# Papua New Guinea - United States Department of State

- Assistant Secretary Witkowsky and Ambassador-at-Large Rao Gupta’s Travel to Papua New Guinea and Australia Office of the SpokespersonAssistant Secretary of the State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Anne A. Witkowsky and U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Dr. Geeta Rao Gupta will travel jointly to Papua New Guinea and Australia from April 26 to May 10.In Papua New Guinea, Assistant Secretary Witkowsky and Ambassador-at-Large Rao Gupta will meet with government representatives, civil society and private sector stakeholders, and women-led organizations to discuss mutual priorities related to the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability and opportunities to advance Women, Peace, and Security and address gender-based violence.In Australia, Assistant Secretary Witkowsky will lead a delegation composed of Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues Dr. Rao Gupta and Deputy Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism Aaron Keyak to attend sessions at the International Atrocity Prevention Working Group Spring Meeting. &nbsp;Ambassador Rao Gupta, joined by Assistant Secretary Witkowsky, will also lead U.S. participation in the second U.S.-Australia Bilateral Strategic Dialogue on Gender Equality.For more information, follow @StateCSO on X and Facebook and @StateGWI on X, Facebook, and LinkedIn or contact CSO at CSOPublicAffairs1@state.gov and S/GWI at StateGWI@state.gov.						Tags																					Australia																								Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																																Conflict Prevention																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Official International Travel																															Papua New Guinea																																Women&#039;s Issues
- 2024 Interagency Fact Sheets HomeU.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability &#8230;2024 Interagency Fact Sheets				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										2024 Interagency Fact Sheets																																																																										The following fact sheets were created to provide a snapshot of efforts under the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) in each priority country/region.  Each fact sheet details the main objectives and lists a sample of activities that the wider U.S. government is leveraging for SPCPS.Coastal West AfricaHaitiLibyaMozambiquePapua New Guinea						Tags																					Benin																								Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations																								Côte d&#039;Ivoire																								Ghana																								Guinea																								Haiti																								Libya																								Mozambique																								Papua New Guinea																								Togo
- Papua New Guinea HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Papua New Guinea				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Papua New Guinea																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																											c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				There were no significant changes in the human rights situation in Papua New Guinea during the year.Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; serious acts of government corruption; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, and other forms of such violence; trafficking in persons; the criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct between men; and extensive child labor, including the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take credible action to identify and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses. Impunity was pervasive.There were reported abuses by private entities and criminal gangs. Authorities investigated and prosecuted some cases involving these groups.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										Unlike in previous years, there were no reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings or extrajudicial killings.In March, the National Court found a policeman guilty of a double murder in 2021. The court found that during a “commotion” in Port Moresby, the off-duty officer fired several shots, killing two men. As of year’s end, however, the court had not issued a sentence.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited such practices, but there were credible reports that government officials employed them. Individual police and correctional services officers reportedly beat and otherwise abused citizens or suspects before or during arrests, during interrogations, and in pretrial detention.In November 2022, a detainee was allegedly brutally beaten by police in Oro Province. Other detainees alerted duty officers who took him to Popondetta General Hospital. As of October, the Internal Affairs Unit, responsible for investigating such incidents, had not pursued an investigation into the incident.A high level of violence and property destruction often marked police raids and searches of suspected criminals as well as forced evictions of illegal squatter settlements.Public concern about police and military violence against civilians and security forces’ impunity persisted. Police also committed sexual violence.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to gross overcrowding in some facilities, physical abuse, and inadequate sanitary conditions, medical care, and food shortages.Abusive Physical Conditions: The country’s prisons were overcrowded. In August, an Ombudsman Commission visit revealed that inmate overcrowding was a problem at the Buimo Correctional Facility in Morobe Province. The facility was holding more than 1,000 inmates; its official capacity was 600. Court delays contributed to remandees being held for extended periods of time, leading to overcrowding.In September, the Post Courier newspaper reported several remanded inmates were returned to the National Capital District Police Command for processing due to occupancy constraints. Port Moresby’s Bomana jail was unable to accept new inmates as it was operating at 45 percent above the official capacity of 550 inmates.Sanitation was poor, and prisoners complained of lack of medical treatment.Jail breaks were common, with many escapees not caught and some killed by security forces. In April, 24 prisoners cut a fence and attempted to escape from a prison in West New Britain Province. Corrections Service officials confirmed that 16 of the group were shot and killed, one was shot and injured, and seven escaped successfully. In October 2022, 26 prisoners escaped successfully from the same prison.Administration: The government mandated the Ombudsman Commission visit prisons and investigate complaints from prisoners.In August, the Ombudsman Commission visited prisons in Western Highlands, Morobe, East New Britian, Central Province and in the National Capital District. The commission’s report cited overcrowding and human rights violations at the Buimo prison in Morobe Province and recommended collaboration between the commission and government bodies in addition to provincial government funding allocations for correctional facility improvements.Independent Monitoring: The government permitted monitoring visits by independent observers. Correctional service officials stated various church representatives made visits, but the service did not release records or statistics on the number or types of visits. During the year, the International Committee of the Red Cross independently visited prisons in Baisu in Mount Hagen, Western Highlands Province, Bomana in Port Moresby, National Capital District, and in Bougainville.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but these provisions were rarely enforced.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						By law police were required to have reason to believe that a crime was being or was expected to be committed before making an arrest. A warrant was not required, but police, prosecutors, and citizens could apply to a court for a warrant. Police normally did so only if they believed it would assist them in carrying out an arrest. Judicial authorization of a warrant was usually prompt.Suspects charged with minor offenses could be released after bail was paid. Only national or Supreme Court judges could grant bail to persons charged with murder or aggravated robbery. In all other cases, police or magistrates could grant bail.Arrested suspects had the right to legal counsel and to be informed of the charges against them; however, the government did not always respect these rights.Arbitrary Arrest: Police frequently detained citizens arbitrarily without evidence. In some cases, police detained citizens without charge to steal from them.Pretrial Detention: Although the constitution provided for a right to trial “within a reasonable time” and pretrial detention was subject to strict judicial review through continuing pretrial consultations, lengthy pretrial detention was a problem, due to limited police resources, the slow pace of police investigations, a high crime rate, bail restrictions for certain crimes, and infrequent court sessions. According to Correctional Services’ data, detainees could wait up to 10 years before trial, sentencing, or release. Pretrial detention frequently equaled or exceeded the maximum sentence for alleged crimes. The average pretrial time served for all individuals was five years, according to local media reports. Pretrial detainees, frustrated by the slow processing of their cases, at times led prison breaks. Petition cases alleging electoral malfeasance after the 2022 national election further clogged the courts, some observers reported.In August, the Ombudsman Commission visited Buimo prison in Morobe, where two remandees had not seen their cases brought before the courts for seven years. This extended delay contradicted the legal requirement that cases be presented within three months of arrest.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected judicial independence and impartiality.																Trial Procedures						The law provided for a presumption of innocence and due process, including a public trial “within a reasonable time.” The court system generally enforced these rights, except for timeliness. The shortage of judges created delays in both the trial process and the rendering of decisions.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										Not applicable.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution prohibited such actions and there were no reports of such abuses.																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for the press and other media, and the government generally respected this right. An independent media, the judiciary, and a functioning democratic political system combined to promote freedom of expression, including for media members.Violence and Harassment: Journalists were sometimes subjected to harassment, intimidation, or violence by police or supporters of parliamentarians for their reporting.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: Publishers and journalists were generally aware of what content the government would object to and at times practiced self-censorship due to publications’ reliance on government-purchased advertising.Libel/Slander Laws: The law allowed for investigation and criminal prosecution for the release of allegedly defamatory material, although there were no reports of such cases used as a political weapon against journalists or opposition political figures.																Internet Freedom						The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online content.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Office for Migration, and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, or asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern.Access to Asylum: The law provided for granting asylum or refugee status, and the government had a system for providing protection to refugees. Recognized refugees could apply for a refugee visa and certificate of identity, which allowed them to work and access public services.Access to Basic Services: Asylum seekers and refugees were unable to access medical care and accommodation due to nonpayment of bills.On September 28, the Asylum Seeker Resource Center reported 17 refugees in Port Moresby were evicted or on the verge of eviction due to nonpayment for accommodation services by the government.On October 22, The Guardian newspaper reported an increasingly urgent need to provide services for 64 refugees and others at a closed detention center on Manus Island after funding from the Australian government ran out. The country’s chief migration officer reported 16 persons requiring special medical treatment would be transferred to Australia, 10 would be resettled in Papua New Guinea, and the remainder would be resettled in New Zealand.Durable Solutions: Approved asylum claimants could settle permanently in the country and, after eight years, apply for citizenship. Indonesian Papuans could apply for Papua New Guinean citizenship without having to wait for eight years or pay the citizenship fee.Temporary Protection: The government provided temporary protection to persons from Indonesia’s Papua region who might not qualify as refugees. According to government estimates, more than 10,000 refugees from Indonesia’s Papua region were living in the country. In 2022 the government began a nationwide Naturalization and Registration Project to regularize the status of these persons. The country also welcomed non-Melanesian refugees, including those who arrived independently and those processed under regional arrangements.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										Natural disasters, tribal violence, ethnic clashes, sorcery and related violence, and land disputes contributed to the displacement of communities and individuals.In July, the International Organization for Migration, at the request of the National Disaster Centre and Autonomous Bougainville Government, conducted a survey to assess the effects of the Mount Bagana volcano eruption. The survey reported 3,303 persons (724 households) were temporarily displaced. From May to September, large-scale intertribal violence in Enga Province displaced more than 5,000 persons.Displacement from disaster and violence was generally protracted, with families living in temporary situations for more than one year on average. These IDPs lacked access to land, basic services, and protection. Women and children were especially susceptible to food and housing insecurity, and their personal safety was at risk. The government had no policy or legislation to address the needs of IDPs, and host communities often responded to the arrival of displaced populations with violence.In August, armed men attacked a house in Hela Province that was used by sorcery-related displaced persons. Such persons were frequently stigmatized, women were denied space at the markets, and children were threatened at schools.For further information about IDPs in the country, please see the materials of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center:  https://www.internal-displacement.org .																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The law provided citizens the ability to choose their government in periodic, free, and fair elections; these were, however, seriously flawed. Suffrage was universal and equal.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National elections were widely reported to not be fair or free of abuses and irregularities. Bribery, voter intimidation, lack of ballot secrecy, ballot stuffing, social coercion by village leaders, campaigning at polling stations, and undue political and tribal influence were widespread in some parts of the country during the general election campaign in July 2022. Secrecy of the ballot was routinely compromised, and assisted voting was common. There were also many incidents of violence and destruction of property, primarily in the Highlands, during and after voting, causing the deaths of at least 50 individuals, including three police officers. Observers estimated that, altogether, up to 265,000 persons were affected by electoral violence.The nongovernmental organization (NGO) International Foundation for Electoral Systems reported the violence stemmed in part from an under-resourced electoral commission along with poor planning and implementation. An observer group from the Commonwealth Secretariat agreed the commission faced funding shortages and noted logistical defects that were partly to blame for significant problems with the voter registration process. An observer group from the NGO Transparency International PNG described a severely flawed electoral process, with failures in the preparation, conduct, delivery, and conclusion of the 2022 election. Key problems identified by the NGO included inaccurate voting rolls, lack of enforcement against election offenses, noncompliance with constitutional requirements, disturbances in counting ballots, confusion about the declaration of victorious candidates, and widespread election-related violence. Because of the manifold flaws, observers could not say the results were even broadly reflective of the voters’ will.Political Parties and Political Participation: There were no restrictions on party registration, and 43 parties contested the July 2022 elections. Several parties alleged that sitting members of parliament used government resources for campaigning in the 2022 elections. The lack of transparency in accounting for funds made this both possible and difficult to verify. In some areas, tribal leaders determined which candidate their tribe would support and influenced the entire tribe to vote for that candidate.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: No law limited participation by women or members of marginalized or vulnerable groups in the political process, but the deeply rooted patriarchal culture and fear of gender-based violence impeded women’s full participation in political life; women were expected to vote along tribal and family lines. Two women won seats in the July 2022 elections for the 118-seat parliament. A third woman won a seat in a by-election in Bougainville in October. Of the 46 judges on the National Court and the Supreme Court, nine were women. The chief magistrate and deputy chief magistrate were women.There were nine non-Melanesian members of parliament, triple the number before the election. Non-Melanesians generally did not face limitations in running for office.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively. There were numerous reports of government corruption; officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.Corruption: International civil society and human rights groups termed corruption “widespread” and “pervasive.” Corruption was a problem in part due to weak public institutions, lack of transparency, politicization of the bureaucracy, and the social pressure of traditional clan obligations. Corruption and conflicts of interest were of particular concern in extractive industries, most notably the logging sector, and in government procurement. In February, the parliamentary leadership tribunal found the former member for Madang and Immigration Minister, Bryan Kramer, guilty of seven counts of misconduct, including five counts of misuse of public funds. Kramer was fined and dismissed from office in May.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for the country and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						A variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor, investigate, and publish their findings on human rights conditions or cases. Government officials were somewhat cooperative and responsive to their reports.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Ombudsman Commission was responsible under the leadership code for investigating alleged misconduct and poor administration by governmental bodies, alleged discriminatory practices by any person or body, and alleged misconduct in office by leaders. Staffing constraints often delayed investigations and the completion and release of reports.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape of women or men, including spousal rape, was a crime punishable by from 15 years’ to life imprisonment. Gender-based violence, including sexual violence, gang rape, and intimate-partner violence, was a serious and widespread problem. Although the law also criminalized family violence and imposed maximum penalties of two years’ imprisonment and fines, it was seldom enforced. The law criminalized intimate-partner violence as well, but it nonetheless persisted throughout the country and was generally committed with impunity.In January, Human Rights Watch’s World Report stated that the country remained a dangerous place for women, with weak law enforcement fostering a culture of impunity. Police officials acknowledged police could not keep women and children safe and lacked resources for thorough investigations. In May, the Special Parliamentary Committee on Gender Based Violence revealed that in the country a woman was beaten every 30 seconds, and that 81 percent of the perpetrators were intimate partners of those beaten. The committee estimated that more than 1.5 million women experienced gender-based violence yearly.Due to stigma, fear of retribution, and limited trust in authorities, most women did not report rape or domestic violence to authorities. Moreover, most communities viewed intimate-partner violence as a private matter, further discouraging survivors from reporting the crime or pressing charges.Those convicted of rape received prison sentences, but authorities apprehended and prosecuted few rapists. The legal system allowed village chiefs to negotiate the payment of compensation to survivors in lieu of trials for rapists. Anecdotal evidence suggested survivors and their families pursued tribal remedies, including compensation, in preference to procedures in official courts. Village and district courts often hesitated to escalate domestic matters to higher judicial levels. Village courts regularly ordered payment of compensation to an abused spouse’s family rather than issue an order to detain and potentially charge the alleged offender.On August 31, police sought the aid of the Public Prosecutor for the reindictment of three men charged with the May 2022 murder of Imelda Tupi Tiamanda. Tiamanda was found dead in her husband’s vehicle at a police checkpoint in Southern Highlands Province. Those charged, including her husband, were released in September 2022 when a magistrate dismissed the charges, citing a lack of evidence.In June, a woman was allegedly beaten to death by her husband, a soldier, for refusing to have group sex at Murray Barracks in Port Moresby. The Police Criminal Investigation Division charged the man with murder; as of November, he was in police custody. Violence committed against women by other women frequently stemmed from domestic disputes. In areas where polygamy was customary, authorities charged women with murdering another of their husband’s wives. Independent observers indicated approximately 90 percent of women in prison were convicted of attacking or killing their husband or another woman.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Customary bride price payments continued, legal under customary law. This contributed to the perception by many communities that husbands owned their wives and could treat them as chattel. In addition to being purchased as brides, women sometimes were given as compensation to settle disputes between clans. Sexual harassment was not illegal and was a widespread and severe problem. Women frequently experienced harassment in public locations and the workplace.Discrimination: The law provided the same legal status and rights for women and men, including under family, religious, personal status, and nationality laws as well as in laws related to labor, property, inheritance, employment, access to credit, and owning or managing businesses or property. The law, however, was not effectively enforced, and although it banned discrimination based on gender in employment and wages, it explicitly precluded women from employment in certain occupations. It also designated certain civil service positions as open only to men or only to women and discriminated by gender in eligibility for certain job-related allowances.Women faced severe inequalities in all aspects of social, cultural, economic, and political life. For example, women had limited access to credit, loans, and land, especially in rural areas where traditional patriarchal biases about women’s roles and lack of government oversight were prevalent.Village courts, which enforced customary law, tended to impose jail terms on women found guilty of adultery while penalizing men lightly or not at all. The law, however, required district courts to endorse village court orders for imprisonment before the imposition of the sentence, and judges frequently annulled such village court sentences.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Barriers that impeded access to contraception included low educational and literacy levels among women; religious beliefs; risk of gender-based violence; the belief that younger women, women not in a union, or unmarried women who had not given birth to a child should not use contraceptives; lack of training among health-care workers; and community gossip and discrimination. There was limited or no access to reproductive health-care services for vulnerable populations in rural areas.The National Department of Health worked to strengthen Family Support Centers that provided counseling and support to survivors of gender-based violence and their families; emergency contraception was provided to those survivors who wanted it on a case-by-case basis following counseling services.According to the World Health Organization, the maternal mortality ratio in 2021 was 145 deaths per 100,000 live births due to factors including minimal access to maternal health services, the lack of health facilities and supplies, unmet needs for family planning and contraception, unsupervised deliveries, and sensitivities surrounding sexual and reproductive health. Of married women, 26 percent had an unmet need for family planning, seeking to stop or delay childbearing but not using any method of contraception; 65 percent of married women used modern contraceptive methods.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										Under the Human Rights Act, every person in the country enjoyed “the Right to Life, Freedom from Inhumane Treatment and the Right to Protection of the Law” regardless of nationality, race, or color. Although the laws provided for protection of members of racial and ethnic minority groups from discrimination, the government did not enforce them effectively.No law prohibited discrimination in employment or occupation on the grounds of race, language, national origin, ethnicity, or refugee or stateless status. Migrant workers were vulnerable to discrimination; the International Labor Organization noted there were concerns about discrimination against certain ethnic groups, including Asian workers and entrepreneurs.																																				Children										Birth Registration: Birth registration often did not occur immediately due to the remote locations in which many births took place. Failure to register did not generally affect access to public services such as education or health care.Education: Education was not compulsory. There were many complaints that inadequate government funding led to overcrowded classrooms with too few teachers. Some schools did not receive promised government subsidies and reportedly closed as a result. Many schools charged fees despite the official free education policy. Only one-third of children completed primary school. Primary and secondary education completion rates tended to be slightly higher for boys than for girls. Access to menstrual health care was constrained culturally in most rural areas, causing many girls in rural areas to leave school, and was a financial problem for girls in urban centers. Recent reports, including a May 2022 UN report, confirmed girls were at high risk of sexual harassment in schools, which, in addition to girls’ generally high risk of sexual violence and harassment, commercial exploitation, and HIV infection, posed serious threats to their education. Families of pregnant secondary school-age girls discouraged them from continuing their education until they gave birth; afterward, to avoid social stigma and discrimination, the new mothers often did not return to school and instead pursued odd jobs to support their children.Child Abuse: The laws against child abuse were rarely enforced. Initiatives such as the opening of Family Sexual and Violence Units within the police force remained limited.According to the NGO Save the Children’s report in November, approximately 70 percent of children suffered physical abuse and 50 percent faced family violence.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal age for marriage was 18 for boys and 16 for girls. There were younger legal marriage ages (16 for boys and 14 for girls) with parental and court consent. In June, UNICEF reported 27 percent of girls in the country younger than 18 were married.Customary and traditional practices allowed marriage of children as young as age 12, and early marriage was common in many traditional, isolated rural communities. Child brides frequently were taken as additional wives or given as brides to pay family debts and often served as domestic servants. Child brides were particularly vulnerable to domestic abuse, and there were no government prevention or mitigation efforts.Sexual Exploitation of Children: The law prohibited the commercial sexual exploitation, sale, grooming, and sex trafficking of children. The law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. The law prohibited using, procuring, and offering a child for pornographic performances; penalties ranged from five to 15 years’ imprisonment. The minimum age for consensual sex was 14. The maximum penalty for child rape was 25 years’ imprisonment or, if the victim was younger than age 12, life imprisonment. Enforcement of the laws remained a problem.There were cases of traffickers, including family members of victims, exploiting local and foreign children in sex trafficking, and NGOs noted the practice was common. There were also reports of traffickers exploiting children in the production of online commercial pornography.The National Center for Missing &amp; Exploited Children recorded approximately 12,000 cases of child sexual exploitation in 2022.																																				Antisemitism										There was a very small Jewish community in Port Moresby. There were no known reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: The law criminalized “sexual penetration against the order of nature” and “gross indecency.” The maximum penalty for same-sex sexual relations was 14 years’ imprisonment, attempts to commit the offense were punishable by seven years’ imprisonment, and misdemeanor acts of “gross indecency” between men were punishable by three years’ imprisonment. The law was enforced. Criminalization reinforced negative societal views of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI+) persons and made them vulnerable to physical abuse and discrimination by authorities and community members.Violence and Harassment: Individuals affiliated with LGBTQI+ organizations reported societal violence against LGBTQI+ persons, which police declined to investigate. Additionally, according to Human Rights Watch, officials and employers sometimes used the law as a pretext to harass or extort money from LGBTQI+ persons, including refugees.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state and nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Local NGOs reported low levels of education and lack of advocacy for legal and policy reforms contributed to an increase in HIV cases, social stigma, and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons, particularly transgender persons.There were no government reports of discrimination due to LGBTQI+ status, but according to observers, the scope of discrimination was difficult to measure due to LGBTQI+ individuals’ fear of expressing themselves openly. The government did not monitor LGBTQI+ discrimination. Discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons, especially transgender individuals, remained widespread in health care, housing, personal safety, employment, education, family, and access to other social services. Societal discrimination against LGBTQI+ individuals prevented them from freely accessing health-care services.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: There were no laws prohibiting or limiting so-called conversion therapy practices. Australia-based NGO Many Coloured Sky reported in 2022 that forced or involuntary so-called conversion therapy was practiced on adults or minors. There were no efforts to condemn such practices.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: Although there were no formal restrictions in place, societal norms inhibited LGBTQI+ individuals from forming organizations and publicly discussing or expressing their sexual orientation or gender identity.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The constitution prohibited discrimination against persons with physical or mental disabilities. Nevertheless, persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment; education; and access to health care, transportation, and other state services. Most buildings and public infrastructure remained inaccessible for persons with disabilities. Children with disabilities attended school in disproportionately low numbers. Those with certain types of disabilities, such as amputees, attended school with children without disabilities, while those who were blind or deaf attended specialized schools. The government endorsed the use of sign language to communicate information about all government programs, although access to interpreters was limited. Public addresses by government officials had simultaneous sign language interpretation, as did all local television broadcast news programs.The government provided free medical consultations and treatment for persons with mental disabilities, but such services were rarely available outside major cities.The law did not protect persons with disabilities from discrimination in employment. Most persons with disabilities did not find training or work outside the family.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										Press reported vigilante killings across the country, in many cases related to alleged involvement in sorcery and witchcraft and typically targeting vulnerable persons, including young women, widows without sons, and the elderly.Many believed perpetrators used claims of sorcery to mask inheritance disputes within or between clans and criminal violence (e.g., theft or revenge) against vulnerable members of the community. Reliable data on the matter remained elusive with estimates ranging from 30 to 500 fatal attacks per year. Police made no known arrests for sorcery-related violence as of October.The Community Good program operated by the United Church in Hela Province reported approximately 72 sorcery-related cases during a three-week investigation in Koroba Kopiago District, Hela Province. According to a program report, approximately 85 percent of those attacked for alleged sorcery died, while 5 percent feared being tortured and committed suicides. In August, the Community Good program in Koroba Kopiago District, Hela Province, recorded more than 100 persons displaced due to sorcery-related violence.Long-standing animosities among isolated tribes, a persistent cultural tradition of avenging perceived wrongs, and the lack of law enforcement were factors underlying frequent violent tribal conflict in highland areas. Tribal fighting continued in Highlands mostly in Hela, Southern, and Enga Provinces. The number of deaths and IDPs resulting from such conflicts continued to rise due to the increased availability of modern weapons. In August, the police commissioner authorized the use of lethal force to combat violence following fighting among 10 tribes in Enga Province that resulted in 70 deaths in the previous few months.There were conflicts between tribes or groups of tribes and the government and foreign investors over the development of mines and other extractive industries on traditional tribal lands.According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, unofficial estimates placed the number of deaths from May to September in Enga, Hela and Southern Highlands Provinces at more than 300; approximately 25,700 students were unable to attend school, and approximately 557,800 persons had no or limited access to basic health services due to damaged facilities, lack of staff (who fled the violence), and disrupted supply chains and other effects of the violence. On July 27, the government deployed 120 troops to Porgera, Laiagam, and Kompiam Districts in Enga Province to secure state assets and enforce law and order.In July, an ethnic clash in Enga Province killed 20 and caused millions of kina in damages, leading the provincial government to declare a three-month lock-down, closure of the airport, schools, and public offices and resulting in additional delays in supplementary elections. Between October and November, tribal fighting and election-related violence increased throughout Enga Province as the supplementary elections concluded, leading to 70 deaths and the displacement of a few hundred persons.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for workers to form and join independent unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes. The government had limited influence over trade union formation and registration. The law required unions to register with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (Labor Department). An unregistered union had no legal standing and could not operate effectively.Although the law provided for the right to strike, the government could, and often did, intervene in labor disputes, forcing arbitration before workers could legally strike or refusing to grant permission for a secret ballot vote on strike action. Some union leaders complained the Labor Department’s refusal to allow for votes on strike action constituted undue government influence. By law the government had discretionary power to intervene in collective bargaining by canceling arbitration awards or declaring wage agreements void when deemed contrary to government policy.The law prohibited both retaliation against strikers and discrimination by employers against union leaders, members, and organizers. The law did not provide for reinstatement of workers dismissed for union activity. In cases of retaliation or unlawful dismissal for union activity, the court could fine an employer and could order the reinstatement of the employee and reimbursement of any lost wages. If an employer failed to comply with such directives, the court could order imprisonment or fines until the employer complied. Judicial proceedings were subject to lengthy delays.The Labor Department was responsible for enforcing the law but did not do so effectively. Penalties were commensurate with those for other analogous violations. With two labor inspectors allocated per province and inadequate resources, inspectors usually monitored and enforced the law on an ad hoc basis. The Labor Department did not always act to prevent retaliation against strikers or protect workers from antiunion discrimination, which remained widespread in the logging sector and in state-owned enterprises. Observers attributed its ineffectiveness to insufficient manpower and resources. Neither government nor civil society reported whether penalties were regularly applied against violators of laws protecting freedom of association and collective bargaining.Unions were generally independent of both the government and political parties, whose influence diminished from previous years. Employees of some government-owned enterprises went on strike on several occasions, primarily to protest privatization policies, terminations, and appointments of managers or board members, or in pay disputes.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at   https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/ .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: The law provided for a minimum wage for all sectors, which was above the official poverty level estimate. The law regulated minimum wage levels, allowances, rest periods, holiday leave, and overtime work. The law limited the workweek to 42 hours per week in urban areas and 44 hours per week in rural areas, and it provided for premium pay for overtime work.Occupational Safety and Health: The government set appropriate occupational safety and health (OSH) standards and was required by law to inspect work sites on a regular basis. The law did not specify protection for employees who sought to remove themselves from conditions they deemed hazardous. In the case of a second or subsequent violation of wage or safety and health law, the employer was liable to a fine for each day or part of each day during which the offense continued. When an employer failed to obey an order, direction, or requirement, the court could order imprisonment until the directive was obeyed.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The government did not effectively enforce minimum wage, overtime, and OSH law and rarely responded to worker complaints. Penalties were not commensurate with those for similar crimes, such as fraud or negligence. Penalties were rarely applied against violators. The Labor Department was responsible for enforcing minimum wage, work hours, and OSH laws. The number of labor inspectors was likely insufficient to enforce compliance. Inspectors had the authority to make unannounced visits and levy sanctions.In August, the Ministry for Labor and Employment established a committee to review the country’s minimum wage.Violations of wage, overtime, and OSH law and regulations were common in the logging, mining, agricultural, and construction sectors due to the government’s lack of enforcement capacity and corruption. The logging industry in particular was known for extremely low wages and poor working conditions, including cramped and unhygienic worker housing. Workers in the mining sector were also subjected to hazardous and exploitative conditions, including exposure to toxic metals such as mercury. The government did not report whether OSH experts actively identified unsafe conditions.An estimated 80 percent of the country’s workforce was employed in the unregulated informal sector, primarily in subsistence agriculture and informal sales of betel nut, cigars, basic groceries, arts and crafts, and garments. Informal sector workers were not covered by wage, hour, OSH, and other labor laws and inspections.																																				    							View report by:																				Afghanistan											Albania											Algeria											Andorra											Angola											Antigua and Barbuda											Argentina											Armenia											Australia											Austria											Azerbaijan											Bahrain											Bangladesh											Barbados											Belarus											Belgium											Belize											Benin											Bhutan											Bolivia											Bosnia and Herzegovina											Botswana											Brazil											Brunei											Bulgaria											Burkina Faso											Burma											Burundi											Cabo Verde											Cambodia											Cameroon											Canada											Central African Republic											Chad											Chile											China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet)											Colombia											Comoros											Costa Rica											Côte d&#8217;Ivoire											Croatia											Cuba											Cyprus											Czech Republic											Democratic Republic of the Congo											Denmark											Djibouti											Dominica											Dominican Republic											Ecuador											Egypt											El Salvador											Equatorial Guinea											Eritrea											Estonia											Eswatini											Ethiopia											Fiji											Finland											France											Gabon											Georgia											Germany											Ghana											Greece											Grenada											Guatemala											Guinea											Guinea-Bissau											Guyana											Haiti											Honduras											Hungary											Iceland											India											Indonesia											Iran											Iraq											Ireland											Israel, West Bank and Gaza											Italy											Jamaica											Japan											Jordan											Kazakhstan											Kenya											Kiribati											Kosovo											Kuwait											Kyrgyz Republic											Laos											Latvia											Lebanon											Lesotho											Liberia											Libya											Liechtenstein											Lithuania											Luxembourg											Madagascar											Malawi											Malaysia											Maldives											Mali											Malta											Marshall Islands											Mauritania											Mauritius											Mexico											Micronesia											Moldova											Monaco											Mongolia											Montenegro											Morocco											Mozambique											Namibia											Nauru											Nepal											New Zealand											Nicaragua											Niger											Nigeria											North Korea											North Macedonia											Norway											Oman											Pakistan											Palau											Panama											Papua New Guinea											Paraguay											Peru											Philippines											Poland											Portugal											Qatar											Republic of the Congo											Romania											Russia											Rwanda											Saint Kitts and Nevis											Saint Lucia											Saint Vincent and the Grenadines											Samoa											San Marino											Sao Tome and Principe											Saudi Arabia											Senegal											Serbia											Seychelles											Sierra Leone											Singapore											Slovakia											Slovenia											Solomon Islands											Somalia											South Africa											South Korea											South Sudan											Spain											Sri Lanka											Sudan											Suriname											Sweden											Switzerland											Syria											Taiwan											Tajikistan											Tanzania											Thailand											The Gambia											The Netherlands											Timor-Leste											Togo											Tonga											The Bahamas											Trinidad and Tobago											Tunisia											Turkey (Türkiye)											Turkmenistan											Tuvalu											Uganda											Ukraine											United Arab Emirates											United Kingdom											Uruguay											Uzbekistan											Vanuatu											Venezuela											Vietnam											Yemen											Zambia											Zimbabwe															Build A Custom Report																						On This Page				search													>																										EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																				Trial Procedures																																												Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																				f. Transnational Repression																																																						g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																						h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																			Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																							a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																				Internet Freedom																																																																																				b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																						c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																							Women																																																						Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																						Children																																																						Antisemitism																																																						Trafficking in Persons																																																						Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																						Persons with Disabilities																																																						Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																			Section 7. Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Papua New Guinea
- Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Minister Rosso HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases&#8230;Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Minister Rosso				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Deputy Secretary Campbell’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Minister Rosso																																		Readout																														March 5, 2024																																							The below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Papua New Guinea Deputy Prime Minister John Rosso today. The Deputy Secretary highlighted the United States’ strong partnership with PNG based on shared values and mutual priorities. Deputy Secretary Campbell also emphasized the importance of the Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in demonstrating long-term U.S. commitment to Papua New Guinea. The Deputy Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister discussed ways to enhance the bilateral relationship between our two countries, especially in the economic and security sectors.						Tags																					Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs																								Deputy Secretary of State																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Papua New Guinea
- The U.S. APEC 2023 Host Year Elevated Stakeholder Voices Matt Murray, U.S. Senior Official for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)Bureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsOn November 17, the United States successfully concluded its 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host year.  Starting in Honolulu late last year, we visited Palm Springs, California, a crossroads of the Americas and Asia, in February to advance resilient and sustainable growth.  We then moved on to Detroit in May, where we saw the Motor City being revitalized as a center of innovative and worker-centered transportation and auto industries, and in August we gathered in Seattle, a global gateway of trade, investment, and innovation for the Pacific Northwest.  We completed our fruitful journey in San Francisco last month.   So, what did we accomplish during our host year?  For starters, the United States proudly hosted 400 technical meetings, 10 ministerial meetings, and over 5,000 delegates from the public and private sectors across the Asia-Pacific region.  APEC 2023 outcomes included announcements of $200 billion of investments from companies in the Asia Pacific into the United States and $50 billion of U.S. private sector investments into APEC economies.  We also directly engaged with more than 12,000 stakeholders and nearly 2,500 press members, and most importantly, APEC Economic Leaders endorsed the Golden Gate Declaration to advance the 21 APEC economies’ important work on sustainability, resilience, and economic inclusion.  Our success this year would not be possible without the engagement of each of our stakeholders and many Americans across the country who showed incredible support for APEC 2023.   Spirit of APEC Connect in the Leaders’ DeclarationAt the beginning of our host year, we took domestic outreach efforts to the next level by launching “APEC Connect,” a nation-wide campaign explaining our U.S. APEC 2023 host year to the American public.  Through this program, we engaged stakeholders from diverse sectors, from trade associations and chambers of commerce to labor groups, Indigenous communities, and diaspora communities across nearly all corners of the country. APEC Connect generated public awareness and broad support for our host year and cultivated partnerships to ensure all Americans can play a part in the APEC process.  The program further helped ensure that APEC’s work on sustainability, resiliency, and economic inclusion benefits people across the Asia-Pacific region. Traveling across the United States beyond U.S. APEC host cities – including to Pittsburgh, Atlanta, Rockville, and Chicago – we learned about economic opportunities and policy outcomes Americans would like to see from APEC to improve their personal and their community’s livelihoods.  It strengthened our stakeholder relations and inclusive approach to make better and more informed decisions about our host year policy priorities.  Much of this was captured in the Golden Gate Declaration, which stated, “Our stakeholders and business communities bring creativity, dynamism, and energy and remain vital partners in our work.  We look forward to further strengthening multi-stakeholder engagement.”  APEC Connect Efforts Enhanced in San Francisco Private Sector and Stakeholder Engagements during the 2023 U.S. APEC Economic Leaders&#8217; Week in San Francisco. &nbsp;In San Francisco, our last destination, the voices we gathered from across the United States through APEC Connect were incorporated into our final efforts to build a better tomorrow in the Asia-Pacific region.  During APEC Economic Leaders&#8217; Week (AELW), civic organizations and San Francisco APEC Host Committees hosted nearly 30 public and stakeholder engagement initiatives, conferences, and events to highlight San Francisco and California as the perfect AELW host and discuss how APEC can help people across the region thrive.  They included the APEC Meets California and Silicon Valley series, The Future Starts in California Conference, and more.  Over 3,000 domestic and international participants joined them.  As APEC Connect ‘friends’ advised, we continued to prioritize women’s economic empowerment and a just transition to Net Zero carbon economies through the inaugural APEC Multistakeholder Forum.  We also met with experts from academia at the APEC University Leaders’ Forum and the APEC Study Centers Conference, and engaged with a range of dynamic youth groups.AELW also featured the extensive public-private collaboration of nearly 2,000 participants at the APEC CEO Summit, the inaugural APEC Sustainable Future Forum, the APEC Business Advisory Council&#8217;s Dialogue with APEC Leaders, and other conversations.  This formal role for public-private cooperation – unique to APEC – is the “secret sauce” which helps us continue to deliver important outcomes for our workers, families, and businesses. Importantly, we also engaged with Small-and-Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in San Francisco and from other parts of the United States.  It was amazing to see that SMEs from different cities and states – Nevada, Maryland, Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Texas – that ‘APEC Connect’ed together earlier in the year were reunited in San Francisco as an integral part of AELW.  The City of San Francisco empowered other important stakeholders and members of communities and dramatically expanded APEC’s public outreach.  They recruited 1,200 multilingual volunteers and more than 300 leaders and elected officials from the city and the State of California.  They also engaged around 400 local groups, including members of the Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander community, who account for more than 30% of the city’s population and serve as connectors between San Francisco and the Asia-Pacific region.  They supported the successful execution of AELW, promoted AELW, provided opportunities for San Francisco and APEC delegates to interact, and distributed 40,000 copies of the city’s APEC flyer to neighborhoods.  The San Francisco media team reached more than 30,000 people via newsletters, their 600 advertisements received over 320,000 impressions, and their website attracted almost half a million visitors. Throughout the year, ‘APEC Connect’ed true champions of regional economic engagement to each other, to the U.S. host team, and to the Asia-Pacific.  The champions are all 12,000 stakeholders APEC 2023 engaged directly with – and more importantly, American workers, families, and businesses.  They all played a pivotal role in ‘Creating a Sustainable and Resilient Future for All’ and building an interconnected, innovative, and inclusive APEC region which benefits all our communities.  
- Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Marape Office of the SpokespersonThe below is attributable to Spokesperson Matthew Miller:Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken met with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape today in San Francisco. Secretary Blinken and Prime Minister Marape emphasized the importance of the U.S.-Papua New Guinea relationship to security and prosperity in the Pacific region. The Secretary and the Prime Minister also stressed that bilateral cooperation is essential to promote regional stability and equitable, sustainable economic growth.
- Papua New Guinea (23-816.1) – Agreement Concerning Counter Illicit Transnational Maritime Activity Operations Office of Treaty AffairsMaritime Matters: ShipriderSigned at Port Moresby May 22, 2023; entered into force August 16, 2023.
- Digital Press Briefing with Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023 Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023MODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists to today’s on-the-record briefing with Captain Claudine Caluori, U.S. Navy, Mission Commander of Pacific Partnership 2023.  Captain Caluori will discuss this year’s Pacific Partnership, the largest annual multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the Indo-Pacific.  This year’s mission included stops in Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Fiji, Samoa, Palau, and Papua New Guinea, and will continue through the end of the year with a stop in Tonga.She will be joined today by Director of Medical Operations for Pacific Partnership 2023, U.S. Navy Captain Robert Carpenter and the Mission Engineer, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Junior Grade Colby Gilbert.With that, let’s get started.  Captain Caluori, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you, and good afternoon.  I am U.S. Navy Captain Claudine Caluori.  I’m the Mission Commander for Pacific Partnership 2023.  When I’m not on mission, I am also the Commander of Destroyer Squadron 31, which is based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.First, let me start off by thanking you for being with us today and hearing about the great accomplishments that the 2023 Pacific Partnership mission is currently carrying out in the Pacific.  In my almost 25 years of service in the United States Navy, this has truly been one of the most astonishing missions of my career.So Pacific Partnership is the largest annual multinational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission in the Indo-Pacific.  Each year our mission team works with host and partner nations to enhance regional interoperability and disaster response capabilities.  We increase security and stability and we foster new and enduring friendships in the Indo-Pacific.  The relationship between the countries we have visited and our partners are deep and enduring.So on behalf of the U.S. Navy and the Pacific Partnership crew, we are honored to have visited so many wonderful countries, and we’re excited about our last mission stop on this incredible journey.  The Pacific Partnership 2023 team embarked on the Harpers Fairy-class dock landing ship USS Pearl Harbor LSD 52 and was joined by the Independence-Class littoral combat ship USS Jackson, or LCS-6.As stated earlier, our mission began in August in Vietnam, and we’ve successfully completed stops in the Philippines, Malaysia, Samoa, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and we’re about to complete our stop here in Fiji.  And this is actually our second stop here in Fiji on this current mission.  A small crew of U.S. sailors had the opportunity to board the Japanese tank landing ship, the Japanese ship Shimokita, and they visited the Tailevu province just this past August, where they executed a mangrove revitalization project with other U.S. Navy and Army, the Royal New Zealand Navy and Air Force, the Japanese Maritime and Ground Self-Defense Forces, the Republic of Fiji Maritime Military Forces, and students of the Ballantine Memorial Secondary School.So as I mentioned earlier, the USS Jackson serves as a secondary platform for our mission, and they made their first stop in Fiji, where our team and the ship’s personnel visited the Lautoka School for Special Education, and they held a rugby match.  Unfortunately, they lost that match, but hey, they tried.  But it was at the Sangam Sadhu Kuppuswami Memorial College.  They also gave tours aboard the ship, and they were very grateful to have given this opportunity to visit Fiji not once but twice.And so this mission has allowed us to promote interoperability and multinational cooperation with allies and partners by highlighting multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief through medical and engineering projects, and it’s also in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.We continue our mission throughout the South Pacific until the end of the year.  We are now in its 18th year.  So Pacific Partnership 2023 consists of nearly 1,500 U.S. and partner nation personnel who will carry out this mission.  And it’s a joint effort on behalf of Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and the United States.And just for some background, Pacific Partnership was born out of the devastation wrought by the December 2004 tsunami that swept through parts of South and Southeast Asia, and began as a humanitarian response to one of the world’s most catastrophic natural disasters.So at the invitation of hosts and nations, our mission partners visit and conduct tailored humanitarian civic action preparedness activities in the areas such as engineering, disaster response, public health, and other outreach events.  And additional criteria are also considered, such as host nations’ objectives and desires.  The enduring goal of Pacific Partnership is promoting interoperability and multinational cooperation through multiple lines of effort to help be regional – help build, sorry, regional resilience and the capacity to respond to disasters.Our projects, as I said earlier, have been tailored at the request of host nations.  So while on our mission stops, we conduct these projects throughout cities and provinces that were selected.  And we have and we will continue to conduct subject matter expert exchanges in public health and preventative medicine, also in adult and pediatric medicine, basic life support, first aid lectures, dental care, and veterinary services.  These medical subject matter expert exchanges are designed to share expertise across participating nation providers to combine provider practices and bring cultural awareness.So Pacific Partnership transitioned from its primary focus of providing direct care to focus on collective capacity building.  So any direct care provided will be shoulder to shoulder with host nation and partner nations.  And the intent is that we share the knowledge and skills that are enduring and applicable well after the mission is completed.So military and civilian leaders agree about the necessity of collaboration to respond to disasters and emergencies quickly and effectively.  As we all know, storms and catastrophic events don’t know a country’s boundaries.  And this mission allows us to show response capabilities and show that we can prepare in calm to be able to respond to a crisis.As you are all very much aware, I’m sure, Indo-Pacific is within what the scientists call the Pacific Ring of Fire, and it’s not about if, but when we will need to work collectively to respond to natural disasters.  So the United States and our partners, we stand ready to assist when called upon.  Some recent relief efforts include the 2022 volcanic eruption and tsunami in Tonga; the 2018 Super Typhoon Yutu relief efforts in the Northern Mariana Islands; and the 2011 relief efforts during Operation Tomodachi in Japan, which followed the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami.  So just to name few.So again, thanks for joining us and I’m happy to take your questions.MODERATOR:  Thank you, Captain Caluori.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.Our first question goes to Huizhong Wu of AP based in Bangkok, Thailand, who submitted their question in advance.  “I’d like to hear about U.S. military partnerships in the Federated States of Micronesia.”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you for your question.  So just recently, sailors and Marines assigned to Task Force Koa Moana 23 demonstrated their skills while bolstering U.S. alliances in the Pacific region.  So that task force, they worked on a series of construction projects in several Indo-Pacific nations over the summer.  The latest was the renovation of a – I can’t – of a municipal center on the island of Yap, Micronesia.  So just like Pacific Partnership, their mission helps to improve the health and safety of the communities, which in turn enhance U.S. relationships with its partners.Additionally, Pacific Partnership has visited the Federated States of Micronesia several times over the last years, to include 20 – 2008, ’11, ’15, most recently in 2019 with the USNS Brunswick, and they will also be visited in 2024, in January, with the USNS Mercy as a part of their mission coming up.MODERATOR:  Our next question goes to Bethany Allen of Axios based in Taipei, Taiwan.  And Bethany, I see that you also inputted your question in the Q&amp;A.  If you would like to unmute and pose your question, please do so now.QUESTION:  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes, please go ahead.QUESTION:  Okay.  Yes, thank you.  I noticed that the Solomon Islands is not on the list of participating countries this year.  I know it has participated for several years in the past, including last year when it was supposed to participate and then in the ended up denying access to a U.S. Navy vessel but still allowed access to a U.S. hospital ship during the Pacific Partnership.  Why are they not on the list this year?  And is that related to their growing security partnership with China?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, Bethany.  Thank you for your question.  So to answer that, Pacific Partnership 24-1 is with the hospital ship USNS Mercy.  They will actually be going to the Solomon Islands.  Actually, they’re going to be arriving in the Solomon Islands – I think it’s on or around 18 November – and they’ll depart on 3 December.As far as the second part of your question, I can’t comment on any claims or hypothetical accusations on a previous mission.  However, last year from May through September, the USNS Mercy did stop in Palau and Philippines and Vietnam in addition to several events that included Federated States and Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, and Papua New Guinea.MODERATOR:  The next question goes to Vincent Choi from the South China Morning Post based in Hong Kong.  Vincent, if you could please unmute and please pose your question.QUESTION:  Hi, can you hear me?MODERATOR:  YesCAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, we can.  Thank you.QUESTION:  Yes.  Yeah, so there has been frequent clashes between Chinese and Philippine coast guard near the Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.  So how does the U.S. Navy observe the situation here and what are the plans you have regarding the cooperation with the Philippine navy in the in the region?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, can you say the second half of your question?  I think I caught the first half, but I didn’t quite grab the second one.QUESTION:  Oh yeah, okay.  So what are your – what are the plans you have regarding the cooperation with the Philippine navy in the South China Sea?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, great.  Thank you, Vincent.  I appreciate your question.  As far as – I’ll address the second one first, where we just talked about the cooperation.  And I just want to reiterate that our government has reaffirmed that a strong U.S.-Philippine alliance is vital to a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and that we’ll continue to partner closely with the Philippines.  And I know you’re aware that for more than 70 years the U.S. Navy has maintained a persistent maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command is committed to continuing its forward presence, which is focused on stability and regional cooperation and economic prosperity for all nations.And then as far as the first part of your question, it’s like we’ll continue – the U.S. will continue to fly, sail, and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows.  And the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Joint Force, we remain dedicated to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and we expect all countries in the Indo-Pacific to operate in international waters safely and in accordance with international law.MODERATOR:  Our next question goes to Gordon Arthur from Naval News based in Christchurch, New Zealand.  Gordon, if you could please unmute and please ask your question now.QUESTION:  Hi there, Captain.  Thanks very much for this opportunity to listen and to ask you questions.  My question is to do with China, and I know the last few months in particular Chinese – China has been performing naval diplomacy in the South Pacific.  There have been hospital ships, training ships.  So just wondering, do you see the U.S. as complementing or competing with China for influence in the South Pacific?  And also during Pacific Partnership, have you had any encounters or contact with the PLA Navy?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you, Gordon, for your question.  So the U.S. Navy and our allies and partners, we value our growing cooperation with host nations and we look forward to enhancing the lines of communication and understanding that promotes greater cooperation and partnerships that benefit all nations.  And all Pacific Partnership 2023 operations are driven by host nation requests and approval.  As I stated earlier, the host nations invite the U.S. Navy and its mission partners to visit and conduct tailored humanitarian civic action preparedness activities in areas such as engineering, disaster response, public health and outreach events.  And all – again, all additional criteria are taken into consideration, such as the host nation objections and desires.  But I am not aware of any contacts at this time.MODERATOR:  Okay, we’re going to go to a question that was submitted in advance from Angie Chen of the Central News Agency based in Manila, Philippines.  “We are seeing higher tensions in the South China Sea, but some are worried that the U.S. is distracted by the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.  Will this concern be addressed in the Pacific Partnership this year?”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, thanks for the question.  Pacific Partnership is conducted yearly, so it’s not in response to any nation or current events.  Pacific Partnership does have an enduring history as a multinational mission designed to bring several nations together to build relationships, enhance interoperability, and elevate preparedness for responding to disaster emergencies in the region.So the focus is disaster relief preparation.  And as I stated earlier, for more than 70 years the U.S. Navy has maintained a persistent maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, and we remain committed to continuing this forward presence, which is focused on stability, regional cooperation, and economic prosperity for all nations.  And as always, a free Indo-Pacific is vital to the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.MODERATOR:  Okay, our next question will go to Dat Duong Quoc from Trí newspaper in Vietnam.  If you could please unmute and ask your question now.QUESTION:  Hello.  Thank you for doing this.  So am I premature to ask about whether Vietnam will be included in the next year Pacific Partnership?  And has Vietnamese authorities made any invitation to you for the next year?  Thank you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi.  Thank you for your question.  I am not aware if Vietnam is included in next year’s Pacific Partnership.  We have been going to Vietnam over the last several years, and the last time we were in Vietnam was – we were just in Phú Yên province, where we conducted over 119 events over 10 days.  And we’re looking forward to future collaboration with Vietnam.  And again, our relationship with Vietnam continues to grow stronger across an increasingly broad range of subjects, and Pacific Partnership is a way that we continue to develop these relationships.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to the Q&amp;A queue.  We have a correspondent from the Joongangilbo in South Korea.  If you would like to unmute and ask your question now, please do so.Okay, I will ask the question.  So this is from Joongangilbo from South Korea.  “We already have two wars in the Middle East and Europe, and there are many reports about military conflicts between the U.S. and China in Asia, especially around Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.  Do you think – do you think there is some possibility to occur another war in this area?  Thank you.”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Thank you again for your question.  So our allies and partners are one of our greatest strengths and key strategic advantage.  We’re advancing a shared vision alongside our allies and partners of a free and open and secure Indo-Pacific, and we continue to deepen our connections with regional allies and partners, and we will continue to support our allies and partners as they strengthen those relationships with each other.  And we are committed – we remain committed to upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific region where all nations, large and small, are secure in their sovereignty, can pursue economic opportunity, and resolve disputes without coercion, and of course have the freedom to navigate and fly consistent with international laws and norms.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to Chino Gaston from the GMA Network Incorporated in Manila, Philippines, who submitted his question in advance.  “China has shown it will carry out law enforcement action against the Philippines to the extent of causing collisions with Philippine boats.  The Philippines is looking for help.  Will the U.S. help or will it continue to merely monitor the situation on the basis that gray zone operations do not bring about obligations under the MDT?”CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, thank you for your question.  And so while I cannot comment directly on the U.S. response, again, I will say that the U.S. will continue to fly, sail, and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows.  These actions are destabilizing and they threaten the region’s security and prosperity.  And this is why our primary focus is on strengthening deterrence in collaboration with our growing network of allies and partners.  And we remain focused on building and strengthening international relationships both in preparation for and in response to disaster emergencies.MODERATOR:  We have just a few more minutes left for questions, so this next one will go to Joseph Thaddeus Morong.  Please unmute and ask your question.QUESTION:  Hi, good afternoon.  Can you hear me?MODERATOR:  Yes.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes.QUESTION:  Hello?  Yeah, alright.  Cool.  Would the U.S. Navy be interested in joining the rotation and resupply mission of the Philippine coast guard?Hello?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, Joseph.  Sorry.QUESTION:  Yeah.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  I had the mute on.  (Laughter.)QUESTION:  That’s all right.  That’s all right.  Should I repeat my question?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, please do.QUESTION:  Okay.  So right now, the ones that are involved in the resupply missions in the Second Thomas Shoal are the Philippine coast guard primarily, but there have been ISR help from the U.S. State Department.  My question is:  Would the U.S. Navy be interested in a more proactive role in the sense that it will join the resupply missions in the Second Thomas Shoal just to send a message that the Philippines maybe is not alone in maintaining the (inaudible) there?CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Okay, Joe.  Thank you so much for your question.  And I just want to say that our government has reaffirmed that we have a strong U.S.-Philippine alliance, which is vital to the free and open Indo-Pacific region, and that we’ll continue to partner closely with the Philippines.  And I do want to say that our relations are based on strong historical and cultural linkages, and a shared commitment to democracy and human rights.  These strong people-to-people ties and economic cooperation provide additional avenues to engage on bilateral and regional and global issues.  And it’s like our alliance continues to contribute to the security of our two nations while also strengthening the rules-based order that benefits all nations within the Indo-Pacific.  Thank you again for your question.MODERATOR:  And our last question will go to David Santos from CNN Philippines.  Please unmute and ask your question.QUESTION:  Hi, thank you for doing this.  I think we spoke to you, ma’am, in La Unión a few months back when Pacific Partnership was here.  I would like to ask, we are – the Philippines is marking the 10th year since Super Typhoon Haiyan hit the eastern Philippines, and we know that Pacific Partnership or the U.S. Government in general was part in that multinational response during that particular catastrophe.  I know that our security and defense alliance is largely focused on joint trainings, sharing of intelligence information, enhancing our defense capabilities.  But can you talk to us how HADR – humanitarian assistance and disaster response – has played a key role in enhancing that defense alliance?  Thank you very much.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Hi, David.  Thank you.  And yes, I do remember our conversations when we were in San Fernando.  And thank you for your question.  I will say that having – having our continued cooperation through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief is one of the ways that we can continue to promote greater cooperation and our partnership.  It’s one of those things where it’s almost a base level to continue and moving forward.  Because it’s something that we’re – no matter what we’re going to have to respond to it.  It’s like when we go out, we have this mission to where the hope is that we can become recovery and relief experts in order to better assist each other as we prepare for the next catastrophic events.  And the goal is that we continue to work together and respond in a crisis.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time for today.  If you have any closing remarks, Captain Caluori, I’ll turn it back over to you.CAPTAIN CALUORI:  Yes, thank you so much.  I just want to kind of highlight a few of the things that we’ve done.  Well, multilateral missions like Pacific Partnerships are based on the common goal of enhancing regional stability with allies and partners, and it’s a unifying mission that fosters enduring friendships and cooperation among many nations.  And I just want to give a few statistics.I mean, so far over the last 3 months, we have conducted over 489 events, 316 of which were medical.  We’ve done 99 outreach events.  We’ve done 34 HADR symposiums and tabletop exercises.  And our engineers have conducted over 38 renovation and new construction projects so far.And I just want to say that having this Pacific Partnership continues to build trust among nations to work effectively together, and it’s crucial to maintaining peace and stability in the region.  Thank you again for everyone.MODERATOR:  Thank you to the participants for your questions today, and thank you to Captain Caluori for joining us, and thanks to your team as well from the Pacific Partnership 2023.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.
- Papua New Guinea (23-816) – Defense Cooperation Agreement Office of Treaty AffairsDefense: CooperationSigned at Port Moresby May 22, 2023; entered into force August 16, 2023.
- Digital Press Briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania Daniel J. Kritenbrink, Assistant SecretaryBureau of East Asian and Pacific AffairsDr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for East Asia and OceaniaMODERATOR:  Greetings from the U.S. Department of State’s Asia Pacific Media Hub.  I would like to welcome journalists today to the on-the-record briefing with Daniel J. Kritenbrink, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper, Special Assistant to the President and National Security Council Senior Director for East Asia and Oceania.  The speakers will provide a readout on the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.With that, let’s get started.  Dr. Rapp-Hooper, I’ll turn it over to you for your opening remarks.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, and thanks to you all for being here this evening, this morning.  We’re glad to have the opportunity to read you out the President’s really consequential summit of Pacific Islands Forum leaders here in Washington just a few days ago, and thrilled to be joining my friend and colleague Dan Kritenbrink to do so.As you know, this week, leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum were all in Washington for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Island Leaders Summit.  By all accounts, this was an extremely successful and productive visit for the PIF leaders and for the President.  I’ll start with a brief recap of the leaders’ engagements over the past few days, and then I’ll discuss in brief some of the key deliverables that were announced over the course of the summit before handing the floor over to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.In advance of the formal meetings that took place in Washington, we got our summit started early on Sunday when Pacific Island Forum leaders took a trip from New York on a special Amtrak train down to Baltimore.  In Baltimore, the leaders attended a Baltimore Ravens game, where they were recognized for their role as American friends in the Indo-Pacific.  They even made it onto the field, where they were recognized before the game began.After the game, they toured a Coast Guard cutter ship in the Baltimore Harbor, the USS Forward, and had a meeting and opportunity to exchange views with Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Linda Fagan on key issues to Pacific Island leaders, including combating illegal fishing and effectively managing maritime domains.Following the Pacific Island Forum leaders’ trip to Baltimore, the leaders came to Washington, where they were hosted by President Biden at the White House on Monday for the second-ever U.S.-Pacific Summit.  They also attended a climate roundtable hosted by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry as well as a dinner hosted by Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield about which Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink will say more in just a moment.On Tuesday, the leaders also met with members of the philanthropic community, U.S. businesses, and members of Congress.  We closed out the summit with a reception hosted by our friends at the Australian embassy, emphasizing the depths of our people-to-people ties.  And I look forward to Dan speaking to those engagements in a bit more detail very soon.At the summit with PIF leaders on Monday, President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to shared regional priorities and to deepening our cooperation, including to tackling the climate crisis, advancing economic growth, promoting sustainable development, countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and expanding our people-to-people ties.Before getting into the deliverables that we unveiled on Monday, I’d first like to take a step back and recognize the milestones of engagement with PIF countries that we have passed over the course of the last couple of years.Just in the last year, we have opened new embassies in the Solomon Islands and Tonga in record time, thanks in no small part to the extraordinary work of our colleagues at the State Department.  We opened a USAID regional mission in Fiji and are returning the Peace Corps to the region after years of relative absence.  We are enhancing our engagement with the Pacific Islands Forum as the region’s leading institution, and we continue to expand U.S. cooperation and assistance programs throughout the region.At this year’s summit, we announced expanded ties with our recognition, our diplomatic recognition, of the Cook Islands and Niue, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with both of these Pacific Island nations.Since last year’s summit, this May, Secretary Blinken met with the Pacific Island Forum leaders in Papua New Guinea, and at this week’s summit, the Biden-Harris administration has continued to show that we are delivering on our promises.  All told, we have now announced a commitment to work with Congress towards over $8 billion in new funding and programs for the Pacific Island region.  And again, this is just in the last year.On Monday, President Biden announced a new slate of activities, including plans to work with Congress to request and provide nearly $200 million in new funding.  These programs seek to address the priority issues we hear about from Pacific Island leaders, including the climate crisis – which is existential for many of our Pacific Island friends – and we always stand shoulder to shoulder with them as they work to meet the challenge to achieve net zero emissions by 2050.The President on Monday also reaffirmed his commitment to the security of the Blue Pacific Continent, and to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, the United States has announced that it will provide over $11 million to bring cutting-edge maritime domain awareness technology to the Pacific through the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to help improve the maritime picture and law enforcement information analysis and provision amongst our Pacific Island friends.We’re also delivering on our promise to invest in the prosperity of the region.  As the President has announced, we will invest an additional $40 million working with Congress to expand our Pacific Islands Infrastructure Initiative.  Through this initiative, we’re bringing technical assistance and project preparation work needed to identify commercially viable projects through partners in the U.S. Government, including the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.These are just a few of the key initiatives announced as part of our summit.  One more that I’d flag that we’re happy to go into during our question-and-answer period involves a new microfinance facility that will offer small and micro loans to Pacific Island businesses so that entrepreneurs there have the chance to thrive.  And these deliverables we are working towards illustrate the depths of our collaboration with the Pacific Islands and the promise of expanding our partnership for many years to come.As President Biden has said, the United States is and will long remain a proud Pacific nation.  And as a Pacific nation, the United States is here for the long haul and will continue to deliver on our promises to our partners in the region.I’ll hand the floor over to Dan to talk more about Secretary Blinken’s consequential engagements with the PIF leaders throughout the summit.  Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, thanks so much, and good evening, everyone.  I think, as my esteemed colleague Dr. Mira Rapp-Hooper has outlined, this was a tremendously successful summit that I think demonstrates further the breadth and depth of America’s commitment to the Pacific.  And Mira, I thought that was really a tremendous rundown of a momentous series of events related to the U.S.-Pacific Islands Forum Summit.I thought that I would focus my remarks a bit more narrowly on some of Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s significant engagements with the Pacific Island leaders here in Washington, and then also mention briefly the engagement involving the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry’s meetings during the summit as well.As Secretary Blinken put it, our engagements were designed to show that we’re seizing on the possibilities of this moment to build a more secure, resilient, inclusive, and prosperous Pacific region.As Secretary Blinken also said on Monday night, the fundamental fact is this:  Our fates are tied together.  We’ve long been committed development partners to the Pacific Islands, and we’re excited to bring new energy and resources to the Pacific, working with partners in the Pacific Islands on our shared goal of meeting Pacific priorities and supporting Pacific institutions.We saw this last week, last Friday at the UN – at the end of the UN General Assembly High-Level Week, when Secretary Blinken hosted a Partners in the Blue Pacific ministerial in New York.  And at that meeting on Friday, we aimed to highlight the tremendous work we’ve done to advance more effective and efficient cooperation and engagement with our Pacific partners, designed to strengthen Pacific regionalism and to facilitate and encourage other partners and institutions to engage and consult with the Pacific.  And of course those efforts flowed nicely into the Pacific Islands Forum Summit itself, which began, as Mira indicated, on Monday.I think a clear sign of our commitment to the Pacific region came through the establishment of diplomatic relations with both Niue and the Cook Islands.  Following an announcement from President Biden earlier on Monday, Secretary Blinken hosted Niue Premier Dalton Tagelagi and Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown for two separate signing ceremonies here in the State Department Treaty Room to make these momentous occasions.  These historic announcements reaffirmed our joint commitments to deepen our cooperation as equal and sovereign partners, guided by respect, genuine engagement, and partnership.  We fully anticipate working even closer with Niue and the Cook Islands on our shared priorities, which include the climate crisis, renewable energy, Pacific regionalism, and good governance, among many others.Secretary Blinken then had the pleasure of joining the millennium compact corporation CEO Alice Albright and iKiribati President Taneti Maamau for a signing ceremony for an MCC-Kiribati threshold program grant agreement that will provide up to $29.1 million to promote safe, accessible, decent, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers, both in Kiribati and across the region.  This will be the United States’ largest direct grant investment in Kiribati to date, and it is an agreement that we believe will deliver clear results and benefits to people in the Pacific Islands and solve real challenges to shape our future.I wanted to mention, also on Monday evening, Secretary Blinken hosted really a spectacular dinner here at the State Department in the newly renovated Benjamin Franklin Room, which was an opportunity for the Secretary and other leaders across the U.S. Government to meet with all of the Pacific Island leaders and to discuss in more detail ways that we can expand our cooperation in the future.  The Secretary was delighted to host the banquet with his co-host, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield – of course, America’s Permanent Representative to the UN – and at the dinner, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced that she will be America’s representative to the next Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Summit in November of this year.I think the final event of the summit, the two-day summit, for Secretary Blinken was his meeting with representatives from the Freely Associated States.  Namely, he met with Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ading, he met with Federated States of Micronesia President Simina, and with Palau President Whipps.  That was on Tuesday, late Tuesday afternoon.During the meeting, the Secretary took the opportunity to underscore the strong people-to-people ties and shared history underpinned by the Compacts of Free Association between the U.S. and these three Freely Associated States.  The Secretary commended the dignitaries for the progress in the negotiations on the compact-related agreements, which we believe signals a new era in our partnerships that will help advance a secure, free, and open Pacific.  And we look forward to further progress on these Compacts of Free Association agreements in the months to come.Finally, of course, climate change, as Mira indicated, was a major topic of discussions since it is such an existential challenge, and we recognize it, as our partners do, as the single greatest threat facing the Blue Pacific.Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry met with Pacific leaders on Monday to discuss the climate crisis and ocean resilience.  Secretary Kerry reiterated the United States’ new policy on sea-level rise and statehood that President Biden had earlier announced as well as new investments in strengthening early warning systems and sustainable development.So in the interest of time, why don’t I stop there.  I know that Mira and I will be delighted to take your questions.  Thanks.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  Thank you, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink.  We’ll now turn it over to the question-and-answer portion of today’s briefing.  The first question will go to Ralph Jennings from the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong, who sent his question in advance:  “How does the recent U.S. engagement with the South Pacific help offset China’s economic influence in the region?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, do you want to take that one first or you want me to dive in?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  I’m happy to take that one, Dan.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Please.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  And I’ll turn to you in just a moment to add your thoughts.  Thanks for the question.  I would say just as a topline matter, when we’re working with our Pacific Island friends, we’re really not focused principally on China.  We’re focused on what the United States can offer as a likeminded partner to this group of countries.  And we are very focused on delivering positive, attractive alternatives to these countries that can help them and their people thrive.  But it’s really about what we stand for together alongside our Pacific Island partners, not about who or what we’re against.But with that in mind, I will note that, as the President announced, our $200 million in new programs for Pacific Island Forum nations do include some really consequential new programs that we believe are going to help our friends in the Pacific to generate the economic dynamism that they’re looking for to offset and combat climate change and to continue their recovery from the pandemic, where they were especially hard-hit.Just as a few examples, we’re stepping up our infrastructure efforts.  Specifically, as I mentioned, the President announced $40 million to new infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands.  He also announced that the United States will be undertaking new submarine cable projects in the Pacific Islands to build secure, reliable connectivity amongst Pacific Island nations and to ensure that our friends there have the basic digital infrastructure that they need, like reliable, speedy internet on which so many businesses and individuals rely.  And of course, that submarine cable work builds on work we have been doing in recent years, including with the East Micronesia Cable, where we’ve already begun work to improve high-quality and more reliable secure communications for over 100,000 people in the Pacific Islands.  So infrastructure is a big part of our work.We are also delivering a new Millennium Challenge Corporation project with the Government of Kiribati, which is intended to advance economic growth in Kiribati in partnership with the International Labor Organization and American Councils of International Education to bolster and promote safe, accessible, and inclusive employment opportunities for Kiribati workers.Through the Quad, we are partnering with the Government of Palau to implement the deployment of a new ORAN network that is a next-generation, secure mobile network to help Palau get the secure connectivity that it needs.  And as we mentioned at the top of the call, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency is working throughout the Pacific Islands to identify through its technical work opportunities for more viable projects in the months and years to come.So this is just a sampling of the work that we’re doing to try to bring the economic tools we have to bear to help Pacific economies thrive, but I’ll hand it back to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink to see what he might like to add.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, that’s a brilliant answer.  I – all I could really do is foot-stomp what Mira has already said.  We approach the region from the perspective of advancing our affirmative agenda – the shared interests and values that we hold in common with our Pacific partners.That’s our focus, not any notion of focusing on a third party.  And as we often say, we have a regional strategy.  We’re focused on our affirmative agenda.  And I think if we continue to deliver benefits to our partners in the Indo-Pacific, I’m very confident and optimistic about our future together.In particular, as Dr. Rapp-Hooper has indicated, our entire approach to the Pacific is predicated on meeting our Pacific Island friends where they live.  In other words, in conversation with our Pacific partners, we have understood clearly what their needs and concerns and interests are, as outlined very clearly in the Pacific Islands Forum’s 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent.  And by design, our work and the work of our other partners through the Partners in the Blue Pacific is specifically designed to address the needs that they themselves have outlined in their strategy.Again, that is the focus of our efforts, not any third parties.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Okay.  The next question is going to go to Rurika Imahashi, who submitted the question on the chat, the Q&amp;A box here on Zoom.  “Our understanding is that the Marshall Islands parliament will soon certify the compact deal with the U.S.  What is the U.S. understanding on the development of the agreement?”  So we’ll answer that part.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, why don’t I take an initial stab at this one and we’ll ask you, obviously, to add anything else that you would like.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Sounds good.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I guess what I would say to any friends with questions about the compacts, I would just simply underscore that the compacts remain of vital importance to the United States.  I think they recognize our deep and historic ties to the three Freely Associated States.  I think they embody the strong ties between the peoples and the governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau.  And we remain very optimistic about the progress that we’ve made in the compact-related negotiations.I know when Secretary Blinken sat down with the leaders of the three Freely Associated States, he really commended them for the progress that we’ve made.  I think as everyone is tracking, we signed COFA-related agreements with Palau in May and with the Federated States of Micronesia in May, and we’ve made tremendous progress with our friends in the Marshall Islands.  We’re confident that we will conclude all of these agreements very soon and we will continue to build out these incredibly significant relationships that are central to everything we hope to achieve in the Pacific.And I think, as friends are tracking, that these compacts really are extraordinary agreements that are 20-year agreements in duration, and again, we’re confident that we will conclude them and implement them very soon.But, Mira, would you like to add anything to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Not much that I could add, Dan, except just to foot-stomp the point that we believe we are well on our way; we’ll soon be at a successful conclusion and very much look forward to being able to mark that milestone after months of really terrific cooperation with all of the Freely Associated States.  That’s all for me.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Yeah, and maybe just one final comment.  I think Mira’s comments reminded me that I do want to recognize that obviously this work is all being done at the direction of President Biden and Secretary Blinken, but our Special Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations Joe Yun and his team have also done a brilliant job and I really commend them.  And as Mira indicated, we’re very close and look forward to implementing them very soon.MODERATOR:  The next question will go to Stephen Wright from Radio Free Asia’s BenarNews Service.  Stephen, I also see that your hand is up.  If you’d like to unmute and ask your question, please go ahead.  Yeah, please go ahead and unmute.QUESTION:  Yeah, thanks.  Prime Minister Sogavare didn’t attend the recent summit and subsequently he said the U.S. should show respect to Pacific Island leaders and not lecture them at summits.  What do you think that shows about the progress of U.S. and Solomon Islands relations?  And are there any plans to have an ambassador at the new but smaller embassy in the Solomon Islands?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks very much.  This is Mira; I’m happy to take a first crack at this, and Dan, perhaps I’ll pass to you just on the embassy piece.We were disappointed that Prime Minister Sogavare was unable to attend the summit in Washington.  We did reach out, including at the very highest levels, to encourage him to join us for this terrific conversation that we’ve been laying out for you here, this opportunity to engage amongst friends, and we’re disappointed that he declined to do so.I don’t have much to say about the specific comments except to note, I think as we have been throughout this call tonight, that the conversation with the President, with the Secretary of State, with every cabinet official and member of Congress at the Pacific Island Forum leaders met with was collaborative, constructive, forward-looking, and I think most importantly involved an incredible amount of listening by U.S. Government officials to continue to refine their understanding of what our Pacific Island Forum friends are most looking for from us.So that’s the approach that we’re going to continue to take.  We continue to believe that it’s the right approach.  We feel that our three really dynamic days of programming show that we’re on the right track, and we look forward to continuing that work on the road ahead.Dan, over to you.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Thank you, Mira.  Maybe specifically on the question regarding our presence in the Solomon Islands, I’ll just note that we were excited and honored to open our new U.S. embassy in Honiara in January of this year, which was less than one year after Secretary Blinken announced our intent to do so.  Really excited about the work that our embassy colleagues there, led by Chargé Russ Comeau – excited about the work that they’re doing, again, to build our friendship and our ties with the people of the Solmon Islands and ensure that we work to deliver tangible benefits to our partners there.Of course, any new first step in opening an embassy involves staffing it, and of course our chargé d’affaires currently leading our embassy efforts there, and we recognized him for his really stellar work there.I would simply say at this point we have taken a number of steps internally to identify the U.S. ambassador, the next U.S. ambassador to the Solomon Islands, and I don’t have anything to announce to you this evening.  But I hope we’ll have something to announce in the near future, but we are certainly working towards that end.  Thank you.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Dan, if I may just jump in really quickly to add one additional detail.  I did want to note, as Dan noted, the – our wonderful Chargé Russ Comeau in the Solmon Islands was given a really important inaugural award at the dinner so graciously hosted by Secretary Blinken during the Pacific Island Forum Summit.  That inaugural award commemorates intrepid diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, and Chargé Comeau really embodies that to a T.  He has been just absolutely indefatigable in working to build U.S.-Solomons ties.I underscore that because I do want to make clear that the purpose of an award like this is to continue to draw attention to and raise up Americans who are doing their utmost on the ground to build ties with the Pacific Islands.  And I think the fact that we’ve established this award this year, that it was given by the Secretary of State, is just yet another demonstration that we are continuing to create incentives, recognize achievements so that Americans continue to step up and deliver on our promises throughout the Pacific.MODERATOR:  Okay.  I realize that we’re running a little bit over.  We started a few minutes late, so we’ll take a couple more questions.  We have one from Daniel Hurst from The Guardian.  “To what extent is the United States concerned about the newly announced comprehensive strategic partnership between Timor-Leste and China?  Why or why not?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Perhaps I can take an initial crack at that one and then ask Mira to chime in.  Look, I think as we indicated earlier, our message to partners in the region is that we’re not asking countries to choose.  We’re in the business of trying to ensure that countries have the ability to make their own sovereign decisions and their own choices free from coercion.My second point would be, as indicated earlier, we’re focused on our affirmative agenda in the region, including with friends in Timor-Leste, and we’ll continue to do that.  We’ll focus on how we can further build out our friendship and partnership with counterparts in the region, including Timor-Leste, and focus on the great work that we can do together.But again, we’re not in the business of asking countries to choose, and I don’t really think it’s beneficial to try to get into some kind of a comparison game or comment on engagement of other partners with the PRC.But, Mira, what would you like to add to that?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  I’m in violent agreement.MODERATOR:  Great.  We are – let’s see.  If the speakers are okay, can we take one more question?ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Absolutely.  Please.MODERATOR:  Great.  Great.  And this one is from Mar-Vic Cagurangan from the Pacific Island Times, based in Tamuning, Guam, who sent it in advance:  “How will a federal shutdown affect the Compact of Free Association, COFA?  Will the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands, and Palau continue to receive funds throughout the shutdown?  Do you think this affect – this will affect the U.S. credibility with the Freely Associated States?”ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  Mira, perhaps I could provide an initial answer on this one as well and then be happy to turn to you.  Yeah, I really do appreciate the question, and I’ll just underscore what I mentioned earlier.  We’re really excited about the progress we’ve made in the compact negotiations and we’re confident that all of these agreements will be concluded soon.The issue that you raised here was discussed in some detail in the meeting between Secretary Blinken and the three leaders from the Freely Associated States, and I can assure you that we are in very close and constant communication with our friends both in the Freely Associated States and with leaders on Capitol Hill to make sure that we have a plan going forward under all circumstances that will allow us to meet our obligations under the compacts.I think, as friends may be tracking, that the draft Compact of Free Association agreements, the draft legislation on the Hill includes authority to continue programs and services at the same levels provided under current agreements until the new agreements are in place so as to avoid a lapse in services.  And we’re also working very closely with our friends so that if there were to be any kind of a lapse in appropriations that we can take the appropriate mitigating steps wherever possible to minimize any possible impacts on our friends in the Freely Associated States.But I think that I can assure you we’re in close and frequent contact with our friends in the Freely Associated States and I’m confident we have a plan to work through any contingency.Mira, what would you like to add?DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Nothing to add, Dan.  Thanks so much.MODERATOR:  Thank you.  And for our closing remarks, I’d like to turn it back to Dr. Rapp-Hooper.DR RAPP-HOOPER:  Thanks so much, folks, for joining us this evening.  I think from this conversation you’ve gotten a pretty good lay of the land of the incredibly substantive set of conversations that took place in Washington this week.  The point I want to emphasize before we let you go is that for us, this project, this promise to renew our ties, renew our commitment to the Pacific Islands, is really about much more than a three-day summit.  It’s about delivery on the promises that we’ve made in the last two years, which I think we showed in spades this week, but on delivery on those new conversations and those new commitments that have been made just this week.We have clear instructions from the President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and many others to move out expeditiously on everything that we announced alongside our Pacific Island friends earlier this week, and we intend to literally put our money where our mouth is and deliver on everything that we seek to do together in the Pacific, whether that is providing finance so that friends in the Pacific can more quickly and readily adapt to climate change or providing micro and small loans to entrepreneurs and small businesses so that women leaders in particular can get the financing they need to allow them to contribute to increasingly dynamic Pacific economies.So we’re really just still in the opening chapter of the new Pacific story that we’re writing here under the Biden administration, but we feel like we have made tremendous progress in just the last two years, and we are emerging from this week’s summit energized and ready to hit the ground running with this new set of programs and new set of promises, and we look forward to being back in touch to share more about how this exciting work is all going.MODERATOR:  And Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I’ll turn it over to you for any closing remarks.ASSISTANT SECRETARY KRITENBRINK:  I can’t say it any better than that.  Beautifully summarized by Mira.  Really grateful to all of our friends in the media for joining us here tonight.  And as Mira indicated, we’re committed to now implementing all of the agreements and the objectives that we’ve set out flowing from this latest summit, and very optimistic, again, about our future ahead with friends in the Pacific.  Thanks again for joining us tonight.MODERATOR:  That brings us to the end of our time today.  Thank you for your questions and thank you to Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink and Dr. Rapp-Hooper for joining us.  We will provide a transcript of this briefing to participating journalists as soon as it is available.  We’d also love to hear your feedback, and you can contact us at any time at AsiaPacMedia@state.gov.  Thank you again for your participation and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon.