# Zimbabwe - United States Department of State

- Zimbabwe National Day Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateOn behalf of the people of the United States, I congratulate the people of Zimbabwe as you celebrate the 44th anniversary of your country&#8217;s independence.We remain committed to partnering with the people of Zimbabwe as you endeavor toward a more just, equitable, and healthy society. The United States is pleased to support Zimbabwean efforts to promote democracy and respect for human rights. As you celebrate your independence, please know our friendship with the Zimbabwean people endures.We wish the very best for the people of Zimbabwe
- Zimbabwe HomeReportsBureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices&#8230;Zimbabwe				hide	document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function(event) {	if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}});																							2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe																																					Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																																																																							Download Report																																																							Translations																																																																 In this section										/																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																																													EXECUTIVE SUMMARY																															Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																																									a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																																											b. Disappearance																																																																											c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																																			Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																																																		d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																																			Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																																																		e. Denial of Fair Public Trial																																																																			Trial Procedures																																																								Political Prisoners and Detainees																																																																																																																		f. Transnational Repression																																																																											g. Property Seizure and Restitution																																																																											h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence																																																																																	Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties																																																									a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media																																																																			Internet Freedom																																																																																																																		b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																																			Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																																								Freedom of Association																																																																																																																		c. Freedom of Religion																																																																											d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																																											e. Protection of Refugees																																																																											f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																																											g. Stateless Persons																																																																																	Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																																									Elections and Political Participation																																																																																	Section 4. Corruption in Government																															Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights																															Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses																																																									Women																																																																											Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination																																																																											Children																																																																											Antisemitism																																																																											Trafficking in Persons																																																																											Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics																																																																											Persons with Disabilities																																																																											Other Societal Violence or Discrimination																																																																																	Section 7. Worker Rights																																																									a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																																											b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																																											c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																																											d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																																											e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																																																																							EXECUTIVE SUMMARY				Significant developments during the year impacted the human rights situation in Zimbabwe, including August 23-24 national presidential, parliamentary, and local elections that were widely reported not to be fair and free of abuses and irregularities. In addition, in July the government enacted amendments to the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act, referred to as the Patriot Act, which rights groups condemned as infringing on freedom of expression because it imposed extreme penalties on those convicted of “willfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe.”Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary; political prisoners; arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including violence, threats of violence, and unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists, censorship, arrests for libel, and passage of the Patriot Act that had a chilling impact on freedom of expression; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, and child, early, and forced marriage; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, although they were generally not enforced; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and existence of the worst forms of child labor.The government did not take credible steps to identify, investigate, or prosecute officials who may have committed human rights abuses.There were credible reports of human rights abuses by criminal gangs in the artisanal and small-scale mining sector. Authorities did not systematically investigate or prosecute such abuses.																														Section 1.													 Respect for the Integrity of the Person												    																																																a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings										There were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings, during the year. On September 15, Persuade Mandara was reportedly killed in Mashonaland Central Province by Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). According to the Human Rights NGO Forum, officers investigating his connection with a grain theft case broke into Mandara’s home, assaulted him with burning logs that were being used for cooking, and fired gunshots. The officers took the severely injured Mandara to the police station, and he died in their custody.On November 11, local media reported the alleged abduction of opposition activist Tapfumaneyi Masaya while he was campaigning for a Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) party candidate. Masaya was found dead three days later. An opposition member who claimed to have examined the body reported it had deep cuts and that the victim had been injected with a chemical substance, causing the body to be found in a partially decomposed state. Police claimed they were investigating the incident.																																				b. Disappearance										There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.																																				c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses										The constitution prohibited torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local media, however, reported security forces assaulted and tortured citizens, including targeted assaults on civil society activists, opposition members, and other perceived opponents of the government. Throughout the year, police used excessive force in apprehending, detaining, and interrogating criminal suspects. Police and military officers used excessive force and violent means to disperse peaceful demonstrations and to disrupt informal trading.Security forces often acted in the interest of the ruling party. On January 14, members of the ZRP assaulted Kudzai Kadzere, a member of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), in Budiriro while he was responding to a call for legal assistance by a group of opposition supporters. ZLHR stated police officers used truncheons and fists to assault Kadzere, leading to injuries including a fractured hand.Impunity for politically motivated violence remained a problem. Impunity was also a significant problem in the security forces including police, military, and intelligence officers; and among civilian authorities who oversaw them.Investigations into violence from previous years remained pending, including into state-sponsored violence that resulted in the deaths of 17 civilians in 2019 and of seven civilians in postelection violence in 2018. Despite the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2018 postelection violence and an August 2022 High Court ruling demanding respondents pay three million Zimbabwean dollars ($4,300) to one of the victims, Zakeo Mutimutema, the government had not paid any compensation to the victims or the families of those killed.																Prison and Detention Center Conditions						Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to overcrowding, food shortages, lack of water, lice infestations, shortage of blankets in the cold season, physical mistreatment of prisoners, and lack of access to personal hygiene products, as well as inadequate sanitary conditions and medical care.Abusive Physical Conditions: Conditions in prisons, jails, and detention centers were harsh. NGOs reported most prisons were overcrowded due to outdated infrastructure and judicial backlogs. A December 2022 parliamentary report found Harare Remand Prison, with a capacity of 900 inmates, was housing nearly 1,500 inmates and Bindura Prison, with capacity of 20, was housing 87 inmates. In August, Al Jazeera reported that former inmates of the Harare Remand facility claimed they witnessed or suffered violence at the hands of prison guards, with one stating, “Not a day went by without someone getting beaten up for no apparent reason. It was the order of the day.&#8221;Several dozen children younger than age four living with their incarcerated mothers shared their mothers’ food allocation, rather than receiving their own. Women inmates reported violence and sexual abuse. Despite support from NGOs, prison distribution of menstrual hygiene supplies was limited. Women often lacked access to pre and postnatal care and emergency obstetric services. Officials did not provide pregnant women and nursing mothers with additional care or food rations out of the Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services (ZPCS) budget, but the ZPCS solicited and received donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.Juveniles were vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and other prisoners.Psychiatric sections were available at some prisons but offered little specialized care.Detainees depended on family members for essential dietary needs. Those without family or community support were forced to rely on other detainees for survival, although some prisoners identified as malnourished received additional meals. If available at all, blankets and clothing were often unwashed and soiled. A December 2022 report on the state of the country’s prisons by the parliament’s Committee on Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs stated Bindura Prison inmates were sleeping directly on the floors without blankets. Lice infestations were common. Although detainees could be transported to hospitals for medical treatment, unsanitary conditions and cold winters led to severe and sometimes fatal medical conditions. Detainees denied bail were often held in severely overcrowded remand (pretrial) cells for years while awaiting trial.According to NGOs, food shortages were widespread in prisons but were not life-threatening. The harvest of prison farm products provided meals for prisoners. Protein was in short supply. Prisoners’ access to clean water varied by prison. Diarrhea was prevalent in most prisons. Diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, and HIV and AIDS-related illnesses were most common in those prisons with the worst conditions. Lighting and ventilation were inadequate.Prisoners had access to very basic medical care, with a clinic and doctor at nearly every prison. Due to outdated regulations and a lack of specialized medical personnel and medications, prisoners suffered from routine but treatable medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases. The ZPCS was at times unable to transport prisoners with emergency medical needs to local hospitals.Administration: The ZPCS inspections and audit unit, charged with assessing prison conditions and improving monitoring of prisoners’ rights, did not release the results of its assessments.Independent Monitoring: The law provided international human rights monitors the right to visit prisons. Church groups and NGOs seeking to provide humanitarian assistance gained access to prisons. Some organizations working in prisons reported meetings with prisoners occurred without third parties present and with minimal restrictions, but some political prisoners reported no privacy for visits, even with their legal representatives.																										d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention, although other sections of the law effectively weakened these prohibitions. The government’s enforcement of security laws often conflicted with the constitution. Security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists, labor leaders, street vendors, and journalists perceived as opposing the government.																Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees						The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court. Police did not always respect these requirements. The law stipulated that arrests required a warrant issued by a court or senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody. Regulations required a preliminary hearing be held before a court within 48 hours of an arrest. This was not followed consistently. According to the constitution, only a competent court could extend the period of detention.The law provided that bail be made available for most accused persons. Lower courts commonly denied bail based on previous arrests, including for defendants never convicted of a prior offense.The government monitored, harassed, intimidated, and arrested human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients. A destitute detainee could apply to the government for an attorney, but only for capital offenses. Some opposition party members, civil society activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens had limited or no access to legal counsel.Arbitrary Arrest: The government regularly used arbitrary arrest and detention as tools of intimidation and harassment, especially against opposition party members, political activists, civil society members, journalists, attorneys, and ordinary citizens asserting their rights.Security forces frequently arrested individuals during and following meetings and rallies organized by the opposition political party. On January 14, police arrested 25 opposition activists in Budiriro, Harare, for holding an “unsanctioned” meeting at a private residence. Detainees were held nearly two weeks before being released on bail and included the CCC party’s National Organizing Secretary and Member of Parliament Amos Chibaya.																										e. Denial of Fair Public Trial										The constitution provided for an independent judiciary, but the government often did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The government intensified executive influence over the courts and executive interference in court decisions.The government often refused to abide by judicial decisions and routinely delayed payment of court costs or judgments awarded against it in civil cases. Government officials at times ignored court orders, delayed bail and access to medical care, and selectively enforced court orders related to land disputes favorable to those associated with the government.Judicial corruption was widespread. NGOs reported that during the past several years, senior government officials gave homes, farms, agricultural machinery, and other perks to numerous judges. Prior to the August 23-24 elections, media also reported that the executive branch gave judges and magistrates loans of up to $400,000, which were not part of their regular conditions of service nor provided for in the national budget. Legal experts called the loans “bribes” since the judges did not sign loan repayment agreements.NGOs reported the chief magistrate often routed cases involving human rights defenders to specific anti-corruption magistrates in the lower courts even if the cases were unrelated to corruption. Legal experts claimed defendants in politically sensitive cases were less likely to receive a fair hearing from magistrates, who heard most cases, than from higher courts. In lower courts, justices were more likely to make politicized decisions due to the use of threats and intimidation to force magistrates to rule in the government’s favor, particularly in rural areas. In politically charged cases, other judicial officers such as prosecutors and private attorneys faced pressure from high-ranking judges and officials of the ruling party, including harassment and intimidation.Certain high court justices made apparently independent rulings and granted opposition party members and civil society activists’ bail.																Trial Procedures						The constitution provided for the right to a fair and public trial, but corruption and executive control over the judiciary increasingly compromised this right. By law, defendants enjoyed a presumption of innocence, although courts often did not respect this right. Government and ruling party officials used social media to imply guilt ahead of a court ruling in politically charged cases. Trials were usually open to the public except in cases involving juveniles or state security matters. Government officials liberally interpreted state security matters to include trials and hearings for defendants who protested the government or reported on government corruption.Defendants had the right to a lawyer of their choice, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation due to costs or onerous administrative hurdles. In criminal cases, a destitute defendant could apply to have the government provide an attorney, but requests were rarely granted except in capital cases in which the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. The Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association also provided some free legal assistance to women and youth. The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense was also provided for by law but was often lacking. Although any person arrested or detained for an alleged offense had the right to remain silent and could not be compelled to confess, authorities did not always respect these rights and courts were permitted to draw adverse inferences from defendants’ silence. Authorities sometimes denied or significantly delayed attorneys’ access to their clients or falsely claimed the attorneys’ clients were being held at another facility.						Political Prisoners and Detainees						There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including opposition party officials and their supporters. On April 28, the Harare magistrate convicted and sentenced to four years in prison opposition political party Transform Zimbabwe leader Jacob Ngarivhume for incitement to public violence related to anti-corruption protests he organized in July 2020, effectively prohibiting him from participating in the August 23-24 elections. The High Court overturned the conviction and he was released in December after spending eight months in prison. CCC Deputy National Chairman and parliamentarian Job Sikhala, imprisoned since June 2022 for obstruction of justice, incitement to public violence, and disorderly conduct after he allegedly implicated the ruling party in the death of an activist, remained in jail at year’s end awaiting his sentencing after authorities denied him bail on numerous occasions.Charges against government critics included incitement to violence and illegal gatherings. Authorities sometimes detained such individuals for one or two days and released them without charge. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees. Human rights or humanitarian organizations were provided access to political prisoners. There were reports police physically abused political activists and journalists while in detention.Unlike normal criminal proceedings, which moved from investigation to trial within months, prosecutors regularly took an abnormally long time to submit cases involving members of the political opposition or civil society critics of the government. Hearings were sometimes scheduled when presiding judges were unavailable, causing unnecessary delays due to rescheduling. Prosecutors in political cases often were “unprepared to proceed” and received numerous extensions. When authorities granted bail to government opponents, they frequently did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays. Magistrates sometimes delayed making case records available to deliberately delay appeals for bail in the High Court.In July the High Court dropped charges against three opposition activists who had been in and out of court numerous times following their 2020 arrest for allegedly faking an abduction after they were taken from a Harare police station and later released in another town. Following their release, government prosecutors announced they would appeal the judgement.																										f. Transnational Repression										Not applicable.																																				g. Property Seizure and Restitution										The constitution protected property rights, but the government frequently violated this right. On January 7, media reported two ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union-Popular Front (ZANU-PF) activists seized a sugar plantation belonging to a white commercial farmer in Mwenezi, Masvingo Province, leaving the owners and scores of workers and their children homeless.The constitution stipulated the government had to compensate persons for improvements made on land taken by the government, but it did not set a timeline for providing compensation. The government rarely provided restitution or compensation for the confiscation of private property, and police generally did not act against individuals who seized private property without having secured authorization from the state to do so.Commercial farmers reported the government had still not compensated them for losses suffered from the land resettlement program in the early 2000s. In 2020 the government, the Commercial Farmers Union, and other farmers’ groups signed a $3.5 billion compensation deal for farms expropriated in the decades following independence. The deal promised half of the payments after one year and the remainder over the course of the next four years. In 2021, the government made a $1 million token payment to commercial farmers but continued to delay additional compensation payments as of year’s end. Despite the negotiated agreement, government officials continued to seize and downsize farms without fair compensation.The Commercial Farmers Union estimated there were fewer than 400 active white commercial farmers still living in the country. Some reported they continued to be targeted, harassed, threatened with eviction, and evicted by unemployed youth and individuals hired by politically connected individuals standing to benefit from farm seizures.High-level ZANU-PF officials, meanwhile, registered numerous farms in the names of officials’ family members to evade the government’s policy of one farm per official. The government continued to allow individuals aligned with top officials to seize land not designated for acquisition. Media commonly reported high-level government officials possessed large farm holdings. In May, divorce proceedings for Bona Mugabe, former President Robert Mugabe’s daughter, revealed that she owned 21 farms.																																				h. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence										The constitution and law prohibited arbitrary interference with privacy, family, or home, but local NGOs reported the government did not respect this right.While the post and telecommunications authority reportedly was barred from monitoring content, communications laws permitted eavesdropping and call interception by state security personnel. The laws allowed authorities to apply to the responsible minister or director of the Cybersecurity and Monitoring of Interception of Communications Center housed in the Office of the President, without legal oversight from the judiciary, for a warrant authorizing them to intercept communications, including calls, emails, and other digital messages. Regulations allowed officers to apply for interception warrants if they knew the identities of individuals whose calls and messages they wanted to intercept. There were no known or reported applications of this provision during the year. Civil liberties advocates claimed the government used the law to stifle freedom of speech and target political and civil society activists (see section 2.a.).																																					Section 2.													 Respect for Civil Liberties												    																																																a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and Other Media										The constitution provided for freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but the law limited these freedoms in the “interest of defense, public security or professional confidentiality, to the extent that the restriction is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society.” The government continued to arrest, detain, and harass journalists, critics, and opposition politicians.Freedom of Expression: There were restrictions on individuals criticizing the government or discussing matters of public interest. Authorities were sensitive to criticism of the government and the ruling ZANU-PF party.In May authorities disrupted a media conference at a local university where journalists, academics, civil society, and political activists criticized the government for its failure to implement political and economic reforms. On July 14, the government amended the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act (Criminal Code) to include a provision known as the Patriot Act, introducing heavy penalties for citizens at home and abroad and permanent residents convicted of “willfully injuring the sovereignty and national interest of Zimbabwe.” This included participating in meetings with foreign governments whose intentions involved consideration of a military or armed intervention, subverting, upsetting, overthrowing, or overturning the country’s constitutional government, or enacting a trade boycott or sanctions. Penalties for violating the law ranged from a $2,000 fine to 10 or more years’ imprisonment, loss of citizenship for dual citizens, loss of residency, loss of office, denial of the right to vote or hold office for five to 15 years, and in the most extreme cases, the death penalty.Violence and Harassment: Security forces, officials, and supporters of the ruling party routinely harassed journalists. On July 17, ZANU-PF members assaulted three Voice of America journalists in Bulawayo as they carried out their work covering clashes between ZANU-PF members and street traders. The journalists reported the matter to police, but police made no arrests. The 2023 Global Press Freedom Index report stated although violence against journalists declined, police often used force, and in some cases confiscated journalists’ equipment.In March, Deputy Chief Secretary in Presidential Communications George Charamba, using social media, cautioned local journalists who reported on the Al Jazeera documentary exposing corruption in the gold industry, saying they would “be sorry” and promised “brickbats.” Charamba referred to jailed politician Job Sikhala to express an example of how the government would deal with journalists.Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other Media, Including Online Media: The government maintained censorship through media registration and accreditation laws, although many provisions of the law were inconsistent with the constitution. The law provided the government with extensive powers to control media and suppress free speech by requiring the registration of journalists and prohibiting the “abuse of free expression.” Government-controlled and independent media outlets and journalists practiced self-censorship.In December 2022, local musician Wallace Chirumiko, professionally known as Winky D, released two songs critiquing social conditions in the country. An economic lobbying group affiliated with the ruling ZANU-PF party accused Winky D of instigating anarchy and demanded that art regulatory bodies ban his songs. On March 4, police raided his concert and forced it to end. In May, Winky D told local media that he had been instructed not to perform particular songs, saying “I have been warned. I have been cautioned and they said if I sing that particular song there is going to be disaster.” Local media reported in July that senior staffers at state-run media outlets including the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation confirmed receiving an unwritten order to not play Winky D’s music.Libel/Slander Laws: The constitution prohibited criminal defamation. Although libel, slander, defamation, and blasphemy could be treated only as civil offenses, there were occasional arrests for insulting the president or his family. Civil defamation laws remained in force.On April 5, authorities convicted CCC Spokesperson and government critic Fadzayi Mahere and fined her $500 for “publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state” for posting a video on social media alleging that a police officer had killed a baby, even though the law under which she was convicted had been repealed years prior.National Security: The law granted the government a wide range of legal powers to prosecute persons for political and security crimes that were not clearly defined. For example, the extremely broad Official Secrets Act criminalized the divulging of any information acquired by government employees in the course of official duties. Authorities used these laws to restrict publication of information critical of government policies or public officials.																Internet Freedom						The government at times restricted or disrupted access to the internet or censored online content. The law permitted the government to monitor all communications in the country, including internet transmissions, without judiciary review. The government used social media posts as the basis to arrest opposition leaders on charges such as publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state. During the August elections, independent media reported denial of service attacks. Journalists reported the government and government-aligned media employed paid trolls to attack opposition members, foreign diplomatic missions, and journalists and to manipulate social media discourse on their accounts.																										b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association										The constitution provided for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association, but the government continued to restrict these rights, particularly for the political opposition and government critics.																Freedom of Peaceful Assembly						The government restricted the right to peaceful assembly. The law required organizers to notify police of their intention to hold a procession or public demonstration seven days in advance. It required five days advance notice (or three days during an election period) for a public meeting, defined as more than 15 participants. Failure to do so could result in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law allowed police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but required police to file an affidavit in a magistrate’s court stating the reasons behind the denial. The government was required to respond to notifications to demonstrate within three days.Rallies in support of the ruling party were generally unimpeded, as were religious assemblies by groups seen as loyal to the ruling party. Meanwhile, opposition members, unions, civil society activists, and street vendors often faced arrests, and in some cases police violence. On July 7, police denied the opposition CCC from holding its presidential campaign launch rally in Bindura, claiming the “bushy” venue had poor access and presented a high risk for the spread of communicable disease. The ban was upheld by the High Court July 9. On February 26, police beat and arrested 16 ruling party members who gathered at the Kadoma district administrator’s office where they protested a ban on small unregulated taxis, commonly known as mushikashika.						Freedom of Association						The constitution and law provided for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right. Ruling party supporters, sometimes with direct government support or tacit approval, intimidated and harassed members of organizations perceived to be opposed to the government.																										c. Freedom of Religion										See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at  https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.																																				d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country										The constitution and law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.Foreign Travel: The constitution provided the right for citizens to enter and leave the country and for the right to a passport or other travel documents. Although dual citizenship was recognized, there were reports the Office of the Registrar General sometimes imposed administrative obstacles in the passport application process for dual citizens, particularly Malawian, Zambian, and Mozambican citizens.																																				e. Protection of Refugees										The government often cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of concern. In August, the government launched the country’s first-ever National Migration Policy, which was reportedly designed to respond to emerging global migration dynamics and problems of migrant smuggling, human trafficking, refugee flows, xenophobia, irregular migration, and mass repatriations of nationals.Access to Asylum: The law provided for granting refugee status and the government established a system for providing protection to refugees. As of July, Tongogara Refugee Camp hosted 15,705 refugees and asylum seekers, despite being designed to host only 3,000.Abuse of Refugees and Asylum Seekers: Migrants reported that border officials routinely accepted bribes in exchange for border crossings. Migrants reported arbitrary detention and deportation. Security forces routinely detained migrants who lacked identity documents or permission to be in the country and held them in prisons with convicted criminals, as the country did not have holding facilities for immigrants awaiting deportation. Prolonged detention for undocumented migrants was common. Migrants complained of mistreatment by other prisoners. Local media reported in September that approximately 50 Malawian migrants, arrested while en route to South Africa, had been in Zimbabwean prisons for more than three months due to lack of funds to repatriate them. An unknown number of refugees were held in criminal detention facilities.Freedom of Movement: The government maintained a formal encampment policy requiring refugees to live at Tongogara Refugee Camp. Nevertheless, as of July, approximately 900 refugees lived in urban areas, including Harare and Bulawayo, and more than 6,500 Mozambican asylum seekers lived among host communities along the porous border with Mozambique.Employment: The government imposed restrictions on refugees’ ability to work. The government maintained an exception to the right to work under the UN refugee convention. Refugees working in the informal sector had limited employment options in Tongogara Refugee Camp.																																				f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)										International organizations reported more than 60,000 persons were forcibly displaced from their homes for manmade reasons between 2017 and 2022. The primary causes of evictions were economic reasons, such as displacing persons to accommodate mining or other economic activity, and political reasons, including evicting persons not affiliated with the ruling party.Many IDPs from earlier emergencies, including Cyclone Idai in 2019, continued to live in dire conditions, lacking sufficient access to food, water, and basic sanitation. IDPs were among those at greatest risk of food insecurity.																																				g. Stateless Persons										The country had a significant number of habitual residents who were stateless or at risk of statelessness. In 2016 international organizations estimated 300,000 persons in the country were stateless. The government conducted a mobile registration campaign during the year resulting in proof of citizenship for an estimated 10,000 individuals. Longstanding migrant labor populations from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia lacked documentation. Many migrant workers and their families who had lived in the country for generations, along with thousands of those impacted by the Gukurahundi killings of mainly Ndebele persons in the country’s southwest between 1983 and 1987, remained blocked from accessing national identity documents.Descendants of victims of the Gukurahundi killings in the 1980s had difficulty securing a birth certificate because they often could not obtain their parents’ death certificates, as required.Stateless persons were often unable to enroll or remain enrolled in school, access formal health-care facilities, or obtain a passport to travel to neighboring countries for work or to visit family.																																					Section 3.													 Freedom to Participate in the Political Process												    																						The constitution provided citizens the ability to choose their government in free and fair periodic elections based on universal and equal suffrage and conducted by secret ballot.																										Elections and Political Participation										Abuses or Irregularities in Recent Elections: National presidential, parliamentary, and local elections held August 23-24 were widely reported to not be fair and free of abuses and irregularities. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Electoral Observation Mission’s preliminary statement noted aspects of elections – including curtailed freedom of assembly and expression and voter intimidation – fell short of the requirements of the constitution, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2021). The EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) claimed, “the election fell short of international standards including equality, universality, and transparency,” while The Carter Center reported the election “took place in a restricted political environment” and with “poorly or opaquely implemented processes that reduced the transparency and credibility.” In addition, the EU chief observer strongly criticized disinformation on state media and other efforts to discredit its mission, stating, “The EU EOM deplores an extensive and sustained disinformation and defamation campaign in some media and social platforms against the EU EOM and other international observer missions.”Election day was marked by delays in polling station openings in urban areas (where opposition parties were strongest), with the Zimbabwe Election Commission reporting 77 percent of polling stations in Harare, 25 percent in Bulawayo, and 15 percent in Manicaland opened late due to delays in the printing and delivery of ballot papers. Many polling stations did not open until afternoon or evening, or opened but later ran out of ballot papers, forcing the voting to be extended an extra day. Stakeholders expressed concerns that logistical delays may have depressed voter turnout in those areas.Observers and civil society contacts reported Forever Associates Zimbabwe (FAZ), a group linked to the Central Intelligence Organization, intimidated voters, particularly in rural areas. The group was reported to have deployed to approximately 36,000 villages. FAZ set up “exit polls” outside of many polling stations where staff requested voters’ names and ID numbers. Community organizations reported FAZ intimidated residents to vote in a particular manner and warned that it would be easy to determine who voted against certain parties.The night of August 23, the ZRP conducted raids at two local observation-related centers, leading to the arrest of 35 members of the Election Resource Centre and Zimbabwe Election Support Network for allegedly planning “to illegally announce” election results. The ZRP also confiscated computers and laptops and visited the homes of two local observers.State media coverage was heavily biased in favor of ZANU-PF and provided little access to or positive coverage of the opposition. In its preliminary report, the EU EOM noted that state-run Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation Television devoted two-thirds of its coverage to the ruling ZANU-PF and state radio dedicated more than 96 percent of radio time to ZANU-PF.The Election Commission never released the voters roll used to set new voter district boundaries and did not release the voters roll for August elections to the opposition until July 10. Multiple observers assessed ZANU-PF had access to the voters roll well in advance of the opposition. The activist group Team Pachedu reported many voters roll irregularities, including the Election Commission illegally changing some constituency boundaries to favor the ruling party, such as in Mbare where the change resulted in 7,514 voters being moved from what had been an opposition stronghold to a neighboring constituency.While voting was largely peaceful, there were targeted incidents of violence and intimidation before and following the elections. On August 3, ZANU-PF supporters threw stones at CCC members preparing for a rally in a Harare suburb, resulting in one death and several injuries. NGO Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded 384 human rights abuses in August, including threats, harassment, intimidation, assault, and arson, two-thirds of which were perpetrated by ZANU-PF members or FAZ. There were persistent reports of ruling party intimidation tactics to make citizens nervous and “stay in line” at the voting booth, including coffins left outside known opposition supporters houses as “warnings” and ZANU-PF rallies held under the guise of community meetings that community members were compelled to attend. In August, opposition leaders reported that police and prison staff engaging in early voting were forced to vote in front of their supervisors.The Human Rights NGO Forum documented 316 postelection-related cases of intimidation and abuse between August 24 and September 30. This included eight abductions, 32 cases of assault, 153 persons displaced from their homes due to violence or threats, and 56 cases of arbitrary arrests or unlawful detention, including 16 opposition political figures. While the law required traditional chiefs to be impartial, traditional leaders mobilized voters and canvassed support for ZANU-PF in rural areas. According to local NGOs, traditional leaders and government officials often distributed food aid based on perceived political affiliation. While candidates for president had run in previous elections despite prolonged periods outside the country, the court removed former ZANU-PF minister Savior Kasukuwere from the ballot as a presidential candidate on July 28, citing seldom enforced Electoral Act provisions that required voters to be ordinarily resident in their constituency during the previous 12 to 18 months.Political Parties and Political Participation: High nomination fees ($20,000 for presidential aspirants, $1,000 for members of parliament, and $200 for local councilors) significantly reduced the number of parties and candidates (from 23 to 11 presidential candidates) able to participate in the most recent elections, compared with the 2018 elections. Journalists and the opposition CCC party reported FAZ helped fund 22 opposition candidates who filed their nomination forms with the Election Commission without the party’s authority in order to run against the legitimate CCC candidate, to confuse voters on election day and dilute the opposition vote.CCC officials claimed the ZRP banned 58 CCC rallies between January and April and five between June 21 and July 11. There was no evidence to confirm the government’s assertion that ZANU-PF also had rallies blocked for noncompliance.Despite being granted citizenship under the constitution and having voted previously, some persons were denied the right to vote because they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship. Undocumented individuals could not vote, run for office, or serve as election agents. Large numbers of youth lacked the national identification cards needed to register to vote.Participation of Women and Members of Marginalized or Vulnerable Groups: Laws that criminalized lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI+) identities had the effect of prohibiting LGBTQI+ persons from participating openly in the political process. Transgender persons encountered difficulties when registering to vote because of changes in their appearance compared to their identity documents, disenfranchising them from the political process.Women candidates across multiple political parties faced particularly vitriolic gender-based insults online and offline regarding appearance, sexual proclivity, accusations of involvement in sex work, and gender-based stereotypes. They also faced challenges within their party if running against a male candidate in a primary. During the most recent elections, some persons associated with the opposition reported their family members were instructed to declare themselves blind or illiterate to enable a biased person to “assist” them to vote.Individuals within minority groups such as the San, Tonga, and Doma, as well as communities affected by Cyclone Idai and Gukurahundi, remained undocumented despite a national mobile registration drive in 2022 that targeted some of these communities. A wide range of factors contributed to this problem including clerical errors, limited registration windows, inaccessibility for persons with disabilities, undocumented home births, distance to registrar offices, parental deaths and imprisonment, illiteracy, and onerous age requirements for witnesses.There were administrative barriers to participation in the electoral processes for persons with disabilities. Administrative arrangements for voter registration at relevant government offices were burdensome, involving long queues, several hours or days of waiting, and necessary return visits. During the August general elections, many polling stations in urban areas opened hours late, including some that opened after nightfall, making the polls inaccessible to many, particularly persons with disabilities. Ballots were not provided in braille or large text.																																					Section 4.													 Corruption in Government												    																						The law provided criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but the government did not implement the law effectively or impartially. There were numerous reports of government corruption.Corruption: The country experienced both petty and grand corruption, defined respectively by Transparency International Zimbabwe as an “everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- to mid-level public officials” such as by police and local officials and “an abuse of high-level power by political elites.”In the case of government officials, experts described the problem as “catch and release,” where the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) arrested some corrupt officials but did not secure convictions through the National Prosecuting Authority, which was responsible for referring all cases to the anti-corruption courts.Although the country had specialized anti-corruption courts in all 10 provinces, challenges persisted, including perceptions of political interference, delays in concluding high-profile cases, and a low quality of investigations. Independent governmental oversight entities such as the Auditor General’s Office were often constrained politically and lacked the funding and staffing to carry out their mandates.The constitution mandated that ZACC conduct corruption investigations. According to its annual report, ZACC assessed a total of 684 complaints of suspected corruption cases in 2022, reflecting a 38 percent decrease from 2021. While ZACC had the power to arrest, it did not have the power to prosecute.Cabinet officials, including then Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister Paul Mavima, were involved in several high-profile corruption cases. In February, a National Social Security Authority (NSSA) internal audit alleged Mavima directed the NSSA to purchase a $359,000 property on his behalf using pension funds, which he claimed he would later repay. The ZACC opened an investigation into Mavima’s purchase. Mavima was never officially charged nor arrested, remained in his position until the end of his administration, and was reappointed to the sitting cabinet in a new role.A four-part investigation by Al Jazeera’s investigative unit entitled “Gold Mafia” alleged the involvement of high-ranking officials in smuggling gold and money laundering.A 2022 Transparency International Zimbabwe report identified bribery as rampant and existing within most public institutions. The report identified the ZRP, Registrar General’s Office, and Vehicle Inspection Department as the top three bribe-seeking institutions.For additional information about corruption in the country, please see the Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement for Zimbabwe, and the Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which includes information on financial crimes.																											Section 5.													 Governmental Posture Towards International and Nongovernmental Monitoring and Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights												    																						Several domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were rarely cooperative or responsive to the views of these groups.Retribution against Human Rights Defenders: The government harassed NGOs and specific persons it believed would expose abuses by government personnel or oppose government policies. NGOs reported surveillance missions by unidentified individuals visiting and occasionally raiding NGO offices. According to many human rights NGOs, the state viewed governance, human rights, and media NGOs as regime-change agents supported by the West. Human rights lawyers were also targeted. On September 4, Doug Coltart and Tapiwa Muchineripi with Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights were arrested while representing two CCC members recovering in a hospital from abduction and torture by unknown actors.Government-controlled media as well as government-associated social media handles disparaged and attacked human rights groups, especially those believed to be funded by western embassies or governments.Government Human Rights Bodies: The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), an independent commission mandated by the constitution to protect, promote, and enforce human rights, fulfilled some of its functions despite government efforts to constrain its funding and staff. Through its website, a hotline, and mobile legal clinics, the ZHRC conducted public outreach and accepted complaints from the public for investigation. The government, however, did not provide the ZHRC with sufficient personnel to investigate the complaints it received.The government did not overtly attempt to obstruct the ZHRC’s work that was critical of government or security service actions. Some NGOs questioned the ZHRC’s independence and effectiveness.The National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), which was established in 2013 with the constitutional mandate to handle matters related to postconflict justice, healing, and reconciliation, made no significant progress, in part due to the government not allocating sufficient funding. The government asserted resources would be made available to finance outcomes developed by chiefs in select provinces with their communities, including access to documentation, counseling and psychological support, exhumations, burials, memorials, reparations, and social security benefits (including pensions, social welfare, education, and health services). The NPRC’s 10-year mandate expired during the year and the commission was dissolved, despite not having effectively started operations until 2018, and some of its work was transferred to the ZHRC.In October 2022, the Zimbabwe Independent Complaints Commission (ZICC) Bill became law, which should have operationalized section 210 (Chapter 11) of the constitution to, “provide an effective and independent mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from members of the public concerning misconduct on the part of members of the security services, and for remedying any harm caused by such misconduct.” Security services included “Defense Forces; Police Service; Intelligence Services; and Prisons and Correctional Service, and any other security services established by Act of Parliament.” The government did not issue a call for commissioner nominations, pass a budget, or take the necessary steps to stand up the ZICC.																											Section 6.													 Discrimination and Societal Abuses												    																																																Women										Rape and Domestic Violence: While the law criminalized sexual offenses, including rape and spousal rape of women, these crimes remained widespread. The 2019 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency reported nearly 40 percent of never-married adolescent girls and women ages 15-49 had experienced physical or sexual violence by their existing or former partners. The 2020 SADC Gender Protocol Barometer reported 68 percent of women in the country experienced gender-based violence from partners or caregivers over their lifetime. Women were sexually assaulted while seeking treatment in public hospitals, collecting water from communal boreholes, in religious settings, and riding in public transportation. Violent gender-based offenses were often committed in private and without any witnesses.Police and hospitals did not have sufficient training or facilities to collect and store physical evidence of gender-based violence. The country also lacked the laboratory capacity to analyze rape kits. The lack of evidence hampered the effectiveness of the justice system and demotivated survivors to report these cases. Justice for survivors of violence and particularly gender-based violence remained elusive. The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2023 set minimum sentences for rape and aggravated rape.Although sexual offenses were punishable by lengthy prison sentences, women’s organizations stated that convictions were rare and sentences were inconsistent. Rape survivors were not consistently afforded protection in court. Women’s rights activists declared the country’s self-defense law was too weak to protect women because the courts could decide whether harm was intended. Women political leaders and human rights activists were targeted physically and online through threats and intimidation via social media. Domestic violence was punishable by a modest fine, a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. Authorities, however, generally considered it a private matter and rarely prosecuted.Rape and sexual violence were generally underreported. Social stigma and societal perceptions that rape was a “fact of life” continued to inhibit reporting of rape. Women were less likely to report spousal rape, due to fear of losing economic support or of reprisal, lack of awareness that spousal rape was a crime, police reluctance to engage with domestic disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles.Children born from rape suffered stigma and marginalization. Mothers who gave birth after rape were sometimes reluctant to register the births. Without registration, these children did not have access to social services or national identification cards.Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C): There were no national statistics available regarding FGM/C, but the practice of labial elongation occurred in at least one minority ethnic community. The country had many different cultures that incorporated this practice in beliefs and ceremonies. Some parts of the population practiced harmful procedures such as pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, and cauterization.Other Forms of Gender-based Violence or Harassment: Virginity testing was prohibited by law. Although reportedly decreasing, it continued to occur in some regions and in some faith communities. A December 2021 research study published by the Gender Institute at Midlands State University found that virginity testing persisted and was viewed by some as a necessary customary rite, despite legal prohibitions.Widows, when compelled to relocate to rural areas, were sometimes forcibly married off to an in-law.While no specific law criminalized all forms of sexual harassment, amendments to the Labor Act in July broadened definitions of and protection of employees against sexual harassment and gender-based violence, instituted criminal penalties for violence and harassment, and extended the scope of coverage to the world of work that included violence that occurred beyond the physical workplace. Prior to these amendments, labor law had prohibited the practice in the workplace. The government, however, did not effectively enforce the law.A 2019 survey by Transparency International Zimbabwe found 57 percent of the women surveyed reported that they had needed to offer sexual favors in exchange for jobs, medical care, and even when seeking placements at schools for their children. Media reported that sexual harassment was prevalent in universities, workplaces, and parliament.In July 2022, the Public Service Commission introduced a Public Service Sexual Harassment Policy. On March 23, Information and Publicity Minister Monica Mutsvangwa reported that women journalists had been sexually harassed and sometimes raped by their male bosses. A January 2022 report from the NGO Women in News stated that 40 percent of women media professionals in the country had faced workplace sexual harassment and violence.Discrimination: The constitution provided the same legal status and rights for women and men, stating all “laws, customs, traditions, and practices that infringe the rights of women conferred by this constitution are void to the extent of the infringement.” There was an institutional framework to address women’s rights and gender equality through the Ministry of Women Affairs and the Gender Commission, one of the independent commissions established under the constitution. The commission received minimal support from the government and lacked sufficient independence from the ministry. The law recognized a woman’s right to own property, but very few women owned property, due to the customary practice of patriarchal inheritance. Fewer than 20 percent of women farmers were official landowners or named on government lease agreements. Divorce and alimony laws were equitable, but many women lacked awareness of their rights. In traditional practice, property reverted to the man in case of divorce or to his family in case of his death. When women were not listed on lease agreements, and they could not benefit from most government programs that provided agricultural inputs as a form of economic assistance.The law afforded civil partnerships or common law marriages the same remedies as legal marriages but recognized only heterosexual civil unions or common-law marriages. The law did not address property rights during marriage.There were no known formal complaints of wage discrimination filed with the Ministry of Public Service and Labor. Women’s salaries lagged those of men in most sectors. In July, the 2023 Labor Act Amendment stipulated equal pay for male and female employees for work of equal value. The amendment also removed a provision that an employee had to work for one year before being eligible for maternity leave and made the number of maternity leaves an employee could take unlimited.Discrimination against women in employment occurred despite being prohibited by law. Women received fewer loans and other forms of financial support, even in informal economic sectors where they outnumbered men, such as in micro and small-scale enterprises and agricultural production. This disparity was partly explained by deficiencies in access to loan collateral and documented years of business experience.Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary sterilization on the part of government authorities.Adolescents, rural residents, LGBTQI+ persons, and survivors of gender-based violence lacked consistent access to reproductive health services. Barriers affecting access to contraception included supply chain and commodity problems, limited access to health facilities in remote areas, religious skepticism of modern medicine among some groups, health worker attitudes to adolescents seeking services, and ambiguity on the age of access to contraception. Emergency contraceptives were not readily available in the public sector. Some public sector facilities did not have enough commodities to provide youth with the free family planning method of their choice. Women could purchase emergency contraceptives at private pharmacies, but the cost was prohibitive and availability limited. The law, the policy on sexual abuse and violence, and the creation of one-stop centers for survivors of gender-based violence were designed to provide survivors access to sexual and reproductive health services. Lack of resources, however, constrained access.The 2019 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey estimated maternal mortality at 462 deaths per 100,000 live births, down from 651 deaths per 100,000 live births in the 2015 Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey. Nonetheless, the rate was high despite high prenatal care coverage (93 percent), high institutional deliveries (86 percent), and the presence of a skilled health worker at delivery (86 percent). Although these rates of maternal mortality were partly explained by the high prevalence of HIV, maternal and neonatal quality of care were areas of concern.Ministry of Health guidelines provided for postabortion care for rape survivors, including medical and psychosocial services. These services were not uniform across facilities and were not routinely available.Few families could afford menstrual hygiene products. Some girls failed to attend school when menstruating, while others used unhygienic rags, leading to infections and illness. Pregnancy and motherhood also impeded girls’ access to education.																																				Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination										The constitution used strong language to provide for the protection of members of racial and ethnic minorities from violence and discrimination. Implementation, however, was less strong, with some serious gaps in access to personal identity documents for certain ethnic minority groups, and consequent impacts on statelessness and access to services. Discrimination based on race and tribe continued to exist.According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group made up 82 percent of the population, the Ndebele 14 percent, Whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and other ethnic and racial groups 3 percent. Historical tension between the Shona majority and the Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by the Shona-dominated government. Some employers discriminated against members of minority ethnic groups whom they often perceived as opposition supporters.Observers expressed concern over President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s perceived favoritism towards his own Shona subclan, the Karanga, in senior government appointments, saying the appointments came at the expense of other Shona subgroups and the Ndebele. President Mnangagwa’s cabinet included more Karanga than any other ethnic subgroup, and Karanga dominated the leadership of the security forces, including heads of the Central Intelligence Organization, Air Force, Army, and the commander of the Defense Forces.Police seldom arrested government officials or charged them with infringing upon minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority White commercial farmers or wildlife conservancy owners, who continued to be targets of land redistribution programs.Government development projects reportedly excluded some ethnic minorities in border areas, such as the Tonga people living in Binga. Those living in these areas faced food insecurity and lacked modern infrastructure.																																				Children										Birth Registration: According to the 2022 census, 72 percent of the population was in possession of a birth certificate, 85 percent in urban areas and 64 percent in rural areas. Birth registration was provided largely on a nondiscriminatory basis, with some exceptions (see section 2.g., Stateless Persons). Lack of birth certificates impeded access to national identity documents and public services such as education and health care, resulting in many children being unable to attend school and increasing their vulnerability to exploitation.Child Abuse: Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, was illegal but continued to be a serious problem. In 2022 the NGO Childline logged 18,807 case reports of child abuse, a 24 percent increase from 2021. Approximately 30 percent of all reported cases of abuse involved sexual abuse, 24 percent involved physical abuse, 19 percent emotional abuse, 18 percent involved neglect, and 8 percent involved forced marriage. More than two-thirds of cases involved girls.Corporal punishment was illegal. Government efforts to combat child abuse were inadequate. The government continued to implement a case management protocol to guide the provision of child welfare services. Additionally, there were facilities that served underage survivors of sexual assault and abuse.Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The constitution declared anyone younger than age 18 was a child. A 2022 law abolished child marriage and aligned the country’s marriage laws with the constitution. The marriage law prohibited anyone underage from marriage or entering a civil partnership. The law also criminalized assisting, encouraging, or permitting child marriages or civil partnerships.Despite legal prohibitions, some rural families and religious groups continued to force girls to marry. High rates of unemployment, the prevalence of girls dropping out of school, and the inability of families to earn a stable income were major causes of child marriage. Child marriages were common, with 34 percent of girls married before reaching age 18.Families gave girls or young women to other families in marriage to avenge spirits, as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes, or to provide economic protection for the family. Some families sold their daughters as brides in exchange for food, and sometimes if a wife died, her family offered a younger daughter as a “replacement” bride to the widower.Sexual Exploitation of Children: Conviction of statutory rape, legally defined as sexual intercourse with a child younger than age 18, carried a penalty of five to 15 years’ imprisonment. In May 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that laws defining the age of consent as 16 within marriage were unconstitutional. A person in possession of child pornography could be charged with public indecency; convictions resulted in a fine, imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. There was no information available on whether authorities enforced laws against child pornography. A conviction for procuring a child younger than age 16 for purposes of engaging in unlawful sexual conduct resulted in a fine, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. Persons charged with facilitating child sex trafficking often were also charged with statutory rape. Child sex trafficking, including by a parent or guardian, carried a fine, up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both.																																				Antisemitism										An estimated 300 to 350 long-term residents identified as Jewish. There were no reports of antisemitic incidents.																																				Trafficking in Persons										See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex Characteristics										Criminalization: According to the criminal code, any consensual act between men “involving physical contact...that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act” was deemed sodomy; conviction carried a fine, one year in prison, or both. The law was rarely enforced, however civil society organizations reported LGBTQI+ persons were disproportionally charged with public indecency and disorderly conduct, in some cases resulting in severe mental health consequences including depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and suicidal ideation.Violence and Harassment: Police and government agents tolerated violence and abuse against LGBTQI+ persons. LGBTQI+ community leaders reported, however, that state-sanctioned violence targeting LGBTQI+ persons was less frequent than in the previous administration. LGBTQI+ community members continued to report homophobic attacks by the public, which police did not investigate, and intimate partner violence. A 2021 study by Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) reported that one in three lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women experienced violence for their sexual orientation or gender identity; 65 percent of respondents never reported violence due to concerns regarding subsequent victimization at the hands of authorities. In a 2022 report, GALZ documented 27 cases of abuse of LGBTQI+ persons, a decline from 41 cases in 2021.Discrimination: The law did not prohibit discrimination by state or nonstate actors based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics. Leading NGOs noted harassment and discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in education, employment, housing, and health services.Observers reported LGBTQI+ persons were vulnerable to extortion by police because of the criminalization and stigma associated with same-sex conduct. LGBTQI+ advocacy organizations reported extortion and “outing” as two of the most common forms of repression of LGBTQI+ persons.LGBTQI+ persons often left school at an early age due to discrimination. Higher education institutions reportedly threatened to expel students based on sexual orientation. LGBTQI+ persons faced discrimination in employment and reported higher rates of unemployment and homelessness. They were also less likely to seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health problems due to fear that health-care providers would shun them or report them to authorities. Health-care workers commonly discriminated against and refused service to LGBTQI+ persons.Public medical services did not offer hormone treatment or gender-affirming care to transgender persons. A small number of private clinics provided testosterone therapy, but estrogen therapy required patients to purchase treatment privately and self-administer the drugs or travel to neighboring countries where treatment was available but expensive.Transgender individuals continued to face challenges when seeking government services. They often encountered difficulties when registering to vote or participating in sporting events because of changes in their appearance, disenfranchising them from political and social processes. One community leader described police indifference when transgender women were beaten or sexually assaulted. She noted that many transgender women were excluded from the workplace and thus relied on commercial sex for their livelihoods, where they encountered high levels of exploitation and vulnerability to HIV and sexually transmitted infections.Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Legal gender recognition was not available. A discrepancy between gender presentation and assigned gender could lead state officials, police, or potential employers to believe the individual was committing identity fraud, and potentially lead to criminal arrest.Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices: Civil society organizations described instances in which families and communities implemented psychological “therapies” to try to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity or expression. These included family members pressuring the person to have intercourse with an arranged person of the opposite sex, arranged marriages, “corrective rape,” and exorcisms performed by traditional healers. Some parents treated their children’s identity as an intellectual disability and forced transgender youth into mental health institutions. Civil society contacts reported many LGBTQI+ persons succumbed to familial pressure, including the threat of disownment and community ostracization, and entered heterosexual marriages.Medically unnecessary genital normalizing surgeries were performed on intersex persons, including children. While there were no reported cases of such surgeries being performed on nonconsenting adults, civil society organizations observed cases in which adults and adolescents consented to surgery under pressure and coercion from family members, medical doctors, traditional and religious leaders, and societal expectations to conform to the binary concept of gender. Adult intersex individuals and adolescents often acted based on misinformation from medical practitioners regarding the surgery’s implications and traditional perceptions of what their bodies should resemble after surgery. Organizations reported numerous cases of adverse effects from these medical interventions, encompassing physical and psychological complications such as depression leading to suicidal ideation, substance and drug abuse, and other mental health challenges. Physical impacts included permanent scarring and loss of sensitivity. Additionally, there were reported cases of intersex individuals being sterilized without their consent due to invasive surgeries.Civil society organizations advocated with government entities and medical practitioners to raise awareness of the risks to children from medically unnecessary surgeries; however, no legal framework existed to limit or prohibit this practice.Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly: There were no laws prohibiting individuals speaking or media reporting on LGBTQI+ matters, on the ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations, or on the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events.																																				Persons with Disabilities										The constitution and law prohibited discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. Persons with disabilities, however, could not access education, health services, public buildings, and transportation on an equal basis with others and faced discrimination in employment. The 2021 National Disability Policy mandated the Public Service Commission strive to ensure a minimum of 15 percent of the workforce of all organizations across all sectors be comprised of persons with disabilities. The constitution and law did not specifically address access to transportation, nor did they distinguish among physical, sensory, mental, or intellectual disabilities.Prevailing law stipulated government buildings had to be accessible to persons with disabilities, but implementation remained slow. Two senate seats were designated for persons with disabilities.Persons with disabilities living in rural settings faced even greater challenges. For example, some faced discrimination based on a belief they were bewitched. In extreme cases, families hid children with disabilities from visitors. Mothers of children with disabilities in rural settings were at times viewed negatively and discriminated against.There were very few government-sponsored schools for persons with disabilities, thus necessitating NGOs to compensate for this in their communities. Organizations such as the Zimbabwe Parents of Handicapped Children Association rotated classroom space and hours to accommodate children with physical and mental disabilities. Sunshine Zimbabwe, the only accredited center offering skill-based training for adults with disabilities, was poorly supported. Some schools refused to accept children with disabilities.Essential accommodations such as sign language interpreters, braille materials, and ramps were scarce or nonexistent, which prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many urban children with disabilities obtained informal education through private institutions, but these options were generally unavailable for children with disabilities in rural areas. Government programs intended to benefit children with disabilities, such as the Basic Education Assistance Module, only provided rudimentary instruction.Persons with disabilities were often unable to access food assistance distribution sites and were unaware of services available to them. Women with disabilities faced compounded discrimination, resulting in limited access to services, reduced opportunities for civic and economic participation, and increased vulnerability to violence. Persons with mental disabilities also experienced inadequate medical care.A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in improper diagnoses and inadequate therapy for persons with mental disabilities. There were few certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. NGOs reported gaining access to mental health services was slow and frustrating. They reported persons with mental disabilities experienced extremely poor living conditions, due in part to limited access to food, water, clothing, and sanitation.The Commonwealth Election Observation Mission commended the government for having reserved seats for persons with disabilities in parliament, for providing ballot templates for visually impaired voters at polling stations, and for the Elections Commission’s efforts to accommodate wheelchair-bound voters.																																				Other Societal Violence or Discrimination										The government had a national HIV and AIDS policy that prohibited discrimination against persons with HIV, and the law prohibited such discrimination in the private sector and within parastatals. Despite these provisions, societal discrimination against persons with HIV remained a problem. Local NGOs reported persons with HIV faced discrimination in employment, health services, and education. Although there was an active information campaign to destigmatize HIV – organized by international and local NGOs, the Ministry of Health, and the National AIDS Council – ostracism and discrimination continued. In the 2015 Demographic Health Survey, 22 percent of women and 20 percent of men reported they held discriminatory attitudes towards persons with HIV.A 2022 law decriminalized willful HIV transmission. According to NGOs, criminalization of willful HIV transmission had been misused as a form of blackmail, particularly in divorce cases.																																					Section 7.													 Worker Rights												    																																																a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining										The law provided for the right of private sector workers to form and join unions, bargain collectively, and conduct legal strikes, however the right to strike was limited. The law prohibited antiunion discrimination and empowered the labor court to handle complaints of such discrimination and direct reinstatement of workers fired due to such discrimination. Some provisions in labor laws including in the Labor Act, Public Service Act, and Health Services Act were not fully in line with International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining.Amendments to the Labor Act passed in July repealed ministerial oversight of dues collection and assets purchased with those funds and limited the power of the labor minister to refuse to register a collective bargaining agreement to those cases where the agreement was inconsistent with the law. The amendments also broadened definitions and protection of employees against sexual harassment. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the country’s largest trade organization, cited these as positive aspects of the Labor Act Amendment in its analysis of the new legislation.The labor minister had the authority to appoint an investigator who may, without prior notice, enter trade union premises, question any employee, and inspect and copy any books, records, or other documents.Unions were not required to register, but registered unions had additional rights, such as negotiating for their members at the National Employment Council, calling for a strike, and filing a lawsuit. The law limited registration of new unions in enterprises or industries that already had a union.The law significantly limited the right to strike. The law provided that a majority of employees had to agree to strike by voting in a secret ballot. Strike procedure requirements included a mandatory 30-day reconciliation period and referral to binding arbitration. Following an attempt to resolve a dispute regarding interests not already subject to agreement and a labor officer’s issuance of a certificate of no settlement, the party proposing a collective job action had to provide seven days’ written notice of intent to resort to the strike or labor action, including specifying the grounds for the intended action, to call a strike legally. Failure to notify authorities regarding a strike or public gathering was punishable with a prison term of one year. The law prohibited employers from hiring permanent replacement workers in the event of a strike, but they were allowed to hire temporary workers. In July, the president signed into law amendments to the Labor Act that prescribed a sentence of up to five years in jail for organizing any strike deemed illegal, which the ZCTU decried as “criminalizing the right to strike.”In January, the government enacted the Health Services Amendment Act that classified health as an essential service and limited collective job action to an uninterrupted period of 72 hours in any given 14-day period. It also stated that notice of any collective job action had to be given in writing 48 hours before commencement of such collective job action. The act prescribed a fine of up to level four ($100), imprisonment for up to six months, or both, to any individual who was a member of the governing body of any trade union or representative body of members of the health services that incited any collective job action. Before this, police and army members were the only legally recognized essential services employees and could not strike, but the law allowed the Ministry of Public Service and Labor to declare any nonessential service an essential service if a strike was deemed a danger to the population. The law also allowed employers to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes, with penalties for conviction that included a fine, up to five years’ imprisonment, or both.The government continued to target Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe President Obert Masaraure for advocating for living wages for teachers in rural areas. Since 2022, Masaraure had faced multiple arrests and dubious charges including alleged murder and participating in a protest. The courts, however, did not find him guilty and released him on strict bail conditions forcing the UN special rapporteur in May to express concern, arguing such targeting deterred other human rights defenders from standing up against government repression.Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Collective bargaining could take place at the enterprise and industry levels. At the enterprise level, workers councils could negotiate collective agreements, which became binding if approved by 50 percent of the workers in the bargaining unit. Industry-level bargaining took place within the framework of National Employment Councils. Unions representing at least 50 percent of the workers could bargain with the authorization of the minister of public service and labor. The law encouraged the creation of employee-controlled workers’ committees in enterprises where less than 50 percent of workers were unionized. Workers’ committees existed in parallel with trade unions. Their role was to negotiate shop-floor grievances, while that of the trade unions was to negotiate industry-level grievances, notably wages. The minister and the registrar had broad powers to take over the direction of a workers’ committee if they believed it was mismanaged. Trade unions regarded the existence of such a parallel body as an arrangement that allowed employers to undermine the role of unions.The Ministry of Public Service and Labor did not effectively enforce labor laws. Penalties for conviction of violations of freedom of association or collective bargaining laws were not commensurate with those for similar violations. Those charged with violating the law were subject to lengthy judicial delays and appeals. Penalties were rarely applied to violators. The government demonstrated an unwillingness to implement collective bargaining rights enshrined in the 2013 constitution, including through its limited participation in social dialogue under the Tripartite Negotiating Forum (TNF).The TNF, a body established by law, formalized dialogue efforts among government, labor leaders, and employers on social and economic policy. During the year, the government appointed a CEO of the TNF and acquired office space under efforts to create an independent secretariat of the TNF. Labor unions, under the leadership of the ZCTU, stated the forum did little to address their demands for wage increases and labor law reform, and the government showed little progress in supporting workers’ protections, fairness in addressing labor and national problems, or the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.Government interference with trade union activity was common, including infiltrating unions to hamper their effectiveness and introducing new unions affiliated with the ruling party. Police and state intelligence services regularly attended and monitored trade union meetings and other activities. Police or ZANU-PF supporters sometimes prevented unions from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities. Although the law did not require unions to notify police of public gatherings, police demanded such notification.Parastatal unions were generally perceived as progovernment. The Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions was regarded the largest progovernment trade union and a rival to the ZCTU, which had a history of alignment with opposition parties. The federation was launched in October 1996 with the stated purpose of providing an alternative to the ZCTU. It claimed more than 40 affiliates and to be the largest labor body in the country; however, precise membership numbers were not known.The April 2022 ILO Direct Contacts Mission to Zimbabwe during the year noted with concern the lack of progress on improving civil liberties and trade union rights, the application of the Maintenance of Peace and Order Act, and measures to curb antiunion discrimination.																																				b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor										See the Department of State’s annual Trafficking in Persons Report at:  https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.																																				c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment										See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at  http://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings .																																				d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																														e. Acceptable Conditions of Work										Wage and Hour Laws: Parliament-mandated National Employment Councils set the minimum wage for all industrial sectors through agreement between employers and labor unions. The minimum wage, when paid, seldom exceeded the poverty line due to inflation. Employers paid many agricultural and domestic workers less than minimum wage. Many public servants, including in the education and health sectors, earned salaries that put them below the poverty line due to rampant inflation.The law did not provide for a standard work week, but it prescribed a minimum of one 24-hour continuous rest period per week. Unions and employers in each sector negotiated the maximum legal work week. No worker could work more than 12 continuous hours. The law prescribed that workers receive not less than twice their standard remuneration for working on a public holiday or on their rest day. The law provided workers paid public holidays and annual leave upon one year of service with an employer.Wages remained a major point of friction among workers, employers, and government in the TNF. Significant inflation of the local currency led workers to advocate for wages in U.S. dollars.Occupational Safety and Health: The government set occupational safety and health (OSH) standards on an industry-specific basis. Occupational safety and health standards were up to date and appropriate for the main industries in the country. The law provided for workers to remove themselves from situations that endangered health or safety without jeopardy to their employment.The National Social Security Authority (NSSA) reported the country recorded approximately 5,000 injuries every year resulting in $15 million of lost revenue. According to the NSSA, at least 140 workers died in the mining industry alone and another 100 in other industries annually. Most work-related injuries and deaths occurred in the mining sector due to low investment in occupational safety and health, noncompliance with rules and regulations, and poor awareness of safety and health practices due to lack of training. The growth of the informal mining sector led to increased exposure to chemicals and environmental waste for artisanal miners, including children. For example, civil society groups reported 26 persons died at Redwing Mine in Penhalonga in January, largely a result of mining shaft collapses. A report by the Center for Natural Resource Governance stated that the mine was converted from underground mining to unsafe artisanal mining.Abuses by management at certain enterprises and companies owned by People’s Republic of China (PRC) parastatals and private PRC citizens were reported, including reports of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of workers; unsafe working conditions; underpayment or nonpayment of wages; unfair dismissals; firings without notice; failure to abide by collective bargaining agreements; and failure to report health and safety incidents. In February, workers building a steel plant for the Chinese-owned Dinson Iron &amp; Steel Company in Mvuma claimed they were exploited, forced to work in inhuman conditions, and slept crammed eight to a small room on the construction site. The workers told the press they were not provided with safety equipment, had no proper toilets, and were not permitted regular days off to see their families.Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Ministry of Public Service and Labor was responsible for enforcing the minimum wage and work hours laws for each sector. The government did not effectively enforce these laws, particularly in the farming and domestic service sectors. The number of labor inspectors was insufficient to enforce labor laws, including those covering children. Penalties for violations of wage or working hour restrictions were not commensurate with penalties for comparable offenses. Penalties were sometimes applied against violators.The quasi-governmental Zimbabwe Occupational Safety and Health Council regulated working conditions. Staffing shortages and a limited mandate, however, rendered the council largely ineffective. The law permitted unannounced inspections by the Occupational Safety Council, and penalties for labor violations included taking the company to court, stationing an official on the company’s premises to monitor compliance, and prohibiting the company from operating. The Ministry of Labor reported 8,028 labor inspections conducted in 2022, claiming a 320 percent increase from 2021. The ministry reported it conducted routine inspections as well as targeted inspections based on reports from trade unions and anonymous tips.Poor health and safety conditions in the workplace were common in both the formal and informal sectors, affecting both workers and nearby residents. Environmental hazards in the gold mining sector included the use of cyanide and river pollution, which endangered public health.Nearly 88 percent of the country’s workers labored in the informal sector according to a July report by the Zimbabwe Statistics Agency. Labor laws technically applied to informal sector workers but were not observed or enforced. Most informal workers worked in agriculture, trading, or mining. According to the Zimbabwe Miners Federation, approximately 500,000 persons worked in the small-scale or artisanal mining sector, but only 40,000 were registered with the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development, according to the Zimbabwe Economic Policy Analysis and Research Unit, an independent think tank. Police frequently clashed with and arrested vendors in Harare’s central business district. The district restricted the number of vendors to 6,000 per day but more than 100,000 vendors operated daily as of June. Vendors Initiative for Sustainable Economic Transformation stated authorities arbitrarily confiscated their members’ goods. In January, a town clerk linked to ZANU-PF in the Harare City Council ordered the demolition of informal vendor stalls in Mbare, a township located in the south of Harare. According to a civil society organization, this effort destroyed more than 500 stalls supporting thousands of families.																																				    							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Respect for the Integrity of the Person																																							a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated Killings																																																						b. Disappearance																																																						c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and Other Related Abuses																																																				Prison and Detention Center Conditions																																																																																				d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention																																																				Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees																																																																																				e. 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Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association																																																				Freedom of Peaceful Assembly																																												Freedom of Association																																																																																				c. Freedom of Religion																																																						d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country																																																						e. Protection of Refugees																																																						f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)																																																						g. Stateless Persons																																																			Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process																																							Elections and Political Participation																																																			Section 4. Corruption in Government																Section 5. 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Worker Rights																																							a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining																																																						b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor																																																						c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment																																																						d. Discrimination (see section 6)																																																						e. Acceptable Conditions of Work																																																									Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																								Zimbabwe
- Digital Press Briefing with David Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State – Bureau of African Affairs, and Brad Brooks-Rubin, Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination JOHANNESBURG HUBMODERATOR:  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic of transition of U.S. sanctions tools in Zimbabwe.Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin.  These officials will discuss updates to the U.S. sanctions program in Zimbabwe and in the context of the Global Magnitsky sanctions.We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from our speakers, then we will turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of your questions as we can during the briefing.  So with that, I’ll turn it over to Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin for their opening remarks.MR GAINER:  Thank you so much, Johann.  Good morning, good afternoon, everybody.  I am David Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.  It’s a real pleasure to speak with you regarding the recent actions taken by the United States on our Zimbabwe sanctions program.To recap, on March 4th, President Biden signed an executive order that terminated the Zimbabwe sanctions program, in place since 2003.  He determined that the Global Magnitsky sanctions program – sometimes referred to as GloMag – was a more appropriate tool to address our current concerns in Zimbabwe.Following the termination of the Zimbabwe sanctions program, Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, announced Global Magnitsky designations on 14 Zimbabwean targets, including President Mnangagwa, Vice President Chiwenga, and businessman Kudakwashe Tagwirei.Our policy toward Zimbabwe has not changed, but our sanction tools have.  We continue to have serious concerns about human rights abuses and corruption.  Key individuals, including senior members of government, bear responsibility for these actions, which have siphoned off public resources and left countless citizens to live in fear.  With the Global Magnitsky program, we’ll better be able to promote accountability for persons who engage in that conduct in Zimbabwe.The Global Magnitsky program is a conduct-based sanctions authority, which requires information that demonstrates individuals are connected to serious human rights abuse or corruption.  Global Magnitsky designations block all property and interests that are in the United States for those individuals and entities.This week’s actions move to hold Zimbabwean actors to global standards.  The transition to Global Magnitsky authority allows the United States to target Zimbabwean actors using the same tools used for the world’s worst human rights abusers and corrupt actors.  Zimbabwean designations stand alongside those of the Gupta brothers, Isabel dos Santos, and Delyan Peevski who, alongside other former Bulgarian officials and corrupt oligarchs, siphoned money out of his country for corrupt ends.  The transition toward Global Magnitsky designations re-energizes our focus on those most responsible for corruption and serious human rights abuse.  It also reaffirms our commitment to keeping our sanctions relevant, timely, and targeted.The actions this week do not affect the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, also known as ZDERA.  Importantly, ZDERA is not a sanction – it is legislation passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the U.S. president in 2001.   ZDERA – it is also very important to note – has never been invoked because Zimbabwe is in arrears to its international creditors.The United States has stood with the people of Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.  We will continue to do so, as we uphold our core principles: respect for human rights, democratic practices, and responsible governance.  We continue to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to move toward more open and democratic governance, including addressing corruption, so all Zimbabweans can prosper.Thank you very much.  That’s the end of our opening remarks.  And Brad and I will open it up to questions.  Johann.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So once again to the journalists, if you do wish to ask a question, please make sure that we can see your full name and the outlet that you are – the outlet that you’re representing.  Otherwise, we might not be able to identify you and we won’t call on you.So, the first question today was submitted by Arhtur Shoko of Zimbabwe, a freelance journalist.  And I believe you already spoke to this briefly, but his question – perhaps you could expound on it – is:  “What is the status of ZDERA in view of this most recent development?”MR GAINER:  Thanks, Johann.  This is David again speaking, and we’ll try and identify ourselves, David and Brad when Brad speaks.  So this is David.  As I said, the actions announced this week do not affect the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which is not a sanction, but it’s legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.  Once again, ZDERA  has never been invoked because Zimbabwe is in arrears to its international creditors.Brad, anything else to add on ZDERA?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Nothing further.  It’s not – just reiterate the point that it’s not a sanction and not affected by this week’s actions.MR GAINER:  Thank you, Johann.  Next question?MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  And there was a lot of interest among the journalist on this following topic, so here’s a question from Kemi Osukoya of African Bazar Magazine.  And the question is:  “Can you explain how this sanction might impact or not impact the nation’s economy?  For example, the president is working with the African Development Bank on boosting the economic recovery of the nation.”MR GAINER:  Thanks, Johann.  This is David again.  The change of sanctions tools presents an opportunity for businesses and financial institutions to re-evaluate their de-risking models and re-examine the Zimbabwean market.  I do want to make the point though that over the past 20 years Zimbabwe’s economic woes are not because of U.S. sanctions.  Zimbabwe’s economic woes are because of the gross mismanagement and corruption of the Zimbabwean Government and other actors for the past 20 years.Brad, anything to add?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Nothing further to add.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So, we did have some additional submitted questions, for example, from – this is Thamo Kapisa of SABC Channel Africa, who asks: “Zimbabwe has lost well over an estimated $42 billion in revenue over the past 19 years because of the sanctions.  This includes lost bilateral donor support estimated at $4.5 billion annually since 2001; $4 billion in loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and the AfDB; commercial loans of $18 billion; and a GDP reduction of $21 billion.  As a consequence, the significant progress that Zimbabwe has made in the development of infrastructure, health, education, and social service delivery systems has been reversed.  What program of action is there to accelerate the economic growth in Zimbabwe with the lifting of the sanctions?”MR GAINER:  Thanks, Johann.  First and foremost, I’d like to disagree with the premise with the question.  As I just said, Zimbabwe’s economic woes are not caused by U.S. sanctions.  What U.S. sanctions have done over the past 20 years is target individuals and limit their access to U.S. financial institutions and restrict their travel.  That’s all it’s done.  The economic woes that have faced Zimbabwe over the past 20 years are because of the gross mismanagement by the Zimbabwean Government of their economy, human rights abuses on its own people, as well as corrupt practices for the past 20 years.  So we believe that is why Zimbabwe’s economy is performing as it is.As I’ve said, the change of sanctions tools does represent an opportunity for businesses and financial institutions to re-evaluate their de-risking models, re-examine the Zimbabwean market, but we definitely believe that it’s the corruption and the mismanagement that keeps businesses away from Zimbabwe.Brad, anything else to add?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Sure.  This is Brad.  I would just, I guess, echo David’s notes.  I mean, the program of action really is with – in the hands of the Government of Zimbabwe and the private sector in Zimbabwe to take this opportunity to enact necessary reforms and to ensure that key sectors of the economy that have been affected by corruption and human rights abuse, that those sectors can be reformed and be able to contribute to the growth of Zimbabwe, as we and the international community would like to see.MR GAINER:  Thanks Johann.  Back to you.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So, Romain Chanson of Radio France Internationale is online with us, and he has this question: “How many individuals were sanctioned under the previous program?  Was President Mnangagwa one of them?  And how many entities were sanctioned?  What kind of entities, state-owned enterprises?  Please give us some – some detail.”MR GAINER:  Certainly, thank you.  The Zimbabwe Sanctions Program, as we discussed at the beginning, was put in place in 2003, so it’s a little over 20 years old.  And over the years, we continually look at and re-evaluate and make regular adjustments to the Zimbabwe – or have to the Zimbabwe Sanctions Program, including adding and removing individuals and entities.  I believe the original lists were made public; is that correct, Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Yes.MR GAINER:  Yes.MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Yes.MR GAINER:  And so those lists are public.  And we continually make regular adjustments adding and subtracting names based on available evidence.  U.S. sanctions are not intended to be permanent.  Our sanctions, we believe, are most effective when they reflect the realities on the ground, so that’s why we are switching sanctions tools, so they can refocus our sanctions on those who are actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  This is Brad; I can add a bit more from the sanctions side.  The original executive orders did have a long list of names; you can find the exact lists and numbers in the public.  At the – before the program was transitioned on Monday, there were 98 individuals and entities remaining on the Zimbabwe sanctions list.  As David noted, the designations made on Monday number 14.  There were a range of – so the – those no longer subject to sanctions through Global Magnitsky included a wide array of individuals and entities.And again, the focus of the designations was on – to really highlight and target the most serious examples of human rights abuse and corruption that continue to this day.  And as David noted, we work to ensure that our sanctions can be reviewed and updated and ensure that they are targeted to the most current activity.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So, Linda Ensor of Business Day here in South Africa has her hand up, and I believe I know what her question’s going to be.  Linda, can we open your mic and allow you to ask your question, please?  Oops, pardon me.  I think I might have – I think I might have opened the wrong mic.  Okay, Linda, I think you’re on.All right, I’ll tell you what I can do.  I can read her question.MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  That’d be great.  Thank you.MODERATOR:  Yeah.  And so Linda’s question is: “Analysts in South Africa say that the U.S. action is motivated by the desire of the U.S. to get access to Zimbabwe’s rich wealth of minerals.”  So comment, gentlemen?MR GAINER:  Thanks, Johann.  No, we would disagree with that statement.  The U.S. has been and continues to remain deeply concerned about the human rights abuses, widespread corruption, and lack of good governance in Zimbabwe.  That’s our concern, and this switch, we believe, is to tools that will better help us address these concerns, which have been concerns that have been longstanding well over the past 20 years.  They target a limited number of actors that we believe are most responsible for the human rights abuses and the corrupt practices in Zimbabwe.Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Nothing further to add.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you very much.  So Ray Ndlovu has a question.  He has his hand up, so let me see if I can un – mic Ray.  Of Bloomberg in Zimbabwe, by the way.QUESTION:  Yeah.  Thanks very much.  Ray Ndlovu from Bloomberg.  Just want to find out, what does the U.S. hope to achieve by pausing its involvement in the Africa Development Bank-led debt talks?  And what conditions does the U.S. want to see before it can resume to these talks?  Thank you very much.MR GAINER:  Thanks, Ray.  This is David.  We have paused, as you mention, our participation in the AfDB talks due to what we see as a lack of progress on democratic reforms.  We also paused it due to alleged voter fraud in the past election, as well as political violence targeted at opposition parties.Getting back to my core statement, we remain deeply concerned about the lack of democratic reforms and the human rights abuses and widespread corruption in Zimbabwe.  We want to see fair treatment under the law for all Zimbabweans.  We want to see the abandonment of abuses by security forces that have included, in the past, unlawful or arbitrary killings, kidnap, torture, and assault on civilians.  We want to see the corruption stopped.  We want to see the – a stopping to the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain.  We want to see the corruption related to government contracts stopped.So we believe there is a lack of progress currently on democratic reforms, and that’s why we’ve paused our participation in the AfDB dialogue.I don’t know, Brad, if you want to add anything else?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Nothing further.MODERATOR:  Okay.  All right.  Thank you very much.  So Tobias Mudzingwa of VOA Studio 7 in Zimbabwe has a question.  The question is: “Yesterday the Government of Zimbabwe refuted claims that it has corrupt top leaders and that there are human rights abuses, arguing that there is no evidence to such claims.  Does the U.S. Government have evidence of these claims?”MR GAINER:  Thanks, Johann.  Yes.  First off, I would point you to the Department of Treasury’s website, the OFAC website which lists all 14 people and entities and what our evidence has found for the human rights abuses and corrupt practices.  As I just mentioned, what we have seen in terms of evidence is abuses by security forces that includes unlawful or arbitrary killings, kidnap, torture, as well as assault on Zimbabweans.In terms of corruption, we’ve seen misappropriation of state assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain, and corruption related to government contracts.Brad, anything to add?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  I – no, I would simply reiterate the review of the Treasury Department’s press release and their references to well-documented examples of human rights abuse and corruption as – including – in addition, including in multiple mining sectors that have been seen over the years.  Over.MR GAINER:  I can actually read out the link to the Treasury page.  It’s home.treasury.gov\news\press-releases- – I mean, excuse me, \jy2154.  Once again, that’s home.treasury.gov\news\press-releases\jy2154.  And we can certainly send this on or maybe have Johann at the hub send it on.  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  We’ll be glad to share that with the participants.  And I should remind everyone that we will be generating a transcript of today’s hub call, and so you will receive that as soon as we can generate it.So, we do have further questions.  Here’s an interesting question from Veneranda Langa, a freelance journalist from Zimbabwe.  “So, the SADC countries have been calling for complete removal of sanctions, saying they affect peace and security in the region, and 25th of October has been designated by SADC as anti-sanctions day.  Have there been discussions by SADC states and the U.S. on the removal of sanctions, and is there a dialogue with the Zimbabwe Government over the sanctions?”MR GAINER:  Thanks for the question.  Certainly, we discuss the sanctions issue in our private discussions with many governments, likeminded partners but also in the region, including SADC.  And we’ve had those discussions for many, many years and we will continue to have those discussions.  The United States, however, really remains committed and deeply concerned about the human rights abuses and widespread corruption in Zimbabwe.  And we believe that this transition to Global Magnitsky program is targeted at those individuals most responsible for these corrupt activities.  And so we believe it is a good transition for our sanctions tools, and it refocuses our sanctions on those actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Thanks.  I would just reiterate the point made earlier that throughout the existence of the Zimbabwe sanctions program, as David noted earlier, we consistently reiterated that the sanctions that were in place did not target the country of Zimbabwe or the people of Zimbabwe and that many of the premises of those messages were misplaced as a – with a misunderstanding of the way our sanctions worked.  We – but as David noted, we hope that through the transition to this global tool, and reinforcing the sanctions designations on those key actors involved in human rights abuse and corruption, that it will continue to enhance our conversations with our SADC partners and with others in the region as well as with the private sector to ensure that this is indeed an opportunity for the Government of Zimbabwe and for the region to take action on these key issues and concerns, while working with the opportunity that this transition presents.MR GAINER:  I would just add one more note.  Sanctions are a policy tool.  They are not a criminal charge.  U.S. sanctions prevent perpetrators of human rights abuses and corrupt actors from accessing U.S. banking institutions and restrict their ability to travel to the U.S.  That’s what they do.  Over.MODERATOR:  Okay, thank you very much for those answers.  So we did receive some questions also from Julia Ndlela of the Zimbabwe Independent, and Julia’s question – questions were:  “This week, the U.S. announced a new sanctions regime targeting 14 Zimbabwean individuals and entities.  Is this an admission that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe under the scope of ZDERA were ineffective?”And then her second question is:  “Under ZDERA, the U.S. imposed penalties on its citizens involved in – on its citizens involved in business dealings with designated Zimbabwean individuals.  Under the recently imposed sanctions, is the U.S. still going to do the same?”  In other words, will the U.S. impose sanctions on its own citizens involved in those business dealings?So two questions, gentlemen.MR GAINER:  Thank you.  First off, as we noted before, the President has determined that the Global Magnitsky program is better suited to address our current concerns with Zimbabwe.  We will note that the Zimbabwe sanctions program was created in 2003, so well over 20 years ago.  GloMag, or Global Magnitsky, did not exist at the time.  We believe that these are better tools, and they’re global tools; they’re tools that we have used in dozens of countries throughout the world, from Europe to Asia to Africa to Latin America, even amongst treaty allies of ours.We believe that this is – this more recent global program allows us to target Zimbabwean actors using the same tools that are used for the world’s worst human rights abusers and corrupt actors.  These actions modernize, refocus our sanctions.  We continually look at our sanctions program and evaluate the targets, listing and delisting individuals and entities.  But we believe that this modernizes and refocuses our sanctions on those actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe, ensuring our sanctions are targeted against the key individuals – including members of the Government of Zimbabwe – that bear responsibility for human rights abuses and corruption in Zimbabwe.Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Sure.  I would – thanks.  I would note a slight correction to the question, which premised the idea that our previous sanctions and enforcement of those sanctions happened under ZDERA.  As David noted earlier, ZDERA and the executive orders that were in place that under – that formed the foundation of our former Zimbabwe sanctions program were under different authorities than ZDERA.  So I would note that distinction.Secondly, Global Magnitsky does have – I think the question is getting at enforcement and the issuance of penalties periodically against those who may be U.S. persons for violating the sanctions and conducting financial transactions or other business with those who are sanctioned.  Global Magnitsky does have those same penalty authorities, so to the extent that in the future there are U.S. persons or those subject to our sanctions authorities who are engaged in transactions or conduct that violate the designations, the principals of the designations that were made, then the Treasury Department’s OFAC, Office of Foreign Assets Control – Enforcements Division would – Enforcement Division would pursue those.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  So Gilbert Nyambabvu of the New Zimbabwe has a question, which is:  “Allegations of corruption, human rights abuse, repression against political opponents are not unique to Zimbabwe.  Many other leaders in Africa and elsewhere across the world face similar allegations, but we do not see the U.S. imposing sanctions on these leaders.  So the question is, why Zimbabwe?”MR GAINER:  Look, this – we have used Global Magnitsky sanctions, as I mentioned, in dozens of countries around the world, including against ministers in a variety of contexts, including, as I mentioned, with treaty allies in places such as Slovakia, Latvia, Türkiye, in Asia, in Europe, in Latin America, in Africa.  We are consistently re-examining our sanctions programs to make sure that they’re targeted and to make sure they reflect the realities on the ground in each country.Brad, anything to add?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  I would just add, I mean, as David noted earlier, sanctions are a tool that advance policy, and we have other tools – visa restrictions and other actions we can take – to advance our policy with respect to particular countries.  So while we can’t preview or discuss deliberations with respect to any particular countries, I would note that in the examples cited there are – we have used a variety of other tools and diplomatic action and engagement.  There are sanctions imposed with a number of actors and armed groups connected, for example, to eastern DRC and Rwanda, so would refer the questioner to those authorities and actions.  But in any case, in any situation, as David noted, we are using Global Magnitsky in a wide array of contexts when we determine that the tool is appropriate for use to address a particular policy concern, and in other contexts the determinations at any given time may be that there are other tools that should be used to advance our policy.One thing I would also note is that Global Magnitsky is a sanctions program that a number of allies of the United States have, and it allows for the multilateral coordination and engagement with respect to use of sanctions.  And so this is another aspect of our assessment and deliberation of sanctions over time.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  So Happi Zengeni of Finx Zimbabwe has a question:  “The main deterrent had been the flow of funds to the country and loss of corresponding banking relationships.  Do you not think that by transferring the sanctions to GloMag, you perpetuate the democratic and human rights abuses you speak of as there will be no effect on the country anymore?”  Comment?MR GAINER:  Sure.  No, we disagree with that.  We believe these sanctions tools, they are targeted, they reflect the realities on the ground, and they affect only those individuals and entities that are most responsible and connected to corruption and human rights abuses.  We believe this tool is effective and – but we will – we continue to evaluate listings and delistings on a continuous basis.Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Yes, thanks.  I would simply note in addition, as we have earlier, I mean, the – with this action we expect the private sector, the banking sector, et cetera, to conduct due diligence based on these actions and evaluate their engagement, their relationships.  I would again disagree with the premise that our previous sanctions would have caused the loss of – themselves caused the loss of corresponding banking relationships.  As we have noted throughout this discussion and elsewhere, the concerns with respect to corruption and risk are those of – have been the actions of the Government of Zimbabwe and other actors that raise those risks.  We expect that this sanctions transition will prompt re-evaluation and reassessment and due diligence, and whether the private sector decides to re-establish relationships, et cetera, is obviously a decision that they will make on their own.But we expect that this transition will be something that is taken note of, and certainly as we continue our engagement with the private sector as we do on sanctions more generally, this will be something that we highlight.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you so much.  So, John Eligon of The New York Times has this question:  “Is there anything that changes functionally in terms of the sanctions under the Magnitsky Act versus the sanctions that were in place under the executive order?  Are there any differences in the restrictions for sanctioned individuals under Magnitsky versus those sanctioned under the previous executive order?”And second part of his question, which I think we’ve touched on already:  “The press release  outlines why certain individuals are being sanctioned but does not say what specific acts committed led to the sanctions.  Regarding President Mnangagwa, what state assets has he misappropriated and what acts of corruption has he committed that led the U.S. to believe that he should be sanctioned?  What serious human rights violations has his government committed that led to him being sanctioned?”MR GAINER:  Thank you.  This is David.  I would just refer you back to, of course, the Treasury page on the information for the actions taken by those that have been designated, and I would pass it over to Brad for the first part of the question.MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  Thanks.  Functionally, the designations under Global Magnitsky and the designations under the previous sanctions program have the same effect in terms of their restriction on U.S. persons engaging in transactions with those individuals and entities and any property or interest in property that those individuals and entities have would be blocked by U.S. persons.  So, the functional prohibitions are the same.  They’re implemented under the same legal authority as the Zimbabwe sanctions with a slight – the only difference being there’s an additional legislative act that underlines the Global Magnitsky program, but the prohibitions are essentially the same.MR GAINER:  Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right.  Thank you, gentlemen.  So, time is really creeping up on us.  You’ve been very generous with your time, and we’ve definitely covered a lot of ground here.  I think under the time we budgeted we have time for just one more question.  So, there’s a question in the Q&amp;A box from Ish Mafundikwa, a freelance journalist.  And the question is:  “Sanctions are a stick meant to prod the sanctioned to change their ways.  The change of the sanction regime is seen as both a stick and a carrot.  What necessitated the change?”MR GAINER:  As I mentioned before, we – as we have continually examined our designations, we decided that the Global Magnitsky program – which is a global program, it’s a newer program, it’s better suited to address our concerns with Zimbabwe.  We look at the realities on the ground in Zimbabwe and feel that this is a program where it better targets those critical individuals and entities that are actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.  So that’s why we believed this was a correct and good transition to a global program that’s used not just on Zimbabwe, not just in Africa, but in Europe, in Asia, in Latin America, throughout the world.Brad?MR BROOKS-RUBIN:  The only – I would just add, as David noted earlier in the call, at the time the Zimbabwe sanctions were imposed in 2003 and subsequent executive orders in the 2000s, Global Magnitsky did not exist.  And Global Magnitsky has now been in place for a few years and our assessment of its impact and effect and, as has been noted, its use in a variety of contexts across the world has had an impact, and the assessment was made that this would be an opportune time to transition the Zimbabwe program into this newer approach.MR GAINER:  This is David again.  I would just add that Global Magnitsky designations, they target senior officials and key private sector actors that are presently connected to corruption and human rights abuses.Back to you, Johann.MODERATOR:  All right, thank you very much.  So, as I mentioned, we have definitely covered a lot of ground here, and I want to express my appreciation to our speakers.  Do our speakers have any final thoughts, final words you’d like to share?MR GAINER:  Sure, Johann.  This is David again.  Just want to reiterate that this week’s actions do not represent a change in U.S. policy towards Zimbabwe, only a change in our sanctions tools.  We continue to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to move toward more open and democratic governance, including addressing corruption and human rights abuses, so all Zimbabweans can prosper.Thank you, Johann.  Thank you, everybody.MODERATOR:  All right.  It’s – I would like to thank the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin for joining us today.  And thank you all – thank you all as well to the journalists for participating.As I mentioned earlier, a recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  And I would also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you.# # #
- Department Press Briefing – March 4, 2024 HomeDepartment Press Briefing &#8211; March 4, 2024				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Department Press Briefing &#8211; March 4, 2024																																																					March 4, 2024																																																								1:26 p.m. ESTMR MILLER: Good afternoon. Monday. Start with some opening comments. We remain extremely concerned about the humanitarian situation in Gaza. As last week’s incident in northern Gaza made painfully clear, people are desperate for food, for water, for medicine. Parents are facing impossible choices about how to feed their children. Many don’t know where the next meal will come from, or if it will come at all.The situation is simply intolerable. And that’s why the United States is focused on increasing and sustaining aid in Gaza through as many channels as possible.Over the weekend, the Department of Defense and the Jordanian Royal Air Force worked together to air drop 38,000 ready-to-eat meals into Gaza. Operating out of Jordan, this operation saw a United States contribution of 66 bundles of aid, packed across three C-130 aircraft, delivered to those in dire need.This air drop was the first in a series the Department of Defense will be conducting, but I want to be clear about one thing: these air drops are intended to supplement, not replace, aid through other mechanisms.We are also actively pursuing options to establish a maritime assistance corridor. We are in discussion with a number of partners about this initiative, and while it is still in the development phase, we are optimistic about its potential to supplement our air and land efforts.We continue to work to increase the amount of aid flowing through existing border crossings at Rafah and Kerem Shalom and to press the Government of Israel to open additional crossings and routes into Gaza. Even as we explore other means of delivery, it is critical that we maximize the aid flowing into Gaza over land.When it comes to distribution inside Gaza, over the past week, the ability of the UN and other humanitarian implementers to distribute assistance within central and south Gaza has improved. While over 100 trucks a day of humanitarian assistance are now being distributed to those in need, this level is still significantly below the levels needed to meet minimum requirements to avert famine.In northern Gaza, we remain concerned at the increasing severity of the humanitarian situation. While private sector convoys have attempted to deliver assistance and some have been successful, these efforts are not and cannot be a replacement for large-scale assistance to the north distributed by the UN. We will continue to press the Government of Israel to facilitate increased deliveries to the north.Our goal is clear: to establish a comprehensive aid strategy that includes air, land, and sea routes to maximize the flow of humanitarian aid into Gaza and ensure that aid is distributed to everyone in Gaza who needs it.Finally, we continue to push for a temporary ceasefire through a hostage agreement that would allow a massive surge of aid into Gaza and ease the distribution problems that are currently hindering humanitarian efforts. A deal is on the table – a deal that would bring the hostages home and that would alleviate the terrible suffering of the Palestinian people. Hamas should accept it immediately.With that, Matt.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. Before getting back to the – before getting into the aid, I just want to ask you what you know about this U.S. Embassy employee who was found dead in Jerusalem.MR MILLER: I can confirm the death of a direct-hire employee of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. There’s not much more I can say at this point due to privacy considerations; as you know, there are steps we need to undertake, including next-of-kin notification, whenever such a terrible tragedy occurs. But it’s an incident that is under investigation, and I do just want to be clear that’s a step that always happens when someone dies, and there are no indications of foul play.QUESTION: Okay. But when you say a direct hire, what does that mean? Does it mean an American citizen?MR MILLER: American citizen. And I can’t say much more. I’m sure when we’ve finished next-of-kin notifications I’ll be able to say more, but that’s not where we are today.QUESTION: Okay. Well, do you know what this person did?MR MILLER: Again, due to the privacy and respect for the family, it’s not something I can say today. Be happy to get into it once we’ve completed that process.QUESTION: All right. And then back to the – unless someone else wants to go on that, just back on the aid situation. So you know that Bennie Gantz is in town and meeting with the Vice President and people at the White House today and with Secretary Blinken tomorrow. How focused are those – are these discussions going to be on the aid situation, which you just said was intolerable?MR MILLER: So it will be at the top of the agenda. I won’t speak in detail as to what the Vice President and the National Security Advisor will discuss with the minister. I’m sure that they will provide readouts and speak to those meetings at some point. But I can tell you it is at the top of the agenda. It will be at the top of the agenda when Secretary Blinken meets with Minister Gantz tomorrow. It’s something that the Secretary raised in a phone call with Ron Dermer, the Israeli minister for strategic affairs, earlier today to press that more must be done to get aid into Gaza, to ensure that the delivery of aid is sustained into Gaza, and to ensure that once aid gets into Gaza it can be disturbed to those who need it.QUESTION: Okay. And based on the conversation the Secretary had with former Ambassador Dermer this morning, do you have any indication that the Israelis are willing to allow more aid in, especially since you’ve been pushing for several weeks now on opening Erez crossing in the north into Gaza, and that has not yet happened?MR MILLER: So I will let the Israeli Government speak for themselves about decisions that they take, but we will continue to press them to allow more aid in through Rafah, through Kerem Shalom, and to open additional crossings to the north. As we’ve spoken about before, it’s extremely difficult to get aid from southern Gaza and central Gaza into the north right now. We all saw the horrific video last week of commercial deliveries in the north to people who are incredibly desperate for food and the way they – when they see any hope of a chance of getting food, the way they rush to get it. It’s a clear sign that more needs to be done, and so that’s what we’re pressing the Government of Israel to do.QUESTION: Do you have any indication that they get it and that they’re accepting your – your appeals?MR MILLER: Again, I don’t want to speak for them, but it’s something we’re continuing to press with &#8212;QUESTION: Well, I’m not asking you to speak for them. I’m asking you to tell me whether or – or to tell everyone here what – whether or not you think that your arguments are having an impact.MR MILLER: It is an issue that we remain incredibly focused on. The Government of Israel tells us, as they say publicly, that they want to ensure that aid gets to those who need it. But ultimately, as you’ve heard us say when it comes to other matters, it’s the results that matter, not the intent. And right now not enough aid is getting in and not enough aid is getting distributed, and that needs to change.QUESTION: Thanks.MR MILLER: Humeyra.QUESTION: Hi, Matt. I just want to go back a little bit to the air drops because they have raised a lot of questions and some criticism as well. A lot of people made the point that why does Washington need to resort to a practice that it would use in battlefields or areas that are controlled by hostile forces? Given that this area is controlled by Israel, why is the United States forced to use this practice to get aid into an area that its closest ally controls?MR MILLER: So a few things. Number one, we are using air drops because not enough aid is getting in right now. That’s the fundamental reason, and we want to do everything we can to get aid in through any mechanism possible.Number two, even as we air drop food and assistance into Gaza, as I said in my opening comments, we are continuing to push for the expansion of alternative mechanisms.But then the third thing I would say is I’ve seen people expressing their opposition to these air drops, and it’s something I frankly don’t understand. If you want to say that air drops are not enough, fine. We would agree with that proposition. As I said, we want to see aid come in through a maritime delivery route, and we’re exploring one. We want to see aid come in through the crossing that are already open but need to be increased. And we want to see aid come in through additional crossings that are open.But it’s a good thing, not a bad thing, to see thousands of meals distributed by air. And so we will continue to deliver aid through that mechanism, but it is very much not a replacement for every other mechanism to get aid into Gaza.QUESTION: I mean, I think a lot of people were pointing out to the fact that it’s a very expensive workaround. So I want to repeat a question that me and my colleagues have repeatedly asked you here over the last four months. The United States does have a very important and big leverage over Israel, like it does over other countries, and that is the military aid. And you have repeatedly said that Washington has so far – did not feel the need to or does not think it’s the best option to use that leverage.So after the events of last week and as the situation on the ground gets even more dire, and there seems to be an obvious inability on the part of U.S. Government to influence Israel in a meaningful way on this particular issue, does the United States – is the United States reconsidering its decision to not use military aid as its leverage over Israel?MR MILLER: So again, we continue to support Israel’s campaign to ensure that the attacks of October 7th cannot be repeated. We have provided military assistance to Israel because it is consistent with that goal. Hamas continues – the leadership of Hamas, that planned and plotted October 7th, continue to be at large inside Gaza. They continue to pose a threat to innocent civilians inside Israel. They would relaunch the attacks of October 7th today, tomorrow, if they had the capability to do so. So we support Israel’s legitimate military campaign consistent with international humanitarian law, and that’s why we continue to support them militarily.At the same time, we are incredibly concerned about the humanitarian situation, and that’s why you’ve seen engagement at the highest levels of this government. And you all have heard this from me before, but it is the engagement by the President, the engagement by the Secretary, that ensured that Rafah was open in the first place, that ensured that Kerem Shalom was open in the first place, that hopefully is going to ensure another crossing opens in the north.And so it is through that engagement that we have gotten humanitarian assistance in. That is in no way to say that we are satisfied. We are very much not satisfied. And so we are going to build on the record that has proven somewhat successful but very much needs to be expanded in getting more humanitarian assistance in, and we will engage directly with the Israeli Government on that question.QUESTION: So that’s a no?MR MILLER: It’s my – the answer I just provided.QUESTION: Okay, a couple of other little things &#8212;MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: &#8212; on maritime. You said this is in developmental – development phase. But – so I mean, as much as you can say, there is no port in Gaza. Where is this going to be offloaded?MR MILLER: So I can’t say very much about it. It’s a matter that we are exploring with commercial partners as well as other partners in the region. There are a number of different ways to do it. We’re trying to find the most efficient way to get as much aid in as possible. But while we’re reviewing that privately, I don’t think I should talk to it in detail from here.QUESTION: Is there any consideration that the U.S. military would be involved?MR MILLER: We have – as you’ve heard the President make clear, we do – he is not sending U.S. military to Gaza.QUESTION: Could I just basically follow up on Humeyra’s question, but maybe ask it in a slightly different way? Israel, of course, is a friendly country to the United States, is a very good relationship, but there are actually warnings of famine, perhaps, coming soon in Gaza. I mean, do you believe that Israel could do more to actually avert this?MR MILLER: We do think there is more that they could do. There is more that they could do practically. There are decisions that they could make that would have an impact. Opening an increased crossing would be one. There are practical decisions that they could make with respect to security around the distribution of aid inside Gaza that we have been pressing them to make. So yes, we very much agree that there is more that they can do and more that they should do.QUESTION: And why do you think they haven’t done it? Is there any influence that the U.S. could –MR MILLER: I will – I will let them speak to their own decision making. The point that we make to them is that the situation as it stands now is unacceptable and everyone involved needs to do more.QUESTION: And just one more on that. The situation in northern Gaza in particular, there’s been a security deterioration. I mean, do you think that everything has been done that could be possible to actually improve the security there, or do you think there are things the Israelis could do to improve the stability there?MR MILLER: I do think there’s more. I think the – one of the most important things that they could do to improve the security situation in northern Gaza would be to open a crossing to allow humanitarian aid to get in. There – Israel faces a – there are a number of security issues right now with respect to northern Gaza. One is that there are Hamas fighters that continue to operate there and continue to pop up from time to time and try to re-engage with IDF forces. But there is also a security situation with respect to the number of people who are there – who are desperate for aid. And that’s a security situation that you saw play out last week when you see hundreds if not thousands of people running to trucks just because they’re desperate for food for their families.So we think getting more aid in would both alleviate the underlying humanitarian situation but would alleviate the desperation, and that if people knew – it gets to this point. The reason we are trying to get aid in through as many channels as possible is it is our assessment that if people know that this truck they see today is not the last truck that’s going to be in their neighborhood delivering food in the next week or month, they’re less likely to rush out there and put themselves in danger, put their neighbors in danger, and create a chaotic situation.So we just need to get more aid in so people have confidence that there will be a next meal for themselves, for their family members. And that’s what we’re trying to do.QUESTION: Can I just follow up?MR MILLER: Jen, go ahead.QUESTION: Oh, do you want to &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: It was just a follow-up on the security point.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: I mean, how much of a factor is the bombing of police forces that were securing these convoys by the Israelis in what has happened since? Because we know what a problem that has caused. These police, as far as I understand it, are sometimes unarmed, they contain remnants that are still called Fatah, not all Hamas, and they have been hit. And that seems to have been a huge factor in them no longer be willing to secure the convoys, which has led to this complete drying up of aid, particularly being able to get to the north, and therefore part of the problem with the terrible event we saw on Thursday. So how much of a factor was Israel doing that in what’s now happening?MR MILLER: It is a significant factor. And the point that we have made to the Government of Israel is what’s important is that aid be distributed from the warehouses at Rafah, the warehouses in – at Kerem Shalom or just inside the Gaza border, out to neighborhoods so people can get it. There are a number of ways in which that could occur. Police escorts could be one. As I mentioned a moment ago, there are increased deliveries that have been going on the last week in which the UN has been able to provide – to find security that is not provided by on-duty police. There may be other alternative mechanisms as well. Ultimately, that’s a question for the Government of Israel and the United Nations to determine.But what we have made clear is what’s not an acceptable alternative is for people to starve. And so whatever the security situation is that’s – that needs to be established to ensure that those trucks can deliver needs to be done. And Israel can – we will be happy to work with Israel and with the United Nations to find the best alternative to ensure that those trucks can safely deliver their food, their water, their medicine. But an unacceptable answer is allowing those – is leaving those trucks just sitting in warehouses and not getting the aid distributed to the people who desperately, desperately need it.QUESTION: But doesn’t it go – it goes to the fundamental issue, though, that there is no security in Gaza. So this is not a day-after problem, some sort of hypothetical in the future; it’s happening now. And it’s happening now because there was no plan.MR MILLER: I would not disagree with the assessment that it is not a day-after issue, it is an issue now, and it’s one that the Government of Israel needs to work with the United Nations to determine an answer to now, because there is a very urgent need on the ground.QUESTION: Can I &#8212;MR MILLER: Said, go ahead. Sorry, I was supposed to come to you &#8212;QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. A couple things. In your response to Humeyra and to Shaun, on the – what happened last Thursday, you’re saying that we’ve seen what desperate people needing food and so on, what could – are you saying that the tragedy was a result of the stampede of people?MR MILLER: There is an investigation ongoing by the Government of Israel. I know they’ve released preliminary – a preliminary assessment. But there’s a further investigation going on. But clearly, the reason all those people were out there in the first place at 4:30 in the morning – I think it’s easy to lose sight of that. This was not in the middle of the day; it’s 4:30 in the morning. And the reason that many people were out there was because they’re so desperate for food and assistance. When aid trucks roll in, especially in the middle of the night, you shouldn’t have to see people swarming them for aid. They should have confidence that that aid will be distributed, but they don’t right now and for good reason, because aid hasn’t been getting there, and they’re desperate to feed their families.QUESTION: Okay. But you don’t doubt that the Israeli military fired on those people?MR MILLER: They have &#8212;QUESTION: That there were gunshots?MR MILLER: They have offered a public assessment of what’s happened, and they said that they did fire in one context. We do not have any independent confirmation of how the actual events rolled out. I know that there are differing assessments and conflicting evidence about what happened, which is why we’re going to await the outcome of the investigation.QUESTION: Yeah, but I mean, as wonderful as it is to send them aid by airplanes, I mean, it’s 38,000 meals. That’s, like, 0.07 – one-seventh each one person. I mean, that’s a very small amount. The best way obviously is via ground, and the U.S. can send in trucks. I don’t think that the Israelis would shoot or would fire on American-controlled trailer trucks and so on.MR MILLER: Said, I think you’re – you, number one, are missing everything I just said, both in my opening comments and &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Just – I – please don’t interrupt, because I didn’t interrupt you – about the fact that these air drops are intended to supplement, not replace. And while they are insufficient by themselves, they are still important and will provide meals to people who otherwise did not have them, so we do feel they meet a critical need and we will continue them. But that does not change the fundamental underlying issue, which is we do need to get more aid in through land delivery and potentially through sea delivery, and that’s what we’re trying to accomplish.QUESTION: Yeah. First of all, I’m not dismissing the value of that. In fact, I asked the question last week if the U.S. would do something like this – nor was I interrupting you. I’m just saying I realized that it’s an effort, but it’s a very small effort. There are other ways. And even by sea, I mean, I understand the U.S. military has these wonderful causeways they can roll things in. Doesn’t – you don’t even have to have a harbor and so on. But that is still inefficient. I mean, it’s – the United States and Egypt and so on, there is a political decision to ensure – I mean, to basically force Israel to allow trucks in. I’d believe that they will prevail. You don’t think that the U.S. can prevail if it pressures Israel to allow these trucks in?MR MILLER: We are making clear that more trucks need to come in from the seniormost levels of this government.QUESTION: Okay, a couple more questions. Of course I think it was raised that there is something like 15 children that have already died of starvation in Gaza, and there seems to be maybe hundreds more in the coming days and so on. So the situation is very, very desperate. Let me ask you about UNRWA. Have you arrived a decision on continuing aid or resuming aid to UNRWA?MR MILLER: We have made clear that we are going to make that determination at the conclusion of the two investigations the UN is conducting with respect to UNRWA. Neither of those investigations has concluded at this point.QUESTION: Do you have any, like, calendar or timetable on this, because &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s – it’s &#8212;QUESTION: &#8212; the people in UNRWA are saying that we are – the situation is pretty horrible.MR MILLER: So it’s a question you should direct to the UN about how long that – those two investigations will take.QUESTION: But you are not demanding that the UN sort of speed up the process?MR MILLER: I think it’s in the UN’s interest that the investigations be completed as soon as possible. I’m sure that they are well aware of that.QUESTION: And finally, I have one – can you share with us any update on the talks?MR MILLER: On the hostage talks? No, I’m not going to read those out in detail other than to say, as I said in my opening comments, that there is a deal on the table. And that deal would get hostages out, it would deliver a temporary ceasefire of six weeks, and it would allow more aid to come in, so we hope Hamas will accept the deal.Jen.QUESTION: On the hostage talks, Matt, what do you make of the fact that Israel did not send a delegation to Cairo for these continued working-level talks?MR MILLER: I will let Israel speak for itself. We want – we are engaged in the ongoing talks and want them to conclude successfully.QUESTION: Are you concerned that this indicates that they would not accept any Hamas counterproposals or discuss them at all?MR MILLER: Israel has made clear that they want a deal to secure the release of hostages. They have been engaged to try to secure a deal to release hostages and achieve a temporary ceasefire. And we’ll continue to engage with them in that regard.QUESTION: And you spoke of the Israeli investigation into what happened last Thursday. Would the U.S. support an independent investigation?MR MILLER: So I’ve heard those calls for an independent investigation. I have – as yet have not seen who people have in mind or what body they have in mind to conduct the – such an independent investigation. I did note that the UN says that it is sending UN staff into hospitals to look at the nature of the wounds to see if it was a small number of people who were killed by gunshot or whether it was a larger number, or whether the deaths have – came as a result of being run over by trucks or crushed in the horrific events that occurred. So it does appear the UN is conducting at least its own kind of assessment of what happened, and we support them doing that.QUESTION: And then on the Gantz visit, there’s been a lot of political furor in Israel from Netanyahu and members of his coalition there. Does the U.S. – I guess can you talk us through why you thought it was still appropriate to meet with Gantz despite &#8212;MR MILLER: So Benny Gantz is a member of the war cabinet, someone with whom the Secretary has engaged in his visits to Israel, someone with whom the Secretary has had one-on-one phone calls on repeated occasions when we’re back here in the United States. So what ministers travel to the United States is – and how they make those decisions and how they coordinate is ultimately an internal matter for the Government of Israel to determine on their own. For our part, we find him an important figure inside the Israeli Government to engage with and – given the number of issues that we have currently that we are in discussion with the Government of Israel about, including the need to surge humanitarian assistance in – for our purposes, it’s an important meeting to have.QUESTION: And I have a couple on Haiti when (inaudible) &#8212;QUESTION: (Off-mike.)MR MILLER: Let’s go ahead. Go ahead and go to Haiti, and I’ll come back.QUESTION: I was going to follow up. Is that all right?MR MILLER: Oh, go ahead. Yeah.QUESTION: Sorry. I don&#8217;t want to step on anybody, but just directly to follow &#8212;MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: &#8212; on Jenny’s question, I mean does the fact that senior U.S. officials – including the Secretary, the Vice President, National Security Advisor – the fact that they’re taking these meetings with Benny Gantz signal that they see in him more of a willing diplomatic partner than Prime Minister Netanyahu?MR MILLER: I would not make that assessment. We’re meeting with Benny Gantz because he’s one of three members of the war cabinet thought to – one of five, if you count the two advisor members – but one of three members of the war cabinet who has a critical vote and a critical stake in how this war is conducted. He has a critical voice in the delivery of humanitarian assistance; he’s an important figure in the sitting government of Israel, and so that’s why we engage with him.QUESTION: I mean, he’s also a political rival of the sitting prime minister and Prime Minister Netanyahu made clear that he disapproves of these meetings going forward. So in taking these meetings, did the U.S. consider that they might fuel political instability within the existing Israeli Government.MR MILLER: We – that is – the various political intrigue inside Israel is ultimately a matter for the Government of Israel and the political class in Israel that we take no position on. The Secretary has met with Benny Gantz a number of times – met with him in the presence of the prime minister; he’s met with him separately, just as he’s met with members of the opposition and members of the – and other members of the government, and we’ll continue to do that, because we think it’s important to do so and advances the interests of the United States.QUESTION: Two quick follows on the region?MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: One is, what can you say about Israel’s willingness to make good on the requirements set forth in the National Security Memorandum set forth last month, about providing written confirmation that they’ll use American military aid in accordance with humanitarian law? Absent having already supplied that response, have they indicated that they will be able to meet that deadline and provide you a written &#8212;MR MILLER: So it’s a matter we are in conversation with the Government of Israel about, as we are in conversation with other countries that receive security assistance from the United States. I don&#8217;t want to get into those underlying discussions, but there is a deadline that the executive order sets out. I think it’s 45 days from early February, when it was established. And we will engage with every country that we provide military assistance to about the requirements set out on the executive order and how they can fulfill them.QUESTION: Is Israel on track to meet that deadline?MR MILLER: Again, the deadline is clearly imposed. I don&#8217;t want to speak to it before we get there. It’s a matter, right now, we’re in discussion with Israel. And I should note, I know all the questions always come with respect to Israel, but this is a matter that’s not unique to Israel. It applies to every country that receives security assistance from the U.S.QUESTION: Last quick one on Rafah.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Was – has the U.S. been advised as to whether there is a likely or an imminent ground operation likely to be launched into Rafah?MR MILLER: No, we have not. And we have still not been briefed on any plan either for a military operation or a humanitarian assistance plan that we have said is critical before a military operation takes place.QUESTION: And you would still expect that to happen before anything happens on the ground?MR MILLER: It is what we have said is critical.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: The situation on the ground in Haiti &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; has deteriorated even further. What’s the U.S. assessment of where things go from here? Our understanding is the prime minister is not in the country. Is the U.S. trying to facilitate his return there? And then are there any plans to evacuate the embassy at this point?MR MILLER: So first of all, we are closely monitoring the situation and condemn efforts by gangs to further destabilize and take control of Haiti. It’s our understanding that the prime minister is returning to the country. We think it’s important that he do so and that he be allowed to do so.Many of those responsible for the uptick in violence have been designated by the United States under the Global Magnitsky Act and illicit drugs sanctions programs and by other members of the international community under their authorities. And I think the actions you’ve seen these gang members take over the last few days shows exactly why they have been so designated. And it also underscores the urgency of finalizing the Multinational Security Support Mission to assist the Haiti National Police in dealing with the dire security situation on the ground.With respect to the embassy, the embassy remains open. The – we announced yesterday that the embassy has moved to limited operations with no public services available the first three days of this week due to the ongoing violence in Port-au-Prince.QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that?MR MILLER: Yeah. Janne, I swear I’ll come to you. We’ll do this first and then &#8212;QUESTION: So just the tense – the prime minister is returning to the country. Like is he in the process of it? Is he &#8212;MR MILLER: I will let the Haitian Government speak to that.QUESTION: Does the U.S. have any role in &#8212;MR MILLER: Again, I’ll let the Haitian Government speak to the prime minister’s travel. Go ahead, Janne.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Two questions on Russia and North Korea. The Russian President Putin warned that if the Western countries sent troops to Ukraine nuclear war would break out. How do you think about the Russia as a nuclear threat?MR MILLER: So first of all, the – that rhetoric, as we’ve seen before, is irresponsible and inappropriate for a nuclear power and is inconsistent with the way that any nuclear power should talk about the use of such weapons in public. But we have seen no reason to change our nuclear posture. And I would just note, as I always note, as the President has made clear, we are not sending boots on the ground to Ukraine.QUESTION: Secondly, on North Korea, there are signs that North Korea will soon launch another reconnaissance satellite. Do you think Russia is providing satellite technology to North Korea as part of its weapons support?MR MILLER: I just don’t want to comment on that detail.Alex, go ahead.QUESTION: Thanks, Matt. A couple of separate topics. Staying on Russia rhetoric.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: Russia ramped its rhetoric against Moldova, saying that West is trying to take over the leadership of Moldova. Do you have any response to Lavrov?MR MILLER: That’s obviously not true.QUESTION: He also accused Armenia of going towards the West, and then he promised that they will respond to Armenia. Any reaction?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to respond directly to that question, although it’s the kind of – it’s the kind of rhetoric that we have seen the Russian Government make that is destabilizing to the region, and it’s why you’ve seen so many of Russia’s neighbors be concerned about threatening rhetoric and threatening actions that the Russian Government has shown over and over it is willing to take against its neighbors. And I’ll leave it at that.QUESTION: Thank you. Do you want to weigh into a German leaked story in two contexts actually? One is Germany says that it – Russia has ramped up its information war against it since last night; secondly, whether do you see this might mean that Germany will be frozen out of intel sharing?MR MILLER: I don’t have any comment on intelligence matters at all.Guita, go ahead.QUESTION: A couple of – a few questions, Matt, on Iran. Today, the director general of the IAEA delivered his report – officially delivered his report to the Board of Governors and made statements about the different subjects, including Iran. He didn’t have anything positive to say about what Iran’s been doing in the past few months.MR MILLER: Nor will I, much to your surprise.QUESTION: (Laughter.) He also expressed concern about some comments that Iranian officials have been making that – about their capabilities to build a bomb. This was the first time that Grossi made reference to that. Does the U.S. think that it’s time to censor Iran or at least report it directly to the UN Security Council? Because I think Reuters has reported and quoted Western officials that the E3 do have a draft for a censure, but the U.S. may not be very willing to go along with it.MR MILLER: So we are closely coordinating with our E3 allies on our approach to Iran’s nuclear program, including with respect to the IAEA Board of Governors meeting. I don’t have any actions to preview at this time, but we fully support the IAEA and Director General Grossi and believe that Iran must fully uphold its safeguard obligations without further delay.QUESTION: Your Iranian counterpart today was asked about the 2015 nuclear agreement. He said that the &#8212;MR MILLER: I didn’t know I had an Iranian counterpart. Does he hold press briefings?QUESTION: Yes, they do – once a week. (Laughter.)MR MILLER: Yeah. Yeah. Once a week.QUESTION: Yeah.MR MILLER: With a thriving free press inside Iran.QUESTION: Perfect. He was asked about the JCPOA, and he said that the diplomatic channels was – were still open. Have any communication been exchanged in this regard regarding their nuclear program?MR MILLER: So we have the ability to communicate to Iran when it is in the U.S. interest to do so, but I’m not going to characterize those communications further.QUESTION: Okay. One last one. Shervin Hajipour, one of – who composed a song last year &#8212;MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: &#8212; about – yeah – the protests, and he was given an almost four-year sentence, plus that he has to read books on women’s rights in Islam and to compose an anti-U.S. song and publish it on social media. Do you have any comments?MR MILLER: So we condemn the years-long prison sentence for Shervin Hajipour, who many around the world know for his song Baraye which became a global anthem for the Iranian peoples’ protests. You may remember that Secretary Blinken had the – that song on his 2022 Spotify playlist and Dr. Jill Biden presented him with the first ever Grammy for best song for social change. And I think the Iranian Government’s actions are just another signal of their intent to crack down on freedom of expression and repress voices inside their own society whenever possible.QUESTION: Can I ask one more on Iran?MR MILLER: To – yeah.QUESTION: The – I know you commented on this before the election, but the election, particularly the turnout. Authorities are reporting its 41 percent, which would be the lowest since the Islamic Revolution. Do you have any comment either on the turnout – whether you think that turnout is accurate, but what the overall historically low turnout, what it means?MR MILLER: I don’t have our own assessment to offer about turnout, other than to say that the Iranian authorities’ claims about turnout have generally been unreliable. But as you heard me say last week, we did not assess that these elections would be free and fair and believe that many Iranian voters would assess that the elections would not be free and fair. And so it wouldn’t be surprise me if in that regards they chose not to participate.QUESTION: Can I just take it one step further? I mean, do you think this is a show of discontent or whatever the low &#8212;MR MILLER: We know that the Iranian people are discontented. We see them – we’ve seen them come out and protest on a number of occasions, and we’ve seen the Iranian authorities brutally crack down on those protests. So I don’t think there’s any doubt that there’s discontent about the regime’s rule and the regime’s willingness to crack down and try and keep that discontent from bubbling up.Go ahead. I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: The 30 days notification by the U.S. State Department to the U.S. Congress on sale of drones to India has passed yesterday. What the next steps in that? Do you know?MR MILLER: I will have to take that and get back to you. I wasn’t aware that, that date had passed.QUESTION: Okay.MR MILLER: Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you. I have two questions on Gaza. First, on Israeli investigations – at recent briefings, you have urged a lot of investigations into a lot of issues. I wanted to follow up on two of these. You have urged for investigation into the sexual violence allegations, sexual assault allegations against Palestinian women, and the killing of Hind Rajab. Do you have any updates on those, any &#8212;MR MILLER: I – oh, sorry.QUESTION: Have you heard back from any of these?MR MILLER: I don’t have an update. I don’t know if we have. I’m happy to check, I’m just personally not aware with respect to that one.QUESTION: And the second question, on have you seen the reports of Israeli war planes bombing a makeshift cemetery in Sunday built near the Jabalia refugee camp in northern Gaza? Have you seen those reports? Do you &#8212;MR MILLER: I have seen the reports. I haven’t been able to – we have not been able to verify them, but as we have said a number of times, it is important that Israel conduct this campaign in full compliance with international humanitarian law.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Shehbaz Sharif has been elected as the new prime minister of Pakistan. Would you like to comment on your expectations for bilateral relations with Pakistan under the leadership of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif?MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak with respect to the new prime minister, but as we’ve said before, we value our longstanding partnership with Pakistan and have always viewed a strong, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan as critical to United States-Pakistan interests, and our engagement with new Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and his government will continue to focus on advancing these shared interests.QUESTION: Sir, Maryam Nawaz, the daughter of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, has been elected as the chief minister of the key province of Punjab in Pakistan, the country’s first woman to hold the post. Despite facing fabricated cases and spending time behind bars, she emerged as the winner and the first woman chief minister of Punjab. In your opinion, how does her historic election signify progress for women’s representation in Pakistani politics?MR MILLER: So her selection as chief minister is a milestone in Pakistani politics. We look forward to cooperating with Pakistan more broadly on integrating women more fully into the country’s political life, in the economy, including through the U.S.-Pakistan Women’s Council, civil society, and other decision making spaces. An inclusive Pakistan makes for a strong, prosperous country which all Pakistanis benefit from, and so we are always pleased when we see cracks in the glass ceiling anywhere in the world.QUESTION: Follow-up.MR MILLER: Go ahead – no, go ahead. Go ahead first. Yeah. I’ll come to you &#8212;QUESTION: Yes. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein is in Beirut today.MR MILLER: I – he does not work for the State Department. He works for the White House, so I will defer to them for comment on Amos’s travel.QUESTION: But the ambassador with him in his meeting with officials.MR MILLER: Again – again, I’m going to defer to the White House for comment on a – the travel of a White House official, but Amos Hochstein has been engaged, as have people at the State Department, on trying to achieve a diplomatic resolution to the situation in the north of Israel.Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you.MR MILLER: I’ll come to you next.QUESTION: Yes. You just called my colleague that Maryam Nawaz Sharif was a milestone, becoming the first female chief minister of Pakistan. Has &#8212;MR MILLER: Of Punjab. Of Punjab.QUESTION: Of Punjab, yeah.MR MILLER: Of Punjab.QUESTION: Prime – we have had a prime minister, female, Benazir Bhutto, if you remember.MR MILLER: I do. That does not &#8212;QUESTION: She was a milestone too.MR MILLER: I do. She absolutely was. It in no way changes this accomplishment.QUESTION: But you know Maryam Nawaz Sharif was caught in the supreme court of Pakistan &#8212;MR MILLER: Do you have a question?QUESTION: No, but are you aware that Maryam Nawaz was caught in the supreme court by presenting a fake Calibri font as well?MR MILLER: I am not going to get into those underlying details. It’s a matter for Pakistan, but we do believe her selection as chief minister is a milestone for Pakistan (inaudible).QUESTION: Just one more question. One more question. Human rights – United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Mr. Richard Bennett urged countries to initiate a case against Taliban over women rights. Last week, Karine and you spoke about having a inclusive government, but the women rights are totally forgotten. Can the U.S. at least urge – like, be a part of this case? Because this is a very general case. Millions of girls just across the border from Pakistan are – have been without education for two years now.MR MILLER: So I can’t speak to the specific case that you’re referring to because I’m not aware of it, but of course we have said it many times that the treatment of women and girls inside Afghanistan is deplorable.Humeyra, you had something.QUESTION: Yeah.QUESTION: Thank you.QUESTION: Thank you, Matt. Just to go back to a couple of Israel-Gaza related stuff, so about Erez or the third border crossing opening, given your comments at the top about the urgency and how severe the situation is, what is the sticking point with the Israeli Government?MR MILLER: I’m not going to get into our private conversations, but it’s a matter that we are engaged with them on. I will let them speak for themselves. We think it needs to open urgently.QUESTION: Okay. And just to push you a little bit more on that, given you think it needs to open urgently, can you give a timeline on like days, weeks?MR MILLER: I can’t because it’s not a decision that needs to be made by the United States Government; it’s one that needs to be – that can – has to be made by the Government of Israel. I can’t speak for them, but we continue to urge them to open it as soon as possible.QUESTION: Okay. And on Benny Gantz, following up from colleagues, do you think, like, given that Prime Minister Netanyahu is not happy with this particular trip – and I know the Secretary has seen Benny Gantz on several occasions in our trips – do you think that dispute with Netanyahu actually reduces his effectiveness in – for U.S. to push, like, on aid situation and – does that under – does that trip undercut his impact, his effectiveness?MR MILLER: I am not going to make assessments about the varying levels effectiveness – of effectiveness of any member of the &#8212;QUESTION: Well, you guys are meeting with him.MR MILLER: &#8212; of any member of the Government of Israel. But, that said, he is one of three members of the war cabinet, plays an important role inside the government. That’s why we’re meeting with him. It’s the same reason why the Secretary talked to Ron Dermer, minister for strategic affairs and an advisory member of the war cabinet, today because there are a number of issues that we need to urgently engage with them on. And so that’s what we’re doing.QUESTION: Okay. A couple of little things on CHIRG. You – you have said a few weeks ago that U.S. has begun reviewing reports that Israel may have harmed civilians in its war in Gaza under the CHIRG process specifically, and I know that you did say that this is not a process that is going to yield results right away, but I still would like to check back in and ask. We know that there are dozens, if not more, a number of – dozens of incidents that are being reviewed. Have any of them moved to stage two? Has – have the – has this building made any determination that yes, U.S. weapons were used in incident XYZ and that caused civilian harm, and Israeli military was at fault in this particular incidence?MR MILLER: Those reviews are ongoing. None of them have been concluded, and I’m not going to offer kind of preliminary assessments as they move through the process.QUESTION: Right. And final one. Do you have a better understanding – does this building have a better understanding on what it would do when it reaches – when and if it reaches that assessment? What is the next step of that review?MR MILLER: It &#8212;QUESTION: You should know that because, I mean, that’s the whole point of conducting that review, right?MR MILLER: It totally depends on the circumstances. And given that’s a variety of different cases with different circumstances, I wouldn’t want to speculate.Go ahead in the back, and then we’ll wrap.QUESTION: At least some recent report by United Nation there was a significant funding gap for humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, more than $2 billion. Can you elaborate how does the United States plan to contribute to alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan?MR MILLER: So the United States remains committed to supporting the people of Afghanistan. One way we continue to do that is to address underlying macroeconomic issues, which will provide necessary stability for the current humanitarian response to be more effective and will help alleviate many of the issues that fuel the humanitarian crisis we see in Afghanistan today. And we also remain the single largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, includes providing over $2 billion in lifesaving and sustaining assistance to the Afghan people since August of 2021.With that, we’ll wrap for – yeah, go ahead. Shaun, and then we’ll &#8212;QUESTION: Just one on Zimbabwe.MR MILLER: Yeah.QUESTION: The announcement this morning. I was wondering if you could expand a little bit about the thinking about doing this, about having the targeted – I mean, I realize the Secretary has a statement, but having targeted sanctions against the president and others. Some, including the Zimbabwean Government, are actually saying this is a victory, saying that the sanctions regime has been – in 2003 is over. Is this half full? Half empty? How are you &#8212;MR MILLER: It’s rare that you see a government say that sanctions on the sitting president is a victory for the government. So I won’t – I don’t think – I’ll let that one slide.With the transition, we are focusing our sanctions policy on Zimbabwe now to actively target those who are currently engaged in human rights abuses and corruption. So there were a number – under the old sanctions regime, which had been in place for 20 years, actually over 20 years at this point, there were a number of sanctions in place on people who were no longer in government, some of whom were deceased. So we thought it important to update our policy and focus on those who are currently engaged in human rights abuses and corruption, including the sitting president.QUESTION: Do you have a rough number how many were – will be taken off as a result?MR MILLER: I don’t know, sorry. All right, with that I’ll &#8212;QUESTION: On (inaudible) Pope Francis?MR MILLER: Yeah, go ahead. Go ahead.QUESTION: Thank you, appreciate it. Good afternoon, by the way.MR MILLER: Yes.QUESTION: So on Sunday, yesterday, Pope Francis, he called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza so the hostages can be freed and civilians can get aid. He said, quote, “Enough, please! Stop!” Does the State Department believe that the pope’s urgent plea can help secure a ceasefire in Gaza?MR MILLER: So we believe there ought to be an immediate ceasefire in Gaza that brings the hostages out, that alleviates the suffering of the Palestinian people, and that’s what we are advocating for. There is a deal on the table that would deliver all of those things; Hamas just needs to accept it.With that, we’ll wrap for the day.(The briefing was concluded at 2:12 p.m.)						Tags																					Afghanistan																								Haiti																								India																								Iran																								Israel																								Lebanon																								Moldova																								Office of the Spokesperson																								Pakistan																								Palestinian Territories																								Russia																								Ukraine																								Zimbabwe
- Sanctioning Human Rights Abusers and Corrupt Actors, and Termination of Zimbabwe Sanctions Authority Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe United States is today designating eleven Zimbabwean individuals and three entities, including President Emmerson Mnangagwa, under the Global Magnitsky sanctions program for their connection to corruption or serious human rights abuses.&nbsp; These designations are part of a stronger, more targeted sanctions policy towards Zimbabwe the United States is implementing following President Biden’s approval of a new Executive Order terminating the Zimbabwe sanctions program that had been in effect since 2003.We continue to have concerns regarding serious cases of corruption and human rights abuse in Zimbabwe.&nbsp; Key individuals, including members of the Government of Zimbabwe, bear responsibility for these actions, including the looting of government coffers that robs Zimbabweans of public resources.&nbsp; Multiple cases of abductions, physical abuse, and unlawful killing have left citizens living in fear.&nbsp;The United States is committed to ensuring our sanctions are relevant, timely, and targeted against those most closely connected to corruption and human rights abuses.&nbsp; We continue to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to move toward more open and democratic governance, including addressing corruption and protecting human rights, so all Zimbabweans can prosper.The Department of the Treasury designations were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.  For more information on today’s actions, see the White House announcement and Treasury’s press release.						Tags																					Bureau of African Affairs																																Corruption																															Office of the Spokesperson																																Sanctions																															The Secretary of State																								Zimbabwe
- Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction Darby FitzSimmonsIn December 2002, the United States received intelligence that a North Korean ship – the So San – was in the Arabian Sea carrying missiles destined for Yemen. The U.S. alerted the Spanish navy, which had ships in the area and agreed to intercept the ship.The intelligence was right. Upon boarding the So San, Spanish naval personnel discovered 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 85 drums of unidentified chemicals, and 23 tanks of missile fuel, all hidden under bags of cement.However, after a day of back and forth between the U.S. and Yemeni governments, the ship was released. The U.S. said it lacked clear legal authority to seize the missile parts.Less than a year later, in October 2003, the U.S. and UK once again received intelligence that a ship, the BBC China, was carrying illicit cargo. U.S. government officials contacted German authorities who intercepted the ship. They found and permanently confiscated nuclear centrifuge parts destined for Libya. In 2018, PSI countries held a Mediterranean maritime exercise in the bay of Catania in Sicily. (State Department photo)The difference in outcome between these two events was no accident – it was the result of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Launched in May 2003 by eleven like-minded countries, the PSI is a global effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.A Global EffortToday, there are 111 participating countries that endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles. These include committing to stopping the trafficking of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials, and enhancing relevant legal, diplomatic, financial, military, and law enforcement tools.Although the PSI does not have any formal legal authority, the PSI has played a key role in global counterproliferation efforts for more than 20 years. PSI-endorsing countries agree to work together to impede or stop shipments of WMD-related materials to or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.Many PSI-endorsing countries also have ship boarding agreements, allowing them to carry out searches and seizures of illicit material on ships originating from each other’s countries.PSI in AfricaPSI endorsing states regularly conduct multilateral meetings, workshops, and exercises to improve their counterproliferation readiness and share best practices. One such event occurred in early February when the United States and Morocco co-hosted the 2024 Proliferation Security Initiative African Political Meeting and Outreach event. This was the largest ever PSI event on the African continent. More than 160 attendees from 35 countries attended, including 25 African countries.During the three-day event, civilian and military leaders discussed the current state of counterproliferation, shared best practices, and emphasized the importance of continuing to expand upon nonproliferation efforts on the African continent through the PSI and similar mechanisms. Representatives from 35 countries gather in Marrakech for the kick-off of a PSI event in February. (State Department photo)Looking AheadThese PSI efforts are more important than ever. In recent months, several developments have shaken the global nonproliferation regime. These include:Iran withdrawing permission for international verification at several nuclear sites;DPRK continuing to develop its unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, andRussia continuing to violate nonproliferation norms by attacking Ukraine with missiles and has doubled down on its dangerous nuclear rhetoric – including withdrawing from the PSI in 2022.However, despite the challenges posed by the current security landscape, the PSI remains strong. Following the meeting, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia became endorsers of the PSI, affirming their commitment to countering the spread of WMDs.The success of the 2024 PSI African Political Meeting and Outreach event is a sign that the international community at large is steadfast in their support of counterproliferation efforts. The United States looks forward to working with the five new endorsing countries to improve our multilateral interdiction efforts and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons-related technologies.Darby FitzSimmons is an intern in the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
- U.S. Department of State Announces 2024 Spring Season of Next Level Office of the SpokespersonThe U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce the 10th anniversary season of the Next Level international exchange program is underway.  A key part of the United States’ Global Music Diplomacy Initiative, Next Level sends American aerosol artists, beatboxers, beatmakers, dancers, DJs, and MCs to engage audiences globally through hip hop with an aim to promote peace and democracy namely through conflict resolution in communities around the globe.The Global Music Diplomacy Initiative, launched by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in September 2023, aims to promote peace and democracy through music, and supports broader U.S. foreign policy goals to expand access to education, economic opportunity and equity, and societal inclusion.With the 2024 season already underway including workshops for underserved youth in Costa Rica, Olympic-focused programming in France, and a 10th anniversary event in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, American artists will teach and perform in nearly every region of the world during this spring season.  Next Level is implemented through a cooperative agreement with Meridian International Center and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.The 2024 Next Level spring season includes:Limón, Costa RicaDance: Kara Jenelle (Los Angeles, CA)MC: Queena Bergen (New Brunswick, NJ)Beatmaker: Rokmore (Houston, TX)Beatboxer: Exacto (New York, NY)Paris, FranceDance: Ken Fury (New York, NY)MC: Def-i (Albuquerque, NM)DJ: Amore Querida (New York, NY)Aerosol: Danielle Mastrion (New York, NY)Taoyuan, TaiwanDance: Dez (Washington, DC)MC: Rah Digga (Newark, NJ)DJ: Rugged One (Somerville, MA)Aerosol: Jurne (Oakland, CA)Bulawayo, ZimbabweDance: Lady Beast (Boston, MA)MC: Dee-1 (Boston, MA)DJ: Nick Neutronz (New York, NY)Beatmaker: Krithi (New York, NY)Auckland, New ZealandDancer: Lady Sol (Chicago, IL)MC: Dior Brown (Washington, DC)Beatmaker: SlopFunkDust (Tampa, FL)Aerosol: MAST (San Francisco, CA)For more information on the United States’ global efforts to promote peace and democracy through music, contact eca-press@state.gov.
- Promoting Accountability in Support of the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of StateThe United States is marking Human Rights Day and the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10th by taking actions to promote accountability for human rights abuses and violations.  Together, the Departments of State and the Treasury today have imposed visa restrictions and sanctions on 37 individuals in 13 countries.With today’s actions, the United States is addressing some of the most challenging and harmful forms of human rights abuses in the world, including those involving conflict-related sexual violence, forced labor, and transnational repression.  Our actions promote accountability for these heinous acts, especially in environments with poor adherence to the rule of law, and support members of vulnerable and marginalized populations including political dissidents, women, civil society leaders and activists, LGBTQI+ persons, and human rights defenders and environmental activists targeted by repressive governments.Many of today’s designations target individuals responsible for gender-based violence and the repression of women and girls globally, including county commissioners and a governor in South Sudan whose forces and militias are responsible for rape and Taliban leaders connected to restrictions on access to secondary education for women and Presidential Memorandum  issued by President Biden last year, which strengthens the use of financial, diplomatic, and legal tools to combat it.The Iranian regime continues to be one of the worst human rights offenders both at home and abroad.  Its abuses include the repression of dissidents and peaceful protestors through lethal force, arbitrary detention, and torture as well as the targeting of dissidents abroad through surveillance, intimidation, and lethal plotting.  The United States today designated two Iranian intelligence officers involved in recruiting individuals to plot against regime opponents in the United States, including current and former U.S. Government officials, as well as surveillance activities focused on religious sites, businesses, and other facilities.Additionally, the Department of State today issued the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA) Report to Congress, while Treasury is sanctioning two People’s Republic of China (PRC) government officials, including one under UHRPA, for their connection to serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang.  Concurrently, the Department of Homeland Security-led interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force is announcing the addition of three PRC entities to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Entity List.We are also revising, expanding, and issuing visa restriction policies for Zimbabwe, Syria, and Uganda to promote accountability for government officials and others involved in repression, human rights abuses, and other unacceptable acts.  In addition, earlier this week, I determined that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed war crimes, and that members of the RSF and allied militias have committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur.Finally, to reinforce the impact of our designations today of four criminal gang leaders in Haiti involved in human rights abuses, including sexual violence, and of five DRC armed group leaders, we nominated these individuals for UN Security Council designations.  The designations of Haitian criminal gang leaders complement previous U.S. government efforts to disrupt criminal activity in Haiti, including a State Department Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program reward offer of up to $1 million and $2 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Joseph Wilson and Vitel’homme Innocent, respectively.Our actions to promote respect for human rights are stronger and more durable when done in concert with allies committed to the international rules-based order.  We are taking our sanctions actions today in coordination with the United Kingdom and with Canada, each of which has taken similar measures to deter human rights abuses globally. The United States will continue to use all available tools to promote accountability and signal our strong support for human rights and fundamental freedoms.The Department of State imposed visa restrictions pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Div. K, P.L. 117-328), as carried forward by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. A, P.L. 118-15) and pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as well as designations pursuant to Executive Order 13224.  The Department of the Treasury actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, UHRPA, as well as other sanctions authorities.  For more information, see the Department of State’s Report to Congress on the Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the UHRPA of 2020, P.L. 116-145 and fact sheet, Treasury’s press release, and the Department of Homeland Security press release.
- Promoting Accountability in Support of the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Office of the SpokespersonOn Human Rights Day and the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Department of State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security, is taking actions to promote accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses.  State is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on four individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act, 11 individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, designating one People’s Republic of China (PRC) individual pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA), and designating two ISIS-DRC leaders pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. On Human Rights Day and the 75th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Department of State, in coordination with the Departments of the Treasury and Homeland Security, is taking actions to promote accountability for perpetrators of human rights abuses.  State is taking steps to impose visa restrictions on four individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act, 11 individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, designating one People’s Republic of China (PRC) individual pursuant to the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (UHRPA), and designating two ISIS-DRC leaders pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.  Treasury is designating 20 individuals pursuant to E.O. 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, as well as E.O. 13667, E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671, and E.O. 13664.  These actions also implement the Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.  Homeland Security is also adding three PRC-based companies to the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act (UFLPA) Entity list.AfghanistanTreasury is designating two individuals for serious human rights abuse related to the restriction of access to secondary education for women and girls in Afghanistan, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Fariduddin Mahmood is a member of the Taliban’s so-called “cabinet” that made decisions to close education centers and schools to women and girls after the sixth grade. Mahmood serves as the so-called “head of the Afghanistan Academy of Sciences” and supported the education-related bans on women and girls.Khalid Hanafi serves as the so-called “Minister” for the so-called “Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” (MPVPV). Since August 2021, members of the MPVPV have engaged in serious human rights abuse, including abductions, whippings, and beatings.  Members of the MPVPV have assaulted people protesting the restrictions on women’s activity, including access to education. Central African Republic (CAR)Treasury is designating three individuals contributing to ongoing instability in the CAR pursuant to E.O. 13667.Jean-Francis Bozize Jr., a CAR national and son of former CAR President Francois Bozize, has moved weapons and ammunition from neighboring countries into CAR for the Coalition for the Patriots of Change (CPC), a rebel group that has recruited child soldiers and perpetrated sexual violence.Mahamat Salleh (Salleh), a CAR national, is a CPC commander and a former zone commander for the CPC-affiliated group, the Popular Front for the Rebirth of CAR, who has raped girls and forced them into sexual slavery.Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)State is designating two ISIS-DRC (aka Allied Democratic Forces) leaders pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for their leadership roles.  ISIS-DRC, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist, has committed numerous abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law against women and children, including involving killing, maiming, and sexual violence.Mohamed Ali Nkalubo (aka Meddie Nkalubo), a Ugandan national, is an ISIS-DRC senior advisor and deputy to ISIS-DRC&#8217;s overall leader, Musa Baluku. Nkalubo served as a communication conduit to ISIS-Core senior leaders and is responsible for disseminating ISIS propaganda in central Africa.  Nkalubo oversees ISIS-DRC attack planning and training and has personally participated in numerous attack operations, such as training the suicide bomber that conducted the April 7, 2022, attack at a bar in the Katindo military camp in Goma, North Kivu, DRC; building an explosive device that was detonated on February 5, 2022, in a market in Beni, North Kivu, killing and injuring several people; and directing the October 23, 2021, attack of a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda.Ahmed Mahamud Hassan Aliyani, a Tanzanian national, is an ISIS-DRC commander. Hassan Aliyani oversees the facilitation of foreign fighters traveling into the DRC to join the group.  Hassan Aliyani has also led attack planning for ISIS-DRC, including the June 16, 2023, attack on the Lhubiriha Secondary School in Uganda and the January 15, 2023, attack on a Pentecostal church in Kasindi, DRC.Treasury is designating three individuals contributing to ongoing instability in the DRC pursuant to E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671.William Yakutumba, a DRC national, is the founder, military commander, and political leader of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba militia and the National Coalition of the People for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC), a coalition of several armed groups in South Kivu province, DRC, that has attacked civilians and humanitarian actors. Through his role as leader of the Mai-Mai Yakutumba militia and CNPSC, Yakutumba has been involved in the commission of rape, mass rape, and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence.Willy Ngoma is the military spokesperson for the March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group that has perpetrated human rights abuses, including killings, attacks, and sexual violence against civilians. On November 29, 2022, M23 conducted a series of killings in the town of Kisheshe in North Kivu province, DRC, where M23 combatants systematically looted civilian property and raped several women.Michel Rukunda, a DRC national, is the commander and overall military leader of the armed group Twirwaneho. Under Rukunda’s leadership, Twirwaneho has recruited children as young as 12 years of age to guard military positions, carry out patrols, gather intelligence, participate in combat operations, act as personal escorts, or work as domestic aids in military camps.  Twirwaneho has conducted attacks against civilians, including at an internally displaced person camp, and has looted and burned several houses and a medical facility.On December 4, the United States also nominated these individuals for designation at the United Nations (UN) pursuant to resolution 1807 (2008) concerning the DRC.   HaitiTreasury is designating four individuals for each being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly or indirectly engaged in serious human rights abuse, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Johnson “Izo” André, leader of criminal gang “5 Segond,” is wanted by the Haitian National Police for assassination, kidnapping for ransom, illegal possession of firearms, hijacking of freight trucks, and criminal conspiracy. André and his gang have been identified by survivors as being directly responsible for 1,035 documented cases of sexual violence in 2022 alone.Renel Destina, leader of criminal gang “Grand Ravine,” is a key ally of André, and has committed kidnappings as well as killings, robberies, rapes, looting and burning of residences, and continuous attacks against Haitian police officers. Destina has been indicted on charges of hostage taking by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for kidnapping U.S. citizens for ransom in February 2021.Vitel’homme Innocent, leader of criminal gang “Kraze Baryé,” has been indicted by the DOJ for his role in the armed kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Haiti in October 2022. The Department of State has a reward offer of up to $2 million under the Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program for information leading to his arrest and/or conviction when he was added to the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted Fugitives List  November 7, 2023.Wilson Joseph, leader of criminal gang “400 Mawozo,” has been indicted by the DOJ for his role in the armed kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Haiti in October 2022. State has a reward offer of up $1 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of Wilson Joseph.On December 1, the United States also nominated these individuals for designation at the UN under Security Council resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti.IndonesiaState is designating two individuals pursuant to Section 7031(c).Terbit Rencana Pergangin-Angin, Former Regent of Langkat, Indonesia. He is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely the forced labor of boys and men.Hartomo, Former Official of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. He is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely extrajudicial killing.IranTreasury is designating two Iranian intelligence officers for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, pursuant to E.O. 13553.Majid Dastjani FarahaniMohammad Mahdi Khanpour ArdestaniBoth Farahani and Ardestani have recruited individuals for various operations in the United States, to include lethal targeting of current and former U.S. Government officials as revenge for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani. Farahani and Ardestani also recruited individuals for surveillance activities focused on religious sites, businesses, and other facilities in the U.S.LiberiaTreasury is designating one individual in connection to serious human rights abuse and corruption, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Jefferson Koijee, the mayor of Monrovia and a senior leader in the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) political party. Koijee has a reputation for stoking violence and has a powerful grip on Monrovia’s youth.  Koijee controls paramilitary-like groups associated with the CDC which allegedly recruit former combatants and recently released prisoners.  Koijee and his supporters have been involved in violence in connection with an opposition rally in July 2022, a memorial service for former Liberian president Amos Sawyer in March 2022 attended by students, an anti-rape protest in August 2020, a student graduation ceremony in December 2019, and an opposition rally in November 2018.  Koijee also engaged in corrupt acts, including bribery and misappropriation of state assets for use by private political movements and pressuring anti-corruption investigators to halt all corruption investigations.People’s Republic of China (PRC)State submitted the “Report to Congress on the Imposition of Sanctions Pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, P.L. 116-145,” which identified two PRC government officials responsible for their connection to ongoing serious human rights abuses in Xinjiang.  Treasury is concurrently sanctioning the two PRC government officials identified in the report.  Gao Qi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 and UHRPA.  Hu Lianhe is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818, in support of UHRPA objectives.Gao Qi formerly served as the leader of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (Yili Prefecture) Public Security Bureau, an organization subordinate to the previously designated Xinjiang Public Security Bureau (XPSB), and as Yili Prefecture’s vice governor. Since June 2018, public security officials in Yili Prefecture have engaged in a range of serious human rights abuses.  State is concurrently designating Gao under Section 7031(c) for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.Hu Lianhe has served as the Deputy Office Director for the Xinjiang Work Coordination Small Group of the Central Committee (XWCSG), which has been instrumental in shaping and implementing Xinjiang policies. As a part of its core role in setting policy in Xinjiang, the XWCSG engaged in direct and close involvement in the PRC’s March 2017 “XUAR De-Extremification Regulation,” and its October 2018 revision, which provided the framework for Xinjiang’s “de-extremification” through re-education campaign.  The regulation created a presumptive legal basis for Xinjiang’s re-education internment campaign in the eyes of the PRC government.  Hu was designated under Section 7031(c) in 2021 for his involvement in a gross violation of human rights, namely the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.The Department of Homeland Security-led interagency task force Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force determined that the following entities meet the criteria of Section 2(d)(2)(B)(ii) of the UFLPA.  Specifically, they are working with the government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.COFCO Sugar Holding Co., LtdSichuan Jingweida Technology Group Co., LtdAnhui Xinya New Materials Co., LtdRussiaState is designating one individual pursuant to Section 7031(c).Ivan A. Ryabov is a police officer at Brateyevo Police Station in Moscow. Ryabov is being designated for his involvement in gross violations of human rights, namely torture and/or the cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of Russian anti-war demonstrators who marched in opposition to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.South SudanTreasury is designating three individuals for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan pursuant to E.O. 13664.Gordon Koang Biel, the Koch County Commissioner.Gatluak Nyang Hoth, the Mayendit County Commissioner.Joseph Mantiel Wajang, the Unity State Governor.Between February and April 2022, government-aligned forces and allied militias under Biel and Hoth’s command committed rape, often accompanied by other human rights abuses, against women and girls during armed attacks in Leer County of Unity State.  Wajang, appointed Biel and Hoth as county commissioners, and was aware of the attacks by their forces.SudanOn December 6, the Secretary of State announced his determination that members of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have committed war crimes, that members of the RSF and allied militias have committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur, and that members of the Sudanese Armed Forces have committed war crimes.  The ongoing atrocities in Sudan are reminiscent of the Darfur genocide almost 20 years ago, and it is imperative the world’s attention remain focused on the unfolding human rights calamity in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.SyriaPursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, State is issuing an expanded visa restriction policy for current or former Syrian government officials or other individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in:The repression of Syrians, especially through violence, including serious human rights abuses in Syria; arbitrary expropriation of property or other abuses related to housing, land, and property rights in Syria; obstruction, disruption, or prevention of efforts to promote a political solution to the conflict in Syria; and forcible repatriation of refugees or other persons to Syria.The production or trafficking of the amphetamine-type stimulant captagon from Syria.The immediate family of such persons may also be subject to visa restrictions under this policy.State is pursuing visa restrictions against 11 Syrian officials and other individuals pursuant to this policy.UgandaTreasury is designating one individual for having been a leader of an entity that has engaged in serious human rights abuses, pursuant to E.O. 13818.Johnson Byabashaija has served as the Commissioner General of the Uganda Prisons Service (UPS) since 2005. During that period, members of the UPS have engaged in torture, including of government critics and LGBTQI+ persons, held within UPS facilities.On December 4, State also announced an expanded visa restriction policy, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that can be used to restrict visa issuance to current or former Ugandan government officials or other individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic process in Uganda or for policies or actions aimed at repressing members of marginalized or vulnerable populations.  Those vulnerable populations include, but are not limited to, environmental activists, human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTQI+ persons, and civil society organizers.ZimbabweOn December 4, State announced a visa restriction policy, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, that can be used to restrict visa issuance to individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic process in Zimbabwe.  Such acts may include manipulating or rigging the electoral process; disenfranchising voters or preventing individuals from exercising their right to vote; excluding members of the political opposition from electoral processes; restricting the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to operate and engage in democratic, governance, or human rights related activities; or intimidation of voters, election observers, or CSOs through threats or acts of physical violence.  They may also include engaging in corrupt acts, including bribery, that undermine the electoral process; interfering with the independent operation of the judiciary during its adjudication of electoral cases; or abusing or violating human rights in Zimbabwe.Financial Sanctions ImplicationsAs a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above, pursuant to E.O. 13224, E.O. 13818, E.O. 13667, E.O. 13413 as amended by E.O. 13671, E.O. 13664, and UHRPA that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.In addition, all entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
- Visa Restriction Policy for Undermining Democracy in Zimbabwe HomeThe Secretary of State Remarks &amp; Releases&#8230;Visa Restriction Policy for Undermining Democracy in Zimbabwe				hide		if(window.jQuery) {		jQuery( document ).ready(function() {			if (jQuery(".bc_middle").hasClass("collapse")) {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});				jQuery(".bc_hide").click(function(){					jQuery(".bc_hide").toggleClass("visible");					jQuery(".bc_middle").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_ellipse").toggle();					jQuery(".bc_content").toggleClass("noflex");					jQuery(".block_breadcrumbs_content").toggleClass("noflex");				});			} else {				jQuery(".bc_ellipse").hide();			}		});	}																										Visa Restriction Policy for Undermining Democracy in Zimbabwe																																		Press Statement																														December 4, 2023																																							I am announcing today a new visa restriction policy for undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. Under this policy, the United States will pursue visa restrictions, pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, for individuals believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. Such acts may include manipulating or rigging the electoral process; disenfranchising voters or preventing individuals from exercising their right to vote; excluding members of the political opposition from electoral processes; restricting the ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to operate and engage in democratic, governance, or human rights related activities; or intimidation of voters, election observers, or CSOs through threats or acts of physical violence. They may also include engaging in corrupt acts, including bribery, that undermine the electoral process; interfering with the independent operation of the judiciary during its adjudication of electoral cases; or abusing or violating human rights in Zimbabwe. Family members of such persons may also be subject to these restrictions. Anyone who undermines the democratic process in Zimbabwe—including in the lead-up to, during, and following Zimbabwe’s August 2023 elections—may be found ineligible for U.S. visas under this policy.The visa restriction policy will apply to specific individuals involved in these acts, and is not directed at the Zimbabwean people. The United States supports Zimbabweans’ aspirations to have free and fair elections that reflect the will of the people and strengthen democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights.						Tags																													Africa																															Bureau of African Affairs																								Bureau of Consular Affairs																								Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor																																Consular Issues																																																					Human Rights and Democracy																															Office of the Spokesperson																								The Secretary of State																																Visas																															Zimbabwe