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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

HURLEY MEDICAL CENTER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

and 

CRAIG MAKELA, 

 Plaintiff, 

UNPUBLISHED 

June 18, 2015 

v No. 320936 

Oakland Circuit Court 

MICHIGAN ASSIGNED CLAIMS PLAN, a/k/a 

MACP, 

LC No. 2013-134720-NF 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and BORRELLO and GADOLA, JJ. 

GADOLA, J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s assessment that Makela’s hearsay 

statements to the psychologist regarding his motive for jumping from the moving vehicle were 

both sufficiently trustworthy and reasonably necessary for his medical diagnosis or treatment to 

warrant admission under MRE 803(4). 

 “Exceptions to the hearsay rule are justified by the belief that the hearsay statements are 

both necessary and inherently trustworthy.” People v Meeboer (After Remand), 439 Mich 310, 

322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992). Hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls within one of the 

clearly established exceptions. People v Eady, 409 Mich 356, 361; 294 NW2d 202 (1980). 

Under MRE 803(4), to be admissible, a statement must be “made for purposes of medical 

treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history, or 

past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause 

or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and treatment.” The 

rationale underlying MRE 803(4) further requires that (1) the statements must be trustworthy 

because the declarant had “a self-interested motivation to be truthful in order to receive proper 

medical care,” and (2) the statements must be reasonably necessary for the declarant’s medical 

diagnosis and treatment. People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 215; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). 

 In my opinion, Makela’s statements to the psychologist that he jumped from the moving 

vehicle to avoid being robbed were not sufficiently reliable to warrant admission under 
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MRE 803(4). In People v LaLone, 432 Mich 103, 109-110; 437 NW2d 611 (1989), our Supreme 

Court addressed the scope of MRE 803(4) as it relates to a declarant’s statements made to a 

psychologist during the course of a psychological evaluation, and concluded the following: 

 A psychologist treats mental and emotional disorders rather than physical 

ones. Lying to one’s health care provider about symptoms and their general 

causes would be detrimental to the patient, and it is, in part, for this reason that we 

permit the introduction of such hearsay statements. It is therefore fair to say that, 

while medical patients may fabricate descriptions of their complaints and the 

general character of the causes of these complaints, we would think it less likely 

that they will do so than psychological patients. In addition, although there are 

psychological tests, fabrications of physical complaints would seem to be far 

easier to discover through empirical tests than are fabrications which might be 

heard by an examining psychologist. Indeed, statements which are untrue, and 

which the examining psychologist knows to be untrue, may nevertheless serve as 

a basis for accurate diagnosis and treatment. Thus, statements made in the course 

of the treatment of psychological disorders may not always be as reliable as those 

made in the course of the treatment of physical disorders. [Footnotes omitted.] 

The fact that Makela’s only statements regarding his motive for jumping out of the moving 

vehicle were made to a psychologist during the course of a psychological evaluation renders the 

reliability of those statements uncertain. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence that Makela 

had a “self-interested motivation to be truthful in order to receive proper medical care” when 

speaking with the psychologist. Mahone, 294 Mich App at 215. At the time Makela made the 

statements concerning his motivation for jumping, he was seeking medical care for his physical 

injuries and was not independently seeking psychological care. Rather, hospital personnel 

ordered the psychological evaluation on their own initiative to evaluate whether Makela required 

mental-health services. Under these circumstances, I do not believe Makela’s statements to the 

psychologist were marked by sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to warrant admission under 

MRE 803(4).1

 Further, Makela’s statements to the psychologist were not reasonably necessary for his 

medical treatment or diagnosis. The language in MRE 803(4) specifically limits the exception to 

“medical treatment or medical diagnosis,” and the rule does “not leave room for speculation on 

 

1

 It is noteworthy that in Meeboer, 439 Mich at 328, the Court attached significance to the fact 

that in LaLone, where the Court determined the hearsay statements must be excluded, “it was the 

Department of Social Services who initiated the examination by the psychologist of the 

complainant.” This suggests that when, as here, the declarant has not independently sought out 

psychological care, the declarant’s statements to a psychologist should be considered less 

trustworthy. “To be admissible under MRE 803(4) . . . statements must also be made with the 

understanding by the declarant of the need to tell the truth . . . .” Id. at 331 (emphasis added). A 

motivation to tell the truth is less apparent when the declarant has not initiated the psychological 

evaluation or treatment at issue. 
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hearsay which may indeed be reliable and useful for other kinds of treatment.” LaLone, 432 

Mich at 114 (emphasis added). In this case, Makela’s statements concerning his motive to jump 

were made to a psychologist, not a physician with the ability to practice medicine. See Merriam 

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed) (defining “medical” as “of, relating to, or concerned 

with physicians or the practice of medicine”). Although Makela’s statements concerning his 

motive to jump may have been reasonably necessary for his psychological diagnosis or 

treatment, in my assessment, the statements were not in any way necessary for his medical

diagnosis or treatment.2

 Accordingly, the statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. I would 

therefore affirm the dismissal of the medical center’s claim because there is no admissible 

evidence demonstrating that Makela’s injuries were accidental, as is required for recovery of nofault benefits under MCL 500.3105. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

 

2

 I acknowledge that this Court has held that “in cases of sexual assault, in which the injuries 

might be latent, such as contracting sexually transmitted diseases or psychological in nature, and 

thus not necessarily physically manifested at all, a victim’s complete history and recitation of the 

totality of the circumstances of the assault are properly considered to be statements made for 

medical treatment.” Mahone, 294 Mich App at 215; see also Meeboer, 439 Mich at 329 

(“[S]exual abuse cases involve medical, physical, developmental, and psychological 

components, all of which require diagnosis and treatment. . . . LaLone involved statements made 

during a psychological examination, rather than psychological treatment resulting from medical 

diagnosis.”). However, the present case does not involve an incident of sexual assault, does not 

concern a patient seeking treatment for psychological injuries arising from a physical event, and 

does not involve psychological treatment resulting from a medical diagnosis.