In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18‐1921

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

STEVE BRIGGINS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:17‐cr‐00243‐1 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 6, 2019

____________________

Before MANION, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. In 2017 Steve Briggins was con‐

victed of robbing multiple banks over several months. This

was not Briggins’s first foray into bank robbery. Eighteen

years earlier, in 1999, Briggins was convicted of and sentenced

for ten bank robberies he committed over a span of a few

months. When the district court sentenced Briggins for the

2017 robberies, it accounted for the 1999 robberies in calculat‐

ing his criminal history points under the Sentencing
2 No. 18‐1921

Guidelines. Briggins now appeals, contending that the district

court, when determining his advisory sentencing range, im‐

properly determined his criminal history category by impos‐

ing too many criminal history points for the 1999 robberies.

Seeing no error, we affirm.

I

Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple

bank robberies. At sentencing a primary focus became

Briggins’s criminal history and, more specifically, how many

criminal history points should be assessed for the ten bank

robberies he was convicted of in 1999 and for which he was

sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of points

to be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether the

prior 84‐month term reflected one sentence (for all ten

robberies) or multiple concurrent sentences (for the ten

separate robberies). Briggins urged the former—if the 84‐

month term reflected one sentence, it would yield fewer

criminal history points and thus a lower advisory guidelines

range.  

The district court’s determination of Briggins’s criminal

history points tracked the Sentencing Guidelines analysis of‐

fered by the probation office. In its presentence investigation

report, the probation office concluded that Briggins received

ten concurrent sentences—one for each of the ten bank rob‐

beries. So, too, did the probation office recognize that the cal‐

culation of Briggins’s criminal history points needed to ac‐

count for the threefold reality that he was charged with all ten

robberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty to each of

those robberies in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing

for all ten on the same day. All of this had ramifications for

the proper criminal history calculation.  
No. 18‐1921 3

In the end, the probation office recommended that

Briggins receive six criminal history points for the 1999 bank

robberies. These six points captured all ten robberies and

came from an application of two provisions within § 4A1.1 of

the guidelines. The first three of those points came from

§ 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3

points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one

year and one month.” And the other three points came from

a provision, § 4A1.1(e), that applies where, as here, a

defendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the

same indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same

day. In this way, § 4A1.1(e) accounts for the circumstance of

multiple convictions and sentences.

We can put the point in even plainer terms. A defendant

sentenced to more than 13 months’ imprisonment following a

felony conviction ordinarily receives three criminal history

points for that offense at a later sentencing. See U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.1(a). By this logic, it may seem that a defendant like

Briggins convicted of and sentenced forten separate robberies

should receive 30 criminal history points—three for each

conviction. The guidelines do not work that way, though, in

situations like the ones present here. Where the prior

sentences “resulted from offenses contained in the same

charging instrument” or were “imposed on the same day,”

the Sentencing Commission limited the number of criminal

history points assigned to those sentences. Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).

The first sentence still receives three points (consistent with

the ordinary rule), but the remaining sentences are subject to

a capping rule: § 4A1.1(e) assigns one criminal history point

for each additional sentence resulting from a conviction of a

crime of violence but limits the maximum number of

additional points to three.
4 No. 18‐1921

The probation office applied this capping rule when calcu‐

lating Briggins’s criminal history points here. It began with

the ten sentences Briggins received for the ten 1999 robberies

and assigned three points to the first of those sentences under

§ 4A1.1(a) because the sentence exceeded 13 months. From

there the probation office recognized that, because the ten

sentences came from the same indictment and were imposed

on the same day, the limitations of § 4A1.1(e) applied. Apply‐

ing § 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were

allowed for Briggins’s remaining nine robberies. The math

from there was simple: Briggins received a total of six criminal

history points for the ten 1999 robberies.  

At the sentencing hearing for the 2017 robberies, the

district court agreed with and adopted the probation office’s

analysis of Briggins’s criminal history. The resulting advisory

guidelines range for Briggins’s 2017 bank robberies was 77 to

96 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a

sentence of 96 months.  

II

On appeal Briggins renews his challenge to the district

court’s calculation of the criminal history points assigned to

his 1999 bank robberies. He does so by attacking a key factual

premise upon which the district court based its determination

that the prior robberies warranted a total of six criminal his‐

tory points. As Briggins sees the 1999 proceeding, he received

not ten concurrent sentences, but rather one sentence of 84

months for all ten robberies. On this view, he contends he

should have received only three criminal history points for

the single term of 84 months he received for the 1999 rob‐

beries, and thus there was no need for the district court to ever

get into how the guidelines treat multiple sentences.  
No. 18‐1921 5

Resolving whether Briggins received multiple concurrent

sentences or one sentence for his ten bank robberies requires

us to review the 1999 sentencing hearing in some detail. The

beginning point is recognizing that Briggins pleaded guilty to

committing ten separate bank robberies, each of which had

been charged as a separate count in the underlying indict‐

ment. At the 1999 sentencing hearing, the district court stated

that it was sentencing Briggins “to a term of 84 months.” In

doing so, the court emphasized that Briggins deserved to be

punished for each robbery—he should not, as the sentencing

judge put it, receive any “group discounts” for having com‐

mitted ten separate robberies. The district court’s written

judgment reflected that Briggins pleaded guilty to ten counts

that resulted in “a total term of 84 months.” Nowhere in the

written judgment did the court indicate whether the 84‐

month term reflected concurrent sentences.

Briggins latches onto the district court’s use of the phrase

“a term” of imprisonment to argue that he received a single,

lump‐sum term of 84 months for the ten robberies. He does

not dispute that he pleaded guilty to ten separate robberies,

but rather underscores that he was sentenced to “a term” of

84 months—a single term, not multiple terms or concurrent

terms. And this single sentence, Briggins continues, is wholly

accounted for by the three criminal history points added un‐

der § 4A1.1(a); there was no basis for assigning additional

criminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) or any other provi‐

sion of the guidelines. The upshot of Briggins’s argument is

that it was not even necessary for the district court to reach

§ 4A1.1(e) because multiple sentences were not in play in the

first place.
6 No. 18‐1921

We disagree. Briggins’s insistence that he received only

one sentence because the district court announced “a term” of

imprisonment ignores the substance and full context of what

transpired at his 1999 sentencing hearing. The transcript

shows that the district court intended to punish each robbery

separately, for there is no other way to understand the sen‐

tencing judge’s comments that Briggins was not entitled to

“any type of group discounts” or “a two‐for‐one sale or a ten‐

for‐one sale.”

The district judge made other statements at sentencing to

drive home that Briggins deserved to be punished for each of

the ten robberies. At one point, for example, the judge

explained that, if Briggins had committed just one bank

robbery, he would “probably be looking at three to five years

easily,” and that “any judge could sentence [him] to 30 years

and say, well, it’s three years for each of the bank robberies.”

The district judge further observed that, even if he sentenced

Briggins to just “one yearfor every one of the bank robberies,”

he would face a total of ten years. But the court was quick to

recognize that a sentence along those lines would be well

outside the then‐mandatory guidelines range of 63 to 78

months. So the district court instead applied an upward

departure, reasoning that the ten robberies conducted over a

short period of time presented an “unusual circumstance”

that was not adequately taken into consideration by the

guidelines. The 1999 sentencing ended with the district court

imposing a sentence of 84 months.

A broader point deserves underscoring. Accepting

Briggins’s position would require us to conclude that the

district court sentenced him to 84 months for one of the ten

1999 bank robberies but to no time for the other nine. But any
No. 18‐1921 7

view like that neither accounts for what the district judge said

at sentencing—that Briggins would not receive a break

because he committed multiple bank robberies—nor the

reality that the court was obligated to sentence him on each of

the ten separate bank robberies to which he pleaded guilty.

We also cannot overlook that the district court imposed a

special assessment of $100 for each of the ten robberies for a

total of $1,000—yet another indicator that the district judge

understood the ten robberies as resulting in separate

convictions warranting separate sentences. The only other

interpretation, which makes even less sense, is that the 84‐

month sentence reflected the sum total of ten consecutive

sentences of 8.4 months each. Not only would a sentence like

that—less than one year for a bank robbery—bear little

relationship to the applicable guidelines range, but it would

also require us to assume the district judge (who uttered not

a word about consecutive sentences) intended to impose ten

small but consecutive sentences.  

Our conclusion that the district court imposed ten

concurrent sentences for the 1999 robberies aligns squarely

with the presumption that sentences imposed in a multiple‐

count case run concurrently with one another. See U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.2(c) (explaining that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the

count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to

achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts

shall run concurrently”). Indeed, the Sentencing

Commission’s accompanying commentary (in effect at the

time of the 1999 sentencing and now) clarifies that, in a

multiple‐count case, the total punishment is to be imposed on

each count and the sentences on all counts are to run

concurrently. See id. § 5G1.2 & cmt; see also id. § 5G1.2 & cmt.

(effective Nov. 1, 1998). Congress incorporated this same
8 No. 18‐1921

presumption of concurrence into the statutory provision

governing the imposition of multiple sentences for a

defendant convicted of a federal offense. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3584(a).  

We decline to interpret Briggins’s 1999 sentence in a way

that contravenes not only this presumption of concurrence,

but also the sentencing judge’s clear statements that he in‐

tended to hold Briggins accountable for each robbery. The

most accurate reading of Briggins’s 1999 sentence—the read‐

ing fairest to the record—is that “a term of 84 months” re‐

flected multiple concurrent sentences.

Briggins urges a contrary conclusion by pointing to prior

decisions where courts have concluded that “a term” refers to

one sentence or, at the very least, creates enough ambiguity

about what sentence a defendant received to warrant resen‐

tencing. In United States v. Eskridge, for example, the question

was whether the district court had imposed one term or two

concurrent terms of supervised release for the defendant’s

two convictions. 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). After exam‐

ining the sentencing transcript, we held that the defendant

was entitled to resentencing for supervised release violations

because the district judge, in sentencing the defendant to “a

term of 26 months,” in no way clarified (in the judgment or

otherwise) whether he had sentenced the defendant to one or

two terms of supervised release. See id. at 935. And we added

that “if the order accurately reflects the judge’s decision, how‐

ever mistaken, to impose just a single term, it cannot be cor‐

rected.” Id. at 934.  

The circumstances here are different. The statements the

district judge made immediately before sentencing Briggins

for the 1999 robberies do not leave room for an interpretation
No. 18‐1921 9

that the court may have decided—however mistakenly—to

impose a single term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the

district judge’s statements made clearthat he intended to hold

Briggins accountable for each of the ten robbery convictions.

At the time, moreover, the guidelines required the court to

sentence Briggins on each count of conviction, with the pre‐

sumption that such sentences would run concurrently.  

On this record, we conclude that the district court in 1999

imposed multiple sentences for Briggins’s ten robbery convic‐

tions. At Briggins’s sentencing for the 2017 convictions, the

district court thus properly assessed six criminal history

points for Briggins’s 1999 sentences—three criminal history

points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a) for one sentence, and three

additional points for the remaining nine sentences under

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM.