alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT10.17**

**Datakey2001 Executive Incentive Plan**

The 2001 Datakey Executive Incentive Planis designed to pay for performance to revenue growth and profitabilityobjectives set forth at the beginning of the year as defined in the Boardapproved 2001 Financial Plan.  This planprovides for quarterly payments of cash and Datakey stock options issued at theclosing price of the last day of the quarter and vesting in six months.  The 2001 Datakey Executive Incentive Planapplies to the following executives, and others if approved by the Board ofDirectors:

•   President & CEO

•   Vice President/General Manager ISS

•   Vice President & CFO

•   Vice President of Corporate Marketing

Inthe event of a change in control, bonus amounts will be computed and paidthroughout the year as if the approved business plan revenue and profitabilitygoals have been met.

**Cash Incentive**Each executive is assigned a target annual incentive cash payment as determinedby the Board of Directors.

Payment of the cash incentive is based onachievement of revenue growth 2001 quarter over same quarter in 2000 andachievement of the planned profit/loss in conjunction with the following table,with the amounts as set forth by the Board of Directors:

 
|                                                      | ** Q1** | ** Q2** | ** Q3** | ** Q4** |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| **2000  ISS revenue**                                     | $459,000     | $940,000     | $843,000     | $1,368,000   |
| **Planned  2001 ISS revenue**                             |         |         |         |         |
| **Planned  ISS revenue growth**                           |         |         |         |         |
| **%  planned revenue growth**                             |         |         |         |         |
| **Actual  ISS revenue**                                   |         |         |         |         |
| **Actual  ISS revenue growth**                            |         |         |         |         |
| **% =  actual revenue growth/planned revenue growth (F)** |         |         |         |         |
| **Meets  profit plan? (0=no, .5=yes) (PP)**               |         |         |         |         |
| **ISS  profitable? (0=no, .5=yes) (PR)**                  |         |         |         |         |
| **%  earned**                                             |         |         |         |         |
Editorial Note on Part 409
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 409 appear at 62 FR 46037, Aug. 29, 1997.

§ 409.31 Level of care requirement. ( a ) *Definition.* As used in this section, *skilled nursing and skilled rehabilitation services* means services that: ( 1 ) Are ordered by a physician;
( 2 ) Require the skills of technical or professional personnel such as registered nurses, licensed practical (vocational) nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, and speech pathologists or audiologists; and
( 3 ) Are furnished directly by, or under the supervision of, such personnel.
( b ) *Specific conditions for meeting level of care requirements.* ( 1 ) The beneficiary must require skilled nursing or skilled rehabilitation services, or both, on a daily basis.
( 2 ) Those services must be furnished for a condition— ( i ) For which the beneficiary received inpatient hospital or inpatient CAH services; or
( ii ) Which arose while the beneficiary was receiving care in a SNF or swing-bed hospital for a condition for which he or she received inpatient hospital or inpatient CAH services; or
( iii ) For which, for an M + C enrollee described in § 409.20(c)(4), a physician has determined that a direct admission to a SNF without an inpatient hospital or inpatient CAH stay would be medically appropriate.
( 3 ) The daily skilled services must be ones that, as a practical matter, can only be provided in a SNF, on an inpatient basis.
[48 FR 12541, Mar. 25, 1983, as amended at 58 FR 30666, May 26, 1993; 68 FR 50854, Aug. 22, 2003; 70 FR 45055, Aug. 4, 2005]
#### JAMES H. COCHNOWER v. THE UNITED STATES.

[51 C. Cls., 461; 248 U. S., 405.]

Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants in the court below. On appeal the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court decided:

Primarily, the creation of offices and the assignment of their compensation is a legislative function; and the fact and the extent of any delegation of it must clearly appear.

The act of March 4, 1909, chapter 314, 35 Statutes, 1065, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury “to increase and fix” the compensation of inspectors of customs, as he may think advisable, etc., did not empower him to decrease their salaries.

Mr. Justice McKenna

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court January 13, 1919.

Order of the Supreme Coure restating judgment entered April 21, 1919, 249 U. S., 589.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**








**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**











I,
      Dennis
      J. FitzSimons, the Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Tribune
      Company, certify that (i) Tribune Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
      Sept. 24, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and (ii) the information contained in the
      Form 10-Q for the quarter ended Sept. 24, 2006 fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of Tribune
      Company.














/s/
                Dennis J. FitzSimons
              Dennis
                J. FitzSimons
              Chairman,
                President and
              Chief
                Executive Officer
              
              
              November
                2, 2006
Editorial Note on Part 411
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 411 appear at 71 FR 9471, Feb. 24, 2006

§ 411.20 Basis and scope. ( a ) *Statutory basis.* ( 1 ) Section 1862(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Act precludes Medicare payment for services to the extent that payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made under a group health plan with respect to— ( i ) A beneficiary entitled to Medicare on the basis of ESRD during the first 18 months of that entitlement;
( ii ) A beneficiary who is age 65 or over, entitled to Medicare on the basis of age, and covered under the plan by virtue of his or her current employment status or the current employment status of a spouse of any age; or
( iii ) A beneficiary who is under age 65, entitled to Medicare on the basis of disability, and covered under the plan by virtue of his or her current employment status or the current employment status of a family member.
( 2 ) Section 1862(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Act precludes Medicare payment for services to the extent that payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made under any of the following: ( i ) Workers' compensation.
( ii ) Liability insurance.
( iii ) No-fault insurance.
( b ) *Scope.* This subpart sets forth general rules that apply to the types of insurance specified in paragraph (a) of this section. Other general rules that apply to group health plans are set forth in subpart E of this part.
[60 FR 45361, Aug. 31, 1995, as amended at 71 FR 9470, Feb. 24, 2006]
Exhibit 32.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Merchants Bancshares, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Janet P. Spitler, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Principal Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the Company.    A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or other document authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.


| |     |                                                                                  
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | By: | /s/ Janet P. Spitler                                                             
| |     | Janet P. Spitler
Chief Financial Officer & Treasurer
Principal Accounting Officer
| |     |                                                                                  
| |     | August 7, 2009                                                                   
| |     | Date
§ 405.508 Determination of comparable circumstances; limitation. ( a ) *Application of limitation.* The carrier may not in any case make a determination of reasonable charge which would be higher than the charge upon which it would base payment to its own policyholders for a comparable service in comparable circumstances. The charge upon which it would base payment, however, does not necessarily mean the amount the carrier would be obligated to pay. Under certain circumstances, some carriers pay amounts on behalf of individuals who are their policyholders, which are below the customary charges of physicians or other persons to other individuals. Payment under the supplementary medical insurance program would not be limited to these lower amounts.
( b ) *When comparability exists.* “Comparable circumstances,” as used in the Act and this subpart, refers to the circumstances under which services are rendered to individuals and the nature of the carrier's health insurance programs and the method it uses to determine the amounts of payments under these programs. Generally, comparability would exist where: ( 1 ) The carrier bases payment under its program on the customary charges, as presently constituted, of physicians or other persons and on current prevailing charges in a locality, and
( 2 ) The determination does not preclude recognition of factors such as speciality status and unusual circumstances which affect the amount charged for a service.
( c ) *Responsibility for determining comparability.* Responsibility for determining whether or not a carrier's program has comparability will in the first instance fall upon the carrier in reporting pertinent information about its programs to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. When the pertinent information has been reported, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services will advise the carrier whether any of its programs have comparability.
#### § 137.35 What is the term of a self-governance compact?

Upon approval and execution of a self-governance compact, the compact remains in effect for so long as permitted by Federal law or until terminated by mutual written agreement or retrocession or reassumption of all PSFAs.
#### Ruby WALKER, Appellant, v. J. V. DUNNE, M. D., Appellee.

No. 78-1962.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 16, 1979.

Charles H. McQuillan, of McQuillan & Beltz, P.A., Bradenton, for appellant.

G. Hunter Gibbons, of Dickinson, O’Rior-den, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, P.A., Sarasota, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the entry of a summary final judgment in favor of appel-lee Dunne who was the defendant in a medical malpractice action in the court below. This action was based on a complaint filed by appellant, Mrs. Walker, in which she alleged that during an operation Dr. Dunne had lost a balloon tip in her leg. She further alleged that as a result of the *641presence of the balloon tip her leg had developed gangrene which necessitated its amputation.

In his motion for summary judgment, Dr. Dunne alleged that appellant had not filed her complaint within the applicable statute of limitations period. The trial court granted Dr. Dunne a summary judgment on this basis, finding that appellant became aware of his alleged negligence in October, 1975, and that the two-year limitation period of Section 95.11(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1975) barred her suit filed on July 19, 1978. We reverse.

In the affidavit which accompanied his motion for summary judgment Dr. Dunne stated that on October 24, 1975, immediately after Mrs. Walker awoke from surgery, he informed her that he had lost a balloon tip in her leg during that surgery. Mrs. Walker did not deny this, but in her affidavit she alleged that Dr. Dunne had continued to treat her and had told her that the amputation of her leg had not been a result of the lost balloon tip. Accordingly there was a factual issue as to whether Dr. Dunne fraudulently concealed his negligence, and thus there was a factual issue as to whether his conduct tolled the statute of limitations. *Nardone v. Reynolds,*333 So.2d 25 (Fla.1976). As a result, the trial court should not have determined the matter on summary judgment but rather, should have left the question to the trier of fact. *Edwards v. Ford,*279 So.2d 851 (Fla.1973); *Smith v. Hussey,*363 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); *Pinkerton v. West,*353 So.2d 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

In view of what we have said, we remand this case for further proceedings.

HOBSON, A. C. J., and SCHEB and RYDER, JJ., concur.
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Peter LEWIS v. Hayden J. DEES, Warden, Dixon Correctional Institute.

No. 65061.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 18, 1979.

In re Peter Lewis, applying for remedial writs. Orleans Parish.

Denied. See *State ex rel. Lewis v. Warden,*363 So.2d 912 on the docket of this Court.

DENNIS, J., would grant an evidentiary hearing.
# C_2006036EN.01001201.xml

| 11.2.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 36/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.2.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 36/12

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Third Chamber)

of 1 December 2005

in Case C-213/04: Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) Ewald Burtscher v Josef Stauderer (1)

1

(Free movement of capital - Article 56 EC - Declaration procedure in respect of the acquisition of built-on land - Retroactive invalidity of the transaction if declaration by the purchaser is submitted after the due date)

(2006/C 36/21)

Language of the case: German

In Case C-213/04: reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), made by decision of 29 April 2004, received at the Court on 19 May 2004, in the proceedings between Ewald Burtscher and Josef Stauderer — the Court (Third Chamber), composed of A. Rosas, President of the Chamber, J. Malenovský, J. P. Puissochet (Rapporteur), S. von Bahr and U. Lõhmus, Judges; F.G. Jacobs, Advocate General; K. Sztranc, Administrator for the Registrar, gave a judgment on 1 December 2005 in which it ruled:

Article 56(1) EC precludes the application of national legislation such as the Vorarlberg Land Transfer Law (Vorarlberger Grundverkehrsgesetz) of 23 September 1993, in its amended version, under which the mere fact that the requisite declaration of acquisition is submitted after the due date results in the retroactive invalidity of the property transaction concerned.

---

(1)  OJ C 190 of 24.07.2004.

1

---
#### York v. Wertz et al.

*Ambrose R. Campana,*for plaintiff.

*Greevy & Knittle,*for defendants.

February 26, 1955.

Williams, P. J.,

Jesse M. York complains because three dogs, owned by three separate people, bark and keep him awake at night. He sues in equity asking that defendants be enjoined and restrained from keeping and harboring their dogs between 8 p.m. and 7 a.m., in such a manner as to cause injury and annoyance to him.

*Findings of Fact*

The chancellor finds that each of the defendants did have a dog at the time complained of, that these dogs were chained to separate dog houses, eight feet apart, on a lot adjoining the homes of two of the defendants; that defendants lived in the front of their houses, that the bedroom of the complainer was 150 feet from the first dog house with no obstacle between to break the sound waves; that the dogs did bark at night for long periods of time, disturbing the rest of Jesse M. York.

*Discussion*

Courts usually have to tread carefully whenever man’s greatest friend is the subject of discussion, and the chancellor in this case has given what he considers mature deliberation to the present dispute.

*760Noises made by dogs may amount to a nuisance: Chambers v. Walker, 57 Pitts. L. J. 210. When such noises amount to a nuisance an injunction may issue.

The real test as to whether or not a noise is a nuisance to a person in the enjoyment of his property is whether or not it is of such a character as would physically annoy a person of ordinary sensibility.

Did the three dogs make such noise at unreasonable hours as to disturb the repose of plaintiff? Plaintiff testified that the dogs barked incessantly in the early morning, keeping him awake as much as three or four hours. His testimony was corroborated.

The chancellor is of the opinion that the dogs did create such a disturbance as to create a nuisance. They were tied on a vacant lot in a residential section of Montgomery. It is the nature of some dogs to become disturbed upon the prowling of cats or other nocturnal animals. The natural activity of the canine supports the complainer’s testimony that when one dog barked they all barked.

Although witnesses for defendants testified that they were not disturbed by the dogs, most of them admitted that there was barking. The difference in the testimony of these people can be fairly accounted for by the difference of temperament and situation.

Many people keep dogs in built-up areas and when ordinances do not interfere they have a right to do so. However, it is incumbent upon them to see that their dogs act in such a way as to not disturb their neighbors.

We think in this case no hardship will be imposed upon defendants. Testimony shows there has been no noise recently.

*Conclusions of Law*

Plaintiff is entitled to relief prayed for and an injunction.

*761
      *Order of Chancellor*

And now, to wit, February 26, 1955, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that an injunction issue enjoining Carl Wertz and Mrs. Carl Wertz, his wife; Nathan Rush and Mrs. Nathan Rush, his wife; James Stiger and Sally Stiger, his wife, from keeping their dogs in such a way as to annoy plaintiff.
```

[110th Congress Public Law 334]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ334.110]

[[Page 122 STAT. 3723]]

Public Law 110-334
110th Congress

                                 An Act

 
    To designate the Federal Bureau of Investigation building under 
 construction in Omaha, Nebraska, as the ``J. James Exon Federal Bureau 
    of Investigation Building''. <<NOTE: Oct. 1, 2008 -  [S. 3009]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. J. JAMES EXON FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation building under 
construction at the intersection of 120th and L Streets in Omaha, 
Nebraska, shall be known and designated as the ``J. James Exon Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the building referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the J. James Exon 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Building.

    Approved October 1, 2008.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--S. 3009:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 110-878 (Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure).
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 154 (2008):
            June 24, considered and passed Senate.
            Sept. 24, considered and passed House.

                                  <all>
```
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# Sweden

253 items

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        -    Report  		2021 Trafficking in Persons Report: Sweden	  July 1, 2021 
        -    Remarks  		Transcript of the Transatlantic Trends 2021 Launch Event: A Conversation with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman	  Wendy R. ShermanJune 9, 2021 
        -    Press Statement  		Swedish National Day	  Antony J. BlinkenJune 6, 2021 
        -    Readout  		Secretary Blinken’s Meeting with Sweden’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Linde	  May 19, 2021 
        -    Remarks  		Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde Before Their Meeting	  Antony J. BlinkenMay 19, 2021Harpa Concert Hall and Conference CenterReykjavik, Iceland 
        -    Report  		2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sweden	  May 12, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sweden	  March 30, 2021 

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§ 408.42 Deduction from railroad retirement benefits. ( a ) *Responsibility for deductions.* If an enrollee is entitled to railroad retirement benefits, his or her SMI premiums are deducted from those benefits by the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) even though he or she is also entitled to social security benefits or a civil service annuity, or both.
( b ) *Action when benefits are suspended.* If the railroad retirement benefits are suspended, the RRB sends premium notices requesting direct remittance, to be made in accordance with the rules set forth in Subpart D of this part.
EXHIBIT 32.2
 
 **Certification
Pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.** **§** **1350)**
 
 The
undersigned, as the chief financial officer of PAB Bankshares, Inc., certifies,
to the best of my knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period
ended December 31, 2004, which accompanies this certification fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of PAB
Bankshares, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing
certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18
U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose.
  Dated this 16thday of March, 2005.***/s/ Donald J. Torbert, Jr.***Donald J. Torbert, Jr.Executive
      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
      (principal
      financial officer of the
registrant)