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REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT: ASSESSING THE 

PATH FORWARD FOR THE TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Serial No. 114–36 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

JOHN KATKO, New York, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KRISTA P. HARVEY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

VACANCY, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security ....... 1 

The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Honorable John Roth, Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Honorable Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

List ........................................................................................................................ 39

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman John Katko for Peter Neffenger ............................... 45 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Peter Neffenger ... 50 

Questions From Honorable William R. Keating for Peter Neffenger .................. 52 

Questions From Chairman John Katko for John Roth ......................................... 53 

(1) 

REFORM AND IMPROVEMENT: ASSESSING 

THE PATH FORWARD FOR THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Thursday, October 8, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:13 p.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko [Chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Katko, Carter, Rice, Keating, and 

Thompson. 

Mr. KATKO. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 

on Transportation Security will come to order. The subcommittee 

is meeting today to hear testimony on assessing the future of the 

Transportation Security Administration. I now recognize myself for 

an opening statement. 

I would like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing and I am 

pleased to have Inspector General Roth back once again and Administrator Neffenger again back here as well. The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine TSA’s challenges and identify what 

changes TSA needs to make in order to move forward in an effective manner. 

TSA was created out of a tragedy and was quickly stood up to 

address major security vulnerabilities that terrorists exploited. 

However, 14 years after 9/11, we now have an agency that has had 

many missteps in its efforts to keep the traveling public safe. 

Inspector General Roth, your office has conducted over 100 audits identifying major security vulnerabilities and organizational 

challenges throughout TSA, including the most recent reports that 

found that TSA passenger screening was allegedly wrong 96 percent of the time. And that 73 aviation workers had potential ties 

to terrorism. Of course, there is also the recent cases involving 

drug trafficking incidents in airports at Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles International, and Oakland, to name a few involving employees. These figures are startling and shatter the public confidence. 

I look forward to hearing from you today about what systemic 

problems you have identified and what needs to be done to help 

TSA address these challenges. 

What is most unfortunate is that these startling findings by both 

your office, and the Government Accountability Office, as well as 

the FBI and other agencies, are not isolated instances. Many of 
2 

these vulnerabilities have been identified and known for years, and 

unfortunately, prior to this year the previous leadership in both 

TSA and DHS did not take the appropriate steps to address these 

known security vulnerabilities. The purpose of today’s hearing is 

not to look backwards, however. 

With new leadership, Administrator Neffenger, you have an opportunity to address these challenges head on, and lead TSA in a 

different path, and I am confident that you will do so. In our discussions you have been frank, straightforward, and sincere and I 

appreciate that. I have full confidence that you are tackling TSA’s 

challenges with an open mind. I look forward to hearing from you 

today about how we can work together to ensure TSA fulfills its 

critical mission. 

This subcommittee has worked tirelessly and in an overwhelmingly bipartisan manner to address the challenges that TSA faces. 

Since the start of this Congress we have had 7 pieces of legislation 

pass the House, which is remarkable out of this committee, and 2 

of those bills are now public laws. However, there is no silver bullet 

to address all of the challenges that TSA faces, and unfortunately, 

we have to be right 100 percent of the time and the terrorists have 

to be right just once. 

With nearly 2 million passengers being screened every day we 

need to do more to better focus our efforts on those passengers that 

are unknown while still taking precautions to protect against the 

insider threat. 

Currently, less than 5 percent of travellers participate in 

PreCheck. TSA needs to increase this population so that it can target its efforts and resources in a more risk-based manner. That is 

why I introduced H.R. 2843, the PreCheck Expansion Act. This bill 

will help TSA to take steps to effectively and robustly market the 

program and dramatically increase the enrollment. However, in addition to expanding PreCheck, TSA must look at what additional 

efforts are necessary to increase the security effectiveness of 

PreCheck and what measures are necessary to mitigate the insider 

threat. 

This week the House passed H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015. This legislation which I introduced earlier this year requires TSA to consult with Federal and 

private-sector partners to review existing employee screening protocols and work in a comprehensive manner to improve the effectiveness of access controls at airports across the United States. It is 

a major undertaking. 

We must do a better job at knowing more about the people who 

work and travel through our Nation’s airports. Securing our Nation’s transportation systems is of vital importance to both our National security, and our economic strength, and stability. 

In the 9/11 Commission report, the then head of the CIA, George 

Tenet was quoted as saying, ‘‘The system was blinking red,’’ in the 

months leading up to 9/11. We cannot stand idly by and grant tacit 

approval to lax security measures when we have the authority, responsibility, and indeed the duty to spur action and keep the traveling public safe from harm. 

Inspector General Roth, Administrator Neffenger, this committee 

wants to support both of you in your efforts to reform TSA. We look 
3 

forward to hearing from you today. You are not on opposite sides 

of the fence. I view you both on the same side of the fence: One 

exposing the problems, the other one making sure they get fixed. 

That is why you are both here today. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, 

the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice for an opening statement. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this hearing. I would also like to thank the witnesses for 

being here today to discuss the need for and status of reforms and 

improvements within the TSA. 

Administrator Neffenger, I understand you had to adjust your 

schedule in order to testify before this subcommittee today and I 

want to tell you how much we appreciate that. While you have only 

been in this position since June, you have demonstrate a true commitment to work constructively with us as you take on the challenges facing TSA and I thank you for that. 

Finally, I want to thank Inspector General Roth for being here 

today and for the work you have done and continue to do, to identify vulnerabilities within TSA and advise us on what we can do 

to enhance the security of our commercial aviation sector. Your 

most recent report which is Classified, concerns covert tests conducted by undercover DHS investigators who attempted to smuggle 

prohibited items, including weapons and mock explosives past TSA 

security checkpoints. As we all know the results of these covert 

tests were leaked to the media in June before the report was complete, and it was reported that in 67 out of 70 tests, TSA failed to 

detect these items and allowed the investigators to proceed past 

the checkpoint. 

Sixty-seven out of 70, that is 96 percent of the time. I think we 

can all agree that 96 percent is an alarming figure, and one that 

we cannot overlook. We have to assess all of the findings and recommendations in your report. We have to shine a light on the 

vulnerabilities that these covert tests have exposed, and we have 

to take action to eliminate those vulnerabilities. 

We know that the threats to this country, particularly to our 

aviation sector, are constant. They are real. We know those threats 

are evolving and becoming more sophisticated, but the people who 

want to do us harm are always on the watch for a new way in, a 

new way to beat the system. That is why we have to be even more 

vigilant. That is why we conduct these tests. Because we know that 

no matter how good our security might be, it can be better. It can 

always be better and the findings in this report make it clear that 

it can and must be much better in order to match the threats that 

we face today. 

So I am eager to hear how our witnesses are working together 

to act on these findings, to implement reforms, and to close the 

gaps that these covert tests uncovered. 

Obviously, as we all know, Administrator Neffenger, you have 

only been in your position for a few months. Many of the topics and 

reports that Inspector General Roth has compiled pre-date your 

time at TSA, but I certainly look forward to hearing what TSA is 

doing in response to this most recent report, and if Inspector General Roth has previously identified other security gaps or 
4 

vulnerabilities that TSA must still address, I would like to learn 

about those efforts as well. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I 

look forward to productive dialogue today. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

[The statement of Miss Rice follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER KATHLEEN RICE

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Administrator Neffenger, while you’ve only been in this position since June, 

you’ve demonstrated a real commitment to work constructively with us as you take 

on the challenges facing TSA, and I thank you for that. 

Finally, I want to thank Inspector General Roth for being here today and for the 

work you have done and continue to do to identify vulnerabilities within TSA and 

advise us on what we can do to enhance the security of our commercial aviation sector. 

Your most recent report, which is Classified, concerns covert tests conducted by 

undercover DHS investigators who attempted to smuggle prohibited items—including weapons and mock explosives—past TSA airport security checkpoints. 

As we all know, the results of these covert tests were leaked to the media in June, 

before the report was complete, and it was reported that in 67 out of 70 tests, TSA 

failed to detect these items and allowed the investigators to proceed past the checkpoint. Sixty-seven out of 70—that’s 96 percent. 

I think we can all agree that 96 percent is an alarming figure, and one that we 

cannot overlook. 

We have to assess all of the findings and recommendations in your report, we 

have to shine a light on the vulnerabilities that these covert tests have exposed, and 

we have to take action to eliminate those vulnerabilities. 

We know that the threats to this country, particularly to our aviation sector, are 

constant. We know those threats are evolving and becoming more sophisticated, that 

the people who want to do us harm are always on the watch for a new way in, a 

new way to beat the system. 

That’s why we have to be even more vigilant, that’s why we conduct these tests— 

because we know that no matter how good our security might be, it can be better. 

It can always be better—and the findings in this report make it clear that it can 

and must be much better in order to match the threats we face today. 

So I’m eager to hear how our witnesses are working together to act on these findings, implement reforms, and close the gaps that these covert tests uncovered. 

I know that Administrator Neffenger has been in his position for only a few 

months, and that many of the topics and reports that Inspector General Roth has 

compiled pre-date the administrator’s time at TSA. 

But I certainly look forward to hearing what TSA is doing in response to this most 

recent report. And if Inspector General Roth has previously identified other security 

gaps or vulnerabilities that TSA must still address, I would like to learn about those 

efforts as well. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Miss Rice. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the 

full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for 

any statement he may have. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Katko and 

Ranking Member Rice, for holding today’s hearing. Also, I welcome 

the administrator and the Inspector General for their appearance 

also. 

Throughout this Congress, this committee has voiced its concern 

with the state of security within the commercial aviation sector. 

Over the span of recent years, both Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office, have compiled numerous reports 

that detail mismanagement, inefficiencies, and vulnerabilities within TSA. These reports range from vulnerabilities associated with 

granting expedited screening via the use of Secure Flight and Man-
5 

aged Inclusion, to vulnerabilities associated with access to secure 

areas of airports, and the tracking of maintenance for security-related technologies within airports. 

Most recently, the Inspector General released a report Covert 

Testing of TSA’s Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes 

at Airport Security Checkpoints. Details of this Classified report 

were leaked this summer and the Inspector General has given a 

briefing on the final report to this subcommittee. While I look forward to hearing the status of solutions that TSA and DHS are implementing to ensure that any security gaps associated with checkpoint screening and technologies are secure, our main concern is 

that TSA will continue to purchase more technologies that address 

the threats of yesterday instead of the threats of tomorrow. 

Consequently, the Transportation Security Administration Reform and Improvement Act of 2015, a bill that recently passed the 

committee, includes language that aims to aid in the development 

and innovative security technologies through a program that would 

create public and private-sector partnerships to help businesses, 

particularly small businesses, to commercialize these innovative 

technologies. While that amendment is designed to improve the 

technologies TSA uses, I still have concerns about some of TSA’s 

other screening programs the Inspector General has found ineffective. 

For example, the Inspector General has found that TSA’s behavioral detection program commonly referred to as SPOT is a magnet 

for racial profiling, and TSA has little evidence that the program 

is an effective tool for screening passengers. We know that terrorists span all races, in all ethnicities, and have a profiling mechanism as a means of security is skeptical. Once again, I ask the administrator to review its efficiency of the behavioral detection program. 

While the administrator appeared before the committee on July 

1, I, along with many of my colleagues across the aisle, stated that 

we would give him appropriate time to address some of these glaring concerns at TSA. So Mr. Administrator, we are glad to have 

you. I would assume the honeymoon is about over, and we can 

move forward. So I look forward to your testimony and I yield back. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Throughout this Congress, this committee has voiced its concerns with the state 

of security within the commercial aviation sector. Over the span of recent years, 

both the Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office have compiled 

numerous reports that detail mismanagement, inefficiencies, and vulnerabilities 

within TSA. 

These reports range from vulnerabilities associated with granting expedited 

screening via the use of Secure Flight and Managed Inclusion, to vulnerabilities associated with access to the secure areas of airports and the tracking of maintenance 

for security-related technologies within airports. 

Most recently, the Inspector General released a report, ‘‘Covert Testing of TSA’s 

Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes at Airport Security Checkpoints.’’ 

Details of this Classified report were leaked this summer, and the Inspector General 

has given a briefing on the final report to the subcommittee. 

While I look forward to hearing the status of solutions that TSA and DHS are 

implementing to ensure that any security gaps associated with checkpoint screening 

and technologies are secure, I remain concerned that TSA will continue to purchase 
6 

more technologies that address the threats of yesterday instead of the threats of tomorrow. 

Consequently, the ‘‘Transportation Security Administration Reform and Improvement Act of 2015’’ a bill that recently passed the committee includes language that 

aims to aid in the development of innovative security technologies through a program that would create public and private-sector partnerships to help businesses, 

particularly small businesses, to commercialize these innovative technologies. 

And while that amendment is designed to improve the technologies TSA uses, I 

still have concerns about some of TSAs other screening programs the Inspector General has found ineffective. For example, the Inspector General has found that TSA’s 

behavioral detection program, commonly known as SPOT, is a magnet for racial 

profiling and TSA has little evidence that the program is an effective tool for screening passengers. 

We know that terrorists span all races and ethnicities and having a profiling 

mechanism as a means of security is skeptical. Once again, I ask the administrator 

to review its efficacy of behavioral detection programs. 

When the administrator appeared before the committee in July, I, along with my 

colleagues across the aisle, stated that we would give him appropriate time to address some of the glaring concerns at TSA. It is unrealistic to expect sweeping reforms to have been made in such a short amount of time, and I want to express 

my appreciation for the administrator’s agreeing with Congress that the Managed 

Inclusion program was flawed and needed to be phased out. 

Even though the Inspector General’s reports have been scathing, I am optimistic 

that the culture of TSA and the willingness to take the recommendations from these 

reports and implement reforms is improving. 

I am interested in hearing how these entities work together to take the issues 

found within these investigations and audits and use them to create solutions that 

will keep the traveling public safe. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Other Members of the 

committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have a group of distinguished witnesses before 

us today, as I mentioned, to speak on this important topic, and are 

no strangers to this subcommittee. Let me remind the witnesses 

that their entire written statements will appear in the record. 

Our first witness is The Honorable John Roth, who currently 

serves as Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his appointment as Inspector General, Mr. Roth 

served as the director of the Office of Criminal Investigations at 

the Food and Drug Administration, was chief of staff to the Deputy 

Attorney General and worked at the Narcotic and Dangerous 

Drugs Section, which is the best section in all of the Department 

of Justice. Am I right? 

Mr. ROTH. You are close, yes. 

Mr. KATKO. Because we both worked there. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Roth to testify. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko, Ranking Member 

Rice, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me 

here to testify today. 

Throughout this year I have testified before this subcommittee 

and others regarding TSA’s ability to execute its important mission. I highlighted the challenges that TSA faced. I testified that 

these challenges were in almost every area of TSA’s operations. Its 

problematic implementation of risk assessment rules, including its 

management of TSA PreCheck, failures in passenger and baggage 
7 

screen operations, TSA’s control over access to secure areas including management of its access badge program, its management of 

the Workforce Integrity program, its oversight over acquisition and 

maintenance of screening equipment, and other issues that we 

have discovered in the course of over 115 audits and inspection reports. 

These issues were exacerbated, in my judgment, by a culture 

that developed over time which resisted oversight and was unwilling to accept the need for change in the face of an evolving and serious threat. We have been writing reports highlighting some of 

these problems for years without an acknowledgment by TSA of the 

need to correct its deficiencies. However, we may be in a very different place now than we were then. I am hopeful that Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new attitude about oversight. 

Ensuring transportation safety is a massive and complex problem 

and there is no single silver bullet to solve it. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort. 

The first step, however, in fixing this problem is having the courage to critically assess the deficiencies in an honest and objective 

light, creating a culture of change within TSA, and giving the TSA 

workforce the ability to identify and address risks will be the administrator’s most critical and challenging task. I believe that the 

Department and TSA leadership has begun that process of critical 

self-evaluation and aided by the workforce at TSA are in a position 

to address some of these issues. As you noted, we have just completed and distributed a report on our most recent round of covert 

testing of TSA’s checkpoint operations. The results, while Classified, were disappointing. 

Our testing was designed to check test point operations in realworld conditions. The failures included failures in technology, failures in TSA procedures, and human error. We found layers of security simply missing. But these results were not unexpected. We had 

conducted other covert testing in the past with similar results. 

TSA has put forward a plan consistent with our recommendation 

to improve checkpoint quality in three areas: Technology, personnel, and procedures. This plan is appropriate because the checkpoint must be considered as a single system. The most effective 

technology is useless without the right personnel, and the personnel need to be guided by the appropriate procedures. Unless all 

three elements are operating efficiently, the checkpoint will not be 

effective. 

We will be monitoring TSA’s efforts to increase the effectiveness 

of checkpoint operations and will continue to conduct covert testing. Consistent with our obligations under the Inspector General 

Act, we will report our results to this committee, as well as other 

committees of jurisdiction. 

While this audit focused on the checkpoint, effective checkpoint 

operations in and of themselves are not enough. We must also look 

at other areas to determine vulnerabilities. We have done considerable work on TSA’s assessment of passenger risk, and have registered our concern about TSA’s use of Managed Inclusion and risk 

rules that were not based on an individual assessment of passenger 

risk. I am pleased to report that TSA has phased out its use of 

Managed Inclusion. However, we still have outstanding rec-
8 

ommendations regarding the risk assessment rules that TSA continues to use. I urge the administrator to consider whether or not 

those risk rules are effective and ensure the safety of the transportation public. 

TSA also has the responsibility to oversee and regulate airport 

security provided by airport authorities. For example, in the case 

of airport worker vetting, TSA relies on airports to submit a complete and accurate aviation worker application data for vetting. In 

a recent audit we found that TSA does not ensure that airports 

have a robust verification process for criminal history, and authorization to work in the United States, or sufficiently track the results of their review. TSA also did not have an adequate monitoring process in place to ensure that airport operators properly adjudicated applicants’ criminal histories. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome 

any questions that you or other Members of the committee may 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our work on the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA). Our reviews have given us a perspective on the obstacles facing TSA in carrying out an important—but incredibly difficult—mission 

to protect the Nation’s transportation systems and ensure freedom of movement for 

people and commerce. 

Throughout this year, I have testified—before this subcommittee and others—regarding my concerns about TSA’s ability to execute its important mission. I highlighted the challenges TSA faced. I testified that these challenges were in almost 

every area of TSA’s operations: Its problematic implementation of risk assessment 

rules, including its management of TSA PreCheck; failures in passenger and baggage screening operations, discovered in part through our covert testing program; 

TSA’s controls over access to secure areas, including management of its access 

badge program; its management of the workforce integrity program; TSA’s oversight 

over its acquisition and maintenance of screening equipment; and other issues we 

have discovered in the course of over 115 audit and inspection reports. 

My remarks were described as ‘‘unusually blunt testimony from a Government 

witness,’’ and I will confess that it was. However, those remarks were born of frustration that TSA was assessing risk inappropriately and did not have the ability to 

perform basic management functions in order to meet the mission the American 

people expect of it. These issues were exacerbated, in my judgment, by a culture, 

developed over time, which resisted oversight and was unwilling to accept the need 

for change in the face of an evolving and serious threat. We have been writing reports highlighting some of these problems for years without an acknowledgment by 

TSA of the need to correct its deficiencies. 

We may be in a very different place than we were in May. I am hopeful that Administrator Neffenger brings with him a new attitude about oversight. Ensuring 

transportation safety is a massive and complex problem, and there is no silver bullet 

to solve it. It will take a sustained and disciplined effort. However, the first step 

in fixing a problem is having the courage to critically assess the deficiencies in an 

honest and objective light. Creating a culture of change within TSA, and giving the 

TSA workforce the ability to identify and address risks without fear of retribution, 

will be the new administrator’s most critical and challenging task. 

I believe that the Department and TSA leadership have begun the process of critical self-evaluation and, aided by the dedicated workforce of TSA, are in a position 

to begin addressing some of these issues. I am hopeful that the days of TSA sweeping its problems under the rug and simply ignoring the findings and recommendations of the OIG and GAO are coming to an end. 

I have been gratified by the Department’s response and believe that this episode 

serves as an illustration of the value of the Office of Inspector General, particularly 
9 

when coupled with a Department leadership that understands and appreciates objective and independent oversight. 

OUR MOST RECENT COVERT TESTING

We have just completed and distributed our report on our most recent round of 

covert testing. The results are classified at the Secret level, and the Department and 

this committee have been provided a copy of our Classified report. TSA justifiably 

classifies at the Secret level the validated test results; any analysis, trends, or comparison of the results of our testing; and specific vulnerabilities uncovered during 

testing. Additionally, TSA considers other information protected from disclosure as 

Sensitive Security Information. 

While I cannot talk about the specifics in this setting, I am able to say that we 

conducted the audit with sufficient rigor to satisfy the standards contained within 

the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, that the tests were conducted by auditors within our Office of Audits without any special knowledge or 

training, and that the test results were disappointing and troubling. We ran multiple tests at 8 different airports of different sizes, including large Category X airports across the country, and tested airports using private screeners as part of the 

Screening Partnership Program. The results were consistent across every airport. 

Our testing was designed to test checkpoint operations in real-world conditions. 

It was not designed to test specific, discrete segments of checkpoint operations, but 

rather the system as a whole. The failures included failures in the technology, failures in TSA procedures, and human error. We found layers of security simply missing. It would be misleading to minimize the rigor of our testing, or to imply that 

our testing was not an accurate reflection of the effectiveness of the totality of aviation security. 

The results were not, however, unexpected. We had conducted other covert testing 

in the past: 

• In September 2014, we conducted covert testing of the checked baggage screening system and identified significant vulnerabilities in this area caused by 

human and technology based failures. We also determined that TSA did not 

have a process in place to assess or identify the cause for equipment-based test 

failures or the capability to independently assess whether deployed explosive 

detection systems are operating at the correct detection standards. We found 

that, notwithstanding an intervening investment of over $550 million, TSA had 

not improved checked baggage screening since our 2009 report on the same 

issue. (Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations, 

OIG–14–142, Sept. 2014) 

• In January 2012, we conducted covert testing of access controls to secure airport 

areas and identified significant access control vulnerabilities, meaning 

uncleared individuals could have unrestricted and unaccompanied access to the 

most vulnerable parts of the airport—the aircraft and checked baggage. (Covert 

Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas, OIG–12–26, Jan. 2012) 

• In 2011, we conducted covert penetration testing on the previous generation of 

AIT machines in use at the time; the testing was far broader than the most recent testing, and likewise discovered significant vulnerabilities. (Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology, OIG–12–06, Nov. 2011) 

THE DHS RESPONSE

The Department’s response to our most recent findings has been swift and definite. For example, within 24 hours of receiving preliminary results of OIG covert 

penetration testing, the Secretary summoned senior TSA leadership and directed 

that an immediate plan of action be created to correct deficiencies uncovered by our 

testing. Moreover, DHS has initiated a program—led by members of Secretary Johnson’s leadership team—to conduct a focused analysis on issues that the OIG has uncovered, as well as other matters. These efforts have already resulted in significant 

changes to TSA leadership, operations, training, and policy, although the specifics 

of most of those changes cannot be discussed in an open setting, and should, in any 

event, come from TSA itself. 

TSA has put forward a plan, consistent with our recommendations, to improve 

checkpoint quality in three areas: Technology, personnel, and procedures. This plan 

is appropriate because the checkpoint must be considered as a single system: The 

most effective technology is useless without the right personnel, and the personnel 

need to be guided by the appropriate procedures. Unless all three elements are operating effectively, the checkpoint will not be effective. 

We will be monitoring TSA’s efforts to increase the effectiveness of checkpoint operations and will continue to conduct covert testing. Consistent with our obligations 
10 

under the Inspector General Act, we will report our results to this subcommittee as 

well as other committees of jurisdiction. 

We have also been making significant progress on many outstanding recommendations from prior reports. 

TSA AND THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT

Nowhere is the asymmetric threat of terrorism more evident than in the area of 

aviation security. TSA cannot afford to miss a single, genuine threat without potentially catastrophic consequences, and yet a terrorist only needs to get it right once. 

Securing the civil aviation transportation system remains a formidable task—TSA 

is responsible for screening travelers and baggage for over 1.8 million passengers 

a day at 450 of our Nation’s airports. Complicating this responsibility is the constantly-evolving threat by adversaries willing to use any means at their disposal to 

incite terror. 

The dangers TSA must contend with are complex and not within its control. Recent media reports have indicated that some in the U.S. intelligence community 

warn terrorist groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) may be working to build the capability to carry out mass casualty attacks, a significant departure from—and posing a different type of threat—than simply encouraging lone-wolf attacks. According 

to these media reports, a mass casualty attack has become more likely in part because of a fierce competition with other terrorist networks: Being able to kill opponents on a large scale would allow terrorist groups such as ISIS to make a powerful 

showing. We believe such an act of terrorism would likely be designed to impact 

areas where people are concentrated and vulnerable, such as the Nation’s commercial aviation system. 

MERE INTELLIGENCE IS NOT ENOUGH

In the past, officials from TSA, in testimony to Congress, in speeches to think 

tanks, and elsewhere, have described TSA as an intelligence-driven organization. 

According to TSA, it continually assesses intelligence to develop countermeasures in 

order to enhance these multiple layers of security at airports and on-board aircraft. 

This is a necessary thing, but it is not sufficient. 

In the vast majority of the instances, the identities of those who commit terrorist 

acts were simply unknown to or misjudged by the intelligence community. Terrorism, especially suicide terrorism, depends on a cadre of newly-converted individuals who are often unknown to the intelligence community. Moreover, the threat of 

ISIS or al-Qaeda-inspired actors—those who have no formal ties to the larger organizations but who simply take inspiration from them—increases the possibilities of 

a terrorist actor being unknown to the intelligence community. 

Recent history bears this out: 

• 17 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were unknown to the intelligence community. In fact, many were recruited specifically because they were unknown to 

the intelligence community. 

• Richard Reid, the 2002 ‘‘shoe bomber,’’ was briefly questioned by the French police, but allowed to board an airplane to Miami. He had the high explosive 

PETN in his shoes, and but for the intervention of passengers and flight crew, 

risked bringing down the aircraft. 

• The Christmas day 2009 bomber, who was equipped with a sophisticated nonmetallic explosive device provided by al-Qaeda, was known to certain elements 

of the intelligence community but was not placed in the Terrorist Screening 

Database, on the Selectee List, or on the No-Fly List. A bipartisan Senate report found there were systemic failures across the intelligence community, 

which contributed to the failure to identify the threat posed by this individual. 

• The single most high-profile domestic terrorist attack since 9/11, the Boston 

Marathon bombing, was masterminded and carried out by Tamerlan Tsarnaev, 

an individual who approximately 2 years earlier was judged by the FBI not to 

pose a terrorist threat, and who was not within any active U.S. Government 

databases. 

Of course, there are instances in which intelligence can foil plots that screening 

cannot detect—such as the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, utilizing liquid explosives; the October 2010 discovery of U.S.-bound bombs concealed in printer cartridges on cargo planes in England and Dubai; and the 2012 discovery that a second 

generation nonmetallic device, designed for use on-board aircraft, had been produced. 

What this means is that there is no easy substitute for the checkpoint. The checkpoint must necessarily be intelligence-driven, but the nature of terrorism today 

means that each and every passenger must be screened in some way. 
11 

1 As an example of PreCheck’s vulnerabilities, we reported that, through risk assessment 

rules, a felon who had been imprisoned for multiple convictions for violent felonies while participating in a domestic terrorist group was granted expedited screening through PreCheck. 

BEYOND THE CHECKPOINT

Much of the attention has been focused on the checkpoint, since that is the primary and most visible means of entry onto aircraft. But effective checkpoint operations simply are not of themselves sufficient. Aviation security must also look at 

other areas to determine vulnerabilities. 

Assessment of passenger risk 

We applaud TSA’s efforts to use risk-based passenger screening because it allows 

TSA to focus on high-risk or unknown passengers instead of known, vetted passengers who pose less risk to aviation security. 

However, we have had deep concerns about some of TSA’s previous decisions 

about this risk. For example, we recently assessed the PreCheck initiative, which 

is used at about 125 airports to identify low-risk passengers for expedited airport 

checkpoint screening. Starting in 2012, TSA massively increased the use of 

PreCheck. Some of the expansion, for example allowing PreCheck to other Federal 

Government-vetted or known flying populations, such as those in the CBP Trusted 

Traveler Program, made sense. In addition, TSA continues to promote participation 

in PreCheck by passengers who apply, pay a fee, and undergo individualized security threat assessment vetting. I am encouraged by legislation, originating in this 

subcommittee, H.R. 2843, the TSA PreCheck Expansion Act, which I believe would 

further improve the use of PreCheck operations. 

However, we believe that TSA’s use of risk assessment rules, which granted expedited screening to broad categories of individuals unrelated to an individual assessment of risk, but rather on some questionable assumptions about relative risk based 

on other factors, created an unacceptable risk to aviation security.1 Additionally, 

TSA used ‘‘managed inclusion’’ for the general public, allowing random passengers 

access to PreCheck lanes with no assessment of risk. Additional layers of security 

TSA intended to provide, which were meant to compensate for the lack of risk assessment, were often simply not present. 

We made a number of recommendations as a result of several audits and inspections. Disappointingly, when the report was issued, TSA did not concur with the 

majority of our 17 recommendations. At the time, I testified that I believed this represented TSA’s failure to understand the gravity of the risk that they were assuming. I am pleased to report, however, that we have recently made significant 

progress in getting concurrence and compliance with these recommendations. 

For example, I am pleased to report that TSA’s practice of using Managed Inclusion has been eliminated. As you know, this subcommittee held a hearing on the 

issue of expedited screening in March, at which I expressed my significant concerns. 

TSA disagreed with that finding notwithstanding our recommendation and continued to use Managed Inclusion. Now, however, I am pleased to report that TSA has 

reversed its decision. 

However, that report still has an outstanding recommendation regarding the risk 

assessment rules to grant expedited screening through PreCheck lanes. Unfortunately, TSA continues to use these risk rules. 

There is pending legislation originating in this subcommittee, H.R. 3584—the 

Transportation Security Administration Reform and Improvement Act of 2015, which 

has been introduced—that would eliminate the practice. I urge the administrator to 

reconsider, in advance of the passage of this legislation, TSA’s non-concurrence with 

our recommendation and stop the practice. 

Access to secure areas 

TSA is responsible, in conjunction with the 450 airports across the country, to ensure that the secure areas of airports, including the ability to access aircraft and 

checked baggage, are truly secure. In our audit work, we have had reason to question whether that has been the case. We conducted covert testing in 2012 to see if 

auditors could get access to secure areas by a variety of means. While the results 

of those tests are Classified, they were similar to the other covert testing we have 

done, which was disappointing. 

Additionally, as we discuss below, TSA’s oversight of airports when it comes to 

employee screening needs to be improved. (TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted), OIG–15–98, June 2015) 

I have reviewed the work of this subcommittee as well, and am aware of the significant vulnerabilities that have been uncovered in the course of criminal investigations and this subcommittee’s hearings. We are encouraged by the introduction of 
12 

H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015, which requires TSA to establish a risk-based screening model for airport employees, to look 

at the current list of disqualifying offenses, to improve the auditing procedures TSA 

uses to check on airport badging operations, and to make other improvements. 

We are doing additional audit and inspection work in this area, determining 

whether controls over access media badges issued by airport operators is adequate. 

We are also engaging in an audit of the screening process for the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential program (TWIC) to see whether it is operating effectively and whether the program’s continued eligibility processes ensures that only 

eligible TWIC card holders remain eligible. 

Other questionable investments in aviation security 

TSA uses behavior detection officers to identify passenger behaviors that may indicate stress, fear, or deception. This program, Screening Passengers by Observation 

Techniques (SPOT), includes more than 2,800 employees and has cost taxpayers 

about $878 million from fiscal years 2007 through 2012. 

We understand the desire to have such a program. Israel is foremost in their use 

of non-physical screening, although the differences in size, culture, and attitudes 

about civil liberties make such a program difficult to adopt in this country. In the 

United States, sharp-eyed Government officials were able to assess behavior to prevent entry to terrorists on two separate occasions: 

• Ahmed Ressam’s plot to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport on New 

Year’s Eve 1999 was foiled when a U.S. Customs officer in Port Angeles, Washington, thought Ressam was acting ‘‘hinky’’ and directed a search of his car, 

finding numerous explosives and timers. 

• In 2001, a U.S. immigration officer denied entry to the United States to Mohammed al Qahtani, based on Qahtani’s evasive answers to his questions. Later 

investigation by the 9/11 Commission revealed that Qahtani was to be the 20th 

hijacker, assigned to the aircraft that ultimately crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. 

However, we have deep concerns that the current program is both expensive and 

ineffective. In 2013, we audited the SPOT program and found that TSA could not 

ensure that passengers were screened objectively, nor could it show that the program was cost-effective or merited expansion. We noted deficiencies in selection and 

training of the behavior detection officers. Further, in a November 2013 report on 

the program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that TSA risked 

funding activities that had not been determined to be effective. Specifically, according to its analysis of more than 400 studies, GAO concluded that SPOT program 

behavioral indicators might not be effective in identifying people who might pose a 

risk to aviation security. TSA has taken steps to implement our recommendations 

and improve the program. However, we continue to have questions with regard to 

the program and this fiscal year will conduct a Verification Review, with regard to— 

among other things—performance management, training, and financial accountability, and selection, allocation, and performance of the Behavior Detection Officers. 

Likewise, the Federal Air Marshal Program costs the American taxpayer over 

$800 million per year. The program was greatly expanded after 9/11 to guard 

against a specific type of terrorist incident. In the intervening years, terrorist operations and intentions have evolved. We will be auditing the Federal Air Marshal 

Program this year to determine whether the significant investment of resources in 

the program is justified by the risk. 

TSA’s role as regulator 

TSA has dual responsibilities, one to provide checkpoint security for passengers 

and baggage and another to oversee and regulate airport security provided by airport authorities. The separation of responsibility for airport security between TSA 

and the airport authorities creates a potential vulnerability in safeguarding the system. The concern about which entity is accountable for protecting areas other than 

checkpoints has come up in relation to airport worker vetting, perimeter security, 

and cargo transport. We have also assessed whether TSA is appropriately regulating 

airports, such as whether it ensures airports’ compliance with security regulations. 

We have found shortfalls. 

In the case of airport worker vetting, for example, TSA relies on airports to submit complete and accurate aviation worker application data for vetting. In a recent 

audit, we found TSA does not ensure that airports have a robust verification process 

for criminal history and authorization to work in the United States, or sufficiently 

track the results of their reviews. TSA also did not have an adequate monitoring 

process in place to ensure that airport operators properly adjudicated credential ap-
13 

plicants’ criminal histories. TSA officials informed us that airport officials rarely or 

almost never documented the results of their criminal history reviews electronically. 

Without sufficient documentation, TSA cannot systematically determine whether individuals with access to secured areas of the airports are free of disqualifying criminal events. 

As a result, TSA is required to conduct manual reviews of aviation worker 

records. Due to the workload at larger airports, this inspection process may look at 

as few as 1 percent of all aviation workers’ applications. In addition, inspectors were 

generally reviewing files maintained by the airport badging office, which contained 

photocopies of aviation worker documents rather than the physical documents themselves. An official told us that a duplicate of a document could hinder an inspector’s 

ability to determine whether a document is real or fake because a photocopy may 

not be matched to a face and may not show the security elements contained in the 

identification document. 

Additionally, we identified thousands of aviation worker records that appeared to 

have incomplete or inaccurate biographic information. Without sufficient documentation of criminal histories or reliable biographical data, TSA cannot systematically determine whether individuals with access to secured areas of the airports are 

free of disqualifying criminal events, and TSA has thus far not addressed the poor 

data quality of these records. (TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted), 

OIG–15–98, June 2015) 

Further, the responsibility for executing perimeter and airport facility security is 

in the purview of the 450 local airport authorities rather than TSA. There is no 

clear structure for responsibility, accountability, and authority at most airports, and 

the potential lack of local Government resources makes it difficult for TSA to issue 

and enforce higher standards to counter new threats. Unfortunately, intrusion prevention into restricted areas and other ground security vulnerabilities is a lower priority than checkpoint operations. 

CONCLUSION

Making critical changes to TSA’s culture, technology, and processes is not an easy 

undertaking. However, a commitment to and persistent movement towards effecting 

such changes—including continued progress towards complying with our recommendations—is paramount to ensuring transportation security. We recognize and 

are encouraged by TSA’s steps towards compliance with our recent recommendations. Without a sustained commitment to addressing known vulnerabilities, the 

agency risks compromising the safety of the Nation’s transportation systems. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions 

you or other Members of the subcommittee may have. 

APPENDIX A.—RECENT OIG REPORTS ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

Covert Testing of the TSA’s Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes at Airport Security Checkpoints (Unclassified Summary), OIG–15–150, September 2015 

Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight (Redacted), OIG–14–153, June 2015 

TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted), OIG–15–98, June 2015 

The Transportation Security Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport 

Screening Equipment Maintenance Program, OIG–15–86, May 2015 

Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (Redacted), OIG–15–45, March 2015 

Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck Initiative (Unclassified Summary), OIG–15–29, January 2015 

Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations (Unclassified 

Spotlight), OIG–14–142, September 2014 

APPENDIX B.—STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SELECTED OIG REPORTS ON TSA 

(AS OF 9.22.15) 
14 

Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response 

OIG–11–47 ...... DHS Department-wide Management of Detection 

Equipment.

3/2/2011 We recommend that the Deputy 

Under Secretary for Management reestablish the Joint Requirements Council.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–11–47 ...... DHS Department-wide Management of Detection 

Equipment.

3/2/2011 We recommend that the Deputy 

Under Secretary for Management: Establish a commodity council for detection equipment, responsible for: Coordinating, communicating, and, where appropriate, strategically sourcing items at the Department level or identifying a singlesource commodity manager; Standardizing purchases for similar detection equipment; and Developing a data dictionary that standardizes data elements in inventory accounts for detection equipment.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ No Response. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 
15 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–12–06 ...... Transportation Security Administration Penetration 

Testing of Advanced Imaging Technology.

11/21/2011 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities develop and implement a comprehensive strategic plan for the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program that includes— Mission, goals, objectives, and a system to measure performance; A training strategy that addresses the goals and objectives of the SPOT program; A plan to identify external partners integral to program success, such as law enforcement agencies, and take steps to ensure that effective relationships are established; and, A financial plan that includes identification of priorities, goals, objectives, and measures; needs analysis; budget formulation and execution; and expenditure tracking.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 
16 

Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities develop and implement controls to ensure completeness, accuracy, authorization, and validity of referral data entered into the Performance Measurement Information System.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities develop and implement a plan that provides recurrent training to Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) instructors and BDOs.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities develop and implement a plan to assess BDO instructor performance in required core competencies on a regular basis.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities monitor and track the use of BDOs for non-SPOT related duties to ensure BDOs are used in a cost-effective manner and in accordance with the mission of the SPOT program.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 
17 

OIG–13–91 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

of Passengers by Observation Techniques.

5/29/2013 We recommend that the Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities develop and implement a process for identifying and addressing issues that may directly affect the success of the SPOT program such as the selection, allocation, and performance of BDOs.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–99 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

Partnership Program.

6/20/2013 We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration 

Deputy Administrator expedite developing and implementing procedures to ensure that decisions on Screening Partnership Program applications and procurements are fully documented according to applicable Department and Federal guidance.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–99 ...... Transportation Security Administration’s Screening 

Partnership Program.

6/20/2013 We recommend that the Transportation Security Administration 

Deputy Administrator establish and implement quality assurance procedures to ensure that the most relevant and accurate information is used when determining eligibility and approving airports’ participation in the Screening Partnership Program.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–13–120 .... Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment 

and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology.

9/16/2013 We recommend that the Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration: Develop and 

approve a single, comprehensive deployment strategy that addresses short- and long-term goals for screening equipment.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 
18 

Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response 

OIG–13–120 .... Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment 

and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology.

9/16/2013 We recommend that the Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security Administration: Develop and 

implement a disciplined system of internal controls from data entry to reporting to ensure PMIS data integrity.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–14–142 .... (U) Vulnerabilities Exist in 

TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations.

9/9/2014 This recommendation is Classified ... Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–14–142 .... (U) Vulnerabilities Exist in 

TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations.

9/9/2014 This recommendation is Classified ... Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–14–142 .... (U) Vulnerabilities Exist in 

TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations.

9/9/2014 This recommendation is Classified ... Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–14–142 .... (U) Vulnerabilities Exist in 

TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations.

12/16/2014 This recommendation is Classified ... Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–14–142 .... (U) Vulnerabilities Exist in 

TSA’s Checked Baggage Screening Operations.

12/16/2014 This recommendation is Classified ... Open—Unresolved ... Agreed. 

OIG–14–153 .... Use of Risk Assessment 

within Secure Flight.

9/9/2014 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 

OIG–14–153 .... Use of Risk Assessment 

within Secure Flight.

9/9/2014 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed ........................ Agreed. 

OIG–14–153 .... Use of Risk Assessment 

within Secure Flight.

9/9/2014 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Unresolved ... Disagreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 
19 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved* ...... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 We recommend that the TSA Assistant Administrator for the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis: Employ exclusion factors to refer TSA PreCheckTM passengers to standard security lane screening at random intervals.

Open—Resolved* ...... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 We recommend that the TSA Assistant Administrator for the Office of 

Security Operations: Develop and implement a strategy to address the TSA PreCheckTM lane covert 

testing results.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 
20 

Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 We recommend that the TSA Assistant Administrator for the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis: Provide an explanation of TSA PreCheckTM

rules and responsibilities to all enrollment center applicants and include this information in eligibility letters.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 We recommend that the TSA Assistant Administrator for the Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis: Coordinate with Federal Government and private partners to ensure all TSA PreCheckTM eligible populations 

receive the rules and responsibilities when notifying participants of eligibility.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed.** 

OIG–15–29 ...... Security Enhancements 

Needed to the TSA PreCheckTM Initiative.

1/28/2015 We recommend that the TSA Chief 

Risk Officer: Develop consolidated guidance outlining processes and procedures for all offices involved in the TSA PreCheckTM initiative.

Open—Resolved ....... Agreed. 

OIG–15–45 ...... Allegations of Granting Expedited Screening through 

TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI–14– 3679).

3/16/2015 Recommendation includes Sensitive 

Security Information.

Open—Unresolved ... Disagreed. 
21 

OIG–15–45 ...... Allegations of Granting Expedited Screening through 

TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI–14– 3679).

3/16/2015 We recommend that the TSA Assistant Administrator for Security Operations: Modify standard operating procedures to clarify Transportation Security Officer (TSO) 

and supervisory TSO authority to refer passengers with TSA PreCheck boarding passes to standard screening lanes when they believe that the passenger should not be eligible for TSA PreCheck screening.

Closed* ...................... Agreed. 

OIG–15–86 ...... The Transportation Security 

Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program.

5/6/2015 We recommend that TSA’s Office of 

Security Capabilities and Office of Security Operations develop and implement a preventive maintenance validation process to verify that required routine maintenance activities are completed according to contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. These procedures should also include instruction for appropriate TSA airport personnel on documenting the performance of Level 1 preventive maintenance actions.

Open—Resolved* ...... Agreed. 

OIG–15–86 ...... The Transportation Security 

Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program.

5/6/2015 We recommend that TSA’s Office of 

Security Capabilities and Office of Security Operations: Develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that local TSA airport personnel verify and document contractors’ completion of corrective maintenance actions. These procedures should also include quality assurance steps that would ensure the integrity of the information collected.

Open—Resolved* ...... Agreed. 
22 

Report No. Report Title Date Issued Recommendation Current Status Mgmt. Response 

OIG–15–86 ...... The Transportation Security 

Administration Does Not Properly Manage Its Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program.

5/6/2015 We recommend TSA’s Office of Acquisition enhance future screening 

equipment maintenance contracts by including penalties for noncompliance when it is determined that either preventive or corrective maintenance has not been completed according to contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications.

Open—Resolved* ...... Agreed. 

* These recommendations were either resolved or closed within the last 6 months. ** TSA management changed their response from disagreed to agreed. 
23 

APPENDIX C.—CURRENT AND PLANNED OIG WORK ON TSA 

PROJECTS IN-PROGRESS 

Project Topic Objective 

TSA Security Vetting of 

Passenger Rail Reservation Systems.

Determine the extent to which TSA has policies, processes, and oversight measures to improve security at 

the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK). 

Reliability of TWIC Background Check Process.Determine whether the screening process for the 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential 

program (TWIC) is operating effectively and whether the program’s continued eligibility processes ensure that only eligible TWIC card holders remain eligible. 

TSA’s Security Technology 

Integrated Program 

(STIP).

Determine whether TSA has incorporated adequate IT 

security controls for passenger and baggage screening STIP equipment to ensure it is performing as required. 

TSA’s Controls Over Access Media Badges.Identify and test selected controls over access media 

badges issued by airport operators. 

TSA’s Risk-Based Strategy Determine the extent to which TSA’s intelligence-driven, risk-based strategy informs security and resource decisions to protect the traveling public and 

the Nation’s transportation systems. 

TSA’s Office of Human 

Capital Contracts.

Determine whether TSA’s human capital contracts are 

managed effectively, comply with DHS’s acquisition 

guidelines, and are achieving expected goals. 

UPCOMING PROJECTS 

Project Topic Objective 

Federal Air Marshal Service’s Oversight of Civil 

Aviation Security.

Determine whether the Federal Air Marshal Service 

adequately manages its resources to detect, deter, 

and defeat threats to the civil aviation system. 

TSA Carry-On Baggage 

Penetration Testing.

Determine the effectiveness of TSA’s carry-on baggage 

screening technologies and checkpoint screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. 

Airport Security Capping 

Report.

Synthesize the results of our airport security evaluations into a capping report that groups and summarizes identified weaknesses and root causes and recommends how TSA can systematically and 

proactively address these issues at airports Nationwide. 

TSA’s Classification Program.Determine whether TSA is effectively managing its 

classification program and its use of the Sensitive 

Security Information designation. 

TSA’s Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis.

Determine whether TSA’s Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis is effectively meeting its mission mandates. 

Mr. KATKO. Those questions are indeed forthcoming, but before 

that Mr. Roth, I want to thank you for your testimony. I appreciate 

you being here. 

I want to hear from our second witness, Administrator Neffenger, 

who I am sure the honeymoon is indeed over. You were confirmed 

in June 2015 as the sixth administrator of the TSA. You lead the 

security operations at more than 450 airports within the United 

States, and a workforce of almost 60,000 employees. Prior to joining TSA, Administrator Neffenger served admirably as the 29th 

vice commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard’s 
24 

deputy commandant for operations. The Chair now recognizes Admiral Neffenger for his testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER NEFFENGER, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Thank you, and good afternoon Chairman 

Katko, Ranking Member Rice, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for answering these concerns and evolving the Transportation 

Security Administration. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, TSA was founded from crisis, and 

has continued to evolve throughout its existence. Careful and sustained oversight by Congress, and audits by the Inspector General 

and GAO are critical elements of this process, and I am a strong 

supporter of such. I thank you for the support each of you has provided in exercising that oversight. I also want to thank Inspector 

General Roth for identifying areas for improvement in TSA. I met 

with him prior to my confirmation and met with him again during 

my first month as administrator to relay the seriousness with 

which I take his work. His team has been invaluable in helping us 

to identify the root causes of the recent covert testing results, and 

I thank him for his encouraging assessment of our new direction. 

That direction is a reflection of my vision on how we approach 

the continuing evolution of TSA. As you noted, I am now 3 months 

into the job, and during that time, I have traveled to about 15 airports and numerous Federal Air Marshal offices across the country. 

I have also visited our partners in the United Kingdom, France, 

and the Netherlands, and I met with our stakeholders from the airlines, travel industry, and airport operators from major airports, 

including Los Angeles, Atlanta, Dallas, and Chicago. I have also 

been engaging with surface stakeholders and passenger rail and 

light rail both here and in Europe. 

Throughout all of these visits, I have been thoroughly impressed 

with the professionals who occupy our ranks. I am speaking specifically of our front-line transportation security officers. In addition to 

our air marshals, our inspectors, and other employees, each of 

whom swore an oath to serve their Nation in a mission that encounters nearly 2 million travelers a day in the aviation sector 

alone. I have been impressed with the collaboration I have seen 

across the transportation enterprise and I am pleased that the 

range of capabilities our Federal, State, and local partners bring to 

bear across every sector. 

These complex systems require that we systematically examine 

them and consider them as a whole; that we integrate this wide 

range of public and private capabilities, that we benchmark and 

apply best practices across the enterprise, and that we seek global 

consistency. 

I can assure you that as we move forward, we remain an intelligence-driven, risk-based counterterrorism agency with a well-defined statement of mission, clear and unequivocal standards of performance, training, and resourcing that enabled the workforce to 

achieve success, and a relentless pursuit of excellence and accountability. 
25 

We will conduct counterterrorism operations with discipline and 

competence. We will invest in deliberately developing our workforce, and we will field advance capabilities responsive to a pervasive and dynamic threat. We have a no-fail mission, one for which 

the consequences of a successful attack overwhelm the risk equation and for which we must ensure we deliver mission success. 

My immediate priority is to pursue solutions to the recent covert 

testing failures and I believe we are making significant progress in 

doing so. In response to the IG’s findings, we have implemented an 

action plan to ensure leadership accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase effectiveness and deterrence, increase threat testing, and strengthen our procedures. 

We have also responded vigorously to Secretary Johnson’s 10- 

point plan to review and assess screening operations, including 

training for the entire screening workforce, testing and improving 

the technology, and implementing these new procedures. We will 

continue to implement this plan of action and provide regular updates to you and to the Secretary. 

Of utmost concern is determining root causes for the failures 

noted. Our conclusion is that the screening effectiveness challenges 

were not merely a performance problem, nor were they a failure of 

the advanced imaging technology. Indeed, this technology has 

greatly enhanced our ability to detect threats and it continues to 

perform to expected standards when deployed and used properly. 

Strong drivers of the problem, however, include leadership focus, 

environmental influences, and gaps in system design and processes 

along with a disproportionate focus on efficiency and speed in 

screening operations rather than security and effectiveness. These 

powerfully influenced organizational culture and officer performance. As a result, there was significant pressure to clear passengers quickly at the risk of not diligently resolving alarms. 

Our analysis also revealed our officers did not fully understand 

the capabilities and limitations of the equipment and several procedures were inadequate to resolve alarms. We have trained our officers to understand and use the equipment properly and we have 

corrected our procedures. Solutions require a renewed focus on security, streamlined effective procedures, investments in technology, 

and realistic, consistent, standardized training along with a new 

balance between effectiveness and efficiency. We must support our 

officers as they perform their duties. 

We will continue to partner with our airlines and other members 

of the travel and airport industry to ensure that we can reduce 

stress on the checkpoint and we will right-size and re-source TSA 

appropriately. Our near-term solutions will halt further reductions 

in officer staffing to support our revised screening efforts, provide 

consistent high-quality training at a centralized location, and enhance our technology. 

Our Mission Essentials Training conducted over the past 2 

months with every front-line officer and leader across TSA has 

helped to reset our focus on security effectiveness, and most critically, has enhanced our officers’ knowledge of the screening systems that they operate. 

I refer repeatedly how valuable this information is to our officers. 

I need to now extend that into our new-hire training across the 
26 

country. We need greater consistency and efficiency in its delivery, 

and we must do more to establish a professional foundation that 

is required of a high-performing counterterrorism organization. 

As such, I am committed to expanding our existing TSA Academy 

at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and plan to send 

all new-hire TSOs to basic training beginning in January 2016. 

Centralized training in a formal, professional academy ensures consistency and professionalism, produces greater enthusiasm, increased confidence and skills, and connectedness to a common 

agency culture and focus on mission. 

We must ensure the appropriate measures of effectiveness are in 

place to drive an institutional focus on our primary mission. We 

must employ a culture of operational evolution, one that constantly 

reassesses assumptions, plans, and processes, so we are able to 

rapidly field new concepts of operation and we must deliver an effective system and earn the confidence of the traveling public 

through competence, discipline, performance, and professionalism. 

We face a critical turning point in evolving TSA, both to address 

these recent findings and begin our investment in a strategic approach to securing the transportation sector. As such, I am committed to ensuring that we do so, that we employ multiple elements in intelligence-driven operations, while discarding a onesize-fits-all approach that we recruit and retain a highly-trained 

workforce, with accountability and high standards of performance. 

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, we have an incredible 

challenge ahead of us, but I know that TSA is up to the task. I 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Neffenger follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER NEFFENGER

OCTOBER 8, 2015 

Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on my vision for 

evolving the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 

Since its creation following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, TSA has 

played an invaluable role in protecting the traveling public. Fourteen years after the 

9/11 attacks, we face threats more dangerous than at any time in the recent past. 

Terrorist groups and aspiring violent extremists, inspired by messages of hatred and 

violence, remain intent on striking our Nation’s aviation system as well as other 

transportation modes. The threat is decentralized, diffuse, and quite complex. 

These persistent and evolving threats are TSA’s most pressing challenge and require an intense and sustained focus on our security missions. We remain deeply 

committed to ensuring that TSA remains a high-performing, risk-based intelligencedriven counterterrorism organization. We are working diligently to ensure we recruit, train, develop, and lead a mission ready and highly-capable workforce, placing 

a premium on professional values and personal accountability. Further, we will pursue advanced and innovative capabilities that our mission requires to deter, detect, 

and disrupt threats to our Nation’s transportations systems, with a clear understanding that we must continue to optimize today’s capabilities while envisioning 

future methods of achieving success. 

I am intently focused on leading TSA strategically, developing and supporting our 

workforce, and investing appropriately, to deliver on our vital security mission. 

IMPROVING AVIATION SCREENING OPERATIONS

My highest priority for TSA is determining root causes and implementing solutions to address the recent covert testing of TSA’s checkpoint operations and technology conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector 
27 

General (OIG). I was greatly disturbed by TSA’s failure rate on these tests, and 

have met with the Inspector General on several occasions to better understand the 

nature of the failures and the scope of the corrective actions needed. 

Screening operations are a core mission of TSA. In fiscal year 2014, our officers 

screened approximately 660 million passengers and nearly 2 billion carry-on and 

checked bags. Through their diligent daily efforts, our officers prevented over 

180,000 dangerous and/or prohibited items, including over 2,200 firearms, from 

being carried onto planes. In addition, our workforce vetted a daily average of 6 million air passengers against the United States. Government’s Terrorist Screening 

Database, preventing those who may wish to do us harm from boarding aircraft, and 

conducting enhanced screening of passengers and their baggage prior to allowing 

them to board an aircraft. In conjunction with these screening efforts, and using intelligence-driven analysis, TSA’s Federal Air Marshals also protected thousands of 

flights. To ensure compliance with aviation security requirements, in fiscal year 

2014 TSA Inspectors completed over 1,054 airport inspections, nearly 18,000 aircraft 

operator inspections, and almost 3,000 foreign air carrier inspections to ensure compliance with aviation security requirements. Still, as recent and prior testing shows, 

we must continue to formulate solutions that will enhance our effectiveness at 

checkpoint screening operations. 

It is important to acknowledge that the OIG covert tests, as a part of their design, 

focused on a discrete segment of TSA’s myriad capabilities of detecting and disrupting threats to aviation security. TSA conducts similar, more extensive testing 

that is part of a deliberate process designed to defeat and subsequently improve our 

performance, processes, and screening technologies. TSA’s covert testing program, 

along with the OIG’s covert testing, provides invaluable lessons learned, highlighting areas in which the agency needs improvement in detecting threats. Such 

testing is an important element in the continual evolution of aviation security. 

As we pursue solutions to the challenges presented by recent and on-going covert 

testing, there are several critical concepts that must be in place. TSA must ensure 

that its value proposition is well-defined, clearly-communicated, understood and applied across the entire workforce and mission enterprise. From my first day on the 

job, I have made it clear that we are first and foremost a security organization. Our 

mission is to deter, detect, and disrupt threats, and we must ensure every officer, 

inspector, air marshal, and member of our agency remains laser-focused on this mission. In addition, we must ensure the appropriate measures of effectiveness are in 

place to drive an institutional focus on the primary security objectives for all modes 

of transportation, and renewed emphasis on aviation measures. 

We have demonstrated our ability to efficiently screen passengers: However, it is 

clear that we now must improve our effectiveness. By focusing on the basic fundamentals of security screening, and by readjusting the measurements of success to 

focus on security rather than speed, and by measuring what we value most, we can 

adjust the institutional focus and adapt the culture to deliver success. TSA must 

adopt a culture of operational evolution, one that constantly questions assumptions, 

plans, and processes, and is able to rapidly field new concepts of operation, performance standards and capabilities, particularly given the persistent and adaptive 

enemy we face. 

To drive these important changes, it is essential to understand and assess appropriately the effectiveness of our aviation security enterprise, to rigorously pursue 

initiatives to quickly close capability and security gaps, and employ our own covert 

testing and vulnerability assessments. Delivering an effective security system and 

earning the confidence of the traveling public will come only through competence, 

disciplined performance, successful results, and professionalism. These imperatives 

are essential to address the immediate challenges, and more broadly, to accomplish 

the important mission entrusted to TSA. 

In late May, in response to the OIG initial findings, TSA developed and implemented an immediate action plan built on its understanding of the known 

vulnerabilities in checkpoint operations. Consisting of dozens of individual actions, 

it was designed to: 

(1) ensure leadership accountability; 

(2) improve alarm resolution; 

(3) increase effectiveness and deterrence; 

(4) increase threat testing to sharpen officer performance; 

(5) strengthen standard operating procedures; 

(6) improve the Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) system; 

(7) deploy additional resolution tools; and 

(8) improve human factors, including enhanced training and operational responses. 
28 

Scheduled for completion in March 2016, TSA is actively engaged in implementing 

this plan of action and provides regular updates to the Secretary of Homeland Security as well as frequent updates to the Congress. 

There are a number of immediate actions that have been completed, including the 

following: (1) Requiring screening leadership at each airport to oversee AIT operations to ensure compliance with standard procedures; (2) requiring each officer to 

complete initial video-based training to reinforce proper alarm resolution conversations; (3) conducting leadership and officer same-day debriefs for threat inject testing and lessons learned; and (4) performing daily operational exercises and reinforcement of proper pat-down procedures at least once per shift to ensure optimal 

TSO performance. 

SECRETARY JOHNSON’S TEN-POINT PLAN

In addition to the TSA action plan, Department of Homeland Security Secretary 

Jeh Johnson directed a series of actions, which in cooperation with TSA, constituted 

a 10-point plan to address these findings. TSA is now working aggressively to accomplish these actions. The plan includes the following: 

• Briefing all Federal Security Directors at airports Nation-wide on the OIG’s preliminary test results to ensure leadership awareness and accountability. This 

was completed in May and continues regularly. In September, I convened the 

leadership of TSA—from across the agency and in every mission area—to discuss our progress, to clearly convey my expectations, and to outline my vision 

for the evolution of our counterterrorism agency. 

• Training every Transportation Security Officer (TSO) and supervisor to address 

the specific vulnerabilities identified by the OIG tests. This training also is intended to reemphasize the value and underscore the importance we place on the 

security mission. The training will reemphasize the threat we face, the design 

of our security system, integrating technology with human expertise, the range 

of tools we employ to detect threats, and the essential role our officers perform 

in resolving alarms. Fundamentally, this training is intended to explain the 

‘‘why’’ behind our renewed and intense focus on security effectiveness. We are 

also training supervisors and leaders to ensure they appreciate and support the 

shift in emphasis. Most important, we are asking our supervisors to recognize 

their critical role in supporting our officers’ renewed focus on alarm resolution. 

This training began May 29, 2015 and was recently completed at the end of 

September 2015. 

• Increasing manual screening measures, including reintroducing hand-held 

metal detectors to resolve alarms at the checkpoint. This has been underway 

since mid-June and reinforces our ability to detect the full range of threats. 

• Increasing the use of random explosives trace detection, which also started in 

mid-June, enhancing detection capabilities to a range of threat vectors. 

• Re-testing and re-evaluating screening equipment to measure current performance standards. We are retesting the systems in the airports tested by the Inspector General and assessing performance of the field systems against those 

in the labs to ensure optimal performance. This testing, which began in June 

and is on-going, will help us to more fully understand and strengthen equipment performance across the enterprise. 

• Assessing areas where screening technology equipment can be enhanced. This 

includes new software, new operating concepts, and technology upgrades in collaboration with our private-sector partners. 

• Evaluating the current practice of including non-vetted populations in expedited 

screening. We continue to take steps to ensure that we have a more fully-vetted 

population of travelers exposed to screening in our expedited lanes. For example, as of September 12, the practice of Managed Inclusion–2 is no longer used 

in daily operations. 

• Revising TSA’s standard operating procedures to include using TSA supervisors 

to help resolve situations at security checkpoints. On June 26, 2015, TSA began 

field testing new standard operating procedures at six airports. Lessons learned 
29 

1The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program, Dated October 21, 2013, requires, with 

some exceptions for crewmembers, medical assistance items, musical instruments, duty-free 

items, and photographic equipment, that the accessible property for individuals accessing the 

sterile area be limited to one bag plus one personal item per passenger (e.g., purse, briefcase, 

or laptop computer). 

will be incorporated and deployed Nation-wide. This procedure is intended to 

ensure appropriate resolution techniques are employed in every situation. 

• Continuing covert testing to assess the effectiveness of these actions. For each 

test, there must be a same-day debrief with the workforce of outcomes and performance along with immediate remediation actions. Expansion of our testing 

also enhances officer vigilance. 

• Finally, we have responded vigorously by establishing a team of TSA and other 

DHS officials to monitor implementation of these measures and report to the 

Secretary and me every 2 weeks. These updates have been on-going since June. 

ROOT CAUSE ASSESSMENT

DHS and TSA are also committed to resolving the root causes of these test failures. A diverse team of DHS leaders, subject-matter experts, as well as officers and 

leaders from the front-line workforce are examining the underlying problems resulting in our performance failures and will make recommendations on system-wide solutions for implementations across the agency. 

The team’s initial conclusion is that the screening effectiveness challenges noted 

by the Inspector General were not merely a performance problem to be solved solely 

by retraining our officers. Officer performance is but one among many of the challenges. TSA front-line officers have repeatedly demonstrated during their annual 

proficiency evaluations that they have the knowledge and the skill to perform the 

screening mission well. Nor was this principally a failure of the AIT technology. 

These systems have greatly enhanced TSA’s ability to detect and disrupt new and 

evolving threats to aviation. AIT technology continues to perform to specification 

standards when maintained and employed properly, and we continue to improve its 

detection capabilities. 

The challenge can be succinctly described as a set of multi-dimensional factors 

that have influenced the conduct of screening operations, creating a disproportionate 

focus on screening operations efficiency rather than security effectiveness. These 

challenges range across six dimensions: Leadership, technology, workforce performance, environmental influences, operating procedures, and system design. 

Pressures driven by increasing passenger volume, an increase in checkpoint 

screening of baggage due to fees charged for checked bags as well as inconsistent 

or limited enforcement of size requirements for hand-carried bags and the one bag 

plus one personal item (1+1) standard 1 create a stressed screening environment at 

airport checkpoints. The challenges also include the range of complex rocedures that 

we ask our officers to employ, resulting in cognitive overload and personnel not 

properly employing the technology or a specific procedure. The limitations of the 

technology, the systems detection standards, TSA officers’ lack of training on equipment limitations, and procedures that failed to resolve the alarms appropriately all 

undermined our ability to effectively screen, as noted by the Inspector General’s report. 

A critical component of the problem was confusing messages on the values of the 

institution, as expressed in the metrics used to assess effectiveness and leadership 

performance. As noted, a prior focus on measures that emphasized reduced wait 

times and organizational efficiency powerfully influenced screening performance as 

well as organizational culture. As a result, across TSA, leaders’ and officers’ organizational behavior emphasized efficiency outcomes and a pressure to clear passengers 

quickly, at the risk of not diligently resolving alarms. The combined effect of these 

many variables produced the performance reported by the Office of the Inspector 

General. 

IMPLEMENTING SOLUTIONS

Solutions to the challenges facing TSA will require a renewed focus on the agency’s security mission, a commitment to right-sizing and re-sourcing TSA to effectively secure the aviation enterprise, and an industry commitment to incentivizing 

vetting of passengers as well as creating conditions that can decrease the volume 

and contents of bags presented for screening in airports. 
30 

For TSA, we must renew our focus on the fundamentals of security, thereby asking our officers and leaders to strike a new balance between security effectiveness 

and line efficiency, to field and diligently perform appropriate resolution procedures 

and to close technology and performance gaps. We need our managers and supervisors to support our officers when they perform their difficult daily mission. As we 

move forward, we are guided by a principled, strategic approach, with specific 

projects already underway to advance our goal of ensuring we deliver on our mission 

to deter, detect, and disrupt threats to aviation. 

This principled approach extends beyond the immediate findings identified in the 

OIG’s covert test of checkpoint operations. This approach also informs our strategy 

and ability as an agency to systematically evolve operations, workforce development, 

and capability investment, now and in the future. We will systematically review the 

prior findings of OIG and GAO reports as well as other sources of analysis that can 

inform security effectiveness. 

Redefine Value Proposition 

First, TSA is in the process of ensuring our focus on security effectiveness is welldefined and applied across the entire workforce and mission space. Our ‘‘Mission Essentials—Threat Mitigation’’ course, being provided to every officer by the end of 

September, is our initial step. We will follow this initial effort with a range of initiatives to convey these priorities to leaders and officers using additional tools, such 

as a statement of the Administrator’s Intent, the National Training Plan, and in our 

workforce messaging. Redefining our values as an agency by focusing on threat mitigation and improving TSO awareness and knowledge of the threat will provide a 

new and acute mission focus. Resolving every alarm, with discipline, competence, 

and professionalism are the values we are emphasizing to the workforce. From my 

initial field visits, I can report that our officers are hearing, understanding, and applying this new approach. 

Communicate New Standards and Expectations 

To communicate these new standards, TSA’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

is pursuing an information-sharing project to expand and ensure standardized information and intelligence sharing to front-line officers. Expanding the reach of the 

threat information provided to the field, enhancing our officers’ awareness and understanding of the threat and the critical role they play in interdicting these threats 

creates ownership and a greater commitment to ensuring security procedures are 

followed. 

Align Measures of Effectiveness to Standards and Expectations 

TSA’s Office of Security Operations is examining and revising the current Management Objectives Report to rebalance the field leaders’ scorecard with security effectiveness measures in addition to some preserved efficiency data. We are operating 

on the premise that what we measure are the organizational objectives to which our 

field leaders will pay close attention. We expect the first iteration of our new measures to be in the field by early October 2015. 

Design System to Achieve Desired Outcome 

The aviation security system must interdict the full range of threats on the Prohibited Items List and evolving threats that require our immediate action. Our concept of operations review project, run by the Operations Performance and Mission 

Analysis Divisions, is further identifying system-wide gaps and vulnerabilities and 

how to ensure the traveling public is exposed to our mission-essential detection capabilities when transiting the screening checkpoint. The results of this analysis may 

lead to a range of recommended improvements, from clarification of pat-down procedures to fielding decisions for new technologies. 

Eliminate Gaps and Vulnerabilities in Achieving Desired End-State 

Our work in analyzing the root causes has identified a range of vulnerabilities in 

TSA; however, there is no single office or accountable official charged with systemically tracking our vulnerability mitigation efforts. Centralizing these activities 

under a single official should drive systemic research, development, and fielding of 

new capabilities. Our TSA Office of the Chief Risk Officer is managing this project. 

Evaluate Performance by Using the New Values, Standards, and Expectations 

To motivate behavior, supervisors must clearly communicate the performance objectives they expect from their subordinate officers and leaders. Our Chief of Human 

Capital is working an initiative we are calling the ‘‘Performance Evaluation Project,’’ 

which is designed to ensure the appropriate focus on desired mission outcomes is 
31 

imbedded within Annual Performance Plans. These new standards will be used for 

the performance period that started on October 1, 2015. 

Incentivize Performance to Enact Values, Standard, and Expectations 

Several of our field leaders and officers have also recommended a Model Transportation Security Officer Project to determine model performance criteria. The project 

is intended to incentivize performance and emphasize the values and standards 

front-line employees are expected to uphold across the enterprise. I am a strong proponent of incentivizing performance, as this can be a powerful instrument to drive 

employee behaviors. Through these efforts, we intend to convey our values, measure 

them, and evaluate performance against these new expectations, uniting the TSA 

workforce behind critical agency reforms that will deliver organizational alignment 

and strengthen our security posture. 

Finally, we will continue to partner with the trade and travel industry, the airlines, and airport operators to identify solutions that can fundamentally alter the 

reality on the ground for our screening workforce. 

A key element of our solution set will be reassessing the screening workforce staffing baseline. Budgeted staffing levels for fiscal year 2016, planned more than a year 

in advance of the covert testing failures, presumed a significant increase in the vetted traveling population which, combined with Managed Inclusion, allowed for a 

smaller workforce. We are reassessing screener workforce staffing needs and planning additional adjustments to support training and operational enhancements, all 

to ensure future staffing reductions remain rational choices that balance effectiveness with efficiency. Additionally, we look forward to working with the Congress to 

identify means of adding additional field intelligence officers to ensure every field 

operation is supported with a dedicated intelligence officer to facilitate information 

sharing, and to expand our efforts at the TSA Academy to train the workforce. Finally, we expect to invest in Advanced Imaging Technology detection upgrades 

based on the OIG findings. 

MISSION ESSENTIALS TRAINING

Given the importance of training to our mission, I would like to elaborate on 

TSA’s approach to training following the OIG covert testing results. It is critical 

that we train out these failures so we do not repeat the mistakes, including those 

which could have catastrophic consequences. As of October 1, we have trained the 

specifics of the failures to virtually every front-line member and leader of TSA. 

This training, referred to as ‘‘Mission Essentials—Threat Mitigation,’’ builds our 

workforce understanding of the link among intelligence, technology, and the procedures they perform. The training advances our new value proposition by: (1) Providing a detailed intelligence briefing on the current threat; (2) discussing passenger 

tactics and techniques that may be used to dissuade the TSOs from thoroughly performing their screening duties and what counter-measures they can employ; (3) reviewing recent procedural changes for screening individuals who present themselves 

as having a disability; (4) practicing pat-down procedures with the goal of finding 

components of improvised explosive devices; and (5) exploring the capabilities and 

limitations of the checkpoint equipment and how the TSO can by following proper 

procedures. I have been encouraged to see our TSOs embracing the principles of 

Mission Essentials training. 

Through this training, our employees are being taught how to respond to social 

engineering—techniques used by passengers seeking to manipulate our screening 

workforce and avoid regular processes. As I meet with these employees in my travels to airports throughout the country, I have heard repeatedly that they wished 

they had this valuable information. As such, I have charged TSA’s senior leaders 

to plan to send all new-hire TSOs to the TSA Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA, for TSO-basic training beginning in January 

2016. Most of our major counterterrorism partners in security and law enforcement 

send their employees through similar-type academies to ensure a laser-focus on mission, and we should as well. We recognize this initiative may require additional resources, and look forward to working with the committee accordingly. 

FUTURE OF SCREENING

As we envision the future of screening, even in the context of the current challenges, I remain a strong proponent of a risk-based approach to security. The vast 

majority of people, goods, and services moving through our transportation systems 

are legitimate and pose minimal risk. To support our risk-based approach, it is critical to continue growing the population of fully-vetted travelers, such as those participating in TSA PreCheckTM or in other DHS trusted traveler programs. In par-
32 

allel, I am also reviewing expedited screening concepts with the intent of moving 

away from unvetted travelers. This multi-pronged, risk-based approach will result 

in separating known and unknown travelers, with known travelers receiving expedited screening and other travelers, some high-threat, receiving more extensive 

screening. 

I envision a future where some known travelers will be as vetted and trusted as 

flight crews. Technology on the horizon may support passengers becoming their own 

‘‘boarding passes’’ by using biometrics, such as fingerprint scans, to verify identities 

linked to Secure Flight. The Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) is the first 

step in this process and will provide TSOs with real-time authentication of a passenger’s identity credentials and travel itinerary. 

A second objective is to screen at the ‘‘speed of life’’ with an integrated screening 

system that combines metal detection, non-metallic anomaly detection, shoe X-ray, 

and explosive vapor detection. Prototypes of these machines exist, which hold great 

promise for the traveling public. 

Purposeful checkpoint and airport designs that facilitate screening advances are 

also a future approach. At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Tom Bradley 

International Terminal, recent innovative renovations have been completed so that 

screening operations are seamlessly integrated into the movement and flow of the 

traveling public. This effort will continue, with 6 out of 8 terminals at LAX scheduled for design and renovation. Other locations, such as Dulles International Airport 

(IAD), have dedicated checkpoints that separate expedited screening from other operations, allowing TSOs to follow the appropriate concepts of operations with greater focus and clarity. 

While some airports may not be able to take the same approach, the future of 

screening is based on fulfilling the promise of risk-based security. By increasing the 

number of fully-vetted passengers and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of 

physical screening, I am committed to refining and advancing our risk-based security strategy. I look forward to working with this committee and the Congress to 

chart a way forward in this regard. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, we have an incredible challenge ahead 

of us. Still, I know TSA is up to the task, and will adjust its focus from one based 

on speed and efficiency to one based on security effectiveness. We are on the front 

lines of a critical counterterrorism fight and our workforce is willing and able to do 

the job. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and sincerely 

appreciate your time and attention. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Administrator Neffenger. 

I called you Admiral or Administrator, either one. It is interchangeable, I guess. But thank you again for your testimony. I appreciate the fact that you are responding rapidly, and recognizing, 

and embracing the problems, and trying to find solutions. I am encouraged by that. We all are. We look forward during the course 

of the questioning here today to talk about moving forward, what 

is the plan, and we hope you weave that into your testimony as we 

go through it today. 

I also thank you for rearranging your schedule to be here with 

us today. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions. 

I will start by observing the nature and tenor of this hearing and 

how it is different from the other ones that we have had. The other 

hearings we have had so far, and we have had 7 subcommittee 

hearings. This is the seventh one, I believe, which is more than any 

in all of Homeland Security, and perhaps more than most in Congress. The reason is because there is a lot to do. There is a lot of 

issues to examine. 

At the forefront of examining of those issues has been the Inspector General, and we appreciate that. Like we said earlier, by Miss 

Rice, I believe, or someone, more than 100 such reports have been 

done by the Inspector General since the inception of TSA. Those reports are revealing and also at times troubling. Since we got into 
33 

the hearings this year, we did one on the Atlanta gun trafficking 

case which exposed 170 guns being trafficked by employees through 

supposedly secure access points. It exposed a major weakness in 

the airline aviation system and that is employee access controls, 

which are sorely lacking. That was exacerbated by a number of 

cases recently in Dallas/Fort Worth, and LAX, and Oakland, and 

elsewhere where major drug trafficking rings had been disrupted. 

One of those rings, at the preliminary hearing, one of the employees was bragging about the fact that he could bring anything 

through there, including a bomb, which is incredibly troubling. Instead of having an oh-my-God-moment by the airports, we hear a 

lot of pushback about costs, and that is something we are going to 

have to examine going forward. We have had a lot of hearings 

about screenings and the problems with screenings, a 97 percent 

fail rate in recent tests. That is unbelievably troubling. 

We have had hearings about PreCheck and Managed Inclusion 

and how people are getting pulled out of regular lines into the 

PreCheck line without any additional background checks, which defeats the purpose of PreCheck. 

We have heard about the Federal Air Marshal Service and we 

had a good productive hearing with them and then we found out 

that after that, Federal Air Marshals are filling sessions with prostitutes in hotels paid for with Government credit cards, and Lord 

knows what else is going on. That is troubling too. 

We have also heard some things about private screenings from 

the Inspector General. This all points up that, I think, and underscores the belief by the Inspector General himself that sometimes— 

and it is not on your watch, Mr. Neffenger, but sometimes, many 

times, TSA has not responded. That leads me to the conclusion that 

TSA, while a young agency, has become a very bureaucratized 

agency already, too slow to respond and not nimble enough to respond. 

So the genesis of all that was why I had this hearing today to 

allow us to discuss at a more general level what are some of its 

systemic problems that we see at TSA, and we are doing this to 

benefit Mr. Neffenger’s presence so that he can hopefully address 

them going forward. 

So with that teeing the ball up, Mr. Roth, I would like to hear 

from you as to what you think some of the, you know, global problems are at TSA, and I encourage you to be as frank as possible. 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me preface my remarks by, this is a look back over a number of different audit reports that span the course of years. One of the conclusions or 

themes that I can draw from this is that there is a mismatch between the risk and meeting the risk. That sort of working theory 

that we have is either TSA doesn’t understand the nature of the 

risk, or they do understand the nature of the risk, and then worse 

from that is that they don’t address the risk in any appropriate 

way. 

Again, I am going to be speaking in the past tense about this because I do think, or at least I am hopeful, consistent with my auditor’s vow of critical thinking and skepticism, but I am hopeful that 

we are in a new era. But I will talk about three episodes that to 
34 

me sort-of illustrate one of the big issues we have in sort-of either 

not understanding the risk, or simply dismissing the risk. 

The first is, of course, our covert testing. The recent round of covert testing was not a surprise to us and it was not a surprise to 

TSA. We had been doing covert testing over the years with consistently disappointing results. You know, as we like to say, the best 

test of a football team is how they do on Sunday. To us, a covert 

testing is the Sunday game. Real-world conditions, figure out exactly how well the system works, and it did not work very well. 

What we found after the covert testing was even a little bit more 

upsetting, which was, TSA does their own covert testing and those 

results were very similar to our results. So none of this came as 

a surprise to TSA. One of the things that we discovered after this 

round of testing and the, I would say, the very vigorous response 

that the Department gave with regard to our briefing on the covert 

testing, was that no one in DHS had known sort-of this issue; that 

the issue had remained within TSA. TSA had not sort-of elevated 

the issue. It came as a surprise to the Secretary, to the Deputy Secretary, to the leadership within the Department. 

When you look at TSA’s fiscal 2016 budget, 2016 budget what it 

shows is that they are actually going to reduce the number of 

screeners. Their proposal was to reduce the number of screeners by 

about 1,700 people. Now, this is a budget that was developed over 

time and certainly not under this current administrator’s watch, 

and I understand that it is going to be reversed, but I think it 

shows sort of a cultural attitude that they knew that they had a 

risk. 

Their response to that risk was reducing the number of screeners. Their justification for it, and I am just reading from their 

budget document that was submitted to the Hill, was that TSA employs a multi-layered, risk-based, intelligence-driven approach to 

its security and counterterrorism mission, and as a result of these, 

they are focusing efforts on efficiency and can save money as a result of this. Which is in direct contradiction to the evidence that 

they had at the time as to the efficiency of checkpoint operations. 

So they either dismissed the risk, or understood the risk, but, 

yet, didn’t meet the risk. So that would be the first episode, and 

if I could have, there is a couple of others, which I am happy to 

continue, or—— 

Mr. KATKO. Yeah, for a few moments, please. 

Mr. ROTH. Okay. The second one is our audit on PreCheck. You 

know, we had real concerns about Managed Inclusion and 

PreCheck. As you know, you had a hearing on this. I had a conversation with the previous administrator about our audit report 

where we had deep concerns that people that didn’t have an individualized assessment of risk were getting expedited screening. His 

answer was, well, look, it is my job to accept the risk, and I am 

accepting this risk, which is fine, except my family flies. So, you 

know, I am not sure that is an adequate answer. That all of these 

people went through Secure Flight. 

So the idea is, of course, that they have been vetted against certain intelligence databases to determine whether they are a risk. 

I mean the problem with that is any student of modern terrorism 

history understands that 17 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were unknown 
35 

to the intelligence community, and they wouldn’t be on any sort of 

special list. 

Richard Reid, the shoe bomber was not on any special list. The 

Christmas day bomber in 2009 was not on any list. The most significant terrorist attack we had in recent memory, the Marathon 

bomber, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, wasn’t on any list. In fact, he was 

looked at by the FBI and adjudged not to be a threat and then not 

on any sort of active list. 

So this idea that, oh, well, it is an intelligence-based, and that 

is the silver bullet, and that is what is going to help us here, is 

just a wrong-headed assessment of risk. As I said, again, this was 

not on this administrator’s watch, but it was very deeply upsetting 

to me during the course of our audits to see this kind of a reaction. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Roth. I will have some questions for 

you, Admiral Neffenger, on the second go-around if we are able to 

get to that. If not, I will ask you to submit the questions in writing 

depending on our schedule here. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the 

subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, for any 

questions she may have. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Inspector General Roth, 

what I would like to ask you, you mentioned in your statement the 

No. 1 thing is that TSA can do to change the culture, which is what 

you cite as significantly problematic. So what are your thoughts on 

how you change the culture? 

Mr. ROTH. Okay, it is a difficult problem, because it is a problem 

that has grown up over time. One of the ways that you change the 

culture is, I think, what the administrator is currently doing, which 

is an honest look at what it is that is going on and sort of honestly 

confront your problems and put a plan of action in place. 

Historically, it has not been that. It has been both for us and 

GAO sort-of a reaction, and a very disturbing reaction, for example, 

in our covert testing I think for 2012, we had our results and TSA 

pushed back considerably on our methodology, and on a number of 

other things. But lo and behold, they had their own internal testing 

that was almost the same. So what kind of an agency is sort of 

pushing back in public, and yet, understands that the audit is correct? 

As I said, I think this is changing, and there is an honest assessment of what is going on. My understanding is that the administrator is going to put forth a realistic strategic plan that isn’t, you 

know, everything is wonderful and we are doing fine, and pay no 

attention to the man behind the curtain, but rather this is a problem. The risks of catastrophic terrorism are real, and we absolutely 

need to get it right. 

So it is a long process. There isn’t a single magic bullet, but certainly, good leadership helps and that is what we are hopeful for. 

Miss RICE. So being 1 of 10 kids, I have to be optimistic, right, 

and I am choosing to be optimistic about the ability to change the 

culture at TSA because it has only been around for a short period 

of time, right? I am on the Veterans Affairs’ Committee and I can 

tell you that that agency does the same exact thing. Every time 

there is an IG report that says here is a problem, here is a problem, they push back and say no, no, no, there is no problem. Noth-
36 

ing needs to be changed. The stakes are equally high for both our 

veterans, right, and National security, domestic, and international 

that TSA is dealing with. 

So I am glad to hear you, Mr. Roth, speak so bluntly because 

that is what we need. That is what your job is, but I am also happy 

to hear that you are optimistic about Admiral Neffenger, because 

I am very optimistic about the new administrator for a whole host 

of reasons. 

So one issue that I do want to address because you mentioned 

this, because I do believe, Mr. Roth, that in order to do an adequate assessment of your risk, right, intelligence has to be part of 

that. One of the things that I was so distressed to hear about, is 

how the TSA is responsible for doing the checks on airport employees, and yet, they are given incredibly poor information to do these 

background checks, which affects the ability to really adequately 

assess the risk of this employee, which as the Chairman pointed 

out, when you have gunrunners and drug runners, some of whom 

are employed by the agency, that is problematic. 

So my question is to you, Admiral Neffenger, regarding that—it 

seemed to me that that was a fix that didn’t have to be a legislative fix. You, as the administrator, could say, from now on, if you 

want a background check to be done, which you have to have done, 

these are the things—these are the pieces of information that we 

need to get, or you don’t get the background check and you can’t 

hire the person. 

So just that one area, if you could just address that one issue? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, thank you. With respect to that, so I 

have got some good news to report. We actually get access to a 

whole host of information in databases now that allow us to do— 

and actually, we always had access to terrorist screening database, 

and databases with known or suspected terrorist information in it. 

Some of which you are referring to are some categories within 

what is called the terrorist information datamart environment. It 

is just a big database where this was information that may or may 

not be sufficient to directly tie somebody to a known or suspected 

terrorist, or identify them as such, or there might be partial information. Those are the categories that we had, you know, one-byone, or case-by-case access to, but not automated access. So we 

have asked for that automated access and we are working through 

the interagency to achieve that. 

We have also dramatically improved our oversight of the airport 

vetting environment. So as you know, we still vet the folks who are 

applying for secure access badges. But to the Inspector General’s 

point, we had not been overseeing the collection of information and 

the maintenance of the data in doing regular audits of that. We are 

doing that now directly as a result of the Inspector General’s findings. 

So I think that we are moving forward in a good way on getting 

information. I share your concern that we have access to as much 

information as we need to have access to in order to fully vet people who we put into trusted environments, given what we have already known about what has happened in some of the airport environments across the country. I think that we made good progress. 
37 

I have met with my counterparts in the intelligence community, 

and I have been sitting—I met with the National security staff and 

the senior directors for trans-border and others to make clear my 

priorities, and so far I have been getting good results from that. 

Miss RICE. Great, thank you both very much. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Miss Rice. The Chair now recognizes the 

Ranking Minority Member of the Homeland Security Committee, 

the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Neffenger, one of the real challenges I alluded to in my opening statement went toward the fact that we buy technology in the 

form of equipment for vulnerabilities that they can’t detect. How 

are you going to close that gap between known vulnerabilities and 

acquiring equipment and technologies that won’t detect it? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, you know, Mr. Thompson, you really 

hit on a key concern, and that is how do you get beyond today’s 

security systems and look towards the future and evolve fast 

enough to meet what we know to be an evolving threat environment? I think there are a couple of things we need to do. 

First of all, I would like to see more robust competition in the 

marketplace. Right now we are tied to a couple of key vendors. 

They have done good work and they produced some good equipment for us, but I would like to see even more competition. I would 

like to incentivize more. I think there is a lot of creativity in the 

private sector and I think there is a lot of innovation in the private 

sector. 

I have got some thoughts on ways in which we can incentivize 

that competition to include small business competition because I 

think that some of the small businesses out there are doing some 

of the most innovative work that we have. 

The second piece is to have a clear understanding of what the 

threat is so that when we develop the requirements that we need 

for the equipment that we are looking for, that those requirements 

are expansive and robust; that we don’t just look to buy the next 

thing on the shelf that looks like it might do the job, but that you 

have got to really start—I will back up a moment because it speaks 

to some of the points that each of you have made with respect to 

focus on mission. 

You really have to start with the mission. It is not just enough 

to say my mission is secure. You have to say, well, what does that 

mean? What are the components of my mission? So you have to do 

a true analysis of the mission. I say this sincerely, I start every day 

by thinking about the mission and I work backwards from there 

and I think, what does it take to accomplish this mission? What 

are the requirements we need to—if you are sitting at a checkpoint, 

what does that checkpoint have to actually do? What is the nature 

of the threats that might present themselves at the checkpoint? 

How might you determine those threats? How might they be presented? In what manner can they be presented? All of the different 

variations of that. That is a very complex process to do that, but 

you have to do it, and you have got to dissect that mission down 

to the—down to the details. 

Then you can begin to put out requirements that I think we 

can—we will see much more robust response to that. In the mean 
38 

time, I want to make sure that the equipment that we currently 

operate is operating to its peak. So we are working to get the most 

out of the current equipment as we look to move the next technology in. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, and not for a response, if we keep buying 

current equipment that can’t identify those known vulnerabilities, 

we are not where we need to be, and I think this robust competition is healthy because when you only have three major players in 

the area, you know, that is a lot. So I look forward to your leadership to incentivize other competition. I think that is important. We 

put it in the legislation, and I hope that authority gets us where 

we need to be. 

A couple of other things. You talked about the checkpoints. You 

know, TSOs are special to a lot of the traveling public. Most of the 

time, that is all people see are those men and women at the checkpoints. I would like to make sure that those men and women are 

being encouraged to be the best that they can be, and not penalized. Now, I heard something yesterday and I just need a yes or 

no answer. Are the medical guidelines for TSOs and all other employees for TSA the same? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. You know, I don’t know the answer to that 

question exactly, because I am looking at the very medical guidelines right now. I know that they have over the past year, before 

I became confirmed, I know that we had been working on updating 

the standards for medical guidelines. Here is what I believe to be 

the case. That I think that there are different categories of medical 

guidelines depending upon the type of work that you have to do in 

the organization. 

For example, I believe that there are certain physical standards 

you have to be able to meet in order to perform the duties as a baggage check person that may or may not be the same standards that 

you have to hold if you are an employee at TSA headquarters. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I want you to check that out. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. But I will verify it for you. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Because I am told that, like, people who are 

TSOs who might have asthma get discharged by having asthma, or 

high blood pressure, diabetes, whatever; but that people in management somehow don’t. Actually, I have the information, but that 

is a problem from my vantage point because if you have a different—just look at that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I will do that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. In health. I have got some other questions that 

I will submit, Mr. Chairman, for the record to get it. But I would 

also like unanimous consent to provide for the record that there 

have been 165 TSOs who have been terminated for disqualifying 

medical conditions—and cancer. I mean, you know, how can you 

terminate somebody because they have cancer? I mean, that is, you 

know, what I am saying? So I don’t want us to be a scrooge. I want 

us to treat people humanely, and I would like to include that into 

the record. 

Mr. KATKO. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information follows:] 
39 

LIST SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

TSO’S REMOVED/TERMINATED FOR DISQUALIFYING MEDICAL CONDITIONS FOR CALENDAR

YEAR 2014—THE NUMBER OF TSO REMOVALS/TERMINATIONS IS 165

Breakdown By Gender: 

Female—85 

Male—80 

Total—165 

Breakdown by Disqualifying Medical Guideline 

• Anxiety Related Dysfunction—15 • Arrhythmias—1 • Arthritis—2 • Asthma—3 • Behavior Dyscontrol—1 • Bipolar Disorder—2 • Body Mass Index—1 • Cancer—3 • Cardiomyopathy, Myocarditis, Constrictive Pericarditis—2 • Cataracts, Corneal Disorder, Eye Disorders—1 • Cervical, Thoracic and Lumbosacral Disc Disease Syndrome—23 • Chronic Bronchitis, Cystic Lung Disease & COPD—1 • Chronic Pain—4 

• Coronary Artery Disease—1 

• Delusional/Paranoid Dysfunction—1 

• Depression Related Disorder—13 

• Diabetes Mellitus—3 

• Equilibrium Disorder—3 

• Gout—1 

• Hernia—1 

• Hip, Knee, Ankle and Foot Related Dysfunction—4 

• Hypertension—1 

• Inability to Lift and Carry Items Weighing up to 70 Pounds—19 

• Inability to Walk, Stand for Periods Greater Than 10 Minutes—1 

• Inflammatory Bowel Disease—1 

• Irritable Bowel Syndrome—5 

• Lumbar Spine Disorder—5 

• Lumbosacral Surgery—1 

• Migraines and Other Episodic Headaches—18 

• Mobility and Dexterity—3 

• Motor Neuron Disease—1 

• Osteoarthritis—4 

• Pain & Neuropathies—1 

• Parkinson’s Disease—1 

• Peak Experiratory Flor (PEE)—1 

• PTSD—2 

• Renal Function—1 

• Seizure Disorder—6 

• Sleep Disorder—2 

• Spinal Abnormalities—1 

• Transient Neurological Events—1 

• Traumatic Brain Injury—1 

• Vertigo—2 

• Visual Acuity Far And Near—1 

Total=165 

TSOS REMOVED/TERMINATED FOR DISQUALIFYING MEDICAL CONDITIONS FOR CALENDAR

YEAR 2013—THE NUMBER OF TSO REMOVALS/TERMINATIONS IS 185

Breakdown By Gender 

Female—106 

Male—79 

Total—185 

Breakdown by Disqualifying Medical Guideline 

(1) Migraines and Other Episodic Headaches—27 

(2) Anxiety—14 

(3) Depression and Related Disorder—10 
40 

(4) Cervical Lumbar—1 

(5) Diabetes—9 

(6) Inflammatory Bowel Disease—3 

(7) Anemia—1 

(8) Anticoagulation Therapy—1 

(9) Psychotic Functioning—1 

(10) Cervical Thoracic—12 

(11) Gout—3 

(12) Urticaria—1 

(13) Joint Condition—3 

(14) Heart Disease—2 

(15) Cancer—2 

(16) Ventricular Arrhythmia—2 

(17) Inability to Lift and Carry Items Weighing up to 70 Pounds—44 

(18) Inability to Squat and Bend—6 

(19) Inability to Walk, Stand for Periods Greater Than 10 Minutes—8 

(20) Mobility and Dexterity—9 

(21) Vertigo—1 

(22) Inguinal, Umbilical or Ventral Hernia—1 

(23) Endocrine Disorder—1 

(24) Chronic Pain—4 

(25) Myotonic Dystrophy—1 

(26) Renal Dysfunction—1 

(27) Peripheral Neuropathy—1 

(28) Spinal Abnormalities—2 

(29) Sleep Disorder—2 

(30) Meniere’s Disease—1 

(31) Asthma—1 

(32) Seizures—2 

(33) Chronic Bronchitis—2 

(34) Diplopia and Visual Field Loss—1 

(35) Delusional/Paranoid Dysfunction—1 

(36) Behavioral Dyscontrol—2 

(37) Syncope—1 

(38) Thoracic Outlet Synedrome—1 

Total—185 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. The Chair now will recognize other Members of the committee for questions they may 

wish to ask the witnesses. 

In accordance with the committee rules and practice, I plan to 

recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing by 

the seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be 

recognized in the order of arrival. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Keating from Massachusetts for 5 

minutes of questioning. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was only me, anyway. 

Mr. KATKO. Well, you are very important to all of us. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, sir. Thank you for being here Mr. 

Roth, Inspector General Roth, and thank you for your work. You 

are talking about a culture. Let me just do this again. You know, 

it is not just TSA administrator that we are talking about in terms 

of the culture. It is higher up, Secretary Ridge when he was a witness, I brought this up with him, and he agreed it was a major 

issue. 

Secretary Napolitano, when she was the Secretary several times 

said this is a priority. It is an issue. I brought it up with Secretary 

Johnson, and last summer I brought it up with you. You agreed 

that this was a top priority. That is the issue of perimeter security 

around the airports. I have been saying this for so long and the re-
41 

sponse has been to cut down the number of vulnerability studies 

and to tell this committee that things are more secure. 

In the mean time, teenagers, intoxicated people, are breaching 

perimeter security, go right up to the aircraft, which is, I hate to 

say this publicly, but which is an amazing target. They can put a 

bomb on there the same way that these teenagers had access and 

not even risk their own lives the way people would ordinarily have 

to do it if they are going to breach the gate. 

So I wanted to follow up, No. 1, with that question to see what 

steps have been taken since we last discussed this, and what you 

expect to implement. 

The second issue, part of the problem with perimeter is the jurisdictional issue. You have got some airports that are municipal airports, very small airports, but still networked into the big commercial flights. You have got authorities, all kinds of brands and 

shapes, all types of resources to deal with it. The continuing problem of what to do with the exit lanes, which TSA maintains is still 

a priority, it is still important. 

It is still an access point, but you want to shift that authority 

to these airports that aren’t even doing the job with perimeter security. 

So the two questions I have are: What is the update on perimeter 

security in terms of implementing what you said was high priority? 

No. 2, how can we resolve the exit lane issue which I think if it 

is so important for TSA, it should remain their responsibility and 

make sure we have the kind of security we need there, because 

that is a vulnerability standpoint as far as I have seen? If you 

could, those two questions, Administrator Neffenger, and thank you 

again for making yourself so available. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, thank you, Mr. Keating. 

Perimeter security, as you know, one of the things that was requested right in the aftermath of the Atlanta issue was a look by 

the Aviation Security Advisory Committee at vulnerabilities across 

the airport system. I think that provided a very good series of 

issues to address as well as some strong recommendations and we 

have been working to, first of all, to think about how to implement 

those, and then to take a good solid look at the system. 

So it actually is a significant priority of ours to ensure perimeter 

security. I share your same concerns with it. So what have we 

done? I have ordered a look at all of the airports across the country. 

I want to know from top to bottom, you know, what have we 

done with respect to perimeter security, including access control 

points, how those access control points are maintained, and then 

what do we do to actually ensure the safety and security of the perimeter itself? What is the nature of the perimeter, and how consistently is it enforced around? So that is a fairly large undertaking, and I haven’t seen the results of that request yet. 

The other thing I am doing is putting more effort into that oversight piece. We have legislative authority to do that oversight 

whether you are dealing with a local airport authority, a local municipality, or a large aviation concern. All of it falls under the purview, and I think that there are—you can set clear performance 

standards for how that is done. 
42 

So the first is to assess what the current state really is as opposed to—— 

Mr. KEATING. I don’t want to interrupt you, but my time is going 

away on me. Do you have a time frame in which that study could 

be taking place? I am a few weeks away from asking this question 

for 6 years now. Do you have a time frame? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I understand your frustration so we 

are doing that right now. Let me get you an actual time frame so 

that I—because I don’t want to promise something I can’t deliver 

on a certain time, but I can commit to you is that it is happening 

right now and I have asked the same question. 

I am very concerned about the same issue, I want you to understand. Because that system is important. Let’s say you get the 

checkpoint 100 percent right. There are more vulnerabilities in the 

aviation system than the checkpoint. 

Mr. KEATING. The exit lane, briefly if you could. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I will get back to you on the exit lane question as well, sir. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Keating. We are getting ready for 

votes, but I think what I would like to do, if any of the other Members have questions, just ask questions and have you respond to 

the rest in writing. I have a few that I would like to have responded to in writing before we wrap up here. 

With respect to Mr. Roth, simply, Mr. Roth, if there are other 

kind of 30,000-foot observations you would like to make about TSA 

that you weren’t able to cover today in the short period that we 

were here, I encourage you to submit them in writing to the committee and I encourage you to be as blunt and open as possible. I 

think it is important to expose that, and make sure to copy the administrator on it as well. 

With respect to Administrator Neffenger, there are a couple of 

things I would like to have you talk about. Ranking Member 

Thompson hit it right on the head with the technology issues. One 

of the things he said that is very important is he said he has only 

seen three major players, if you will, within the technology providing for the administration, and that sometimes it seems like 

there is a sense of comfort with dealing with just those three. 

I think competition is a good thing. I have been to many technology presentations recently and the updated technology out there 

is stunningly advanced. It seems to me that I would like to hear 

from you, actually, as to what you are doing to vet that technology, 

and how you are encouraging these newcomers on the scene to give 

them a fair shake. Not only from a competition aspect, but taking 

a real good hard look at everything from the prescreening aspects 

with the biometric data, to the actual physical screening procedures and machines because we know there are problems with 

them now, and going forward, how are you going to address that? 

The other component I want to ask you about is the age of the 

screening equipment itself. Because from my understanding, much 

of this equipment is at or near a 10-year lifespan. That I would like 

to know what the plans are going forward to replace it because 

many of these are at the end of their lifespan and—projected life-
43 

span at least, and it doesn’t seem like there is a plan going forward 

on the horizon. 

So I would like to see what the blueprint is going forward to deal 

with this new technology. I think Mr. Thompson is 100 percent 

right that technology is critically important and hearing from all 

parties, not just the ones that TSA is comfortable with. That is 

very important. 

Let me make sure there is nothing else here. Oh, yeah, last thing 

is, with respect to the access controls. I would like to hear what 

has been done since we have to tighten up access controls, and I 

will note to just warn you that with respect to the Viper team that 

was celebrated as a risk-based security for the access controls, but 

it was completely exploited by the individuals in the Dallas/Fort 

Worth case. 

As a matter of fact, employees went into areas and if the Viper 

team was there, they just simply called out to their comrades to 

bring the drugs and contrabands to another exit, another entry 

point. That is a major concern. So I don’t want to hear too much 

about the Viper teams because it is not getting the job done. It’s 

pretty obvious. They are a good idea, but they are easily circumvented. So I would like to hear what your ideas are about that 

going forward, and what has actually been done going forward. 

I really look forward to getting that bill passed that we just recently passed out of the House and getting it signed—passed out 

of the Senate and signed by the President so that we can get to 

work on doing an in-depth study that is really needed with this. 

So with that, I will ask my colleagues if they have any further 

questions they want to have submitted for the record. Anything? 

All right, if there is anything further, we will submit them to you 

in writing within 10 days. 

I thank you very much. It was an abbreviated session, but we 

have had a few things going on today as you might imagine, and 

it is now time for some votes. So thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JOHN KATKO FOR PETER NEFFENGER

Question 1. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has long been 

plagued with accusations of mismanagement and waste. Since taking the helm at 

the agency, have you had the opportunity to assess the various programs and activities in TSA’s area of responsibility and identify any areas that are in need of reform, 

restructuring, or elimination? 

Answer. On an annual basis, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

examines all programs and activities to review current requirements and execution 

of resources along with program performance to ensure optimal use of limited resources. This process identifies realignments, restructurings, and/or elimination of 

programs or activities to propose in the annual Congressional budget submission. 

Over the past several fiscal years, TSA has identified efficiencies and savings in 

the budget. For example, in fiscal year 2014, TSA identified approximately $100 million in various enterprise-wide and administrative/professional support contract efficiencies; in fiscal year 2015 and 2016, TSA’s budget submissions reflected over $200 

million in savings as a result of implementing risk-based security initiatives. Realignments have also been made through the formal budget process to better apportion resources to TSA’s organization and management structure, while enhancing 

mission effectiveness. In the fiscal year 2015 budget, TSA permanently consolidated 

the Federal Air Marshal Service Appropriation into a single Program, Project, and 

Activity (PPA) within TSA’s Aviation Security Appropriation and realigned the Intelligence PPA from Transportation Security Support Appropriation to the Intelligence and Vetting Appropriation. 

TSA recently established a new level of review in the budget process for the fiscal 

year 2018–2022 cycle which will include in-depth, transparent, agency-wide program 

reviews and prioritization of requirements. In the current fiscal climate, TSA will 

ensure that the available resources are effectively and efficiently aligned and managed to minimize waste. Additionally, TSA will ensure that programs and activities 

support the TSA and Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) missions, while 

aligning resources to the TSA Administrator’s and DHS Secretary’s priorities. 

Programs and activities are also assessed when high-priority emergent needs 

arise outside of the development of an annual budget. For example, TSA initiated 

a programmatic review of security procedures addressing issues raised by the DHS 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) covert testing results issued in May 2015. The report revealed the need for improvements in the screening process, to be addressed 

in the near and long terms. Based on the review, resource realignments have been 

proposed to improve security performance and monitoring. TSA is committed to optimizing resources, and remaining a high-performing, risk-based intelligence-driven 

agency. 

Question 2. How do you plan to measure and evaluate TSA’s success in achieving 

programmatic goals and outcomes? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will report strategic 

and management measures externally through the Future Years Homeland Security 

Program system. These select measures align to the Department of Homeland Security Mission 1.1 Goal: Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security. TSA will also use 

other metrics to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of individual security programs, such as the use of scorecards to assess performance management in the 

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) report. This report identifies security programs, 

procedures, and technology deemed strategically important by TSA leadership, and 

measures performance at the airport, regional, and National levels. The MOE replaces the previous Management Objectives Report and reflects the increased emphasis on security effectiveness and a decreased emphasis on throughput. The specific performance metrics used in the MOE reporting are organized into the following four broad categories: 
46 

• Workforce Readiness.—Measures emphasize the continued development of an 

adaptive and flexible counterterrorism workforce that is highly-trained, competent, and ready to meet the threat. • System Readiness.—Measures improve mission effectiveness by measuring the 

implementation and continuation of risk-based, intelligence-driven security initiatives aimed at deterring and disrupting adversary activity. • Workforce Performance.—Measures reflect the ability of TSA’s human assets to 

detect threats to aviation security presented through the screening checkpoint 

and checked baggage. • System Performance.—Measures reflect the operational and management conditions that optimize TSA’s ability to detect threats to aviation security. 

Individual programs will also have management-level reports which measure all 

facets of those programs, procedures, and/or technologies. 

Question 3. Do you believe that TSA is adequately adapting its tactics and resources to mitigate the evolving threats to transportation? Similarly, do you believe 

TSA’s foreign partners are keeping up with threats emanating from overseas? How 

has TSA improved its overseas footprint and coordination with other governments? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) identifies key risk information related to global aviation, conducts systematic analysis to determine key 

risk drivers, and develops effective and efficient strategies that mitigate the inbound aviation risk to the United States. TSA assesses the security posture at international airports that serve U.S. aircraft operators and from which foreign air carriers serve the United States. TSA has made great strides in strengthening its international network by developing and instituting an innovative risk management 

methodology that drives the allocation of resources and operations to target the 

most important vulnerabilities. TSA identifies these vulnerabilities and determines 

how frequently an airport should be assessed based on existing data collection and 

analysis. In fiscal year 2015, TSA conducted 146 foreign airport assessments and 

289 air carrier inspections. 

TSA relies on a wide range of activities, resources, and personnel to effect change 

in the vulnerability posture at a foreign airport. TSA determines a way forward, 

choosing from a number of direct or indirect mitigation actions. When a specific 

threat is identified or significant vulnerabilities warrant additional mitigation actions, TSA may issue Security Directives and Emergency Amendments to be implemented by air carriers at selected locations. Following issuance of these Security Directives or Emergency Amendments, TSA relies on a number of methods, such as 

ad hoc visits or inspections, to verify compliance with the additional measures. Follow-up assessments and inspections reveal whether any reduction in vulnerability 

occurred. The results of these visits enable TSA to determine if the mitigation actions were successful. 

TSA also aligns its strategic engagements with international partners using this 

risk-based approach. Through its TSA Representatives and International Industry 

Representatives, as well as through TSA Senior Leadership engagement, TSA is 

able to influence and inform key decision makers in both foreign governments and 

industry on on-going threat streams and associated vulnerabilities in the aviation 

security system, and encourage a subsequent mitigation strategy to address these 

vulnerabilities. TSA, through its internationally-deployed workforce, builds and 

maintains relationships with foreign government officials, foreign and domestic air 

carriers, civil aviation authorities, airport authorities, international aviation organizations, and other U.S. Government stakeholders to enhance global aviation security. In addition, TSA plays an active role in the International Civil Aviation Organization, and engages with a number of regional international aviation security 

working groups, such as the Quadrilateral Working Group, where TSA coordinates 

with other Member States on a range of pressing aviation security issues, and mitigation measures. 

TSA continues to examine its international footprint to ensure that it has the appropriate resources forward-deployed to mitigate the inbound threat. Since 2013, 

TSA has opened two new offices in Africa—Senegal and Morocco—bringing the total 

to four offices on that continent. 

Question 4. Subsequent to the OIG’s report release, Secretary Johnson announced 

that a ‘‘Tiger Team’’ of DHS and TSA officials would monitor the implementation 

of measures put in place to improve security at airport checkpoints. The committee 

requests that a copy of the ‘‘Tiger Team’’ report is transmitted to Congress upon 

completion. By what date do you expect this report to be completed? 

Answer. We expect the report to be complete and available to the committee not 

later than November 25, 2015. 

Question 5. Technology plays an important role in mitigating evolving threats to 

transportation security. Traditionally, TSA has engaged the same vendors in the 
47 

procurement process which has hampered competition and innovation. What is 

being done by TSA to engage with new vendors and encourage increased competition in the procurement process? 

Answer. Almost all of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) contracts are awarded competitively through open-source procurements. However, there 

are only a limited number of vendors with capabilities sufficient enough to satisfy 

TSA’s very specific mission-related requirements. TSA actively participates—both in 

a leading and supporting role—in recurring industry engagement events to promote 

transparency, and provide input on topics such as key operational issues, process 

improvement, and procurement forecasting. TSA encourages robust competition as 

it ultimately reduces risk to the Government and increases vendor performance. 

In addition, TSA frequently works with small businesses interested in accessing 

the market and was pleased to make a significant award to a small business. In 

March 2015, TSA awarded a contract for 1,170 Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) 

units to a new Small Business entrant, a prime example of a small business introducing new ETD technology into aviation security and achieving approval through 

the TSA Qualified Products List process. 

In addition, TSA employs market research by submitting requests for information, 

publishing broad agency announcements, and hosting industry days that help facilitate engagement with a variety of industry stakeholders, including those that are 

not currently TSA vendors. 

Most recently, TSA issued the Transportation Security Innovative Concepts Broad 

Agency Announcement through FedBizOpps.gov, seeking to accelerate the design, 

realization, and delivery of new capabilities by focusing on advancing state-of-theart technology and increasing knowledge or understanding related to transportation 

security. 

Question 6. Last week, the committee released its report from the Task Force on 

Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel. As I am sure you are aware, a 

record number of individuals are traveling to active conflict zones, and a number 

of these individuals return to the United States undetected. This poses a serious 

threat to our Nation’s security. 

What steps is TSA taking to address this issue? Are you actively collaborating 

with other relevant departments and agencies to develop strategies to combat terrorist and foreign fighter travel? How is TSA collaborating with partners abroad to 

identify and prevent bad actors from boarding planes bound to the United States? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has a number of programs in place to identify passengers who have booked travel from abroad to the 

United States, and who may pose a security risk. These programs rely upon nearreal-time information sharing with our stakeholders, industry partners, and the intelligence community. TSA’s Secure Flight program conducts passenger watch list 

matching for more than 270 U.S. and foreign air carriers with flights into, out of, 

within, and over the United States, as well as covered U.S. flights between two 

international points, to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation or 

National security, and designate them for enhanced screening or prohibition from 

boarding an aircraft, as appropriate. TSA also provides risk-based, intelligence-driven, scenario rules to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for use in the Automated 

Targeting System—Passenger to identify international travelers requiring enhanced 

screening based upon our knowledge of patterns identified as needing additional 

scrutiny. 

In 2015, TSA identified a number of known or suspected terrorists who attempted 

to travel on commercial aircraft, and who represented the highest threat to transportation, some of whom were identified as potential foreign fighters. For these 

cases, TSA took action to address the threat, which included, as appropriate, denial 

of boarding to prevent overseas travel to participate in foreign fighting or to conduct 

other nefarious activities. 

TSA also assigns intelligence officers to key components with responsibilities for 

analytical partnerships and watchlisting duties. TSA intelligence personnel are embedded at 8 different agencies and centers; these include the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the CBP National Targeting Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. In these positions, TSA 

intelligence analysts work closely across organizational lines to optimize information-sharing efforts, and facilitate a coordinated U.S. Government response to 

known and suspected terrorist travel. Improved monitoring and vetting processes of 

travelers with robust data analytics provide a clearer understanding of travelers’ 

movements, and permit the sharing of a superior common operating picture between 

agencies to mitigate potential threats. 
48 

TSA personnel are also assigned to law enforcement-related agencies and task 

forces to facilitate information sharing. These assignments include the Syria-Iraq 

Task Force, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation-led National Joint Terrorism 

Task Force. These officers collaborate daily with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CBP, and other organizations to disseminate intelligence relating to foreign 

fighters. 

Additionally, TSA Field Intelligence Officers assigned to our Nation’s airports 

work closely with CBP, and the local Joint Terrorism Task Forces locally develop 

a coordinated approach to engagement with local stakeholders and coordinate intelligence messaging and threat awareness to the field, developing and maintaining a 

common aviation threat picture for Federal, State, and local task force officers assigned to U.S. airports, as well as TSA field components specific to foreign fighter 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. 

Question 7. The President recently signed into law H.R. 719, which I introduced 

earlier this year; this bill requires the TSA to conduct a reclassification of employees 

within the Office of Inspection to ensure that those employees classified as criminal 

investigators spend at least 50% of their time conducting criminal investigations. 

Those investigators spending less than 50% of their time on criminal investigations 

will be reclassified and receive pay that is commensurate with their actual job responsibilities. The OIG estimated that this will result in savings of approximately 

$17.5 million in taxpayer dollars over 5 years. We exchanged letters on this matter 

this summer in which you stated that TSA and OIG are working closely together 

to ensure all employees are properly classified. 

Can you give the committee an estimate of how long it will take to evaluate and 

implement this reclassification? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to conducting an independent full position classification review and workforce analysis to 

determine the appropriate classification of each position currently classified as a 

criminal investigator in the Office of Inspection. TSA will reclassify any criminal investigator position that does not meet the minimum legally-required 50 percent 

criminal investigation workload. 

TSA and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)—the recognized expert in 

the field of position classification and workforce analysis—have agreed to a statement of work for the classification review and workforce analysis as requested by 

the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). TSA currently awaits OIG final approval 

of the OPM methodology outlined in the statement of work to initiate the independent OPM review and analysis of the TSA Office of Inspection criminal investigations workforce. 

Question 8a. Two weeks ago, the President signed into law H.R. 720, the Gerardo 

Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015, which requires the TSA to increase communication and coordination with all pertinent agencies that would respond to an airport during a crisis situation, which was the result of a tragic event. The committee 

has voiced concern over the amount of training TSOs receive, as it pertains to operating technology being used at checkpoints, but I want to make sure the TSA is adequately training the TSOs to defend themselves as well. This is an officer safety 

issue and we simply must give the people on the front lines the tools to succeed 

and survive. 

How much training do TSOs receive in defensive tactics? 

Question 8b. How are the TSOs taught to deal with physically combative people 

at the checkpoints, who may or may not have a weapon? 

Answer. While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) currently does 

not offer defensive tactics training to the Officer workforce, it has taken significant 

steps to address employee safety concerns. Immediately following the tragic November 1, 2013, incident at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), TSA required all 

its employees to complete training on how to recognize and respond to an activethreat incident in the workplace, be it an office or airport environment. TSA developed a series of interactive training courses with the support and participation of 

local airport officials, law enforcement officers, and TSA personnel to help Officers: 

• recognize how to respond when an active shooter is in their vicinity; 

• identify how to interact with Law Enforcement Officers who are responding to 

an incident; and 

• execute the widely-accepted active-shooter response reactions of Run-HideFight. 

Most recently, TSA created a new training course entitled ‘‘Active Shooter Incident Response Training.’’ Filmed entirely at the Indianapolis (IND) airport, the 

interactive training video reinforces the widely-accepted active-shooter response reactions of Run-Hide-Fight. TSA released the training video in January 2015, with 

a required completion date of March 31, 2015. TSA mandates Active-Shooter train-
49 

ing as an annual training requirement for its employees, and the entire TSA screening workforce has completed the training. 

In addition to the active-shooter video, Operational Directive (OD) 400–19–2, 

Emergency Evacuation Drills, addresses the requirement for employees to be familiar with the two types of emergency evacuation drills: Controlled and uncontrolled. 

The evacuation drills are scenario-based and include active shooter as an uncontrolled drill. The minimum requirement is two drills per year. The reporting requirement is to document airport completion of emergency evacuation drills in the 

Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS) and individual employee 

completion in the Online Learning Center (OLC). 

Question 9. Airport employee access controls continue to be a concerning security 

vulnerability. I introduced H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015 earlier this year, and it passed the House earlier this week. 

Can you please provide an update to the committee on what changes to employee 

access controls TSA has implemented this year? What additional changes do you 

have planned? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) performed a comprehensive review of Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) proposed recommendations regarding access controls. As a result, TSA issued Information Circular (IC) 15–01 on April 29, 2015. This IC made recommendations to airports to 

reduce the number of access points to the operational minimum, to increase the 

number of continuous random inspections for individuals entering the sterile/secured area other than through the checkpoint, and to promote a culture of situational awareness by leveraging the Department of Homeland Security’s ‘‘If You See 

Something, Say Something’’ campaign, or a similar program. 

On August 26, 2015, TSA issued IC 15–01A to provide further details regarding 

recommended inspections and measures previously identified in IC 15–01, and those 

measures that are mandated by TSA in the Security Directive (SD) 1542–06–01 series. This version supplied additional specific recommendations regarding the inspection of individuals, such as inspecting for a minimum number of hours per 

week, restricting other access points when inspections are being conducted, as well 

as recommendation of the methodology of the actual search. 

Finally, TSA is developing a capability for continuous monitoring of airport employees’ criminal history records. Once implemented, TSA will be notified of any 

change in an employee’s status so that appropriate action can be taken. At this 

time, TSA is piloting this process at a limited number of airports, and intends to 

expand it system-wide, once completed. TSA already performs recurrent vetting 

against the Terrorist Screening Database. 

TSA continues to work with the airports through the Federal Security Directors 

to ensure access points are kept to an operational minimum, and that random and 

unpredictable inspection of individuals and property entering the sterile/secured 

areas is conducted. 

Question 10. The OIG recently issued a report that uncovered 73 aviation workers 

that had links to terrorism which were not detected in the initial screening process. 

Furthermore, the report found that different airports employed different screening 

techniques and there lacked consistency across the board. What is the current status of TSA’s efforts to improve and streamline the employee screening process? 

What additional measures do you feel are necessary in order to improve the daily 

screening of employees at our Nation’s airports? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to further strengthening our ability to identify insider threats at our Nation’s airports, 

as well as to streamline the employee-vetting process. As indicated in the Office of 

the Inspector General report, 69 individuals (represented by 73 records) had records 

in certain Governmental databases to which TSA did not have automated access 

when they were first vetted. These individuals have never been on the terrorist 

watch list. TSA recognizes the value of having as much relevant data as possible 

to make informed decisions in its vetting, and is pursuing access to additional types 

of intelligence records to maximize its vetting capabilities. TSA now requires airports to conduct a criminal history records check (CHRC) every 2 years, and will 

continue to do so until an alternative recurrent CHRC process is developed. TSA 

is working collaboratively with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to develop 

and establish next generation identification databases, which would automatically 

update an employee’s criminal history as incidents occur. TSA and FBI are moving 

to pilot the initiative with two airports and one airline. This initiative aligns with 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General and Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) recommendations for improving Aviation Workers security. 
50 

TSA has been working to implement many ASAC recommendations for improving 

the employee screening process at our Nation’s airports. 

These measures include: 

• Working to implement the FBI/Next Generation Identification RAP Back Service, which would automatically update an employee’s criminal history as events 

occur in order to augment the current 2-year background check process; • Training enhancements on verification of identification documents, recognition 

of identity fraud, and behavioral analysis for use by Government and industry 

partners at the airports; • Increasing intelligence-sharing opportunities with industry partners at the airports; and 

• Examining the ASAC recommendation to develop enhanced employee access security model based on elements such as intelligence, game theory, and riskbased security principals that would cause employees to have a reasonable expectation of being inspected. 

Question 11. Secretary Johnson stated that random screening of airport employees 

was increased after authorities uncovered that aviation workers in Atlanta and New 

York City were smuggling weapons and ammunitions. By how much was screening 

increased? Do you believe that this has been an effective deterrent? 

Answer. In the aftermath of the Atlanta and New York City incidents, in January 

2015, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) increased the amount of 

random screening of employees through its Playbook Program. With Playbook, TSA 

personnel conduct screening on an unpredictable basis at locations throughout the 

airport. These activities, which include but are not limited to, identity verification, 

physical screening of accessible property, and explosives detection, are coordinated 

at the local airport level and conducted by Transportation Security Officers. Playbook operations provide a level of risk-based and unpredictable screening for Security Identification Display Area badge-holding personnel and others who are entering the airport at locations other than the screening checkpoint. 

From January 1–September 30, 2015, TSA screened over 11 million employees 

using Playbook operations. This is a 340 percent increase compared to the 2.5 million employees screened using Playbook in the prior year. 

Playbook is not the only deterrence method used to address the insider threat. 

TSA has worked with airports to reduce the number of access points at airports regulated by TSA to an operational minimum. TSA has also recommended and worked 

with airports to limit access privileges for aviation workers. 

TSA believes that providing a visible presence, and additional random screening 

at employee access points, coupled with our other layers of security, creates an effective deterrent. TSA will continue to focus on mitigating the insider threat. 

Question 12. In a recent response to a letter sent by the committee, TSA indicated 

that it was aware of allegations of sexual misconduct by Air Marshals in mid-June. 

Why was the committee not informed of this issue earlier, particularly in light of 

the oversight hearing that was held on the FAMS on July 16? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is committed to working with committee staff to ensure they are kept aware of relevant investigations; 

however, details will not be available until investigations are complete and the circumstances surrounding the allegation(s) are known. TSA will continue to keep the 

committee staff up-to-date and informed. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR PETER NEFFENGER

Question 1. Has TSA moved forward with the implementation of changes to the 

dispute resolution process and the NRC without adopting any of the union’s recommendations? 

Answer. No, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not moved forward with the implementation of changes to the dispute resolution process and the 

National Resolution Center (NRC) without adopting any of the Union’s recommendations. The NRC, the TSA office that administers and implements the resolution process, has not made any changes to the existing resolution process. The 

NRC provided the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) a copy 

of the draft dispute resolution process policy for AFGE’s input. AFGE provided its 

input and the NRC continues to consider this input and revise the draft policy. Once 

the NRC completes additional revisions to the draft dispute resolution process policy, another draft copy will be provided to AFGE for input before the revised policy 

is issued. AFGE was informed of this via email on September 29, 2015. 

Question 2. The 2012 Determination requires that the union’s suggestions be 

adopted ‘‘to the extent possible.’’ Is it TSA’s position that the union’s suggestions 

were impossible to adopt? 
51 

Answer. As an initial matter, the 2011 Decision issued by former Administrator 

Pistole is no longer in effect. It was replaced by the 2014 Determination issued by 

former Administrator Pistole on December 29, 2014. In regard to the Unitary Dispute Resolution System (UDRS), the 2014 Determination does not require that TSA 

take the Union’s suggestions to the extent possible. Instead, the 2014 Determination 

stipulates that the Union is encouraged to provide input, including any suggestions, 

comments, and/or concerns to the National Resolution Center (NRC) regarding the 

policy governing the UDRS as applied to covered employees. The NRC gave the 

Union an opportunity to provide its input on changes to the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) policy governing the UDRS and is considering its input. The 

NRC will give the Union another opportunity to provide further input before the 

policy is issued. If the NRC does not incorporate the Union’s input into the TSA 

policy, the NRC will provide a written response to the Union explaining the basis 

for its decision. 

Question 3. TSA and the union are in mediated talks for a new contract, and the 

union has initiated a request for informal interest-based discussions with TSA. 

Given the union’s strenuous objections to TSA’s unilateral changes to the NRC and 

the dispute resolution process, will TSA agree to limit the role of the NRC in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement signed by TSA and AFGE throughout the 

duration of those discussions? 

Answer. The current collective bargaining is for a new collective bargaining agreement on the negotiable issues listed in former Administrator Pistole’s December 29, 

2014, Determination on Transportation Security Officers and Collective Bargaining 

(2014 Determination). The NRC is the Transportation Security Administration’s 

(TSA) office that administers and implements the dispute resolution processes for 

all TSA employees, not just bargaining unit employees. Only one aspect of the dispute resolution process is reflected in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed 

by TSA and AFGE in 2012. The MOA addresses third-party review of certain disciplinary actions and other covered disputes for bargaining unit employees. The 

MOA was not a part of collective bargaining in 2012 and is not a part of any collective bargaining agreement. Significantly, the MOA also does not govern or limit the 

NRC. 

Question 4. Do the Medical Guidelines apply to TSA managers? 

Answer. The Medical and Psychological Guidelines for Transportation Security 

Administration Transportation Security Officer Job Series (TSO Medical Guidelines) 

apply to the Supervisory Transportation Security Officers (STSOs). Management officials, other than STSOs, who manage security screeners do not fall under the TSO 

Medical Guidelines as physical/medical requirements have not been established for 

these positions. 

Question 5. Once the exam confirms a TSO has a certain diagnosis of migraines, 

Type 1 or 2 diabetes or heart disease, for instance, is TSA required to establish that 

the medical condition impairs the ability of the TSO to perform their duties? 

Is it assumed that a diagnosis or confirmation of a medical condition is in itself 

proof that the TSO is not fit for duty? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Officer (TSO) has to meet the medical and 

psychological requirements of the position. Generally, it is not assumed that a diagnosis is in itself proof that the TSO is not fit for duty. The Transportation Security 

Administration’s physician will obtain information on the TSO’s medical conditions, 

medications, and job limitations, and will compare that information with the TSO 

Medical Guidelines, and may seek other sources of medical information to determine 

fitness for duty. 

Question 6. TSOs report that TSA uses a document entitled ‘‘Medical Guidelines 

for Transportation Security Screeners’’ to determine whether a TSO is fit for duty. 

Has TSA provided the most current version of this document to the American Federation of Government Employees, the union elected as exclusive representative of 

the TSO workforce? 

If not, will you provide the most current version of the Medical Guidelines to the 

union immediately? 

Answer. The current Medical and Psychological Guidelines for Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Job Series (TSO 

Medical Guidelines) have not been provided in their entirety to the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), due to the sensitive content contained 

therein. The TSO Medical Guidelines are intended for use by medical practitioners. 

Consistent with the 2011 Determination on Transportation Security Officers and 

Collective Bargaining (2011 Determination) and subsequent 2014 Determination, 

AFGE did not have the right to the current TSO Medical Guidelines as they do not 

relate to the issues for collective bargaining. Union representatives who represent 

individual bargaining unit employees in cases involving the TSO Medical Guidelines 
52 

have received, and continue to receive, copies of the relevant section(s) of the TSO 

Medical Guidelines. TSA is in the process of revising the medical guidelines. 

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE WILLIAM R. KEATING FOR PETER NEFFENGER

Question 1a. Administrator Neffenger: Thank you for your testimony and thoughtful responses at the Transportation Security Subcommittee hearing on October 8, 

2015. During our discussion, you said you are conducting a ‘‘top-to-bottom’’ review 

of all airports, including access control points and what, exactly, constitutes an airport’s perimeter. 

What, specifically, has this review entailed and when will it be completed? 

Question 1b. Once completed, will you provide its findings to interested Members? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked with Federalized airports to closely review all aspects of physical security, including access 

control points and perimeter security. In doing so, the total number of access points 

has been reduced by almost 10 percent Nation-wide, while airport security personnel and TSA have increased random screening of airport employees at those access points. 

The perimeter security of an airport involves perimeter access and transition 

areas at the airport, and includes protection of the fence line, active and inactive 

vehicle & pedestrian gates, maintenance & construction gates, vehicle roadways, 

and general aviation areas. Access control security generally refers to security features that control who can access certain restricted areas or systems at the airport. 

At an airport, restricted areas may include the baggage claim area, baggage makeup 

area, sterile area, secured area, air operations area, catering facilities, cargo facilities, fuel farms, and other public spaces and areas. In the context of access control 

security at the airport perimeter (for example, direct entry into the secured area 

through a vehicle access gate), this definition does not include access at a passenger 

checkpoint. 

TSA is working with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) on a comprehensive review of airport perimeter security. ASAC has provided a list of recommendations to improve perimeter security. These recommendations are under review. 

TSA will be pleased to share its findings with the committee and interested Members. 

Question 2. Second, you are aware of my long-standing concern for transitioning 

the responsibility of staffing airport exit lanes from TSA to airport operators. I have 

spoken with numerous operators, include the Massachusetts Port Authority 

(Massport), which owns and operates three airports in Massachusetts, including 

Boston Logan International Airport, in addition to the Port of Boston. They remain 

troubled that TSA interpreted the staffing of exit lanes as an issue of access control 

rather than screening function, and that the expectation for airport operators to 

staff these exit ways will continue. This is a matter of both safety and resources. 

What is TSA’s current policy for staffing exit lanes? Will TSA continue to staff 

airport exit lanes into the future? If not, how will TSA work with airports to mitigate costs? 

Answer. Currently, approximately two-thirds of the airport operators control access at exit lanes by using airport technology or personnel. The remaining exit lanes 

are staffed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Under § 603 of the 

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (Budget Act), Pub. L. No. 113–67, Div. A, § 603, 127 

Stat. 1188 (2013), TSA is responsible for monitoring passenger exit lanes from the 

sterile area of airports at which TSA provided such monitoring as of December 1, 

2013. TSA interprets § 603 of the Budget Act to mean that TSA must staff a sterile 

area exit lane only if the exit lane was in existence on December 1, 2013, at one 

of the 155 airports at which TSA was providing monitoring services on that date. 

Therefore, if an airport is remodeling an exit lane and the location of this exit remains essentially the same, TSA will continue to staff this lane. If the remodeling 

significantly changes the location of the exit lane, to where it is no longer co-located 

with the screening checkpoint, and/or requires additional staffing and resources, 

TSA is no longer obligated to monitor this exit lane. 

TSA provides an evaluation tool, which allows the airport operator to input exit 

lane configurations and parameters, and receive recommendations for technological 

solutions. Consideration of technology options to exit lane staffing should also include evaluation of related advantages, disadvantages, and trade-offs in breach response requirements. 
53 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN JOHN KATKO FOR JOHN ROTH

Question 1. Inspector General Roth, your office has conducted numerous investigations highlighting various challenges that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) faces. What systemic problems have you identified? 

Answer. In the past year, I have testified before your committee and others on 

my concerns about TSA’s enormous and complex challenges. These challenges are 

systemic; they impact virtually every area of TSA operations. Our audits and reviews have shown that TSA’s challenges include: • assessing risk appropriately; • contracting for goods and services; • deploying and maintaining equipment; 

• hiring and training an effective workforce; 

• performing basic management functions to meet its mission; and 

• operating in a culture resistant to oversight and unwilling to accept the need 

for change in the face of an evolving and serious threat. 

Question 2. From your perspective what steps do you feel Administrator Neffenger 

should take to reform and improve TSA? 

Answer. Addressing the aforementioned challenges will require time, resources, 

and committed, courageous leadership at every level of management and throughout 

the organization, from the TSA Administrator to Transportation Security Officers 

(TSO) who screen passengers and baggage. Examples of steps TSA should take to 

reform and improve its performance include: 

• Ensure proper staffing, training, and supervision of TSOs to mitigate the effects 

of human error-related vulnerabilities in passenger and baggage screening. 

• Ensure everyone in the chain-of-command understands and is committed to addressing passenger and baggage screening vulnerabilities identified in our reports. 

• Encourage all TSA personnel to identify and report security deficiencies and 

vulnerabilities and participate in developing and implementing solutions. 

• Improve the transparency and accountability of efforts undertaken or planned 

to address the technological, personnel, and procedural deficiencies and 

vulnerabilities identified by OIG, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

and internal offices, such as TSA’s Office of Inspections. 

• Implement timely, efficient, and effective strategies to ensure all screening 

equipment is well-maintained and fully operational. 

OIG will continue its oversight of TSA. For example, we plan to: 

• determine whether the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) adequately manages its resources to detect, deter, and defeat threats to the civil aviation system (Federal Air Marshal Service Oversight of Civil Aviation Security); and 

• determine the effectiveness of TSA’s carry-on baggage screening technologies 

and checkpoint screener performance in identifying and resolving potential 

threats at airport security checkpoints (TSA Carry-On Baggage Penetration 

Testing). 

Our on-going audits and reviews of TSA include: 

• Office of Human Capital Contracts.—Determine whether TSA’s human capital 

contracts are managed effectively, comply with DHS’s acquisition guidelines, 

and are achieving expected goals. 

• Security Vetting of Passenger Rail Reservation Systems.—Determine the extent 

to which TSA has policies, processes, and oversight measures to improve security at the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK). 

• Controls Over Access Media Badges.—Identify and test selected controls over access media badges issued by airport operators. 

Question 3. Looking at your office’s extensive body of work as it relates to TSA’s 

technology challenges, stepping back, how can TSA improve its technology procurement and development processes in order to prevent itself from investing in technology that does not adequately meet the current threat environment? 

Answer. Our office has also audited and reported on TSA’s acquisition programs. 

Although TSA has spent billions on aviation security technology, our testing of certain systems revealed no resulting improvement. Given the number, type, complexity, and cost of these passenger screening technologies, TSA must exercise due 

diligence in developing, procuring, and deploying these valuable and costly assets. 

These systems include: 

• Explosives Detection System (EDS) machines 

• Explosives Trace Detection machines 

• Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines 

• Bottled Liquid Scanners 

• X-ray machines 
54 

• Walkthrough metal detectors. 

OIG has conducted a number of audits that identified issues with TSA’s procurement, deployment, and maintenance of its passenger screening technologies. These 

audits raise serious questions regarding TSA’s management of its passenger screening technologies. For example, in fiscal year 2013, we reviewed TSA’s deployment 

of AIT machines upgraded with automatic target recognition (ATR) software, an upgrade that addressed privacy concerns raised by travelers and Members of Congress. 

These concerns led to the passage of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 

2012, which mandated that all AIT screening equipment at airports include the 

ATR upgrade no later than June 1, 2013. 

We determined that TSA failed to develop a strategic acquisition and deployment 

plan for the AIT machines with the required AIT software that aligned with the 

overall needs and goals of its passenger screening program. As a result, TSA did 

not deploy many of the newly purchased or upgraded AIT machines and fully utilize 

them for screening passengers. This led to continued use of less capable walkthrough metal detectors. We made two recommendations to improve future deployment and use of AIT machines. 

Question 4. A report issued by your office in May found that TSA’s airport screening equipment is not being properly maintained. Lack of maintenance not only puts 

into question the effectiveness of the equipment, but can reduce the life span of 

technologies, requiring their replacement at the expense of significant taxpayer dollars. What has the TSA done to date, to implement the recommendations of this report? 

Answer. In May 2015, we reported that because TSA did not ensure routine preventive and corrective maintenance was performed according to contractual requirements, it could not be certain screening equipment was repaired and ready for operational use. We made three recommendations to improve TSA’s oversight of its 

maintenance program. 

We recommended that TSA assess penalties when contractors do not perform preventive or corrective maintenance according to contractual requirements and manufacturers’ specifications. We believe TSA’s actions are sufficient to close this recommendation. Specifically, TSA recently signed contracts with Morpho Detection 

and L–3 Communications for preventive and corrective maintenance on EDS equipment. Both contracts include specific financial penalties for maintenance not completed according to contractual requirements. For preventive maintenance, TSA will 

assess a penalty of 50 percent of the monthly invoice amount for the particular machine. The contracts also include penalty clauses for corrective maintenance actions 

when they affect operational availability at the equipment and airport level. 

TSA has taken steps to implement the other two recommendations, but we do not 

believe their actions are sufficient to close them. Basically, we recommended that 

TSA airport personnel validate data on both types of maintenance to ensure that 

preventive maintenance is completed according to contract requirements and manufacturers’ specifications and to ensure its screening equipment is repaired and ready 

for operational use. 

TSA has implemented additional reporting requirements for maintenance contractors that should provide airports with better awareness of maintenance actions on 

their screening equipment. For example, contractors are now required to give 

monthly preventive maintenance schedules to airport coordination centers. However, 

TSA has not yet developed and implemented policies and procedures to verify and 

document the contractors’ completion of all required preventive and corrective maintenance actions. According to TSA, an independent contractor compares the preventive maintenance data with contractual requirements, but this is not the same as 

validating that the work has actually been performed, which is the intent of our recommendation. Further, although contractors are required to provide certain reports 

on corrective maintenance, TSA does not have policies or procedures to verify the 

information in these reports or test the data for accuracy. 

Question 5. In response to the highly disappointing results of the OIG’s covert 

testing of airport screening procedures, Secretary Johnson mandated that all airport 

screeners and managers undergo an 8-hour training course. Do you believe that this 

training is sufficient to address the security gap found in the covert testing? What 

else, if anything, should be done to ensure that the workforce has the skills they 

need to effectively perform their duties? 

Answer. On September 22, 2015, my office provided TSA with our Classified final 

report, Covert Testing of TSA’s Passenger Screening Technologies and Processes at 

Airport Security Checkpoints, OIG–15–150. TSA has 90 days following receipt of the 

final report to update us on the status of its implementation of our recommendation. 

We cannot comment on TSA’s training because we have not yet received a formal, 
55 

detailed update. The detailed information on TSA’s training will most likely contain 

Classified or Sensitive Security Information and we will not be able to discuss or 

comment on the content of the TSA training in the public record. However, once we 

receive the formal update, we would be happy to arrange a meeting with you or 

your staff to discuss the specific details in a Classified setting. 

With respect to other actions TSA can take to ensure its workforce has the skills 

needed to effectively screen passengers at airport checkpoints, TSA and OIG must 

continue to conduct covert testing of technology, human performance, and screening 

procedures used at checkpoints. These covert tests must be continuously updated, 

based on intelligence about security threats. Rigorous covert testing will help ensure 

that the TSA workforce is prepared to deal with the constantly-changing threat environment. 

Question 6. The TSA PreCheck initiative has resulted in more risk-based and efficient screening of passengers at airports. However, a January OIG report found that 

modifications to the screening and vetting process are necessary. Do you feel TSA 

has taken the necessary steps to address these concerns? 

Answer. We reported in January 2015 that TSA’s implementation of PreCheck 

and the expedited screening process increased throughput at airport checkpoints, 

but also increased the risk to aviation security because TSA was not making individualized risk-based decisions. We made recommendations to address identified deficiencies. Initially, TSA did not concur with the majority of the 17 recommendations 

in our report, but we have made significant progress in getting TSA’s concurrence 

and compliance. As of November 2015, we have closed 3 report recommendations; 

13 recommendations are open, but resolved, meaning we agree with TSA’s planned 

actions to address the intent of these recommendations. Although one recommendation remains open and unresolved, TSA officials said there has been a significant 

shift to address this recommendation and TSA is currently drafting a response outlining these changes. We would be happy to update you and your staff on the 

progress once we have received a formal response from TSA. 

Question 7. Currently fewer than 5% of travelers participate in TSA PreCheck. 

Do you believe TSA has put ample emphasis on enrolling more passengers in TSA 

PreCheck? What additional steps do you feel TSA needs to take in order to expand 

and enhance the PreCheck program? 

Answer. Our review did not focus on expanding the TSA PreCheck initiative; GAO 

conducted a review addressing the expansion. 

We are currently reviewing TSA’s Risk-Based Strategy to determine the extent to 

which this strategy informs security and resource decisions to protect the traveling 

public and the Nation’s transportation systems. Our report, which we expect to publish in the spring of 2016, will include a discussion of the PreCheck initiative. We 

look forward to sharing our findings and recommendations with you. 

Question 8. Prior to Admiral Neffenger’s confirmation as administrator, TSA 

failed to concur with recommendations in a number of your reports. Are there any 

outstanding recommendations with which TSA has not concurred and taken some 

steps to address at this time? 

Answer. We believe TSA is working in good faith to concur with recommendations 

with which it previously did not concur and to close open recommendations. For example, although TSA did not initially concur with the majority of our recommendations to correct identified TSA PreCheck deficiencies, it continues to seek closure 

through the recommendation follow-up and resolution process. TSA recently told us 

it is reevaluating its position on its open recommendations and for the single unresolved recommendation in that report, we are optimistic that TSA is reconsidering 

the wisdom of its position. 

As we reported in Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information at John F. Kennedy International Airport (OIG–15–18), TSA did not perform required security authorizations or privacy reviews on closed-circuit television and surveillance monitoring room technology (i.e., cameras) used to record passenger data and photos. We 

reported that according to DHS 4300 security policy, the cameras should be considered IT assets and counted as part of DHS’s asset inventory. TSA did not concur 

with our recommendation to address this issue, asserting that DHS 4300 security 

policy did not apply to the cameras. We are currently working with TSA, the DHS 

Office of the Chief Information Officer, and the DHS Office of Privacy to resolve this 

issue. 

Question 9. It is no secret that employee morale is a significant problem at the 

TSA, both for screeners and agency employees alike. Your office has a unique perspective in that you are able to talk confidentially with TSA employees. Do you have 

any insights into the underlying cause of the on-going lack of morale at the agency? 

Answer. DHS OIG has not done any recent audit or inspection work in this area. 
56 

Question 10. Airports in Miami and Orlando conduct 100% employee screening, 

yet the Aviation Security Advisory Committee report concluded that 100% employee 

screening would be too costly to implement Nation-wide. What changes do you feel 

need to be implemented in order to improve the screening of airport employees? 

Answer. Our office is familiar with the Department’s Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee’s report and the immediate actions Secretary Johnson took to increase 

physical screening of aviation employees. We have not conducted work in the area 

of employee physical screening, but we believe that unscreened airport workers represent a threat to air transportation security. We recently reviewed aviation employee vetting (TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting, OIG–15–98), and our recommendations from that report were very similar to those in a recent committee 

report. The Aviation Security Advisory Committee and OIG agree that TSA can 

strengthen airport employee vetting by: 

• updating the list of disqualifying criminal offenses; 

• continuously monitoring criminal activity (recurrent employee vetting); and 

• maintaining a National database of airport employees whose credentials have 

been revoked. 

Question 11. The Air Marshal Association, a professional association for members 

of the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), advocates shifting the workforce to 

focus on investigations and anti-terrorism operations as opposed to deploying on 

flights to deter terrorism and hijacking. Do you think this would be a more effective 

use of manpower and resources? 

Answer. We have not done a large-scale review of FAMS that would allow us to 

draw across-the-board conclusions about whether its legacy mission and goals are 

effectively aligned with the current threat environment. This year we will audit 

FAMS to determine whether it adequately manages its resources to detect, deter, 

and defeat threats to the civil aviation system. 

According to the Department’s 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, the 

terrorist threat has changed since the attacks of September 11, 2001. In our Fiscal 

Year 2016 Annual Performance Plan, we discussed the threat of organized radical 

extremist groups repeatedly seeking to recruit members and export terrorism to the 

United States. We have also seen domestic ‘‘lone offenders’’ and those inspired by 

extremist ideologies commit terrorist acts. These threats are difficult to detect. In 

countering terrorism, DHS focuses on preventing attacks; preventing unauthorized 

acquisition, importation, movement, or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear materials and capabilities in the United States; and reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, essential leadership, and major 

events to terrorist attacks and other hazards. In the upcoming FAMS audit and 

other audits focused on preventing terrorism and enhancing security, OIG will seek 

to determine how efficiently and effectively the Department is working to counter 

these emerging threats. 

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