Maxwell Paper

Anthology

Award-Winning

Papers AY 2010
Air University

Allen G. Peck. Lt Gen. Commander

Air War College

Robert C. Kane. Maj Gen. Commandant

Daniel Baltrusaitis. Col, PhD. Dean of Research

Michael Masterson. Lt Col. PhD. Series Editor

Air Force Research Institute

John A. Shaud. Gen. PhD, USAF. Retired. Director

Air University Press

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1

AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR WAR COLLEGE

Maxwell Paper Anthology

Award-Winning Papers AY 2010

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2011

20110727017
This Maxwell Paper and others In the series are available

electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://

research.au.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress

.au.af.mil.

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the

authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:

distribution unlimited.

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

155 N. Twining Street

Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-6026
Contents

Maxwell Page

Paper

DISCLAIMER ii

FOREWORD v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS vii

48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER

STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE

AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET 1

Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF

49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US

MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE

VACCINE PROGRAM 17

Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF

50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE

DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY 39

Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces

51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND

RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 ... 55

Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF

52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE

INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE:

LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY

CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD 69

Col Rebecca A. Keller. USAF

53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 85

Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force

54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR

FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A

1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT 101

Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF

m
Maxwell Page

Paper

55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY

NEED, WHEN THEY NEED IT 119

Col Carl E. Schaefer, USAF

56 DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS

ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DISTRIBUTION

PROCESS OWNER: RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR US TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 137

Lt Col James Michael Doolin,

USAF Reserve/YC-3, DAF civilian

57 THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFICCONTROL SERVICE: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR

US LEADERSHIP 153

Lt Col Matthew C. Smitham, USAF

58 READY OR NOT? REPEAL OF "DONT ASK,

DONTTELL" 171

Col Julie C. Bolt, USAF

59 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL

CAPITAL: A CRITICAL US ASSET 189

Col Stella T. Smith. USAF

iv
Foreword

It is my pleasure to Introduce the Air War College Maxwell Paper

Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010

graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996,

we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to

senior leaders.

In the opening paper. Col Rolanda Burnett argues that the Air

Force master tenet of centralized control with decentralized execution

is no longer applicable. He highlights the tenet's key doctrinal

strengths and weaknesses and explains how it can be improved. In

the next paper, Col Kenneth Hall describes how the emphasis on bioengineered threats since 9/11 has had unintended consequences for

the US vaccination program. He concludes that we are all at great

risk because of inattention to common diseases that affect our entire

population. Our Canadian international fellow, Lt Col Michael Rafter,

analyzes the legal and ethical implications of the United States' 1970

incursion into Cambodia to determine if it was justified.

Several of our papers address the influence of emerging technology

and trends on US security strategy. Lt Col Kevin Coyne examines the

US European Command's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) strategy and suggests a road ahead for ISR integration.

Col Rebecca Keller analyzes the intersection of influence operations

(IO) and cyberspace operations. She identifies current operational

and legal constraints on the execution of IO using cyber technology

and offers remedial actions to enhance the use of the Internet as a

military IO tool in today's cyber world. Another international fellow,

Lt Col Lars Helmrich of the Swedish air force, critiques US Arctic

policy and argues for an increased leadership role for the United

States. Lt Col David Baylor analyzes the strategic implications of a

reduction in nuclear weapons and asks the important question "Are

there different negotiation considerations and dynamics in play when

Russia and the United States go below 1,000 strategic warheads?"

These papers all tackle the influence of change on the strategic environment while another batch addresses how change should influence

the Department of Defense (DOD). Col Carl Schaefer assesses the

DOD's procurement system and concludes that the services could

learn from the Special Operations Command's streamlined acquisition system. Lt Col James Michael Doolin evaluates technologies to

meet the US Transportation Command's need for a situational aware-
ness tool. And Lt Col Matthew Smitham argues that the time is ripe

for a US-led space traffic control system.

Our anthology closes with a pair of papers that address DOD human capital challenges. Col Julie Bolt analyzes the "Don't Ask, Don't

Tell" policy and offers specific policy implementation recommendations for the DOD. Col Stella Smith examines the potential loss of

intellectual capital as measured by the number of undergraduate and

graduate degrees earned in science, technology, engineering, and

mathematics. Her analysis suggests dire consequences for the US technical base and our ability to deter future adversaries if this critical

capability is allowed to atrophy.

The Maxwell Paper compendium provides a short summary of the

best research at Air War College. I hope you will find that the papers

stimulate thinking and discussion on a wide range of topics. As with

all Maxwell Papers, the Air War College publishes this anthology in

the spirit of academic freedom and open debate. We encourage your

engagement on the issues raised by the papers in this collection and

solicit your responses.

ROBERTC: KANE

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

vi
About the Authors

Lt Col David "DJ" Baylor is assigned to Air Combat Command

(ACC), Langley AFB, Virginia. His assignments include weapons and

tactics officer and scheduler, 79th Fighter Squadron. Royal Air Force

(RAF) Upper Heyford, England, and instructor weapon system officer

(WSO), training officer, and wing scheduler, 522d Fighter Squadron,

Cannon AFB, New Mexico. At the 34th Bomb Squadron, Mountain

Home AFB, Idaho, he was the chief of plans, responsible for the development of a "light strike" deployment package that became the

standard for deployment of all B-1 units; to prove his concept. Colonel Baylor led two deployments to Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain. For his

innovative solutions to deploying the B-l, Twelfth Air Force twice

nominated Colonel Baylor and his crew for the Curtis E. LeMay Trophy; his team won ACC's outstanding bomber crew trophy in 1998.

Colonel Baylor has also served as an instructor WSO and flight

commander at the B-l schoolhouse, Dyess AFB, Texas, and later as

the 7th Operations Group executive officer and assistant director of

operations for the 9th Bomb Squadron, where he participated in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002; the commander's nuclear strike

advisor and Mobile Consolidated Command Center chief, US Northern Command; and commander and professor of aerospace studies.

The University of Georgia. He holds a BS, mechanical engineering,

Pennsylvania State University, where he was a Distinguished Graduate (DG), Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps; master of military

operational art and science. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell

AFB, Alabama, where he was a DG; and master of strategic studies,

Air War College, Maxwell AFB.

Col Julie C. Boit is assigned to Headquarters Air Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC. As a career personnel officer, she has served

in several stateside and overseas assignments, including base-level

tours at Kelly AFB, Texas; Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea; and RAF

Mildenhall, UK. Colonel Boit has commanded at the flight, detachment, and squadron levels, leading the Military Personnel Flight, RAF

Lakenheath, UK; Detachment 2, United States Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE) Mission Support Squadron. Italy; and 437th Mission Support Squadron, Charleston AFB, South Carolina. Additionally, she has

served at Headquarters Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph AFB,

Texas, and at Headquarters European Command, Stuttgart, Germany.

She is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy and earned a master's

degree in business administration from St. Mary's University, San

Antonio, Texas; a master's degree in National Security and Strategic

•
Studies from Naval War College, Newport. Rhode Island; and a master's

degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College in 2010.

Col Rolanda Burnett Sr. is a foreign affairs specialist with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He was the deputy chief. Air and

Space Operation Center Requirements Division, Requirements Directorate, Air Combat Command headquarters staff, Langley AFB, Virginia, and commanded the 705th Training Squadron, 505th Command and Control Group, and 505th Command and Control Wing,

Hurlburt Field, Florida. At the 609th Combat Plans Squadron and

Headquarters Ninth Air Force, United States Central Command Air

Forces, Colonel Burnett was pivotal in developing and executing the

air campaign strategy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

His other assignments include the 912th Air Refueling Squadron,

Robins AFB, Georgia, where he deployed in support of multiple operations to include Desert Calm and Restore Hope; Kadena AB, Japan, where he was chief of navigation training, standardization and

evaluation/instructor navigator, and flight commander/instructor

navigator; and the 54th and 55th Air Refueling Squadrons, Altus

AFB, Oklahoma, where he served as a Combat Crew Training School

(CCTS) instructor navigator, executive officer, flight commander, and

chief CCTS evaluator navigator. Colonel Burnett is a graduate of Air

War College; the Army Command and General Staff College, Leavenworth, Kansas; and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB.

Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne is a career intelligence officer with 20 years

of signals intelligence experience at the operational and headquarters

levels. He is the chief of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Policy Division, the Pentagon. He has served as commander,

390th Intelligence Squadron (IS), Kadena AB, Japan; board chair.

Joint Staff/J2 Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities; and

operations officer. 488th IS, RAF Mildenhall, UK. Prior to this. Colonel Coyne was the RC-135 program element monitor at the Pentagon,

responsible for supporting aircraft and sensor procurement for all

variants of the RC-135 fleet. At the 97th IS, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, he

served as chief, Current Operations, and chief. Force Applications,

providing airborne cryptolinguist support to RC-135 RivetJoint, Cobra

Ball, and Combat Sent operations.

At Headquarters USAFE, he served as an intelligence watch officer

and as a focal point for intelligence relationships with NATO partners,

overseeing the functional employment of theater signals intelligence

systems and working reconnaissance employment issues. Colonel

Coyne served as a flight commander at signals intelligence units in

Korea and Greece supporting U-2 and RC-135 operations. He has

(•[(!
deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, Southern and

Northern Watch, and NATO's Bosnia Implementation Force.

James Michael "Mike" Doolin led the chief information officer

(CIO) Support and Distribution Portfolio Management Division. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems Directorate, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Scott AFB, Illinois, where he was responsible for USTRANSCOM CIO support and

management of the Department of Defense distribution information

technology (IT) systems portfolio. Doolin is also a lieutenant colonel in

the USAF Reserve, serving as a deputy operations center chief in the

J3 at USTRANSCOM. Colonel Doolin recently served two years on active duty as a joint mobility operations officer in the Current Air Operations Branch of the USTRANSCOM Operations Center. These assignments enabled him to gain experience and insights into the daily

operations of USTRANSCOM as the distribution process owner.

Doolin's combined civilian and military career spans over 34 years

of federal service in the IT and logistics professions, including both

line and staff assignments ranging from the squadron and group level

as a traditional guardsman with the Hawaii Air National Guard to

combatant command level as a civilian at both US Pacific Command

and USTRANSCOM. He holds a master of science degree from Central Michigan University and is a 2010 graduate of Air War College.

Col Kenneth Hall is the deputy command surgeon, HQ USAFE.

Ramstein AB, Germany. He has served as the commander of the

27th Special Operations Medical Group, Cannon AFB. New Mexico.

Colonel Hall has supported numerous combat operations, including

Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, and Desert Storm.

His other military positions include deputy command surgeon and

command public health officer at Headquarters Air Combat Command, Aerospace Medicine Squadron commander, command public

health officer and health promotion director at Headquarters United

States Air Forces in Europe, chief of public health and prevention at

the Air National Guard Readiness Center, medical inspector at the

Air Force Inspection Agency, and base public health officer at stateside and overseas installations. Colonel Hall holds a bachelor's degree in biology from Virginia Tech, a doctorate in veterinary medicine

from Auburn University, and a master's in public health from Harvard University and is a recent graduate of the Air War College. He is

a chief Biomedical Sciences Corps officer and is board certified in

veterinary preventive medicine.

Lt Col Lars Helntrich has been a pilot in the Swedish Air Force

since 1990. Colonel Helmrich has served as commander of a Gripen

squadron and as wing commander (flying). In 2008 he commanded

lx
the Swedish Red Flag detachment. He is a graduate of the Swedish

Defense College Staff Course and Senior Staff Course and is a recent

graduate of Air War College.

Col Rebecca A. Keller is a career intelligence officer with one career broadening tour in the computer and communications career

field. Her intelligence assignments have been varied and include signals and imagery intelligence, targeting, information operations, and

collection management. Colonel Keller has served as a flight commander,

operations officer, squadron commander, and deputy division chief

on a major command staff. She was commissioned through the Air

Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, University of St. Thomas, St.

Paul, Minnesota and is a recent graduate of Air War College.

Lt Col Michael Rafter is a member of the Canadian Forces. He

has served on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization staff in the Allied Movement Coordination Center, Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium; as a United Nations peacekeeper in

Haiti; and as an air mobility advisor to the African Union's Darfur

Integrated Task Force, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. His varied operational

and headquarters assignments throughout Canada include postings

to Kingston, Ontario; Goose Bay, Labrador; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Cold

Lake, Alberta; Ottawa, Ontario; and Toronto, Ontario. As an air mobility officer, he qualified as a loadmaster on the C-130 Hercules aircraft and travelled extensively in support of Canadian Forces operations in the Arctic, the United States, Europe, Africa, and Australia.

He holds a bachelor of arts in history from the Royal Military College of Canada and completed his training as a logistics officer with a

specialization in movements and transportation. Colonel Rafter has a

master of arts in war studies and defence studies from the Canadian

Forces Joint Command and Staff Program and a master of strategic

studies from the USAF Air War College.

Col Carl Schaefer is the commander ofthe 46th Operations Group,

Eglin AFB, Florida. He has served as a squadron commander, a T-38

instructor pilot (IP), and an F-15E IP and led combat missions during

Operation Allied Force. Colonel Schaefer graduated from the USAF

Test Pilot School in 2000 and has conducted developmental flight

tests in the F-15, F-16, and T-38. A command pilot with over 2,800

hours in 30 aircraft types, Colonel Schaefer is a United States Air

Force Academy, Air Force Institute ofTechnology, and recent Air War

College graduate.

Col Stella Smith is the commander of the 552d Maintenance

Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Her operational assignments include

various aircraft maintenance positions at Grifhss, Kunsan, McChord,

and Tinker Air Force Bases. She has also held staff assignments do-
ing research at the Air Force Logistics Management Agency, managing aircraft maintenance contracts for Air Education and Training

Command, and serving as a Headquarters Air Force legislative liaison

to the US House of Representatives.

Colonel Smith deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom,

standing up the strategic airlift maintenance capability at Balad, Iraq,

as well as to Headquarters European Command in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Colonel Smith commanded the 62d Logistics

Support Squadron, 62d Maintenance Squadron, and 332d Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron and was the deputy commander of

the 552d Maintenance Group. She holds a bachelor's degree in Soviet

area studies from the US Air Force Academy, a master's degree in

maintenance management from the Air Force Institute of Technology,

and a master of strategic studies degree from Air War College.

Lt Col Matthew C. Smitham is assigned to the Office ofthe Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Space

and Intelligence Capabilities Office, the Pentagon, Washington, DC,

where he oversees major system acquisitions within the space and

intelligence portfolios for the Department of Defense. He was the payload deputy program manager for a next-generation imaging satellite

constellation at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, and led a system program office that directed a contractor team

in the development, integration, test, launch, and initialization of the

mission payload.

Colonel Smitham has served in a variety of technical management,

leadership, and staff positions in the Air Force. Previous assignments

include Air Staff positions as a program element monitor and deputy

division chief in the Directorate of Information Dominance, Assistant

Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions), Washington, DC; research,

development, and program management positions at the National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia, in the Advanced Science and

Technology and Signal Intelligence Directorates; and scientific researcher to mitigate space weather impacts on US space systems at

the Space Vehicles Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. He holds a BS in physics. University of

Washington; an MS in engineering physics, Air Force Institute of

Technology; an MA in military operational art and science, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and a master ofstrategic studies. Air War College.

Articulation beyond the Bumper Sticker

Revamping an Incomplete and

Confusing Master Tenet

Col Rolando. Burnett Sr., USAF*

The US Air Force should adjust its time-honored master tenet for

the employment of alrpower: centralized control and decentralized

execution (CC&DE). This Mosaic Law equivalent remains as valid today as when the airpower forefathers divined it amidst their operational context. It is, nonetheless, incomplete.

The United States conducts air operations over a wide spectrum of

conflicts producing many varied conditions. Correspondingly, the

military has adapted. From counter-insurgency operations to thermonuclear deterrence, America's strength has been the ability to create

flexibility to effectively respond to the types of wars it may face. Why

then should the Air Force assume its master tenet is the right approach to all operational contexts? Many Airmen view the master tenet as the only way to employ air and space power; however, restrictive doctrine and thinking have contributed to the master tenet's

unenviable status as a "bumper sticker."

This paper considers why centralized control dominates an Airman's thinking, the doctrinal history of centralized control and current doctrinal concerns, how different operational contexts impact

the Air Force's master tenet, key doctrinal strengths and weaknesses,

and how the master tenet can be improved upon.

Why Centralized Control

Dominates Airmen's Thinking

What Is the basis for an Airman's total commitment to this age-old

edict? Some may argue that the Airman's allegiance stems from

fear—fear of losing the status of an independent service. Centralized

control holds a special place in airpower history, underpinning the

argument that led to an independent US Air Force in 1947. Therefore,

if an Airman compromises—even one iota—on the master tenet, it

would be tantamount to undermining the value of an independent US

•Gp Capt Raymond Goodall, Royal Air Force, was the essay advisor for this paper.
2 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

Air Force. Most would agree that airpower has come of age in the last

63 years, based on the experiences in World War II, Korea, Vietnam,

and Iraq, with the chances of returning the Air Force back to the

Army slim to none.1 Nevertheless, dogged defense of centralized control may, in part, be explained by the fear of losing independence.

Paranoia is not the only explanation for an Airman's loyalty to the

master tenet. The origins for such loyalty can be traced back to lessons

learned by early airpower practitioners. As a result of the British experience prior to and during World War II and the US experience during that war, Airmen would rightly conclude that centralization (command and control) was the foundation to effective airpower operations.

British Experience

Following the Battle of France in 1940, numerous events shaped

Britain's approach to the employment of airpower. The Battle of Britain, lessons learned in North Africa, numerous exercises, and technological advances all contributed to Britain's approach to joint operations. During the fall of 1940, exercises in Northern Ireland

resulted in air support controls which embodied the technical and

organizational means to enhance support of ground forces. Another

development emphasized colocated army-air headquarters and a signals network that linked forward and rear airfields with the joint

army-air headquarters and deployed army divisions and brigades.

Sorting out the best of the emerging systems led to delays. Even more

daunting was introducing these concepts in the crucible of battle

against the Germans in North Africa during WWII. However, they

proved effective once fully developed. A hybrid of the two systems,

developed by Air Marshals Arthur William Tedder and Arthur "Mary"

Coningham, gained acceptance in the summer of 1942.2

During Operations Compass's and Crusader's (autumn of 1940

through the winter of 1941-42) offensive operations against Italian

forces in Libya, British airmen learned that colocating with army

headquarters and leveraging technological advances in communications allowed airpower's flexibility to gain air superiority. This enabled airpower to be effective in the ground-support role by massing

airpower at a decisive point. The new doctrine proved far superior to

German blitzkrieg.3

The success achieved is correctly attributed to the system devised

by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder and Air Vice Marshal Arthur

Coningham, but the system alone was not antecedent to successful

operations. . . . Continuous and intimate collaboration between

Coningham and (Bernard] Montgomery [Eighth Army commander]
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 3

accounts for the triumphant application of airpower" in North Africa's

Western Desert in 1942.4The British learned that properly employing

airpower in its different roles at the right place and time and in the

right amount was far more advantageous than dividing airpower between the land commanders. Airpower's ability to morph during operations would not materialize if shackled by a ground commander

who is (1) unable to think outside the ground force limitations; and

(2) unable to consider the theater-wide picture—concerned only with

one "fight"—and thus does not take advantage of opportunities to

influence the fight outside the geographic "box."

To realize these advantages, airmen needed a mechanism to wield

airpower to leverage its flexibility. The mechanism was central control, in the form of an airman who commanded air assets and was

coequal and preferably colocated with the ground commander. Sadly,

the Americans and British did not incorporate the lessons learned

and executed by the British during Operation Torch, the massive operation in November 1942 that intended to remove the Axis forces

from Northern Africa.

American Experience

An untested American airpower doctrine—Field Manual (FM) 31 -35,

Aviation in Support of Ground Operations—bounded the initial foray

into joint and combined operations by the Americans and British. On

paper it looked sound, with "a comprehensive tactical air control system: a central air command, a sophisticated network of ASC [air support control] centres and various levels of communications between the

ground and air forces."5 However, the theory had not been exercised.

The doctrine's emphasis on corps-level support and the ground

commander's decision authority for target priority and selection led

to dispersion and subordination of air assets to the "narrow closesupport interests of the ground commanders."6 Despite Britain's successful air operations in the Western Desert, Operation Torch planners did not consult with Tedder and Coningham, the chief architects,

for advice. As a result, air assets were spread throughout the close

battle, putting up an "air umbrella" (flying artillery) to protect ground

units and thus preventing airpower from massing decisively. Strategic targets such as enemy aerodromes and ports, which could have

had a more significant long-term effect on overall operations, were

not considered high priority and thus were not engaged. Brig Gen

Elwood "Pete" Quesada, 12th Fighter Command commander at the

time, said that "there was an abundance of ignorance" from US Army

Air Corps Airmen during Operation Torch.7
4 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

In contrast, Erwin Rommel massed Axis air assets and gained air

superiority by outnumbering Allied forces at decisive points. With air

superiority, Rommel eroded Allied defense in depth of key airfields

and supply depots on the Algerian coast. Allied forces used two mountain ranges and their key passes to form defense in depth. By midFebruary 1943, Rommel had driven Allied forces from the first mountain range, the Eastern Dorsal, and was advancing toward the

Western Dorsal, the second mountain range, and one of its key

passes, Kasserine. It was during the Kasserine crisis that a number

of things changed.8

Allied forces reorganized, based on changes proposed at the Casablanca conference In January 1943. In essence, the British implemented lessons learned. Airpower was controlled centrally by an airman who was coequal with the ground commander. Gen Carl Spaatz

established and commanded the Northwest African Air Force and was

supported by Marshal Coningham, who commanded a subelement

called the Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF). With control

of airpower, Coningham halted umbrella missions and concentrated

forces against targets, achieving air superiority. With air superiority,

the NATAF gained the upper hand as it punished Rommel while he

retreated to the Eastern Dorsal after 20 February 1943. Operation

Torch tactics changed to fit the British model and eventually resulted

in the United States' wholesale embracement of the UK doctrine in

the form of FM 100-20, Command and Employment ofAirpower.9"In

short, the Americans adopted the British doctrine in toto," and Axis

powers surrendered to US and British commanders two months after

Operation Torch adopted these new command relationships.10

North Africa 1943—A Major Combat Operation

FM 100-20 is a product of Its environment, which was unlimited in

nature where overwhelming force was required to destroy the enemy

to achieve military and strategic objectives.11 Achieving air superiority, establishing airpower as a coequal to land power, and exploiting

airpower's inherent flexibility to be concentrated at a decisive point

were key advantages enabled by centralized control.12

Air superiority was necessary, as in most conflicts involving airpower. However, it is important to point out the context in which air

superiority was gained. Air superiority for the Allied forces was not a

given; it had to be wrestled from an enemy who possessed a legitimate

air threat—one fully capable of gaining and maintaining air superiority

for itself. Next, the operational environment allowed combatants to

Identify decisive points where concentrated combat power meant the
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 5

difference between success and failure. The environment favored an

approach which leveraged the flexibility of airpower. Air commanders

exploited decisive points because the nature of the fight was homogeneous, or consistent across the area of operations. Thus, the air commander was more likely to understand the operational pros and cons

of flexibly applying airpower to meet the changing needs across operational areas.

The doctrine of centralized control was essentially formed in a conventional operational environment—force-on-force on a linear battlefield, a type of fight the United States has become very adept in prosecuting. Therefore, centralized control, through a single Airman

commander, is rooted in validity. It is understandable why Airmen

have created and clung to the master tenet. Given the conditions and

operational context, centralized control was a logical and pragmatic

approach to fully exploit airpower. The tendency of Airmen to default

to centralized control is warranted. Centralized control is still relevant

today; however, its relevancy does not necessarily mean it is without

shortcomings.

Doctrinal History of Centralized Control and

Decentralized Execution, 1954-2010

It is important to establish a background of post-WWII doctrine

with regard to CC&DE because it serves as a foundation to evaluate

and determine possible improvements. Historically, what does USAF

and joint doctrine reveal about CC&DE?

In 1954 the USAF's doctrinal approach to managing air operations

was "centralized overall direction and decentralized control of operations."13 In 1955 USAF doctrine described control in the context of

command: when determining command relationships, "control

should always be placed at a level which is fully able to employ the

capabilities of the forces."14 In 1971 it changed to "aerospace forces

must be centrally allocated and directed," and "mission control and

execution of specific tasks must be decentralized."15 In 1975 the doctrine first used the terms centralized control and decentralized execution but added coordinated effort, a third pillar deemed fundamental

to aerospace operations.16 In 1984 coordinated effort was not explicitly linked to CC&DE, and the dual-pronged master tenet became

gospel for directing and executing aerospace forces.17 The 2003 version of doctrine continues to state the value of CC&DE. The language

describing what has become CC&DE has been far from consistent

over the years and has contributed to a culture of confusion concern-
6 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

ing the master tenet and its relationship to command. The confusion

continues today.

Current Doctrine and Concerns

There is confusion over the relationship between command and

control. The terms are mistakenly used interchangeably.18

Command

An overriding aspect to the debate over CC&DE is command. Joint

Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms, defines command as "the authority that a

commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates

by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority

and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for

planning the employment .... organizing, directing, coordinating,

and controlling [of] military forces for the accomplishment of assigned

missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale,

and discipline of assigned personnel."19

While control is inherent to command, these terms are not synonymous. Command has to do with organizational issues. For example,

should command of air assets be given to a single Airman, or should

it be divided among commanders? Control has to do with operational

issues, such as whether a single commander should centrally control

air assets or "allow decentralized control so that lower echelon commanders can develop and implement plans in accordance with JFACC

(joint force air component commander] intent."20 Command and control are distinct: it is clear from doctrine that control can be delegated,

whereas command cannot. Just as the commander can delegate authority but not responsibility, so can a commander delegate control

but not command. Command is the ability to give orders. Control is

implementing those orders. Even though military terminology has

tended to put them together, they are two distinct things. Since control is inherent to command, why does the USAF master tenet focus

on centralized control instead of centralized command?

The following excerpt from a proposed revision in USAF doctrine

continues the Air Force's long-standing focus on and fascination with

control: "Centralized control empowers the JFACC to respond to

changes in the operational environment."21 Surely, the JFACC is the

commander and does not need control to be empowered. It is the element of command that should be emphasized. This muddled interpretation of the relationship between command and control may be a
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 7

major source of confusion and may be why Airmen and the other

services struggle to correctly understand the USAF's master tenet.

USAF doctrine seems to have placed the emphasis on a part (control)

rather than the whole (command).

Control

JP 1 -02 defines control in two ways—at the operational and tactical levels. Operational control is defined as "organizing and employing

commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission."22

Tactical control is defined as "detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned."23

Both Air Force and joint air and space operations doctrine define

control from a centralized perspective, espousing centralized control

as the best way to conduct air operations. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, defines centralized control as

"the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, integration,

and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander."24 JP 3-30, Command and Control

for Joint Air Operations, also offers the virtues of centralized control.

For example, it states that centralized control adds "coherence, guidance and organization to the air effort and the ability to focus the

tremendous impact of air capabilities wherever needed across the

theater of operations."25

Although doctrine portrays centralized control as beneficial, JP 3-30

implies other ways to control Joint air operations: "Joint air operations are normally conducted using centralized control."26 However,

there is no explanation of what "other than normal" might look like in

practice. Effectively, doctrine views centralized control as not merely

the best way, but the only way, to control air and space forces. Since

current doctrine does not go into detail about how to control air operations other than centrally, it can be assumed that the conditions

warranting something other than centralized control have never occurred (since doctrine is based on best practices during operations)

or have not occurred enough to warrant inclusion into the USAF's

codified system of best practices.

It is clear that within US doctrine there are differences in how control is viewed. JP 1-02 makes allowances for effective control of forces

at the operational as well as the tactical level. Though not explicitly

mentioned, this would include air and space forces. On the other

hand, air and space operations doctrine, JP 3-30 and AFDD 1, re-
8 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

ports effective control only in the context of the operational (centralized) level.

Decentralized Execution

At first glance, doctrine regarding decentralized execution seems

more unified and less confusing than either command or control.

AFDD 1, JP 1-02, and JP 3-30 define execution in terms of decentralization. The doctrine explicitly defines decentralized execution but not

execution. AFDD 1, JP 1-02, and JP 3-30 characterize decentralized

execution as "delegation of execution authority." However, AFDD 1

and JP 3-30 say that "decentralized execution helps achieve effective

span of control and flexibility to deal with changes and uncertainty."27

Although execution seems straightforward, it is not.

As Daniel Baltrusaitis states in Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution, "Current AF doctrine fails to adequately and consistently define the central terms of command, control and execution.

This causes major weaknesses in the debate over command, control

and execution concepts because there is no agreed upon definition of

the terms."28 This has led to varying interpretations.

In Command in Air War, Lt Col Michael Kometer observes that

"what control is to one may be execution to another."29 Likewise, what

may be centralized at one echelon of the organization could be viewed

as decentralization to another. For example, I asked career-Air Force

senior space officers about the nature of space operations with respect to control and execution. One concluded that space operated

under decentralized command and centralized execution (notice the

word control was not used), while another believed that space conformed to centralized control, decentralized execution.30 In another

example, the letter "C" in AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System, a common reference to the E-3 Sentry), stands for control To

battle-manager crew members, this is an accurate, functional description of what they do at the tactical level. However, the combined

air and space operations center (CAOC) may view those same activities, from the operational level, as decentralized execution.

This doctrinal analysis offers insight into the arguments over

CC&DE, but it doesn't answer all the questions. In fact it raises an

important one: can something other than CC&DE be a better option

for air and space operations? When we consider this question through

the lens of differing operational environments, it adds clarity.
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 9

One Size Does Not Fit All

There are weaknesses with the master tenet. It is not the optimal

approach for every situation—it is necessary but not sufficient to

overcome the vast diversity of challenges posed by airpower employment across the spectrum of operations.

FM 100-20 represented the best way to use airpower—one might

say an optimization—based on the operational environment of WWII.

However, the conditions which shaped and led to centralized control

were not universal. One could reason, then, given different operational circumstances and conditions, that centralized control may

not be the optimal approach in conducting air operations. Control is

a subset of command; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that

ideas on command could also apply to control. Martin van Creveld

writes about varied contexts and the impact these variations have on

so-called immutable laws of command. He suggests that since "command [is] so intimately bound up with numerous other factors that

shape war, the pronunciation of one or more 'master principles' that

should govern its structure and the way it operates is impossible."31

What about other operational environments? What are the differences, and how might they affect the conduct of air and space operations? Is CC&DE right for every situation—a counterinsurgency, for

instance? Van Creveld also explains that "the fundamentals of command in conventional war may require modification, even inversion,

in a counterinsurgency environment where purely military factors are

less important than psychological and political ones."32 Gen James N.

Mattis, commander, US Joint Forces Command, said of the current

counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, "Times are changing. We are having to decentralize, in terms of decision making, decentralize in terms

of assets. . . . It's wasteful but highly effective."33 He characterized the

type of war America is in as "not the American way of war. . . . It's

outside our comfort zone. We have to overcome this as our reality

meets the reality on the ground—not the reality as we want it to be

but the reality as it exists."34 So what is the reality of this war? What

are the conditions that make it different from the conditions under

which centralized control was forged?

The contextual divergence is staggering. First, counterinsurgencies

are limited in nature, and the use of overwhelming force can possibly

cause negative political fallout that can be detrimental to achieving

military and strategic objectives. The United States and its allies had

air superiority by default—the enemy posed no significant air capability. Next, the notion of a decisive point or points where massing

combat capability decides the outcome is simply not applicable in a
10 BURNETT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

counterinsurgency. If massing airpower is less advantageous, then

the mechanism (centralized control) that enables the massing of airpower is also less advantageous.

The current insurgency in Afghanistan is comprised of many varied mini-insurgencies—each with different challenges and requiring

tailored approaches. Afghanistan is a nation of ethnic tribes. It becomes difficult for a single commander to understand interrelationships between the mini-insurgencies as capability is moved between

local insurgencies, as opposed to the homogeneity of the North Africa

operation in WWII. It is reasonable to conclude that this type of operational environment may benefit from an increased level of decentralization. In fact, the land forces have done just that by "pushing"

the planning down to the division and, in some cases, to the brigade.

The shift toward decentralization in response to the diverse nature of

counterinsurgencies is understandable for land forces but does not apply to air and space power. This view is shortsighted and does not take

into account many instances where the Air Force has departed from its

master tenet, based on the conditions. For example, "Air Force participation in Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, and

Deliberate Force emphasize [sic] the use of centralized execution to manage the application of air power [because of political influence and force

protection requirements for coalition aircraft]. In each instance, the operation's small scale [and] limited objectives . . . allowed the C/JFACC to

pay individual attention to the execution of the air effort and thereby to

achieve the desired political and military objectives."35

The context and environment influence choices on how to employ

airpower. The experiences of Lt Col Clint Hinote, while serving as

chief of strategy for the Central Command combined force air component commander responsible for surge operations in Iraq, convinced

him that asking five questions can help determine how airpower is

best controlled and executed: (1) What is the nature of the operation?

(2) Where should flexibility be preserved? (3) How many assets are

available? (4) What is the geographical range of effects? and (5) Who

has the best situational awareness?36 Properly answering and appropriately responding to the questions are necessary but not sufficient

for improved command and control. Trust and cooperation between

components are also critical.

Lack of Trust and Cooperation

The AF doctrinal approach to centralized control, coupled with

Army trends to further decentralizing planning, has made it more difficult for air and ground planners to cooperate. A key characteristic of
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 11

centralized control is the Airman's approach to planning. Significant

planning occurs centrally at the CAOC, although detailed planning

also occurs at lower levels upon receipt of the air tasking order.37

Historically, the Army's approach has been more decentralized

through mission-type orders. This different approach has led to USAF

deficiencies in planning entities for the Army at every echelon.38

When critical Army planning occurs at the corps level, the USAF's

doctrinal approach is appropriate and works relatively well, heavily

impacting and shaping subordinate echelons such as in Operation

Desert Storm.39 The counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan,

however, have caused the Army to change. These insurgencies can be

described as made up of differing insurgencies—each with its own

specifics requiring its own approach. A senior leader at the Air Command and Control workshop describes the wars in Afghanistan and

Iraq as not two conflicts but 12, the implication being that they are

so different they should be considered as separate fights.40

The components no longer operate in a coordinated fashion as they

did during the first phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Instead of operating in support of the joint force commander's grand scheme of

maneuver, they now operate in "a highly decentralized fight, driven

largely by independent actions of lower level tactical commanders."41

What does all of this mean to the air component?

The absence of robust air planning capability at lower Army echelons

results in Airmen not providing air expertise where it matters. Often,

ground commanders do not realize all the benefits airpower could

provide because air isn't an integral part of the planning. Sometimes

this can cause ill-conceived and poorly executed operations. Lt Col

William Pinter believes that "the air component needs to commit to

developing the necessary resources to allow for the full degree of airground integration to occur at the lowest planning levels required for

effective combat operations."42 Operation Anaconda highlighted operational weaknesses that can occur due to, among other things, a

lack of integrated planning between air and ground forces.43

Another negative is missed opportunities for the joint planning

that fosters trust between air and ground components. The more the

Army decentralizes, the more profound the issue becomes. With planning by land forces occurring at lower levels, it has become even more

difficult for the air and land forces to plan together to best leverage

what airpower can contribute. This has resulted in a perceived wider

divide between air and ground planners.

Colonel Hinote comments that "not being in the mud" with the

ground planners limits opportunities to build trust. "There are not

many shared experiences between the air and ground. . . . There is no
12 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

sense of trust between air planners at the CAOC and ground planners at the many decentralized fights which are going on."44 This

general sentiment is shared by Colonel Kometer, who also served as

chief of strategy in the Al Udeid CAOC.45

Conclusions and Recommendations

From the analysis above flow three broad conclusions. The first is

that the master tenet is incomplete; it does not address the variety of

ways air and space power has been managed. Differing operational

contexts have led to different, but valid, ways to conduct air and

space power operations. For the most part they are not addressed in

USAF doctrine. The second main conclusion is that USAF doctrine,

although incomplete, is still relevant. As long as there remains the

possibility of the United States engaging in major combat operations,

CC&DE is an option. Third, confusion abounds over centralization,

decentralization, command, control, and execution. The varied interpretations of these terms and how they relate reflect the profound

complexities associated with conducting air and space operations.

Centralized command, flexible control, and flexible execution seem

to be a sound basis from which to articulate airpower philosophy. The

new and improved master tenet unequivocally places the emphasis

on command. It recognizes centralized command as the most likely

constant across the spectrum of air and space operations. Control is

inherent to command; by emphasizing command, the confusion over

how they relate can be lessened if not totally eliminated.

Control and execution, however, need to be flexible. Sometimes it

may be best to centrally control and execute (e.g., nuclear deterrence

mission); at other times, controlling and executing in a decentralized

fashion (e.g., counterinsurgency operations) may be best. And there

are times when they may fall somewhere in between this continuum.

The issue of centralization and decentralization is a matter of degree

when applied to control and execution. In Command in Air War, Colonel Kometer states that "control of airpower has varied among different types of wars and even among different missions within the same

war."46 Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, retired, said as he recounted

operations during Allied Force, "In the same ATO (air tasking order]

some missions were centrally controlled and executed, and others

were centrally controlled with decentralized execution."47 Although

useful, this simple tweak to the tenet is not enough.

Doctrine has to address, in detail, what is meant by flexible. This

could be accomplished in a supplement that presents a contextual

analysis by explaining the differing operational circumstances and their
ARTIC U LATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 13

impact In determining the best approach to conducting air operations.

Airmen would then be better equipped to understand the centralization issue that dominates control and execution arguments. It would

allow Airmen to discern the complex interplay between the pluses

and minuses of centralization or decentralization, based on those

who have experience. In short, it would add much-needed muscle,

bone, and academic rigor to the current straw man of CC&DE.

Airmen have a hard time articulating beyond the bumper sticker,

partly because the Air Force has failed to systematically document

these complexities and their all-important implications. The Airman's

understanding is stifled, lacking in-depth comprehension of command and control of air and space operations. USAF doctrine penetrates only surface deep and leaves much to be learned through trial

and error or word of mouth. It is time the Air Force adjusted its master tenet to reflect those complexities. If it continues to allow the doctrine to be what amounts to a caricature of reality, its Airmen's ability

to explain the doctrine will also be a caricature. Sadly, that amounts

to nothing more than dogma.

Notes

1. Many lessons were learned in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific theaters.

2. David Ian Hall, Learning How to Fight Together. AFRI Paper 2009-2 (Maxwell

AFB. AL: Air University Press, 2009). 1-13.

3. Ibid.. 14-15.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 21.

6. Ibid.

7. Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada, USAF. retired, interview by Col William R. Carter; Lt

Col Price Bingham; J. A. Mowbray, PhD; Lt Col David Mclsaac. USAF, retired; and

Charles Westenhoff. Fall 1990. Maxwell AFB, AL. (Personal collection ofJ. A. Mowbray).

8. Shawn P. Rife, "Kasserine Pass and the Proper Application of Power." Joint Force

Quarterly, no. 20 (Fall/Winter 1998-1999): 71-77.

9. Ibid.

10. Hall, Learning How to Fight Together. 25.

11. Lt Col Daniel F. Baltrusaitis. Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution:

Never Divide the Fleet? Occasional Paper no. 36 (Maxwell AFB. AL: Center for Strategy

and Technology, Air War College. 2004). 16, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

cst/csat36.pdf.

12. Field Manual (FM) 100-20. Command and Employment ofAir Power. 21 July

1943, 1.

13. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-2. United States Air Force Basic Doctrine. 1 April

1954. 4.

14. Ibid., 1 April 1955. 2.

15. AFMAN 1 -1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine ofthe United States Air Force. September

1971. 2-2.

16. Ibid., January 1975. 2-2.

17. Ibid., March 1984. 2-20 and 2-21.
14 BURNETT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 48

18. Baltrusaitis, Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution, 6.

19. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 as amended through 19 August 2009, http://www

.dtic.mi1/dod_dictionary/data/c/01087.html (accessed 5 December 2009).

20. Ibid.

21. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine, draft revision,

1 April 2010.

22. JP 1-02, Department ofDefense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms.

23. Ibid.

24. AFDD 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine. November 2003, 28.

25. JP 3-30. Command and Control ofJoint Operations. 5 June 2003. vii-viii.

26. Ibid., vii.

27. Ibid.. 1-3: and AFDD 1. Air Force Basic Doctrine. November 2003. 28.

28. Baltrusaitis, Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution, 5.

29. Lt Col Michael Kometer, Command in Air War: Centralized versus Decentralized

Control ofCombat Airpower (Maxwell AFB. AL: Air University Press, 2007), 23.

30. Comments by Air Force senior space officers.

31. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press, 1995), 261.

32. Ibid., 262.

33. Gen James N. Mattls, commander, US Joint Forces Command (speech. Air War

College, 15 September 2009).

34. Ibid.

35. Baltrusaitis, Centralized Control with Decentralized Execution. 28-29.

36. Lt Col Clint Hinote. Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution: A Catchphrase in Crisis? (Maxwell AFB. AL: Air University Press, March 2009), 59-62.

37. The five deployable CAOCs are a direct result of centralized doctrine.

38. The Army's planning echelons Include the corps, division, brigade, and company levels.

39. Lt Gen Eugene D Santarelli, USAF, retired (comments. Command and Control

of Air and Space Power Forces course, Maxwell AFB, AL, 13 October 2009).

40. Maj Gen Maurice H. Forsyth, commander, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine

Development and Education, and vice-commander, Air University (comments. Air

Command and Control workshop, Maxwell AFB. AL, 13 October 2009).

41. Air Force/Marine Corps Tiger Team, Air Force/Marine Corps Tiger Team Trip

Report, March 2008, 4.

42. Lt Col William E. Pinter. "Air-Ground Integration in the 21st Century: Improving Air Force Combat Capabilities and Theater Command and Control for Major Combat Operations and Irregular Warfare." Research report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War

College. 2009).

43. HQ USAF/XOL. Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, Operation Anaconda: An

Airpower Perspective (Washington. DC: DOD. 7 February 2005). 3-10.

44. Lt Col Clint Hinote (comments. Air Command and Control workshop. Maxwell

AFB, AL, 13 October 2009).

45. Lt Col Michael Kometer (comments. Air Command and Control workshop. Maxwell AFB, AL, 13 October 2009).

46. Kometer, Command in Air War, 17.

47. Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, retired (comments. Command and Control of Air

and Space Power course, Maxwell AFB, AL, 9 December 2009).
ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER 15

Abbreviations

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

ASC air support control

ATO air tasking order

AWCS Airborne Warning and Control System

CAOC combined air and space operations center

CC&DE centralized control and decentralized execution

FM field manual

JFACC joint force air component commander

JP joint publication

NATAF Northwest African Tactical Air Force

The Dangerous Decline in the US Military's

Infectious-Disease Vaccine Program

Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF*

For over 230 years, vaccines advanced by the US military research

and development (R&D) community have dramatically reduced the

impact of naturally acquired infections not only in America's armed

forces but in society at large. In recent years, however, the military's

infectious-disease vaccine program has lost considerable emphasis,

funding, and mission capability. In the 1990s, with the burgeoning

concern for weaponized bioagents in Iraq and North Korea, Congress

turned its attention to combating biological threats of deliberate origin over those of natural causes. The Department of Defense (DOD)

responded by partitioning its biodefense and infectious-disease vaccine acquisition programs, with biodefense vaccines holding a higher

acquisition priority and receiving more robust funding than infectiousdisease vaccines. The result has been a significant erosion of the

DOD's ability to ensure the acquisition and availability of the right

vaccines at the right time to optimally protect US forces from established and emerging natural infections now and in the future.'

In this paper, I argue that the DOD needs to take swift actions to

revitalize its infectious-disease vaccine program and enhance the

synergy between biodefense and infectious-disease activities to resolve vaccine acquisition and availability shortfalls. Specifically, the

DOD must collectively assess and prioritize all biological threats,

whether natural, accidental, or deliberate in nature; consolidate redundant vaccine acquisition activities; elevate the priority ofinfectiousdisease vaccines; and provide ample resources to sustain a robust

vaccine acquisition capability to protect US military forces against

validated and prioritized biological threats.2

In presenting the argument, I first make a case for why vaccines

against natural infectious diseases, developed under US military R&D

leadership, must remain a vital force health protection (FHP) imperative for safeguarding the war fighter and optimizing US military mission effectiveness. I then establish the historical impact of naturally

occurring infectious diseases on military operations, the criticality of

FHP in defending the human weapon system, and the superiority of

vaccines among medical countermeasures. An analysis of the factors

•Col Gilbert Hansen. USAF. was the essay advisor for this paper.

17
18 HALL * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

hindering infectious-disease vaccine acquisition follows, including

unbalanced threat assessment and mission focus, ineffective organization, insufficient funding, and inferior priority status. Finally, I recommend ways to enhance FHP vaccine acquisition and availability

that will posture the DOD and America's military forces for twentyfirst-century national security success.

Why DOD-Led Vaccines against

Naturally Acquired Infections Are Vital

Throughout America's wars, naturally acquired infectious diseases—

many preventable by vaccine—have eclipsed bombs and bullets as

the culprits of morbidity, mortality, disability, and mission degradation. This section investigates the criticality of infectious-disease vaccines in protecting force health and explains why US military R&D

leadership is vital to their development.

Historical Impact of Infections Diseases on

US Military Readiness and Effectiveness

"Should the disorder infect the Army, in the natural way ... we

should have more to dread from it than from the sword of the enemy."3

These were the sentiments of Gen George Washington as thousands

of troops fell ill—and hundreds died—from smallpox during the first

two years of the American Revolution, resulting in campaign losses,

poor morale, and sparse recruiting. Via inoculation, the Continental

Army dramatically reduced smallpox mortality from 160 to 3.3 per

1,000 cases, all but eliminating the threat.4The US Civil War saw

twice as many deaths from disease (65 per 1,000) as from battle (33

per 1.000).5 Of the 6 million disease cases among 2.8 million enlistees

on both sides, over 95,000 died and roughly 250,000 were discharged

for disability.6Typhoid fever, malaria, and yellow fever accounted for

80 percent of US military deaths in the Spanish-American War, forcing a rapid withdrawal from Cuba soon after the end of hostilities.7

While World War I saw—for the first time—parity between US deaths

from battle (50,510) and disease (51,477), the latter's impact on combat operations was demoralizing.8 Various diseases accounted for 95

percent of American battlefield hospital admissions in World War II,

69 percent in Vietnam, 71 percent in the Gulf War, and over 95 percent in Somalia.9 Unchecked, natural infections can wreak havoc on

military forces.10
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 19

Critlcality of Force Health Protection in

Defending the Human Weapon System

The DOD's FHP doctrine characterizes every service member as a

human weapon system requiring total life-cycle support and health

maintenance.11 Protecting the human weapon system, the central

element of military power, is pivotal. Absent "craniums at the controls," "boots on the ground," and "hands on deck," wars cannot be

won. Strained budgets, emerging technologies, and evolving threats

have pressed the United States to transform its military into a

lighter, leaner, and more agile force. With fewer people performing

more specialized roles, it is critical for each military member to remain healthy, fit, and effective. Such is the challenge, as DOD personnel are often placed in austere locations, on short notice, and

under stressful conditions, where naturally acquired infectious

threats are abundant, immune systems are naive, and healthcare

support is limited. A vital part of FHP, immunization is effective In

mitigating these operational hurdles.12

Superiority of Immunization among

Medical Countermeaaures

In defeating health threats, primary prevention—action prior to exposure—reigns supreme. Immunization affords the lowest risk, highest efficacy, and most cost-effective protection to vaccine recipients.

Immunization is superior to therapeutics (e.g., antibiotics and chemoprophylactics) and personal protection (e.g., repellents and bed nets)

since it does not require knowledge of exposure; is not contingent

upon an accurate and timely diagnosis; protects against severe diseases (e.g., rabies) and those for which treatment is unavailable, ineffective, or prone to cause side-effects; does not require individual

compliance (e.g., antimalarials); and neither contributes to nor is

fazed by microbial resistance. As well, immunization can notably reduce the medical logistical footprint in theater since, for every casualty, five personnel are required In the evacuation and treatment support chain.13 Furthermore, vaccines not only elicit a direct benefit to

recipients, they also afford herd immunity to those in the communities with whom they live and work.14 Finally, despite perceived differences between weaponized and natural pathogens, "vaccines are a

unifying technology proven to effectively and efficiently defeat both of

these threats."15
20 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

The Case for US Military Leadership

in Infections-Disease Vaccine R&D

Fielding a licensed vaccine is a long, complex, high-risk endeavor.

It requires the synergy of expertise and resources from multiple partners spanning government, industry, academia, nonprofits, and international organizations.16 Cooperation is essential to manage the

substantial scientific and financial risks. In general, no partner is

capable of developing and producing a vaccine countermeasure alone.

The DOD, for instance, must rely on industry for scale-up production, just as industry relies on the DOD to bring its many unique

R&D capabilities to the cooperative effort.17

First is the DOD's unique experience. More than half of the routine

vaccines given to service members today were codeveloped by the US

military.18 Beyond protection of its own forces, the military's advances

also created solutions to diseases of dire importance to national and

international public health. Of 15 adult vaccines licensed in the United

States since 1962, the DOD played a significant role in developing

eight.19 Currently used worldwide, these include vaccines for influenza,

meningococcal disease, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, rubella, adenovirus,

typhoid, and Japanese encephalitis.20 In addition, development of licensed vaccines for yellow fever, mumps, measles, varicella, and oral

polio was supervised by investigators who began their careers at US

military R&D centers.21 In the high-risk business of vaccine production, experience breeds proficiency and efficiency and curbs scientific,

regulatory, and financial risk that can stifle product development.

Second are the DOD's unique facilities. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) is currently home to one of the nation's

three pilot facilities dedicated to the production of a variety of investigational vaccines for use in clinical trials.22 Industry actively seeks

the WRAIR's in-house laboratory capabilities to conduct animal modeling studies.

Third is the DOD's unique intellectual property (IP) sharing.23 Highly

sought after by industry, DOD partnerships attract companies by allowing them to retain IP rights for use in lucrative civilian markets.24

Fourth is the DOD's unique R&D networks.25 Because the Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) requires pivotal clinical trials of products in

people living in areas where infectious diseases are endemic, the DOD's

overseas laboratories serve as bases for conducting clinical trials that

attract industry partnerships.26 Because of its enduring presence,

strong host-nation relationships, and professional development of

host-nation scientists, the DOD has been able to successfully execute

complex clinical trials with industry and international partners.27
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 21

Fifth, and most importantly, is the DOD's focus on the often unique

needs of the war fighter. This mission distinguishes its infectiousdisease activities from other organizations conducting what may appear to be similar R&D. The global effort to develop antimalarial

countermeasures provides one example. Outside of the DOD, this

effort is focused on drug therapies to attenuate lethal disease in children and pregnant women in underdeveloped countries. The goal of

the DOD's program, on the other hand, is to prevent the war fighter

from ever contracting the debilitating illness in the first place. To that

end, DOD research has focused on developing prophylactic drugs

and, more recently, a malaria vaccine solution. Additionally, any drug

or vaccine used to protect US war fighters must be FDA licensed.

Because many companies are reluctant to independently take on this

costly risk, the DOD's R&D community plays a key role in moving

potential military-relevant products through early development, FDA

licensure, and eventual use by the US military.28

Also compelling is the potential impact of infectious-disease vaccines on the military's increasing role in stability operations, which

the DOD recently designated as "a core US military mission that [it)

should be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat

operations."29 Infectious diseases contribute significantly to social

unrest and conflict in these scenarios. Infections not only ravage the

local civilian populace, but also can decimate the strength of their

national militaries. The prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus

(HIV) infection and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in

Africa provides a persuasive example. Of 33 million people living with

HIV worldwide, two-thirds reside in sub-Saharan Africa.30 Armed

forces in this region experience HIV infection rates two to three times

those of the civilian population, further eroding local, national, and

regional prospects for stability.31 The significance of this US national

security concern is well summarized in the following excerpt from a

2002 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies:

In Africa. HIV/AIDS is spreading fastest in the Horn of Africa, where the US already has deep concerns about lawlessness and extremism. In both Ethiopia and

Kenya, potentially important regional hubs in the violent and volatile East African

sub-region, adult HTV-prevalence rates are over 10 percent. Nigeria, an essential

guarantor of security and economic growth in the West African region, has more

than 3 million citizens living with HIV or AIDS. The adult prevalence rate in South

Africa, which plays a similar economic and security role in the southern African

region, is 20 percent. If these two regional hegemons cannot send peacekeepers,

contribute to growth and stability, or guarantee their own internal stability, US

security interests in the continent. . . are severely threatened.32

This situation demonstrates the powerful potential impact that vaccines for endemic diseases could have on geopolitical stability.33 An
22 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

effective HIV vaccine could remarkably strengthen foreign militaries,

secure vulnerable families and communities, bolster international

public health, and reinforce US national security.34

Natural infections will continue to challenge the US military and its

R&D community. With 1,500 known human pathogens continuously

lurking and novel agents like H1N1 (influenza A virus or "swine flu")

constantly emerging, infectious diseases will remain a formidable national security threat indefinitely.35 The expeditionary nature of military missions, the effects of climate change, and the interconnectedness of an increasingly globalized planet accentuate the risks.

Worldwide, 14.7 million people die each year from known and preventable contagions.36 Even in industrialized nations, 46 percent of

all deaths result from infectious causes.37 Emerging infections have

been discovered at the rate of one per year since the late 1980s.38

Pathogens adapt, persist, and emerge; this pattern will continue.39

Keeping pace with the evolving threat requires a robust US military

infectious-disease vaccine program with the venerable experience,

proven track record, and unique attributes that no other agency can

bring to bear—one that can continually improve upon its unparalleled protection ofAmerica's warriors and, in the process, her citizens

and global neighbors.

The DOD's Unbalanced Biological-Threat

Assessment and Mission Focus

Since the Cold War's end, the DOD has become fixated on combattog biological threats of deliberate origin over those of natural causes.

This section examines the DOD's lopsided focus on notional bioweapons while natural infections continue to plague military operations.

Weaponized Pathogens: A Matter of National Insecurity

Despite its remarkable history, the US military infectious-disease

vaccine program has taken a backseat to countering the bioterrorism

threat since the mid-1990s. Beginning with its stand-up of the Joint

Program Office for Biological Defense in 1993 and formalized requirements for biodefense vaccines in 1995, the DOD—with a push from

Congress—justifiably turned a focused eye to biodefense.40 By 1998

the DOD had established the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program

(JVAP) and significantly increased funding for advanced biodefense

vaccine development, while core funding for infectious-disease vaccine R&D declined.41 Because of the post-9/11 anthrax letters, fears

of state-sponsored weapons-of-mass-destruction proliferation by Iraq,
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 23

and the express interest in bioagents by al-Qaeda, the nation perceived an urgent vulnerability to biological attack.42 The DOD responded with wholesale investments in biodefense as infectiousdisease R&D funding remained level.43

Reportedly, about a dozen states and multiple nonstate actors possess or are pursuing biological weapons.44 Their potential use clearly

poses a level of danger to US forces in the contemporary battlespace,

as do established and emerging natural infections. To date, the DOD

has yet to incur a single case ofweaponized disease, while some 3,400

cases of natural-origin and vaccine-preventable infectious diseases

have been reported in deployed US forces since 1998.45 While the

potential threat is duly noted, bioterrorism against US interests has

been limited to 22 American citizens sickened by anthrax-tainted letters in 2001, of whom five tragically died. Allegedly, this may have

been the work of a lone American researcher, with no link to either

state sponsors or nonstate actors.46

In contrast, by 2008 West Nile virus had sickened 28,961 Americans—claiming 1,131 lives—since its arrival on US soil in 1999.47 The

emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003,

H5N1 (influenza A virus or "bird flu") in 2006, and H1N1 in 2009

further underscores the clear and present danger posed by natural

infectious diseases. Also, to some experts, the emergence of a novel

strain of adenovirus among military recruits in 2007 served to " 'remind us that we are at least equally likely ... to soon experience

large-scale morbidity through epidemics of emergent pathogens' as

we are to experience a biological weapons attack."48

Although it is undoubtedly a national security imperative for the

United States to prepare its public and military against the intentional use of biological agents, vigilance for natural infections warrants at least the same level of emphasis.

Natural Pathogens: An Operational Reality Check

All the while, natural-origin infectious diseases have continued to

pose real challenges to US military commanders in lost manpower-days,

reduced effectiveness, increased medical visits, and frequent medical

evacuations.49 In one tri-service study, of 15,459 Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) deployers

surveyed, 75 percent reported having at least one bout of diarrhea, 69

percent suffered one or more episodes of acute respiratory illness,

and "one-quarter believed that combat unit effectiveness had been

negatively affected by these common illnesses."50 Roughly 13 percent

of ground forces missed at least one patrol, 12 percent of air forces
24 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

were grounded, 25 percent required intravenous fluids, and over 10

percent were hospitalized.51

Table 1 summarizes the incidence of the four leading—and potentially vaccine-preventable—infectious diseases in deployed US forces

between 1998 and 2009.52 Of 3,386 total cases, leishmaniasis, malaria, and Lyme disease accounted for 95.8 percent of the disease

burden. Through 2004, leishmaniasis prompted 4.4 percent of the

monthly medical evacuations during OIF.53 The occurrence of 126

cases of meningococcal disease reflects the absence of an effective

vaccine for subtype B of this potentially lethal pathogen. Each of

these operational experiences emphasizes the current threat from

naturally acquired pathogens and urges continued development of

vaccine solutions for the mission-crippling diseases they cause.

Table 1. Summary of the major potentially vaccine-preventable infectious diseases incurred by deployed US military forces, 1998-2009

Leishmaniasis Malaria Lyme Disease

Meningococcal

Disease

Active 771 990 551 106

Reserve 420 68 445 20

TOTAL 1,191 1,058 996 126

Datafrom Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC). "Defense Medical Surveillance System,'

10 December 2009.

Signs of a Program in Serious Decline:

Loss of Adenovirus Vaccine

While its emphasis was shifting to biodefense, the DOD was losing

ground in its portfolio of infectious-disease vaccines. Table 2 depicts

the major vaccine shortfalls which resulted from a variety of economic, regulatory, scientific, and legal pressures the existing DOD

vaccine-acquisition apparatus was unable to mitigate.54 Previously

licensed vaccines for Lyme disease, cholera, and plague are currently

unavailable. Ten investigational new drug (IND) vaccines are no longer produced and have limited availability.

The most instructive example is the DOD's loss of adenovirus vaccine. Because of crowding and various stressors, adenovirus is a frequent cause of acute respiratory disease in unvaccinated military

recruits.55 Prior to routine immunization in 1971, adenoviral outbreaks in DOD basic-training units were common. Infection rates approached 50 percent, hospitalizations reached 10 percent, and occasionally trainees died.56 Outbreaks stressed medical services, eroded
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 25

Table 2. Previously licensed and IND-only infectious-disease vaccine shortfalls

Vaccine

Previously licensed but unavailable

Adenovirus, types 4 and 7

Lyme disease

Cholera

Plague

IND product no longer produced and of

limited availability

Argentine hemorrhagic fever

Chikungunya virus

Eastern equine encephalitis

Q fever

Rift Valley fever

Tularemia

Venezuelan equine encephalitis

Western equine encephalitis

Botulinum toxoid

Tickborne encephalitis

Data from Stanley M. Lemon, Susan ThauJ. Salem Flsseha. and Heather C. O'Maonaigh. eds..

Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and Availability in the US Military (Washington.

DC: Institute of Medicine of the National Academies. National Academies Press. 2002).

training effectiveness, and sometimes stalled the training pipeline altogether.57 During 25 years of use, the adenovirus vaccine provided to

recruits on day one of training virtually eliminated the disease.58 In

the mid-1990s, however, negotiations between the DOD and the sole

adenovirus vaccine manufacturer failed to produce a financial agreement concerning upgrades to the production facility required by the

FDA. In 1996 the manufacturer could no longer afford to produce the

vaccine. As supplies waned across the DOD, prevaccination program

morbidity returned, with unvaccinated trainees 28 times more likely

than vaccinated trainees to be positive for the types of adenovirus

covered by the vaccine.59 All stocks were depleted by 1999, and by the

end of 2000, seven basic military training centers had experienced

adenoviral epidemics.

Today the DOD remains without an adenovirus vaccine, and the

disease continues to sicken trainees, burden medical systems, and

disrupt training.60 For the 12 months prior to December 2009, over

4,400 military recruits with febrile respiratory illness tested positive

for adenovirus.61 Not all who became ill were tested; the actual number of cases was higher.62 One DOD study estimated the loss of adenovirus vaccine to be responsible for 10,650 preventable infections,

4,260 medical clinic visits, and 852 hospitalizations among the

roughly 213.000 active duty and reserve trainees enrolled in basic
26 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

training each year.63 Another study projected the related annual medical and training costs at $26.4 million for the US Army alone.64

The loss ofthe adenovirus vaccine "sounds a warning for the fragile

system supporting other vaccines of military and public health importance."65 To stay in business, vaccine manufacturers need to realize a profit. To do so, they must weigh what it costs to manufacture a

product, how much of it they can sell at what price, and what they

could be making if they used their production capacity on a different

product. The economic pressures brought on by evolving regulatory

requirements caused this sole-source manufacturer to abandon its

production of a limited-market, mainly military-use vaccine. Competing priorities and the lack of a single agent with the authority and

budget to preserve adenovirus vaccine availability were significant

DOD shortcomings.

Disparate Organizations, Disproportionate

Funding, Dissimilar Priority

Despite overlapping missions, the DOD maintains separate organizations for infectious-disease and biodefense vaccine development,

procurement, and product management. Each has exclusive budgetary authority and product-line responsibility. This section investigates the negative impacts from the DOD's decision to decouple its

vaccine programs while granting preferential funding and priority to

its biodefense efforts.

Disparate Organizations

The Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP) mission

is to "protect the US military against naturally-occurring infectious

diseases via the development of FDA-approved vaccines" and other

protection systems.66 The JVAP exists to "develop, produce and stockpile FDA-licensed vaccine systems to protect the warfighter from biological agents."67 Figure 1, a simplified organizational chart, highlights

these agencies' disparate command and control relationships.68 In reality, the number of players and interactions is much more complex,

indicative of the fragmented and diffuse organization that encumbers

acquisition. Congress directed the split management scheme to raise

the visibility of biodefense and streamline acquisition procedures.69 In

retrospect, however, separating the acquisition of infectious-disease

and biodefense vaccines was ill-advised for multiple reasons.

First, separate acquisition precludes a unified approach to the

identification and prioritization of vaccine solutions based primarily
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 27

USD(AT&1) CK3

Mmm

BO Program Involvement

ID Program tnvolvamant

BD* >D Program tnvotvtrrwrit

Command / Control

Coordtn«tofi / Owitght

AAE Army Acquisition Executive JVAP

Army SG Army Surgeon General MIDRP

ASD(HA> Assistant Secretary ol Defense tor Health Affairs

ATSD Assistant to the Secretary of Defense MRMC

CBMS Chemical-Biological Medical Systems Sec Army

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff SECDEF

OATSO(CBD) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical USAMRHD

and Biological Defense Programs

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency USD(AT4Lj

DVC DynCorp Vaccine Company {Prime Systems

Contractor) USCXP4R)

JPEO-CBD Jomt Program Executive Office-Chemtcal and

Biological Defense WR AIR

JRO-CBRN Joint Requirements Office-Chemical. Biological,

Radiological, Nuciea'

'Central Ovtrsajtn Authority for MCBO

"ttrectt PPfJfor el BO Research

Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program

(US Army) Military Infectious Diseases Research

Program

(US Army) Medical Research and Materiel Command

Secretary ol the Army

Secretary ol Defense

US Army Medical Research institute of Infectious

Under Secretary ol Defense tor Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics

Under Secretary ol Defense for Personnel and

Readiness

Walter Reed Army Institute ol Research

Figure 1. Simplified organizational chart depicting DOD infectious-disease and

biodefense vaccine programs. (Adapted from LTC Coleen K. Martinez, "Biodefense

Research Supporting the DOD: A New Strategic Vision," Research Report no. 1-58487-

288-8 [Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2007]; Rudolph Kuppers,

USMRMC/MIDRP, to the author, e-mail, 11 December 2009; and COL Charles Hoke,

retired, MD, USAMRHD, to the author, e-mail, 24 January 2010.)

on operational risk rather than the nature of the threat. Similarly, it

impedes a united approach to the acquisition of "dual-use" vaccines,

those which could counter both a natural and a weaponized threat to

military personnel.70 The National Select Agent Registry (NSAR), utilized

for monitoring the possession and use of 48 pathogens and toxins

that pose a severe threat to human health, contains 13 bioweapons

that are also natural infections for which vaccines have been, or currently are, in some stage of development by the MIDRP.71

Second, separate acquisition fosters programmatic redundancy.

There are many more similarities than differences between the pathogens, science, technology, and business processes for vaccines

against natural and weaponized agents. Their development and pro-
28 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

ductlon follow like pathways, encounter similar difficulties, and present comparable developmental and financial risks.

Third, separate acquisition dilutes limited expertise and splits

budgetary power. Because vaccine development is so complex, highly

skilled and experienced professionals are required in all facets, from

scientists to administrators. Also, the industry average cost to bring

a new vaccine through the development process from concept to licensure ranges from $800 million to $1.6 billion over 14 years; to

sustain a fielded product costs millions more. Separation curbs professional and budgetary synergy.72

Fourth, separate acquisition hinders the Total Life-Cycle Systems

Management (TLCSM) of vaccine products—"the implementation,

management, and oversight, by a single accountable authority, of all

activities associated with the acquisition, development, production,

fielding and sustainment of a DOD system across its life cycle."73 The

Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense

(JPEO-CBD) leads the TLCSM of biodefense vaccines.74 To date, no

single locus of TLCSM authority, responsibility, and accountability

exists for infectious-disease vaccine products.75 Separation underserves infectious-disease vaccine acquisition and precludes enterprisewide vaccine TLCSM collaboration.

These issues have contributed to significant vaccine availability

problems, such as the loss of the adenovirus vaccine as previously

described. They also signify the level of commitment required by the

DOD not only to bring militarily important vaccines on line but to

keep them available.76 In its 2002 report to the DOD, the Institute of

Medicine was "convinced that disjointed authority . . . within DOD

contributed significantly to the lack of additional investment required

for continued production of [adenovirus] vaccine."77

Disproportionate Funding

While discrete programs with no single oversight authority are

problematic, the pivotal issue in separating the acquisition of infectiousdisease and biodefense vaccines is budgetary. In 1993 the DOD's

annual budget for the advanced development of biodefense vaccines

was $1 million.78 By 1998 funding levels rose to $25 million per

year.79 Between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2008. the US government annually allocated $57 billion to biodefense, with the DOD receiving nearly $12 billion.80 In FY 2009 government-wide allocations

jumped by 39 percent to $8.97 billion; the DOD share was $1.72 billion.81 Billions were allocated to the Department of Health and Human Services and the DOD to develop, produce, procure, and stock-
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 29

pile vaccine countermeasures against weaponized pathogens.82 Since

FY 1997 the annual US budget for biological defense has increased

over 47-fold, from $137 million to $6.5 billion by FT 2008.83

Figure 2 shows MIDRP funding for its core research over the past

15 years, with projections to FY 2011.84 Several points must be made.

First, biodefense vaccine management transitioned from the MIDRP

to the JVAP in 1998, accounting for the associated funding spike and

then dip. Second, there is a relative budget flatline in actual-year dollars over the period. In FY 1994 the MIDRP's annual budget was $42

million. By FY 2009 it had increased only to $47 million. Third, when

adjusted for inflation to FY 2005 dollars, the buying power of the FY

2009 budget was only $41 million, less than that of 15 years earlier.

Fourth, the Inflationary gap is widening. By FY 2011 the MIDRP's

$46 million annual budget will be worth, in effect, only $37 million in

FY 2005 dollars.

Figure 3 depicts the mounting impact of inflation on the MIDRP

budget through FY 2015.85 With projected funding levels, the MIDRP

cannot keep pace with inflation. This dismal scenario is exacerbated

by the rising cost of advanced product development and clinical trials,

which accounts for roughly 75 percent of total development outlays.86

Also, clinical trials to assess a vaccine's safety and efficacy in human

subjects are very expensive. In the past five years, these costs have

30

ID Program - Actual Dollars

ID Program - Inflation Adjusted

*» LT) KO t~- 00 CT> OS Ol C£ Crt 0*S CT1 O"* CTt 0> CT> O^ &*r-irMcr>5mvpr-~00<T>OrH 888888888S3

Figure 2. US Army MIDRP funding for infectious diseases core research with

inflation adjusted to FY 2005, in millions of dollars (does not include HIV program). (Adapted from Rudolph Kuppers, USMRMC/MIDRR to the author, e-mail, 11

December 2009.)
30 HALL * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

25

20

•-< rg m

8 8 8 OJ rsl c4

m8vc r~

o o

o o o

rg

HD Program - Actual Dollars •ID Program - Inflation Adjusted

Figure 3. US Army MIDRP budget, FY 2000-15, in millions of dollars (does not

include HIV program). (Adapted from Rudolph Kuppers, USMRMC/MIDRP, to the author, e-mail, 11 December 2009.)

risen from $15,000 to as much as $26,000 per enrollee.87 With static

funding and less buying power, the MIDRP's ability to develop vaccine

products is, and will remain, seriously constrained.

Dissimilar Priority

To make the best use of limited resources, the rules of the Defense

Acquisition Management System govern the acquisition of military

vaccines. Acquisition categories (ACAT I, II, and III) are used to assign

priority and determine the level of DOD review, decision authority,

and milestones that apply to a given project.88 The MIDRP's infectiousdisease vaccines are now managed as an ACAT III "less than major"

program, the lowest priority level, with each vaccine managed as a

separate acquisition project.89 Biodefense vaccines, on the other hand,

are developed by the JVAP as an ACAT II "major system" program

under the JPEO-CBD.90 The ACAT II designation affords biodefense

vaccines not only a higher priority for acquisition funding but also

higher visibility than vaccines against infections of natural origin.

The lack of emphasis on these natural infectious-disease countermeasures has contributed to the loss oflicensed vaccines (e.g., adenovirus, plague, and cholera) and the inability to advance IND products

(e.g., tick-borne encephalitis. Rift Valley fever, and eastern equine

encephalitis vaccines) to full licensure. Additionally, the inferior priority of infectious-disease vaccines makes their funding vulnerable to

becoming offsets for higher ACAT programs.
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 31

Recommendations and Conclusion

This section recommends four imperatives for ensuring the DOD's

ongoing ability to produce vaccines against natural Infections and

provides final thoughts on reversing the dangerous decline in US

military infectious-disease R&D capability. While the challenges are

formidable, the DOD can return its ailing infectious-disease vaccine

program to its former status as the world's premier force health defender. Here is what needs to be done.

Redesign the Biological-Threat Assessment Process

Concurrently consider all biothreats regardless of origin. Then prioritize them based on a balanced assessment of notional and experiential risks to war fighters independent of the nature of the threat.91

To facilitate this process, a standardized cost-benefit computation

should be instituted for candidate vaccines and strategies, where solutions to natural or weaponized biothreats with the most compelling

calculations garner the highest priority for funding.92

Merge Infectious-Disease and Biodefense

Vaccine Management

A single DOD program is required to unify needs identification,

prioritization, basic and advanced research, production, procurement, and ongoing product management.93 Program leadership must

be vested in a single agent with the authority, responsibility, and accountability for ensuring effective TLCSM of all vaccines that protect

war fighters against natural and weaponized pathogens. Combining

programs will facilitate the synergistic sharing of ideas, expertise,

and resources; incentivize cohesive thinking on vaccine solutions of

mutual benefit to infectious-disease prevention, biodefense, and public health; and underpin the maintenance of a robust, adaptable

technology base that can flex to conduct timely research on the moving target of natural and weaponized biothreats. In addition, a unified

program champion will provide the strongest advocacy for infectiousdisease vaccines to balance against the government's proclivity for

biodefense countermeasures.

Elevate the Acquisition Priority of

Infectious-Disease Vaccines

Like those intended for biodefense, vaccines to counter natural infections should be managed at the ACAT II major-system level (or

higher). This is in alignment with the first recommendation above to
32 HALL * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

consider all biological threats—regardless of origin—of equal threat

potential to war fighters. This will ensure appropriate visibility and

emphasis of both infectious-disease and biodefense vaccine acquisition within the DOD.

Increase Funding for Infections-Disease Vaccine

Research, Development, and Procurement

In addition to raising overall program funding, each infectiousdisease vaccine should be funded as a separate line item in the Future Years Defense Program to ensure TLCSM.94 These are the most

important actions the DOD must take. To be clear, what is needed is

not a zero-sum realignment of biodefense and infectious-disease vaccine resources. Biodefense vaccines should remain fully funded, with

relative parity achieved for infectious-disease vaccine development.

Currently, at least half of national biodefense funding serves both

biodefense and public health ends.95 This kind of overlap should become the rallying cry of DOD vaccine prioritization and resource allocation. A successful biothreat vaccine program is about cooperation, not competition.

Conclusion

The president's 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological

Threats calls for "a comprehensive and integrated approach to prevent the full spectrum of biological threats . . . whether natural, accidental or deliberate in nature."96 To meet his intent, the DOD needs

to reorganize its current infectious-disease and biodefense vaccine

acquisition stovepipes and establish a unified program to effectively

assess, prioritize, develop, and procure vaccines to protect war fighters against threats from all causes.

Staying ahead of the changing threat requires the DOD to refocus

on the full range of biothreats and commit ample resources for the

sustained development of infectious-disease—as well as biodefense—

vaccines. Anything less places force health, combat readiness, and

operational effectiveness at serious risk.

Notes

1. In thi9 paper, acquisition is defined as the DOD's process for ensuring that vaccines are acquired and maintained for the protection of its forces, from needs identification, prioritization, and basic research to advanced development, testing, production, and procurement. Availability is having on hand the right vaccine for the right

threat at the right time.
US MILITARY'S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 33

2. National Security Council, National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.

November 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/flles/National_Strategy

_for_Countering_BioThreats.pdf (accessed 15 January 2010).

3. Stanhope Bayne-Jones. The EuoJufton ofPreventive Medicine in the United States

Army. 1607-1939 (Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the

Army, 1968). 52. http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/misc/evprev/default

html (accessed 28 October 2009).

4. Specifically, this was variolation. an "obsolete process of inoculating a susceptible

person with material taken from a vesicle of a person who has smallpox." Princeton

University, WordNet, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=variolation.

5. Bayne-Jones, Evolution ofPreventive Medicine in the US Army. 99.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 124.

8. Ibid., 151.

9. Mark S. Riddle et al„ "Past Trends and Current Status of Self-Reported Incidence and Impact of Disease and Nonbattle Injury in Military Operations in Southwest

Asia and the Middle East." American Journal ofPublic Health 98. no. 12 (2008): 2199:

and Stanley M. Lemon et al.. Protecting Our Forces: Improving Vaccine Acquisition and

Availability in the US Military (Washington, DC: Institute of Medicine of the National

Academies, National Academies Press. 2002), 10.

10. John W. Sanders et al., "Impact of Illness and Non-Combat Injury during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)," American Journal of

Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 73, no. 4 (2005): 713-19.

11. Joint Publication (JP) 4-02. Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Opera

tions. 31 October 2006, GL-14: Anthony P. Tvaryanas. Lex Brown, and Nita L. Miller.

"Managing the Human Weapon System: A Vision for an Air Force Human-Performance

Doctrine." Air and Space Power Journal 23, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 34-41: and Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Force Health Protection Capstone Document (Washington. DC:

JCS. 2000). 2.

12. JP4-02. Doctrine for Health Services Support, IV-5.

13. Richard D. Nldel. JVAP Office Video, http://www.jpeocbd.osd.mil/packs/

DocHandler.ashx?DocId=4711 (accessed 5 December 2009).

14. John D. Grabenstein, "Immunization to Protect the US Armed Forces: Heritage.

Current Practice. Prospects," Epidemiologic Reviews 28. no. 1 (2006): 10.

15. DOD. Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research & Development

Programs (Washington, DC: DOD, July 2001), 7.

16. Rudolph Kuppers. USMRMC/MIDRP. to the author, e-mail. 11 December 2009.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP), "History and Achievements," https://midrp.amedd.army.mil/info/HAchieve.html (accessed 5 January 2010).

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The Quantlc Group. "CBRN Medical Countermeasures (MCM) Manufacturing

Capabilities Analysis of Alternatives Report," 15 June 2009. 10.

23. Intellectual property is "the group of legal rights to things people create or Invent. Intellectual property rights typically include patent, copyright, trademark and

trade secret rights." Sitepoint, http://www.sitepoint.com/glossary.php.

24. Kuppers to the author, e-mail; and Lemon. Protecting Our Forces, 87.

25. COL Charles Hoke, retired. MD. USAMRIID. to the author, e-mail. 24 January

2010.
34 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

26. A pivotal clinical trial must be controlled, have a double-blinded design when

practical and ethical, be randomized, and be of adequate size. Adlslnsight, http://

www.adisinstght.com/aCllentServlcelnfo/CTI%20Appendix.pdf. DOD overseas labs

are located In Thailand, Peru, Kenya, Egypt, and Indonesia. Hoke to the author, e-mail.

27. COL Julia Lynch, USMRMC/M1DRP, to the author, e-mail, 18 January 2010.

28. Kuppers to the author, e-mail.

29. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16

September 2009. 2.

30. World Health Organization (WHO), Towards Universal Access: Scaling Up Priority HTV/ATDS Interventions in the Health Sector, Progress Report 2009 (Geneva, Switzerland: WHO Press, 2009). 7. http://whqllbdoc.who.int/publicatlons/2009/9789241598

750_eng.pdf (accessed 9 January 2010).

31. Mark Schneider and Michael Moodie, The Destabilizing Impacts of HIV/AIDS

(Washington. DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 2002). 2.

32. Ibid., 4.

33. Kuppers to the author, e-mail.

34. In June 2009 a US Army-led Phase III community-based trial of a candidate

HIV vaccine was completed, yielding encouraging preliminary results but requiring

further research. Hoke to the author, e-mail.

35. Lynch to the author, e-mail: and W. Neal Burnette et al., "Infectious Diseases

Investment Decision Evaluation Algorithm: A Quantitative Algorithm for Prioritization

of Naturally Occurring Infectious Disease Threats to the US Military," Military Medicine

173 (February 2008): 174-81.

36. Arguably, climate change is resulting in significant changes in weather patterns and disruptions in ecosystems leading to the emergence of new niches for infectious disease pathogens and vectors. Lynch to the author, e-mail. On the death rate

from contagions, see Sara E. Davies, "Securitizing Infectious Disease." International

Affairs 84. no. 2 (2008): 295-313: and WHO. The Top Ten Causes of Death." fact

sheet, February 2007. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310.pdf (accessed 15 January 2010). The top five infectious disease killers Include HiV/AIDS.

pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria, and tuberculosis.

37. Burnette et al., "Infectious Diseases Investment." 174.

38. Davies. "Securitizing Infectious Disease." 298.

39. Hoke to the author, e-mail.

40. Edward T. Clayson, JVAP Product Management Office, JVAP overview presentation slides. 30 May 2003. slide 5.

41. Ibid.; and Kuppers to the author, e-mail (compares 1997 and 1999 MIDRP

funding).

42. USSenate, Testimonyforthe Senate Foreign Relations Committee byAmy Sands,

PhD, Deputy Director, Centerfor Non-Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies, before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 March 2002,

http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/asands.htm (accessed 7 January 2010); and LTC

Coleen K. Martinez, "Biodefense Research Supporting the DOD: A New Strategic Vision," Research Report no. 1-58487-288-8 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. 2007). 23.

43. Kuppers to the author, e-mail.

44. US Senate. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford Jr. before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on

Reducing the Threat ofChemical and Biological Weapons, 19 March 2002. http://www

.fas.org/bwc/news/testimony/CT2002Marchl9Ford.htm (accessed 7 January 2010);

and US Senate, Testimony by Amy Sands.
US MILITARVS INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 35

45. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC), "Defense Medical Surveillance System," http://www.afhsc.mil/dmss (accessed 10 December 2009).

46. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Amerithrax Investigation," http://www.fbl

.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (accessed 28 January 2010).

47. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). "West Nile Virus: Statistics,

Surveillance, and Control," http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/surv&control

CaseCount99_detailed.htm (accessed 22 December 2009).

48. Amesh A. Adalja. "Adenovirus 14," quoting Gregory C. Gray and Margaret L. Chorazy.

"Human Adenovirus 14a: A New Epidemic Threat," Journal of Infectious Disease 199

(2009): 1413, http://www.journals.uchlcago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/598522 (accessed

5 November 2009). In 2007. 23 trainees at Lackland AFB. Texas, hospitalized for pneumonia, were found to be infected with a variant strain (type 14) of adenovirus: one of

the trainees died. Amesh A. Adalja. "Adenovirus 14: An Emerging Threat." 17 April

2009, Clinician's Biosecurity Network, http://www.upmc-cbn.org/report_archive/

2009/04_April_2009/cbnreport_04172009.html (accessed 27 November 2009).

49. Sanders et al.. "Impact of Illness and Non-Combat Injury."

50. Ibid., 714. Campylobacter, Shigella, Escnerichia coli and norovtrus have been

the most commonly reported diarrheal infections in deployed forces. Rhinovtrus, Coronovirus, parainfluenza virus, and adenovirus have been the most commonly reported

causes of acute respiratory infections In deployed forces. AFHSC, "Defense Medical

Surveillance System."

51. Sanders et al.. "Impact of Illness and Non-Combat Injury." 716.

52. AFHSC, "Defense Medical Surveillance System."

53. C. G. Hawley-Bowland. Casualty Analysis: Health Policy and Services (Washington. DC: US Army Medical Command. 2004).

54. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 44-45.

55. James Chin, ed. Control ofCommunicable Diseases Manual 17th ed. (Washington. DC: American Public Health Association, 2000), 428.

56. Grabenstein. "Immunization to Protect the US Armed Forces." 13.

57. Gregory C. Gray et al., "Adult Adenovirus Infections: Loss of Orphaned Vaccines

Precipitates Military Respiratory Disease Epidemics," Clinical Infectious Disease 31, no.

3 (September 2000): 663-70.

58. Although referred to as a single entity in this paper, two adenovirus vaccines

were actually lost, types 4 and 7.

59. Sanders et al.. "Impact of Illness and Non-Combat Injury." 663.

60. Lynch to the author, e-mail. The DOD is pursuing an adenovirus vaccine from

a new manufacturer with the assistance of the WRAIR. That product was successfully

tested in a phase III efficacy study conducted by military investigators in 2008. Licensure is currently pending FDA review, with a response expected in summer 2010.

61. Naval Health Research Center, Department of Respiratory Diseases Research,

"Febrile Respiratory Illness (FR1) Surveillance Update," week ending 16 January 2010,

http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/nhrc/geis/Documents/FRlUpdate.pdf (accessed 25

January 2010).

62. Ibid.

63. Gray et al.. "Adult Adenovirus Infections." 668.

64. M. Rene Howell et al.. "Prevention of Adenoviral Acute Respiratory Disease in

Army Recruits: Cost-Effectiveness of a Military Vaccination Policy," American Journal

ofPreventive Medicine 14, no. 3 (April 1998): 168.

65. Gray and Chorazy. "Human Adenovirus 14a." 1414.

66. MIDRP. "MIDRP Overview." https://midrp.amedd.army.mil/login.Jsp (accessed

27 December 2009).
36 HALL • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

67. David Williams and Calvin Carpenter, "Medical Systems: Advanced Planning

Briefing to Industry." briefing slides. Joint Program Management-Chemical Biological

Medical Systems (JPM-CBMS), 7 May 2009. slide 8.

68. Martinez, "Biodefense Research Supporting the DOD," 11; Kuppers to the author, e-mail; and Hoke to the author, e-mail.

69. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces. 64.

70. Ibid.

71. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, Interim Final Rule.

Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, pt. 73, http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/42

cfr73.pdf (accessed 4 November 2009); and Lemon et al.. Protecting Our Forces, 40-41.

The NSAR "currently requires registration of facilities, including government agencies,

universities, research institutions, and commercial entities, that possess, use, or

transfer biological agents and toxins." See the NSAR Web site, "Overview," http://www

.selectagents.gov (accessed 19 July 2010).

72. Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen. and Henry G. Grabowksi, "The Price of

Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs," Journal ofHealth Economics

22, no. 2 (2003): 180.

73. Office of the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics Plans

and Programs, Total Life Cycle System Management: Plan of Action and Milestones,

http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/sci/exec_info/sm_mllestone_plan010603.pdf (accessed

31 January 2010), 2.

74. Government Contract & Bid, "Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JYAP) Storage, Distribution, and Testing of Government Owned/Regulated Chemical Biological

Defense." http://www.govcb.com/H-Joint-Vaccine-Acquisition-Program-ADPl 1981138

560001613.htm (accessed 31 January 2010).

75. Hoke to the author, e-mail.

76. Ibid.

77. Lemon et al.. Protecting Our Forces, 59.

78. Clayson. JVAP Overview, slide 5.

79. Ibid.

80. Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Funding for Biological

Weapons Prevention and Defense, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2009, 15 April 2008, http://

www.armscontrolcenter.org/media/fy2009_bw_budgetv2.pdf.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. D. R. Franz, "Ways Ahead: USG Biodefense Program from 2010 to 2020," Biodefense Way Ahead Project Workshop, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington.

DC, 16 September 2009. 2; and Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Federal

Fundingfor Biological Weapons Prevention.

84. Kuppers to the author, e-mail.

85. Ibid.

86. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 52.

87. Kuppers to the author, e-mail; and LifeSciencesWorld. "Phase 3 Clinical Trial

Costs Exceed $26,000 per Patient." 13 October 2006, http://www.lifesciencesworld

.com/news/view/11080 (accessed 31 January 2010).

88. DODI 5000.02, Operation ofthe Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 2008.

89. Lemon et al., Protecting Our Forces, 33.

90. The DOD estimates that major systems will require an eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than 140 million in FY

2000 constant dollars or for procurement more than 600 million dollars. Department

of the Army. US Army Weapon Systems 2010, 2009: and Office of the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Defense
US MILITARTS INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM 37

Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress, March 2005.

E-38, http://handle.dUc.mU/ 100.2/ADA435936 (accessed 14 July 2010).

91. Burnette et al.. "Infectious Diseases Investment Decision Evaluation Algorithm." 174.

92. Hoke to the author, e-mail. Burnette et al. provide a viable algorithm for conducting this type of (annually recurring) prioritization.

93. No fewer than five separate studies have previously made this recommendation:

DOD, Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine. 11; DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001. 52: General Accounting Office (GAO). Defense Acqui

sttions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices, Testimony before the

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services,

US Senate. GAO-02-469T (Washington, DC: GAO. 27 February 2002). 3; Lemon et al..

Protecting Our Forces, 58; and University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Ensuring Biologics Advanced Development and Manufacturing Capability for the United States Government: A Summary of Key Findings and Conclusions, final report for cooperative

agreement research study with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 6 October

2009. 66.

94. Ibid.

95. Franz, "Ways Ahead," 2.

96. National Security Council. National Strategyfor Countering Biological Threats, 3.
38 HALL * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 49

Abbreviations

ACAT acquisition category

AIDS acquired immune deficiency syndrome

AWC Air War College

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

DOD Department of Defense

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FHP force health protection

FY fiscal year

H1N1 influenza A virus or "swine flu"

H5N1 influenza A virus or "bird flu"

HIV human immunodeficiency virus

IND investigational new drug

IP intellectual property

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPEO-CBD Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and

Biological Defense

JVAP Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program

MIDRP Military Infectious Diseases Research Program

NSAR National Select Agent Registry

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

R&D research and development

SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome

TLCSM Total Life-Cycle Systems Management

WHO World Health Organization

WRA1R Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
Legal and Ethical Aspects

of the Decision for War

A Case Study

Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces*

Throughout its history, the United States rarely shied away from

using military force to confront perceived threats to its security and

to support its interests abroad. The one element which sets the United

States apart from virtually all other states maintaining an expeditionary military capability, particularly in the post-Cold War environment, is the scope and size of the missions and military engagements

that it is capable of undertaking. This fact, combined with the reality

that it must provide transparency and remain accountable, means

that its actions are far more open to scrutiny and criticism from both

within and without. Despite its status as the sole remaining superpower, the US government must garner the support of allies, likeminded states, and nations with which it does not traditionally align

itself if its military actions are to be considered reasonable and justifiable. The key to ensuring this support is a timely provision of legitimate legal and moral justifications for war.

While it is true the executive and legislative branches of the American government have an important role to play in the approval mechanism to launch military operations, the president, as commander in

chief, has the greatest overall influence on the decision-making process. This is not entirely surprising, as the president will normally be

criticized when the decision to go to war is questioned. The war-making

powers assigned to the president are enshrined in the US Constitution,

largely "as a result of the unity of the office of the presidency . . .

[where] speedy and purposeful action is often requisite to counter

moves from abroad and to deal with rapidly changing international

events [and because] Congress, it is claimed, is too cumbersome and

ponderous a body to meet and deal with foreign policy and foreign

military complexities.''1

When hostilities involving US military assets are initiated, the

American populace, foreign governments, national and international

media, and any other parties who have an interest in understanding

•COL Eric Smith, USA. was the essay advisor for this paper.

39
40 RAFTER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

the motivations for going to war will turn to the president for an explanation or a clarification. The ability or inability to convincingly

validate the military action taken—particularly to those whose ongoing

support is vital to the United States—will have an important impact

on American economic, foreign, and military relations, as well as national interests. In situations where use of military force is in direct

response to an attack or a verifiable and imminent threat to the United

States, the case for war is often quite obvious and understandable.

When the recourse to military action is both legally and morally

defensible, the likelihood of negative repercussions will be lessened.

In fact, it can be argued that this capability to frame the decision in

legal and ethical terms best serves the president in substantiating a

military reaction to a particular situation.

Over the past century, which constitutes the period of time when

the majority of US expeditionary military operations have taken place,

American presidents have effectively explained the rationale for war

or military activities in terms of legal and ethical considerations. In

instances where the substantiation has been less credible, presidents

contended with domestic and international condemnation and opposition to the use of armed force. Given the existence of established

laws of armed conflict (LOAC), determinations regarding the legality

of military action have proven far easier than confirming the morality

of these interventions. Many presidential explanations have been

more compelling when evidence confirmed that moral principles were

present and played an important role in the war decision. The fact

that a particular president truly believed that a moral imperative existed for war has gone a long way in deflecting criticism in the past.

Although the end of the Cold War brought an expectation that a

new era of worldwide peace and cooperation would emerge, the ensuing two decades have been fraught with conflict and strife which ultimately resulted in war or warlike confrontations—many involving the

US military. Though the need to defend the use of armed forces has

always existed, a growing political awareness among the general population, combined with improved media coverage and near real-time

communications in recent years, has made the need for legal and

moral justification for military action by the commander in chief all

the more important.

Examples of specific instances where presidents articulated why

compelling arguments existed for international military engagements

are relatively straightforward. During the 1999 air war in Kosovo,

Pres. Bill Clinton clearly explained that US participation in the operation was legally justified since it equated to an intervention in an escalating humanitarian crisis and that the United States was "acting
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 41

out of a 'moral imperative' to help the people of Kosovo."2 When the

United States and its coalition allies undertook operations in Afghanistan in late 2001, they did so with the legal backing of a United Nations (UN) resolution, as well as an undeniable belief that they were

morally obliged to root out those responsible for the reprehensible

terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Pres. George W. Bush enjoyed widespread support for his decision

to authorize the Southwest Asia mission, principally due to the solid

legal and moral arguments in favor of the operation. Conversely, the

president's failure to credibly highlight the legal and moral Justifications for the war in Iraq, despite his genuine belief the United States

was morally bound to redress Saddam's mistreatment of Iraqi citizens, resulted in an unprecedented erosion of confidence in the office

of the president and a suspicion of American intentions.3

Not all US military operations achieved success or accomplished

the political goals enunciated prior to the start of hostilities. At times,

military interventions that appeared to be legally and morally justifiable at their start ended badly because the forces suffered from poor

politico-military leadership and vision, among other problems. Having a sound legal and ethical basis for military action is no guarantee

that the mission will end favorably. Legal and ethical validation for

warfare simply provides a greater probability that the action will be

seen as a valid response to an existing threat, the reason for the decision will be understood and supported, and, in the long term, domestic, political, and diplomatic relations will not be negatively impacted.

To validate the premises proposed, a case study from the Vietnam

era is elaborated upon. While both legal and moral justifications have

been offered for more recent operations, they are ongoing to this day.

The long-term consequences and final outcomes of the wars in both

Afghanistan and Iraq have yet to be determined, making a final conclusion difficult. For this reason, this paper considers the decision by

Pres. Richard Nixon to authorize the 1970 Cambodian incursion. The

results of actions taken almost 40 years ago are well known and unlikely to change.

From the day the Cambodian incursion was announced, and through

the intervening decades, historians, political scientists, and armchair

generals have sought to rationalize and criticize Nixon's decision to

authorize this operation. Few, however, have been able to place themselves in the shoes of the target of their criticisms; even fewer truly

understand the context and situation at the time the decision was

made. With these facts in mind and by using recognized ethical models

as well as precepts related to LOAC, this paper demonstrates that from

both legal and ethical perspectives, the president's actions were justi-
42 RAFTER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

fied. Politicians or military leaders finding themselves in comparable

circumstances would approve of the president'sjudgment and choices,

however unpopular they may have been. The paper also shows that the

final findings can thereafter be applied to more contemporary situations, whether ongoing or in the future.

The Cambodian Incursion

At the end of April 1970, American and Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

forces launched a series of attacks into the territory of the officially

neutral state of Cambodia. This operation—which came to be known

as the Cambodian incursion—involved approximately 50,000 ground

troops from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as well as

30,000 US Army personnel.4The incursion was accompanied and

supported by an aerial bombardment campaign undertaken by American aircraft from both the Air Force and the Navy.5 Ordered by Nixon,

the stated purpose of the raids was to destroy established Vietcong

fVC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) sanctuaries and strongholds in Cambodia, from which numerous attacks had been launched

against the RVN. The president and his closest supporters, in particular his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, ultimately

hoped to "undercut the North Vietnamese invasion of that country so

that Vietnamization and plans for the withdrawal of American troops

could continue in South Vietnam."6Prior to the deployment, there

was no formal consultation with the US Congress or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.7

In a televised speech on 30 April 1970, Nixon officially advised the

American public about the operation, enflaming growing antiwar sentiment in the United States and resulting in condemnation and outrage from sources ranging from ordinary citizens to journalists, academics, and members of the Congress. Critics of the decision accused

Nixon and his advisors of blatantly violating the US Constitution and

ignoring international law, as well as showing a disconcerting lack of

moral and ethical judgement. Despite the backlash in public opinion,

the operation carried on as planned for almost two months, with

American forces withdrawing to their bases in South Vietnam by the

end ofJune.

From a purely military standpoint, the Cambodian incursion,

dubbed Operation Toan Thang 43,8 was deemed a moderate success

in that it "set the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] offensive timetable

back at least a year, probably 18 months, and possibly two years."9

Few could argue that the operation dealt the North Vietnamese forces

a significant blow, with vast quantities of vital materiel and equip-
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 43

ment destroyed or captured.10 Notwithstanding the widely reported

successes, Nixon was nevertheless vilified for expanding the war, unleashing a humanitarian disaster in Cambodia, and abusing his powers as president and commander in chief. Those who supported his

decision at the time were definitely a minority of the population, especially In the United States.

Legal Issues

The legal aspects of conflicts of an international nature are unarguably complex, numerous, and multifaceted—the 1970 Cambodian

incursion is no exception. Nevertheless, those who have embarked on

a detailed study of Operation Toan Thang 43 have usually limited

their focus to three central themes relating to the legality of the operation: the neutrality of Cambodia, the right to collective self-defense,

and the constitutional powers of the US president. That many disparate experts have singled out these three facets of LOAC and American constitutional law In their examinations is no coincidence, given

that they were repeatedly trumpeted by both Nixon and members of

his administration as the sources from which the legitimacy of the

incursion was derived.

Customary international law and LOAC are very clear regarding

the concept of neutral states as well as the responsibilities of these

states in ensuring neutrality is maintained in times of conflict. Specifically, duties of a neutral state include "obligations to prevent belligerents from transporting troops or supplies across neutral territory

and to prevent neutral territory from being used for base camps, munitions factories, supply depots, training facilities, communications

networks, or staging areas for attacks."11

Prior to the attack, the Cambodian government made some very

public diplomatic representations to Hanoi to prevent violations of

the country's neutrality by the NVA and the VC; however, the efforts

were largely symbolic. In an address given in New York City in late

May 1970, the legal adviser of the US State Department, John R.

Stevenson, pointedly accused Cambodian officials of falling to do all

that they should to safeguard neutrality under the requirements of

the LOAC. He even confirmed that the previous Cambodian government under Prince Sihanouk had tacitly allowed and even condoned

the shipment of communist arms and munitions through the Port of

SlhanoukvUle.12 As a result of this inaction and apparent deception

on the part of the Cambodians, the United States determined that

Cambodia had surrendered its standing as a neutral state and no

longer enjoyed protection under the LOAC. Thus, the prohibition
44 RAFTER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

against attacking a neutral state was Invalidated in this case, given

the actions of the Cambodian government.

Not surprisingly, the decision to question Cambodia's neutrality as

a pretext to launching the operation met with some resistance by

experts opposed to the incursion. Many in the media and the antiwar

movement questioned the US and RVN authorities' assessment that

Cambodia had forfeited its neutrality. They explained that the apparent inaction was largely due to that nation's physical inability to repel

the PAVN forces rather than a conscious decision by the Sihanouk

and Lon Nol governments to allow the unrestricted use of their territory.13 Though not disputing the possibility that this view may be

valid in some respects, John Norton Moore, director of the Center for

National Security Law, provided additional legitimacy to the arguments in favor of the action in an opinion piece published in January

1971. He emphasized the following aspect of customary international

law: "It is well established . . . that a belligerent Power may take action to end serious violations of neutral territory by an opposing belligerent when the neutral Power is unable to prevent belligerent use

of its territory and when the action is necessary and proportional to

lawful defensive objectives."14 This legal opinion presented further

justification for a neutral country conducting cross-border operations: the right of self-defense.

The second legal argument on which American officials based their

decision to undertake the incursion related to the inherent right of

nations, in this case the United States and the Republic of Vietnam,

to practice collective self-defense. To a lesser extent, the stated principle of collective defense was also meant to include Cambodia itself,

regardless of the fact that its government had not formally or directly

approached the American government for military assistance. As

communist forces continued to flood into Cambodia in the spring of

1970, the Lon Nol government put out a general plea for aid, and the

United States answered with the incursion. Nixon argued that this

indirect request further reinforced the rationale for the operation.15

PAVN troops had, for nearly five years, launched deadly strikes on

American and RVN forces in South Vietnam from the relative safety of

their Cambodian sanctuaries. These attacks intensified significantly

in the weeks leading up to the incursion.16 Nixon feared that without

an armed intervention aimed at unseating the PAVN and the VC,

Cambodia would become "an open-ended staging area from which to

mount attacks on South Vietnam that would jeopardize . . . US troop

safety, and US troop withdrawal."17 NVA attacks also posed an important threat to the process of Vietnamization, which could endanger

the very survival of the Republic of Vietnam in the long term.18 Since
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 45

less drastic military and political measures had proven inadequate in

evicting the North Vietnamese in the past, Nixon authorized the military operation in late April 1970.

In addition to the LOAC, the Nixon administratin relied on UN

agreements in justifying its actions. John Lawrence Hargrove, director ofstudies at the American Society of International Law, explained

that Article 51 of the UN Charter did not exclude, in the case of a

military attack, "an exercise of the right of self-defense on the territory of a foreign state which is not itself the attacker, even without the

consent of this state."19 Given that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam had already been engaged in collective measures of

self-defense since 1965, Hargrove therefore extrapolated that the recourse to military action in such a case could be justified.

The Nixon administration further tied its rationale for the incursion to the premise of collective self-defense by relying on other key

aspects of the UN Charter. In particular, legal advisors cited the passages which confirmed that the "use of armed force is prohibited except . . . where the Security Council has not acted, in individual or

collective self-defense against an armed attack."20 Since the Cambodian government's 22 April 1970 appeal to the UN for assistance in

fighting the invaders had been ignored, the legality of the incursion

was reinforced when the United States took the action that it deemed

necessary to ensure that collective self-defense was assured.21

The final legal argument Nixon relied on in framing the rationale

for the incursion is based largely in American constitutional law but

is also tied to the LOAC. Regardless of one's opinion regarding the US

involvement in the Vietnam war itself, the buildup of PAVN forces in

Cambodia unquestionably posed a real threat to US national security

interests of the day. Some critics argued that the framers of the US

Constitution had specifically intended to have Congress decide which

threats imperiled national security, thereby limiting the president's

power to do so. In response. Congress unilaterally choose to utilize a

military solution.22

Conversely, political scientist and author Eugene Rostow, in quoting from Alexander Hamilton's well-known Federalist Paper No. 23,

aptly described that since "the circumstances that endanger the

safety of nations are infinite ... no constitutional shackles can wisely

be imposed on the [executive] power to which the care of it is committed."23 In essence, "[Nixon] maintained that as Commander-in-Chief

he had the constitutional authority to order the Cambodian operation

to protect US troops . . . [and] he did not have to consult Congress

first."24 This interpretation is in line with certain tenets of the US

Constitution which confirm that the president's power "includes
46 RAFTER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

broad authority to make strategic and tactical decisions incident to

the conduct of a Constitutionally authorized conflict."25 Since the

Gulf ofTonkin Resolution of 1964 had granted Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to approve the use of force in the entire Southeast

Asia region without a formal declaration of war by Congress, Nixon

and his advisors considered the Cambodian incursion as being incidental to the conduct of the Vietnam War and, thereby, by extension,

a constitutionally approved conflict.

Moral and Ethical Issues

Just as Nixon was accused by many of initiating an illegal military

operation and overstepping his constitutional authority, so too was

he criticized regarding the morality of his decision. Following his 30

April address to the nation, widespread protests and civil disobedience ensued throughout the United States. He was lambasted in the

press, and the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened

hearings where prominent American religious leaders questioned the

moral leadership of the executive branch.26 The choices that he made

with respect to potentially escalating the conflict in Southeast Asia

may have been unpopular, but this does not mean that they were

ethically unsound.

In considering the morality of Nixon's order for US and ARVN forces

to embark on Operation Toan Thang 43, a number of moral philosophies or doctrines, including variations of each, may be considered.

Two of these moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism (or Immanuel Kant's moral theory), prove relevant in demonstrating that

Nixon did act in an ethical manner by authorizing this military action.

The most logical method of determining whether the actions were

ethical is to apply the principles of utilitarianism or, more precisely, a

more modern form known as preference utilitarianism. The basic

premise of this theory states that "the action that is best is the one

that satisfies the most preferences [of individuals], either in themselves, or according to [the action's] strength or . . . order of importance."27 By the time the operation began, the American public had

lost its appetite for the war in Vietnam, and widespread calls for a

withdrawal of US troops were commonplace. In response, Nixon had

already announced a large-scale downsizing of the number of troops

in Southeast Asia, with the ultimate aim of a complete withdrawal.

This plan was tied closely to the program of Vietnamization. However,

the increasing NVA attacks on US forces in South Vietnam in the

spring of 1970, most of which originated in Cambodia, threatened

this plan.
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 47

Thus, Nixon's decision to authorize the incursion was taken in

large part to ensure that the desire, or preference, voiced by Americans to pull out of the war remained viable. Nixon and his advisors

believed that because this operation would deal a significant blow to

the NVA and VC forces, they would no longer pose a serious threat to

American troops and, thus, the process of handing over responsibility

to the ARVN for its own security would continue unimpeded. The

president also hoped that any military successes resulting from the

operation would compel the North Vietnamese to return to the negotiating table and accept a cease-fire under terms favorable to the

United States. In the eyes of the Nixon administration, such a peaceful resolution to the conflict would not only ensure the viability of a

free South Vietnam but would also be a victory in the larger battle

between good and evil.

Since the beginning of the Cold War, successive American governments emphasized that the struggle against communism was a worthy

moral crusade, based largely on protecting the values of democracy

and freedom throughout the world. Preference utilitarianism helped

validate the US predilection for a world order based on the concept of

self-determination and devoid of political and military oppression. This

corroboration drove many of the American leaders' decisions regarding

the conduct ofthe war in Southeast Asia. It was therefore believed that

a firm stand in Vietnam would counter "the much wider scheme of

world domination by the Soviet Union and contribute to [the] larger

global struggle against this new form of imperialism."28

In addition to the anticommunist element of the president's thinking in authorizing the incursion, there also existed a larger view that

failure in Vietnam would have wider repercussions on the cause of

peace in the world. In his book No More Vietnams, Nixon wrote that

"our acquiescence in aggression would encourage further aggression;

our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would

promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have

not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest."29 Though he did

not relish escalating violence amidst an ongoing troop withdrawal, he

saw the incursion as a morally necessary action to meet the preferred

option of a lasting peace.

The morality of the decision to order the incursion can also be assessed by utilizing Kant's moral theory, which posits that "an act has

moral worth only if it is done with right intention or motive."30 In this

case, it is not the final outcome of a choice that matters—be it positive

or negative—but the reason the action was taken in the first place. The

theory also assumes that any rational person, placed in the same position, would make the same decision. As described above, Nixon's ob-
48 RAFTER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

jective in instigating the operation was to neutralize the enemy's ability

to engage US forces in South Vietnam and to induce the North Vietnamese to accept a diplomatic resolution to the war. This was also

closely linked to what he, as commander in chief, believed was his legal

and moral duty to safeguard American personnel.31

Considerations regarding communism and the US ability to contain

its spread also had a role to play in the president's intentions with respect to the operation in Cambodia. Nixon emphasized this aspect of

this decision when he said, "I would rather be a one-term president

and do what I believe was right, than be a two-term president at the

cost ofseeing America become a second-rate power."32 That the desired

outcome of the incursion was not wholly achieved in the long term is

immaterial in this instance—Nixon can be considered to have acted

ethically because his overall intentions were honorable.33

Conclusion

Nixon's decision to authorize the 1970 military incursion into Cambodia was unquestionably controversial. Much of the literature written about this operation, especially in the years immediately following

its completion, is critical of the rationale and explanations that Nixon

and the administration provided in justifying their actions. More recent studies, however, tainted far less by the widespread antiwar sentiment that existed in the United States in the early 1970s, have provided more balanced and objective scrutiny.

Undoubtably, many will continue to believe that Nixon made the

wrong decision with respect to the Cambodian problem. As is normally the case, the voices and views of the vocal minority often eclipse

those of the silent majority. The final assessment about whether the

Cambodian incursion, regardless of its long-term impact, was the

right thing to do at the time is best summarized in a letter to the New

York Times from the father of a US soldier killed in Vietnam:

Had the fathers of these young men known that this nation would countenance

a sanctuary a scant 50 miles from Saigon, we would have counseled them

against induction. That we did not is a burden we will always bear. A great

percentage of our ground [troops] dead from 1965 to 1970 came from an enemy

who with impunity was staged, trained and equipped in the Parrot's Beak of

Cambodia. The perfidy ... is anything but the US bombing of the sanctuary

itself. The perfidy lies in the fact that for more than four years the United States

of America, without serious recorded concern, allowed her fighting men to be

attacked, maimed and killed from a position which was itself privileged from

either ground or air retaliation.34

With the above statement in mind, it becomes easier to support the

decision made by the president. Few individuals have had to shoulder
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 49

the burden of making such monumental decisions, needing to take

into account public opinion and security as well as political and military factors. From a legal perspective. Nixon and his advisors correctly questioned Cambodia's neutrality, championed the right of collective self-defense, and referred to the constitutional role and

responsibilities of the commander in chief in explaining their actions,

fully believing they were legally permitted and required to launch the

operation. This legal point of view has since been supported by a

growing number of experts. From an ethical perspective, the president truly felt that his actions were ethical and would "end the war in

Vietnam, and win the just peace desired [by Americans]."35 Thus,

contrary to the charges of many of Nixon's detractors, [his] decision

to authorize the operation "was taken carefully, with much hesitation

. . . and [with assumption of| full responsibility."36

Nixon's decision to approve the Cambodian incursion added fuel

to the Are being stoked by antiwar activists in the 1970s and also

drew condemnation from opponents of the United States, especially

in the Soviet Union. His determination to focus on the legal and

moral aspects of the decision served as a valuable example for his

successors and remains a valid approach to this day. Though the

voices of the silent majority were often drowned out by protests of a

vocal minority and accounts of the subsequent demonstrations and

clashes continue to fill the history books, the reality is that the incursion was widely supported, both at home and abroad.37 A CBS

telephone survey taken immediately after Nixon's 30 April speech

announcing the operation found respondents two-to-one in favor of

the president's position. Opinion polls confirmed that Nixon's overall approval rating rose from 51 percent at the end of March to 57

percent at the beginning of May 1970.38 Outside the United States,

as least among allies, open criticism by sitting governments was

rare.39 Through it all, it was Nixon's continued assurances that the

operation was legally and morally sound that strengthened his position and helped deflect criticism of the United States. It is this strategy that bears emulation if the interests and relations of the United

States are to continue to be safeguarded.

The actions taken by Nixon justifying the 1970 Cambodian incursion were rooted in the legal and ethical aspects of decision making.

In doing so, particularly in his capacity as commander in chief, he

was by no means unique. Previous presidents, as well as those following Nixon, also understood this important fact: while a decision by an

American president to use military force may be permissible under

international and constitutional law, that does not necessarily make

it right. Equally, even if recourse to war may appear to be the right
50 RAFTER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

thing to do from an ethical perspective, it may not be supportable

under the law. Only when a president effectively shows that he is

both legally and morallyjustified in turning to war to address a threat

to national security and national interests is he thereby more likely to

avoid a tempest of criticism and a degradation in internal and external relations. Despite all of his own personal foibles and character

shortcomings, Nixon understood this fact clearly and took the steps

necessary to safeguard his position and reputation. Had others followed his example in more recent years, some of the criticisms aimed

at certain commanders in chief and their administrations could have

been avoided.

Notes

1. Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The War-Making Powers of the

President: Constitutional and International Law Aspects (Dallas: SMU Press, 1982), xi.

2. James M. McCormlck, "Clinton and Foreign Policy: Some Legacies for a New

Century." in The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics, ed. Steven

E. Schier (Pittsburgh. PA University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 60.

3. Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider. Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American

People [San Diego, CA: Pearson Education. 2007), 99.

4. Spencer C. Tucker, ed.. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Social Political and

Military History (Santa Barbara. CA: ABC-CLIO. Inc.. 1998), 95.

5. Edward R. Drachman and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions (New York: State University of New York Press,

1997), 151. In fact, the aerial bombardment which took place during the Cambodian

incursion was a continuation of a secret bombing campaign which had begun in March

1969, without the knowledge of the US Congress or the American public.

6. James M. Griffiths, Vietnam Insights: Logic of Involvement and Unconventional

Perspectives (New York: Vantage Press. 2000), 72.

7. William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 153. The decision by the notoriously secretive

Nixon was not taken in an attempt to deceive Congress but instead to ensure security

and deflect criticism that could delay start of the operation.

8. Joseph R. Cerami, "Presidential Declsionmaking and Vietnam: Lessons for Strategists," Parameters 26 (Winter 1996-97): 69.

9. Philip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975 (New York: Oxford

University Press. 1988). 628; and Shelby L. Stanton. The Rise and Fall ofan American

Army (New York: Presidio Press. 1985), 341.

10. J. D. Coleman, Incursion: From America's Chokehold on the NVA Lifelines to the

Sacking ofthe Cambodian Sanctuaries (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 265; and Tucker.

Encyclopedia ofthe Vietnam War. 97. The operation resulted in the capture or destruction of 16 million rounds of ammunition, 14 million pounds of rice, and 23,000 weapons; additionally. 11,369 communist troops were killed. 4.534 wounded, and 2,328

captured.

11. John Norton Moore. "Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia." American Journal ofInternational Law 65, no. 1 (January 1971): 65.
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 51

12. John R. Stevenson. "United States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of

International Law," in The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context,

ed. Richard A. Falk (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1972). 27.

13. Coleman, Incursion, 214-16. Lon Nol, who had been Cambodia's prime minister

since 1966. was named president of the Khmer Republic on 18 March 1970, after a

bloodless coup deposed Prince Sihanouk. An avid anticommunist, Lon Nol had been

far more vocal than his predecessor in calling for the withdrawal of NVA and VC troops:

however, he lacked the wherewithal to back up his demands with action.

14. Moore, "Legal Dimensions of the Decision," 47.

15. Robert H. Johnson, "Vietnamization: Can It Work?" Foreign Affairs 48. no. 4

(July 1970): 637.

16. NVA forces had also stepped up attacks on Cambodian towns in that same time

period, signaling their Intention to move on the capital of Phnom Penh.

17. Griffiths, Vietnam Insights, 149.

18. William Shawcross. Sideshow: Kissinger. Nixon and the Destruction ofCambodia

(New York: Simon and Shuster, 1979). 89-90. Vietnamization was a military-economic

program of South Vietnamese development which would permit rapid but phased withdrawal of US forces without radically upsetting the power balance in Southeast Asia

and the handover of responsibilities to the RVN forces.

19. John Lawrence Hargrove. "Comments on the Articles of the Legality of the

United States Action in Cambodia," American Journal of International Law 65, no. 1

(January 1971): 81-82.

20. Stevenson, "United States Military Action in Cambodia." 31.

21. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little. Brown and Co.. 1979), 489.

22. Francis Wormuth. The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique." California

Law Review 60, no. 3 (May 1972): 628.

23. Eugene V Rostow, The 'Lessons' of Vietnam and Presidential Powers," Strategic Review 12, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 36.

24. Drachman and Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy. 166.

25. Moore, "Legal Dimensions of the Decision," 83.

26. Senate, Moral and Military Aspects ofthe War in SoutheastAsia: Hearings before

the Committee on Foreign Relations. 91st Cong.. 2nd sess.. 1970, 15.

27. Barbara MacKinnon, Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. 2nd ed. (Belmont. CA: Wadsworth Publishing. 1998), 41.

28. David Armstrong, "No End of a Lesson: Vietnam and the Nature of Moral Choice

in Foreign Policy," in Ethics and Statecraft: The Moral Dimension ofInternational AJfairs.

ed. Cathal J. Nolan (London: Praeger Publishers, 2004). 84.

29. Richard M. Nixon. No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House Publishing, 1985).

114.

30. MacKinnon, Ethics: Theory and Contemporary Issues. 53.

31. Peter A. French, Ethics in Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc..

1983). 41.

32. Stephen Graubard, Command ofOffice: How War. Secrecy and Deception Transformed the Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush (New York: Basic

Books, 2004). 394.

33. Nixon was repeatedly accused of misleading Americans regarding his intentions

with respect to this operation. Some theorized that his actions were intended only as a

face-saving measure against the bellicose North Vietnamese, who refused to consider

a diplomatic settlement on US terms, and as a way of containing the feared spread of

communism. It would be naive to believe that Nixon did not consider the favorable

political Impact that would result from an orderly withdrawal from South Vietnam in
52 RAFTER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 50

the shortest time possible and with the fewest casualties. However, these considerations were secondary to his belief that he was doing the right thing for the country.

34. Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books. 1980}. 110.

35. Richard M. Nixon, "Cambodian Incursion Address" (speech, Washington, DC,

30 April 1970), http://inspiraUonalspeakers.wordpress.com/2007/12/07/richard-m

-nixon-cambodian-incursion-address (accessed 29 September 2009).

36. Kissinger, White House Years, 502.

37. Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (London: Rutgers University Press.

1988), 100. 163. The term silent majority was first used by Nixon in a November 1969

speech in an attempt to attract inactive moderates to support the policies surrounding

Vietnamization.

38. Hal W. Bochtn, Richard Nixon: Rhetorical Strategist (New York: Greenwood

Press, 1990), 66.

39. Alexander J. Banks, "Britain and the Cambodian Crisis of Spring 1970." Cold

War History 5, no. 1 (February 2005): 100-101.
LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR 53

Abbreviations

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

LOAC law of armed conflict

NVA North Vietnamese Army

PAVN People's Army of Vietnam

RVN Republic of Vietnam

UN United Nations

VC Vietcong

Developing a US European Command

Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance Strategy for FY 2010-15

Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF*

Intelligence analysts . . . must open their doors to anyone

who is willing to exchange information, and this includes

Afghans and non-governmental organizations as well as the

US military and its allies.

—Maj Gen Michael T. Flyrm, US Army

"Our number one priority is the current fight, which means the

fight in Central Command." said Gen Roger Brady, commander of the

US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), highlighting a major challenge facing most of today's theater component and combatant commanders.'

As the United States continues to fight overseas contingency operations (OCO) in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nation's war-fighting resources remain dedicated to prevailing in today's wars.2

This study

examines how America's OCO focus in the US Central Command

(USCENTCOM) impacts the operations of other commands by analyzing US European Command's (USEUCOM) ability to execute an effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) strategy in

pursuit of its intelligence requirements.

To begin this discussion, the impact of ISR operations in USEUCOM

during the 1990s is introduced, followed by national and Air Forcespecific strategies and their impact on USEUCOM's strategy of active

security. The topics then turn to specific threats to US national security

Interests in the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), the command's

responsibilities versus these threats, and USEUCOM's ability to meet its

responsibilities and requirements with allocated ISR resources.

I propose a three-tiered mitigation strategy based on this information. For a long-term solution, USEUCOM ISR planners can mitigate

command collection gaps through the use of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization's (NATO) alliance ground surveillance (AGS) system,

scheduled for delivery in 2014. As a mid-term solution, the United

States would team with the Royal Air Force (RAF) to begin planning

the Integration of US-purchased RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft into

•Mr. Michael Ivanovsky, USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

55
56 COYNE * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

USEUCOM ISR collection profiles. Finally, in the near term, USEUCOM

can engage with the German Air Force (GAF) to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for combined postmission processing of

EuroHawk-derived signals intelligence (SIGINT) to meet command

collection requirements. With most ISR assets still dedicated to supporting OCO in USCENTCOM, I contend that other theaters competing for remaining scarce ISR resources—such as USEUCOM—should

develop requirements-based collection strategies that better integrate

current and planned allied capabilities to offset collection shortfalls.

ISR in USEUCOM—The 1990s

USEUCOM witnessed a high point oftheater ISR collection operations

in the 1990s due to the Balkan crises in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,

and Kosovo. In 1995 the Bosnian civil war was in its third year; by

that summer, the international community coalesced to put an end to

the conflict by attempting to coerce the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table through an air campaign primarily targeting their heavy

weapons. Operation Deliberate Force lasted from 30 August to 14 September 1995, with airborne ISR sensors playing a critical role in verifying Bosnian Serb compliance "by obtaining needed combat information in the planning, execution and combat assessment phase" of the

operation.3The U-2 and Predator played key roles in monitoring Bosnian Serb heavy weapons sites and assessing "whether the Serbs were

withdrawing, or at least demonstrating an intention to withdraw."4

ISR contributions to the success of Deliberate Force were significant not only in making real-time strike decisions but also in highlighting the contributions of allied ISR capabilities. In fact, "five nations

employed 13 different manned or unmanned recce [reconnaissance]

platforms for purposes that included monitoring heavy weapons as

well as making assessments."5 British, French, German, and Dutch

tactical and select strategic reconnaissance aircraft were integrated

with US ISR assets in a combined air tasking order (ATO) to add "to

the total information available to the combined air and space operations center."6

In sum, while Deliberate Force validated both the criticality of US and allied ISR assets to the joint/combined fight, it also

demonstrated how allied ISR capabilities could be seamlessly integrated with US operations.

Renewed violence in the Balkans from March to June 1999 due to

the Kosovo crisis affected US ISR programs, had an impact on future

ISR asset availability, and highlighted shortfalls in connecting allied

ISR capabilities to the US federated intelligence architecture. In an

after-action lessons learned report to Congress on Operation Allied
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 57

Force, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Gen William

L. Shelton, and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) William S. Cohen, notified Congress of the Department of Defense's (DOD) increased investments in ISR programs by approximately $2.5 billion for sensors;

aircraft; and tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination

(TPED) capabilities.7In their view, "better sensors with improved dissemination capabilities are needed to provide a capability to counter

any future adversary."8The critical need for more remotely piloted

aircraft and greater TPED capacity was especially compelling because

of the low density and high demand (LD/HD) of manned ISR aircraft,

such as the U-2 and the RC-135. These aircraft were "especially critical

since they also support multiple intelligence activities in other areas

around the world."9Thus, DOD leaders were aware of how competing

intelligence requirements impeded their ability to provide combatmission-ready ISR forces in sufficient numbers. LD/HD assets needed

to be more carefully managed; even then, their availability could not

be guaranteed.

Finally, the CJCS and SecDef stressed that "the Department must

develop a clear policy and implementation plan to explain when and

how coalition partners can be connected to US networks and how

data can be shared with those partners."10 In their view, one solution

to the US TPED challenge was through increased reach-back to USbased processing capacity. In addition, they believed that allied partners who were contributing ISR assets to a joint/combined campaign

should be able to benefit from and share in the intelligence output.

This study takes the Kosovo lessons-learned recommendation one

step further and argues that our allies should integrate their sensor

and TPED capacities into the US intelligence community's (IC) federated architecture and assist in the production process. This simple

step of creating seamless US and allied intelligence production and

information sharing, still not a reality 10 years after the Kosovo afteraction report, could readily help the USEUCOM combatant commander begin to meet unfulfilled collection requirements due to limited ISR resources.

Unfortunately, the DOD calls for greater ISR investments, and

process overhauls did not come in time to meet the challenges

caused by the terror attacks of 9/11. Still reconstituting after Operation Allied Force, US ISR assets and personnel surged to meet

USCENTCOM requirements during Operation Enduring Freedom in

October 2001. The surge in ISR operations exceeded steady-state

operating levels for service ISR assets and continues to impact the

requirements of other combatant commanders (COCOM). Today,

USCENTCOM collection requirements absorb the majority of US ISR
58 COYNE • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

assets, with other COCOM requirements met by residual US ISR

assets on a shared or rotational basis.

ISR Strategy Review

This US ISR strategy review will not only reemphasize and highlight US priorities but also offer strategic areas where competing theaters can explore ways to leverage allied ISR capabilities to meet their

needs. The 2006 national security strategy (NSS) stresses three major

threats to American and allied interests: global terrorism, regional

conflicts, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).11 Aside from

strengthening US intelligence capabilities—especially against the

WMD threat—working with allied power centers and strengthening

relations with them are critical to countering these threats. The leveraging of "NATO capabilities must be accelerated" to strengthen this

partnership and make it more effective.12 America's 2006 National

Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism takes this one step further

and calls for expanding partner capacity in the realm of intelligence

and providing friendly states with the training, equipment, and assistance they need to partner with the United States.13

The 2009 national intelligence strategy (NIS) complements the two

aforementioned national strategies in the priorities for the IC writ

large. The first two mission objectives outlined by the director of national intelligence (DNI) deal with combating extremism and WMD

proliferation. The third objective concerns strategic intelligence and

warning and the monitoring of events so "policymakers and military

officials can effectively deter, prevent, or respond to threats and take

advantage of opportunities."14 Interestingly, the NIS also calls on the

IC to improve collaboration and "conduct strategic outreach to key

external centers of knowledge and expertise."15 The DNI's message on

leveraging allied partnerships is clear: due to worldwide threats of

extremism, WMDs, and the necessary strategic warning nation states

require, efficiency of scale in meeting these global challenges can be

achieved only through collaboration with our allies.

Leveraging and expanding allied capabilities and coming to terms

with efficiently managing LD/HD ISR assets are DOD-level issues.

First, to address the problem of LD/HD asset management and developing an ISR strategy, the 2006 quadrennial defense review (QDR)

established a joint functional component command (JFCC)-ISR under

US Strategic Command to "synchronize strategy and planning and integrate all national, theater and tactical ISR capabilities."16 JFCC-ISR

is responsible for arbitrating competing command collection requirements and allocating ISR resources. With US intelligence focused on
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 59

USCENTCOM, however, JFCC-ISR processes do not guarantee an asset increase for competing COCOMs. Secondly, the QDR also addressed

the criticality of bolstering allied capabilities and directed investments

to stand up NATO's planned intelligence fusion cell, which would reside within USEUCOM. The fusion cell could help service the command's intelligence requirements if leveraged effectively.

The 2010 QDR continues the trend of expanding DOD ISR capabilities through greater investments in "long-dwell unmanned aircraft

systems (UAS), such as the Predator and Reaper."17 Already on track

to grow the number of Predator/Reaper orbits from 37 to 50 by fiscal

year (FY) 2011, the Air Force is now committed to increasing the

number to 65 by FY 2015; the Army will expand all classes of UASs.18

Problematic for USEUCOM, however, is that this increase in ISR

capability is intended for counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.19 As Secretary Gates pointed out during the

official release of the QDR, "We have to a considerable extent stripped

the other combatant commands of much of their ISR capability to put

into the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. The reality is that huge demands all over the world are for these capabilities."20 As long as contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are ongoing, the QDRs

increase in ISR investments will largely go to meet the requirements

of those conflicts. The stripping of ISR assets from other commands

will continue. The 2010 QDR continues the theme of leveraging partner capacities as an "important dimension of US defense strategy."21

USEUCOM must look toward greater engagement with its allies to

overcome intelligence collection shortfalls and information gaps.

At a service level, the Air Force's 2006 Security Cooperation Strategy

(SCS) is in line with the DNI's vision of increased intelligence cooperation with partner nations. In fact, the SCS states that "intelligence

relationships provide a means of unique access to data that the US

might be otherwise unable to obtain."22 However, US partners must

have the capabilities and the capacity to obtain such information,

and, if they do, these capabilities can be used to satisfy US "global

and regional objectives."23 The SCS speaks directly to USEUCOM's

dilemma of not being able to satisfy all of its collection requirements

due to lack of ISR resources and, from a DOD perspective, provides a

possible strategy for leveraging allied capabilities to meet COCOM

needs. This is critically important in light of the UK's RC-135 foreign

military sales (FMS) procurement effort and the GAF's direct commercial sale (DCS) effort to procure the RQ-4 Global Hawk.

Air Force security cooperation objectives are important, but do

they coincide with Air Force ISR strategy goals? A review of the service's 2008 strategy for ISR lacks any mention of partnering with al-
60 COYNE * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

lies, expanding allied capacity, or leveraging allied unique ISR capabilities to satisfy US national or COCOM collection requirements.

This does not mean that the SCS and ISR strategies contradict each

other. While there is no specific mention of partnering with allies, the

Air Force's ISR strategy stresses the criticality of "global cross-domain

integrated knowledge dissemination."24 At the heart of this effort is

the distributed common ground station (DCGS) intelligence processing architecture. Allied investments in ISR capabilities compatible

with DCGS, like the GAF's RQ-4 procurement effort, could be easily

integrated into the Air Force's DCGS architecture.

USEUCOM's strategy of active security is fully in line with the three

major threats found in the 2006 US NSS. USEUCOM's mission statement calls for maintaining ready forces for global operations, securing strategic access and global freedom of action, strengthening

NATO, promoting regional stability, and countering terrorism.25 The

command does this through two regional plans for Europe and Eurasia to prevent regional conflicts and three functional plans, two of

which are specifically designed to combat terrorism and prevent the

proliferation of WMDs. The third functional plan focuses on theater

force posture and transformation and stresses that, while a forward

US presence is critical for theater security, teaming with partners is

just as important. "The posture of our forces and installations is

shaped as much by our security cooperation activities as by our requirements for war fighting."26 Thus, a large part of the COCOM's

strategic approach to dealing with regional threats is to "mitigate risk

while the [US] is at war through building partner capacity and enhancing interoperability."27

The Way Ahead: Utilizing NATO Capabilities

While traditionally lacking in quantity and quality, European airborne ISR capacity is seeing significant expansion in both areas. As a

potential long-term solution for USEUCOM's lack of airborne ISR,

this study proposes increased cooperation with NATO as the alliance

prepares for the 2012-14 scheduled full operational capability (FOC)

of Its interoperable AGS system.28 In September 2007, the 21 participating AGS nations abandoned an initial multiplatform concept for a

single air vehicle approach utilizing the RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40.

The multiplatform radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP)

ground surveillance radar will be the primary sensor.29 The AGS's

"Core" segment includes line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight connectivity, as well as on-site data processing and exploitation capabilities. With Sigonella, Italy, destined to be the main operating base,
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 61

NATO will for the first time have a dedicated ISR collection capability.30 However, the most promising benefit of the AGS Core segment is its fully equipped interfaces and interoperability with national

ISR systems. The Core system will be supplemented by interoperable

national airborne stand-off ground surveillance systems from NATO

countries, thus forming a system of systems."31 This is no small

undertaking for NATO. Until AGS, NATO never had its own intelligence collection capability, but instead relied on the national assets

of member states. Challenges in developing proper TTPs for platform

and Core segment mission operations will abound.

NATO traditionally does not conduct its own intelligence collection.

In fact, NATO's intelligence warning system (NIWS), with the NATO

situation center at its hub, is primarily an analytical function that

relies on information feeds from a variety ofsources that include NATOreleasable messages from member states and information provided

by the NATO political and military committees. This structure created

a dependency on national architectures, with no ability by NATO to

leverage those architectures. This offered little value-added to the nations providing the bulk of the information, that is, the United States

and USEUCOM.32 In NATO Intelligence and Early Warning, John

Kriendler said that "the ability of a nation to provide intelligence, the

willingness of a nation to share this intelligence and the time required

for this intelligence to be disseminated to NATO are all constraining

factors which compromise the overall NATO intelligence effort."33

The FOC of the NATO AGS in 2014 will change this dynamic. By

acquiring an indigenous collection capability, NATO will be both a

collector and a producer ofintelligence and will no longer depend solely

on member states. European ISR strategists such as Klaus Becher

see this as an opportunity for greater transatlantic cooperation because NATO will finally have the leverage to request greater "access to

US capabilities."34 In fact, "Europe's access to US-controlled intelligence on global security issues will depend on the practical value of

European assets to US intelligence."35

AGS will provide practical value as its pending FOC date offers

USEUCOM an opportunity to satisfy collection gaps. As stakeholders,

USAFE and USEUCOM maintain the knowledge and expertise on how

to conduct RQ-4 operations and postmission processing in their AOR.

This study recommends that the command engage with NATO now to

develop the requisite TTPs for proper Core system utilization that the

alliance currently lacks. This especially makes sense given the projected basing of three new Block 30 RQ-4s at Sigonella AB in October

2010. These aircraft will be operated by USEUCOM within the constraints of the JFCC-ISR allocation process.36
62 COYNE • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

Helping NATO develop TTPs for postmlssion processing is one way

to gain access to AGS sensors. However, this study also recommends

that USEUCOM champion greater NATO access to US intelligence

collection capabilities and information to build the enhanced atmosphere of cooperation proposed by Becher. This will improve the effectiveness of AGS operations and lead to a revolution in intelligence

sharing, given the "not releasable to foreign nationals" barrier the US

IC currently uses to deter unwanted access. As a RAND study on intelligence process reform recently argued, "For the intelligence community, operational innovation must focus on changing and perhaps

completely rethinking core functions."37

By helping NATO navigate the uncharted waters of operational intelligence collection and processing at the start of the AGS program,

USEUCOM will be in a better position four years from now to leverage

AGS capability. This initiative will have far-reaching effects by complementing ongoing efforts of the information-sharing integrated process

team (IPT) sponsored by DOD's ISR task force. Based largely on the

experiences of working with our allies in Afghanistan, the IPT seeks to

transcend cultural, technical, and arcane classification barriers that

prohibit the free-flow exchange of intelligence information with our allies. At a minimum, the results of the IPT will lead to a transformation

of the DOD's foreign disclosure and classification procedures, if not its

core intelligence processes. USEUCOM could set the new standard for

the DOD's information sharing process with our allies.

The Way Ahead: Utilizing Bilateral Relationships

Mid- and near-term solutions to USEUCOM ISR collection gaps

can be found in existing bilateral partnerships. Many changes are

under way in the development and fielding of allied capabilities that

promise to alleviate "fragile dependence." Both the UK's RAF and the

Federal Republic's GAF are in the process of leveraging and procuring

US ISR technologies to meet their national intelligence requirements.

There is no reason why USEUCOM and USAFE should not work with

our allies to fully integrate their systems into USEUCOM's ISR collection profiles and fill command collection gaps. Due to severe cost

overruns of Project Helix, the replacement program for the UK's ageing Nimrod aircraft, the UK approached the United States in 2007 to

inquire about procuring three RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft. Approved

by the USAF chief of staff and Congress in 2008, the United States

and the UK are now engaged in an FMS contract to deliver three RC135 SIGINT aircraft. The deputy chief of staff for ISR and the DNI

describe this effort as a "win-win" for both parties and an opportunity
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 63

to improve integration.38 Fully in line with national strategy direction

to engage with allies and harness their capabilities, the main objectives of this FMS contract address the command's "capability gaps

through operational burden sharing" and focus on "maintaining and/

or increasing manned SIGINT support to CENTCOM and EUCOM

AORs."39 With the first of three aircraft scheduled for delivery in 2013,

RAF aircrews are now being trained on aircraft employment and utilization.40 The RAF's RC-135 aircraft will provide a unique mid-term

solution to help satisfy USEUCOM ISR collection gaps. The command

should engage with the RAF now, through existing bilateral programs,

and leverage in-theater Air Combat Command RC-135 expertise at

RAF Mildenhall to plan the integration of the RAF's RC-135 aircraft

into USEUCOM's theater ISR-collection profiles.

In the immediate future, a near-term opportunity to overcome

USEUCOM's collection capability shortfalls presents itself in the

GAF's fielding of the RQ-4 Block 20 "EuroHawk" remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). After a 2003 transatlantic test flight and associated sensor demonstration from Nordholz, Germany, the GAF signed a memorandum of understanding with the DOD in May 2006 that set the

parameters for proceeding with a DCS contract of five RQ-4 RPAs.41

The rollout of the first EuroHawk vehicle was on 8 October 2009 in

Palmdale, California.42 Current plans call for incorporating all five

RQ-4 aircraft into the GAF's 51 Squadron, Jagel AB, SchleswigHolstein, by 2011.43 The GAF plans to use RQ-4's in-theater, rather

than deploying them to Afghanistan. Germany is also procuring the

Heron 1, a medium-altitude RPA from Israel, for use in overseas contingency deployments. With a total of five GAF-operated RQ-4s in its

AOR by 2011. USEUCOM has a unique teaming opportunity to increase theater ISR-collection capability through the GAF.

One way to engage the GAF is by offering US expertise in developing TTPs for postmission processing of EuroHawk-derived SIGINT.

The GAF will not be getting a turnkey system since the procurement

effort is a DCS contract, consisting of the air vehicles and not the

sensors (being developed by EADS). The 2003 electronics intelligence

(ELIOT) sensor demonstration showed that the GAF will be faced with

significant mission and postmission processing challenges as it tries

to operationalize its sensor packages.

According to a GAF spokesman, we were "surprised at the huge

amount of radar emitters (merchant ships, airliners) that showed up

in addition to the prepared [demonstration] profile . . . the ELIOT

Ground Support Station (EGSS) was quickly overwhelmed."44 The

GAF realized there "was more data than we could process," leading

one to conclude that a DCGS stakeholder such as USEUCOM could
64 COYNE • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

provide tremendous expertise to help the GAF normalize RQ-4 operations while gaining access to GAF sensors.45

I recommend that USAFE expand its existing bilateral intelligence

programs (traditionally focused on information sharing) to more dynamic agreements that include combined postmission processing opportunities with allied militaries such as the GAF. The intelligence

gain for USEUCOM of integrating GAF operators into USAFE's DGS-4

ground station, or conversely, USAFE operators into the GAF's EGSS,

will go a long way to help mitigate command ISR-collectlon gaps.

Conclusion

This study shows that despite continued DOD investments in 1SR

platforms, these capabilities will remain LD/HD assets as long as the

United States is engaged in OCO with USCENTCOM. The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s proved ISR capabilities are force multipliers in the

modern battlespace, prompting senior DOD leaders to take the right

steps in calling for more ISR resources. These DOD leaders also acknowledged that due to the increased demand for ISR, they would be

hard-pressed to field sufficient numbers of ISR assets to meet global

needs. After the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent surging of ISR

forces to the USCENTCOM AOR, ISR requirements from competing

COCOMs could be met only through ISR rotational forces. This is still

the case, causing collection gaps in all commands. National security

and intelligence strategies, as well as USAF security cooperation and

intelligence strategies, recognize that DOD ISR forces and capabilities

are stretched thin. As this analysis demonstrates, national strategic

direction provides guidance to warfighting commands to partner with

allies and leverage their capabilities to help meet US national intelligence requirements. Intelligence is a field where synergistic efficiencies of cooperation can easily be achieved.

Given that President Obama's Afghanistan strategy calls for a surge

In US forces and capabilities through 2011, USEUCOM must continue to look to other sources to mitigate its ISR collection gaps. In

light of significant advances in allied ISR capabilities, teaming with

NATO, the RAF, and the GAF presents itself as a unique opportunity

for USEUCOM to bring about a revolution in intelligence sharing that

could prove to be a benchmark of security cooperation success for

other COCOMs to emulate.
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010-15 65

Notes

1. Michael Hoffman, "USAFE Bases Key to Building. Maintaining Ties," Defense

News, 21 September 2009.

2. US Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010

(Washington. DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense |OSD|. 2010). iii.

3. Robert C. Owen. Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning

(Maxwell AFB. AL: Air University Press, 2000), 234.

4. Ibid.. 228.

5. Ibid., 223.

6. Ibid.. 228.

7. William S. Cohen and Gen Henry H. Shelton. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force AfterAction Report, Report to Congress (Washington. DC: OSD and the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. 2000). 3.

8. Ibid., xxll.

9. Ibid.. 54.

10. Ibid., 131.

11. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington,

DC: Office of the President of the United States, 2006), 1.

12. Ibid.. 38.

13. The White House, National Security Strategyfor Combating Terrorism (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the United States. 2006). 19.

14. US Director of National Intelligence. National Intelligence Strategy (Washington.

DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2009). 7.

15. Ibid.. 8.

16. DOD. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006 (Washington. DC: OSD. 2006), 56.

17. DOD. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010. 22.

18. Ibid.. 22.

19. Ibid., 20.

20. DOD, "DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen from the

Pentagon," http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx7transcriptids4549.

21. Ibid., vili.

22. Department ofthe Air Force, Security Cooperation Strategy: Building Capacity. Integrating Capabilities (Washington. DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. 2006). 10.

23. Ibid., 10.

24. Department of the Air Force, Lead Turning the Future: The 2008 Strategy for

United States Air Force Intelligence. Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Washington. DC:

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR, 2008), 14.

25. US European Command (EUCOM), A Strategy ofActive Security (Stuttgart, Germany: Office of the Commander, EUCOM. 2008), 2.

26. Ibid.. 5.

27. Ibid., 3.

28. "NATO Signs Initial $26M Contract for AGS Eye in the Sky,-" Defense Industry

Daily, http://www.defenselndustrydally.com/nato-signs-initlal-26m-contract-for-ags

-eye-in-the-sky-0450.

29. Northrop Grumman, "NATO AGS," http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/

products/natoags/lndex.html.

30. NATO, "Alliance Ground Surveillance," http://www.nato.int/issues/ags/index

.html.

31. Ibid.

32. John Kriendler. NATO Intelligence and Early Warning (Watchfleld, UK: Defence

Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2006), 5-6.
66 COYNE * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 51

33. Ibid.. 4.

34. Klaus Becher, "European Intelligence Policy: Political and Military Requirements," In Towards a European Intelligence Policy, Chaillot Paper no. 34 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies. 1998), 52.

35. Ibid., 53.

36. Tom Klngton. "USAF Global Hawks to Patrol Europe, Africa from 2011," Defense News, 25 January 2010.

37. Deborah G. Barger, Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, RAND Technical

Report (Santa Monica. CA: National Security Research Division, 2005).

38. Headquarters USAF. ISR Directorate, "US-UK RC- 135V/W Rivet Joint Cooperative Program" (briefing, Washington, DC, 2009). slides 5-6.

39. Ibid., slides 9, 17.

40. Aeronautical Systems Center. "Rivet Joint 101" (briefing. Wright Patterson AFB,

OH. 21 July 2009). slide 9.

41. Luftwaffe, "Vorstellung des Ersten Euro Hawk," 8 October 2009, http://www

.luftwaffe.de.

42. Ibid.

43. Luftwaffe, "Mit Adleraugen," 24 November 2005, http://www.luftwaffe.de.

44. J. Lok Joris. "Global Hawk Demonstration Success Takes ISR Procurement

One Step Closer," Jane's International Defence Review 37, nos. 1-3 (January-March

2004): 58-62.

45. Ibid.
DEVELOPING A USEUCOM ISR STRATEGY FOR FY 2010 L5 67

Abbreviations

AGS

AOR

ATO

CJCS

COCOM

DCGS

DCS

DNI

DOD

EGSS

ELINT

FMS

FOC

FY

GAF

IC

IPT

IS

ISR

JFCC

LD/HD

MP-RTIP

NATO

NTS

NIWS

NSS

oco

QDR

RAF

RPA

SCS

SecDef

SIGINT

TPED

TTP

UAS

USAFE

USCENTCOM

USEUCOM

WMD

alliance ground surveillance

area of responsibility

air tasking order

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

combatant commander

distributed common ground station

direct commercial sale

director of national intelligence

Department of Defense

ELINT Ground Support Station

electronics intelligence

foreign military sales

full operational capability

fiscal year

German Air Force

Intelligence community

integrated process team

Intelligence Squadron

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

joint functional component command

low density and high demand

multiplatform radar technology insertion program

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

National Intelligence Strategy

NATO intelligence warning system

National Security Strategy

overseas contingency operations

Quadrennial Defense Review

Royal Air Force

remotely piloted aircraft

Security Cooperation Strategy

secretary of defense

signals intelligence

tasking, production, exploitation, and dissemination

tactics, techniques, and procedures

unmanned aircraft system

United States Air Forces in Europe

United States Central Command

United States European Command

weapon of mass destruction

Influence Operations and the Internet:

A 21st Century Issue

Legal, Doctrinal, and Policy Challenges

in the Cyber World

Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF*

The conduct of information operations (IO) by the US military,

which Includes military deception (MILDEC) and psychological operations (PSYOP), is based on doctrinal precedence and operational necessity. The Increasing use of cybertechnology and the Internet in

executing IO missions offers technological advantages while simultaneously being a minefield fraught with legal and cultural challenges.

Using Joint and Air Force doctrinal publications, published books,

and academic papers, this thesis defines relevant terminology and

identifies current operational and legal constraints In the execution

of IO using cybertechnology. It concludes with recommended remediation actions to enhance the use of the Internet as a military IO tool

in today's cyber world.

Primer on Influence Operations

According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Information Operations,

IO Is "integral to the successful execution of military operations. A

key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority for

the US and its allies ... [in order] to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or

usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."1 Two of the five core capabilities of IO are PSYOP

and MILDEC, while Public Affairs (PA) is considered an IO-related

capability.2 All three are Inherent in the conduct of military operations

from peacetime to wartime and are increasingly affected by cybertechnology. In order to understand these missions, It is important to

first explain their definitions and functions.

According to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, short of perfidy, the

intent of MILDEC is the execution of actions "to deliberately mislead

adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations."3 Deception has been a recognized component

•Lt Col Michael Masterson. USAF, was the essay advisor for this paper.

69
70 KELLER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

of war for millennia; nearly 2,500 years ago, Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu stated "all warfare is based on deception."4

In modern

times, two classic examples of military deception are (1) Operation

Mincemeat, the World War II deception strategy that convinced the

Germans that the Allies were preparing to invade Greece instead of

Italy, and (2) a perfectly executed ruse by the Egyptians and Syrians

giving the appearance of a military exercise. Instead, they initiated

the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, catching the Israelis completely off guard.5

While MILDEC is customarily a wartime mission, PSYOP is conducted during all phases of military operations, including peacetime,

and is authorized under Title 10, section 167 of the US Code, which

allows the Department of Defense (DOD) to conduct PSYOP as part of

special operations campaigns.6JP 3-13.2, Psychological Operations,

states the purpose of PSYOP is to influence foreign audience perceptions and behavior as part of approved programs supporting US policy

and military objectives.7Since World War I, the United States has

released psychological leaflets across enemy lines to persuade and

influence behavior. Other traditional forms of PSYOP include groundbased and airborne loudspeaker or radio broadcasts to foreign audiences and show-of-force missions where military ground personnel,

aircraft, or ships visibly remind foreign nations of US combat capabilities.

Propaganda is "a form of communication aimed at influencing the

attitude of a community toward some cause or position."8 While historically not a pejorative term, the terms PSYOP and propaganda are

often freely interchanged and have taken primarily derogatory connotations. This is in spite of the fact that both provide important national security tools and are truthful in content during the execution

of conventional military operations.

Where PSYOP and propaganda are communications directed at

foreign audiences, military PA offices provide similar information to

journalists and the American public to articulate DOD positions on

policies and operations. The same principles based upon the freedom of

the press that guide civilian journalists also guide the activities of PA

professionals. Military PA responsibilities are captured in JP 3-61, Public Affairs—"providing truthful, accurate and timely information ... to

keep the public informed about the military's missions and operations,

countering adversary propaganda, deterring adversary actions, and

maintain[ing] trust and confidence of the US population, and our

friends and allies."9Even Pres. Abraham Lincoln understood the importance of interacting with the public, stating, "Public opinion is everything. With it, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed."10

The requirement to influence foreign attitudes and behaviors is not

unique to the DOD; the Department of State's (DOS) public diplo-
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 71

macy efforts can often overlap with military PSYOP or PA activities.

Out of necessity, DOS public diplomacy and military PA distance

themselves from the highly controversial MILDEC, PSYOP, and propaganda mission sets in order to maintain a sense of credibility and

operational effectiveness which is "predicated on [the] ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences."1

•

Impact of Cybertechnology

on Influence Operations

Increasingly, the use of the cyber domain is being actively researched and exploited by the United States and its adversaries to

conduct influence operations via cell phone, e-mail, text message,

and blogs in both peacetime and combat environments. The cyber

world will progressively become both a boon and a bane to IO personnel,

allowing a global audience reach but providing a large vulnerability to

enemy deception and PSYOP efforts requiring a near immediate response to worldwide operational events.

While traditional forms of MILDEC—operational feints, displays, or

instances of camouflage and concealment—are increasingly negated

by advancements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

technology that quickly uncover the deception, cybertechnology has

brought a new generation of MILDEC options to military planners.12

These include digital imagery manipulation, computer file alteration,

and false file storage where phony or deceptive electronic files are

deliberately made accessible to an adversary.

Ubiquitous Internet availability and the global use of cell phones

present new opportunities for PSYOP efforts. The proliferation of cell

phone ring tones offers options for embarrassment or message delivery.I3 For instance, altering a terrorist cell chief or military leader's

ring tone to the refrain "God bless the USA" would cause embarrassment or shame when triggered to ring within earshot of subordinates

or superiors. Additionally, some cell phone frequencies are "not detectable to people over the age of 30, while those younger than 30 can

hear the frequency," which enables a targeted audience for some

messages.14 Student revolutionaries in an adversary's country could

be targeted to encourage their antiestablishment activities. In theory,

the student could be alerted to a new text message or voice mail with

a high-frequency alert tone audible to them without tipping off older,

anti-American parents, teachers, or government officials.

The traditional airborne psychological leaflet has been modernized

by an Internet version called an "E-flet," and the loudspeaker is being

superseded by text messages delivered to cell phones and called the
72 KELLER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

"silent loudspeaker."15 Messages can even be sent to specific cell

phone towers in a given geographic area, thus enabling regular news

updates to a target audience to be sent.16 Again, the student protestors in an adversary's country could be targeted to receive text messages supporting their activities.

Web sites like You.Tu.be and other social networking sites have

become a battleground for "a global audience to share firsthand reports, military strategies, propaganda videos, and personal conflict

as it unfolds."17 This public participation in conflict blurs the lines

between combatant and noncombatant when operational data is involved. New counterpropaganda tools aided by the Internet combat

this trend.

One method to fight foreign propaganda and lies is for the United

States to use a blog or Web site in native languages to educate foreign

citizens on political issues and to influence attitudes and advance

education on a topic area. For example, if a country holds a constitutional referendum to do away with presidential term limits and the

incumbent president is not a US ally, the United States could use the

Internet to educate the citizens about the significance and impact of

the referendum prior to the vote. Another example is "alert" software,

such as "Megaphone," that notifies a special interest group about

chat rooms or Internet polls that are counter to their special interest.

This alert enables a counterpropaganda response and offers alternate

or contradictory views.18

The importance of proactively capitalizing on the new range of

cyber tools in performing IO missions is surpassed only by the requirement to identify and provide a defense against similar efforts

by opponents.

Challenges to Effective Information Operations

While the lanes in the road between MILDEC, PSYOP, and PA seem

clear cut in doctrine and theory, cyber operations have blurred the

lines between operational missions and authorities due to outdated

US laws, Internet technology, global media, and transnational threats.

Seven challenges highlight conflicts and uncharted cyber areas in IO

that must be addressed if the United States' national defense is not to

be left vulnerable, both legally and defensively. If these areas are not

addressed, the United States risks not only the ability to conduct effective cyber-related influence operations but also the capability to

effectively employ military instruments of power throughout the range

of operations from peacetime to wartime and defend against the same.
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 73

Keeping the American Public Informed

The American public plays a large role, both directly and indirectly,

in the arena of influence operations. Doctrinally, "MILDEC operations

must not intentionally target or mislead the US public, the US Congress, or the US news media."19 This insulation of the US public from

US deception operations is understandable; however, it also leaves

the United States vulnerable to foreign deception and propaganda

efforts and "a questioning mind is the first line of defense."20 Therefore, the general public should be taught how to identify and respond

to propaganda, PSYOP, and deception operations launched by any

foreign nation or other entity.

In the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israel launched an

airstrike on 30 July 2006 that allegedly killed as many as 57 civilians.

It was later called the Qana massacre in the significant international

media coverage.21 Ultimately, in light of postbattle assessment, the

Qana massacre was determined to actually be "a stage-managed

Hezbollah production, designed precisely to enflame international

sentiment against Israel and compel the Israelis to accept a ceasefire

that would enable the jihad terrorist group to gain some time to recover from the Israeli attacks."22 The Hezbollah manipulated the attack timeline and doctored photos of recovery workers and corpses to

make the air strike appear genocidal and to cover up the military

nature of the target. The inconsistencies in the images and the timeline of events were evident upon close scrutiny. Awareness of this

type of deception must be developed in the American public and military personnel.

Legal Challenges to Combatant Command Responsibilities

In June 2007, the deputy secretary of defense (DEPSECDEF) issued a "Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet

Activities" memo authorizing the geographic combatant commands to

provide information to foreign audiences via two-way communications—e-mail, blogs, chat rooms, and Internet bulletin boards.23 A

"Policy for Combatant Command (COCOM) Regional Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences" followed in August 2007, which further

authorized geographic COCOMs to produce and maintain "regionallyoriented websites" with "non-interactive" content for foreign audiences.24 By direction, the Web site data must be accurate, truthful,

and, in all but cases of operational necessity, attributable. On the

surface, it makes sense for a COCOM to use interactive Internet activities (IIA) and regionally focused Web sites to counter extremist

activity and thwart proterrorist mind-sets as well as to advance US
74 KELLER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

political-military interests overseas. However, IIA as defined and

structured is the legal responsibility of the DOS and not the DOD.25

The legal crux of the issue is whether these activities are PSYOP,

which is a legally defined military mission set, or if they fall into the

area of public diplomacy, which is the sole jurisdiction of the DOS.26

While the DEPSECDEF policy letters did direct interagency cooperation with the DOS for international engagement, the term PSYOP is

never used to define DOD activities. The DOD has limited congressional authority to conduct public diplomacy, and once it "no longer

labels its communication measures as PSYOP, it potentially subverts

its own statutory authorities to engage foreign audiences."27 At its

core, IIA is public diplomacy conducted as a military mission, yet the

appropriation of funds and the use of contractor support for foreign

engagement via public diplomacy are more in line with congressional

appropriations targeted to the DOS rather than the DOD.28

Modernizing the Smith-Mundt Act

Related to the discussion of geographic COCOM and DOS responsibilities are the legal boundaries in the conduct of US propaganda

instituted by the Smith-Mundt Act. Passed in 1948, the US Information and Education Exchange Act, also known as Smith-Mundt, was

enacted to counter the worldwide communist propaganda being released by the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. The Act's principles are timeless: tell the truth; explain the motives of the United

States; bolster morale and extend hope; give a true and convincing

picture of American life, methods and ideals; combat misrepresentation and distortion; and aggressively interpret and support American

foreign policy."29 In other words, create a forum for the international

release of American news and information (propaganda) to counter

the communist propaganda from the Soviet Union, which was "defaming our institutions in the eyes of the peoples of the world."30

The result was the creation of the US Information Agency (USIA),

now a part of DOS, to undertake the mission. Additionally, some wellknown media entities are also covered by the Smith-Mundt Act (Voice

of America [VOA1, Radio Free Asia and Europe, and Radio and TV

Marti). A domestic dissemination clause was further strengthened by

Congress in 1972 and 1985 to completely "block Americans from accessing USIA materials to the point USIA products were exempt from

the Freedom of Information Act."31 In essence, US citizens cannot be

trusted to have access to the truthful materials promoting American

ideals that are available to the rest of the world.
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 75

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the worldwide communist threat, as well as the shrinking of the world due to the cyber age,

a number of Smith-Mundt constraints have outlived their usefulness.

First, the Smith-Mundt Act restrictions only cover the current DOS

activities previously conducted by USIA, and not those of the entire

US government. A 2006 legal review requested by the Defense Policy

Analysis Office concluded that "the Act does not apply to the Defense

Department."32 However, based upon implicit congressional support

for the act that extends to the government, the DOD has applied the

restrictions in its COCOM public outreach activities.33

The Internet and satellite radio have also made it impossible to

separate domestic from international audiences, calling into question

whether it is illegal for online products supposedly covered by SmithMundt (a DOS or COCOM article produced for foreign consumption)

to be accessible by American citizens.

Finally, the ability of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

and US Northern Command to counter radical ideological products of

terrorists, foreign and domestic, requires US truthful information developed by the DOS to be made available. For example, a Minneapolis,

Minnesota, community radio station requested permission to rebroadcast a VOA news show that targeted Somalians. The intent was

to "offer an informative, Somali-language alternative to the terrorist

propaganda that [was] streaming into Minneapolis," home of the largest Somali community in the United States.34 The VOA, as regulated

by the Smith-Mundt Act, denied the request. This example highlights

a new strategic vulnerability, the inability to combat a transnational

terrorism threat within our own borders.

Countering Adversary Influence Operations

While Smith-Mundt prohibits dissemination of US influence information to American citizens, no corresponding law prohibits foreign

nations or organizations from targeting US citizens with propaganda

and/or deception. The lack of public awareness of this threat and the

proliferation of cheap means for global message distribution leave the

US public vulnerable to influence operations (propaganda) and deception by adversaries and other nations. This can include altered

imagery, intentional falsehoods, and planted rumors. Some modern

examples of influence operations against the US public include the

Soviet KGB spreading "bogus stories linking the United States to the

creation of HIV/AIDS . . . and [accusing the United States of) employing a Korean civilian airliner as a reconnaissance aircraft over the

Kamchatka peninsula. [Additionally], John Kerry appeared in an al-
76 KELLER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

tered image seated near Jane Fonda at an anti-Vietnam War rally."35

In order for Americans to recognize another nation's propaganda, the

American educational system should have an information literacy

program to ensure that US citizens "have the ability to distinguish

truth from falsehood when information is presented."36

Changing Pejorative Terminology

It seems that the modern usage ofthe terms propaganda and psychological operations is generally viewed by Americans as pejorative in

nature, in spite of the fact that conventional military IO missions are

truthful and accurate. As Hubert H. Humphrey once said, "In real

life, unlike in Shakespeare, the sweetness of the rose depends upon

the name it bears. Things are not only what they are. They are, in very

important respects, what they seem to be."37

Unfortunately, the words propaganda and psychological operations

have evolved in usage over the past half century to imply deceit and

trickery. Thus, the harmful connotation in the minds of Congress, the

American public, and even some military leaders impacts negatively on

the ability of the US military to effectively conduct influence operations, even truthful ones. When discussions of DOD information operations are made public, the potentially positive effects of the operations are overshadowed by the negative association of the terms

themselves. Because the derogatory connotation associated with today's IO terminology can negatively impact the conduct of the mission

and the ability to communicate, a name change should be considered.

Loss of High Ground in the Information Domain

That the United States has no peer competitor in conventional war

fighting is not in question. However, the use of nonconventional,

asymmetric techniques, particularly those enabled by the Internet,

allows nonpeer competitor nation-states and nonnation-state actors

a strategic equivalence or an advantage not found in conventional

settings. During past conventional conflicts, the US military PA structure could effectively manage the information released to the public

by civilian combat newsmen, protecting operations and personnel.

However, today's technology, such as the cell phone, enables everyone the "capability to transmit audio, video and photographs . . .

[and] such contributions from the street carry their own form of psychological persuasion."38 Any incident occurring in a conflict today

can be reported, correctly or incorrectly, via Internet chat room, YouTube, cell phone, or text messaging—long before a "legitimate news

service can adjudicate its authenticity."39 A cell phone enables a
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 77

group, or even an individual, the ability to conduct unilateral psychological or deception operations against the US, negatively impacting

both peacetime and wartime missions by influencing public opinion.

This can put pressure on public officials and military leadership regarding conduct, expected outcomes, and even the duration of combat operations.

With the growing dependence on the use of interconnected networks to function in an e-commerce society, cyber weapons are rapidly becoming the "nuclear weapon" of the millennial age. In the past,

nuclear weapons were considered the ultimate deterrent and battlefield equalizer, which prompted the creation of international controls

on development and possession of such technology. Fortunately, the

cost of a nuclear weapons program was prohibitive to all but a handful of sovereign nations. But cybertechnology is inexpensive, easy to

obtain, and ubiquitous, thus offering an asymmetric advantage to

adversaries, state sponsored and otherwise, to conduct "quite literally, war on the cheap."40 As a result, it is incumbent upon the US

military IO community to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures

(TTP) for using the new technologies. The military must become proficient in the identification and defeat of foreign attempts at IO and

learn to release "precision guided messages ... to target friendly or

enemy soldiers with equal ease."41

Defining Neutrality in Cyber Operations

The 1907 Hague Convention requires combatant nations to recognize the rights of neutral nations and that the territory of a neutral

nation is inviolable by combatant nations.42 The latter neutrality

specification causes many questions and is ill defined relative to the

realm of cyber operations. The century-old Hague Convention was

written when sovereign borders and national boundaries were purely

geographic in nature. It must now be reconsidered in the cyber age.

Specifically, the Hague Convention states that, "belligerents may

not move forces, weapons, or war materiel across a neutral country's

territory, or conduct hostilities within a neutral's territory, waters, or

airspace. A neutral nation jeopardizes its status if it permits belligerents to engage in such violations."43 Two primary Internet-based examples highlight the difficulty of applying international laws of neutrality as they pertain to cyber operations—the use of a neutral

country's cyber infrastructure and execution of cyber missions that

cross neutral borders.

During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Israel bombed the AlManar facilities in Lebanon prompting Al-Manar (an organization
78 KELLER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

outlawed in the United States due to its jihadist activities) to rehost

its operations on an Austin, Texas-based server owned by Broadwing

Communications.44 The nature and intent of this rehosting were apparently unknown to Broadwing at the time. It could be argued that

Hezbollah is not a sovereign state and the Al-Manarjihadist organization is not a legal combatant, so the Hague and Geneva neutrality

conventions were not in play. However, this scenario and similar others

demand some very intricate legal discussion on neutrality when cyber

conflict occurs between nation-states and nonnation-states, especially the legal and practical consequences of a belligerent "occupying" a neutral nation's cyber infrastructure.

Another example of Internet rehosting by a belligerent took place in

July 2008 in the cyber portion of the conflict between Russia and

Georgia. When the Georgian government's Internet capabilities were

rendered virtually nonfunctional by a Russian denial of service attack. Tulip Systems, a US Internet hosting company in Atlanta, "contacted [the] Georgian government officials and offered assistance in

reconstituting Georgian Internet capabilities."45 While Tulip Systems

provided this assistance without the knowledge or permission of the

US government, it calls into question the status of US neutrality during the cyber conflict between these two belligerents. Can a sovereign

nation lose its neutral status based upon the unilateral actions of a

single citizen?

Another gray area in the realm of cyber neutrality deals with influence operations and the release of E-flets, text messages, or deception efforts (such as altering the contents of a Web site) that involve

crossing sovereign borders with respect to physical infrastructure.

Similar to the conventions limiting belligerents' use of radio towers

and broadcast equipment in neutral countries, does the execution of

a cyber mission traveling across a neutral country's web infrastructure violate international neutrality laws? The neutrality laws must

be modernized or the negative impact to the DOD is obvious.

Recommended Changes to Doctrine and Policy

The breadth of questions raised by the use of cybertechnology in

the prosecution of influence operations requires further investigation

and correction. To deal with the challenges discussed in the previous

section, the following represent some suggested remediation efforts.

As a public service, DHS needs to develop and implement an IO

education campaign to develop critical thinking skills to assist the

American public in identifying foreign propaganda and deception

encountered on the Internet and in cyber media. Additionally, busi-
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 79

ness owners of Internet servers would receive education on how

their actions in hosting or assisting corporations or nations in countries under cyber attack could put the United States in jeopardy of

losing its neutral status and unintentionally becoming a warring

party within a conflict.

The DOD must determine whether new legal authorities to undertake Internet-based communications and Web site interactions with

foreign audiences are required, as directed by secretary of defense

policy letters of 2007. Regardless, the DOD must inform Congress of

its public diplomacy (vice PSYOP) efforts and may even need to leave

public diplomacy responsibilities to the DOS.46

"Congress must undo changes to the Smith-Mundt Act that prevent accountability and effective global engagement. This language,

inserted in the 1970's and 1980's, prevents transparency and awareness while ignoring the global movement of information and people."47

Congress must amend Smith-Mundt to remove the ban on domestic

dissemination of materials originally developed for foreign audiences.

"In this age of communication without borders, the existence of such

statutory language only subverts America's most powerful tool ofsoft

power: our ideals."48

Change the terms propaganda and PSYOP to something less pejorative to the American public. Hubert H. Humphrey once stated, "Propaganda, to be effective, must be believed. To be believed, it must be

credible. To be credible, it must be true."49 Given that IO and PA activities in conventional military operations are factual and truthful,

the pejorative terms in use hinder the accomplishment of the mission. New terminology could be as simple as operational communications, strategic effects, broadcast operations, or CYOP (cyber psychological operations).50

Update US influence operations doctrine to include cybertechnology.

Specifically, develop TTPs for employing PSYOP, MILDEC. and PA using

the new cybertechnology. Once developed, the TTPs must be incorporated into all applicable military exercises to allow the military IO

operator an avenue for developing proficiency in the release of "precisionguided messages" to foreign audiences.51

Codify a US cyber policy on cyber neutrality that includes belligerent and neutral nation responsibilities. Since international law is often derived from common practice, the United States can be in the

forefront ofshaping international cyber neutrality laws and sovereign

nation responsibilities when a "belligerent takes cyber refuge in a

neutral country's territory."52 Ultimately, this requires a worldwide

collaborative effort to "create a single set of cyber laws and procedures internationally in order to insure that there is no safe harbor
80 KELLER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

for cyber criminals."53 Cyber criminals would include state and nonstate actors threatening our security.

Putting It All Together—Operational Examples

Assuming all of the previous challenges are addressed and resolved, the following example summarizes how the military commander can benefit from information operations in the cyber age. The

examples use radical Islamic extremists as the notional enemy.

As radical Islam extremists expertly use the Internet and global

media to publicize and advance their propaganda and lies, an educated American civilian and military population can recognize misinformation and deception using critical thinking skills, asking hard

questions, and seeking alternate or corroborating sources of information before making judgments or believing the foreign stories. With a

Smith-Mundt Act modification, DHS, in conjunction with the Northern Command, can provide a direct counterinformation campaign

within US borders via the Internet, radio, and television (in English

and other foreign languages). This campaign will reduce the domestic

threat from misinformed potential terrorist recruits living in the

United States.

Once cyber TTPs are codified and a well trained cadre of military

professionals developed, the combatant commander will be able to

informationally bombard Islamic terrorists and their potential supporters by sending precision-guided messages to specific cell towers,

cell phones, e-mail, or Web sites as part of a public diplomacy or

CYOP effort.54 The ability to incorporate these tools as standard procedures will enhance a counterinsurgency campaign by actively persuading less radical terrorists and sympathizers to give up the fight

without resorting to expensive (both monetarily and socially) conventional warfare.

Once international norms are established for cyber-based laws of

armed conflict, commanders will better understand legal boundaries

to recognizing, initiating, and defending against cyber warfare. This,

in turn, leaves a training and education task for both the military

professionals and the American information technology public. But,

until those norms are codified, the United States is at risk of unintentionally becoming a belligerent in other countries' conflicts, having

our military and civilian cyber professionals unwittingly held liable

under the international court ofjustice or not recognizing that a cyber war attack has taken place against our nation, thus forfeiting our

opportunity for a prompt and appropriate response.
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 81

Conclusion

The remediation actions and operational examples outlined in this

thesis are not exhaustive and still leave a large gray area in the realm

of influence operations and the use of cybertechnology. They do represent a start, however, in identifying doctrinal gaps, outdated legal

roadblocks, and deficiencies in policies, laws, and education. The

United States must "amend existing policies to allow [Influence operations] to embrace the range of contemporary media ... as an integral asset" to military operations.55 These changes would provide

structure to largely disorganized and unnecessarily constrained efforts to fully employ cybertechnology and provide a new opportunity

for the United States to conduct effective and efficient influence operations using that technology. Without addressing these challenges

promptly, the national security of our nation is at risk in current and

future conflicts.

Note*

1. JP 3-13. Information Operations. 13 February 2006. 1-1.

2. Ibid.. II-8-9.

3. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 13 July 2006. vll. Perfidy is "the use of unlawful or

prohibited deceptions. Acts of perfidy are deceptions designed to invite the confidence

of the enemy leading to the belief that he/she is entitled to. or is obliged to accord,

protected status under the law of armed conflict, with the intent to betray that confidence. Acts of perfidy include but are not limited to: feigning surrender or waving a

white flag to lure the enemy into a trap; misusing protective signs, signals, and symbols to injure, kill, or capture the enemy; using an ambulance or medical aircraft

marked with the red cross or red crescent to carry armed combatants, weapons, or

ammunition in order to attack or elude enemy forces; and using false, deceptive, or

neutral flags, insignia, or uniforms [in actual combat)." Ibid., 1-8.

4. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. ed. and trans. Samuel Griffith (London: Oxford University Press. 1963). 66.

5. JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 1-7. A ruse is "a cunning trick designed to deceive the

adversary to obtain friendly advantage. It is characterized by deliberately exposing false

or confusing Information for collection and interpretation by the adversary." Ibid.. 1-7.

6. Daniel Sllverberg and Joseph Heimann. "An Ever-Expanding War: Legal Aspects

of Online Strategic Communication." Parameters, Summer 2009. 80.

7. JP 3-13.2. Psychological Operations. 7 January 2010. vtl.

8. Wikipedia, s.v. "Propaganda," http://en.wlklpedia.org/wikl/Propaganda (accessed 25 January 2010).

9. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. 9 May 2006, xl.

10. Ibid.. II—1.

11. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations. 11 January

2005. 5.

12. JP 3-13.4. Military Deception, 1-7. Afeint is "an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary of the

location and/or time ofthe actual main offensive action." Displays are "the simulation.
82 KELLER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

disguising, and/or portrayed of friendly objects, units, or capabilities in the projection

of the military deception story. Such capabilities may not exist but are made to appear

so (simulations)." Ibid., 1-7.

13. Timothy L. Thomas. "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop," IO Sphere, Winter

2007, 31.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., 32.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, II-8.

20. Scot Macdonald, Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century: Altered Images and Deception Operations (New York: Routledge, 2007). 178.

21. Robert Spencer. "Stage-Managed Massacre," Frontpagemag.com, 2 August 2006.

http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTlD=3281 (accessed 13 February 2010).

22. Ibid.

23. Gordon England, deputy secretary of defense, "Policy for Department of Defense (DOD) Interactive Internet Activities," policy memorandum, 8 June 2007.

24. Gordon England, deputy secretary of defense, "Policy for Combatant Command

(COCOM) Regional Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences," policy memorandum, 3

August 2007.

25. Silverberg and Heimann, "Ever-Expanding War."

26. Ibid.. 78.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Matt Armstrong. "Smith-Mundt Act," Small Wars Journal 28 July 2008.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Matt Armstrong, "Censoring the Voice ofAmerica," Foreign Policy, 6 August 2009.

35. Macdonald. Propaganda and Information Warfare, 182.

36. Ibid.

37. Hubert H. Humphrey, Quoteopia.com, http://www.quoteopia.com/famous.php

?quotesby=huberthhumphrey (accessed 13 February 2010).

38. Thomas, "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop," 30.

39. Ibid.

40. Michael N. Schmitt. Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, research publication (Colorado

Springs, CO: Institute for Information Technology Applications. 1999), 10.

41. Thomas. "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop," 30.

42. Stephen W. Korns and Joshua E. Kastenberg, "Georgia's Cyber Left Hook,"

Parameters, Winter 2008-9. 62.

43. Ibid.

44. Thomas. "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop," 33.

45. Korns and Kastenberg, "Georgia's Cyber Left Hook," 67.

46. Silverberg and Heimann. "Ever-Expanding War," 90.

47. Armstrong. "Smith-Mundt Act."

48. Gregory L. Garland. "Editorials and Op-Eds," AmericanDiplomacy.Org. 3 January

2009, www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/0103/ed/garland_smithmundt.html

(accessed 23 October 2009).
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET 83

49. Hubert H. Humphrey, BrainyQuote.com, http://www.bralnyquote.com/quotes/

authors/h/hubert_h_humphrey_2.html (accessed 13 February 2010).

50. Thomas. "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop": and AFDD 2-5: Information Operations. 30.

51. Thomas, "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop."

52. Korns and Kastenberg. "Georgia's Cyber Left Hook." 66.

53. Paul Rosenzwelg. "National Security Threats in Cyberspace," McCormlck Foundation Conference series (Wheaton, 1L: McCormick Foundation, 2009), 30.

54. Thomas, "Hezballah, Israel, and Cyber Psyop."

55. Angela Maria Lungu. "War.com: The Internet and Psychological Operations."

Joint Forces Quarterly. Spring/Summer 2001. 13-17.
84 KELLER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 52

Abbreviations

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

COCOM combatant command

CYOP cyber psychological operations

DEPSECDEF deputy secretary of defense

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOS Department of State

E-flet Internet psychological leaflet

IIA interactive Internet activities

IO information operations

JP joint publication

MILDEC military deception

PA Public Affairs

PSYOP psychological operations

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

USIA US Information Agency

VOA Voice of America
US National Security and Environmental

Change in the Arctic

Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force*

Historically, dramatic changes in strategic geography have had a

big impact on international relations, as illustrated by the discovery

of America and the building of the Panama and Suez Canals. Today

the warming climate is changing the strategic geography in the Arctic.

The ice coverage is decreasing, which makes shipping possible and

increases the possibility of extracting natural resources. Hence, the

strategic importance of the Arctic is increasing.' This essay discusses

the strategic impact of environmental change in the Arctic. The purpose is to explore how this change affects US national security and to

suggest a future US policy in the region.

The existing academic analyses concerning US climate policy

and Arctic policy generally propose increased international cooperation. However, the existing international framework for the

Arctic is disputed and is not ratified by the United States. Moreover, the actions of countries in the Arctic suggest, contrary to

their stated policies, a desire to unilaterally maximize their own

economic gain. The United States does not have a well-developed

Arctic policy. This essay suggests that the United States first ratify

the United Nations (UN) Convention of the Law of the Sea. Then it

needs to negotiate, bilaterally, agreements regarding the extent of

the Arctic countries' exclusive economic zones (EEZ). To be successful, the United States should broaden these negotiations to

include other areas of policy. The suggested policy does not seek to

maximize the US EEZ; rather the objective is to reach a peaceful

agreement with a positive effect on the world economy, while at the

same time strengthening US strategic leadership.

The essay starts with a brief summary of environmental change in

the Arctic and how that affects the strategic situation. Thereafter, it

presents a synopsis of academic recommendations concerning US

policy. This section is followed by an analysis of the current situation

in the Arctic, pertaining to the status of international cooperation and

the actions of involved countries. The fourth part covers US policy—

what it is now and what It should be in the future.

•Dr. Christopher Hemmer. USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

85
86 HELMRICH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

The Arctic Is Changing

Climate change in the Arctic is fundamentally altering the region's

strategic importance. Increased accessibility, due to decreased ice

coverage, leads to new possibilities for shipping and extraction of

natural resources. For some time, the debate about whether the

climate is changing has been decided. Currently, the debate concerns its implications, among which are those that affect international security. This is evident from President Obama's speech at

the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2009: The danger posed

by climate change cannot be denied. Our responsibility to meet it

must not be deferred. If we continue down our current course, every

member of this Assembly will see irreversible changes within their

borders. Our efforts to end conflicts will be eclipsed by wars over

refugees and resources."2

An important actor concerning climate change is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It was established by the UN

in 1989 to conduct an unbiased review ofscientific evidence concerning climate change. The IPCC was honored with the 2007 Nobel Peace

Prize. According to the IPCC, the polar regions are the areas where

climate change will be most abrupt and will be experienced earliest.3

In fact, it is already occurring. The Arctic glaciers and the Greenland

ice sheet are melting.4 According to the IPCC, by 2050 the Northern

Sea Route, which passes through the Arctic close to the Russian

coast, will have conditions that allow for the navigation of icestrengthened cargo ships 125 days per year.5

The Northwest Passage,

which passes close to Canada's northern coast, was ice free for the

first time in 2007; it may shorten the journey between Europe and

Asia by 2,500 miles. In the past 20 years, the ice coverage of the

Arctic has decreased by an area equal to one-third of the continental

United States.6

The decreasing ice coverage does not affect shipping routes only.

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) assessed undiscovered oil

and gas resources in the Arctic. It concluded that the region is the

earth's largest remaining unexplored area for these resources. It is

estimated that undiscovered oil and gas resources amount to 90

billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 44

billion barrels of gas liquids.7Compared to the total volume of estimated undiscovered energy resources, the Arctic's resources include

13 percent of the undiscovered oil and 30 percent of the undiscovered

natural gas.8

Climate change is affecting the Arctic and shrinking the extent of

the ice cap. The result is easier access to natural resources, as well
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 87

as the possibility of new, shorter sea routes. Hence, the strategic importance of the region is increasing. Additionally, the global consequences of climate change will include upward pressure on oil prices

caused by instability in oil-producing regions.9This development will

further increase the importance of the region. The next section examines the broad trends of analysis about possible US policy on climate

change and on the Arctic.

Existing Academic Recommendations

concerning Strategies in the Arctic

Numerous organizations study climate change and its implications

for international security. There is a general agreement that the challenges created by climate change, due to its global nature, should

result in increased international cooperation.10 Even studies conducted at military academic institutions generally favor multinational

cooperation.11

In 2007 the CNA Corporation published the study National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. The study suggests that the

main threats to international stability are increasing difficulties for

failing states, mass migration, and conflicts concerning resources.

Climate change will reinforce these threats.12 The study recommends

that the United States integrate the consequences of climate change

in its national defense strategy, make a stronger commitment to stabilize climate change, commit to a global partnership to assist lessdeveloped nations, improve energy (fuel) efficiency in its combat

forces, and assess the impact on US military installations globally.13

The study argues that ongoing climate change is most significant in

the Arctic. The decreasing amount of ice could bring more competition for resources as well as more commercial and military activity.14

The CNA study recognizes that projected climate change is a serious

threat to US national security. It states that more international cooperation is needed to address the challenge.15

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) performed an indepth analysis of the implications climate change may have for national security. The analysis argues that climate change will aggravate existing international tensions.16 It also states that, if not

addressed, the effects of climate change may come to represent the

greatest challenge to US national security.17Three different scenarios

are studied: expected, severe, and catastrophic climate change.18 The

study concludes by presenting 10 security implications of climate

change, including north-south tensions, migration challenges, resource conflicts, challenges to global governance, China's role, and
88 HELMRICH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

the unpredictability in balance of power shifts.19 The policy recommendations for the United States are very vague. The CNAS argues

for international cooperation, especially among the United States,

China, and Europe, and stresses the importance of US leadership.20

Concerning the Arctic, the report states that for the first time in recorded history, the Northwest Passage has become navigable and

that the decrease in the Arctic ice cap is likely to continue.21

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its report The

Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference, stresses that

the implications for US security interests as a result of climate change

in the Arctic are profound. Its advice to the United States is to ratify

the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, promote a stronger role for

the Arctic Council, and support Arctic subregional forums. According

to the report, the key security issue in the Arctic is environmental

security. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concludes

that there are no significant geopolitical fault lines and no imminent

reasons to expect wars because of natural resources.22

Existing academic analyses are generally favorable to increased international cooperation. They do not address how to handle increased

competition of resources other than stating the need for increased

international cooperation. There is a common academic appreciation

of the challenge, but when studying the Arctic, it is obvious that the

foundation for international cooperation is fragile and that the main

actors are not acting in accordance with the recommendations.

Recent Strategic Development in the Arctic

The actors in the Arctic consist of international agreements/institutions and states. Those discussed here are the UN Convention of

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic Council, the International

Maritime Organization (IMO), the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, and

the Arctic countries. For brevity's sake, this essay will analyze only

the Arctic countries of Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the

United States. Based upon tradition and geography, I deem these

countries most important. The United States is discussed in a separate section.

International Agreements/Institutions

The UNCLOS was established on 10 December 1982 after 14 years

of work involving more than 150 countries. It entered into force on 16

November 1994. The UNCLOS establishes rules concerning use of the

oceans and extraction of their resources, as well as serving as a legal
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 89

framework for dispute resolution. The UNCLOS defines a state's

EEZ, in which it has the sovereign right to extract natural resources,

as an area within 200 nautical miles (nm) of its baseline.23 This

sovereign right may extend to 350 nm if the state's continental shelf

extends beyond the 200 nm limit. The Commission on the Limits of

the Continental Shelf (CLCS), established under the convention,

makes recommendations concerning the extent of different states'

continental shelves. To support a claim concerning its continental

shelf, each nation is obliged to submit scientific evidence to the

commission. Disputes regarding the right to resources can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, also established under the convention.

Of the Arctic countries, the United States is the only one that

has not ratified the UNCLOS.24 Several countries, though, have

declared that they do not recognize the UNCLOS's right of binding

decisions or have declared other exceptions. Russia, for example,

does not accept the UNCLOS's procedures for binding decisions or

dispute resolution concerning the exercise of sovereign rights.

Canada reserves the right to take any position on any declaration

by the UNCLOS that it deems appropriate. Both Norway and Denmark have made reservations concerning dispute resolution.25 Although the UNCLOS is the critical framework in the Arctic, other

relevant treaties and organizations exist.

The main purpose of the Arctic Council is to maintain peace and

stability in the Arctic. The council was established in 1996, and today

all of the Arctic countries are members. Besides nations, several organizations of indigenous Arctic populations are included as permanent participants in the council. The Arctic Council does not handle

matters associated with military security. Instead, it contributes to

peace and stability by addressing issues such as living conditions,

sustainable development, and environmental protection. However,

according to its chairman Lars Moller, the Arctic Council together

with the UNCLOS can be viewed as the main framework within which

security-related issues can be dealt with.26

The International Maritime Organization, founded in 1958, is a UN

organization concerned with maritime safety and cooperation. It is

based in Great Britain and has 169 member nations. The safety issues encompass shipping as well as environmental safety.27 The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 is a multinational agreement among

84 countries banning the placement of weapons of mass destruction

on the ocean floor, beyond the 12-mile territorial zone.28

With the exception of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the international framework in the Arctic does not consider those issues that
90 HELMR1CH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

are strictly security related. A different international framework has

developed for the Antarctic. The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959;

among other things, it states that Antarctica is to be used only for

peaceful purposes. It also allows for inspections of other nations'

bases/stations on the continent. However, there are still unresolved

overlapping territorial claims even in Antarctica.29 There is an important difference between the Arctic and Antarctic and every other area

on land or above the continental shelf. There is no history in the Arctic or Antarctic of territorial sovereignty; hence there exists no customary law of economic rights. At the same time, because several

countries have declared they do not recognize the UNCLOS's right of

binding decisions, the significance of the existing international framework is unclear.

State Behavior

Since the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has been somewhat disconnected from power politics. There are, however, certain indications that this is about to change.30 Oil companies from several nations are extending their offshore fields farther north. The possibility

of increased shipping has led to disputes between Canada and Denmark about Hans Island, located at the entrance of the Northwest

Passage. Both countries, and Russia, have sent warships to the region to emphasize their interests.31 Additionally, several countries

have made overlapping claims to parts of the Arctic.32

In August 2007 a Russian adventurer placed a Russian flag on the

ocean floor, 4,300 meters below the North Pole. By doing so, he claimed

1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic for Russia.33 Russia first

made a claim to the UNCLOS about this territory in 2001. Russia

argued that its continental shelf, and hence its EEZ, extended far

beyond 200 nm. Because of lack of evidence, Russia's claim was

turned down. However, both the expedition of 2007 and others were

intended to document new evidence to support its claim.34 Russia's

security interests are in part military, since its nuclear submarine

fleet is based at the Kola Peninsula.35 Although the Russian Navy has

downsized, the Northern Fleet is still vital to Russia's military strategy.

It operates Russia's single aircraft carrier as well as the nuclearpowered missile submarines that are the backbone of Russia's strategic naval nuclear force.36

A new Russian strategy for the Arctic was signed on 18 September

2008 by Pres. Dmitry Medvedev. Russia aims to maintain its leading

position as an Arctic power and over time to transform the Arctic into

its main resource base. This is a natural consequence of the Russian
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 91

argument that a large part of the Arctic seabed is an extension of the

Siberian continental shelf. Russia is economically dependent on exports of oil, gas. and metals. The area's significance to Russia is apparent by the estimation that the amount of oil in the Arctic equals

Russia's total known reserves.37 The definition of Russia's continental shelf therefore becomes an important issue. Russia plans to

develop military units capable of protecting its security interests in

the region, among which are control of natural resources and increased control of a shipping route—the Northern Sea Route. Russia's strategy also states that competition about natural resources in

the Arctic may result in military conflict.38 However, Russian officials

refer to the Arctic as a zone of peace.39

Canada also appears to be building up its military capabilities in

the region. A key issue for Canada is whether the Northwest Passage is

in Canadian or international waters. Canada has made vessel notification in the Northwest Passage mandatory.40 It appears that Canada

is focusing on the Arctic's military strategic importance. During the

Cold War. the United States contributed the bulk of military forces

while Canada minimized its military presence. After the Cold War,

Canada further reduced its military activity in the Arctic. Then in

1999 Canada created the Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working

Group to coordinate the nation's security policy in the Arctic. Canada

has acknowledged that the region has large amounts of natural resources as well as a fragile ecosystem. Canada's 2000 Arctic Capabilities Study is based on the assumption that the strategic situation

in the Arctic is changing. The study made some recommendations to

Canada's Department of National Defence, including the following:

increase interdepartmental cooperation, increase Ranger capabilities, implement new exercises for the Canadian Forces, include the

Arctic dimension in future Canadian Forces planning, and improve

surveillance of the region. In 2002 the Canadian Forces conducted

their first joint exercise in the Arctic in over 20 years, which has been

followed by additional exercises.41

In 2005 Canada issued Canada's International Policy Statement. It

elaborates the need for Canada to monitor and control events in its

northern region and stresses the increasing demands on sovereignty

as activities in the Arctic increase. As a consequence, the Canadian

Forces need to increase their presence and capabilities in the region.42 This issue is addressed in Canada's current defense strategy.

Canada First. It includes modernization of its military forces. Arctic

patrol ships, destroyers, frigates, and maritime patrol aircraft, providing all with increased Arctic climate capabilities. Improved surveillance capability of the region is also being studied.43 The defense
92 HELMRICH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

strategy should be considered together with Canada's Northern

Strategy, released in the summer of 2009 by the minister of foreign

affairs, Mr. Lawrence Cannon. The strategy acknowledges the need

for international cooperation, but at the same time it states that the

Arctic is a priority for Canada and that it intends to be the international leader in the region. The strategy expresses a commitment to

protect and patrol the region. One Canadian goal is, through the

UNCLOS, to obtain recognition of the extent of Canada's continental

shelf beyond 200 nm.44 An example of Canadian resolve is the previously mentioned dispute with Denmark about Hans Island. In 2005

Canada's defence minister visited the small uninhabited island,

where Canadian troops erected a Canadian flag. Hans Island is

claimed by both countries.45

Both Denmark and Norway acknowledge the need for international

cooperation in the Arctic. However, a study of their actions in the area

shows that both countries are concerned with securing access to

natural resources. Denmark's position is unique because of Greenland. Following the Russian expedition of 2007, Denmark launched

its own expedition with the objective of establishing the extent of

Greenland's continental shelf.46 Norway's 2007 Strategy of the High

North states that the Arctic is Norway's most strategically important

area and that it will intensify its efforts to exercise Norwegian sovereignty. The area's importance is due to resources—fishing and energy.

A focal point in the strategy is the islands of Svalbard and Spitsbergen.

Further, the strategy discusses Norway's claims concerning the extent of its continental shelf. Norway appears to have identified Russia

as its main counterpart in the region. The strategy praises cooperation with Russia, while it also expresses concerns over Russia's development. The presence of military combat forces, which provide the

ability to exercise sovereignty and authority, is a vital part of Norway's

strategy. However, the primary tasks for the armed forces in this region are surveillance and intelligence gathering, which are mainly

done by Coast Guard assets and maritime patrol aircraft.47 The status of the Svalbard archipelago is disputed. Norway claims exclusive

rights to its resources through the Svalbard Treaty of 1920. Other

states have expressed reservations about Norway's claim. The situation is complicated by the Svalbard and the Spitsbergen treaties as

well as the UNCLOS. Occasionally, it has led to Norway's seizing of

other countries' fishing vessels.48

Territorial claims put forward to the UNCLOS contain both unclaimed areas and overlapping claims in the region.49 The most interesting section is an almost circular area of 460,800 square miles,

north of the nearest Arctic country's 200-nm zone.50 Below this area
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 93

runs the Lomonosov Ridge. It expands 1,700 kilometers from the continental shelf of North America, over the North Pole, to the continental

shelf of the New Siberian Islands.51 Hence, establishing the exact origin of the Lomonosov Ridge and the extension of the continental

shelves of Canada, Russia, Norway, and Greenland becomes very important.52 Since the CLCS has a mandate only to review geological

evidence and make recommendations, there may be counterclaims

and appeals.53

The lack of a security-related treaty in the Arctic is in stark contrast to the amount of security-related activities. All concerned countries stress the importance of international cooperation, but their actions imply that they do not trust the ability of international

institutions/agreements to settle existing disputes. The disputes concern rights to natural resources, control of shipping routes, and, to

some extent, the identity of the leading country in the region. All nations have shown resolve in protecting their interests.

So in a region that is changing and increasing in importance, there

are conflicting interests, demonstrated national resolve, little historical

guidance, and an impotent international framework. The framework

that does exist is being used to promote national interests. Furthermore, the discussion above suggests that unfavorable recommendations by the UNCLOS and CLCS will not be easily accepted. With this

conclusion in mind, the next section analyzes US Arctic policy.

US Policy concerning the Arctic

There are not many official documents concerning US Arctic policy.

The 2002 and 2006 national security strategies and the 2008 national defense strategy do not include any specific US policy in the

region. The White House Web site concerning foreign policy discusses

a number of issues and identifies climate change as one of several

distinct challenges but does not include a specific Arctic policy.54

There exists an old presidential decision directive from 1994 (PDD-26.

US Antarctica Policy) covering US Arctic and Antarctic policy. Then in

January last year, the White House issued a new national security

presidential directive (NSPD-66, Arctic Region Policy) concerning US

Arctic strategy. The context for a new directive was, among other

things, the effects of climate change and the recognition of the region's richness of resources. According to NSPD-66, US objectives In

the Arctic can be simplified and summarized as intense international

cooperation concerning environmental Issues, freedom of the seas

(for the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route), and maximum extension of the US continental shelf. To attain these objectives.
94 HELMRICH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

ratification of the UNCLOS, as well as a significant military presence,

is deemed vital. NSPD-66 supersedes PDD-26 concerning US Arctic

policy, but not Antarctic policy.55

In 2007 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent the UNCLOS

treaty to the full Senate for ratification, where it needs a two-thirds

majority for ratification. It has yet to be ratified. The main objections

in the Senate are the short time frame available between ratification

and the deadline for making territorial claims, an unclear disputeresolution process, infringements on US sovereignty, and possible

limitations on US military activity.56

Not many US activities in the Arctic can be tied to an Arctic policy.

Since 2006, the United States no longer has a permanent military

presence in Iceland.57 This may validate a continuing shift in military

priority, from the Cold War fault lines toward the global war on terrorism and the Central Command area.

Suggestions for US Policy

In contrast to other countries, the United States does not have

a highly developed Arctic policy and is not a member of the most

important international institution concerning the Arctic, the

UNCLOS. The directive that does exist is a legacy from former

president George W. Bush.

The Arctic policy of the Obama administration should be shaped

by overall US interests and the larger context for the policy. Although the new administration has yet to publish a national security strategy, US overall interests can be described as a combination

of long- and short-term objectives. The long-term objectives concern

the United States' role in the world and its perception in the international community. It is obvious that President Obama strives for

a change in strategic leadership. The emphasis when interacting

with other nations is on multilateral cooperation. The administration's preferred leadership style appears to be more persuasive than

coercive and more inclusive than exclusive.58 Therefore, US Arctic

policy must be limited to actions that have legitimacy in the international community. At the same time, the security of the United

States and its citizens is one of the president's main responsibilities

and cannot be compromised.

The short-term objectives encompass avoiding military conflict as

well as denying any other country dominance of the Arctic. From an

economic perspective, US interests can be described as maximizing

its access to natural resources and securing the access of new shipping routes. But solving the disputed issues may be more impor-
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 95

tant, and even more profitable, than maximizing the extent of the

US continental shelf. Ensuring that available resources and shortened shipping routes benefit the world economy may be the true

economic interest.

Besides considering US objectives, US Arctic policy must address

recent and likely future developments in the region. A decrease in the

Arctic ice cap will make new sea routes available and permit extraction of more natural resources. Since climate change is likely to increase instability in the Middle East, the strategic significance of the

Arctic will grow, resulting in greater commercial as well as military

activity in the region. The key strategic challenges are to settle the

dispute concerning the EEZs and, to a lesser degree, the control over

new shipping routes. It may be tempting to pursue a policy similar to

that of other Arctic countries: to ratify the UNCLOS and then file US

territorial claims. However, that would not bring the issue closer to a

solution. Another possibility may be an international conference to

reach an agreement concerning the continental shelf. Because of

conflicting interests, this approach is unlikely to succeed. But it is

possible to formulate a policy that creates synergy by combining the

objective of increasing the credibility of US strategic leadership with

securing economic gain and a peaceful development in the Arctic.

Actually, this opportunity exists because of the conflicting national

interests and the uncertain significance of the international framework. It combines multi- and bilateral initiatives within the existing

international framework.

My suggestion for US Arctic policy encompasses broadening the

issue to other areas and contains activities at several different levels.

First, the foundation of the policy is the UNCLOS; it needs to be ratified by Congress. To convince the Senate, President Obama needs to

invest political will in the issue and compromise in other areas. Next,

it is highly unlikely that the concerned nations in the near future will

be able to agree upon a solution about the continental shelf. Therefore, the US Geological Survey should be tasked to make an overall,

and objective, recommendation about the continental shelf issue.

The recommendation should be used as a starting point in bilateral

negotiations with Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway to reach

an agreement.

The United States must add other issues to the discussions, issues

that may differ depending on the counterpart. Introducing the issue

of control of shipping routes as well as other economic and military/

security instruments of national power to the discussion can help the

parties reach compromises. With Norway and Denmark, the United

States could inject security and foreign military sales issues in the
96 HELMRICH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

discussion—for example, the condition for purchase of the joint strike

fighter. In negotiations with Russia, the strategy versus Iran, cooperation in the conflict against Islamic fundamentalist groups, and NATO's

missile defense system are possible issues to discuss. With Canada,

control of the Northwest Passage and trade issues may be included in

negotiations. The United States can then submit a final compromise

multilaterally to the UNCLOS and CLCS. Additionally, a securityrelated treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty should be initiated.

From a military perspective, the division of the Arctic among several combatant commanders is not preferable. The commander of the

US Northern Command should be responsible for the Arctic area north

of each Arctic country's 200-nm zone. Such a change would facilitate

coordination of the national instruments of power. From the United

States' perspective, the suggested policy would probably not maximize the extension of its continental shelf, a stated goal in NSPD-66.

However, it would strengthen US strategic leadership, have a positive

effect on the world economy, and promote peaceful development in

the Arctic region. Hence, the suggested policy accommodates both

the long- and short-term objectives concerning US interests. If the

policy is wisely introduced in a strategic communications context, its

outcome may be further enhanced.

Conclusion

History has shown that strategic geography influences international

relations. For example, the United States has frequently used military

means to demonstrate its interests in the Panama Canal, and in 1956

the Suez Canal was the scene of armed conflict involving two of the

great powers: Great Britain and France. It is obvious that the European discovery ofAmerica—with the ensuing competition for America's

resources and the eventual birth of a superpower—has affected greatpower politics ever since. I do not suggest that these examples are

perfect analogies. However, they do illustrate that important sea

routes as well as disputed rights to natural resources can play an

important part in international politics. A dramatic environmental

change in the Arctic may cause serious competition over resources

and affect international security.

The Arctic has some very specific characteristics. Most of its territory is neither a continent nor an island; hence, it does not and cannot have a tradition of ordinary human settlement. It has an inhospitable climate and was until recentiy extremely difficult to access. The

shrinking Arctic ice cap will open new sea routes and permit increased extraction of natural resources. Therefore, the strategic sig-
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 97

nificance of the Arctic is increasing. The international framework that

does exist is not sufficient. At the same time, several nations' actions

imply a risk of increased tension concerning unresolved issues about

the right to resources. The key strategic challenge for the United

States is to settle the dispute concerning the EEZs, while at the same

time protecting overall US interests. The suggested US policy would

enhance its credibility as the world's strategic leader and encourage

development of the world economy. Hence, it meets the nation's longand short-term objectives.

Notes

1. I use the Arctic Council's definition of the Arctic. Countries Include Canada.

Iceland. Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands, Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and

the United States. Arctic Council, Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Working

Group. Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 2009, 29 April 2009, 5. http://arctic

-council.org/filearchive/Arctic%200ffhsore%200il%20and%20Gas%20Guidellnes

%202009.pdf (accessed 19 October 2009).

2. Pres. Barack Obama {speech, UN General Assembly, New York. 23 September

2009). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ofnce/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the

-United-Nations-General-Assembly (accessed 28 September 2009).

3. Martin L. Parry et al.. eds.. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press. 2007).

4. Ibid.. 656.

5. Ibid., 676.

6. Vsevolod Gunitskiy, "On Thin Ice: Water Rights and Resource Disputes in the

Arctic Ocean," Journal ofInternational Affairs 61. no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2008): 261-71.

7. Peter H. Stauffer. ed.. "Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle," US Geological Survey Fact Sheet

2008-3049, 23 July 2008.

8. Zachary Colie, "Rush to Arctic as Warming Opens Oil Deposits." San Francisco

Chronicle. 12August2008. http://sfgate.com/cgi-bln/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/08/12/

MN5R1290QE.DTL (accessed 28 September 2009).

9. Kurt M. Campbell et al., The Age ofConsequences: The Foreign Policy and National

Security Implications of Global Climate Change (Washington. DC: Center for a New

American Security, November 2007), 65. http://handle.dUc.mll/100.2/ADA473826

(accessed 28 September 2009).

10. See, as an example, Christiane Callsen. "Climate Change and Security Policy." CSS

[Centerfor Security Studies] Analyses in Security Policy 2. no. 26 (December 2007): 3.

11. See, as an example, Douglas V. Johnson. II. Global Climate Change: National

Security Implications, Colloquium Brief (Carlisle. PA: Army War College. Strategic Studies

Institute. 2007). 2. http://handle.duc.mi1/100.2/ADA466551 (accessed 28 September

2009).

12. David M. Catarious, Jr.. et al.. National Security and the Threat of Climate

Change (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation. 2007). 13ff.. http://securttyandclimate

.cna.org/report/Natlonal%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%20of%20Climate

%20Change.pdf (accessed 28 September 2009).
98 HELMR1CH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

13. Ibid., 7-8.

14. Ibid.. 38.

15. Ibid., 44-45.

16. Campbell et al.. Age ofConsequences, 8.

17. Ibid.. 10.

18. Ibid., 38-39.

19. Ibid.. 105ff.

20. Ibid.. 99.

21. Ibid.. 5. 47.

22. Kenneth S. Yalowitz. James F. Collins, and Ross A. Virginia. The Arctic Climate

Change and Security Policy Conference: Final Report and Findings, sponsored by Dickey

Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace, and University of the Arctic Institute for Applied Circumpolar

Policy, Dartmouth College, Hanover. New Hampshire. December 2008. 1-2. 17. http://

www.carnegleendowment.org/files/arctic_cliniate_change.pdf (accessed 24 September

2009).

23. A nation's baseline is determined by UNCLOS. Normally, it is the low-water line

along the coast.

24. UN, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982:

Overview and Full Text," http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/

convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed 13 October 2009).

25. Ibid.

26. Arctic Council, "Declaration ofthe Establishment of the Arctic Council," http://

arctic-council.org/article/about (accessed 19 October 2009).

27. International Maritime Organization, Web site, http://www.imo.org (accessed

19 October 2009).

28. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other

Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil

Thereof (Seabed Treaty). 11 February 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, http://

www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/seabedl.html (accessed 20 July 2010).

29. Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty. "The Antarctic Treaty." http://www.ats

.aq/e/ats_treaty.htm (accessed 19 October 2009).

30. Yalowitz. Collins, and Virginia, Arctic Climate Change. 15.

31. Doug Mellgren, Technology, Climate Change Spark Race to Claim Arctic Resources," Associated Press, 24 March 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/

2007-03-24-arcticbonanza_N.htm (accessed 19 October 2009).

32. Gunitskiy, "On Thin Ice."

33. Campbell et al.. Age ofConsequences, 5.

34. Oxford Analytlca, "Russia's Arctic Plays Concern Region," Forbes.com, 12 August

2009. http://www.forbes.eom/2009/08/l 1/russia-energy-climate-change-business

-energy-oxford.html (accessed 19 October 2009).

35. Yalowitz. Collins, and Virginia, Arctic Climate Change, 15.

36. Ilya Kramnik, "Northern Fleet Protecting Russian Arctic," Rianovosti, 2 June

2009, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090602/155147701.html (accessed 28 September 2009).

37. Dmitry Solovyov. "Russia to Boost Arctic Troops to Defend Resources." Reuters.

27 March 2009. http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE52P5NS

20090327 (accessed 19 October 2009).

38. Katarzyna Zysk, "Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020." Institutt for

forsvarsstudier. 15 June 2009. http://www.geopolitlcsnorth.org/index.php7options

com_content&view=article&id=2%3Arussia-norway-and-the-high-north-past-present

-future&catid=3%3Anewsflash&Itemid=l&limitstart=2 (accessed 26 October 2009).
US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 99

39. Oxford Analytica, "Russia's Arctic Plays."

40. Yalowitz, Collins, and Virginia, Arctic Climate Change. 15-16.

41. Rob Huebert, "Renaissance in Canadian Arctic Security?" Canadian Military

Journal 14 July 2008. http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vo6/no4/north-nord-eng.asp (accessed 24 September 2009).

42. Ibid.

43. Department of National Defence. "Rebuilding the Canadian Forces," Canada

First Defence Strategy, 3 April 2009, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/flrst-premier/

defstra/rebulld-rebatlr-eng.asp (accessed 26 October 2009).

44. Lawrence Cannon (address. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Canada, Gatlneau. Quebec. 26 July 2009), http://www.lnternational.gc.ca/media/

aff/speeches-discours/2009/387436.aspx?lang=en (accessed 26 October 2009).

45. "Charging round the Block." Economist 376, no. 8440 (20 August 2005): 29-30.

46. Gunitskiy, "On Thin Ice."

47. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Norwegian Government's High North

Strategy, report, 2006, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/strateglen.pdf

(accessed 2 November 2009).

48. Torbjorn Pedersen, The Dynamics of Svalbard Diplomacy," Diplomacy and

Statecraft 19, no. 2 (June 2008): 236-37. 253.

49. Yalowitz. Collins, and Virginia, Arctic Climate Change, 16.

50. Gunitskiy. "On Thin Ice."

51. International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean. "Selective Comparisons of

GEBCO (1979) and IBCAO (2000) Maps." http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/bathymetry/

arctlc/ibcao_gebco_comp.html (accessed 2 November 2009).

52. Colie. "Rush to Arctic."

53. Gunitskiy. "On Thin Ice."

54. Pres. Barack Obama, "Foreign Policy," White House Web site. http://www

.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy (accessed 11 November 2009).

55. Pres. George W. Bush. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66.

"Arctic Region Policy." 9 January 2009, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives

•gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html (accessed 2 November 2009).

56. Kevin Drawbaugh. "U.S. Senate Panel Backs Law of the Sea Treaty," Reuters,

31 October 2007. http://www.reuters.com/artlcle/idUSN31335584 (accessed 11 January 2010); and Clifford Krauss et al.. "As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams ofTreasure

Abound," New York Times. 10 October 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/10/

science/10arctic.html (accessed 11 January 2010).

57. Valur Inglmundarson. "Iceland's Post-American Security Policy, Russian Geopolitics and the Arctic Question," RUSIJournal 154. no. 4 (August 2009): 74.

58. This is evident from, for example. President Obama's recent speeches in Cairo

and the UN and the White House Web site concerning foreign policy.
100 HELMRICH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 53

Abbreviations

CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

CNAS Center for a New American Security

CSS Center for Security Studies

EEZ exclusive economic zone

IMO International Maritime Organization

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

nm nautical mile

NSPD national security presidential directive

PDD presidential decision directive

UN United Nations

UNCLOS UN Convention of the Law of the Sea

USGS United States Geological Survey
Considerations for a US Nuclear Force

Structure below a 1,000-Warhead Limit

Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF*

On 5 April 2009 in Prague, Czech Republic, President Obama committed the United States to seeking "the peace and security of a

world without nuclear weapons."1 This move toward a world free of

nuclear weapons is not a new idea. In January 2008, George P. Shultz,

William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn authored an article

in the Wall Street Journal Toward a Nuclear Free World," in which

they suggested steps to "dramatically reduce nuclear dangers." More

than a dozen former senior US officials from the past six administrations endorsed these suggestions.2 While these officials offered "suggestions," they realized the challenge of achieving a nuclear-free

world would be difficult. In fact, the president recognized this challenge in his Prague speech when he stated, "This goal will not be

reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime."3Just as importantly,

the president went on to state, "As long as these weapons exist, the

United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to

deter any adversary, and guarantee the defense of our allies."4

As the president moves toward a nuclear-free world, we must ask

some very important questions about that journey: (1) Are there different negotiation considerations and dynamics in play when Russia

and the United States go below 1,000 strategic warheads? (2) What

are the implications of nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons in

the world security environment? and (3) Finally, what are some potential implications for the US nuclear force structure and the impact

on the role of nuclear deterrence as our national arsenal moves below

1,000 strategic warheads?

New Negotiation Dynamics below 1,000 Warheads

A world free of nuclear weapons is a noble goal and a commitment

we have as a nation in accordance with Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NFT) as ratified by the United States in March

1970.5 Over the past 40 years, the United States has negotiated directly with the Soviets, and now the Russians, to reduce their nuclear

arsenals. While negotiations were difficult, viewed from a distance

•Dr. Barry Schneider. USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

101
102 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

these talks were very similar to Newton's Third Law of Motion: "For

every action there is an equal and opposite reaction."6This is not to

say there was a one-for-one reduction in warheads between the two

nations. But as one nation proposed an action to reduce weapons,

the other responded with what it saw as an equal reduction while

always maintaining the status quo balance of power. As we move into

a period where the United States and Russian arsenals are perhaps

reduced below 1,000 warheads, we leave Newtonian physics of equal

and opposite actions and enter a new quantum physics world of negotiations, with additional actors affecting strategic and crisis stability

with implications we don't yet completely comprehend.7

In this quantum physics view of nuclear arms reduction, we must

look at numerous additional actors and forces—great and small—that

will play important roles. These actors include current nuclear weapons states, aspiring nuclear weapon counties, other states with some

nuclear technology, and US allies operating under the cover of our

"nuclear umbrella."8To understand the impact that these countries

will have on the negotiation process as we move toward a world free of

nuclear weapons, we must first have a general understanding of their

current position in the world security environment and the direction

these countries are moving. While it is impossible to know everything

about each of these nations or to do justice to the complexity of these

countries, we will look at some important factors to consider as the

United States and Russia move toward nuclear arsenals below 1,000

warheads and fewer associated strategic delivery vehicles.

To start our examination of these players in the new world of everdeeper cuts, we will first look at those countries currently possessing

nuclear weapons. Only five recognized nuclear weapons nations have

signed and ratified the NPT: the United States, Russia, China, France,

and Great Britain. Russia, with its large nuclear arsenal, possesses

the greatest potential threat to US national security.9It is therefore

against the Russian threat that the United States' deterrent forces

must be capably and properly sized, since this force poses the greatest existential threat to the United States. The Russian government is

no doubt concerned with deterring what it may perceive as a US threat

to its existence. With maintaining this deterrent capability in mind,

the United States and Russia are currently negotiating a follow-on

agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that expired on 5 December 2009, with the goal of significantly reducing the

size of each long-range nuclear arsenal.10

Recent press releases show that Russia is working closely with the

United States to reduce both countries' strategic nuclear warheads to

around 1,500-1,675, while limiting their delivery systems for those
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 103

warheads to 500-1,000.nIf negotiations are successful, the two

countries would be at their lowest number ofstrategic nuclear weapons

and delivery vehicles since the early 1950s for the United States and

1960s for Russia (see fig. 1), bringing both countries' arsenals much

closer in number to the Chinese and other nuclear-armed nations.

Thousands of Warheads/Bombs

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1960 1985 1990 1996

^ US strategic weapons — US nonstrategic weapons

— USSR/Russian strategic weapons — USSR/Russian nonstrategic weapons

— Britian — France

— China

Figure 1. Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-1996. These figures show active nuclear

weapons. They do not include inactive but intact weapons awaiting dismantlement. For

the United States, these warheads are estimated as follows: 241 (1988), 642 (1989),

752 (1990), 2,330 (1991), 5,261 (1992), 5,789 (1993), 4,916 (1994), 3,635 (1995), and

2,542 (1996). For the USSR/Russia, these are estimated as follows: 4,277 (1986), 4,141

(1987), 3,670 (1988), 3,183 (1989), 3,485 (1990), 5,394 (1991), 6,744 (1992), 8,215

(1993), 9,933 (1994), 11,385 (1995), and 12,278 (1996). It should be noted that there is

a great deal of uncertainty as to the exact number of USSR/Russian nonstrategic

nuclear weapons. South Africa (not shown) secretly built six nuclear weapons between

1979 and 1989; these were subsequently dismantled between July 1990 and July 1991.

Israel (not shown) is assumed to have at present approximately 100-150 nuclear weapons. (Reprinted from Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, US and USSR/Russian

Strategic Offensive Nuclear Forces, 1945-1996, Nuclear Weapons Databook Working

Paper 97-1 [Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, January 1997];

Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Arsenals of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France

and China: A Status Report," Presented at the 5th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms

Control, 12-15 November 1996; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W.

Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, vol. 5, British, French, and Chinese Nuclear

Weapons [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994]; and Robert S. Norris and William M.

Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook [Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1997]," Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, 67.)
104 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

While publicly committing to a world free of nuclear weapons, Russia continues to replace its strategic nuclear warheads with new designs and delivery systems.12 In recent defense budgets, it has allocated resources to procure new dual-capable strategic bombers while

also attempting to reinvigorate its fleet of nuclear submarines.13 In

addition, it is building new land-based RS-12M1/2 Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with a multiple reentry vehicle

capability.14 Most importantly, Russia is placing more emphasis on

its large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in its national defense

strategy.15 Its shift to a "first use" strategy is a counterbalance and

cost-savings move while it is downsizing and modernizing its conventional military forces.16 With this increased reliance on nuclear weapons in a first-use capacity, it will be difficult for the Russians to reduce their nuclear arsenal below START Follow-on levels until they

feel their conventional forces are equal or greater in capability to

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Chinese conventional

forces on their borders.

According to open sources, China possesses approximately 240

nuclear warheads, with approximately 186 operationally ready for

employment on aircraft and ballistic missiles.17 With such a small

force, China appears to have adopted a minimum deterrence strategy.

Of these warheads, approximately 20 CSS-4 ICBMs are able to reach

the United States.18 The remaining warheads are programmed to be

delivered by aircraft along with short- and medium-range missiles.19

The Chinese have publicly declared a "no first use" policy, with a selfdefense nuclear strategy.20 China has taken the route of defense

against attack by developing underground facilities to house its nuclear weapons, providing for maximum survival of its arsenal from a

first strike and guaranteeing a robust retaliatory capability.21 Maintaining a secure second-strike retaliatory force rather than an insecure and vulnerable nuclear force is also better for crisis stability.22

When we include the Chinese at the arms control negotiation table,

we must first consider their strategic situation of being surrounded

by such nuclear-armed countries as the United States, Russia, India,

North Korea, and Pakistan and within striking distance of Iran. While

China has formidable conventional forces, as long as surrounding

countries have nuclear weapons, the Chinese are unlikely to reduce

their nuclear arsenal. Indeed, all countries with nuclear arms need to

be included in future nuclear arms control treaty negotiations, including the United Kingdom and France.

The UK currently maintains approximately 160 nuclear warheads

configured to be delivered by submarine launched ballistic missiles

(SLBM) from four Vanguard-class Trident fleet ballistic missile sub-
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 105

marines (SSBN).23 The UK currently only has the ability to deliver

nuclear weapons from Its submarines. Researchers at the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) believe that some of the

UK missiles only contain one warhead and are configured for a "low

yield" by using only the "fission primary." The UK Ministry of Defense

believes this "provides a 'sub-strategic' role to the Trident Fleet."24

Britain has reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons since the end of

the Cold War, and, from recent comments made by Prime Minister

Gordon Brown, it appears it is willing to reduce its number of new

nuclear submarines purchased by 25 percent, from four to three.25

France possesses approximately 300 nuclear weapons that are

widely dispersed on four SSBNs and 84 tactical aircraft.26 While the

French have recently rejoined NATO's Integrated Military Command

after 43 years, they still pride themselves on a nuclear capability that

could be used independently of the NATO command structure.27

While the UK, France, Russia, and China are all important players

as nuclear powers and permanent members of the United Nations

(UN) Security Council, when the United States goes below 1.000 strategic nuclear warheads, it and all other states that possess nuclear

weapons will need to be included at the negotiations table. These additional countries—India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel—are not

signatories to the NPT but already have or, in the case of Israel, are

believed to have, nuclear weapons.

India currently maintains an arsenal estimated at approximately

60-70 tactical nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft along with shortand medium-range missiles.28 India and its rival, nuclear-armed

Pakistan, have fought three wars and continue to threaten each other,

suggesting these two states must, at some point in the near future, be

included in multilateral nonproliferation and nuclear arms control talks.

Pakistan is estimated to possess 60 tactical nuclear weapons along

with enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce 40

more.29 It sees India's larger and technologically more advanced conventional military as an existential threat.30 Pakistan will not give up

its nuclear weapons, seen as equalizers, as long as it sees India as a

threat. In addition, as the only Muslim nation with nuclear weapons,

Pakistani leaders and citizens take pride in the prestige conferred by

their nuclear arsenal. While India and Pakistan should be essential

players in future negotiations, we must also consider crafting agreements to take into account and limit other states that have or are

pursuing nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, Iran, and Israel.

North Korea has twice demonstrated the ability to detonate a nuclear weapon while it refines its ICBM capabilities. Iran, already with

a proven short- and medium-range missile capability, continues to
106 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

defy UN mandates as it develops its uranium enrichment technologies. Israel has chosen a nondeclaratory policy toward nuclear weapons, but some analysts estimate that Israel maintains approximately

100 nuclear warheads.31 These three states, with their nuclear ambitions, influence and threaten the security of countries around them

that either already have some nuclear technology or have the funding

to acquire nuclear technology and weapons.

For example. North Korea's nuclear ambitions affect the Republic

of Korea and Japan. These are two of 30-plus countries under the

United States' nuclear umbrella.32 Japan has the technological

knowledge to build nuclear weapons if it chooses.33 On the other side

of Asia, Iran's drive to acquire nuclear weapons has inspired other

Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey to

consider pursuing their own enrichment capabilities.34

Prestige is another important consideration in future nuclear negotiations. Many countries, such as the UK, France, India, Pakistan,

Iran, and North Korea, see nuclear weapons not only as part of their

national security policy but also as important status symbols providing them influence in the international community and a seat at the

table with the United States, Russia, and China. Asking these countries to give up their nuclear weapons and perceived political status

in international relations will complicate all future nuclear arms negotiations directed toward that end.

While prestige is a factor to consider, ironically, democracy will add

one of the biggest unknown variables to all future negotiations. With

elections held at periodic intervals throughout the various democratic

countries around the world, internal politics of the moment can almost instantly change the direction that country takes concerning

nuclear weapons. Some examples include the US election with the

change in direction between the Bush and Obama administrations.

The various NATO allies can easily change their stance on nuclear

weapons and forward deployment of US nuclear weapons within their

countries. The recentJapanese election demonstrates how an administration can take a significantly different approach to nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by their recently launched probe into reported

"secret nuclear pacts" with the United States.35 While all states, democratic and autocratic, can be reversed by their opponents taking

power, this is more likely to occur within democracies.

Another potential problem is that verification of compliance by

nine to 10 different nuclear-armed countries will slow the progress

and complicate nuclear disarmament talks. Current bilateral US and

Russian negotiations have yielded an accepted inspection protocol
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 107

that works in the current negotiation environment. However, future

multinational negotiations may present numerous new questions:

• Can 10 different states agree upon a rigorous and adequate verification regime?

• What kind of international inspectorate can be formed?

• Will each state be willing to open its country to adequate types of

inspections?

• What is the role that the UN will play in treaty execution?

• How does the United States manage and verify stockpiles to ensure other nuclear states do not reweaponize?

• How do we prevent countries from nuclear weapons breakouts

from their treaty obligations and, thereby, gaining strategic advantages denied to others?

• As we disarm further, can we ensure the protection to our allies

currently under our nuclear umbrella?

• Will these countries pursue their own nuclear weapons as the US

nuclear force shrinks?

• Will their foreign policies change in favor of nuclear neighbors,

making us less secure?

• Is there some alternative other than nuclear protection that the

United States can substitute?

This discussion identifies some of the players and future questions

that must be considered in forging new nuclear arms reduction agreements, along with the dynamics in play within and among these nations.

It is easy to understand why President Obama does not see a world

free of nuclear weapons as happening within his lifetime. With the

rapid spread of nuclear energy and weapons technology, we are about

to enter a new world of arms negotiations much different from those

we have practiced with the Russians. What this means is that we may

be on a path to reduce our weapons and delivery systems to numbers

closer to other nuclear-armed countries around the world in the next

decade or so. If this happens, we will then enter a period in history

with multiple countries possessing relatively equal numbers of nuclear weapons, while others still seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

When we negotiate with these multiple nuclear powers in the future in bringing our warhead numbers below 1,000 to around 500,

we will be negotiating less from the position of superior numbers and
108 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

relative strength and more from relative parity. This will require a

dramatic shift in our national security outlook. Indeed, should such

deep cuts be taken, we will have fewer warheads and delivery vehicles

than we have had since the 1950s, and more countries will possess

or be seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.

Significance of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

While most other nuclear nations around the world are upgrading

their delivery systems and replacing their old warheads, the United

States has placed a self-imposed freeze on the replacement of our

nuclear stockpile.36 In addition, due to our geographic location in the

world and historical context, we are sitting on a stockpile of what are

considered strategic nuclear weapons, while the preponderance of

other nuclear weapons around the world are considered tactical. This

is an important factor to consider as the START Follow-on talks with

the Russians only address strategic nuclear weapons, allowing Russia to retain an advantage in tactical nuclear weapon Inventory to

defend its borders.37

The simple difference between strategic and nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons, as defined by the United States and Russia, is

the difference in the range of delivery vehicles. ICBMs, SLBMs, and

long-range bombers with the intercontinental range to destroy military, industrial, and leadership targets in each other's homelands are

considered strategic nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons that do not

have the ability to reach the United States' or Russian heartlands

when launched from their homelands are considered tactical nuclear

weapons.38 While there are some exceptions to this definition, it is

important to realize that under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT) I, SALT II, START, START II, the Strategic Offensive Reduction

Treaty (SORT), and START Follow-on treaties, only strategic warheads and delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, long-range bombers) are

considered. This leaves out of the negotiations Russia's large nonstrategic weapons arsenal estimated at 2,000 to 6.000 tactical nuclear weapons.39

The actual number of Russian nonstrategic or tactical nuclear

weapons is difficult to pinpoint. In its 2009 yearbook. Armaments,

Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI places Russian operational numbers at the low end of 2,047 deployed tactical warheads. Of

these, 701 tactical nuclear weapons are assigned to missile-defense

interceptors. The remainder of the nonstrategic weapons is offensive,

including 648 weapons for delivery by land-based bombers like the

Tu-22M Backfire and Su-24 Fencer. Further, the Russian Navy pos-
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 109

sesses 237 tactical nuclear weapons to be delivered by naval aircraft

and 276 on sea-launched cruise missiles to be launched from ship

platforms. Another 185 tactical nuclear weapons are dedicated to

antisubmarine warfare and surface-to-air missiles.40

These numbers are in contrast to the 400 US operational nonstrategic weapons—all B61 gravity bombs delivered by fighters and

bombers.41 Excluding missile-defense warheads, the Russians have a

three-to-one numerical advantage over the United States in tactical

nuclear weapons. However, these shorter-range weapons, if based on

Russian soil, cannot reach the continental United States. Tactical

nuclear arms would primarily be the concern, therefore, of states

along Russia's periphery in Asia and Europe.

While the United States and Russia have their understanding and

definition of strategic nuclear weapons worked out by negotiations, it

is difficult for most countries in Europe and Asia to distinguish between Russia's strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. To countries

like Estonia, South Korea, or Japan, one low-yield "tactical" nuclear

weapon delivered by a missile or fighter aircraft would have devastating strategic implications.

These tactical nuclear weapons present additional challenges to

negotiations and proliferation. First, tactical nuclear weapons are, on

average, smaller than strategic weapons. Yields can vary anywhere

from subkiloton to the strength of a strategic nuclear weapon.

Smaller-sized weapons present multiple challenges. First, these

weapons are easier to hide, complicating verification of treaty limits.

In addition, unlike a bomber, ICBM, or SLBM force, tactical nuclear

weapons are easily moved, contributing to counting and verification

problems. Finally, the relatively low yield of some of these weapons

may increase the likelihood of use in certain crisis contingencies. In

some cases, this can improve deterrence effects versus an adversary

but also might tempt decision makers to use them more readily.

These tactical nuclear weapons spread around the world will put the

United States in a difficult strategic position. If moved forward nearer

the United States either clandestinely or on mobile platforms, these

"tactical" weapons could become "strategic."

Impact on the United States and the

Air Force in the Near Future

As START Follow-on Treaty negotiations continue and as we strive

for a nuclear-free world in perpetuity, the United States will find itself

in a unique situation. Unlike Russia and China who have chosen to

modernize their nuclear arsenals, or countries like India. Pakistan,
110 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

and Iran who have recently developed or are developing new weapons, the United States has chosen a path of "life extension" for its

weapons.42 This life extension approach can be complicated, as some

components originally developed for these weapons are no longer

manufactured.43 This new paradigm of parity in numbers, more nuclear nations around the world, and an aging US arsenal will present

numerous challenges to the United States over the next few decades.

First, as we move below 1,000 strategic warheads and toward 500 or

fewer delivery systems, the Department of Defense will be forced to

make difficult force structure decisions.44 Just a reduction to the numbers Russian president Dmitry Medvedev proposed in September 2009

would force the United States to look seriously at reconfiguring its current strategic nuclear weapons triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range

bombers of B-52s and B-2s, while considering the inefficiencies of

maintaining three separate weapon systems in small quantities.45

The United States might take numerous approaches when apportioning its nuclear weapons and delivery systems. An in-depth study

will be required to optimize deterrence effects of the US nuclear arsenal following any future arms treaties, but two general approaches

will most likely be considered. The first is an across-the-board reduction in all weapon systems to include ICBM's, bombers, and SLBMs.

Another more likely approach will be to completely eliminate one leg

of the triad. Each leg of the triad possesses strengths and weaknesses, and each adds a certain element of deterrence that translates

into retaliatory strength. If we look at other nations, such as Great

Britain, that have trimmed their nuclear arsenals over the years for

an indication of the direction we may go, it appears SLBMs would be

the weapon systems of choice to maintain. The primary advantage of

the SLBM force is its likely survivability from a rival's surprise first

strike. The downside is the "all of your eggs in one basket" syndrome.

Advances in antisubmarine warfare by our adversaries may materialize in the future, threatening the survivability of our submarines. If

so, then the preponderance of our nuclear capability could be lost.

Indeed, a single submarine malfunction might instantaneously bring

its 24 missiles off alert.46 If there were a defect in a missile or warhead

type, then all US SLBMs could possibly be rendered useless. Therefore, it would be prudent for the United States to maintain some semblance of diversity in its nuclear arsenal.

Unfortunately, the Air Force, as has been documented in several

recent studies, for a time had neglected its maintenance, security,

funding, and advocacy for nuclear weapons, thereby somewhat eroding its ability to carry out its mission of strategic deterrence.47 Atrophy of our capabilities over the past 17 years has produced a genera-
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 111

tion of leaders who are not well versed in the nuclear mission and

who are unable to advocate properly the advantages and necessity of

the Air Force's role in nuclear deterrence.48 As a service, we continue

to look to the future for the next new thing while sometimes forgetting

our heritage.

This loss of mission focus may regrettably cause the Air Force to

lose much of the nuclear mission it fought the Navy so hard for.49 As

the Air Force revitalizes the nuclear enterprise, part of the price of

neglect might be the eventual loss of the nuclear strategic bombing

mission. US bombers are dual capable and can easily be used in

conventional-only missions, much like the B-1 transition made in the

early 1990s. This would be an easy force structure modification, leading to a dyad of US nuclear weapons rather than a triad. Removal of

the bombers from our nuclear arsenal would eliminate an important

signaling capability. Unlike other legs of the triad, bombers can be

both launched and recalled. By scrambling our bomber forces, getting them airborne poised to strike, the country can signal its willingness (an important part of deterrence) to use nuclear weapons. Yet

US decision makers can still recall the bombers once launched. Without bombers to put on alert, this traditional signaling mechanism

could be lost.

Recent revitalization of the nuclear enterprise is not limited to the

bomber force; it also includes the ICBM career field. As the Air Force

strives to provide those who work with ICBMs a sense of purpose and

mission in a post-Cold War era, it will be faced with increased reductions, as the ICBMs will be the second most likely delivery system in

the US nuclear arsenal to be reduced, if not eliminated.

These reductions in USAF resources and missions, if taken, would

exacerbate the nuclear culture problems it currently faces. With fewer

nuclear billets in the Air Force at fewer locations, there would be an

even smaller numbers of officers and senior noncommissioned officers to call upon to fill important command-and-control and critical

nuclear-related staff and leadership positions. With a continued decrease in emphasis within the Air Force on the nuclear mission, it

would be even more difficult to draw the best and brightest young

Airmen into this dying career field, causing many to pursue other

career opportunities. On the other hand, while it looks like there may

be a reduction in Air Force strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems, there may be an associated increase in the deterrence role for

the Air Force's fighter community.

To maintain some semblance of a triad to provide the necessary

deterrence effects and security for our allies, the fighter community

could ultimately pick up more of the aircraft nuclear weapons deliv-
112 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

ery mission formerly provided by heavy bombers. With the new Joint

Strike Fighter becoming the Air Force's weapons system of choice, its

mandated nuclear weapons delivery capability will be a vital part of

its mission.50

With a world moving toward a preponderance of tactical nuclear

weapons (see fig. 2), it will be important for the United States to demonstrate its tactical nuclear capability. This capability could be a

critical element of our future deterrence posture. It can be used in a

show of force and national resolve when the aircraft are forward deployed and placed on airborne alert.

F-35s picking up the nuclear deterrence role from the bombers will

present its own set of problems to the Air Force. Tactical nuclear

weapons may not be regularly deployed to Asia and Europe due to the

constantly changing political environments. However, if F-35s are to

play a nuclear deterrent role, it would be wise to continue to deploy

most of the estimated 200-350 forward-based nuclear bombs and

air-to-ground missiles in NATO countries (see table l).51 Otherwise,

the F-35 community will face the challenges of keeping fighter crews,

maintainers, security forces, and support personnel associated with

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500 --WL£U

*?& o

s

•Tactical Nuclear

Weapons

•Strategic Nuclear

Weapons

^<//^</

?

* *

Figure 2. Future US/Russian strategic warhead limit of 500 with current tactical

nuclear weapons. Strategic numbers are based on any future agreement between

Russia and the United States that limit strategic nuclear weapons to 500 warheads

each. Strategic nuclear weapons for China, France, and Great Britain along with all

tactical nuclear weapons numbers are based on current strategic nuclear weapons

and tactical nuclear weapons as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. {Reprinted from SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press]).
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 113

Table 1. Status of US nuclear weapons In Europe, 2008

Country Air Base Custodian Delivery Deployment

W53

vaults

Est.

Weapons

Belgium Kleine 701stMUNSSa Belgian F-16s 11 10-20

Germany Brogel

Buchel 702d MUNSS

German

Tornadoes 11 10-20

Holland Volkel 703d MUNSS Dutch F-16s 11 10-20

Italy Aviano

Ghedi"

31st Fighter Wing

704th MUNSS

US F-16s

Italian

Tornadoes

18

11

50

20-40

Turkey lncirlikc39th Air Base Wing Rotational US

aircraft from

other wings 25 50-90

UK Lakenheath 48th Fighter Wing US F-15Es 33

Total

50-110

200-350

Source: Hans M. Kristensen, "USAF Report: Most' Nuclear Weapons Sites In Europe Do Not Meet

U.S. Security Requirements," Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog. http://

www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/usaf-report. 19 June 2008.

"Munitions Support Squadron

"Rumored decision to withdraw 704 MUNSS and consolidate weapons at Aviano.

rNo permanent fighter wing at base. National Turkish nuclear strike mission In doubt.

nuclear weapons fully qualified and capable of completing the nuclear

mission while not actually having nuclear weapons at their forward

locations. This shift to the F-35 as the primary airborne delivery system would provide enhanced deterrence for our nation at the cost of

a cultural shift among the fighter community as it takes on this important role.

Conclusion

In April 2009, President Obama set the nation on the path toward

the eventual long-term goal of zero nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament has been a worldwide goal since the Nuclear Non-proliferation

Treaty was opened for signature in 1970. Over the years, states have

taken numerous positive steps toward that end. Now the United

States finds itself in negotiations with Russia to further reduce our

nuclear arsenal. Perhaps in later rounds, after the current START

Follow-on negotiations, the sides may agree to levels below 1,000

warheads. Once we cross the 1,000 threshold, we will be entering a

new, more complicated world of nuclear arms negotiations.
114 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

As previously noted, it will take time to understand the different

players, motives, and issues that each of the new players brings to

the negotiation table. The challenge is to coordinate the step-bystep disarmament of the nine current members of the nuclear

weapons state club while simultaneously attempting to persuade

others from "going nuclear." New challenges on the path to zero

may emerge as allied nations consider acquiring nuclear weapons

to make up for a perceived loss of US umbrella protection or as

other nations see an opportunity to increase their relative military/

political power and prestige.

To counter these unintended consequences, it is important to bring

into negotiations all of the world's nuclear-armed nations as soon as

possible. However, even if we were to bring all other nuclear-armed

nations into negotiations today, it would likely be a long time, if ever,

before all parties would be able to agree on total disarmament or even

on the next steps to be taken. During this protracted period of negotiations, we are going to find ourselves in a world with a group of

countries that posses a relatively large and growing number of nuclear weapons.

The preponderance of weapons in this new environment will be socalled nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which will present a different

dimension to our national security posture and force structure. The

United States will have to make some tough choices as negotiations

further limit delivery vehicles and warheads. With the most likely

losses to the strategic retaliatory forces being first the bombers and

then, possibly later, a reduction of ICBMs, the Air Force will need to

focus more on its tactical nuclear mission. This proposed shift to

tactical nukes would have a dramatic impact on the Air Force's efforts

to reinvigorate its nuclear enterprise.

As the Air Force endeavors to recapture the pride and discipline of

Strategic Air Command (SAC) without actually resurrecting SAC, it

will be faced with the additional challenges of a nuclear force structure so small that it will be even more difficult to maintain and inspire

those to join and work with high energy and commitment. In addition, if the United States shifts to F-35s as the foundation of its nuclear airborne arsenal, the service will experience a cultural shift

among aircrews as fighter pilots more fully join the nuclear enterprise

by taking on the traditional role of the bombers.

The United States is committed to a path of a nuclear-free world.

Meanwhile, the Air Force is committed to reinvigorating its nuclear

enterprise. The first is a noble goal fraught with unknown challenges,

numerous new actors, and dynamics that will yield surprises. The

latter will reinvigorate the USAF nuclear force while simultaneously
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 115

downsizing that arsenal, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the

US national security strategy. This downsizing may ultimately result

in a shift of focus on the Air Force's nuclear deterrence role from the

strategic bomber community to tactical fighters.

Notes

1. "Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square. Prague, Czech Republic,"

Office of the Press Secretary. The White House, 5 April 2009. http://www.whltehouse

.gov/the_press_office/Rernarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

2. George Shultz. William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, Toward a

Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal 15 January 2008. http://onllne.wsj.com/

publlc/article_prlnt/SB12003642267358 9947.html.

3. "Remarks by President Barack Obama."

4. Ibid.

5. US Department ofState (DOS), "Treaty on the Non-Prollferatlon of Nuclear Weapons

(NPT)." entered into force 5 March 1970. United States Treaties and Other International

Agreements, vol. 757, no. 10485, http:// www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16281.htm.

6. Isaac Asimov. Understanding Physics (New York: Walker, 1966). 34.

7. The Heissenberg uncertainty principle simply states that you can't know the

position and momentum of an atom at the same time; similarly, under the current

international environment no country or entity completely knows the "nuclear position" or the "direction and speed" (momentum) a country is moving with regards to

nuclear weapons. Richard Rhodes. The Making ofthe Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &

Schuster. 1986), 130.

8. James Schleslnger, chairman, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on

DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission (Washington. DC: Department of Defense. 2008).

9. US DOS. "Treaty on the Non-Prollferatlon of Nuclear Weapons."

10. US DOS. "START II Treaty." 1997, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/

starthtm/start2/st2intal.html.

11. R1A Novostl. "Russia, U.S. to Slash Nuclear Delivery Vehicles—Medvedev." 24

September 2009, http://en.rlan.ru/world/20090924/156243233.html.

12. Schleslnger. Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense, 18.

13. RIA Novostl, "Russia Air Force to Get New TU-160 Strategic Bomber in April."

22 April 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080422/105640820.html: and RIA Novostl.

"Russia to Start Construction of 4th Borey-Class Sub in December," 5 October 2009,

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091005/156357397.html.

14. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI Yearbook 2009:

Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford. UK: Oxford University

Press. 2009). 353.

15. For an In-depth study of US and Russian nonstrateglc or tactical weapons, see

Amy F Woolf. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Congressional Research

Service. 2009). 14-17.

16. Stephen J. Cimbala. "Forward to Where? U.S.-Russia Strategic Nuclear Force

Reductions." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22. no. 1 (January 2009): 68-86.

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~db=all~content=a909097059~full

text=713240928.

17. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009, 364.

18. Ibid.
116 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

19. Ibid.

20. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress. Military Power of

the Peoples Republic ofChina 2009. 24. http://www.cfr.org/publicaUon/18943.

21. Hans M. Kristensen. "Estimated Nuclear Weapons Locations 2009," Federation

of American Scientists. Strategic Security Blog. November 2009. http://www.fas.org/

blog/ssp/2009/11/locations.php.

22. States with vulnerable nuclear forces may be tempted to launch their forces on

warning (LOW) or under attack (LUA), and this could put a hair trigger on their weapons to prevent their being destroyed by surprise attack. The Chinese seem to have

solved this "use or lose" dilemma by deploying nuclear arms underground.

23. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009. 359.

24. Ibid.. 360.

25. Elliott Francis and Michael Evans. "Britain's Nuclear Overture—We Will Cut

Trident Fleet," Timesonline. 22 September 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/

news/politics/article6845247.ece.

26. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009. 360.

27. Edward Cody. "After 43 Years. France to Rejoin NATO as Full Member," Washington Post. 12 March 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/

2009/03/11/AR2009031100547.html.

28. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009. 367, 370.

29. Ibid.. 367, 372.

30. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen. "Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risks of

Nuclear Terrorism." Arms Control Association, Arms Control Today. July/August 2009,

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen.

31. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009. 375.

32. Schlesinger, Report of the Secretary ofDefense. 18.

33. Federation of American Scientists, "Nuclear Weapons Program." 16 April 2000.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke.

34. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 103.

35. Jun Hongo, "Probe Launched into Four Secret Pacts with U.S.," Japan Times

Online. September 2009, http://search.Japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20090926a2.html.

36. Jeffrey Lewis. "After the Reliable Replacement Warhead: What's Next for the

U.S. Nuclear Arsenal?" Arms Control Association. Arms Control Today. December

2008. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/Lewis.

37. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 14-16.

38. Ibid., 5.

39. Ibid., 17.

40. SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2009. 354.

41. Ibid., 348.

42. William J. Perry, chairman, and James R. Schlesinger. vice-chairman, America's

Strategic Posture. The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic

Posture of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press,

2009), 40. http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf.

43. Ibid.

44. Joint Working Group of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). American Physical Society, and the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Nuclear Weapons in 21st Century U.S. National Security (Washington. DC:

AAAS, 2008). 8. http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/upload/nuclear

-weapons.PDF.

45. President Medvedev stated on 24 September that the United States and Russia

were discussing the possibility of slashing nuclear weapon delivery vehicles by 67 per-
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE 117

cent. From the US State Department report In April, the United States has 1.198 delivery vehicles; this cut would reduce US delivery vehicles to below 500. R1A Novosti.

"Russia. U.S. to Slash Nuclear Delivery Vehicles."

46. "Trident Fleet Ballistic Missile." US Navy Fact File. Navy.mO, 17 January 2009.

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1400&ct=2.

47. Schleslnger. Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense. 51.

48. Ibid.. 0-1.

49. Walter J. Boyne. Beyond the Wild Blue: A History of the United States Air Force,

1947-1997 (New York: St. Martins Press. 1997).

50. Adam J. Hebert. "New Nukes. Old Nukes." Air Force Magazine 92. no. 10 (October 2009): 20.

51. Ian Anthony. The Future ofNuclear Weapons in NATO (Stockholm. Sweden: SIPRI.

4 February 2008). 28.
118 BAYLOR * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 54

Abbreviations

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

LOW launch on warning

LUA launch under attack

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

SAC Strategic Air Command

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM submarine launched ballistic missile

SORT Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty

SSBN fleet ballistic missile submarine

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UN United Nations
Getting War Fighters What They Need,

When They Need It

Col Carl E. Schaefer, USAF*

In 1981 the Air Force completed the requirements for the Advanced

Tactical Fighter (ATF) and began the longest fighter aircraft acquisition program in history. The ATF was to replace the F-15, 13 years old

at the time, and counter the proliferation of Soviet Su-27 advanced

fighter planes. Ten years later, in 1991, Lockheed's ATF prototype,

the YF-22, won the flyoff competition against Northrop Grumman's

YF-23. The initial program called for 750 F-22s to be Initial Operational Capable (IOC) in 1995.' Following the flyoff and 14 more years

of development, the F-22A became IOC with 12 aircraft in December

2005, 10 years later than desired. Twenty-four years of acquisition

developed the most capable and complex fighter in the world, but the

schedule and cost overruns contributed to the Air Force being authorized to procure 187 of the 750 required to replace the F-15.

Almost 25 years after the initial ATF requirements, Marine commanders developed the requirements for the mine-resistant ambush

protected (MRAP) vehicle in 2005.2This vehicle was developed to stem

the horrific affects from improvised explosive devices (IED), accounting for 75 percent of all US casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan.3 Using

streamlined acquisition processes, the MRAP became IOC in 2007,

33 months after identifying the need.4 As ofJuly 2009. 16,204 MRAP

vehicles have been produced, and over 13,000 have been fielded.5

Although it is unfair to compare the F-22 and MRAP vehicle acquisitions based upon weapon system complexity, urgent need, streamlined acquisition processes, and supplemental congressional funding, the MRAP example clearly points to the government's ability to

quickly procure military weapon systems when required. These rapid

acquisition processes are slowly being institutionalized throughout

the services to meet urgent needs for our war fighters in the face of a

rapidly evolving threat.

Currently, each service and combatant command (COCOM) has its

own rapid acquisition process. The Defense Science Board (DSB)

completed a study in July 2009 which states, "Current approaches to

implement rapid responses to urgent needs were found to be unsustainable, and institutional barriers—people, funding, and processes—

•Col Norman Potter. USAF. was the essay advisor for this paper.

119
120 SCHAEFER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

are power inhibitors to successful rapid acquisition and fielding of

new capabilities."6The study found that rapid acquisition processes

should be based on proven technology to deliver capability to the war

fighter within two to 24 months. The study also recommends that the

Department of Defense (DOD) "establish a streamlined, integrated

approach for rapid acquisition." Finding a rapid acquisition standard

for all services is the focus of this paper.7

I propose the United States Special Operations Command's (SOCOM)

rapid acquisition process offers a benchmark that should be adopted

throughout the military. SOCOM's rapid acquisition process could be

used to acquire a limited major weapon system (MWS) (e.g., a light

attack aircraft) in less than two years.

Deliberate and Rapid Acquisition—

What's the Difference?

When people think of DOD acquisition processes, they are generally thinking about deliberate acquisition. Programs like the B-2,

F-22, F-35, and the Army's Future Combat System come to mind.

These large programs take years and billions of dollars to develop.

Many don't survive the cost overruns and schedule delays associated

with these programs. In May 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates

announced the cancellation of the VH-71 presidential helicopter, the

Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X program, ground components

of the Future Combat System, and missile defense's multiple kill vehicle.8

Secretary Gates stated the root causes for the cancelations

were immature technology and unnecessary requirements, which led

to cost and schedule overruns and fewer quantities procured.9

The 2009 DSB states, "Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became apparent that U.S. forces were not adequately

equipped for ongoing stability or counter insurgency operations."10

The report also notes that "the reality is that the Department is not

geared to acquire and field capabilities in a rapidly shifting threat

environment."11 The deliberate acquisition process was not developed

to handle urgent needs, so each service and COCOM developed its

own processes. As a foundation for this paper, the deliberate acquisition process and selected rapid acquisition processes are examined.

Deliberate Acquisition

Deliberate acquisition is governed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) for requirements; the DOD

5000-series of regulations for acquisition guidance; and the Plan-
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED. WHEN THEY NEED IT 121

ning, Programming. Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) for funding.12

Details of each process are beyond the scope of this paper, but as

shown in figure 1, the JCIDS precedes the acquisition process to

validate the joint capabilities required to counter current and future

threats. Once a required capability is identified, a service (Army,

Navy, or Air Force) is designated to acquire the weapon system to

meet the capability shortfall. To develop the system, the designated

service will request funding from Congress through the PPBE system.

AOA analysis of alternatives

CDO -capability development document

KB - Functional Capabilities Board

ICD - Initial capabilities document

iCS Joint Oilers of Staff

MDD materiel development decision

0&5 operating and support

0S0 - Office of the Secretary of Defense

Figure 1. JCIDS/Acquisition Process

According to the Congressional Research Service, "the PPBE is intended to provide Combatant Commanders the best mix of forces,

equipment, and support within fiscal constraints; the PPBE develops

DOD's proposed budget for all acquisitions."13 Each service and COCOM

plans and develops a five-year program to fulfill its mission responsibilities. This five-year plan is called the program objective memorandum (POM) and is submitted to the OSD for approval. Concurrent

with the POM process, each service develops a budget estimate submission (BES) to support the POM and then submits it to the OSD.

The OSD then consolidates each service's BES for a DOD budget submission to the president. Following presidential approval, the budget

is submitted to Congress for approval. Although this is a simplified

explanation of the DOD's deliberate acquisition process, it is clear to

see the multlstep process and review system to approve funding for a

particular program.

In 1987 SOCOM was established to "oversee the training, doctrine,

and equipping of all U.S. Special Operations Forces."14 To meet the

unique needs of special operations forces, SOCOM was granted certain exceptions to the deliberate acquisition system. Under provisions

of Title 10, US Code, "the commander of special operations command
122 SCHAEFER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, the

following: development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar

equipment and acquisition of special operations-peculiar material,

supplies, and services."15 No other combatant commander has been

given direct congressional authority to develop and acquire equipment

for their forces. Under this law, SOCOM developed its own version of

JCIDS—the Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and

Development System (SOFCIDS). SOFCIDS is a streamlined version

of the JCIDS process, wholly owned by the SOCOM commander for

SOF-particular acquisition. SOFCIDS reduces the requirements of

JCIDs documents and streamlines the coordination process within

the command. Even with SOCOM's acquisition exceptions, the deliberate acquisition process is unable to support the rapidly changing

needs of the current war fighter. Based on these unique needs, each

service and COCOM developed its own rapid acquisition process.

Rapid Acquisition

There are over 20 different urgent needs processes throughout the

DOD, Joint Staff, COCOMs, and services.16 Each process carries varying

and overlapping definitions of rapid acquisition. This paper discusses

the documents, approval authority, funding, and timelines of the joint,

Army, Air Force, Navy, and SOCOM rapid acquisition processes.

Joint Rapid Acquisition

Joint rapid acquisition is centered on fulfilling a combatant commander's joint urgent operational need (JUON). A JUON addresses

"urgent operational needs that: (1) fall outside of the established Service processes; and (2) most importantly, if not addressed immediately, will seriously endanger personnel or pose a major threat to

ongoing operations."17 The governing regulation for joint rapid acquisition is Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing ofJoint Urgent Operational

Needs (JUONS) in the Year ofExecution, which details the JUON process and provides an overview for each service's rapid acquisition

process.18 The timeline to deliver a JUON is normally 120 days to two

years to provide the 70-80 percent solution.19 If the material or logistics solution is needed in less than 120 days, the JUON is designated

as an immediate war fighter need (IWN) and handled by the Joint

Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) for oversight of the process.20 The JRAC

tracks the IWN and provides updates to the deputy secretary of defense. The funding for an IWN has been sourced primarily from the

Iraq Freedom Fund, which has been designated by Congress for the
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED. WHEN THEY NEED IT 123

funding of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 In contrast, there is no

designated funding for a JUON, where the solution takes longer than

120 days. Funding for JUONs come from sources within the COCOM

or a designated service. Funding approval for both the JUON and IWN

comes from Budget Office Director's Board, cochaired by the OSD

comptroller and the J-8, deputy for resources and acquisition.22

Based on the nature of the JUON or IWN, the J-8 designates a lead

service to provide a material or logistic solution for the war fighter.

Army Rapid Acquisition

The core of the Army's rapid acquisition process is the operational

needs statement (ONS) process and the Rapid Equipping Force (REF).

Army field commanders and combatant commanders submit an ONS to

fulfill an "urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to

improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment."23The

ONS is submitted via the Equipment Common Operation Picture (ECOP),

an information technology tool. ECOP allows commanders to submit

and track ONS documentation and approval ofthe capability.24 The ONS

is validated and authorized by Headquarters, Department of the Army

(HQDA). If the cost of the material solution is expected to be under

$100,000, commanders can submit a "10-liner" to the REF.25The Army

established the REF in 2002 to rapidly respond to war fighter needs. The

10-liner consists of the following: (1) problem, (2) justification, (3) system characteristics, (4) operational concept. (5) organizational concept,

(6) procurement objective, (7) support requirements, (8) availability,

(9) recommendation, and (10) coordination accomplished.

The Army G3 {Operations Branch) runs the REF process, and the

Army vice chief of staff normally approves solutions. Commercial offthe-shelf (COTS) solutions generally take three to six months to field,

whereas new technology may take 12-18 months.26 The REF and

ONS do not have a specific funding source but are normally funded

through a number ofjoint and Army research, development, test, and

evaluation funding based on the material solution (e.g., robotic or

IED funding). The goal of the Army's rapid acquisition process is to

quickly field the 80 percent solution to meet the war fighter's need

versus waiting longer for the 100 percent solution.27

Air Force Rapid Acquisition

The Rapid Response Process (RRP) is the Air Force's rapid acquisition method, detailed in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-114, 12 June

2008. The RRP begins when a major command or COCOM identifies

an urgent operational need (UON). The requirements of the UON are
124 SCHAEFER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

normally documented in a combat capability document and submitted to the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition (SAF/

AQX), the focal point for the RRP. No specific funding exists for the

RRP; SAF/AQX recommends sources, and the chief of staff, US Air

Force (CSAF), approves them.28 According to AFI 63-114, "Capability

must be fielded in time to impact an ongoing conflict or a crisis (nominally within 60 days of initial warfighter request)."29 SAF/AQX represents the Air Force on the JRAC, and the RRP is the process used

when the Air Force is assigned the responsibility of fulfilling a JUON.

Navy Rapid Acquisition

The Urgent Needs Process (UNP) is the Navy's rapid acquisition system, outlined in Secretary of the Navy Notice (SECNAVNOTE) 5000, 12

March 2009. A combatant. Navy, or Marine commander identifies an

urgent need, defined as "an exceptional request ... for an additional

warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting

combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to result in the inability of units to accomplish their

missions or increases the probability of casualties and loss of life."30

The goal of the UNP is to provide the war fighter with a fielded solution

in less than 24 months. Based on the technology readiness of the solution, the Navy employs a range of acquisition strategies to include

COTS/government off-the-shelf (GOTS) procurement, rapid deployment capability for slightly modified COTS/GOTS, and rapid deployment and development when no commercial solution is available.31

The chief of naval operations (CNO) is the approval authority for the

UNP, and the CNO staff is the focal point for the process. No separate

funding exists for the UNP; the CNO approves funding sources. Similarly to the other services, the UNP supports the JUON process when

the Navy is designated as the lead service to field the JUON.

SOCOM Rapid Acquisition

SOCOM's rapid acquisition process consists of the Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System-Urgent

(SOFCIDS-U). As described earlier, SOCOM is unique among COCOMs

because Congress has granted it the ability to acquire its own solution to meet war fighter needs. SOCOM's rapid acquisition process is

governed by USSOCOM Directive 71 -4, Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System, which states that

"SOFCIDS-U may be used when a SOF unit, either deployed or during

pre-deployment, identifies an urgent and compelling capability gap or

requirement derived from combat survivability deficiency or risk to op-
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WHEN THEY NEED IT 125

eratlonal success."32 SOFCIDS-U is initiated through the chain of command by a combat mission needs statement (CMNS). The CMNS process

is well denned in USSOCOM Directive 71-4 and consists of denning the

capability gap, environment, material approach, concept of operations,

and an analysis summary. Once the CMNS is submitted, the SOCOM

J-8 convenes a rapid response team (RRT) within 24 hours.33 The RRT

provides expeditious review and coordinates the solution and fielding of

the needed capability. The deputy SOCOM commander normally approves the solution, and designated CMNS funding provides resources.

If CMNS funding is not available, funding may be sourced from other

programs.34 The goal of the SOFCIDS-U is to field the solution within

180 days of CMNS submittal. The solution is planned to be sustainable

for the duration ofthe need or one year, whichever is less.35 Sustalnment

of the solution expires after one year unless a CDD is approved

through the normal SOFCIDS process. Other than the joint rapid

acquisition process, the SOFCIDS-U is the only process with a separate funding source. Also, based on my review of existing documentation, the SOCOM rapid acquisition process is the most detailed and

well denned.

The table below summarizes the numerous joint. Army. Air Force,

Navy, and SOCOM rapid acquisition processes:

Table 1. Summary of rapid acquisition processes

Joint Army Air Force Navy SOCOM

Rapid

acquisition

process

name

Joint urgent

operational

need

Operational

needs statement & Rapid

Equipping

Force

Rapid

Response

Process

Urgent Needs

Process

SOFCIDS-U

Primary CJCSI ECOP User's AFI 63-114 SECNAVNOTE USSOCCOM

document 3470.1 (15 Guide (12 June 5000 (15 D 71-4 (9

July 2005) 2008) March 2009) June 2009)

Approval Budget Office

Director

Board

HQDA CSAF CNO Deputy

SOCOM

Funding No specific No specific No specific No specific CMNS fund

fund fund fund fund

Timeline to IWN—120 REF—90- 60 days Less than 2 180 days-2

IOC days

JUON—120

days-2 years

360 days

ONS—90

days-2 years

years years

Solution 70-80% 80% None None specified 80%

goal % specified
126 SCHAEFER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

Defense Science Board Recommendations

Only five of the more than 20 rapid acquisition processes have

been discussed in this paper. As shown, there are numerous documents, timelines, definitions, approval authorities, and funding

sources for rapid acquisition. In response to the numerous processes,

the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics directed the DSB to study the situation and present recommendations. In July 2009, the DSB published the study Fulfillment of

Urgent Operational Needs. The DSB makes five specific recommendations for the DOD rapid acquisition process:

1. The Secretary of Defense should formalize a dual acquisition

path (deliberate and rapid).

2. Executive and legislative branches must establish a fund for

rapid acquisition and fielding.

3. The Secretary of Defense should establish a new agency: the

Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency (RAFA).

4. Initial funding and billets for RAFA will be based on absorbing

and Integrating existing programs and organizations.

5. DOD should establish a streamlined, integrated approach for

rapid acquisition.36

The DSB's final recommendation on "a streamlined, integrated approach for rapid acquisition" is a key finding and the premise of this

paper. The DSB highlights the need for a process to validate the COCOM's

request in 48 hours and then to use a tightly coordinated acquisition

and funding framework to meet the COCOM's need.37 Specifically, under the DSB's recommendations, the RAFA would concurrendy assign

acquisition responsibility to an appropriate organization that would analyze alternatives, approve funding, and work with the COCOM for concept of operations approval and IOC. This course of action would produce a solution for the COCOM within two to 24 months and is intended

to have maximum flexibility to minimize time.38 This paper suggests that

SOCOM's SOFCIDS-U process is the benchmark to fulfill this streamlined, integrated approach for all services. The strengths and weaknesses of SOCOM's rapid acquisition process are examined next.

USSOCOM's Rapid Acquisition Success

This discussion supports the first half of my recommendation:

SOCOM's rapid acquisition process offers a rapid acquisition benchmark that should be adopted throughout the military.
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED. WHEN THEY NEED IT 127

SOCOM's SOFCID-U process stands out for one main reason: results. Based on data that the DSB has collected, if the goal of any

urgent needs process Is to get a capability into the war fighter's hands,

the SOFCID-U process has the lowest time to IOC for the war fighter.

The data below were submitted by each major rapid acquisition organization and compiled by the DSB (see fig. 2).

The data indicate that SOCOM's process takes an average of 296

days to become IOC. Upon initial investigation, it appears the Army

takes the least time to IOC. However, the Army process is skewed by

94 percent of the urgent needs being met by a redistribution of inventory. With only three UONs, the Air Force process does not meet requirements for statistical significance. Also, according to AFI 63-114,

the Air Force goal is to fulfill the urgent need within 60 days. Based

on the three submitted UONs, it takes 118 days just to generate the

needs statement. With a lack of significant Army and Air Force data,

SOCOM bears the shortest IOC time of 296 days. Although it appears

that SOCOM's process is the fastest based on technicalities, it is also

JUONS (228)*

Navy (20) I

USCM (16)

SOCOM (90)

Air Force (3)

Army (-6,700)

Median Days to Generate m^

Need Statement

edianDaysto

Validate

Median Days to Reach

Initial Operating Capability

1

38 341

78 206 391

Median

Total Days

437

90 142 335

270

218*

_i_

50 100 150 200 250 300

MedianTimein Days

350 400 450

•Numbers in parentheses Indicate the number of needs statements evaluated.

"More than 94 percent of Army ONSs (-6,4001 were for redistribution of inventory, which skews

data to shorter times.

Figure 2. Urgent need data. (Reprinted from Defense Science Board [DSB] Task

Force, Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs [Washington, DC: Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, July 2009], 22.)
128 SCHAEFER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

the only service or COCOM with a designated funding source and the

congressional authority to acquire its own solution. This frees SOCOM

from bureaucracy that exists in the other processes. These strengths

of fastest to IOC, designated funding, and the ability to acquire its

own solution are not without a few weaknesses.

The weakness of the SOFCIDS-U process is that it is only intended

to sustain a war fighter solution for one year. Other urgent needs

processes did not specify a specific length of time for sustainment.

Sustaining a solution for one year cuts down on the planning and

scope required for the solution and decreases the time necessary to

field the capability. However, this limits the ability to perform a "system of systems" approach to acquisition, especially in the area of logistics. Ultimately, the war fighter desires the capability solution to

integrate into other war fighting systems to enhance mission effectiveness. The logisticians want the solution to integrate into the existing

supply and sustainment system. The planning required for the complete system of systems acquisition approach does not meet the war

fighter's urgent timeline. However, the war fighter knows that the 80

percent solution now is better than the 100 percent solution years

from now. The compromise is that under the SOFCIDS-U process, if

the solution needs sustainment beyond a year, a CDD must be submitted and approved. Fortunately, the SOCOM CDD under the SOFCIDs

has fewer requirements than a CDD under the JCIDs process.

In summary, SOCOM's rapid acquisition process rises to the top

based on IOC results data, specified funding, and the ability to manage its own acquisition. This makes SOCOM's SOFCIDS-U process a

DOD benchmark for streamlined acquisition. Based on SOCOM's

success, a similar process could be used to acquire and sustain a

limited major weapon system.

Two-Year Limited Major

Weapon System Acquisition

Funding changes could support my premise that SOCOM's rapid

acquisition process is a model for acquiring a limited MWS, such as a

light attack aircraft, in less than two years. Indeed, research shows

that the Air Force has already accomplished something similar.

In a recent article, Gen David Deptula, the current deputy CSAF for

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), states "We need to

make accelerated acquisition the norm. An example is the MC-12W

[ISR aircraft]. The first was delivered in less than eight months."39 The

MC-12 Project Liberty was delivered in less than eight months from

contract to combat missions. General Deptula goes on to say.
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WHEN THEY NEED IT 129

We are In an Information age, but we have an Industrial-age acquisition system.

We have to be more agile In this regard because our adversaries are not limited

by the same bureaucratic and legislative constraints that we have. AI Qaeda

doesn't have a JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System)

process. If we're going to succeed, we have to operate inside our adversaries'

decision loop. To do that is going to require significant changes not just to the

acquisition processes we built in the last century, but to our decision-making

processes.40

Using streamlined acquisition processes. Big Safari, the Air Force's

ISR program office, turned a COTS King Air into an ISR platform to

meet the war fighter's need in under a year. Big Safari's success is

built on having a small acquisition team closely integrated with a

contractor, in this case, L-3 Communications Corporation. Unfortunately, this streamlined process has yet to be institutionalized for

programs outside of Big Safari. The following topics outline some requirements for institutionalizing rapid acquisition.

Entry Criteria

To develop a limited MWS in under two years, the solution needs to

meet three specific criteria: (1) stable requirements, (2) a COTS platform, and (3) stable technology for systems integration. First, to meet

an urgent war fighter need, the requirements must be thoroughly

vetted before acquisition and not change during the rapid acquisition

process. SOCOM would be unable to achieve its average of 296 days

to IOC with changing requirements. Second, the primary platform

needs to be a COTS item currently in production. For example, in the

case of a light-attack weapon system, the primary platform could be

the T-6 Texan II. The Air Force uses these aircraft for primary training, and Hawker-Beach is still producing them. Third, any technology

added to the weapon system needs to be stable technology. Using the

Navy guidance for rapid acquisition, the solution would require an

8-9 technology readiness level (TRL) or better.41 For example, in the

case of weaponizing the T-6, a production small diameter bomb would

be integrated versus developing a new weapon.

SOFCIDS-U Additions

Minor additions to the SOFCIDS-U process are required to support

two-year limited MWS acquisition. Currently, the SOFCIDS-U process does not mandate a systems engineering plan, which would outline the cradle-to-grave implications of the MWS and integration with

other weapon systems. A systems engineering plan needs to be developed for any MWS. A subset of the systems engineering plan is the

supportability plan. Currently, the SOFCIDS-U process intends to
130 SCHAEFER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

support a solution for only one year and does not include a robust

sustainment plan. To support an MWS, a supportability plan would

need to be developed for the intended life of a weapon system. Although

these two items would increase the planning time upfront, they would

provide the war fighter a sustainable system into the future.

Timeline

The current SOFCIDS-U process delivers capability to the war fighter

in an average of 296 days; Big Safari was able to deliver the MC-12 in

under a year. The limited MWS acquisition team could use either process as a timeline model. The crucial factors for maintaining an acquisition timeline are a small team of highly experienced acquisition personnel with an intimate oversight relationship with the contractor. As

an example. Big Safari assigns program office personnel to oversee its

contractor, L3 Communications, in Greenville, Texas.

Funding

Rapid acquisition funding needs to be a priority for the DOD and

Congress. Currently, the SOFCIDS-U process uses CMNS funding

specifically allocated to fulfill urgent needs. This should be accepted

as the service model to fulfill urgent needs, including a limited MWS.

Congress also provides the COCOM with the "Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (CCIF) as a means to finance unforeseen contingency

requirements critical to combatant commanders' joint warfighting

readiness and national security interests."42 This fund is managed by

J-7 and could be used as a source for a limited MWS. Institutionally,

Congress has recognized the need for creating funding to meet urgent

war fighting needs. However, other than SOCOM, no specific service

is authorized such a fund. Each service normally resorts to its own

sources to meet war fighter needs. The practice of robbing other programs to pay for urgent needs disrupts other acquisition programs

and ultimately increases the cost to the taxpayer. The DSB recommended that 0.5 percent of the DOD budget be set aside for rapid

acquisition, and such a fund could be used to procure a limited MWS.43

The key for funding a limited MWS would be military transparency

with Congress on how the money is managed and spent.

To summarize, the SOFCIDS-U provides a model for acquiring a

limited MWS, but not the only model. Big Safari's acquisition process

could also be leveraged to acquire an MWS, provided the MWS meets

specific entry criteria and incorporates systems engineering planning. The acquisition team also needs to maintain an intimate contractor relationship as well as work with Congress on funding.
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED. WHEN THEY NEED IT 131

Recommendations

Based on the research presented, I propose three recommendations:

1. Rapid acquisition must be consolidated into one process. I agree

with the DSB findings that over 20 rapid acquisition processes

are unwieldy and redundant. As shown, with the myriad of

terms and processes between SOCOM, the Air Force, Navy, and

Army, rapid acquisition is disjointed and inefficient. Like the

DSB, I recommend creating and codifying a separate deliberate

and rapid acquisition system. This would identify a single rapid

acquisition process and bring clarity to cloudy process and

funding issues.

2. SOCOM's rapid acquisition process should be used as a benchmark. SOCOM's SOFCIDS-U process offers a streamlined acquisition process with proven delivery to the war fighter. SOCOM's

process should be adopted by OSD as the single rapid acquisition process.

3. Future acquisition of limited major weapons systems (e.g., light

attack aircraft) should use rapid acquisition processes. Acquisition of a limited MWS to support the war fighter should use a

rapid versus deliberate acquisition process. Taking five, 10, or

20 years to field a system is unacceptable in today's rapidly

changing environment. Our acquisition system must adapt to

defeat the threat. MWSs that meet specific entry criteria—stable

requirements, COTS platform, and mature systems integration

(8-9 TRL)—should be considered for rapid acquisition. The

SOFCID-U or Big Safari processes offer benchmarks for limited

MWS acquisition.

Conclusion

In 2008 the Government Accountability Office published four main

causes for defense acquisition delivering war fighter capabilities an

average of 21 months late: unstable requirements, frequent program

manager turnover, overreliance on contractors to perform roles previously performed by government employees, and difficulty managing

software.44 While the DOD attempts to transform deliberate acquisition to repair the aforementioned problems, the need for rapid acquisition to support the war fighter has been recognized. Although the

F-35 is in its 12th year of development with IOC still years away,

rapid acquisition success exists with programs like the MRAP and
132 SCHAEFER • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

MC-12. All services desire to get the necessary equipment into the

war fighter's hands to defeat the enemy, but no DOD Institutionalized

processes exists for this critical endeavor.

This paper outlined the difference between deliberate and rapid

acquisition; discussed the joint. Army, Air Force, Navy, and SOCOM

rapid acquisition processes; argued the success of the SOCOM model;

and explored the possibility of acquiring a limited MWS with a rapid

acquisition process. My proposal was that SOCOM's rapid acquisition process offers a rapid acquisition benchmark that should be adopted throughout the military and that could be used to acquire a

limited MWS (e.g., a light attack aircraft) in less than two years. The

limited data showed that SOCOM's rapid acquisition process consistently fulfills urgent needs in the least amount of time—296 days.

However, when proposing a process to acquire a limited MWS, both

SOCOM and Big Safari stand out as best practices.

This paper made three specific recommendations: rapid acquisition must be consolidated into one process, SOCOM's rapid acquisition process should be used as a benchmark, and future acquisition

of limited major weapons systems (e.g., light attack aircraft) should

use rapid acquisition processes. These recommendations are congruent with Defense Secretary Robert Gates's comments during a speech

in July 2009: The Defense Department needs to think about and

prepare for war In a profoundly different way than what we have been

accustomed to throughout the better part of the last century. What is

needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility

across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. As a result, we must

change the way we think and the way we plan—and fundamentally

reform—the way the Pentagon does business and buys weapons."45

Changing the way the Pentagon buys weapons is crucial to our

national security. Using SOCOM's processes as a model is a proven

way to meet the war fighter's needs and posture our military's acquisition system to defeat future threats.

Notes

1. James Rothenflue and Marsha Kwolek, eds.. Streamlining DOD Acquisition: Balancing Schedule with Complexity. Occasional paper no. 57-59 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology. Air War College, 2006). 32.

2. Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, director, acquisition and sourcing management, in Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition qfMRAP Vehicles: Testimony before the

House Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition Reform Panel (Washington. DC:

Government Accountability Office [GAO], 8 October 2009). GAO-10-155T, 1.

3. Ibid., 1.

4. Ibid., 6.

5. Ibid.
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WHEN THEY NEED IT 133

6. DSB Task Force, Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs (Washington, DC: Office

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. Technology, and Logistics. July

2009), ill.

7. Ibid., xii.

8. Moshe Schwartz. Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and

Recent Efforts to Reform the Process (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

2010). 17.

9. Ibid., 17.

10. DSB Task Force, Ful/illment of Urgent Operational Needs, 2.

11. Ibid., 4.

12. Ibid.

13. Schwartz, Defense Acquisitions. 4.

14. US GAO, Defense Acquisitions: An Analysis of the Special Operations Command's Management of Weapon System Programs: Report to the Subcommittee on

Emerging Threats and Capabilities. Committee on Armed Services. U.S. Senate (Washington. DC: GAO. June 2007). GAO-07-620. 1.

15. US Code. Title 10, "Armed Forces," chap. 6, sec. 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces," 4A. 8 January 2008.

16. DSB Task Force. Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs. 9.

17. Ibid., 10.

18. CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational

Needs (JUONS) in the Year ofExecution. 15 July 2005.

19. William Beasley. "Institutionalization of DOD Processes in Support of Immediate

Warflghter Needs" (professional student paper. Army War College, 11 August 2009). 10.

20. CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing. A-5.

21. Beasley, "Institutionalization of DOD Processes." 10.

22. CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation and Resourcing, GL-2.

23. Ibid.. 12.

24. Beasley, "Institutionalization of DOD Processes," 2.

25. DSB Task Force. Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, 13.

26. Ibid., 13.

27. "U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force." REF Web site, http://www.ref.army.mil/

textonly/default.html#about.

28. AFI 63-114, Rapid Response Process. 12 June 2008, 3.

29. Ibid., 6.

30. SECNAVNOTE 5000. "Urgent Needs Process." 12 March 2009.

31. Ibid., 5.

32. USSOCOM Directive 71-4. Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration

and Development System (SOFCIDS). 9 June 2009. 23.

33. Ibid., C-7.

34. Ibid., 23.

35. Ibid.. C-l.

36. DSB Task Force. Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, x-xii.

37. Ibid.. 39.

38. Ibid.

39. David A. Deptula, "Fast Forward," Defense Technology International December

2009. 46.

40. Ibid.

41. SECNAVNOTE 5000. "Urgent Needs Process." 5.

42. Beasley. "Institutionalization of DOD Processes." 15.

43. DSB Task Force. Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs. 33.
134 SCHAEFER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

44. Statement of Michael J. Sullivan, director, acquisition and sourcing management, In Defense Acquisitions: Results ofAnnual Assessment ofDOD Weapon Programs:

Testimony before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, House ofRepresentatives (Washington, DC: GAO, 29 April 2008), GAO-08-674T, 2-3.

45. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (speech, Economic Club of Chicago. 16 July

2009), news transcript, DOD Web site, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript

.aspx?transcriptid=4445.
GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WHEN THEY NEED IT 135

Abbreviations

AFI

AOA

ATF

BES

CDD

CJCSI

CMNS

CNO

COCOM

COTS

CSAF

DOD

DSB

ECOP

FCB

GAO

GOTS

HQDA

ICD

IED

IOC

ISR

IWN

JCIDS

JCS

JRAC

JUON

MDD

MRAP

MWS

O&S

ONS

OSD

POM

PPBE

RAFA

REF

RRP

RRT

SECNAVNOTE

Air Force Instruction

analysis of alternatives

Advanced Tactical Fighter

budget estimation submission

capability development document

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction

combat mission needs statement

chief of naval operations

combatant command

commercial off-the-shelf

chief of staff, US Air Force

Department of Defense

Defense Science Board

Equipment Common Operation Picture

Functional Capabilities Board

Government Accountability Office

government off-the shelf

Headquarters, Department of the Army

initial capabilities document

improvised explosive device

Initial Operational Capable/Capability

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

immediate war fighter need

Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell

joint urgent operational need

materiel development decision

mine-resistant ambush protected

major weapon system

operating and support

operational needs statement

Office of the Secretary of Defense

program objective memorandum

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution

Rapid Acquisition and Fielding Agency

Rapid Equipping Force

Rapid Response Process

rapid response team

Secretary of the Navy Notice
136 SCHAEFER * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 55

SOFCIDS Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration

and Development System

TRL technology readiness level

UNP Urgent Needs Process

UON urgent operational need

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
Developing a Situation Awareness

Environment for the

Distribution Process Owner

Recommendations for US Transportation Command

Lt Col James Michael Doolin

USAF Reserve/YC-3, DAF civilian*

This study addresses three basic questions: (1) what should be the

endgame objective for distribution process owner (DPO) situation

awareness (SA)? (2) what is in the critical path to achieve the objective? and (3) how does the DPO get to the objective end state? DPO

decision makers need to have confidence in their information for successful SA. Integral to this trust is the requirement for accurate,

timely, and relevant information; this leads to confident and actionable decision making.1 Decisions based on confidence in trusted information lead, in turn, to effective and efficient logistics actions in

support of global Department of Defense (DOD) operations. Therefore, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) should pursue

information confidence as the endgame objective for DPO SA. That

assertion leads to the thesis that the DPO should articulate the need

for information confidence as its fundamental requirement for an effective and successful SA environment. Considering information confidence as its primary objective will drive the DPO to understand all

of the necessary critical-path elements to achieve success.

In addressing how the DPO reaches its objective, this study provides three macrolevel recommendations for USTRANSCOM:

1. leverage pertinent SA industry research and adopt user-centered

design as the foundation for a DPO SA environment:

2. adopt a knowledge-centric approach to DPO culture by defining

ownership of information, processes, and business rules; and

3. address critical-path concerns for DPO SA through appropriate

governance forums.

•Col Alvln M. Lowry. Jr.. USAF. was the essay advisor lor this paper.

137
138 DOOLIN • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

These broad findings highlight the need for the DPO to advocate development of information-confidence factors as a microlevel recommendation for its SA environment.

A basic definition of information-confidencefactors is a visual, audible,

or textual indicator that communicates a level of confidence (low, medium, or high, based on appropriate business rules) for a given element of SA information. The basic business rules associated with

information-confidence factors should be based on providing timely,

accurate, and relevant information to the decision maker (see fig. I).2

DPO Situation Awareness

Trusted Awareness

Figure 1. Incorporating information-confidence factors for SA

As a foundation to understanding the concept of information confidence, other elements should be addressed. This study introduces

some ofthese, for instance, the basic process of decision making within

the DPO SA environment. Its major premise, however, is that information confidence lies within the critical path of successfully providing

actionable (decision-ready) information and, therefore, should be an

integral part of any best-practice-driven solution (see fig. 2).

This research provides recommendations for USTRANSCOM leaders to consider as they embark upon a major business transformation effort called "Agile Transportation for the 21st Century" (AT21)

and rolls out information technology (IT)-enabled capabilities as part

of its corporate services vision.3The DPO SA environment will be integral to successful realization of the AT21 vision. USTRANSCOM

commander. Gen Duncan J. McNabb, noted in a 27 March 2009

statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee that "when

fully operational, AT21 will provide the warfighter full distribution

pipeline visibility and enable throughput management at critical
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 139

DPO Situation Awareness

Critical Path

Information

Confidence

Processes

Defined

Disciplined

Execution

Personnel

• Trained

Organization

Leader/Staff Buy-in

Knowledge-focused

Ownership:

Process, Rules

Information

Information

• Confidence Factors

• Accessible, Timely

• Accurate, Relevant

V

2. Trusted

Awareness

1. Information

Confidence *

3. Precise

Assessments

\

Key Decision-Making Elements i

5. Appropriate

Actions

I

6. DPO Support to

Operations

4. Quality

Decisions

Combat Operations

Security Cooperation

'• Humanitarian Assistance J

Figure 2. DPO SA decision-making model ('information confidence is the first step)

ports and waypoints around the world."4 Undoubtedly, the success of

AT21 will depend upon confidence in the underlying information.

Background

This study leverages specific research centered upon designing for

SA and human factors engineering as the basis for its recommendations for USTRANSCOM. As a further clarification, one should consider

that the distribution process is part of the greater domain of logistics

within the DOD. As such, logistics-centered topics are directly relevant

to the DPO discussions herein. A basic definition of SA is required to

establish the baseline discussion. There are at least 26 SA definitions,

according to a 2001 systematic classification of SA definitions by Richard

Breton and Robert Rousseau.5The well-known Endsley definition is

used herein: "the perception of the elements in the environment within

a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and

the projection of their status in the near future."6

This translates well for the DPO environment and the capabilities

envisioned for AT21. Consider Endsley's definition of SA as it relates

to the capability of AT21 to provide distribution pipeline visibility and
140 DOOUN * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

enable throughput management. The perception of the elements In

the environment" relates well to visibility of assets within the distribution pipeline such as material supplies, transportation conveyances (a ship, plane, truck, or railcar), supply depots, and ports of

embarkation and debarkation. "Within a volume of time and space"

translates nicely to the location of a transportation conveyance and

timeliness of the relevant information to enable throughput management of people, equipment, and supplies. And finally, "the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status In the near

future" enable visibility and planning for throughput management by

reporting whether the item of interest is expected to arrive early, on

time, late, or not at all.

The Importance of Information Confidence

One key to successful logistics planning and execution is the need

for actionable information. For information to be actionable, however,

the decision maker must be confident in the information being presented. Confidence is fundamentally achieved when the decision

maker accepts that the information being acted upon meets the requirements of timeliness, accuracy, and relevance. To deliver these

requirements for decision makers, it is necessary to develop and present information-confidence factors (high, medium, or low) in the SA

environment. The decision maker can then consider a level of risk

(low, medium, or high) associated with the decision to be made and

decide—based on the confidence and risk levels—whether or not to

make a decision that will lead to a subsequent action. The Importance

of information confidence in the decision-making process leads one

to deduce that information-confidence factors are in the critical path

for the logistics decision maker. Therefore, information-confidence factors should be addressed as part of the solution to providing situation

awareness for USTRANSCOM (see fig. 3).

To better understand the importance of information confidence,

consider the example of a key logistics decision affecting the safety

and lives of war fighters during Operation Iraqi Freedom.7In 2004

enemy threats evolved as insurgents strategically placed improvised

explosive devices (IED) along roads traveled by US forces. The interim

solution to help counter that threat was to ship add-on armor for installation on US vehicles in Iraq. The planners in the joint operations

center at USTRANSCOM were working diligently with their counterparts at the USAF's Air Mobility Command (AMC) and the Army's

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to

ensure the most expeditious shipping solution (air and/or surface).
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 141

DPO Situation Awareness

•Information Confidence

Factors Assigned

Information Confidence

Factors Incorporated

'Med

low

Business Rules Applied

Data Source! Type TimeStampi

Trusted Awareness

Supply Transportation

Precise Assessment

cision Risk-level

Incorporated High

Med

Information Confidence

Drives Decision Risk-Level

Information Confidence | Decision Risk-Level

Low Confidence High Risk

Medium Confidence Medium Risk

High Confidence Low Risk

Figure 3. Relationship of information confidence to decision risk level

Although planners were leveraging all of their IT systems capabilities,

there was no automated way to indicate a level of confidence in the

information associated with timeliness, accuracy, or relevance. Conflicting information was available, and much of it was being validated

verbally by a "human in the loop" prior to final decisions for shipment

to Iraq by air or surface. Traditionally, critical logistics decisions have

been made only after checking and double-checking information

gained from the various IT systems available across the department,

followed by verbal confirmation on the agreed-upon information from

all parties involved.

By implementing information-confidence factors associated with

corresponding risk levels, decision makers can focus attention on the

most critical decisions, trusting business-rule-based software to provide confidence and risk levels versus having to manually engage in

the process every time. The bottom-line benefit to users is that they

can allow software to perform confidence checks (starting with the

least-critical decisions). That, in turn, frees decision makers to perform more critical analysis for the higher-risk decisions. Therefore, it

is necessary for USTRANSCOM to define, develop, and field the capability to display information-confidence factors leading to trusted

situation awareness and effective logistics decision making.
142 DOOLIN • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

The Critical Path to DPO Situation Awareness

How does the DPO reach the objective end state of information

confidence? To answer that question, this study highlights other

critical-path requirements to illustrate how information confidence

drives effective logistics decision making. The critical path to deliver

actionable or decision-ready information contains DOD-level concerns,

as well as those within USTRANSCOM's direct sphere of influence as

the DPO and distribution portfolio manager for DOD distribution.

USTRANSCOM should continue to address concerns with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the military

services, and agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA),

Defense Information Systems Agency, and others as appropriate to

realize the stated SA environment end game. Of the many elements

external to the DPO, three stand out as essential for success within

the military services' purview to organize, train, and equip its forces:

(1) the need for trained personnel engaged in well-defined and understood DOD logistics business processes, (2) a disciplined approach to

information gathering and reporting, and (3) universal access to information through appropriate fielding of IT.8

Logistics personnel are key to successful delivery of trusted SA for

decision makers. Therefore, the proper mechanics for conducting the

business of logistics should be inherent in training, and the impact of

shortcutting processes that support logistics visibility should be

understood. For example, failure to ensure that cargo is appropriately

marked with accurate shipping labels or radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags causes information gathering and reporting problems

within the supply and transportation domains ranging from rework

at the next location to reordering a critical supply item that might be

needed for a mission-essential task or operation. Trained personnel

must have the discipline to ensure timely gathering and reporting of

information to enable information confidence for decision makers

and to guard against "the possible loss of life and equipment resulting

from poor planning" based on incomplete or inaccurate logistics information.9 Along with training and disciplined execution of logistics

processes comes the requirement to ensure complete access to the

necessary IT solution that supports execution of logistics duties. Today, access to logistics information via Web-enabled services and applications is prolific through the fielding of capabilities like the Global

Combat Support System-Joint Common Operating Picture Deployment

and Distribution (GCSS-J COP D2) structure. All new IT services

should be Web-enabled to ensure the widest access possible.
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 143

The scope of this research does not allow in-depth discussion regarding the importance of these DOD-level critical-path items or others like them. However, the DPO should pursue their accomplishment

to realize its objective of a successful SA environment. It should also

continue to leverage governance forums like the Distribution Executive Board and the Distribution Transformation Task Force to address essential elements within the critical path of providing decision-ready information for decision makers.10

USTRANSCOM-Centric Critical-Path Discussion

Three DPO-centric elements are necessary for USTRANSCOM to

achieve success: senior leader buy-in and staff advocacy; ownership

of processes, information, and business rules; and adopting a

knowledge-centric culture.

Senior Leader Buy-in and Staff Advocacy

Delivering a secure SA environment for the DPO requires that senior leaders are an integral part of achieving the endgame objective.

This is apparent from General McNabb's statement to the Senate

Armed Services Committee. In addition to senior leader buy-in, the

power of the entire staff should be focused on the same goals. Success is predicated on a horizontal, integrated team approach to planning and executing the solution. Isolated requirements development

and materiel solution design and fielding should be viewed as counterproductive to a successful outcome.

Ownership of Processes, Information, and Business Rules

To achieve the desired confidence in information necessary for logistics decision makers in a future DPO SA environment, one must

first ensure that ownership of major business processes and the information supporting those processes is clearly defined and that

those identified as responsible are empowered, resourced, and engaged accordingly. For example, who owns the strategic surface

transportation process from the seaport of embarkation to the other

end at the seaport of debarkation? One can argue that ownership is

split between two of USTRANSCOM's component commands, the

Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) and

the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), depending on the type of

sealift employed (contract or organic). This is one example of the complexities associated with the duties of distribution process owner.

Clearly understanding who owns a business process is critical to
144 DOOLIN * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

determining other key relationships fundamental to the discussion of

information confidence.

The process owner should also own the information related to that

process and be solely responsible for updating and reporting that

information within the decision-making environment. In the current

DPO environment, a user can determine which information source

(IT system) to access for logistics information. This can, and does,

result in different answers to the same question. To eliminate this

occurrence, an integral first step in the right direction is to assign

responsibility or ownership of information to an organization. Next

comes designating an authoritative information source and providing a time stamp associated with currency of the information. This

should enable tagging of information and subsequent development

of information-confidence factors.

Achieving a successful DPO SA environment also involves business

rules. The information owner should make information that is critical

to a future DPO SA environment available in a standard manner that

articulates the confidence level for the information being presented.

The same pertains for other major process owners in the distribution

domain. AMC should be responsible for airlift transportation information, the DLA and military service supply organizations should

manage supply information, and USTRANSCOM should oversee information for joint intermodal transportation decisions. The information should be "tagged" to indicate high, medium, or low confidence

based on a definitive, minimal criteria articulated as business rules.

To understand this concept, consider the following notional example of an information tag for an airlift transportation manifest:

1. type of information (e.g., airlift manifest),

2. organization responsible and point of contact for the information

(e.g.. Tanker Airlift Control Center: TACC OpsCtr@AMC.af.mil.

618-229-3131),

3. authoritative information source (e.g., "Gates"), and

4. date/time stamp of last update for the information provided.

By providing basic tag information (also known as metadata) one can next

move on to developing the business rules for displaying informationconfidence factors (see fig. 4).

Adopting a Knowledge-Centric Approach to DPO Culture

A trusted SA environment for DPO decision makers requires a culture

that values knowledge as a central theme for success. Along the path to
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 145

DPO Situation Awareness

Figure 4. Example: business rules and information tag

becoming a knowledge-centric organization are the fundamentals of disciplined information management. These fundamentals include, but are

not limited to, some of the following basic information management

principles. A knowledge-centric organization should tag and categorize

information in a standard way, with agreed-upon naming conventions,

to be able to discover the information with an automated search engine.

Otherwise, even the most powerful search engines available will only

retrieve unorganized lists of disjointed information.

Practicing the fundamentals of disciplined information management is foundatlonal to achieving information confidence and realizing ultimate transformation to a knowledge-centric organization and

culture. None of these can be achieved through technology alone, and

all should be realized to ensure information confidence. The DPO

should continue to institutionalize ownership of processes, information, and business rules to fully reap the benefits of a DPO SA environment enabled by technology.

Analysis of Situation Awareness Research

To understand why information confidence is in the critical path of

DPO decision makers, consider the mechanics ofthe decision-making
146 DOOLIN * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

process within the SA environment (see fig. 1). The decision maker is

the center of focus in the SA environment. The desired outcome of the

model is a trusted decision which then leads to an appropriate action

being taken in response to the information being presented. To

achieve a trusted decision, the decision maker must have confidence

in the information. The purpose of providing information-confidence

factors is to enable the decision maker to proceed based on a visible

level of confidence (high, medium, or low), such that minimal rework

is required to validate and/or verify information prior to an ultimate

decision being made.

A review of readily available SA research led to several primary

references that were pertinent to USTRANSCOM's request for best

practices for a COP for D2, that is, the DPO SA environment. Two

were considered most pertinent for discussion: Designingfor Situation

Awareness, An Approach to User-Centered Design by Mica R. Endsley,

Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones; and A Cognitive Approach to Situation Awareness Theory and Application, edited by Simon Banbury and

Sebastlen Tremblay.

Endsley has worked extensively in the SA field and is president of

SA Technologies in Marietta, Georgia. Her area of SA expertise is in

aviation, the military, and the medical profession. Her work provides

a detailed approach to SA that focuses on the business of the user

and a holistic SA business solution that guides development through

user-centered design, focusing on user requirements, and applying

SA-oriented design to the entire system of the mission environment.'1

Banbury and Tremblay complement Endsley's work by providing a

broader review of SA research. Their book includes 17 chapters from

41 contributors. Endsley provides her insights regarding progress

and directions for SA, providing a brief 2004 update to her extensive

research from 2003 (see chap. 17). Banbury and Tremblay look critically at defining and modeling SA, questioning Endsley's 2003 work

as being focused on a basic descriptive approach instead of a detailed

prescriptive approach. While there may be some validity to that criticism, Endsley's detailed template for design principles is an excellent

source from which USTRANSCOM can draw to perform a comprehensive baseline review of user requirements as it moves to a future DPO

SA environment. The Banbury and Tremblay work draws credibility

and strength from the 41 individuals across theoretical perspectives,

research approaches, and domains of application.12
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 147

Why User-Centered Design and SA-Oriented

Design Principles?

Foremost, Endsley's work impresses as a comprehensive design

checklist that identifies the user as the appropriate focus versus driving solutions based on technology. She compares user-centered design with technology-centered design and ends with a detailed list of

50 design principles that appear to cover a grounded approach for

addressing requirements for SA design. A review of the design principles reveals six areas for consideration: general, certainty, complexity,

alarm, automation, and multioperator.13 To reinforce the value of this

list, consider the primary assertion of this study: USTRANSCOM

should identify information confidence and information-confidence

factors as key requirements for its future SA environment, as articulated and supported by the proposed DPO SA decision-making model

(see fig. 2). Endsley's "certainty" design principles speak directly to

information confidence as follows: (1) explicitly identify missing information, (2) support sensor reliability (e.g., passive and active RFID

sensor reliability), (3) use data salience in support of certainty, (4)

represent information timeliness, (5) support assessment of confidence in composite data, and (6) support uncertainty management

activities. More specifically. Endsley notes, "as more systems employ

classification algorithms, sensor fusion, and decision support systems, the need will arise to apprise operators ofthe reliability or confidence levels of these systems' outputs."14

One inclined to disagree with the need for information-confidence

factors will possibly cite the net-centric data strategy that identifies

an unrealized goal within the DOD—to introduce information pedigree as part of the overall data strategy for the department.15 Many of

the standards or strategies for data in the DOD have been "all or

none" propositions. These strategies have arguably led to shortfalls in

expectations due to the enormous amount of work required to engineer information pedigree into the DOD data environment. The recommendation herein for implementation of information-confidence

factors focuses on only relevant data. In other words, USTRANSCOM

should leverage the power of user-centered design to identify the relevant data or information necessary to provide the most pertinent SA

for its decision makers. The application of information-confidence

factors should start with the relevant information that is valued most

by USTRANSCOM and move forward based on an appropriate business case that identifies the return on investment. This will preclude

much of the discussion regarding magnitude of effort and feasibility.
148 DOOLIN • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

It will also cause the DPO to consider what information is most critical to its core mission and provide appropriate focus for SA designers.

If Not User-Centered Design,

Then What Should Be the Focus?

Some may still argue for a technology-centered versus user-centered

design. However, the focus should be on human factors such as processes, information assimilation, business rules, and measuring successful mission outcomes. Reaching the DPO objective is also about

technology—the good news is that technology is well matured and

deployed in today's Web-enabled, connected IT world. Access to information is provided universally via portal technology, geographic visualization is readily provided by mapping tools like Google Earth, data

warehouses and operational data stores are foundational capabilities

in any corporate IT environment, and reusable Web portlets provide

active content for the user experience. The user experience or interface is realized through common capabilities like iGoogle where a

user can customize the views that are most relevant, such as international news, weather, sports, and so forth. All of the foregoing is

made possible due to the years of foundational code development and

subsequent proliferation through reuse in the world of software development. While technology is in the critical path for successful

fielding of SA tools, it is well matured and readily available for implementation by any fundamentally competent IT organization. Therefore, a technology-centered design approach is not the answer for the

DPO. Focusing on human engineering factors associated with usercentered design allows developers to focus on important outcomes,

such as information confidence for the decision maker. Perhaps most

critical to success, this strategy places users at the center of attention

and involves them from concept to the fielding of capabilities.

Recommendations for USTRANSCOM

SA research and design appear to have come a long way in the last

10 years. SA research for the military has centered on the command

and control domain. But the basic research, which is focused on design principles, crosses over to the logistics domain. (Several reference books have been cited in this study.) Based on this research and

the author's personal experience with USTRANSCOM operations and

IT programs, USTRANSCOM is at an opportune juncture to benefit

from the extensive work done by many in the SA profession.
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 149

Leverage SA Industry Research and Adopt

User-Centered Design Principles

The most relevant research for USTRANSCOM at this point in its

maturity with DPO SA is that by Endsley. Bolte. and Jones. Based on

theirwork, this paperidentifies information-confidence factors as a microlevel recommendation and one of the key elements in USTRANSCOM's

critical path to achieving successful DPO SA. Their approach to SAoriented design is founded on three overarching principles that are

recommended as best practices for USTRANSCOM leaders to consider

as they continue transformation of the AT21 initiative: (1) organize

technology around the user's goals, tasks, and abilities: (2) implement technology according to the way users process information and

make decisions; and (3) use technology to keep the user in control

and aware of the state of the system.16 The author's research offers a

list of 50 design principles that the DPO should use as the basis for

development of its SA requirements and subsequent development of

a DPO SA environment. The research also directly supports the need

to address what is termed certainty design principles, leading the DPO

to address information confidence and understand the value of displaying information-confidence factors as part of its SA solution.

Adopt a Knowledge-Centric Approach: Define Ownership

of Processes, Information, and Business Rules

By adopting a knowledge-centric approach and redefining the DPO

culture as dependent upon trusted information, the DPO will set the

tone for taking its SA game to the next level. The DPO should not treat

all information as equal in terms of relevance to its mission. As a start,

the process owner should determine which information is relevant to

its SA environment and then establish information-confidence factors. In turn, this will enable decision makers to more expeditiously

make critical logistics decisions. To embrace a knowledge-centric approach, the DPO should institutionalize disciplined information management principles. Otherwise, future DPO SA solutions may be relegated to providing the latest ways to present "uncertain" information,

or users will continue to be burdened with checking, double-checking,

and calling someone to ensure information confidence prior to making a decision. To solidify this recommendation, the DPO should

adopt process, information, and business-rule ownership, to include

identification of ownership stewards and measurement of information and knowledge management performance.
150 DOOLIN * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

Address Critical-Path Concerns for DPO SA

in Appropriate Governance Forums

As outlined earlier, several factors Influence the achievement of

information confidence. They range from personnel training, disciplined information reporting, and access to appropriate technology,

to ownership of processes, information, and business rules—to name

but a few. USTRANSCOM should continue to leverage the DPO and

department-level governance forums to better ensure information

confidence within the DPO SA environment. Some elements are directly within USTRANSCOM's control (e.g., senior-leader buy-in), and

many are influenced at the DOD level.

Conclusion

This study posed three questions to help frame the discussion.

First, what should be the endgame objective for DPO SA? The answer

proposed forms the basis for the argument that the DPO should articulate the need for information confidence as its fundamental requirement for an effective and successful SA environment.

Secondly, what is in the critical path to achieve the DPO SA objective? The study provided an overarching look at several elements

within the critical path for success (some within USTRANSCOM's direct control and some requiring coordination at the DOD level of responsibility). Finally, it asked, how does the DPO get to the objective

end state? The recommendations given should provide a sound start

to USTRANSCOM's pursuit of a future DPO SA environment. The author's intent was to address the DPO's considerations in a holistic

manner, spanning multiple areas that will undoubtedly influence USTRANSCOM's ability to transform to the DPO of the future.

There is no single silver bullet for success here. As USTRANSCOM

moves forward with DPO transformation through implementation of

the AT21 initiative and delivery of IT-enabled capabilities through its

corporate services vision, it should take advantage of the aforementioned research, best practices, and industry standards. This will

help guide its end game for a future DPO SA environment informed

by an appropriate cost-benefit analysis to determine the value ofsuch

an undertaking.

Notes

1. Lt Gen Claude V. (Chris) Christianson, USA retired. "In Search of Logistics Visibility:

Enabling Effective Decision Making," Logistics Spectrum 41, no. 3 (July-September

2007): 17.
DEVELOPING A SITUATION AWARENESS ENVIRONMENT FOR THE DPO 151

2. Ibid.

3. Scott D. Ross. The DPO's Corporate Services Vision: Learning from E-Commerce

Leaders." release no. 090218-1, 18 February 2009. http://www.transcom.mil/pa/

body.cfm?relnumber=090218-1.

4. Gen Duncan J. McNabb. USAF. commander. US Transportation Command,

"Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the State of the Command," 27 March 2009, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/

McNabb%2003- 17-09.pdf.

5. Robert Rousseau and Richard Breton. "Defining and Modeling Situation Awareness: A Critical Review," in A Cognitive Approach to Situation Awareness: Theory and

Approach, eds. Simon Banbury and Sebastien Tremblay (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate

Publishing, Ltd., 2004). 3.

6. Ibid, 3-4.

7. Norah O'Donnell and Ted Savaglio, "Bush: Soldier's Equipment Gripes Heard,"

MSNBC.com, 9 December 2004. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6676765.

8. James C. Bates, "Joint Asset Visibility: Why So Hard? The Way Ahead." Army

Logistician, January-February 2008, 31; Timothy N. McCarter Sr.. "Logistics Status

Reports and the Logistics Common Operating Picture," Army Logistician, NovemberDecember 2008, 5: and David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. Power to the Edge:

Command and Control in the Information Age (Washington. DC: DOD Command and

Control Research Program, 2005). 191.

9. McCarter. "Logistics Status Reports," 7.

10. DPO Web site, "Governance Structure," http://www.transcom.mil/dpo.

11. Banbury and Tremblay, Cognitive Approach to Situation Awareness, vtii.

12. Ibid., xiv.

13. Mica R. Endsley, Betty Bolte, and Debra G. Jones, Designing for Situation

Awareness: An Approach to User-Centered Design (New York: Taylor & Francis, Inc.

2003). 251-52.

14. Ibid., 129.

15. Net-Centric Enterprise Services Tech Guide. "Net-Centric Data Strategy (NCDS)

Goals," sec. 1.4, "Trustworthy," https://metadata.dod.mil/mdr/ns/ces/techguide/net_centric_data_strategy_ncds_goals.html.

16. Endsley, Bolte, and Jones. Designingfor Situation Awareness, 8-10.
152 DOOLIN * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 56

Abbreviations

AMC

AT21

COP

D2

DLA

DOD

DPO

GCSS-J

IED

IT

MSC

OSD

RFID

SA

SDDC

USTRANSCOM

Air Mobility Command

Agile Transportation for the 21st Century

common operating picture

deployment and distribution

Defense Logistics Agency

Department of Defense

distribution process owner

Global Combat Support System-Joint

improvised explosive device

information technology

Military Sealift Command

Office of the Secretary of Defense

radio-frequency identification

situation awareness

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

US Transportation Command
The Need for a Global

Space-Traffic-Control Service

An Opportunity for US Leadership

Lt Col Matthew C. Smitham. USAF*

Losing a satellite to an accidental on-orbit collision is no longer

hypothetical but real and increasingly likely. As a result, the spacefaring nations of the world, especially the United States, need to address a global space-trafnc-control service. The fiscal and national

security ramifications are too significant to ignore. The replacement

cost of a satellite, perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars, is the most

obvious impact. But this may be the most trivial consideration. The

greatest concern is the potential catastrophic loss of vital communications, navigation, weather, and other services we depend on for

daily global commerce and defense. This paper explains the problem,

examines some possible paths to address the problem, and recommends actions.

In February 2009, a spectacular collision grabbed headlines around

the world. In low Earth orbit (LEO) 400 miles above Siberia, an American commercial communications satellite. Iridium 33, collided with

the defunct Russian satellite. Cosmos 2251.1The probability of this

first known satellite-to-satellite collision was estimated to be one in

100.000.2 With a closing velocity of 22.000 mph. the satellites were

instantly pulverized into debris clouds, creating more than 870 objects observed by the US Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN).3

The specter of collisions is not new, despite the "big sky" theory.4

Although Iridium-Cosmos is the first known collision between two

satellites, this was the fourth documented accidental collision in

space (intentional destruction is described later). In 1991, coincidently, a defunct Russian satellite. Cosmos 1934, collided with a fragment from another Cosmos launch.5

Five years later, the French reconnaissance satellite Cerise was damaged by colliding with a

fragment from an Arianne rocket body, another French object. In this

collision, the fragment struck Cerise with a closing velocity of 32,400

mph, cleaving its 20-foot boom in half. Experts estimate the probability

of this collision was one in a million—so much for the big sky theory.6

•Mr. Allen Sexton. USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

153
154 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

Luckily, the satellite remained operational.7In 2005 the third confirmed collision occurred. The final stage of a US Thor Burner 2A

rocket, in orbit more than 31 years, struck a fragment from the upper

stage of a Chinese Long March 4 rocket.8

Beyond collisions, other events also present dangers to satellite

traffic. Lt Gen Larry D. James, commander of the Joint Functional

Component for Space, reported that the Chinese antisatellite test that

destroyed Fengyun-lC in January 2007 was the worst fragmentation

event in the history of spaceflight. This event added "2,400 pieces of

potentially destructive debris," Increasing the number of objects that

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) tracked by over 10 percent.9 A

month later, a Russian upper stage from a Proton rocket, loaded with

fuel leftover from a failed boost, exploded and created another 1,100

pieces of debris.10 As of April 2009, the Air Force was tracking approximately 19,000 objects larger than 10 centimeters. If it could

track objects down to one centimeter, the Air Force estimates that

number would Increase to about 300,000.n

As space becomes more crowded with debris, it may be reaching a

precarious tipping point. In 2006 National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA) scientists warned that unless space debris is

removed, the likelihood of collisions will increase. They predict that

beyond 2055 "the creation of new collision fragments [will exceed] the

number of decaying debris," while the "current debris population in

the LEO region has reached the point where the environment Is unstable and collisions will become the dominant debris-generation

mechanism in the future." In other words, as collisions create more

debris, the collisions themselves become the primary source for debris.12 As a result, NASA is concerned about the risk debris poses to

its manned systems.

During 2008, with the aid of the Department of Defense's (DOD)

Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), NASA made five collisionavoidance maneuvers to protect its human spaceflight missions and

maneuverable robotic assets.13 In March 2009 alone, the International Space Station had three near misses, which required the

crew to prepare for emergency evacuation in one case and change

orbit in another.14 GeoEye, a commercial imaging company, reported

it has maneuvered its Ikonos satellite seven times and GeoEye-1 satellite four times to avoid space junk in the LEO region.15 In addition,

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory has

recommended 65 avoidance strategies in the geosynchronous Earth

orbit (GEO) belt since 1997.16 Although these efforts are encouraging,

they are insufficient.
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 155

Today, most of the world's satellites fly in the blind, operating under the safety assumptions inherent in the big sky theory. However,

Gen Kevin P. Chilton, commander of US Strategic Command

(USSTRATCOM), stated that big sky has now "[come] to a close."17 Of

the 19,000 objects that AFSPC and the JSpOC were tracking in April

2009. 1,300 were active payloads.18 In the next decade, an additional

200 payloads are expected.19 This growth in satellite numbers and

the world's dependence on these systems points to the need for global

space-traffic control. As the Iridium-Cosmos collision illustrates, the

ad hoc efforts of NASA and others are not enough. Without a robust

service to mitigate potential collisions, operators of military, civil, and

commercial satellites are without the means to avoid catastrophe.

This paper advocates that the United States establish a global

service with the cooperation of the international community and

private sectors. To support this recommendation, we will examine

existing global services that could serve as a model for a spacetraffic-control service. But first, we will review the functional components of a service, the current space environment, the state of

fielded space situational awareness (SSA) systems, gaps in these

systems, and liability implications.

The Current Landscape

Before discussing the current space environment and the systems

which monitor space, let's first describe what would make up a worldwide 24/7 space-traffic-control service. From a functional view, this

service must be able to accurately search, detect, track, identify, and

catalog space objects in Earth's orbit. The service would then need to

predict the future positions of these objects, analyze the traffic for

possible collisions (referred to as conjunctions), issue timely warnings to affected parties, and direct avoidance maneuvers, if required.

If damage is sustained, per international treaties, the service would

then need to assist to the greatest extent feasible in identifying the

space objects and nations involved to help determine liability.20 Logically, these functions can be organized into three categories: acquire,

analyze, and act (see fig. 1), which parallel how data can be transformed into information and knowledge.

Monitoring and understanding the space environment comprise the

essential first steps towards building a space-traffic-control service.21

This is traditionally referred to as SSA. SSA by itself is necessary but

insufficient. A space-traffic-control service goes beyond this by also

actively mitigating potential collisions (acting with knowledge, see

fig. 1). Currently, a service which actively controls the global space
156 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

Acquire

(Data)

•SIMUI'ricn nrttii

• lutk space sfajti ta

(Information)

H .il,\\nr. HjaCfl olijit Is

•I'fi'tliU lututc positions

•An.iv!'''1for ((ttiiurx lions

(With Knowledge)

•Issue warnings

• Dirwldvuiddiuc

Figure 1. Functional view of a global space-traffic-control service

traffic does not exist.22 To begin this discussion, let's first examine

the near-Earth space environment.

The number of man-made objects in Earth's orbit tracked by the

Air Force has quadrupled to 19,000 over the past 29 years.23 By 2015

the Air Force plans to upgrade its space surveillance network. With

its increased sensitivity, the Air Force expects the catalog to grow

fivefold to 100,000 objects.24 The vast majority of these space objects

and debris are in the LEO region.25 This is the orbital region of most

manned space flights and also where all the collisions described earlier occurred. However, objects in LEO are not the only ones susceptible to collision. The GEO belt is another region of concern.26 Almost

one-third (380) of the total 1,300 active payloads is In the GEO belt.

Most of these are the high-value, high-bandwidth communication

satellites used for television and communications. To complicate

matters, another 750 dead satellites dangerously drift uncontrolled

in the GEO belt.27 In all, the Air Force tracks between 2,000 and

2,500 objects in GEO.28

Beyond satellite-to-satellite collisions, as discussed earlier, satellite collisions with debris are another concern. Historically, 94 percent of all tracked objects is debris. Debris includes nonfunctional

spacecraft, spent rocket bodies, breakup fragments, deterioration and

exhaust products, objects released during spacecraft deployments

and operations, and refuse from human missions.29 In the last 20

years, fragmentation debris has comprised roughly 40-45 percent of

all objects tracked. Large debris, such as dead satellites and old

rocket bodies, comprises another 35-40 percent.30
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 157

Recent events in the LEO region have made the debris environment even messier. The 2007 Chinese antisatellite test added another 2,400 pieces of potentially destructive orbital debris, a 2.7-

fold increase in debris centered at 850 kilometers (km) in altitude.

The Iridium-Cosmos collision added another 870 objects, a 33 percent increase at 780 km.31 As discussed earlier, unless debris can

be removed, the problem will only get worse. Scientists predict that

by 2055 new debris generated by collisions will outpace debris naturally removed through orbital decay.32

Currently, only two nations have the necessary network of groundbased sensors and computational capabilities to attain the minimum

degree of SSA to bootstrap a global space-traffic-control service.

These are the American SSN and Russian Space Surveillance System

(SSS).33 Other government agencies with limited or nascent capabilities include the Chinese, French, and German militaries and the European Space Agency (ESA). Nongovernmental agencies such as the

International Scientific Optical Network, operated by the Russian

Academy of Sciences, and amateur astronomers also produce orbital

data.34 However, to achieve a truly global system, none of these are

adequate; they all require upgrades and/or cooperation.35

The US SSN is by far the most comprehensive system in the world.

It is a global network of 29 ground-based sensors. In general, it uses

radars to track LEO objects and optical telescopes to track GEO objects. Combined, these sensors provide the JSpOC with roughly

300,000 to 400,000 measurements (observations) per day. The JSpOC

then has the enormous computational task of merging these observations into tracks, correlating the tracks with a priori information on

known objects, and updating the 19,000 objects in the unclassified

space catalog.36 For high-priority US military and NASA analyses, the

JSpOC also generates high-accuracy analyst sets available only to

military personnel at JSpOC.37

In comparison the Russian SSS has 22 sensors, which include

military and civilian radars and telescopes. These systems collect approximately 50,000 observations per day. To make up for fewer observations (as compared to the Americans), the Russians depend on

superior mathematical and predictive abilities to maintain their catalog. However, the SSS is not a global network; it is geographically

confined to the longitudes of Russia and former Soviet republics. This

geometry hinders their ability to track low-inclination LEO and GEO

satellites in the Western Hemisphere. Further, unlike the Americans,

the Russians do not publish a publically available catalog.38

For self-stated reasons of sovereignty and independence, the Europeans are proposing an SSN of their own. The European Union real-
158 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

izes that its economy depends on space technologies and that protection ofspace systems is vital to its security. Some of its member states,

such as Germany and France, already have some space-surveillance

assets, but these are limited and not integrated into a holistic system.

The ESA's director general said that "Europe is blind to what happens

in space and wholly dependent on US supplied data."39 To remedy

this situation, the ESA plans to invest $66 million over the next three

years to develop its own capability.40

A new US government initiative is also emerging. In 2003 Congress

directed the secretary of defense to conduct SSA for all US government space systems and, as appropriate, for commercial and foreign

entities (CFE). In response, AFSPC made available conjunction analyses via the Space-track.org Web site to nongovernmental entities as a

pilot program. As of September 2009, 18 commercial companies,

which operate 66 satellites, have signed quid pro quo agreements

with the US government for conjunction analyses and launch support. In October 2009, AFSPC transitioned CFEs to USSTRATCOM as

an operational program. However, the high-precision conjunction

analyses needed for effective collision avoidance are not universally

available. This is limited to high-value satellites (as prioritized by the

US military) because it is labor intensive and not automated.41

Along with Space-track.org (as part of CFEs), several other publicdomain services, such as HeavensAbove.com and Celestrack.com,

also publish the space catalog on the Internet. Although they provide

a valuable service, they are not necessarily providing new data. Essentially, they republish the unclassified space catalog provided by

the Air Force, the so-called two-line element (TLE) sets. Although

available to the world, these TLE sets do not have the requisite accuracy needed for precision conjunction analysis. In fact, the Air

Force warns Space-track users to use the data at their own risk.42

Additionally, at least 6,000 objects do not appear in the Space-track

catalog because the launching nation could not be identified.43 With

these restrictions and limitations, the underlying message is that users need more accurate data.

In an apparent response to these deficiencies, three of the world's

largest commercial satellite operators—Intelsat, SES, and Inmarsat—

in a cooperative private venture, created the Space Data Association

in November 2009. They expect eight companies to participate in collision avoidance and another 14 companies to be involved in reducing

satellite radio-frequency interference. Although they acknowledge

that the US CFE program has some benefit, they feel compelled to

invest their own capital because the "information is not always as
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 159

precise or up to date—nor is it disseminated as quickly—as it needs

to be to protect against close encounters between satellites."44

Two other organizations also provide conjunction analyses and

warnings of possible satellite collisions. Lincoln Laboratory, as part of

a cooperative research and development agreement, fielded the Geosynchronous Monitoring and Warning System (GMWS) for its four

member partners. The automated GMWS, via high-precision orbits

derived from three Lincoln Laboratory-operated radars merged with

SSN data, produces 60-day watch lists and two-week warning lists of

close encounters for 60 commercial satellites. Lincoln Laboratory

typically reports 250 conjunctions per year and has recommended 65

avoidance strategies to its partners since 1997.45 A second service,

the Satellite Orbital Conjunction Reports Assessing Threatening Encounters in Space (SOCRATES), is hosted on Celestrack.com and

available to anyone interested. It provides twice-a-day analyses for all

orbital regions based on the Air Force's unclassified TLE sets. Although it's not very accurate—the positional uncertainties are hundreds or thousands of meters due to the limitations of the TLE sets—

the SOCRATES reports can be used as tip-offs by satellite operators

for further investigation.46

Despite these efforts, there is a significant gap between current

space surveillance capabilities and what is needed for comprehensive, global space-traffic control. For example, as good as the US system is, General James says it still lacks the ability to acquire all onorbit objects. He stated that the SSN has a significant coverage gap in

the Southern Hemisphere and often loses some GEO satellites.47 To

plug this hardware gap, the Air Force is investing $45 million to field

a new ground surveillance system—an expansion of the "Space

Fence"—with initial deployment by 2015.48 In addition, the SpaceBased Space Surveillance System, slated to launch in 2010, will provide the ability to scan the entire GEO belt from space and maintain

"track custody" of GEO objects every 24 hours.49 However, these efforts mainly address data acquisition (see fig. 1), not holistic solutions for space-traffic control.

Beyond hardware, the US software system is also imperfect and

antiquated. In some cases, the Americans are behind Russian mathematical practices to process and predict high-quality space tracks.50

For example, the US military is still using decades-old astrodynamic

techniques to create element sets, mainly because the costs to redesign and recertify its operational systems would be enormous.51 To

make up some of this deficit, the Air Force uses the brute-force

method of oversampling (lots of observations) versus elegant mathematics. Until recently JSpOC was performing conjunction analyses
160 SMITHAM • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

only for priority US satellites, such as manned flights and US defense

satellites. After the Indium-Cosmos collision and renewed interest by

DOD senior leaders, the JSpOC recently upgraded its computational

systems to give it the ability to run conjunction analyses for all active

satellites within the catalog.52 However, precision analysis needed for

positive collision avoidance is still only on a case-by-case basis because it is labor intensive and not automated.53

Another challenge is data sharing. Only the United States currently

shares its unclassified space TLE catalog with the world (with some

restrictions). But its information sharing is criticized for being untimely and insufficient for conjunction assessment and warning.54

Russia and China currently do not share.55 And the ESA does not

plan to publicly share data either. An ESA official stated, "We will send

our data only to those who really need it."56 Further complications

arise from security. For example, the Americans do not share orbital

information on their national-security satellites. The French were

frustrated that the United States publishes data on French classified

satellites and asked that the Americans withhold this information.57

Dr. William Ailor, Aerospace's director for the Center for Orbital and

Reentry Debris Studies, states that an effective space-trafflc-control

system would need to incorporate data from all sources, government

and private, and would need to protect proprietary and sensitive data.58

Beyond the inadequacies of data policies, no international treaties

or guidelines "mandate a legal set of approaches towards space traffic

management."59 Only liability resulting from collisions is presently

addressed by international law. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the

Liability Convention of 1972, and the Registration Convention of

1976 make it clear that both intergovernmental organizations and

state parties are liable for damages caused by their space objects

(including their components) whether on the ground or in the air or

outer space. Unfortunately, the treaties are silent on the issues of

debris management or removal. If debris happens to be involved in a

collision, the Registration Convention obligates nations with space

surveillance systems to assist to the greatest extent feasible in identifying the origin of the space object.60 To address this problem, the

State Department's deputy director of space policy is looking "at ways

to protect critical government and commercial space infrastructure

against orbital debris" and improve SSA at the 2010 United Nations

(UN) Conference on Disarmament.61

If a global service is required to avoid satellite collisions, is there precedence for such a service? We next look at three global services operating today, some ofwhich have been in use for more than a century.
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 161

Precedents for Global Services

Three existing services could be models for a global service.62 These

include a free US-operated service and international services that

would help to manage the global commons on behalf of their members.

The Global Positioning System (GPS) demonstrates the first type of

global service, one provided free by the United States. Today, GPS is

used by virtually the entire world for positioning, navigation, and timing. According to senior US State Department officials, although its

genesis was military uses, GPS evolved into a global utility and a

centerpiece of US diplomacy. In 1983 President Reagan offered free

civilian access to GPS to help enhance aviation safety around the

world. President Clinton in 1996 expanded the policy to ensure the

worldwide availability of the service for peaceful civil, commercial,

and scientific purposes, free of user fees. In 2004 President Bush

furthered the policy to ensure that the GPS meet the increasing and

varied domestic and global requirements. These successive policies

"helped unleash the power of free markets and private enterprise for

the good of all users worldwide."63 Clearly, this type of service is a

likely candidate. With the largest, most comprehensive space surveillance system in the world, the United States is uniquely poised to

offer another free service to the world.

A second precedent for a global utility is the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized UN agency based in Geneva,

Switzerland. The ITU manages the worldwide radio spectrum usage and

slot allocation for GEO satellites on behalf of its members. The ITU currently consists of 191 member states (nations), 574 sector members (commercial companies), and 150 associates (commercial companies). The

members underwrite operations and participate in its decision making.64

The ITU ensures the rational, equitable, efficient, and economical use of

radio frequencies and orbital slots—both of which are finite resources—

and creates the conditions that harmonize development of systems, taking into account all parties involved. According to the director ofits Radiocommunication Bureau, the ITU "plays a vital role in the global

management of the radio-frequency spectrum and satellite orbits."65

The third example of a global service is the International Civil Aviation

Organization (ICAO). Founded in 1947, it governs the international

civil aviation system. With the rise in aircraft use during World War II,

the United States and others saw the need for a global aviation system. According to the ICAO, "A vast network of passenger and freight

carriage was set up, but in order for air transport to support and

benefit the world at peace there were many political and technical

obstacles to overcome. In those early days of 1944, the Government
162 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

of the United States conducted exploratory discussions with other

allied nations to develop an effective strategy."66 The ICAO is now a

specialized UN agency with 190 member states that have voluntarily

entered into its conventions. These conventions established the rules,

procedures, requirements, and techniques to govern the movement of

international civil aviation. Although each nation governs air traffic

within its own sovereign territory, the ICAO successfully established

protocols and procedures for the operations of international traffic,

the transition of aircraft from one nation to the next, and the operation of aircraft over global commons, such as the high seas.

* '-'

Qy~

v _

Photograph courtesy ot the ICAO

In November 1944, under the leadership of the United States, 54 nations met

In Chicago, resulting in a Convention on International Civil Aviation. In 1947

the ICAO became permanent.

Possible Solutions

Which model is most appropriate for the management of a global

space-traffic-control service? One USAF general advocates a unilateral solution for protecting global utilities. "Having the Air Force assume responsibility for global satellite protection as an extension of

its existing space-control responsibilities seems the most feasible option. Since the Air Force is tasked with controlling space, placing

global utilities under the protective umbrella of space control would

be a matter of policy—not an expansion of technology or costs."67 On

the other hand, the State Department's International Security Advisory Board proposes a multilateral solution and recommends that the
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 163

United States "seek to enlist allies and friendly nations in cooperative

efforts to improve situational awareness."68 The following examines

four possible constructs and their pros and cons.

The first conceptual model is a US-owned-and-operated service

akin to GPS. There are many compelling reasons why the US government could do this. First, it is probably the most expedient avenue to

establish a global service because it could quickly leverage the existing SSN infrastructure and nascent CFE program. Second, the United

States, as the leading spacefaring nation and the only nation with the

necessary resources, has treaty obligations to ensure safety of space

operations in the global commons. Lastly, as matter of national Interest, the United States has the most at stake and most to gain. As the

world's superpower benefiting from globalization, maintaining international institutions and their associated systems that contribute to

the current world order is paramount to its economic security. Moreover, a global space-traffic-control service would enhance military

space security as a defensive system.

Many believe there is a significant drawback to this type of service:

that is, a utility provided by a single nation with the power to turn it

off. For example, despite US public law, presidential policy, and diplomatic engagement, many nations are still wary of US intentions

with the GPS and are pursuing their own navigational systems. The

Europeans, Russians, and Chinese all have satellite programs that

aim to implement organic capabilities. With respect to SSA, it's much

the same. ESA's director-general articulated Europe's worry of being

"blind" and wholly dependent on US-supplled data.69 Despite these

reservations, the United States could leverage this opportunity and

promote US leadership and diplomacy just as it has done with spacebased navigation applications.70

A second model could involve a multinational cooperative service, as

"it takes a village to build a (good) catalog."71 This could be a bilateral

or multilateral arrangement among the United States, Russia, China,

and/or the European Union. Significant diplomatic negotiations would

be required to establish such an alliance, but the benefits could be

significant. Doug Messier suggests that "the key benefit to international

participation in SSA is greater capability for relatively low cost, by combining existing sensor and data sources."72 This model would also align

with President Obama's anticipated space policy focusing on international cooperation.73 Another benefit of cooperation Is that each nation would have access to the same space operating picture, thus lowering mutual suspicion and increasing international security.

This construct does have several flaws. Data sharing could be

sticky—especially Information about defense satellites that each na-
164 SMITHAM • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

tion would want to protect.74 As stated earlier, Russia and China currently do not share their catalogs, and the Europeans have already

expressed reluctance to share theirs. Equitable cost sharing associated with the operations, maintenance, and upgrades of this service

would also need to be negotiated, probably not an easy matter. The

service could disintegrate if one or more of the cooperating nations

decided to withdraw from the arrangement.

The third model could be a commercial utility with clients—nations

or private sector—that would pay for the service. A fledgling operation

similar to this, the Space Data Association, is already in planning

stages. The association plans to compile satellite positional data from

its members' satellite telemetry feeds. A benefit to this kind of service

is the built-in perception that it is independent from any one state or

member. The association also aspires to be more nimble, timely, and

responsive compared to the current US CFE paradigm.75 However,

without a robust, organic space surveillance system, its situational

awareness will be limited to the collective knowledge of its members,

and it would not be able to globally track nonmember satellites or

debris unless a government augments the data.

The last model examined is an international global utility similar to

ICAO. Advocates for this model include Dr. Ailor and the Secure World

Foundation, a space-policy think tank. They propose a nonprofit

space-operations clearinghouse with a board of governors and members drawn from governments of spacefaring nations and major nongovernmental satellite owners "to establish common standards and

practices."76 This service would have the benefit of being recognized

as legitimate and unbiased by nations and private-sector interests

alike. The purpose and aims of such an organization could be orchestrated to parallel existing international laws and customs, such as

the Outer Space Treaty and US space policy. This organization would

also provide a forum for substantive discussions on debris control

and unimpeded, safe access to the global commons. One drawback to

such an arrangement would be that its members would be subject to

rulings from an international body. However, this is no different than

what already happens today with the ITU and ICAO.

Because an ICAO-like service has the most advantages and is more

likely to enjoy international support, it is most likely to succeed. Pursuing this model would constructively leverage existing SSA infrastructures and capabilities as well as international cooperation while

also suppressing mutual suspicions. The United States, as the leading spacefaring nation in the world, would additionally benefit indirectly in terms of diplomatic leadership and international prestige. It

would also benefit directly, as would the world, from improved mill-
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 165

tary and economic security via Improved space control and a safer

environment for commerce.

Findings and Recommendations

Based on this research, this paper identifies five critical findings.

First, the big sky theory for safe operations is no longer valid. Space

is becoming congested and prone to collisions. It will only get worse

with time. Second, the global economy and international security are

in part dependent upon space systems. Consequently, safe operation

of satellites is essential. Third, no governmental, international, or

nongovernmental organization is ultimately responsible for global

space-traffic control. Some governments, namely the United States,

and several nongovernmental organizations have taken nascent steps

to address this problem. However, these efforts are not synchronized

or comprehensive. Fourth, an international consensus Is building for

improved SSA and space-traffic control.77 Finally, the United States

is the world's premier source for SSA. However, even with its future

planned hardware upgrades, the United States is not configured to

meet the needs of global space-traffic control, especially In terms of

timely high-precision data analysis, data sharing, and policy.78

These findings coalesce into a need for a global space-traffic-control

service. This paper recommends first, as In 1944, that the US Department of State, in concert with applicable US agencies and departments, convene an international conference with the purpose of establishing a global space-traffic-control service. Within the next two

years, the United States should engage spacefaring nations and interested private-sector companies in exploratory discussions to develop an effective strategy for such a service. Second, AFSPC, in concert with USSTRATCOM, should upgrade its antiquated software and

databases utilized to track and catalog space objects. Although the

planned Space Fence and Space Based Surveillance System will

greatly expand data available, these hardware upgrades by themselves do not fundamentally bridge the processing gap required for

timely, accurate collision mitigation.

As revealed by the fourth documented collision in space and the

increasing orbital congestion, the need for global space-traffic-control

service is clear. Ignoring the issue will not ease the problem. Within

the US government, the USAF, NASA. STRATCOM, the State Department, and Congress all have stated the need to improve SSA and

mitigate orbital collisions. Outside the US government, the ESA, the

Secure World Foundation, and private industry have also advocated

the need. What is missing is a comprehensive, synchronized plan to
166 SMITHAM • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

addresses the problem in its entirety. As a matter of national prestige,

leadership, and security, the US government should endeavor to establish an international institution to govern global space traffic.

Notes

1. Secure World Foundation, "Iridium 33-Cosmos 2251 Collision," fact sheet, 13

February 2009, http://www.secureworldfoundation.org/siteadmin/images/files/file

_273.pdf: and Liz DeCastro, "Update on Iridium Satellite Constellation." 11 February

2009, http://iridium.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=885.

2. William Ailor, director. Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies. The Aerospace Corporation, briefing, subject: Space Traffic Control and Space Debris, 8 May

2009, slide 5, https://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/Session_5_William_Ailor.pdf.

3. Statement of Lt Gen Larry James, commander. Joint Functional Component

Command for Space, before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics of the House

Committee on Science and Technology, "Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil

and Commercial Users." 28 April 2009, http://gop.science.house.gov/Media/hearings/

Space09/april28/james.pdf (accessed 16 September 2009).

4. "Big sky" theory, borrowed from the aviation community, proposes that space is

so large the probability of a collision is infinitesimally small. Some also use the term

"big space."

5. Tony Reichhardt, "Satellite Smashers: Space-faring nations: Cleanup low Earth

orbit or you're grounded." Air and Space Magazine. 1 March 2008; and Ailor. briefing,

slide 5.

6. Ailor. briefing, slide 5.

7. Reichhardt, "Satellite Smashers."

8. Ibid.: and Ailor. briefing, slide 5.

9. James, "Keeping the Space Environment Safe," 3.

10. House, Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Space and

Aeronautics. Hearing Charter. Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Users. 28 April 2009. http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Comm

docs/hearings/2009/Space/28apr/Hearing_Charter.pdf (accessed 16 September 2009).

11. NASA, briefing, subject: The Threat of Orbital Debris and Protecting NASA Space

Assets from Satellite Collisions. 28 April 2009, www.secureworldfoundation.org/site

admin/images/ftTes/fiTe_308.pdf. Although space debris mitigation, by physical means,

policy, or international agreement, is an important topic unto itself, it has been extensively discussed by others and is not addressed in this paper.

12. Nicholas Johnson and Jer-Chyi Liou. "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris,"

Science Magazine 311. no. 5759 (January 2006): 340; and Reichhardt. "Satellite

Smashers."

13. NASA, briefing.

14. Doug Messier. "Secure World Foundation Proposes Global Space Debris Tracking System." Parabolic Arc. 29 April 2009. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2009/04/29/

secure-world-foundation-proposes-global-space-debris-tracklng-system (accessed 17

September 2009).

15. Warren Ferster, "GeoEye Dodging Space Junk with Increasing Frequency."

Space News. 4 November 2009. http://www.spacenews.com/earth_observations/

091104-geoeye-dodging-space-junk.html.

16. Richard Abbot and Timothy Wallace. "Decision Support in Space Situational

Awareness." Lincoln Laboratory Journal 16. no. 2 (2007): 313.
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 167

17. Gen Kevin P. Chllton (address. Strategic Space and Defense Conference. Offutt

AFB. NE. 4 November 2009). In this speech. General Chllton refers to "big sky" as "big

space."

18. James. "Keeping the Space Environment Safe." 3. The number of active payloads cited in literature varies from 900 to 1.300. For consistency, this paper uses

1.300 payloads cited by General James during his 2009 congressional testimony. The

math for the number of objects reported in public forums by the USAF does not add up

in a straightforward manner either. For example. 6.000 objects are tracked but not

cataloged because the launching country cannot be determined.

19. Ibid.

20. US Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem—Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-72 [Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. September 1990).

21. For this paper, space environment is narrowly defined to be just the man-made

space objects and associated debris orbiting the earth. It does not include space

weather commonly included in the definition of space environment.

22. The United States, in a nonroutine. limited fashion, maneuvers some of its

high-priority satellites to avoid collisions. But the United States does this only for its

own satellites. A global service that could direct space traffic for all satellites irrespective

of their origin (governmental or nongovernmental) does not exist. The CFE program

(discussed later in this paper) does provide some collision avoidance warnings for non-US

government entities, but these warnings lack sufficient accuracy for collision avoidance maneuvers. The Air Force only passively warns and makes suggestions; it does

not recommend maneuvers or enforce maneuvers for collision avoidance. In fact, the Air

Force cautions the users to use the information at their own risk. See Space-track.org.

"User Agreement." www.space-track.org/perl/new_account.pl.

23. James. "Keeping the Space Environment Safe." 3.

24. Jim Hodges, "Space Fence Reinvented." C4ISR Journal, October 2008. 37.

25. LEO is defined as an orbit less than 2,000 kilometers (km) in altitude.

26. GEO is defined as an orbit 36,000 km above the earth. The medium Earth orbit

(MEO) region, although containing some important constellations such as the Global

Positioning System, currently is at low risk for collisions and is not discussed at length

in ihis paper.

27. Abbot and Wallace. "Decision Support in Space Situational Awareness," 306.

28. USSTRATCOM. "Space Control and Space Surveillance." fact sheet. 19 February

2008. http://www.su^tcom.iiiU/nles/STRATCOM_Space_and%20ControI_Fact_Sheet-25

_Feb_08.doc (accessed 18 September 2009).

29. Committee on Space Debris, Orbital Debris: A Technical Assessment (Washington. DC: National Academy Press. 1995). 12.

30. US Congress, Orbiting Debris. 2: and Committee on Space Debris, Orbital Debris. 22.

31. James. "Keeping the Space Environment Safe." 3: and NASA, briefing, slide 5.

32. Johnson and Liou, "Risks in Space from Orbiting Debris." 340; and Reichhardt,

"Satellite Smashers."

33. Committee on Space Debris, Orbital Debris. 32.

34. Brian Weeden, The Numbers Game: What's in Earth Orbit and How Do We

Know?" Space Review. 13 July 2009. http://www.thespacereview.eom/article/1417/l

(accessed 16 September 2009).

35. Committee on Space Debris. Orbital Debris. 32.

36. USSTRATCOM, "Space Control and Space Surveillance."

37. The US military uses two different mathematical models to describe orbits and

conduct its analyses. The first is general perturbations: it describes orbits with two-
168 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

line element (TLE) sets compatible with the Simplified General Perturbation computer

model; these are made public. The second method—far more accurate and complex—is

special perturbation, which uses state vectors with double-precision positions and

velocity vectors. It is only used for high-priority mission support on a case-by-case

basis. State vectors are available only to the US government and are not shared with

the public like TLE sets. See US Space Command Instruction 10-5. DOD. Commercial.

Civil and Foreign Space Support. 1 April 2002. 2. 9.

38. Committee on Space Debris. Orbital Debris. 32.

39. Quoted in Peter B. De Selding. "Despite SSA Collaboration, Europe Leery of

U.S. Intentions." Space News. 19 January 2009. 6.

40. Ibid.

41. Lt Col Charles Spillar, interview by the author, 24 September 2009. Peterson

AFB. CO: Lt Col Charles Spillar. USAF Space Command/A3CN. briefing, subject: Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) & U.S. Government (USG) SSA Sharing. 24 September 2009.

42. Space-track.org, "User Agreement." www.space-track.org/perl/new_account.pl

(accessed 17 November 2009).

43. Weeden, "Numbers Game?"

44. Peter B. De Selding, "Satellite Firms Moving Ahead on Orbital Database." Space

News. 18 November 2009, http://spacenews.com/satellite_telecom/091118-satellite

-firms-moving-ahead-orbital-database.htm (accessed 22 November 2009).

45. Abbot and Wallace. "Decision Support in Space Situational Awareness." 307-13.

46. Lt Gen John Campbell. USAF. retired, et al.. Examining Codes and Rules for

Space. Forum on National Security Space (Washington. DC: George Marshall Institute.

27 June 2007), http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/554.pdf. 17; and T. S. Kelso

and S. Alfano. "Satellite Orbital Conjunction Reports Assessing Threatening Encounters in Space (SOCRATES)" (address. 2005 American Astronautical Society/American

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Space Flight Mechanics Conference, 23-27

January 2005). http://celestrack.com/publications/AAS/05-124.

47. James, "Keeping the Space Environment Safe," 8.

48. Jeremy Singer, "Air Force Seeks to Triple Funding for Space Surveillance,"

Space News. 7 April 2008, 50.

49. James. "Keeping the Space Environment Safe." 8.

50. Author's personal experience and knowledge.

51. Weeden, "Numbers Game?"

52. Spillar. interview.

53. In addition to its antiquated data processing and orbit prediction software, the

associated Air Force databases are also archaic. Currently, the database is hard coded

to handle only a limited number of objects, so it will also need to be upgraded. "Out of

the 69.999 entries allocated for cataloged objects, about half are already used and

growth is accelerating every year. Compounding this situation are the plans to add new

sensors to the SSN in the near future that will greatly expand the number of objects

tracked." Refer to Weeden's article. "Numbers Game?"

54. Iridium Satellite LLC. "Iridium Provides Update on Satellite Constellation," 9

March 2009. http://www.iridium.com: and De Selding. "Satellite Firms Moving Ahead

on Orbital Database."

55. Edward O'Hara, Space Situational Awareness. Technological and Aerospace

Committee. European Security and Defense Assembly. Assembly of Western European

Union, Document C/2035. 6 May 2009. 6.

56. Quoted in "ESA Approves Space Situational Awareness Program." C41SR Journal

7-8 July 2008, 8.

57. Campbell et al.. Examining Codes and Rulesfor Space. 17.
THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL SPACE-TRAFFIC-CONTROL SERVICE 169

58. Ailor. briefing, slide 7.

59. House. Hearing Charter. Keeping the Space Environment Safe. 28 April 2009. 20.

60. US Congress. Orbiting Debris. 28-31.

61. Amy Hamper. "Obama Space Policy to Focus on Internationa] Cooperation."

Defense News, 7 December 2009. 44.

62. This paper does not attempt to analyze these services in detail in terms of

structure, cost, or degree to which they provide totally comprehensive solutions—only

as appropriate examples to consider.

63. Alice A. Wong and Rave E. Clore, "Promoting International Civil GNSS Cooperation through Diplomacy." High Frontier 4. no. 3 (May 2008): 25-27.

64. ITU membership overview, http://www.itu.int/members/index.html (accessed

21 November 2009).

65. Valerie Timofeev. "Welcome to ITU-R." International Telecommunication Union

Web site, http: //www.itu.mt/rrU-R/index.asp?category=inforTnationfia-link=itur-welcome

&lang=en.

66. International Civil Aviation Organization, "Memorandum on ICAO." http://

www.icao.int/icao/en/pub/memo.pdf.

67. Gen Bruce Carlson. "Protecting Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millennium's Space-Based Public Service." Air and Space Power Journal 14. no. 2 (Summer

2000): 37-41.

68. US Department of State. International Security Advisory Board, "Report on U.S.

Space Policy." Washington. DC. 25 April 2007. http://www.state.gov/documents/

organization/85263.pdf (accessed 16 September 2009).

69. De Selding. "Despite SSA Collaboration, Europe Leery of U.S. Intentions." 6.

70. Wong and Clore. "Promoting International Civil GNSS Cooperation." 25-27.

71. Weeden, "Numbers Game?"

72. Messier, "Secure World Foundation."

73. Klamper. "Obama Space Policy." 44.

74. Edward O'Hara. Space Situational Awareness. Technological and Aerospace

Committee. European Security and Defense Assembly. Assembly ofWestern European

Union. Document C/2035. 6 May 2009. 10.

75. De Selding, "Satellite Firms Moving Ahead on Orbital Database."

76. Peter N. Sports, "Does Space Need Air Traffic Control? As More Countries Race

to Launch Satellites and Manned Craft. Some Warn of a Space Jam." Christian Science

Monitor. 14 March 2008. http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0314/p01s02-usgn.html.

See also Ailor. briefing; and Doug Messier, "Space Traffic Control Conference to be Held

Next Week in DC," Parabolic Arc, 20 March 2009. http://www.parabolicarc.com/

2009/03/20/space-traffic-control-conferences-held-week-dc.

77. Ailor. briefing: Spotts. "Does Space Need Air Traffic Control?"; Messier. "Space

Traffic Control Conference": De Selding, "Satellite Firms Moving Ahead on Orbital

Database"; Messier, "Secure World Foundation": and Space.com staff. "Out There:

Space Traffic Control System Needed," Space.com. 9 November 2008. http://www

.space.com/new/081109-space-traffic.html.

78. Albert Glassman. The Growing Threat of Space Debris." IEEE-USA Today s

Engineer online. July 2009. http://www.todaysengineer.org/2009/jul/space_debris.asp.
170 SMITHAM * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 57

Abbreviations

AFSPC

CFE

DOD

ESA

GEO

GMWS

GPS

ICAO

ITU

JSpOC

km

LEO

MEO

NASA

SOCRATES

SSA

SSN

SSS

TLE

UN

USSTRATCOM

Air Force Space Command

commercial and foreign entity

Department of Defense

European Space Agency

geosynchronous Earth orbit

Geosynchronous Monitoring and Warning System

Global Positioning System

International Civil Aviation Organization

International Telecommunication Union

Joint Space Operations Center

kilometer

low Earth orbit

medium Earth orbit

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Satellite Orbital Conjunction Reports Assessing

Threatening Encounters in Space

space situational awareness

space surveillance network

space surveillance system

two-line element

United Nations

United States Strategic Command
Ready or Not?

Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell

Col Julie C. Boit, USAF*

I will end "don't ask, don't tell"

—Pres. Barack Obama

Throughout his presidential campaign and again as recently as the

2010 State of the Union address, Pres. Barack Obama reinforced his

commitment to lift the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the US

military.' Although he cannot lift the ban on his own—only the legislative branch has that authority—the president's clear stance and the

Democratic Party's majority in Congress point to a repeal of the "Don't

Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy in the nearer term.* In fact, bills have

already been introduced, and some Democrats in Congress are posturing to include a repeal in their versions of the defense authorization

bill this year.2 Moreover, in congressional testimony, Adm Michael G.

Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), stated that it was

his "personal belief that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly

would be the right thing to do."3These facts make a repeal of DADT

more likely than not—therefore, the Department of Defense (DOD) should

begin preparing now to manage prospective impacts to its forces.

The US military, with its ban on the open display of homosexuality,

stands with 11 other countries, but this list does not include countries where homosexuality is "banned outright, such as Iran, Saudi

Arabia, and several other nations in the Middle East."4 However, other

key allies, including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Israel, have already lifted the ban on homosexuals serving in their

militaries. In fact, 24 foreign militaries now have no ban on gay service members, and many of these allies provide critical support to the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.5

These "combat-tested fighting forces"

are "critical partners in the American defense strategy" and can pro-

*Dr. Stefan Eisen. USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

tThe author finalized this paper In fall 2009 with the intent to better prepare the DOD for the

eventual repeal of DADT. In March 2010. the secretary of defense directed establishment of the

Comprehensive Review Working Group, which examined many of the Issues outlined in this paper.

In December 2010. Congress repealed DADT; the DOD is now in the process of implementing the

new nondiscrtminatory policy.

171
172 BOIT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

vide insight to the United States as it prepares for its own policy

change regarding homosexuals.6

This paper briefly discusses the history and current policy under

DADT and outlines proposed legislation currently in the US House of

Representatives and Senate. Given the likelihood of repeal sooner rather

than later, this paper then focuses on specific policy implementation

recommendations for the DOD—and who should be involved. This paper

does not argue the "rightness" or "wrongness" of any alteration to DADT.

It does, however, show that to successfully execute the potential new law

in the US military work environment, the DOD must involve key stakeholders and take multiple actions now to mitigate potential impacts.

Such steps include being proactive, emphasizing professional conduct,

top-down implementation, training and education, and consideration of

manpower, facility, and other internal policy concerns.

Recent History and the Current Law

Those serving in the US military in the early 1990s remember the

charged political debates and presidential campaign promises of Gov.

Bill Clinton that eventually led to 10 United States Code 654, Policy

Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces, commonly known as

DADT. While Clinton promised to lift the ban entirely, §654, enacted in

1993, was essentially a compromise based on fierce resistance by influential congressional members and senior US military officers.7

In

the law, Congress reasserted its unique discretion to "establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the Armed Forces," reaffirmed

the "prohibition against homosexual conduct," and reemphasized its

authority to "regulate a [service] member's life for 24 hours each day."8

Basically, the law allows a homosexual to serve in the armed forces as

long as that person does not engage (or intend to engage) in homosexual

conduct, which includes homosexual acts, statements, marriage (or attempted marriage) to a person known to be of the same biological sex.9

Since implementation, from fiscal years 1994 through 2009, 13,167 service members have been discharged from the US military under §654.10

This paper uses DADT and the general term policy to refer to restrictions

against open homosexuals in accordance with the 1993 statute, as well as

the accompanying US government policy and implementing directives.

Proposed Legislation

The Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009, introduced in

the House of Representatives and in subcommittee in March 2009,

proposes to repeal the current law and the DOD policy concerning
READY OR NOT? 173

homosexuality. As written. It "prohibits the Secretary of Defense, and

Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the Coast Guard

when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, from discriminating

on the basis of sexual orientation against any member of the Armed

Forces or any person seeking to become a member."11 The proposed

legislation also "authorizes the re-accession into the Armed Forces of

otherwise qualified individuals previously separated for homosexuality,

bisexuality, or homosexual conduct."12 The secretaries may also "not

establish. Implement, or apply any personnel or administrative policy,

or take any personnel or administrative action (including any policy

or action relating to promotions, demotions, evaluations, selections for

awards, selections for duty assignments, transfers, or separations) in

whole or in part on the basis of sexual orientation."13 A similarly

worded and entitled bill was also Introduced in the Senate, and it is

currently in committee as of March 2010.14

Note that since repeal could affect family member benefits, section

5 of each bill states "[njothing in this act . . . shall be construed to

require the furnishing of dependent benefits in violation of section 7

of title 1, U.S. Code (relating to the definitions of 'marriage' and

'spouse' and referred to as the 'Defense of Marriage Act')."15 Unless

changed, the federal definition of marriage will continue to be a "legal

union between a man and a woman" and a spouse still "refers only to

a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."16 In other

words, unless the Defense of Marriage Act is altered or the proposed

DADT repeal legislation is amended, spousal and dependent benefits

should not be an immediate issue for the DOD.

Working the Interfaces—Who Should Be Involved?

Having people from all levels involved brings in multiple

perspectives, identifies unexpected problems, and can generate

innovative ideas and solutions.

—Wayne Turk

"Be Willing to Make ChangesRepealing DADT must involve numerous stakeholders to ensure effective implementation and full consideration of unintended consequences. Participative involvement from all levels can also create buyIn and help "overcome resistance and make changes succeed."17 To

determine who should be involved, figure 1 provides a proposed interest

map for the DOD's use as it prepares for repeal.

Steven Cohen's interest map concept can be useful to visualize the

different agencies with an interest in the outcome.18 For example, the
174 BOIT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

Implementing the Repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"

Constituents ^tereSt M°P

Unit leadership

Medical Treatment

Facilities & VA

Homosexuals serving

in U.S. Armed Forces

Judge Advocate Corps

Family Support

Sexual Assault Response &

Eaual OoDortunitv Exports

Accessions Training, Mil

Academies & Recruiters

Housing/Dormitory

Experts

Personnel/Human

Resource Experts

Primary Stakeholders

Navy

Guard &

Reserves

' Dtptof

Homeland

Other Interested Parties

Supreme Court

Domestic Public

International Public

Other U.S. Federal

Ag»nci<s

Interest Groups

(Pro/Con)

Prior Military (Including those

discharged under DADT)

Potential Recruits (Homosexual

and Heterosexual)

Figure 1. Implementing the repeal of "don't ask, don't tell" interest map. (Created

by the author.)

primary stakeholders clearly have an interest if DADT is repealed, as

they will be the primary implementers. The constituents, such as military members and agencies within the DOD, have a direct relationship

and will be directly affected by the implementation plan approved by

the department. Other interested parties (OIP) may or may not have a

direct relationship with the DOD, but OIPs certainly have interests in

the outcome—and might make decisions or take action based on that

outcome. As Cohen suggests, these stakeholders' interests may appear

remote. However, "If we ignore them . . . they may come back to haunt

us when we are least expecting it."19 Moreover, note the overlapping

interests, multiple ties, and connections among all of the parties on the

map, even though these connections are not shown in the graphic.

To illustrate the recommended thought process, note that OIPs include the American public, the media, and US allies. Making a concerted effort to reach out and communicate strategically with the

American public through the media before, during, and after implementation can go a long way towards ensuring transparency and

maintaining public trust. Strategic communication should also target

US allies, especially since many ofthem no longer have a ban on openly
READY OR NOT? 175

serving homosexuals. Coalition partners must understand the change

and the DOD's efforts to smoothly implement the repeal. In fact, many

allies can offer potential "lessons learned" from their personnel policies, as will be discussed later. The key is to engage the right internal

and external organizations from the start and to realize that others

outside the US military are also impacted by a repeal ofthe DADT policy.

Policy Implementation Recommendations

If elected officials change the military's homosexual policy, the

DOD must appropriately implement and adhere to the new law to

minimize negative impacts to its forces. Armed with the background

and proposed legislation above, several recommendations, outlined

in figure 2, should assist the DOD in executing the new law's details.

Recommendations for DOD

1. Be Proactive

- Consult Foreign Militaries

- Review prior DOD integration efforts

2. Emphasize Professional Conduct

- Create "code of professional conduct"

3. Top-Down Implementation

- Message must come from DOD senior leadership

4. Training & Education

- Not sensitivity training, but education on new law/standards

5. Manpower Considerations

- Temporary augmentation of Equal Opportunity (EO), Sexual Assault

Response Coordinators (SARC), Chaplaincy, & Medical Corps

- Posture for reinstatement of formerly discharged members

- Prepare for potential "mass exodus" (senior officer/NCO leaders)

6. Facility Issues

- Consider, but be wary of special treatment/benefits

7. Other Internal Policy Considerations

- Revision of directives, regulations, Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ), and personnel policies

- Posture for potential litigation

8. Immediate Implementation (versus Gradual Change)

Figure 2. Implementing repeal of DADT—recommendations for the DOD. (Created by the author.)
176 BOIT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

Be Proactive

The DOD must be proactive and act now to involve such key players

as those recommended in figure 1. The initial intent is to begin the dialogue among the stakeholders to determine what they think the issues

will be and follow their suggestions by establishing specific action

plans to deal with those issues. While the DOD may be concerned that

leaning too far forward would signal acceptance or desire for the

change, it may find that waiting until the change occurs risks failure—

and is inconsistent with the military culture of planning ahead.

Part of a proactive approach should include consultations with allies who have lifted their bans to garner lessons learned. While such

nations as Canada, Israel, Britain, and Australia did not experience

the difficulties initially anticipated20—and for Britain and Australia,

lifting the ban was an "absolute non-event"21—there are still insights

to be gained. Perhaps by consulting with Britain, for example, the

United States can ascertain how none of the fears about "harassment, discord, blackmail, bullying or an erosion of unit cohesion or

military effectiveness" materialized for its all-volunteer force.22 Despite size and cultural differences, an opportunity exists to extrapolate from allied experiences what might happen for the United States.

Regardless of these insights, the American military should still expect internal resistance; attitudes, social norms, and religious beliefs

differ in the United States. For example, US military concerns regarding service of open homosexuals include undermining of unit cohesion, violence or abuse towards gays, violation of religious and moral

beliefs, lack of respect for homosexual leaders, and the sharing of

close quarters (such as foxholes, latrines, and operational spaces)

between heterosexuals and open homosexuals.23

A 2009 survey of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans with specific

questions about the concerns listed above suggests that "the strong

support for the policy when it was created [in 1993] has shifted somewhat toward the direction of uncertainty or opposition," indicating less

internal resistance to a repeal.24 Furthermore, the ratings indicated

that the quality of leaders, equipment, and training is the critical factor associated with unit cohesion and readiness.25 This is relevant

since concerns about unit cohesion and readiness are the most cited

reasons for opposition to any repeal of the gay ban.26 Despite this,

some current military members might view any change to the current

policy as "coercive interference in their way of life."27 Therefore, the

United States must prepare for this if the law changes.

Finally, while this change may not exactly mirror previous integration efforts in the US military, the DOD should still consult lessons
READY OR NOT? 177

learned surrounding integration of African Americans and women for

use during this effort. Consulting historical lessons can provide an

essential base of knowledge leading to a successful transition. At a

minimum, these experiences can provide insights into the military's

adaptability to change. As RAND stated, "Experience shows that it is

possible to change how troops behave towards previously excluded

(and despised) minority groups, even if underlying attitudes towards

these groups change very little."28

Emphasis on Professional Conduct

Gay service personnel know that they have the code of

conduct to back them up in the event of harassment or

bullying. And all servicemembers know that they have

recourse to complain ifthey witness inappropriate comments

or actions.

—Aaron Belkin and R. L. Evans

The Effects ofIncluding Gay and Lesbian

Soldiers in the British Armed Forces

One successful implementation strategy used in the United Kingdom's transition in 2000 was the establishment of a code of social

conduct modeled after the Australian armed forces.29 The code, referenced in the quote above, places the focus on professional conduct and behavior for all, regardless of sexual orientation. Homosexuals and heterosexuals are "prohibited from engaging in social

behavior that undermines, or may potentially undermine the trust,

cohesion, and therefore the operational effectiveness, of the Services."30 Existing policies, such as "zero tolerance for harassment,

discrimination and bullying," complemented the code, which enumerated inappropriate behavior that included unwelcome physical or

verbal sexual attention, displaying affection which might cause offense to others, and taking sexual advantage of subordinates.31 The

key was the code avoided dealing with attitudes and beliefs that are

often difficult to change. Instead, it addressed behavior, which can

be more directly influenced.

Using such a code tailored for the United States may work. If the

DOD adopts this approach, the first step would be to create a guiding

coalition of senior leadership across the DOD with enough power and

vision to lead the change.32 The second step would be to involve such

key stakeholders as those illustrated in figure 1 to create a similar

code that would apply to all US service members. The new conduct

code should also be as simple as possible to enhance understanding.
178 BOIT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

Additionally, the stakeholder team should specifically address public

displays of affection (PDA), since challenges in implementation may

occur if heterosexuals and homosexuals have different standards in

this regard. The team developing the code must realize that if PDA for

a heterosexual couple is acceptable, the same standard should apply

to homosexuals. In sum, an emphasis on professional conduct will be

critical to successful implementation—and long-term adherence—to

the proposed law.

Top-Down Implementation

It must be clear to the troops that behavioral dissentfrom the

policy will not be tolerated.

—RAND Research Brief RB-7537, 2000

To effectively implement the DADT repeal, DOD officials must issue a consistent message from the top. DOD-wide talking points and

senior leadership support and training must be central to this policy

conversion. In addition to the message within the quote above, DOD

guidance should include reminders that the US military is subject to

civilian authority and that the DOD must make the change successful.

At all levels, commanders and their senior enlisted leaders must be

the messengers, leading from the front rather than using the equal

opportunity (EO) or sexual assault response coordinator (SARC) offices to deliver the news. Because the military is already under significant stress in Iraq and Afghanistan, leaders must also send messages of reassurance to the force, "convey[ing] that this policy is not

a challenge to traditional military values."33 While potentially difficult

to execute (depending on the personal views of each leader), the policy,

coming directly from senior levels, can set the tone for a positive transition across the services.34

Training and Education

Any enterprise-wide change requires training and education to ensure the initial roll out is implemented appropriately and to ensure

the message is reinforced as new members enter. This change will be

no exception. Using the code of conduct and talking points described

earlier provide a great start. However, the training should not resemble

sensitivity training, as has been suggested by other recent articles.35

As RAND advises, "[EJmphasis should be placed on conduct, not on

teaching tolerance or sensitivity. For those who believe that homo-
READY OR NOT? 179

sexuality Is primarily a moral Issue, efforts to teach tolerance would

simply breed more resentment."36

Instead, the focus should center on establishing "clear norms that

sexual orientation is irrelevant to performing one's duty and that

everyone should be judged on his or her own merits."37 Moreover,

training should emphasize "all sexual harassment is unacceptable

regardless of the genders or sexual orientations of the individuals

involved."38 Furthermore, training should include other specific

guidelines—such as Britain's implementation guidance that advised

"a person's sexual orientation is to be considered a private matter,

and every servicemember has a right to personal privacy"—reminding

personnel to "[rjespect that right, and do not try to make their private

business your concern."39 Educational efforts should also include

clear direction and a focus on professional conduct by all. Finally, in

anticipation of potential violence against known homosexuals in the

military, training should emphasize that perpetrators of violence of

any kind will be punished quickly and appropriately. In sum, training

and education must clearly (and simply) communicate the new policy's

expectations and explain what it means to each military member, focusing on characteristics that unite, rather than what separates.

Manpower Considerations

Although our allies did not experience great difficulties within their

militaries and data from a 2006 survey of US, Iraq, and Afghanistan

war veterans shows "declining support" for the homosexual ban, it is

still prudent to plan for internal resistance.40 To this end, the DOD

should consider several resource issues. For example, the DOD's EO

and SARC programs may require augmentation to deal with the potential increase in sexual harassment and EO-related complaints resulting from homosexuals serving openly. While homosexual-related

complaints occur now, it is realistic to anticipate a temporary increase once the threat of involuntary discharge is lifted. As an integral part of change implementation, these organizations can appropriately deal with any lapses in performance by service members

(both homosexual and heterosexual), and these functions can also

provide critical commander support if adequately staffed.

Furthermore, such support agencies as the chaplaincy and medical

community could require help depending on the reaction of the force.

Although the DOD approach should emphasize behavioral issues,

this topic has spiritual and moral implications that need consideration. In terms of religious counseling, even though a chaplain "would

not be required to preach something that he did not believe as a part
180 BOIT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

of remaining in the chaplaincy, this community could face significant

challenges as it seeks to minister to members of the force."41 Additionally, frequency of homosexual-related medical issues may cause

an uptick in readiness challenges if homosexual conduct is no longer

prohibited. While HIV testing is already a part of medical screening

for service members, a new nondiscriminatory homosexual policy

could still have a negative impact. In response, additional screening,

targeted medical care, and additional HIV medications may be required—and the medical community should be manned accordingly.

Another important issue deals with reinstatement of individuals

previously discharged under the current DADT law, particularly since

the proposed legislation calls for "re-accession of otherwise qualified

persons."42 Given this, the services should examine homosexual discharge cases since 1993 and begin determining personnel procedures

for reinstatement immediately. The services should also begin collecting data regarding career fields in which these individuals served and

begin formulating where and how they can be utilized to benefit both

the service and the returning service member. The DOD should note

that Britain successfully invited, integrated, and reaccessed previously

separated members. After ensuring the individual's qualifications,

security clearance, and fitness for duty, the candidate was reinstated

in fields where military personnel were needed. In addition, on-thejob or other training programs were used to establish job currency.43

Finally, the DOD cannot ignore the possibility of a "mass exodus"—

or at least a significant number of currently serving personnel deciding to separate or retire early because of the policy change. Other

foreign militaries expected it based on vocal resistance before implementation. Even though it did not materialize, the United Sates could

certainly be different, particularly in the higher ranks of its military.

In fact, 1,152 retired flag and general officers have communicated

concerns regarding DADT repeal, which could indicate significant resistance in current leadership as well.44 To manage this risk, DOD

leaders must communicate with the entire force early and often and

reiterate such themes as fair and equitable standards for all and

DOD-wide expectations for professional conduct. Focusing on leadership support at the intermediate level and what it means to them

professionally is also important, for the "next layer of leaders, those

who actually must implement the new rules, [must] come to identify

their enforcement of the new policy with their own self-interest as institutional leaders" (emphasis added).45 Interestingly, in addition to a

concerted effort by military leadership to prevent any mass exodus,

the presently weakened economy may actually be an asset In dealing

with the repeal of the DADT policy. Even though RAND warned of
READY OR NOT? 181

negative impacts on recruiting and retention, it is realistic to predict

current economic concerns could mitigate those effects, not to mention those who do resign or choose not to reenlist are more easily replaced during record enlistment resulting from the new post-9/11

Government Issue bill, a steady paycheck, training, and other benefits.46 Moreover, those retained will likely adhere to the new rules

rather than risk discharge or disciplinary action, particularly given

the fear of unemployment in the currently challenging job market.

However, a potential still exists that members may depart because

their belief system will not allow them to adjust to the new policy, or

they may depart to make a statement. The DOD should be prepared

for this possibility, but such departures should not change an approach that incorporates an emphasis on professional conduct.

Facility Considerations

Another resource consideration mentioned in other literature

stated that "dorm and facility upgrades would be needed."47 While

such upgrades would certainly be worth considering, since the most

common concern for heterosexuals is related to sharing with homosexuals such accommodations as showers, bathrooms, and dormitories, the significant monetary costs and potential fairness concerns

make it critical to look carefully at all sides.48

For example, note that the United Kingdom chose not to make any

facility adaptations to accommodate homosexuals and that the negative reaction was only short term.49 Additionally, in Israel, rather

than alter facilities, "gay soldiers are assigned to open bases, allowing

them to commute to and from home and sleep at their own homes

rather than in barracks."50

In this regard, the US military must be particularly wary of special

treatment—if homosexuals receive better facilities or special accommodations, it would only exacerbate potentially contentious integration issues and undermine cohesion and morale. Moreover, creating

separate facilities or special quarters policies for homosexuals would

theoretically require homosexuals to declare their orientation—a concept directly contrary to the proposed law's intent. In addition to cautions about special treatment, one could argue that current US military facilities are already adequate. With the exception of Navy ships

and some Marine Corps bases, most enlisted dormitories are at (or

projected for) the "1 + 1 standard," which includes separate living

quarters with a shared bathroom and kitchen.51 Also, most locations,

even in Iraq and Afghanistan, already use such privacy measures as

stalls to separate common-use showers and bathrooms.
182 BOIT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

Lastly, it is accepted as factual that homosexuals already serve in

today's armed forces and that there are no issues with the facilities

currently available. Nor is there "valid scientific evidence to indicate

that gay men and lesbians are less able than heterosexuals to control

their sexual or romantic urges" or that "acknowledged homosexuals

very seldom challenge the norms and customs of their organizations."52 Given this, if facilities are not an issue now, they should not

be after the ban is lifted. However, ifjust knowing someone is homosexual, or if the real issue is that heterosexuals simply do not like or

are threatened by homosexuals, perhaps the right way to deal with

such discomfort or any resulting inappropriate behavior is through

sexual harassment or educational channels and the chain of command. Within such channels, it remains an issue of professional behavior, not special accommodation.

In summary, good order and discipline, ensured through leadership, are what will make the transition work—much more than walls

and stalls. Consequently, repeal of the DADT policy should not necessarily require special facilities accommodations—particularly given

the enormous costs—but the DOD should look closely to consider all

sides of the argument.

Internal Process Changes and

Other Policy Considerations

Upon the ban's repeal, the DOD's most obvious internal tasks are

to rewrite or adjust directives, instructions, and regulations and task

subordinate services to do the same. In fact, proposed legislation already includes a blanket statement to this effect: "Not later than 90

days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall revise Department of Defense regulations" and each military department must revise its regulations "not later than 180 days

after the date of enactment."53 This relatively short timeline makes it

prudent for the DOD to take stock of documents requiring edits

now—while the repeal is being debated. This easy step enables a

timely plan of action.

Note that the proposed bill does not address a revision of the punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The congressionally mandated UCMJ requires the president to implement the

UCMJ. The president does this through an executive order known as

the Manual for Courts Martial. If Congress passes the DADT repeal

bill, it follows that Article 125 ("Sodomy"), Article 133 ("Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman"), and Article 134-4 ("General

Article-Assault") would need to be aligned with the new law, since
READY OR NOT? 183

arguably these articles could no longer be legitimately enforced under

a homosexual antidiscrimination policy.

Another internal consideration is to prepare for possible lawsuits

from separated homosexual service members. An increase in litigation is especially realistic if the DOD continues to discharge military

members while the DADT policy is under review. Interestingly, the

British Ministry of Defence discharged its last homosexual three days

before lifting of its ban in 2000, resulting in additional negative press

and litigation.54 Thus, the United States should consider immediately

whether to place on hold current discharge cases to preclude issues

after repeal.

In addition to the considerations above, a broad range of personnel

policies must be reviewed in the wake of the DADT policy repeal to

determine if any other policies include discriminatory language. For

example, service fraternization policies appear to remain relevant in

any post-DADT world, with the exception of those paragraphs specifically addressing the current homosexual policy.55 However, with

regards to assignment policies, while military members could argue

that homosexuals should be restricted from serving in certain career

fields more likely to experience austere or close-knit living conditions

(e.g., infantry, ranger, or Marine units), the proposed bill specifically

prohibits any personnel policy, including selections for duty assignments, on the basis ofsexual orientation in whole or in part.56 Finally,

if the proposed bill is altered to include dependent benefits, given that

some states allow same-sex marriages, several other recommendations

will need to be considered at some point, including medical benefits,

insurance, and survivor benefits.57 Even though the federal government is not bound by such state laws, repeal could just be a foot in

the door and lead to dependent benefits as the next step of legislation.

Either way, the DOD should at least consider this possibility, since

the monetary and policy impacts would be significant. In sum, the

DOD must undertake an enterprise-wide review of its policies to ensure

they meet the new law's intent—and consider possible challenges.

Implementation Timeline

/ think it's important, as we look to this change, that it be done

in a way that doesn't disrupt the force at a time where it's

under a lot ofstress. And that, to me, means in a measured,

deliberate way, over some time—to be determined.

—Adm Michael G. Mullen

Chairman, JCS
184 BOIT • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

While some could argue that a gradual change may be more palatable because of current operations tempo (as the chairman states

above) or because military culture does not change quickly and its

customs are formed over generations, note that it has already been

more than 16 years since the DADT policy was implemented. In other

words, in a way, it has already been a gradual change.

Regardless, if the homosexual ban is lifted, the DOD may not have

a choice in its implementation. The law may be directive and specific—the proposed bill's regulation rewrite timelines are a case in

point. But even if there is a choice, most change experts recommend

establishing a "sense of urgency" as the organization embarks on

change and puts together its vision and strategy for implementation.58 RAND also recommended immediate rather than gradual implementation as "any sense of experimentation or uncertainty invites

those opposed to change to continue to resist it."59 Since military

members may feel like their turf is being invaded, leaders at all levels

need to understand these concerns and communicate the policy

change benefits to heterosexuals too, because it hinges on the professional standard of conduct for all. Still, leaders should not expect

fundamental attitude changes towards homosexuals (or homosexuality)

regardless of the timeline—even well after the change is implemented—but they must Insist on an adherence to the new rules and

a display of professional behavior from all service members.

Lastly, to ensure implementation is progressing as planned, the

DOD must solicit feedback through hotlines, climate surveys, unit

assessments, and possibly DOD-hosted conferences to identify and

address issues during implementation. The DOD must also closely

monitor retention and recruiting trends to determine the policy

change's impact, if any.

Conclusion

Today's integrated force is the product of many years of

effort, constant monitoring, and the sustained commitment

of civilian and military leaders.

—RAND Research Brief RB-7537, 2000

The US military is the strongest force in the world, and if required

by law, it is capable of integrating homosexuals as other countries

have successfully done. The key in implementing a DADT policy repeal will be for the DOD to plan now and smartly implement any

change to the existing policy by being proactive, emphasizing profes-
READY OR NOT? 185

sional conduct, implementing the change with visible support from

senior leaders, utilizing robust training and education programs,

considering manpower and facility ramifications, and leaning forward

to make policy and regulatory changes required by the new law. Doing these things, particularly with a sustained leadership commitment mentioned in the quote above, will help to ensure that US military readiness and cohesion remains intact in the midst of such a

significant change. With a repeal of the DADT policy likely in the nottoo-distant future, the DOD must be more ready than not—the American people and its government expects and deserves nothing less.

Notes

1. Pres. Barack Obama stated. This year. I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal the law that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country

they love because of who they are." See Pres. Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (White House. Washington. DC. 27 January 2010). http://stateoftheunlon

address.org (accessed 28 January 2010).

2. Ed O'Keefe and Paul Kane. "Congressman Vows Repeal Effort in 2010," Washing

ton Post, 12 November 2009. 6.

3. JCS Web site. "Testimony Regarding DOD 'Don't Ask. Don't Tell' Policy." as delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Adm Mike Mullen, chairman. JCS.

2 February 2010. http://www.Jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1322 (accessed 8 February

2010).

4. Other countries with homosexual bans Include Argentina. Belarus, Brazil. Croatia.

Greece. Poland, Peru. Portugal. Russia. Turkey, and Venezuela. See Nathaniel Frank.

Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America (New

York: St. Martin's Press. 2009), 137.

5. Ibid., 137. 158. Other countries without homosexual bans include Australia.

Austria, Bahamas, Belgium. Great Britain. Canada. Czech Republic. Denmark, Estonia. Finland, France, Ireland. Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New

Zealand. Norway, Slovenia, South Africa. Spain. Sweden, and Switzerland.

6. Ibid., 158.

7. Statements presented by members of Congress indicated resistance. See US

House. Committee on Armed Services. Policy Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 103d Cong., 1st sess.. May 1993. For Information on resistance

from the JCS, see Colin Powell, My American Journey, ed. Joseph Perisco (New York:

Random House. 1995). 556-57.

8. "Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces." US Code, Title 10. sec.

654.

9. Ibid.

10. JCS Web site. "Testimony Regarding DOD Don't Ask. Don't Tell' Policy"; and Lt

Col Greg A. Brown (USAF. Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness), interview by the author. 13 October 2009.

11. House, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of2009, 111th Cong.. 1st sess. HR

1283. in Congressional Record, 3 March 2009: and Senate. Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2010. 111th Cong.. 2d sess.. S. 3065, in Congressional Record. 3

March 2010.

12. House, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of2009.
186 BOIT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

13. Ibid.

14. Senate, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2010.

15. Ibid.; and House, Military Readiness Enhancement Act of2009.

16. Defense of Marriage Act, Definition of Marriage and Spouse, US Code, 104th

Cong., 2d sess., 3 January 1996.

17. Wayne Turk, "Be Willing to Make Changes: But Not Change for Change's Sake."

Defense AT & L, 1 May 2009, 2. http://www.thefreelibrary.eom/_/print/PrlntArticle

. aspx?id=201622652.

18. Discussed In detail by Steven P. Cohen, Negotiating Skills for Managers and

Everyone Else (New York: McGraw-Hill Co.. 2002).

19. Ibid., 71.

20. Frank, Unfriendly Fire. 147.

21. Aaron Belkin. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?" Parameters 33, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 110; and Group Captain Raymond Goodall

(Royal Air Force, Air War College instructor), interview by the author. 14 October 2009.

See also Frank, Unfriendly Fire, 147; Sarah Lyall, "Gay Britons Serve in Military with

Little Fuss, as Predicted Discord Does Not Occur," New York Times, 21 May 2007;

Cralg Jones (lieutenant commander. Royal Navy, retired), interview by the author, 19

January 2010; and "Gays In the Military: The UK and US Compared," BBC News.

http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hl/amerlcas/8493888.stm (accessed 14 February 2010).

22. Lyall. "Gay Britons Serve in Military with Little Fuss."

23. Bonnie Moradi and Laura Miller, "Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans towards Gay and Lesbian Service Members," Armed Forces and Society, 29 October

2009. http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/rapidpdf/0095327X09352960vl (accessed 13 December 2009).

24. Ibid., 19.

25. Ibid., 1.

26. Rowan Scarborough, "Marine Leads 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Fight," Washington

Times, 2 November 2009, 1.

27. Frank, Unfriendly Fire. 143.

28. "Changing the Policy toward Homosexuals In the U.S. Military," RAND Research

Brief, RB-7537. 2000, htrp://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7537/indexl.htrnl.

29. Aaron Belkin and R. L. Evans, The Effects ofIncluding Gay and Lesbian Soldiers

in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence (University of California-Santa

Barbara: The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military. 2000). 27. 33.

30. Ibid., 26.

31. Ibid.

32. John P. Kotter. Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 21.

33. "Changing the Policy toward Homosexuals in the U.S. Military."

34. Some leaders may view homosexuality as wrong—for example, former chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs, Gen Peter Pace, "belleve(d) that homosexual acts are immoral."

Quoted in "Top General: Remarks on Gays Were 'Personal Moral Views.'" CNN.com. 14

March 2007. http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/03/13/gays.mllltary/index.html (accessed

14 December 2009).

35. See Om Prakash, The Efficacy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell," Joint Forces Quarterly

55 (October-December 2009): 88-94.

36. "Changing the Policy toward Homosexuals in the U.S. Military."

37. House, Policy Implications ofLifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 247.

38. Ibid.

39. Belkin and Evans, Effects ofIncluding Gay and Lesbian Soldiers, 27.

40. Moradi and Miller, "Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans."

41. House. Policy Implications ofLifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 170.
READY OR NOT? 187

42. House. Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009.

43. Jones. Interview.

44. "Flag and General Officers for the Military: Supporting the 1993 Law That Protects Morale and Readiness." http://www.flagandgeneralofncersforthemllitary.com

(accessed 8 February 2010). For example, current Marine Corps commandant. Gen

James T. Conway. has been the "most outspoken opponent" of repeal. See Scarborough,

"Marine Leads Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Fight."

45. Frank, Unfriendly Fire. 166.

46. Llzette Alvarez, "More Americans Joining Military as Jobs Dwindle." New York

Times, 18 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/us/19recruits.html

(accessed 14 December 2009).

47. Prakash. "Efficacy of Don't Ask, Don't Tell."

48. Belkln and Evans, Effects ofIncluding Gay and Lesbian Soldiers, 38.

49. Ibid.. 39.

50. Aaron Belkln and Melissa Levitt, "Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces:

Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?" Armed Forces & Society 27.

no. 4 (Summer 2001): 553.

51. "Base Housing: Barracks and Dormitories," Army Times.com, http://www.army

tlmes.com/benefits/houslng/online_hbml08_housing_barracks/ (accessed 14 February 2010).

52. House, Policy Implications ofLifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 245:

and "Changing the Policy toward Homosexuals In the U.S. Military."

53. House. Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009.

54. Brown, interview.

55. Ibid.

56. House. Military Readiness Enhancement Act of2009.

57. Massachusetts. Connecticut, California, Iowa. Vermont, and New Hampshire

issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples: Rhode Island. New York, and the District

of Columbia recognize same-sex marriages from other states: and New Jersey allows

civil unions. See National Conference of State Legislatures, "Same Sex Marriage, Civfl

Unions and Domestic Partnerships." http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Human

Services/SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (accessed 8 February 2010).

58. Kotter, Leading Change, 21.

59. "Changing the Policy toward Homosexuals in the U.S. Military."
188 BOIT * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 58

Abbreviations

DADT "don't ask, don't tell"

DOD Department of Defense

EO Equal Opportunity

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OIP other interested party

PDA public display of affection

SARC sexual assault response coordinator

UCMJ Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice
Science and Technology Intellectual Capital

A Critical US Asset

Col Stella T. Smith, USAF*

The potential for losing intellectual dominance in science and technology is a major threat to the ability of the United States to maintain

national security and economic superiority. The United States must

ensure it exercises the best possible options to grow, attract, and

maintain enough qualified individuals to stay ahead of all adversaries. In addition to expanding the base of technology-educated individuals, the United States must counter threats to the intellectual

capital base to secure its ability to deter the actions of adversaries.

The primary measure of intellectual capital development is the number of undergraduate and graduate degrees earned in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). The United States

must focus now on doing what is necessary to maintain educational

excellence and post-education opportunities to ensure that the US

knowledge base in science and technology will remain the strongest

in the world.

The following discussion examines many variables influencing the

future of US intellectual capital. I first review the strategic importance

of growing, attracting, and retaining graduate-level STEM professionals. This includes the first-, second-, and third-order effects of having, or conversely losing, US intellectual capacity. I next address current trends and, specifically, the importance of benefiting from

foreign-born students and workers. This analysis includes statistics

regarding graduate degrees granted in the United States to both citizens and noncitizens. Subsequently, I review initiatives to ensure

that the United States will have a robust technology-educated core in

future years. Finally, the discussion lays out potential impacts of developing technology on deterrence. I specifically focus on the United

States' ability to stay at the cutting edge of innovation and the correlation of maintaining STEM intellectual capacity to countering or

deterring technically advanced threats.

The exponential growth of technology combined with rapid globalization points to a future that requires the United States to have an

advantage in science and technology intellectual capital. Without this

•Mr. Theodore Halles. USAF civilian, was the essay advisor for this paper.

189
190 SMITH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

resource, the United States will be at a disadvantage in many areas,

including national security and economic stability. To best prepare

for future threats, the United States needs to prioritize growing, attracting, and maintaining graduate-level technical capacity.

The Importance of STEM Intellectual Capital

A loss ofleadership in S&T[science and technology] could hurt

the U.S. economy, living standards, and national security.

—Titus Galama and James Hosek

Perspectives on U.S. Competitiveness

in Science and Technology

The United States earned and has maintained the preeminent

place on the world's science and technology stage because of a robust

higher education system and a pervasive culture of innovation. This

advantage contributed to successes in all sectors and is a perishable

resource worthy of attention and preservation. Exponential growth in

technological change combined with rapid globalization increases the

criticality of creating, recruiting, and maintaining science and technology intellectual capital.

STEM intellectual capital is the group of individuals with education

and prowess in science and technology who use those talents to benefit

the nation. This definition includes both American-born individuals

and immigrants. Historically, the technological and scientific knowledge needed for US national security has not been a function of only

domestic scientific talent.1 While the Manhattan Project was overseen

by a general and a chiefscientist who were both US born and educated,

over half the key scientists involved were foreign born.2The two scientists most responsible for the hydrogen bomb were born and educated

abroad, one in Hungary and the other in what is now the Ukraine.3

Similarly, when the "space race" began with the Soviet Union launching Sputnik I, the United States responded by recruiting Wernher von

Braun, born in Poland. He became known as the "father of the U.S.

space program."4These examples illustrate that throughout American

history, when faced with a threat, the United States found the requisite

talent wherever available. This has been, in breadth and depth, a

uniquely American approach, one that has created diversity and

strength in many fields. To maintain and increase intellectual capital,

the United States must continue to seek, recruit, and retain foreign

immigrants with science and engineering (S&E) capabilities.

Retaining or increasing the advantage of dominant intellectual capacity in science and technology is critical to the United States' staying
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 191

at the forefront of innovation and has potential second- and thirdorder economic, political, military, and social effects. Potential firstorder effects include producing new forms of energy, responding to

diseases, protecting the environment, stimulating further interest

and excitement in students to study science and technology, sparking the next technological revolution, and enhancing security.5

Currently, the United States is the leader in many of these areas, and a

change in that position could alter the world's economic, social, and

security balance. Possible second-order effects of STEM capability

Include Innovation, economic growth, military superiority, and the

ability to detect and counter threats. All these elements support the

broad US national strategy of promoting peace and prosperity. Thirdorder effects could include global social changes which alter the balance of power. These effects are amplified by globalization.

As an example, the National Academy of Engineering published an

in-depth analysis of the impact of globalization on technical advancement. In part. It stated that "the United States must develop the necessary human, financial, physical, regulatory and institutional infrastructures to compare more advantageously with other nations in

attracting the technical, managerial, and financial resources of globally active private corporations or individuals."6

In a globalized world,

additional opportunities exist for individuals worldwide to gain expertise and use it in many locations for a variety of motivations. Where a

person earns a degree may have less influence on where he or she will

work in the future. Likewise, in a globalized world, where a highly

educated worker lives will put less of a limit on whose interest he or

she supports. This illustrates the importance of growing and recruiting individual intellectual capital working specifically in the interest

of the United States.

One second-order effect of intellectual capital superiority is the national security activity of deterrence—influencing adversary leadership decisions away from actions deleterious to the United States.

This endeavor requires an understanding of the actions an adversary

is capable of taking, including threats based on emerging technologies. A decreasing science and technology intellectual base is likely to

diminish the United States' ability to deter these threats. More simply

stated, brainpower itself provides deterrence capability. If the adversary knows the United States has the intellectual ability to understand and counter threats, the chance of achieving his desired effect

decreases. This change in the adversary's decision equation deters

him from acting. Likewise, existing weapons are a key component of

the US deterrent posture, and those weapons also require individuals

with the intellectual capability to keep them viable. According to one
192 SMITH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

estimate, the Pentagon is at risk of running out of scientists to operate and upgrade the nation's arsenal of intercontinental nuclear and

conventional missiles.7

As technology advances exponentially, risk increases due to dependence on vulnerable major networks such as the electrical grid and

the Internet. Not only are more aspects of human endeavors relying

heavily on these networks, but as time goes on, the United States is

losing the necessary knowledge base required to revert to previous

ways of doing business in a crisis. This increased dependence on

high-value systems is a compelling reason why maintaining a robust

pool of people with critical STEM knowledge is essential to successfully deterring adversaries.

If the United States does not take the actions necessary to stay at

least even, if not ahead, in science and technology, there will be

significant and very negative impacts. No other nation is its equal in

scientific and technological accomplishments, but this does not

make the United States invulnerable. The globalized world requires

that the United States be at least on par with all potential adversaries in every technology field so not even one adversary can get an

advantage by an outpacing advance in one area. If an adversary

were to develop an advantage in a technology beyond what the

United States could deter or counter, that would cause a change in

the balance of world power. For this reason, the United States must

stay even or ahead in all areas or be prepared to exist in a world

where it is not the number one power.

Current Status and Trends

The number of university degrees a nation awards in S&E is an indicator of a nation's capacity to innovate in those arenas. S&E graduate enrollment in the United States declined in the latter half of the

1990s but has increased steadily since 1999. The most recent data,

published by the National Science Foundation in 2010, shows that the

number of bachelor's degrees awarded in 2007 increased in most technical fields, except computer sciences.8 Although it is difficult to determine the specific number of degrees required to keep an advantage, a

positive trend is promising and far better than the alternative.

Students in the United States on temporary visas earned only 4

percent of the technical bachelor's degrees awarded in 2007, but foreign students make up a much higher proportion of the master's and

doctoral degree recipients. In 2007 foreign students earned 24 percent of S&E master's degrees and 33 percent of doctoral degrees,

bringing the total number of doctorates earned by foreign students to

13,700—a new peak.9The United States should encourage these stu-
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 193

dents to stay and work for US interests. John Smart, preeminent

scholar on the future of technology and founder of the Acceleration

Studies Foundation, points to the US culture of innovation and the

ability to do valuable research as advantages foreign students see for

studying in the United States.10 The next step must be recruiting and

retaining individuals in the high-skill work force.

Foreign-born intellectual capital is a critical asset. The United

States has depended on the diversity, competition, and personal drive

contributed by foreign students both during their education and afterwards in the highly skilled work force. Fortunately, through 2007

the trend of foreign-born students choosing to study in the United

States is positive, as is the trend of foreign-born graduates who intend to stay here after graduation (fig. 1).

The United States is still the destination of the largest number of

foreign students, but the numbers are trending downward. The US

share in 2000 was 25 percent, but in 2006 it had fallen to 20 percent.

The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are the other top destinations. '' This is a trend worthy of close attention because attracting

foreign students is a primary way of recruiting foreign talent for the

16,000

14,000

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Figure 1. Plans of foreign recipients of US S&E doctorates to stay in the United

States: 1987-2007. (Adapted from National Science Foundation, "Survey of Earned

Doctorates," special tabulations, 2009.)
194 SMITH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

long term. Historically, graduate-level science and technology programs in US universities have been the world's benchmark. This acknowledged excellence, combined with the US culture of innovation,

made degrees from US universities attractive to both US-born and

international students. The secondary effect of attracting foreign students to US universities is that many of the international students

have historically remained in the United States after graduation, increasing the intellectual resources available to US educational institutions, private companies, and government institutions.

Increased competition from other countries expanding their recruitment efforts is not the only threat to the United States attracting

foreign students. Several trends threaten to decrease the US advantage in attracting foreign talent between now and 2035. First, US security concerns have increased greatly since the terrorist attacks of

9/11; as a result, visa procedures are more daunting, including those

for foreign students and for foreign graduates of US universities who

wish to stay in the United States to work. Second, at the same time

that US policies are making it more difficult for foreigners to stay,

improving conditions in many competitor nations are making it more

attractive for foreigners educated in the United States to return home.

The knee-jerk reaction to 9/11, which tightened visa policies, created

a two-year decline in the number offoreign studentsin the United States.

This trend later reversed, with the number of foreign S&E graduate

students in US institutions increasing in the fall of 2006.12 The number of student and exchange-visitor visas issued in 2006 was higher

than ever before, and the sum of the other high-skill-related visa categories was near the 2001 high, suggesting the United States continues to

attract those with advanced education.13 This improvement bodes well

for recovery in the areas of recruiting and retaining intellectual capital, but the dip must be heeded as a warning of how easily the trend

can be reversed. The foiled terrorist attack on a Northwest Airlines

flight to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 returned national attention

to visas for foreigners. US policy makers must understand that any

tightening of visa restrictions may seem to provide short-term improvements in security, but it could result in a long-term decrease in

the capability to deter the very threats we are bracing against.

Finally, the pervasive interconnectedness or "flattening" of the

world is a trend that has made it more possible and palatable for

foreign-born graduates who do stay in the United States to still commit all or part of their efforts to interests in their countries of origin

rather than using them to benefit the United States.14 The United

States must develop a strategic plan now to continue to ensure adequate science and technology skills for 2035 and beyond.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 195

Attracting foreign students is only the first step in securing foreignborn intellectual capital for the United States. Obtaining student visas

is not the only issue. After graduation, many foreign graduates have

difficulty obtaining visas to stay in the United States. In a study of

approaches to strengthening scientific technology. Col WalterJuzukonis

pointed out that the United States provides fast-track citizenship for

foreign nationals who serve in the US military and proposes a similar

fast-track approach for foreign nationals who have earned doctorate

degrees in fields we need to bolster.15

Historically the United States has benefited from "brain drain"—

when highly skilled immigrants contribute educational and economic

assets to a country that hosts them for extended periods or permanently. 16 The brain drain from foreign countries is created by a lack

of opportunity for individuals to be innovative in their home countries. The United States provides attractive opportunities in a culture

of innovation, and the brain drain for other nations in turn becomes

a brain surge for the United States. A 2006 report on Brazilian, Chinese, and Italian students in the United States showed that social

responsibility and perceived opportunities in their home countries

were strong factors in their decision to stay in the United States or

return to their country of origin.17 The United States can increase the

potential for foreign graduates to stay here by providing incentives

that outweigh their desire to return to their home countries. Investing

resources and creativity in influencing these decisions will provide

payback if it means the United States retains STEM-educated, innovative individuals.

In today's environment, the United States must recognize and prepare for multiple levels of external threats. Easy access to information increases the possibility of high-tech threats being wielded not

only by nation-states but also by groups and individuals. Some see

this as an impetus for tighter restrictions on visas and the naturalization policy. Ironically, these same policies make it more difficult to

expand the pool of individuals with technology and science skills

needed to counter those threats. National policy makers must work

these issues aggressively and recognize that keeping science- and

technology-educated individuals out of the United States is a prescription for increased external threats and decreased capability to

deter or counter them.18

T. A. Frank, an Irvine Fellow at the New America Foundation, proposes that one way to regain our dominance in the tech sector would

be to get more of the brightest people in the world to move here. He

contends that because roughly a quarter of US technology and engineering start-ups have founders who were born abroad, it would benefit
196 SMITH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

the United States to encourage more talent to come here and stay

here. Frank supports a plan whereby any student with an advanced

degree In science, technology, engineering, or math would be offered

a reasonable chance at permanent residency in the United States,

with the requirement of employment in that field. A bill presented by

Republican senator John Cornyn in 2007 would have removed caps

on employment-based green cards for workers with advanced degrees.

The bill did not pass, and neither did a similar one presented by

Senator Aden Specter. The aim should be to prevent an exodus of the

people educated in the United States. Some think this policy will hurt

low-income Americans. Historically, this is not true because an increase

in high-skill workers tends to create additional jobs, not take them.19

Existing Initiatives

Many ongoing initiatives are encouraging the future growth of technological expertise. Great examples already exist of politicians and

educators focusing on this important venture. President Obama made

STEM education a national priority by putting emphasis on science

and technology early in his administration. Prior to that, initiatives already were underway at lower levels in the United States, driven by the

efforts of interest groups, states, and individual politicians.

Even before his inauguration, President Obama recognized that

science and technology need to be reinvigorated.20 The president

made an early announcement that physicist John Holdren would

serve as assistant to the president for science and technology and

director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

In addition to putting a priority on filling this key position, President

Obama started talking publicly about improving education in STEM

areas. In remarks to the National Academy ofSciences, President Obama

quoted Abraham Lincoln's statement regarding his purpose in creating

that organization—to add "the fuel of interest to the fire of genius in

the discovery of new and useful things."21 President Obama stated,

"Science is more essential for our prosperity, our security, our health,

our environment, and our quality of life than it has ever been before."22 In his remarks, he committed to use polices and incentives to

exceed the level of research and development the United States

achieved at the height of the space race. He also committed to improve

education in math and science. The president pointed out that more

than 20 percent of high school students in math and more than 60

percent in chemistry and physics are taught by teachers without expertise in those fields. He created an incentive for states making commitments to math and science education to compete for additional
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 197

funds. Further, In response to the United States' trailing other nations

In creating scientists and engineers, he set a goal for America to have

the highest proportion of college graduates in the world by 2020. He

also pledged to triple the number of National Science Foundation

graduate research fellowships.23 The tone of his entire speech was one

of dedication to reinvigorating the nation's commitment to science and

technology to stay competitive academically and economically.

President Obama is doing more than just talking about improving

technology education—he included substantial funding in the proposed fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget specifically targeted at creating the

next generation of scientists and engineers who can help drive economic growth in the coming decades. The budget provides $300 million in new grants for states to develop and implement instructional

practices and improve teaching and learning in science and math.

The Investing in Innovation Fund totals $500 million and includes

$150 million for competitive grants for school districts, nonprofits,

and other organizations to test, validate, and scale promising strategies to improve teaching and accelerate student learning in STEM

subjects. The budget also directs the Department of Education to

work with the National Science Foundation and other federal agencies to identify the most effective interventions that can help states,

schools, and teachers improve STEM outcomes.24 Setting the goal for

2020 and providing funding for initiatives show the administration's

dedication to the future of science and technology brainpower. These

are all good concepts but only become of value if implemented. The

current fiscal crisis in the United States puts all such programs at

risk, and the political environment may not be conducive to supporting such expenditures for both fiscal and nationalistic reasons. Advocates must continue to make arguments for science and technology

education that strongly illustrate the long-term advantages of increasing the current STEM capabilities.

The administration is not alone in attempting to reinvigorate science and technology education in the United States. In 2005 a coalition of 15 business-oriented organizations, Tapping America's Potential, set a challenge to double the number of American graduates with

bachelor's degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics from 200,000 to 400,000 by 2015. The number Increased

each year through 2006, but not enough to meet the goal. Falling

short of the target may not be statistically relevant because the target

was chosen based on the professional judgment of business people,

rather than the needs of the nation. However, the fact that business

leaders are giving the issue specific attention is a positive indicator

that experts understand the importance of intellectual capital.
198 SMITH • MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

Colorado provides one outstanding example of a state-level project

to invigorate technology education. Four institutions—the Metropolitan State College of Denver, Colorado School of Mines, Community

College of Denver, and Cherry Creek School District—have formed an

unprecedented alliance called the Colorado Academy for the Development of STEM-Related Careers (ADSC). It is designed to position the

state as a leader in STEM education and to ensure that its students,

from kindergarten through graduate level, are connected to cuttingedge innovation. Colorado's governor. Bill Ritter, has embraced and

supported ADSC's vision. The academy's initial focus will be on air

and space—providing education, scholarships, internships, career

guidance, and mentoring to students desiring skills needed to build

air and space careers. The Colorado ADSC will provide educational

certifications and specialized training that connect its targeted learning communities from kindergarten to doctoral programs to ensure

job readiness and career enhancement. It will also collaborate with

Colorado Workforce Centers, which will facilitate training and assist

in job placement.25 This program could be used as a model for other

states and, if leveraged properly, could educate and inspire a whole

generation of US students.

Individual politicians have also recognized the importance of STEM

education. Republican congressman Randy Forbes (VA) obtained a

National Science Foundation grant of $989,747 for Virginia State

University to target minority students to increase the pool of STEM

students. In the United States, this segment of the population has

been underrepresented in the STEM fields, and tapping into that resource is another potential method to increase the intellectual capital

for the future. The money will fund a three-year study aimed at improving test scores for minority students in STEM fields. Forbes hopes

the study can become an education model. He said that it "is about

more than just advancing test scores and equality in education; it is

about economic advancement and ensuring that the United States

retains its edge in the math, science and technology fields—a critically important requirement in today's global economy."26 While the

intent is good and should be supported, it does have the scent of

"pork" politics, so proper arguments need to accompany such proposals to defend them in the political arena.

The issues of creating and maintaining intellectual capital are

complex and require a multifaceted approach. The initiatives listed

above merely provide examples of methods which could yield benefits.

Globalization increases competition for intellectual capital and makes

it critical for all levels of US government, business, and education to
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 199

find innovative, effective ways to encourage STEM education and attract and retain STEM-educated researchers and workers.

Implications for Deterrence in 2035

All indications are that technology will continue to develop at an

increasing rate and that globalization will continue to "flatten" the

world. The world of 2035 will benefit from positive technology innovations which improve health care, information availability, energy

sources, and human performance. The technologies that will make

these improvements possible will also offer adversaries opportunities

to use them for negative purposes. As always, US national security in

2035 will depend upon the ability to deter adversaries. Intellectual

capital in STEM professions, whether residing in US- or foreign-born

individuals, is the foundation of any deterrence. STEM knowledge is

an enabler for deterrence.

Deterrence is dependent upon a potential adversary determining

that an action on his part will either fail to get the result he seeks or

will create an intolerably high cost or risk.27 The United States relies

on deterrence as a major element of national security strategy and, to

keep it viable, must stay aware of developing technological advances.

This can only be accomplished if the United States harnesses the

capabilities of individuals who can understand and competitively operate in the fields of nuclear weaponry, cyber warfare, chemistry, molecular biology, nanotechnology, directed energy, and the space domain. In addition to understanding evolving technologies, the United

States must maintain existing deterrence options, like nuclear and

conventional weapons, while developing new offensive and defensive

weapons. Deterrence is crucially dependent on science and technology.

Space as a Case Study: The United States

May Not Have an Advantage in 2035

There will be many areas of concern for deterrence in 2035. Primary among these will be threats in cyber, nuclear, biological, directed energy, nano, and space technologies. The space domain provides a valuable example as a critical area in which the United States

must be prepared to deter threats in the future. It also provides a

good example of second-order effects because space is an industry

which drives economic growth. According to The Space Report 2009,

"It is unclear whether the U.S. education system can drive growth in

the number of new skilled science and technology graduates, espe-
200 SMITH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

cially those with advanced degrees, needed to replace veteran U.S.

space workers who are retiring."28 The number of bachelor's degrees

awarded in "space critical" fields—Earth and atmospheric sciences,

mathematics, computer science, and engineering—dropped by 8 percent between 1986 and 2006.29

These trends do not bode well for the future of the space industry

or for national security interests in the space domain. The demand

for key space industry occupations is projected to grow over the next

10 years, and unless the number ofspace-critical graduates increases

or the United States is able to recruit foreign talent, jobs will go unfilled.30 As The Space Report 2009 notes. The key to maintaining US

technology preeminence is to encourage and develop skilled scientists and engineers who strengthen the space industry."31 The US

space industry is just one example of a domain in which the United

States may not maintain intellectual dominance through 2035.32

Each area of potential threat must be evaluated individually; space

provides just one clear example of the criticality of maintaining intellectual dominance.

Conclusion

Maintaining the advantage in science and technology intellectual

capital is critical to the future of US security. Current trends are

positive, and initiatives are underway to grow, attract, and maintain

enough qualified individuals to stay ahead of adversaries. However,

the past decade has shown that these trends are vulnerable to sudden change. The tightening of visa processes after 9/11 demonstrated

that the inflow of foreign students and experts can drop quickly. Although keeping terrorists out is vital, the federal government must

also recognize the ramifications of impeding one source of technical

expertise. In the near term, the United States likely will continue to

rely on foreign-born individuals to maintain its science and technology

advantage. If the United States chooses to reduce its historic dependence on foreign-born brainpower, there must be a corresponding

increase in homegrown expertise. The most robust pool of individuals

can be amassed both by attracting foreign-born students and experts

and by increasing the presence of US-born personnel who are highly

educated in the technology arena.

President Obama has said that improving science and technology

education is a matter of national importance, and he included substantial funding in the proposed FY 2011 budget. Industry, state, and

local initiatives are also in place to provide educational opportunities

to increase the number of US-born students earning technology de-
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 201

grees. Adjusting visa and immigration laws to enable the United

States to attract and retain even more talent from other nations will

reduce the threat of the United States falling behind in the capability

to lead innovation in science and technology. Its lead in technology is

crucial to deterring adversaries, whether they are nation-states, nonstate actors, or individuals.

If the United States does not maintain the lead in critical technologies like nuclear weaponry, biological warfare, nanotechnology, cyber

warfare, directed energy, and space technology, one or more adversaries likely will take advantage of areas of weakness. Current deterrence depends on the adversary believing that the United States has

the capability to deter and the will to take decisive action. The capability is created by those who understand cutting-edge technology. If

an adversary did not think the United States could act decisively, he

would be more likely to take offensive action. A cyber attack could

interfere with almost any US data system and could potentially disrupt most US military operations. A space attack could eliminate access to the global positioning system (GPS), which, at a minimum,

would make navigation nearly impossible and disrupt banking worldwide. A biological attack could eradicate a vast portion of the US

population. These are examples of events that, undeterred and uncountered, could change the balance of power and threaten the

American way of life. Current intellectual capacity makes deterrence

viable and supports development of methods to recover if one of these

attacks should occur. Without qualified scientists and engineers, the

United States could not replace or establish a workable alternative for

the GPS after a space attack. Likewise, vaccinations and antidotes

would not be available to counter or minimize the impact of a biological attack. These are just two examples of a plethora of possible

threats if the United States does not maintain intellectual superiority.

The United States enjoys its position as the one remaining superpower in large part because of its broad spectrum of intellectual expertise in technology fields. In his February 2010 State of the Union

address, President Obama stated that the United States is not going

to be "number 2." Maintaining the position as "number 1" means

more than maintaining national security. As the leader of technology

development, the United States also gets to set policy. This has worldwide implications for areas like human genome mapping, nuclear

weaponry, and biological warfare. As the leader in these areas, the

United States can best influence international treaties, bans, and

agreements. Intellectual capital is a critical national security resource

that cannot be regained rapidly if it is allowed to deteriorate. Keeping

the advantage is a wise investment in the future.
202 SMITH * MAXWELL PAPER NO. 59

Notes

1. Paul Oyer. "Some Thoughts on the 'Gathering Storm,' National Security, and the

Global Market for Scientific Talent," in Perspectives on U.S. Competitiveness in Science

and Technology, eds. Titus Galama and James Hosek (Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

2007), 115.

2. Ibid., 114.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Thomas Kalil. "Planning for US Science Policy in 2009," Nature 443 (19 October

2006): 751-52.

6. Thomas Lee and Proctor P. Reid, eds.. National Interests in an Age ofGlobal Technology (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), 5.

7. Matt Kelley, "Report: U.S. Missile Science Slumping." USA Today, 23 March

2006.

8. National Science Board, "Key Science and Engineering Indicators: 2010 Digest,"

http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/digestlO (accessed 22 January 2010).

9. Ibid.

10. Acceleration Watch, Web site, www.accelerationwatch.com (accessed 20 January 2010): and John Smart, briefing, Air War College. Maxwell AFB, AL. 28 October

2009.

11. Ibid.

12. National Science Board, "Key Science and Engineering Indicators: 2010 Digest."

13. National Science Board, "Digest of Key Science and Engineering Indicators

2008." http://www.nsf.gov/staUstics/digest08 (accessed 13 December 2009).

14. Thomas Friedman. The World Is Flat (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

2005).

15. Walter Alan Juzukonis. Strengthening the Scientific Capacity Available to Serve

the Nation (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2009).

16. Katalin Szelenyi, "Students without Borders? Migratory Decision-Making

among International Graduate Students in the U.S.," Knowledge, Technology, and

Policy 19, no. 3 (September 2006): 5.

17. Ibid., 4.

18. Ibid.

19. T. A. Frank, "Green Cards for Grads," Washington Monthly, May/June 2009,

A7-8.

20. Alan I. Leshner. "A Wake-Up Call for Science Education," Boston Globe, 12

January 2009. All.

21. Barack Obama, "Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences," Daily Compilation ofPresidential Documents, 28 April 2009, 1.

22. Ibid., 2.

23. Ibid.

24. Office of Management and Budget, "The President's Budget for Fiscal Year

2011," http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (accessed 28 July 2010).

25. "8th Continent Project: Four Colorado Institutions Launch Statewide Science

and Technology Education Collaborative," Defense and Aerospace Week 44 (July 2009): 44.

26. "Rep Forbes Announces Funding to Advance Math, Science, Technology Education for Minority Students," US Fed News Service, 10 October 2009.

27. Christopher Kinnan. briefing, subject: Deterrence Operations, to Blue Horizons

students, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, November 2009.

28. Space Foundation, The Space Report 2009: The Authoritative Guide to Global

Space Activity (Colorado Springs, CO: Space Foundation, 2009). 88.
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 203

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 99.

31. Ibid.

32. Smart, briefing.