HomeRemarks and Releases – Africa Regional Media Hub...Digital Press Briefing with David Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State – Bureau of African Affairs, and Brad Brooks-Rubin, Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination

# 									Digital Press Briefing with David Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State – Bureau of African Affairs, and Brad Brooks-Rubin, Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination							

Special Briefing

JOHANNESBURG HUB

March 7, 2024

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https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/07-March-Digital-Press-Briefing-Transition-of-U.S.-Sanctions-Tools-in-Zimbabwemp3.mp3

**MODERATOR:**  Good afternoon to everyone from the U.S. Department of State’s Africa Regional Media Hub.  I welcome our participants logging in from across the continent and thank all of you for joining this discussion on the topic of transition of U.S. sanctions tools in Zimbabwe.

Today, we are very pleased to be joined by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin.  These officials will discuss updates to the U.S. sanctions program in Zimbabwe and in the context of the Global Magnitsky sanctions.

We will begin today’s briefing with opening remarks from our speakers, then we will turn to your questions.  We will try to get to as many of your questions as we can during the briefing.  So with that, I’ll turn it over to Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin for their opening remarks.

**MR GAINER:**  Thank you so much, Johann.  Good morning, good afternoon, everybody.  I am David Gainer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State.  It’s a real pleasure to speak with you regarding the recent actions taken by the United States on our Zimbabwe sanctions program.

To recap, on March 4th, President Biden signed an executive order that terminated the Zimbabwe sanctions program, in place since 2003.  He determined that the Global Magnitsky sanctions program – sometimes referred to as GloMag – was a more appropriate tool to address our current concerns in Zimbabwe.

Following the termination of the Zimbabwe sanctions program, Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, announced Global Magnitsky designations on 14 Zimbabwean targets, including President Mnangagwa, Vice President Chiwenga, and businessman Kudakwashe Tagwirei.

Our policy toward Zimbabwe has not changed, but our sanction tools have.  We continue to have serious concerns about human rights abuses and corruption.  Key individuals, including senior members of government, bear responsibility for these actions, which have siphoned off public resources and left countless citizens to live in fear.  With the Global Magnitsky program, we’ll better be able to promote accountability for persons who engage in that conduct in Zimbabwe.

The Global Magnitsky program is a conduct-based sanctions authority, which requires information that demonstrates individuals are connected to serious human rights abuse or corruption.  Global Magnitsky designations block all property and interests that are in the United States for those individuals and entities.

This week’s actions move to hold Zimbabwean actors to global standards.  The transition to Global Magnitsky authority allows the United States to target Zimbabwean actors using the same tools used for the world’s worst human rights abusers and corrupt actors.  Zimbabwean designations stand alongside those of the Gupta brothers, Isabel dos Santos, and Delyan Peevski who, alongside other former Bulgarian officials and corrupt oligarchs, siphoned money out of his country for corrupt ends.  The transition toward Global Magnitsky designations re-energizes our focus on those most responsible for corruption and serious human rights abuse.  It also reaffirms our commitment to keeping our sanctions relevant, timely, and targeted.

The actions this week do not affect the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001, also known as ZDERA.  Importantly, ZDERA is not a sanction – it is legislation passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by the U.S. president in 2001.   ZDERA – it is also very important to note – has never been invoked because Zimbabwe is in arrears to its international creditors.

The United States has stood with the people of Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.  We will continue to do so, as we uphold our core principles: respect for human rights, democratic practices, and responsible governance.  We continue to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to move toward more open and democratic governance, including addressing corruption, so all Zimbabweans can prosper.

Thank you very much.  That’s the end of our opening remarks.  And Brad and I will open it up to questions.  Johann.

**MODERATOR:**  All right.  Thank you very much.  So once again to the journalists, if you do wish to ask a question, please make sure that we can see your full name and the outlet that you are – the outlet that you’re representing.  Otherwise, we might not be able to identify you and we won’t call on you.

So, the first question today was submitted by Arhtur Shoko of Zimbabwe, a freelance journalist.  And I believe you already spoke to this briefly, but his question – perhaps you could expound on it – is:  “What is the status of ZDERA in view of this most recent development?”

**MR GAINER:**Thanks, Johann.  This is David again speaking, and we’ll try and identify ourselves, David and Brad when Brad speaks.  So this is David.  As I said, the actions announced this week do not affect the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, which is not a sanction, but it’s legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.  Once again, ZDERA  has never been invoked because Zimbabwe is in arrears to its international creditors.

Brad, anything else to add on ZDERA?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Nothing further.  It’s not – just reiterate the point that it’s not a sanction and not affected by this week’s actions.

**MR GAINER:**Thank you, Johann.  Next question?

**MODERATOR:**All right.  Thank you very much.  And there was a lot of interest among the journalist on this following topic, so here’s a question from Kemi Osukoya of African Bazar Magazine.  And the question is:  “Can you explain how this sanction might impact or not impact the nation’s economy?  For example, the president is working with the African Development Bank on boosting the economic recovery of the nation.”

**MR GAINER:**Thanks, Johann.  This is David again.  The change of sanctions tools presents an opportunity for businesses and financial institutions to re-evaluate their de-risking models and re-examine the Zimbabwean market.  I do want to make the point though that over the past 20 years Zimbabwe’s economic woes are not because of U.S. sanctions.  Zimbabwe’s economic woes are because of the gross mismanagement and corruption of the Zimbabwean Government and other actors for the past 20 years.

Brad, anything to add?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Nothing further to add.

**MR GAINER:**Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**All right.  Thank you very much.  So, we did have some additional submitted questions, for example, from – this is Thamo Kapisa of SABC Channel Africa, who asks: “Zimbabwe has lost well over an estimated $42 billion in revenue over the past 19 years because of the sanctions.  This includes lost bilateral donor support estimated at $4.5 billion annually since 2001; $4 billion in loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and the AfDB; commercial loans of $18 billion; and a GDP reduction of $21 billion.  As a consequence, the significant progress that Zimbabwe has made in the development of infrastructure, health, education, and social service delivery systems has been reversed.  What program of action is there to accelerate the economic growth in Zimbabwe with the lifting of the sanctions?”

**MR GAINER:**Thanks, Johann.  First and foremost, I’d like to disagree with the premise with the question.  As I just said, Zimbabwe’s economic woes are not caused by U.S. sanctions.  What U.S. sanctions have done over the past 20 years is target individuals and limit their access to U.S. financial institutions and restrict their travel.  That’s all it’s done.  The economic woes that have faced Zimbabwe over the past 20 years are because of the gross mismanagement by the Zimbabwean Government of their economy, human rights abuses on its own people, as well as corrupt practices for the past 20 years.  So we believe that is why Zimbabwe’s economy is performing as it is.

As I’ve said, the change of sanctions tools does represent an opportunity for businesses and financial institutions to re-evaluate their de-risking models, re-examine the Zimbabwean market, but we definitely believe that it’s the corruption and the mismanagement that keeps businesses away from Zimbabwe.

Brad, anything else to add?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Sure.  This is Brad.  I would just, I guess, echo David’s notes.  I mean, the program of action really is with – in the hands of the Government of Zimbabwe and the private sector in Zimbabwe to take this opportunity to enact necessary reforms and to ensure that key sectors of the economy that have been affected by corruption and human rights abuse, that those sectors can be reformed and be able to contribute to the growth of Zimbabwe, as we and the international community would like to see.

**MR GAINER:**Thanks Johann.  Back to you.

**MODERATOR:**All right.  Thank you very much.  So, Romain Chanson of Radio France Internationale is online with us, and he has this question: “How many individuals were sanctioned under the previous program?  Was President Mnangagwa one of them?  And how many entities were sanctioned?  What kind of entities, state-owned enterprises?  Please give us some – some detail.”

**MR GAINER:**Certainly, thank you.  The Zimbabwe Sanctions Program, as we discussed at the beginning, was put in place in 2003, so it’s a little over 20 years old.  And over the years, we continually look at and re-evaluate and make regular adjustments to the Zimbabwe – or have to the Zimbabwe Sanctions Program, including adding and removing individuals and entities.  I believe the original lists were made public; is that correct, Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Yes.

**MR GAINER:**Yes.

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Yes.

**MR GAINER:**And so those lists are public.  And we continually make regular adjustments adding and subtracting names based on available evidence.  U.S. sanctions are not intended to be permanent.  Our sanctions, we believe, are most effective when they reflect the realities on the ground, so that’s why we are switching sanctions tools, so they can refocus our sanctions on those who are actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  This is Brad; I can add a bit more from the sanctions side.  The original executive orders did have a long list of names; you can find the exact lists and numbers in the public.  At the – before the program was transitioned on Monday, there were 98 individuals and entities remaining on the Zimbabwe sanctions list.  As David noted, the designations made on Monday number 14.  There were a range of – so the – those no longer subject to sanctions through Global Magnitsky included a wide array of individuals and entities.

And again, the focus of the designations was on – to really highlight and target the most serious examples of human rights abuse and corruption that continue to this day.  And as David noted, we work to ensure that our sanctions can be reviewed and updated and ensure that they are targeted to the most current activity.

**MR GAINER:**  Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**  All right.  Thank you very much.  So, Linda Ensor of *Business Day* here in South Africa has her hand up, and I believe I know what her question’s going to be.  Linda, can we open your mic and allow you to ask your question, please?  Oops, pardon me.  I think I might have – I think I might have opened the wrong mic.  Okay, Linda, I think you’re on.

All right, I’ll tell you what I can do.  I can read her question.

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  That’d be great.  Thank you.

**MODERATOR:**  Yeah.  And so Linda’s question is: “Analysts in South Africa say that the U.S. action is motivated by the desire of the U.S. to get access to Zimbabwe’s rich wealth of minerals.”  So comment, gentlemen?

**MR GAINER:**  Thanks, Johann.  No, we would disagree with that statement.  The U.S. has been and continues to remain deeply concerned about the human rights abuses, widespread corruption, and lack of good governance in Zimbabwe.  That’s our concern, and this switch, we believe, is to tools that will better help us address these concerns, which have been concerns that have been longstanding well over the past 20 years.  They target a limited number of actors that we believe are most responsible for the human rights abuses and the corrupt practices in Zimbabwe.

Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  Nothing further to add.

**MODERATOR:**  All right.  Thank you very much.  So Ray Ndlovu has a question.  He has his hand up, so let me see if I can un – mic Ray.  Of Bloomberg in Zimbabwe, by the way.

**QUESTION:**  Yeah.  Thanks very much.  Ray Ndlovu from Bloomberg.  Just want to find out, what does the U.S. hope to achieve by pausing its involvement in the Africa Development Bank-led debt talks?  And what conditions does the U.S. want to see before it can resume to these talks?  Thank you very much.

**MR GAINER:**  Thanks, Ray.  This is David.  We have paused, as you mention, our participation in the AfDB talks due to what we see as a lack of progress on democratic reforms.  We also paused it due to alleged voter fraud in the past election, as well as political violence targeted at opposition parties.

Getting back to my core statement, we remain deeply concerned about the lack of democratic reforms and the human rights abuses and widespread corruption in Zimbabwe.  We want to see fair treatment under the law for all Zimbabweans.  We want to see the abandonment of abuses by security forces that have included, in the past, unlawful or arbitrary killings, kidnap, torture, and assault on civilians.  We want to see the corruption stopped.  We want to see the – a stopping to the misappropriation of state assets, the expropriation of private assets for personal gain.  We want to see the corruption related to government contracts stopped.

So we believe there is a lack of progress currently on democratic reforms, and that’s why we’ve paused our participation in the AfDB dialogue.

I don’t know, Brad, if you want to add anything else?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  Nothing further.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay.  All right.  Thank you very much.  So Tobias Mudzingwa of VOA Studio 7 in Zimbabwe has a question.  The question is: “Yesterday the Government of Zimbabwe refuted claims that it has corrupt top leaders and that there are human rights abuses, arguing that there is no evidence to such claims.  Does the U.S. Government have evidence of these claims?”

**MR GAINER:**  Thanks, Johann.  Yes.  First off, I would point you to the Department of Treasury’s website, the OFAC website which lists all 14 people and entities and what our evidence has found for the human rights abuses and corrupt practices.  As I just mentioned, what we have seen in terms of evidence is abuses by security forces that includes unlawful or arbitrary killings, kidnap, torture, as well as assault on Zimbabweans.

In terms of corruption, we’ve seen misappropriation of state assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain, and corruption related to government contracts.

Brad, anything to add?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**I – no, I would simply reiterate the review of the Treasury Department’s press release and their references to well-documented examples of human rights abuse and corruption as – including – in addition, including in multiple mining sectors that have been seen over the years.  Over.

**MR GAINER:**I can actually read out the link to the Treasury page.  It’s home.treasury.gov\news\press-releases- – I mean, excuse me, \jy2154.  Once again, that’s home.treasury.gov\news\press-releases\jy2154.  And we can certainly send this on or maybe have Johann at the hub send it on.  Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**We’ll be glad to share that with the participants.  And I should remind everyone that we will be generating a transcript of today’s hub call, and so you will receive that as soon as we can generate it.

So, we do have further questions.  Here’s an interesting question from Veneranda Langa, a freelance journalist from Zimbabwe.  “So, the SADC countries have been calling for complete removal of sanctions, saying they affect peace and security in the region, and 25th of October has been designated by SADC as anti-sanctions day.  Have there been discussions by SADC states and the U.S. on the removal of sanctions, and is there a dialogue with the Zimbabwe Government over the sanctions?”

**MR GAINER:**Thanks for the question.  Certainly, we discuss the sanctions issue in our private discussions with many governments, likeminded partners but also in the region, including SADC.  And we’ve had those discussions for many, many years and we will continue to have those discussions.  The United States, however, really remains committed and deeply concerned about the human rights abuses and widespread corruption in Zimbabwe.  And we believe that this transition to Global Magnitsky program is targeted at those individuals most responsible for these corrupt activities.  And so we believe it is a good transition for our sanctions tools, and it refocuses our sanctions on those actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.

Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  Thanks.  I would just reiterate the point made earlier that throughout the existence of the Zimbabwe sanctions program, as David noted earlier, we consistently reiterated that the sanctions that were in place did not target the country of Zimbabwe or the people of Zimbabwe and that many of the premises of those messages were misplaced as a – with a misunderstanding of the way our sanctions worked.  We – but as David noted, we hope that through the transition to this global tool, and reinforcing the sanctions designations on those key actors involved in human rights abuse and corruption, that it will continue to enhance our conversations with our SADC partners and with others in the region as well as with the private sector to ensure that this is indeed an opportunity for the Government of Zimbabwe and for the region to take action on these key issues and concerns, while working with the opportunity that this transition presents.

**MR GAINER:**  I would just add one more note.  Sanctions are a policy tool.  They are not a criminal charge.  U.S. sanctions prevent perpetrators of human rights abuses and corrupt actors from accessing U.S. banking institutions and restrict their ability to travel to the U.S.  That’s what they do.  Over.

**MODERATOR:**  Okay, thank you very much for those answers.  So we did receive some questions also from Julia Ndlela of the *Zimbabwe Independent*, and Julia’s question – questions were:  “This week, the U.S. announced a new sanctions regime targeting 14 Zimbabwean individuals and entities.  Is this an admission that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe under the scope of ZDERA were ineffective?”

And then her second question is:  “Under ZDERA, the U.S. imposed penalties on its citizens involved in – on its citizens involved in business dealings with designated Zimbabwean individuals.  Under the recently imposed sanctions, is the U.S. still going to do the same?”  In other words, will the U.S. impose sanctions on its own citizens involved in those business dealings?

So two questions, gentlemen.

**MR GAINER:**  Thank you.  First off, as we noted before, the President has determined that the Global Magnitsky program is better suited to address our current concerns with Zimbabwe.  We will note that the Zimbabwe sanctions program was created in 2003, so well over 20 years ago.  GloMag, or Global Magnitsky, did not exist at the time.  We believe that these are better tools, and they’re global tools; they’re tools that we have used in dozens of countries throughout the world, from Europe to Asia to Africa to Latin America, even amongst treaty allies of ours.

We believe that this is – this more recent global program allows us to target Zimbabwean actors using the same tools that are used for the world’s worst human rights abusers and corrupt actors.  These actions modernize, refocus our sanctions.  We continually look at our sanctions program and evaluate the targets, listing and delisting individuals and entities.  But we believe that this modernizes and refocuses our sanctions on those actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe, ensuring our sanctions are targeted against the key individuals – including members of the Government of Zimbabwe – that bear responsibility for human rights abuses and corruption in Zimbabwe.

Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  Sure.  I would – thanks.  I would note a slight correction to the question, which premised the idea that our previous sanctions and enforcement of those sanctions happened under ZDERA.  As David noted earlier, ZDERA and the executive orders that were in place that under – that formed the foundation of our former Zimbabwe sanctions program were under different authorities than ZDERA.  So I would note that distinction.

Secondly, Global Magnitsky does have – I think the question is getting at enforcement and the issuance of penalties periodically against those who may be U.S. persons for violating the sanctions and conducting financial transactions or other business with those who are sanctioned.  Global Magnitsky does have those same penalty authorities, so to the extent that in the future there are U.S. persons or those subject to our sanctions authorities who are engaged in transactions or conduct that violate the designations, the principals of the designations that were made, then the Treasury Department’s OFAC, Office of Foreign Assets Control – Enforcements Division would – Enforcement Division would pursue those.

**MR GAINER:**  Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**  All right, thank you very much.  So Gilbert Nyambabvu of the New Zimbabwe has a question, which is:  “Allegations of corruption, human rights abuse, repression against political opponents are not unique to Zimbabwe.  Many other leaders in Africa and elsewhere across the world face similar allegations, but we do not see the U.S. imposing sanctions on these leaders.  So the question is, why Zimbabwe?”

**MR GAINER:**  Look, this – we have used Global Magnitsky sanctions, as I mentioned, in dozens of countries around the world, including against ministers in a variety of contexts, including, as I mentioned, with treaty allies in places such as Slovakia, Latvia, Türkiye, in Asia, in Europe, in Latin America, in Africa.  We are consistently re-examining our sanctions programs to make sure that they’re targeted and to make sure they reflect the realities on the ground in each country.

Brad, anything to add?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  I would just add, I mean, as David noted earlier, sanctions are a tool that advance policy, and we have other tools – visa restrictions and other actions we can take – to advance our policy with respect to particular countries.  So while we can’t preview or discuss deliberations with respect to any particular countries, I would note that in the examples cited there are – we have used a variety of other tools and diplomatic action and engagement.  There are sanctions imposed with a number of actors and armed groups connected, for example, to eastern DRC and Rwanda, so would refer the questioner to those authorities and actions.  But in any case, in any situation, as David noted, we are using Global Magnitsky in a wide array of contexts when we determine that the tool is appropriate for use to address a particular policy concern, and in other contexts the determinations at any given time may be that there are other tools that should be used to advance our policy.

One thing I would also note is that Global Magnitsky is a sanctions program that a number of allies of the United States have, and it allows for the multilateral coordination and engagement with respect to use of sanctions.  And so this is another aspect of our assessment and deliberation of sanctions over time.

**MR GAINER:**  Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**  All right, thank you very much.  So Happi Zengeni of Finx Zimbabwe has a question:  “The main deterrent had been the flow of funds to the country and loss of corresponding banking relationships.  Do you not think that by transferring the sanctions to GloMag, you perpetuate the democratic and human rights abuses you speak of as there will be no effect on the country anymore?”  Comment?

**MR GAINER:**  Sure.  No, we disagree with that.  We believe these sanctions tools, they are targeted, they reflect the realities on the ground, and they affect only those individuals and entities that are most responsible and connected to corruption and human rights abuses.  We believe this tool is effective and – but we will – we continue to evaluate listings and delistings on a continuous basis.

Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**  Yes, thanks.  I would simply note in addition, as we have earlier, I mean, the – with this action we expect the private sector, the banking sector, et cetera, to conduct due diligence based on these actions and evaluate their engagement, their relationships.  I would again disagree with the premise that our previous sanctions would have caused the loss of – themselves caused the loss of corresponding banking relationships.  As we have noted throughout this discussion and elsewhere, the concerns with respect to corruption and risk are those of – have been the actions of the Government of Zimbabwe and other actors that raise those risks.  We expect that this sanctions transition will prompt re-evaluation and reassessment and due diligence, and whether the private sector decides to re-establish relationships, et cetera, is obviously a decision that they will make on their own.

But we expect that this transition will be something that is taken note of, and certainly as we continue our engagement with the private sector as we do on sanctions more generally, this will be something that we highlight.

**MR GAINER:**  Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**  All right, thank you so much.  So, John Eligon of *The New York Times* has this question:  “Is there anything that changes functionally in terms of the sanctions under the Magnitsky Act versus the sanctions that were in place under the executive order?  Are there any differences in the restrictions for sanctioned individuals under Magnitsky versus those sanctioned under the previous executive order?”

And second part of his question, which I think we’ve touched on already:  “The press release  outlines why certain individuals are being sanctioned but does not say what specific acts committed led to the sanctions.  Regarding President Mnangagwa, what state assets has he misappropriated and what acts of corruption has he committed that led the U.S. to believe that he should be sanctioned?  What serious human rights violations has his government committed that led to him being sanctioned?”

**MR GAINER:**Thank you.  This is David.  I would just refer you back to, of course, the Treasury page on the information for the actions taken by those that have been designated, and I would pass it over to Brad for the first part of the question.

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**Thanks.  Functionally, the designations under Global Magnitsky and the designations under the previous sanctions program have the same effect in terms of their restriction on U.S. persons engaging in transactions with those individuals and entities and any property or interest in property that those individuals and entities have would be blocked by U.S. persons.  So, the functional prohibitions are the same.  They’re implemented under the same legal authority as the Zimbabwe sanctions with a slight – the only difference being there’s an additional legislative act that underlines the Global Magnitsky program, but the prohibitions are essentially the same.

**MR GAINER:**Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**All right.  Thank you, gentlemen.  So, time is really creeping up on us.  You’ve been very generous with your time, and we’ve definitely covered a lot of ground here.  I think under the time we budgeted we have time for just one more question.  So, there’s a question in the Q&A box from Ish Mafundikwa, a freelance journalist.  And the question is:  “Sanctions are a stick meant to prod the sanctioned to change their ways.  The change of the sanction regime is seen as both a stick and a carrot.  What necessitated the change?”

**MR GAINER:**As I mentioned before, we – as we have continually examined our designations, we decided that the Global Magnitsky program – which is a global program, it’s a newer program, it’s better suited to address our concerns with Zimbabwe.  We look at the realities on the ground in Zimbabwe and feel that this is a program where it better targets those critical individuals and entities that are actively harming the citizens of Zimbabwe.  So that’s why we believed this was a correct and good transition to a global program that’s used not just on Zimbabwe, not just in Africa, but in Europe, in Asia, in Latin America, throughout the world.

Brad?

**MR BROOKS-RUBIN:**The only – I would just add, as David noted earlier in the call, at the time the Zimbabwe sanctions were imposed in 2003 and subsequent executive orders in the 2000s, Global Magnitsky did not exist.  And Global Magnitsky has now been in place for a few years and our assessment of its impact and effect and, as has been noted, its use in a variety of contexts across the world has had an impact, and the assessment was made that this would be an opportune time to transition the Zimbabwe program into this newer approach.

**MR GAINER:**This is David again.  I would just add that Global Magnitsky designations, they target senior officials and key private sector actors that are presently connected to corruption and human rights abuses.

Back to you, Johann.

**MODERATOR:**All right, thank you very much.  So, as I mentioned, we have definitely covered a lot of ground here, and I want to express my appreciation to our speakers.  Do our speakers have any final thoughts, final words you’d like to share?

**MR GAINER:**Sure, Johann.  This is David again.  Just want to reiterate that this week’s actions do not represent a change in U.S. policy towards Zimbabwe, only a change in our sanctions tools.  We continue to urge the Government of Zimbabwe to move toward more open and democratic governance, including addressing corruption and human rights abuses, so all Zimbabweans can prosper.

Thank you, Johann.  Thank you, everybody.

**MODERATOR:**All right.  It’s – I would like to thank the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Gainer and Senior Advisor to the Office of Sanctions Coordination Brad Brooks-Rubin for joining us today.  And thank you all – thank you all as well to the journalists for participating.

As I mentioned earlier, a recording and transcript of today’s briefing will be distributed to participating journalists as soon as we can produce them.  If you have any questions about today’s briefing, you may contact the Africa Regional Media Hub at AFMediaHub@state.gov.  And I would also like to invite everyone to follow us on Twitter at our handle @AfricaMediaHub.  Thank you.

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