agents in the investigation when the conspiracy 

began.

There is ample evidence by which a reasonable jury could find Hommer 

guilty of conspiracy to deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine. Randy 

Crow and Crosby testified that Hommer provided them with methamphetamine 

on multiple occasions. In addition, Hommer provided Randy Crow with 

methamphetamine that he was to deliver to others in exchange for providing 
14

pseudoephedrine. The methamphetamine was measured and in individual 

baggies for delivery with each person’s initials marked on the bag.

Because there is sufficient evidence to support Hommer’s convictions, we 

affirm the denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal and motion in arrest of 

judgment.

IV. Admissibility of the Evidence.

Hommer challenged the admission of the NPLEx records in a motion in 

limine, arguing the records are an investigative report for law enforcement and 

therefore exempt from the hearsay exception for public records provided in Iowa 

Rule of Evidence 5.803(8). He raised the issue again in a motion for new trial 

and now advances this argument on appeal.3 

We review a hearsay ruling for the correction of errors at law. State v. 

Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 675 (Iowa 2014). If hearsay evidence was admitted, 

we will reverse because the admission of hearsay evidence is considered 

prejudicial unless the contrary is shown. Id.

A pharmacy is required by both federal and state law to obtain 

identification information and a signature from anyone purchasing 

pseudoephedrine. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(iv); Iowa Code § 124.212A(2), 

(3), (4). In addition, the purchaser’s name and address, the date and time of 

purchase, and the name of the pseudoephedrine product purchased and quantity 

 

3

In his motion for new trial, Hommer asserted the court erred in admitting the NPLEx 

records as business records, asserting instead that they were investigative reports “as 

law enforcement tools” and were thereby excluded from the public records exception 

under rule 5.803(8)(b)(i)-(iv). In a companion case, State v. Burgdorf, 861 N.W.2d 273, 

276-78 (Iowa 2014), the issue on appeal was whether sufficient foundation had been laid 

for the district court to admit the NPLEx records as business records. We found there 

was not, and reversed and remanded for new trial.
15

sold must be recorded in the electronic logbook. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 830(e)(1)(A)(iii); Iowa Code § 124.212A(5). 

The trial court found the NPLEx records fall under the business record 

exception to the hearsay rule. This exception applies to 

[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, 

of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near 

the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 

knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 

activity, and the regular practice of that business activity was to 

make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as 

shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 

or by certification that complies with rule 5.902(11), rule 5.902(12), 

or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information 

or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 

trustworthiness. 

Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6). Here, the records are maintained by a business—in this 

case, a pharmacy. The NPLEx records the event of a person purchasing a 

pseudoephedrine product and are made at the time of the event by a person with 

knowledge of the event. Finally, these records are kept in the course of regularly 

conducted business activity, as required by law. Therefore, the NPLEx records 

fall within the definition of a business record set forth in rule 5.803(6). 

Hommer argues the NPLEx records more appropriately fall under the 

public records exception set forth in rule 5.803(8). Specifically, he contends the 

NPLEx records are inadmissible as exempt public records under rule 

5.803(8)(B). In order to qualify as a public record under this rule, the evidence in 

question must be “records, reports, statements, or data compilations of a public 

office or agency.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(8)(A). While the records may be released 

to law enforcement as set forth in Iowa Administrative Code rule 657-100.4(124), 

they are not compiled by law enforcement or any public office or agency. 
16

Because the records do not fall under the definition set forth in rule 5.803(8)(A), 

they cannot fall under the exemptions set forth in rule 5.803(8)(B) as Hommer 

argues. 

Because the NPLEx records are admissible under the business records 

exception to the hearsay rule, we affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling 

admitting the records into evidence.

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Finally, Hommer contends he received ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show that as a matter of law, trial counsel failed to perform an 

essential duty and prejudice resulted. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 134 

(Iowa 2004). We will affirm a conviction if the record is adequate for us to 

determine the defendant is unable to establish both a breach of duty and 

prejudice. Id. In order to prevail on the prejudice prong of this test, a defendant 

“must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

Hommer’s ineffective-assistance claims are based upon his counsel’s 

handling of evidence of a prior conviction for conspiracy to manufacture 

methamphetamine. Specifically, Hommer argues counsel was ineffective by 

allowing and discussing evidence of his prior conviction for conspiracy to 

manufacture methamphetamine. He also argues counsel was ineffective by 

failing to request the jury be instructed that his prior conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine could only be used to determine his credibility as a witness.
17

The State argues Hommer is unable to show counsel breached an 

essential duty regarding the evidence of his prior conviction because counsel 

made a strategic decision to discuss Hommer’s past. The State further argues it 

is “possible” counsel chose not to emphasize the prior convictions by requesting 

the jury be given a limiting instruction. 

Our supreme court has often stated its preference for reserving questions 

of ineffective assistance of counsel for postconviction-relief proceedings to allow 

trial counsel to defend against the charge. See, e.g., State v. McNeal, 867 

N.W.2d 91, 105 (Iowa 2015). “This is especially appropriate when the 

challenged actions concern trial strategy or tactics counsel could explain if a 

record were fully developed to address those issues.” Id. at 105-06. We will only 

resolve such claims on direct appeal in the rare event the trial record alone is 

sufficient to allow us to determine the merits of the claim. Id. at 106. Because 

the record before us is inadequate to reach the merits of Hommer’s claims of 

ineffective assistance, we preserve them for possible postconviction-relief 

proceedings. 

AFFIRMED.