National 

Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C.

National Transportation

Safety Board

Washington, D.C. 20594

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NTSB

Permit No. G-200

Highway Accident Report

Multiple Vehicle Collision on Interstate 95

Fairfield, Connecticut

January 17, 2003

NTSB/HAR-05/03

PB2005-916203 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7734 490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted November 16, 2005 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Multiple Vehicle Collision on Interstate 95, Fairfield, 

Connecticut, January 17, 2003. Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-05/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: On Interstate 95 (I-95) near Fairfield, Connecticut, two consecutive accidents occurred within 

11 minutes in the early morning hours of January 17, 2003. At the time of the accidents, light snow was 

falling, the roads were wet and icy, and snow covered the roadway shoulders. About 4:50 a.m., a 1996 

Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer was involved in a nonfatal multivehicle accident. The truck was 

traveling in a work zone on I-95 north, near milepost 26.6, at a driver-estimated speed of 50 mph, when it 

slid out of control. The vehicle entered the median, overturned and overrode the portable concrete barrier, 

and collided with a southbound 1997 Dodge Avenger sedan. A southbound 2001 Freightliner tractor/

refrigerated trailer combination unit struck the Dodge sedan and then struck the 1996 Freightliner tractor. 

The three vehicles came to rest blocking the southbound lanes of the highway. During the accident 

sequence, the flatbed semitrailer separated from the 1996 Freightliner tractor. The semitrailer came to rest 

perpendicular to the roadway, straddling the portable concrete barrier and partially obstructing the left lane 

of I-95 north. At 5:01 a.m., a 1999 Chevrolet Tahoe sport utility vehicleóoccupied by nine college 

students and traveling north in the left laneócollided with and underrode the left side corner of the 1996 

Freightliner semitrailer. Following the impact, the Chevrolet disengaged from the semitrailer and entered 

the median, skidded along the concrete barrier, and came to rest about 450 feet to the northeast. The driver 

and three passengers in the Chevrolet were fatally injured. The surviving occupants were seriously injured.

Major safety issues identified in this investigation include the adequacy of snow and ice treatment 

strategies, lack of specific guidance on the use of high-performance median barriers, placement of portable 

concrete median barriers, and need for primary seat belt laws for all seating positions. As a result of this 

accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes recommendations to the Federal 

Highway Administration, the Connecticut Department of Transportation, and the American Association of 

State Highway and Transportation Officials. The Safety Board reiterates a recommendation to the 

Governor and legislative leaders of Connecticut.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, 

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board 

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study 

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board 

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and 

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also 

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Records Management Division

490 LíEnfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To 

purchase this publication, order report number PB2005-916203 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports 

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Preaccident Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Restraint Use and Survivable Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Driver Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1996 Freightliner Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chevrolet Tahoe Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Vehicle and Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1996 Freightliner Tractor and Flatbed Semitrailer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Chevrolet Tahoe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Forensic Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Accident History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Roadway Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Work Zone Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Variable Message Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Incident Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Motor Carrier Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Conspicuity Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Speed Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Deceleration Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Flare Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Previous Safety Board Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Barrier and Heavy Truck Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Seat Belt Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Toxicology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Vehicle Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Motor Carrier Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Accident Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Driver Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

1996 Freightliner Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Chevrolet Tahoe Driver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Highway Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Median Barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Highway Lighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Variable Message Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Incident Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Reiterated Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Appendixes

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

B: Snow and Ice Removal Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

C: NCHRP Crash Test Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

D: Variable Message Sign Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

E: Arrow Trucking 2003 Compliance Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials

ABS antilock braking system

ADT average daily traffic

C Celsius

CAMI Civil Aeromedical Institute

CDL commercial driverís license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

ConnDOT Connecticut Department of Transportation

CSP Connecticut State Police

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

ECM electronic control module

EMS emergency medical services

F Fahrenheit

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

FMCSRs Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

I-95 Interstate 95

LOS level of service

MP milepost

MUTCD Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NWS National Weather Service

NYSDOT New York State Department of Transportation

PVL Photometric and Visibility Laboratory

SAFER Safety and Fitness Electronic Records

SDM sensing diagnostic module

SUV sport utility vehicle

TL test level (NCHRP)

TTC temporary traffic controls

VMS variable message sign

VMT vehicle miles traveled
vi Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

On Interstate 95 (I-95) near Fairfield, Connecticut, two consecutive accidents 

occurred within 11 minutes in the early morning hours of January 17, 2003. About 4:50 a.m.,

a 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer, loaded with five portable compressor units, 

was involved in a nonfatal multivehicle accident. The truck was traveling in a work zone 

on I-95 north, near milepost 26.6, at a driver-estimated speed of 50 mph, when it slid out 

of control approximately 1,150 feet south of the exit 24 southbound off-ramp. The vehicle 

entered the median, overturned and overrode the portable concrete barrier, and collided 

with a southbound 1997 Dodge Avenger sedan. A southbound 2001 Freightliner 

tractor/refrigerated trailer combination unit struck the Dodge sedan and then struck the 

1996 Freightliner tractor. The three vehicles came to rest blocking the southbound lanes of 

the highway. During the accident sequence, the flatbed semitrailer separated from the 

1996 Freightliner tractor. The semitrailer came to rest perpendicular to the roadway, 

straddling the portable concrete barrier and partially obstructing the left lane of I-95 north.

At 5:01 a.m., a 1999 Chevrolet Tahoe sport utility vehicleóoccupied by nine 

students from Yale University and traveling north in the left laneócollided with and 

underrode the left side corner of the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer. 

Following the impact, the Chevrolet disengaged from the semitrailer and entered the 

median, skidded along the concrete barrier, and came to rest about 450 feet northeast of 

the semitrailer. The driver and three passengers in the Chevrolet were fatally injured. The 

surviving occupants were seriously injured.

Witnesses reported that at the time of the accidents, light snow was falling, the 

roads were wet and icy, and snow covered the roadway shoulders. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the 4:50 a.m. accident was the 1996 Freightlinerís loss of lateral stability, probably due to 

the operator driving too fast for conditions and to the presence of black ice on the 

roadway. Contributing to the accident were the inadequate roadway treatment provided by 

the Connecticut Department of Transportation in response to inclement weather and also 

its failure to provide a median barrier capable of preventing crossovers by heavy vehicles. 

The probable cause of the 5:01 a.m. accident was the failure of the Chevrolet driver to 

identify and avoid the flatbed semitrailer due to fatigue, in conjunction with the distraction 

from the median crossover accident in the southbound lanes.

The following safety issues were identified in this investigation:

ï Adequacy of snow and ice treatment strategies,

ï Lack of specific guidance on the use of high-performance median barriers,

ï Placement of portable concrete median barriers, and

ï Need for primary seat belt laws for all seating positions.
vii Highway Accident Report

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes 

recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration, the Connecticut Department of 

Transportation, and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials. The Safety Board reiterates a recommendation to the Governor and legislative 

leaders of Connecticut.

Executive Summary

1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

Two consecutive accidents occurred within about 11 minutes in the early morning 

hours of January 17, 2003, on Interstate 95 (I-95) near Fairfield, Connecticut. (See figure 1.) 

Witnesses reported that at the time of the accidents, light snow was falling, the roads were 

wet and icy, and snow covered the roadway shoulders.

Figure 1. Map of accident location.

Fairfield

New York

CONNECTICUT

NEW YORK

495

95

684

0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles 

Accident location

About 4:50 a.m.,1 a 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer, loaded with five 

portable compressor units, was involved in a nonfatal multivehicle accident. The truck 

was traveling in a work zone on I-95 north, near milepost (MP) 26.6, at a driver-estimated 

speed of 50 mph, when it slid out of control approximately 1,150 feet south of the exit 24 

southbound off-ramp. The vehicle entered the median, overturned and overrode the 

portable concrete median barrier (see figure 2a), and collided with a southbound 1997 

Dodge Avenger sedan. The sedan was subsequently struck from behind by a southbound 

2001 Freightliner tractor/refrigerated trailer combination unit, which then struck the 1996 

Freightliner tractor. The three vehicles came to rest blocking the southbound lanes of the 

highway. The drivers of the two combination units and the Dodge sedan received minor or 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all times in this report are eastern standard time.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

no injuries. During the accident sequence, the flatbed semitrailer separated from the 1996 

Freightliner tractor. The semitrailer came to rest perpendicular to the roadway, straddling the 

portable concrete barrier and partially obstructing the left lane of I-95 north. (See figure 2b.)

Approximately 11 minutes after the 4:50 a.m. accident, a 1999 Chevrolet Tahoe 

sport utility vehicle (SUV)óoccupied by nine students from Yale University and traveling 

north in the left laneócollided with and underrode the left side corner of the 1996 

Freightliner flatbed semitrailer. (See figure 2c.) Following the impact, the Chevrolet 

disengaged from the semitrailer, entered the median, skidded along the concrete barrier, 

and came to rest about 450 feet northeast of the semitrailer. (See figure 3.) The driver and 

three passengers were fatally injured; the other occupants were seriously injured. A 

witness reported that there were no signs that the Chevrolet driver tried to stop or swerve 

his vehicle to avoid the semitrailer.

Figure 4 presents forensic evidence from both accidents; included are areas of 

impact for each vehicle and final rest locations for the 1996 Freightliner and the 

Chevrolet.

Preaccident Events

According to the 1996 Freightliner driver, he was traveling in the center lane of 

I-95 north at approximately 50 mph. As he negotiated a wide right curve in the vicinity of 

exit 25, his trailer began to skid to the left. He counter-steered to the left in an attempt to 

straighten the vehicle. The trailer then began to skid to the right; the driver counter-steered 

to the right, but both the truck and the trailer entered a right-hand skid and began rotating 

in a counter-clockwise direction. The vehicle entered the median and collided with a 

portable concrete barrier.

The driver stated that he had not experienced any skidding or loss of control earlier 

in his trip, though he had become aware of the forecast weather conditions when he 

stopped in New Jersey. 

According to the driver of the 2001 Freightliner involved in the 4:50 a.m. accident, 

the 1996 Freightliner driver stated that he had seen three flares on the northbound roadway 

and ìpanicked,î which led to the accident. The driver of the 2001 Freightliner stated that 

he had approached the median barrier and saw flares burning on I-95 north. He recalled 

that the flares were ìalmost outî because they had begun to change color. In a postaccident 

interview, a Connecticut State Police (CSP) officer stated that she had left two flares 

burning in the left lane of I-95 north after clearing a 3:56 a.m. single-vehicle accident. The 

flares were located about 500 feet northeast of the location where tire marks from the 1996 

Freightliner first appeared. 
Figure 2. Representation of multivehicle accident sequence.

2c. Chevrolet collides with semitrailer followed by secondary impacts with median barrier. .

2b. Tractor and semitrailer separate, causing semitrailer to encroach into northbound 

 traffic lanes.

2a. 1996 Freightliner tractor and semitrailer impact and overrun median barrier.

 = postcrash direction of travel

Tractor and semitrailer

Tractor Semitrailer

Tractor Semitrailer

Chevrolet

Northbound

Southbound

Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report
Figure 3. Chevrolet Tahoe at final rest in northbound roadway.

Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

Injuries

Table 1 summarizes the injuries resulting from the two consecutive multivehicle 

accidents. It is based on the International Civil Aviation Organization injury criteria, 

which the Safety Board uses in accident reports for all transportation modes.

Table 1. Injuries.

2

Injuries 1996 Freightliner Dodge 2001 Freightliner Chevrolet

Fatal 0 0 0 4

Serious 0 0 0 5

Minor 1 1 0 0

None 0 0 1 0

Total 1 1 1 9

2 Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 defines a fatal injury as any injury that results in 

death within 30 days of the accident. It defines a serious injury as an injury that requires hospitalization for 

more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days of the date of injury; results in a fracture of any bone (except 

simple fractures of the fingers, toes, or nose); causes severe hemorrhages, or nerve, muscle, or tendon 

damage; involves any internal organ; or involves second- or third-degree burns or any burns affecting more 

than 5 percent of the body surface.
Figure 4. Highway forensic evidence from 4:50 a.m. and 5:01 a.m. accidents.

Highway

overpass

NORTH

Tire

furrows

Southbound

NorthboundI-95

0 25 50 100 150 

1996 Freightliner

area of impact

with median barrier

Dodge area of impact

with barrier wall

1996 Freightliner,

Dodge, and

2001 Freightliner

area of impact

Chevrolet area of impact

with median barrier

Scale in feet

P T

T

T T T

P

P P

Semitrailer final rest

location on median barrier

T

Key: T - tire mark area

 P - paint transfer
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

The 1996 Freightliner driver sustained minor lacerations and contusions on the left 

side of his face and left shoulder. The driver of the Dodge sustained minor lacerations on 

his left shoulder and left hip. The 2001 Freightliner driver was not injured. The Chevrolet 

driver and three occupants received fatal head injuries. (See figure 5 for a seating chart.) 

The front-seat passenger sustained serious chest and neck fractures. The passenger in the 

right rear seat suffered a fractured arm and jaw. For the three passengers seated in the 

cargo area, the injuries included head and neck fractures, cranial trauma, and a fractured 

left knee and contusions. The occupants of the four vehicles were transported to three area 

hospitalsóSaint Vincentís Medical Center, Bridgeport Hospital, or Norwalk Hospital.

Medical and Pathological Information

Blood and urine specimens from the 1996 Freightliner driver were taken and 

examined at St. Vincentís Medical Center in Bridgeport, Connecticut, while the driver 

underwent treatment. The specimens were found to be negative for alcohol and illicit 

drugs. Portions of the hospital specimens were forwarded to the Federal Aviation 

Administrationís Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

further examination; they were also found to be negative for alcohol and other drugs.3

The Fairfield Medical Examiner collected toxicological specimens from the 

Chevrolet driver during postmortem examination. The specimens were found to be 

negative for alcohol and illicit drugs. Portions of the specimens were also forwarded to 

CAMI for further examination and were found to be negative for alcohol and other drugs.

No toxicological specimens were collected from the 2001 Freightliner driver. Title 

49 CFR 382.303 does not require the collection of toxicological specimens from a 

commercial driver unless: (1) an accident involves a fatality or (2) the driver received a 

citation in an accident involving either bodily injury with immediate medical treatment 

away from the scene or disabling damage to any motor vehicle requiring towaway. The 

southbound accident did not involve a fatality, and the 2001 Freightliner driver did not 

receive a citation.

Survival Aspects

Restraint Use and Survivable Space

The 1996 Freightliner driver, the 2001 Freightliner driver, and the 1997 Dodge 

driver stated that they were wearing seat belts at the time of the 4:50 a.m. accident. The 

Dodge was equipped with an airbag, which deployed during the accident sequence.

3 CAMI tests samples for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, amphetamines, opiates, marijuana, 

cocaine, phencyclidine, benzodiazepines, barbiturates, antidepressants, antihistamines, meprobamate, 

methaqualone, and nicotine.
Figure 5. Chevrolet Tahoe seating chart.

Driver 

male 21 

fatal 

Male 21 

serious 

injuries 

Chevrolet front 

Chevrolet rear

Rear seats

Cargo 

compartment

Front seats

Male 20 

fatal 

Male 19 

serious 

injuries 

Male 21 

fatal 

Male 19 

fatal 

Male 18 

serious 

injuries 

Male 18 

serious 

injuries 

Male 18 

serious 

injuries 

Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

The Chevrolet was designed to accommodate a maximum of five passengers. It 

included seat belts for the two front seats and the three rear seats. Figure 5 shows the 

seating arrangement at the time of the accident. According to survivor testimony, only the 

driver and front-seat passenger wore their seat belts. Four passengers sat in the rear seat; 

and three passengers sat in the rear cargo area, which had no restraints and was not 

configured for seating. Physical evidence was used to confirm restraint use within the 

vehicle. 

All of the Chevrolet occupants, except for the left rear-seat passenger, were 

contained in the vehicle. According to an American Medical Response emergency 

medical technician, the left rear-seat passenger was found with his upper body protruding 

between the B-pillar and the rear left door. The Chevrolet was equipped with a driverís 

side airbag, which was found intact and not deployed.

Title 14, Chapter 246, Section 14-100a(C)(1), of the Connecticut General Statutes 

requires all individuals under the age of 16 to use safety belts in the front and back seats. 

There are no safety belt requirements for back seat passengers over 16 years of age. On 

April 15, 2005, an amendment to this statute, House Bill No. 5450, was proposed in the 

Connecticut House of Representatives to require safety belt usage in all seating positions 

regardless of passenger age. The bill was not passed into law.

Title 14, Chapter 248, Section 14-272a, of the Connecticut General Statutes 

requires passengers under the age of 16 to be belted when riding in the cargo area of any 

open-bed vehicle, such as a pickup truck, that is traveling on the highway. There are no 

requirements that passengers under 16 be belted when riding in the cargo area of a closedbed vehicle, such as the Chevrolet; and there are no passenger safety restrictions for those 

over the age of 16 riding in the cargo area of either an open- or closed-bed vehicle.

During the accident sequence, the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer intruded 

into the survivable space of the Chevrolet passenger compartment. The driverís side of the 

Chevrolet was torn open up to the rear passenger door. Contact damage extended about 28 

inches into the passenger compartment. The roof of the vehicle was displaced aft and 

downward to a point about midway between the front seats and the rear bench seat. The 

front and rear-seat portion of the passenger compartment was reduced by approximately 

60 percent. The cargo area was intact, with the exception of intrusion by the rear bench 

seat about 8 inches aft.

Emergency Response

Table 2 provides the emergency response timeline for the 4:50 a.m. and 5:01 a.m. 

accidents. The data are based on witness cellular phone records and dispatch records from 

the CSP Bridgeport Operations Center. The times recorded by the operations center were 

generally a few minutes earlier than the times from 911 phone records, on which the 

accident times were based. This discrepancy accounts for the time gap between the 911 

calls and dispatch of the CSP. The times listed in table 2 are the actual times recorded from 

cellular phone and dispatch records.
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Table 2. Emergency response timeline for 4:50 a.m. and 5:01 a.m. accidents.

I-95 South I-95 North

Time Event Time Event

4:50

Northbound 1996 Freightliner hits median 

barrier and partially crosses over to 

southbound side

4:50

Bridgeport Operations Center receives 911 

call but is not informed of blockage of 

northbound lane

4:56 CSP dispatched to accident scene

4:59 CSP requests Fairfield Police Department 

assistance in locating accident

5:00 Fire Department dispatched to accident 

scene

5:02 Emergency medical services (EMS) 

dispatched 5:01 Chevrolet Tahoe collides with 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer

5:01 Bridgeport Operations Center receives 911 call

5:04 Fire Department arrives at accident scene; 

informed of northbound accident 5:05 CSP informed of accident

5:10 EMS dispatched

5:12 CSP arrives 5:12 CSP arrives 

5:18 EMS arrives 5:18 EMS arrives 

6:10 Final passenger transported to hospital

The Bridgeport Operations Center fielded the emergency calls and dispatched first 

responders to the 4:50 a.m. accident scene on I-95 south. The 5:01 a.m. accident involving 

the Chevrolet occurred while first responders were enroute to the southbound accident. 

According to the CSP, both accident scenes were treated as one large event. The 

responding agencies were able to communicate with each other and allocate resources. 

The CSP added that response time was negatively affected by three factors: 

ï Two of the closest patrol officers were detained at the Bridgeport Hospital with 

the driver from the 3:56 a.m. accident, who happened to have an outstanding 

arrest warrant. 

ï Road and weather conditions were poor. 

ï The traffic queue that formed after the southbound accident caused additional 

highway congestion.
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

Driver Information

1996 Freightliner Driver

The 33-year-old 1996 Freightliner driver was an owner/operator who was driving 

his personal truck tractor and a flatbed semitrailer owned by Arrow Trucking Company of 

Tulsa, Oklahoma. He held a valid California Class A commercial driverís license (CDL) 

with hazardous materials and doubles/triples endorsements, issued July 6, 1999, and 

expiring May 13, 2004. The driver also held a valid medical certificate, issued May 30, 

2001, and expiring May 31, 2003. He had attended a professional truck driving school from 

May 24 through June 24, 1999, and then worked as an employee driver for Arrow Trucking 

for 1 year. He subsequently purchased the 1996 Freightliner and worked for Arrow 

Trucking as an owner/operator. Table 3 lists his traffic violations prior to the Fairfield 

accidents. The 1996 Freightliner driver indicated to Safety Board investigators that he had 

prior experience driving commercial vehicles in winter weather conditions and snow.

Table 3. Prior moving violations for 1996 Freightliner driver.

Date Violation

August 31, 2002 Speeding

March 26, 2002 Exceeding/violating weight limits of vehicle/truck

January 30, 2002 Failing to file document/report as required

July 18, 2001 Property damage accident 

The 1996 Freightliner driverís 72-hour history was reconstructed using a 

combination of his daily logs and other records that were found in the tractor cab 

following the accident. (See table 4.)
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

Table 4. Timeline of 1996 Freightliner driverís activities leading up to accident.

Driverís logs External evidence

January 14, 2003 January 14, 2003

12:45ñ3:00 p.m. Off duty, Mocksville, NC 

3:00 p.m.ñ12:00 a.m. Resting, sleeper berth 

January 15, 2003 January 15, 2003

12:01ñ12:00 a.m . Off duty, Mocksville, NC 

January 16, 2003 January 16, 2003

12:01ñ3:45 a.m. Resting, sleeper berth 

3:45ñ4:00 a.m. On duty, pretrip 

inspection/loading 

4:00ñ8:45 a.m. On duty, driving 

8:45ñ 9:00 a.m. On duty, not driving, 

Fredericksburg, VA 

7:02ñ 9:25 a.m. Loading, Mocksville, NC 

(shipperís log)

9:00 a.m.ñ1:00 p.m. Resting, sleeper berth, 

Fredericksburg, VA 

1:00ñ4:00 p.m. Driving 

4:00ñ4:15 p.m. Fueling, Paulsboro, NJ 

4:15ñ5:15 p.m. Driving 4:40 p.m. Toll receipt, JFK Memorial 

Hwy, Perryville, MD

5:15 p.m.ñ12:00 a.m. Resting, sleeper berth, NJ 

Turnpike, exit 8 travel 

plaza 

6:54 p.m. Fueling receipt, Paulsboro, 

NJ

January 17, 2003 January 17, 2003

12:01ñ1:15 a.m. Resting, sleeper berth, NJ 

Turnpike, exit 8 travel 

plaza 

1:15ñ1:30 a.m. On duty, pretrip inspection 

1:30 a.m. Began driving 

3:47 a.m. Toll receipt, NJ Turnpike, 

Allentown, NJ

4:00 a.m. Toll receipt, GW Memorial 

Bridge, Edgewater, NJ

4:50 a.m. Accident (CSP records)

Chevrolet Tahoe Driver

At the time of the accident, the 20-year-old Chevrolet driver held a valid California 

noncommercial Class C driverís license, which was issued on June 19, 1998, and set to 

expire on April 13, 2006. The driverís California record indicated one violation on July 3, 

2002, for ìunsafe speed for road conditions.î The driver did not own the Chevrolet, which 

belonged to another fraternity member.
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

Safety Board investigators reconstructed the activities of the Chevrolet driver 

during rush week and prior to the accident using information gathered during interviews 

with the driverís dormitory roommate; the chapter president of Delta Kappa Epsilon; and 

the driverís friend, also a Yale student. (See table 5.) The driverís sleep/wake pattern was 

also derived from this information. (See figure 6.)

Table 5. Timeline of Chevrolet driverís activities leading up to accident.

Time Activity

January 12, 2003

2:00ñ7:00 a.m. Slept 

9:00 a.m.ñ1:30 p.m. Visited friend

Afternoon Observed in dorm room 

9:00 p.m.ñ2:00 a.m. Participated in fraternity ìrushî activities

January 13, 2003

After 2:00 a.m. Slept 

Daytime Attended classes and activities

9:30 p.m.ñ12:15 a.m. Participated in fraternity ìrushî activities

January 14, 2003

12:15ñ3:00 a.m. Visited friend

3:00ñ9:30 a.m. Slept

Daytime Attended classes and activities

Nighttime Stayed up late at fraternity house

January 15, 2003

6:00 a.m. Returned to dorm room

10:00 a.m. Went to classes

Afternoon Took 2ñ3 hour nap

10:00 p.m. Departed for fraternity ìrushî activities

January 16, 2003

12:30ñ2:45 a.m. Visited friend

3:00ñ10:45 a.m. Slept

10:45 a.m.ñ10 p.m. Attended classes and activities

10:00 p.m. Departed for fraternity ìrushî activities

10:30 p.m. Departed New Haven for New York City

January 17, 2003

11:30 p.m.ñ12:00 a.m. Arrived in New York City

1:30ñ3:30 a.m. Attended party in bar(s)

3:45 a.m. Departed New York City for New Haven

5:01 a.m. Accident
Figure 6. Chevrolet driver sleep pattern prior to accident.

Sunday

January 12

Monday

January 13 Unknown

Tuesday

January 14

Wednesday

January 15

Thursday

January 16

Friday

January 17

12:00 a.m.

1:00 a.m.2:00 a.m.3:00 a.m.4:00 a.m.5:00 a.m.6:00 a.m.7:00 a.m.8:00 a.m.9:00 a.m.

10:00 a.m.11:00 a.m.

12:00 p.m.

1:00 p.m.2:00 p.m.3:00 p.m.4:00 p.m.5:00 p.m.

7.75 hr

6.5 hr

2.5 hr

5 hr

3.5 hr

Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

According to the president of the fraternity chapter to which the Chevrolet driver 

belonged, the Fairfield accidents occurred during ìrush week,î a period when pledges are 

considered for membership. The chapter president stated that the Chevrolet driver 

volunteered to serve as one of three designated nondrinking drivers for the Thursday night 

rush activity in New York City. The fraternity members arrived at an Irish pub in New 

York City between 11:30 p.m. and midnight. They were later joined by several pledges 

who had taken the train to the city. The chapter president stated that he had observed the 

Chevrolet driver drink one beer while at the pub.

The fraternity members and pledges departed New York City for New Haven 

about 3:45 a.m. The pledges who had arrived by train returned by car because the first 

train for New Haven did not leave until 5:00 a.m. The fraternity chapter president, who 

was also a designated nondrinking driver and who was the last to leave for New Haven, 

stated that he experienced slippery road conditions along I-95. He briefly skidded while 

traveling at 65 mph, then reduced his speed to 50 mph and experienced no further 

problems. He said that he also observed a tractor-trailer skidding on the roadway. He 

learned that the Chevrolet had been involved in a collision when he approached the 

accident site.

The CSP and the Safety Board interviewed four of the surviving five Chevrolet 

passengers. Two of the passengers, who had been seated in the cargo area, stated that they 

were asleep when the accident occurred. Another passenger, also seated in the cargo area, 

had sustained serious head injuries and had no recollection of events prior to the accident. 

The right rear-seat passenger stated that he had slept most of the way back from New 

York, except when a friend shared a sandwich with him after a fast food stop along I-95.
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle and Wreckage

1996 Freightliner Tractor and Flatbed Semitrailer

The 1996 Freightliner tractor, model D120064ST, had a wheel base of 235 inches and 

an unladened weight of 17,000 pounds. The odometer indicated that it had been driven 

655,420.3 miles. The tractor was powered by a 12.7-liter, 360-horsepower Detroit Diesel 

Corporation 60-Series engine, with a 10-speed Rockwell Automation, Inc., manual 

transmission. The 2000 Fontaine Trailer Company flatbed semitrailer was 48 feet long and 

had an unladened weight of 14,000 pounds. It carried five portable generators, each weighing 

2,265 pounds (total weight, 11,325 pounds), for a total trailer weight of 25,325 pounds.

The tractor and semitrailer combination unit was equipped with an air braking 

system that consisted of 15-inch drum brakes on the steer axle and 16.5-inch drum brakes 

on the second, third, fourth, and fifth axles. The tractor did not have an antilock braking 

system (ABS); the semitrailer was equipped with ABS. The tractor had an engine 

retarder,4 also called a ìJakeî brake, which could be set to operate on two, four, or six 

cylinders. The retarder switch was in the ìoffî position when the Safety Board inspected 

the tractor. Manufacturers generally advise drivers not to use a retarder under wet or 

slippery roadway conditions. In fact, a Safety Board investigation of a motorcoach 

accident that occurred in Canon City, Colorado, in December 1999, revealed that an 

enabled retarder most likely triggered the loss of control and eventual crash of the 

motorcoach on a snow-covered and mountainous roadway.5

The truck tractor had scrape marks along the entire passenger side as a result of 

overturning during the 4:50 a.m. accident sequence. The steer axle and engine compartment 

received extensive contact damage. The engine was crushed downward. In addition, the 

fifth wheel6 plate was torn off the tractorís frame. On the semitrailer, the area where the 

fifth wheel was connected was damaged, the landing gear was damaged,7 the rear impact 

bar was separated,8 and the surface of both the underside and flatbed area was damaged. 

The bars that had attached the rear impact bar to the semitrailer were bent rightward.

The tractor was equipped with a Detroit Diesel Electronic Control III Module 

(ECM).9 The ECMís optional memory feature, which records operating information about 

the engine and the vehicle, was not activated. There was extensive damage to the brakes 

on the fourth axle and to the right chamber of the second axle. The brakes that could be 

4 An engine retarder is a device that assists the brakes in slowing a vehicle. The most common type of 

retarder on over-the-road trucks manipulates the engineís valves to create drag.

5 National Transportation Safety Board, Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Road Near Canon City, Colorado, 

December 21, 1999, Highway Accident Brief NTSB/HAB-02/19 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2002).

6 The fifth wheel is a coupling device attached to a tractor that supports the front of a semitrailer and 

locks it to the tractor.

7 Retracting legs support the front of a semitrailer when it is not coupled to a tractor.

8 The impact bar is a lower appendage to the rear bumper that helps prevent underride.

9 The primary function of an ECM is to control fuel flow to the engine to provide maximum fuel 

economy and to meet Government emission standards.
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

inspected and measured were found to be properly adjusted. No preexisting defects were 

found in the lines, valves, couplings, or brake chambers. The tires on the tractor and 

semitrailer were found to be in good condition, with little sign of uneven wear; tread 

depths were within regulations.10

The fifth wheel slide11 was in the ìoffî position, which meant that the flatbed 

semitrailer had been locked to the tractor prior to the accident. Cruise control was in the 

ìoffî position. The windshield wiper selection knob was in the ìlow speedî setting. The 

factory fog light switch was in the ìoffî position, and a second after-market add-on fog 

light switch was in the ìonî position.

Retroreflective tape on the semitrailer was 3 inches wide and ran down both sides 

in 18-inch segments spaced 17 inches apart. (See figure 7.) It also ran fully along the rear 

of the semitrailer and rear impact bar. Each segment of the tape consisted of 7 inches of 

white material and 11 inches of red material. The left side of the semitraileróthe area 

impacted by the Chevroletóalso included two circular light covers. The smaller of the 

two covers was amber, about 2 inches in diameter, and cracked and damaged. The larger 

light cover was red, about 3 inches in diameter, and undamaged. 

Figure 7. Retroreflective tape on rear of flatbed semitrailer.

10 According to the 2002 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs), tread depth must be at 

least 4/32 inch for front tires and at least 2/32 inch for all other tires.

11 A slide is a mechanism that allows the fifth wheel to be moved back and forth to adjust the 

distribution of weight on the tractorís axles.
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

Chevrolet Tahoe

The rear impact bar of the semitrailer was embedded in the Chevroletís radiator 

and engine compartment, approximately at the center of the vehicle. The engine hood was 

detached from the vehicle and deformed. The top portion of the engine compartment was 

severely damaged, as were various components mounted above the engineóthe air 

conditioning unit, brake booster, ECM, throttle, air filter, and air intake. The windshield 

was broken and detached from the vehicle. The engine compartment firewall was pushed 

rearward and down toward the passenger compartment. The left side A-pillar was 

deformed and pushed rearward. The front portion of the roof was peeled back. The 

driverís side door was detached. The left rear door was pushed rearward into the left rear 

quarter panel and was in contact with the left rear tire. (See figure 8.)

Figure 8. Diagram of Chevrolet Tahoe wreckage.

Green paint 

transfer 

Contact 

damage 

 Green paint

 transfer

 Engine block

Roof support 

brace 

Left rear 

passenger 

door 

0 24 48 72

Inches

 Front axle

 Rear axle

Safety Board investigators examined the Chevroletís wheels, power train, steering 

mechanism, brakes, and sensors. No preexisting defects were found to be associated with 

these systems. Light bulbs extracted from the Chevrolet were taken to the Safety Boardís 
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

Materials Laboratory for testing. Inspection of the headlight bulbs revealed that the high 

beams were on at the time of the accident, as evidenced by hot stretching on the bulb 

filaments.12 The Chevrolet was equipped with an after-market brush guard over the front 

exterior lighting area. (See figure 9.) The upper and lower metal bars on the guard were 

approximately 1 1/2 inches in diameter, separated by five smaller metal bars of 

approximately 3/8 inch diameter. One of the smaller diameter bars and a small portion of 

the thick upper bar were directly in front of the headlight lenses.

Figure 9. Chevrolet Tahoe with brush guard.

 

The Chevrolet was equipped with a sensing diagnostic module (SDM) located 

under the driverís seat. An SDM interprets a crash pulse (the time over which a crash 

occurs) and determines whether to deploy the airbags. The module can store one 

nondeployment event,13 which is overwritten by subsequent nondeployment events. An 

SDM can also store one deployment event, as well as related information that occurs within 

5 seconds of that event. In this case, one nondeployment event was stored because the 

airbags did not deploy. SDM data obtained by the CSP indicated that the Chevrolet reached 

a maximum change in velocity of 29 mph (5 gís) about 272.5 milliseconds after the 

algorithm was enabled, at which time power was lost and no additional data were recorded. 

The SDM can record up to 300 milliseconds of data once the algorithm is enabled. 

Meteorological Information

The National Weather Service (NWS) reporting facility at Igor Sikorsky Memorial 

Airport, Bridgeport, Connecticut, is located approximately 7 miles east of the accident 

site. Between 11:17 p.m. on January 16 and 3:16 a.m. on January 17, 2003, the airport 

12 When a bulb is on, the metal filament inside is at an extremely high temperature and becomes 

malleable. The hot metal filament stretches with an impact of sufficient force.

13 A nondeployment event is one that is severe enough to trigger the algorithm but not severe enough to 

deploy the airbag.
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

recorded light snow with only a trace of precipitation. The NWS recorded the following 

temperatures and visibilities in the hours preceding the accidents:

ï 2:54 a.m.: Wind from 280o at 7 knots, visibility 3 miles in light snow and mist. 

Temperature -5o Celsius (C; 23o Fahrenheit [F]).

ï 3:54 a.m.: Wind from 310o at 3 knots, visibility 9 miles. Temperature -6o C 

(21o F), with snow ending at 3:16 a.m.

ï 4:54 a.m.: Wind from 340o at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles. Temperature -5o C 

(23o F).

Highway Information

In the vicinity of the accidents, I-95 is a six-lane concrete urban principal arterial 

roadway.14 In January 2003, the width of the paved portion of the northbound roadway 

was 48 feet. The paved area consisted of a 10-foot-wide right shoulder, three 12-foot-wide 

main travel lanes, and a 2-foot-wide left shoulder. The paved portion of the southbound 

roadway was identical. A 26-foot-wide earthen median divided the roadway. A 

32-inch-high portable concrete barrier system had been placed in the middle of the median 

as part of an ongoing work zone project. (See figure 10.) 

 According to the Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT), in 2002, 

the average daily traffic (ADT) on I-95 in the vicinity of the accidents was 125,300 

vehicles, with 63,600 vehicles traveling south and 61,700 traveling north. Trucks 

accounted for 28 percent of the northbound traffic and 26 percent of the southbound 

traffic. The normally posted speed limit was 65 mph. Because of highway construction, 

the speed limit at and in the vicinity of the accident site had been reduced to 45 mph.

The accidents occurred within a work zone that began approximately 660 feet 

south of the exit 24 northbound off-ramp and ended about 340 feet north of the exit 24 

on-rampóa total distance of 3,983 feet. According to ConnDOT, the objectives of the 

highway construction were to eliminate the earthen median, provide full shoulders 

(emergency breakdown lanes), install concrete median barriers and improved drainage 

facilities, and rehabilitate the concrete pavement and bridge decks. Details of this project 

are provided in the discussion of work zone construction.

14 Under the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) 

functional classification of highway facilities and systems, the service characteristics of an urban principal 

arterial road provide for, among other things, service to the major centers of activity of urbanized areas, 

carrying most of the trips entering and leaving the urban area, and significant intra-area travel, such as 

between central business districts and outlying residential areas.
Figure 10. Overturned portable concrete barrier segments viewed from northbound 

lanes of I-95.

Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

Forensic Evidence

Physical evidence of the initial accident involving the 1996 Freightliner consisted 

of furrow marks on the northbound side of the median, contact damage to the concrete 

median barrier, and pavement scrape marks in the southbound lanes. (See figure 4.) The 

furrow marks began in the median adjacent to the left lane, veered off toward the concrete 

median barrier at approximately a 23o angle, and then continued into the southbound 

traffic lanes. The pavement scrape marks traversed the three southbound lanes and 

extended a distance of approximately 63 feet. Additional contact damage to the top of the 

concrete median barrier consisted of green paint transfer that began about 80 feet beyond 

the furrow marks and continued for a distance of 101 feet.

The Chevrolet left pavement scrape marks on the left lane at the point of impact 

with the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer; additional forensic evidence included 

intermittent contact damage to the median barrier beyond the impact with the trailer. (See 

figure 4.) The pavement scrape marks were 10 feet long and were located approximately 

150 feet north of the furrow marks. The contact damage to the median barrieróconsisting 

of tire marks that extended about 500 feetówas located 215 feet north of the furrow 

marks.
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

Accident History

In the 28 miles of I-95 from the New York State line to the eastern boundary of 

Fairfield, Connecticut, which includes the accident location, ConnDOT accident records 

indicated 40 traffic fatalities from 1998 to 2002óa 5-year average of 0.63 fatalities per 

100 million vehicle miles traveled (VMT). The rest of the Connecticut urban interstate 

system averaged 0.596 fatalities per 100 million VMT; the national urban interstate 

system averaged 0.640 fatalities per 100 million VMT.

From 1998 to 2002, a total of 5,743 fatal and nonfatal accidents were recorded 

within the 5 miles of I-95 north that encompass the accident site. Table 6 categorizes these 

accidents.

Table 6. Accidents occurring within 5 miles of I-95 north accident site, 1998ñ2002.15

Year Total Rear end Sideswipe Fixed object 

Moving

object Other 

1998 969 455 221 196 49 48

1999 1,059 512 237 196 65 49

2000 1,240 615 300 223 55 47

2001 1,248 542 345 224 58 79

2002 1,227 572 327 215 53 60

 Total 5,743 2,696 1,430 1,054 280 283

Roadway Condition

The 1996 Freightliner driver stated to Safety Board investigators that the accident 

occurred because he had lost control of his vehicle immediately after crossing an overpass16

and encountering black ice.17 Several witnesses interviewed by the Safety Board reported 

experiencing sideslip or skidding while driving on I-95 north in the vicinity of the accident 

site. Witnesses also stated that there was no evidence of plowing or road treatment in the 

northbound or southbound lanes along the area of the Fairfield accidents.

According to the CSP, 18 other traffic accidents occurred on I-95 between 

midnight and 4:50 a.m. on January 17 ìwithin several milesî of the Fairfield collisions, 

including one at 3:56 a.m. According to the police report for the 3:56 a.m. accident, a Ford 

15 A rear-end accident is a collision in which the front of one vehicle in transport impacts the back end 

of another vehicle in transport. A sideswipe accident is a collision in which two vehicles are traveling in the 

same direction with direct impact on the sides of their vehicles. A fixed-object accident is an allision 

involving a motor vehicle in transport and a fixed object (such as a tree, utility pole, traffic signal, guard rail, 

bridge abutment, or similar object). A moving-object accident is a collision between a motor vehicle in 

transport and any other vehicle that is moveable or moving.

16 Ice generally forms on overpasses and bridges more quickly than on other roadway surfaces because 

heat is conducted away from both the top and bottom of the structure. See 

www.atmos.washington.edu/~cliff/Roadway2.htm, July 14, 2005.

17 Black ice is a popular term for a very thin coating of clear, bubble-free homogeneous ice that forms 

on pavement. It is caused by freezing temperatures at ground level and warmer conditions in the upper 

atmosphere, including wet ground conditions and rapidly falling temperatures. Federal Highway 

Administration, Manual of Practice for an Effective Anti-icing Program: A Guide for Highway 

Maintenance Personnel (Washington, DC: FHWA, 1996) 55. 
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

pickup truck was traveling in the center lane of I-95 north at a driver-estimated speed of 70 

mph when it slid on an icy spot. The vehicle entered the median, struck the median barrier, 

and rolled over 1 1/2 times. The police report stated thatóat the time of this accidentóthe 

weather was clear, the traffic was moderate to light, the area was unlit and dark, and the 

center and right lanes were clear with some icy patches. The report also mentioned that 

while the officer was traveling to the accident scene at speeds between 60 and 65 mph, the 

patrol car slid on the icy roadway, causing the officer to slow to 55 mph. 

There were other reports of slippery conditions on I-95 that morning. About 

2:38 a.m., the Bridgeport Operations Center logs recorded CSP troopers describing I-95 as 

ìextremely slipperyî and requested that ConnDOT be called to sand and plow the 

roadway east of exit 19. The troopers discussed coordination efforts for jackknifed trucks 

near northbound exit 23 and southbound exit 29. They also mentioned other accidents and 

abandoned vehicles on I-95. 

A paramedic enroute from Fairfield University to Bridgeport Hospital about 

4:57 a.m. stated that his ambulance had fishtailed as he drove at 40 mph on I-95 north, 

between exits 22 and 29. He further stated that traffic had been passing him at 50 to 60 

mph. He started receiving calls about the Fairfield accidents at 5:10 a.m. and drove the last 

ambulance that was dispatched. Upon arrival at the scene, he found the roadway to be 

ìextremely slipperyî and had trouble walking in the area.

ConnDOT Maintenance District #3, section #33, Stratford maintenance facility 

(crew 338), was responsible for treating the accident area of I-95 during snow and ice 

conditions. At 10:45 p.m. on January 16, the section #33 supervisor was notified by the 

Newington Operations Center of an AccuWeather report for flurries and light snow, with 

accumulations of up to 1 inch. About 12:50 a.m., the supervisor decided to proceed with 

25-percent coverage of the area.18 Two trucks were sent out to cover I-95, between exits 

18 and 31. Three other trucks were sent to cover Route 25, Route 8, and secondary 

routes.

The supervisor stated that the two trucks assigned to I-95, from exits 31 to 18, 

were loaded with a 7:2 mixture of sand and salt by 1:30 a.m. The ConnDOT 2002/2003 

Snow and Ice Guidelines define a 7:2 mixture as consisting of 1,264 pounds of sand and 

300 pounds of salt per two-lane mile.19 The trucks began to apply a continuous treatment 

to the southbound lanes of I-95 before looping back to treat the northbound lanes. 

During its run, the lead truck also treated an incident area on I-95 south near bridge 99 

so that it could be opened to traffic. This area had been closed due to a construction 

accident that caused a light pole to fall across three lanes. The trucks returned to the 

Stratford maintenance facility between 3:00 and 3:30 a.m. to refill for a second 

18 On six-lane highways such as I-95, 25-percent coverage requires two trucks, 50-percent coverage 

requires three trucks, and 100-percent coverage requires five trucks.

19 The Snow and Ice Guidelines allow for this mixture to be used in lieu of straight salt on multilane 

highways when a complete assignment of trucks is not dispatched. Connecticut Department of 

Transportation, 2002/2003 Snow and Ice Guidelines, Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations, 

Office of Maintenance (Hartford, CT: ConnDOT, 2002) 10.
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

treatment of the same area. The total amount of 7:2 mixture applied to this area of I-95 

prior to the Fairfield accidents was 20 to 25 cubic yards.20 As they applied the second 

treatment on the roadway, both truck drivers reportedly saw the vehicle involved in the 

3:56 a.m. accident being loaded onto a flatbed trailer.

According to the ConnDOT transportation maintenance director, the Snow and Ice 

Guidelines provide instructions for 100-percent coverage only,21 which requires a full 

complement of trucks. The guidelines recommend that straight salt be used when treating 

multilane highways; the 7:2 mixture may be used ìwhen the complete assignment of 

trucks [has] not been called out or if conditions warrant.î The guidelines do not indicate 

when a complete assignment of trucks is unnecessary, nor do they specify treatment 

procedures for such occasions. 

The maintenance districts have unwritten, informal procedures for roadways 

during lesser storm conditions. The maintenance director stated that the criteria for 

implementing 25-, 50-, and 100-percent treatment coverage is ìvery subjectiveî and that it 

is the section supervisorís responsibility to determine coverage for a particular storm. 

Once a decision is made, the section supervisor monitors road conditions by traveling the 

roadway and communicating with the treatment trucks.

AASHTO recommends that State highway maintenance officials responsible for 

snow and ice control treatment establish a level-of-service (LOS) program for identifying 

and managing storms.22 According to AASHTO, LOS refers to

Operational guidelines establishing maintenance activities associated with the 

prevention and removal of snow and ice from roadways. LOS may establish a 

prescribed end-of-storm condition, intermediate stages acceptable while obtaining 

that condition, or the frequency of snow and ice control maintenance operations.

LOS is based on factors such as storm severity, temperature, traffic data, road 

classification, treatment materials used, maintenance coverage and cleanup time, and 

available equipment. Appendix B includes excerpts from the ConnDOT 2002/2003 Snow 

and Ice Guidelines, along with sections from the LOS guidelines published by AASHTO 

and the FHWA. 

Both New York and Massachusettsówhich border Connecticut and have similar 

winter weatheróhave maintenance guidelines that include LOS programs. When 

specifying treatment application rates, the New York guidelines23 account for factors such 

as roadway type, traffic volume and speed, type of precipitation and accumulation rate, 

20 According to the Snow and Ice Guidelines, 1 cubic yard of the 7:2 mixture weighs 2,503 pounds.

21 For 100-percent treatment coverage, ConnDOT recommends echelon plowing with a full 

complement of five trucks. "Echelon" refers to the staggered formation of plow trucks, similar to the 

formation of flying geese. ConnDot Snow and Ice Guidelines, 14.

22 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Guide for Snow and Ice 

Control (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1999) 81ñ82.

23 New York State Department of Transportation, Highway Maintenance Guidelines, Snow and Ice 

Control (Albany, NY: NYSDOT, 1993) 19.
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

and pavement temperature. The New York LOS program also provides guidance on how 

quickly roadway treatment should be completed and on the factors that necessitate 

followup applications. Under the conditions on the morning of the Fairfield accidents, the 

New York LOS program would have called for an initial application of 225 pounds of 

straight salt per mile per lane.

The LOS program in Massachusetts24 relies mainly on air temperature and its 

effect on precipitation characteristics to determine treatment. According to the 

Maintenance Manual, when air temperature is between 25 and 34o F and rising, the initial 

roadway treatment should be ìthe application of straight chloride at the rate of 240 pounds 

per lane mileî (condition 1). At temperatures between 20 and 32o F, the initial treatment 

should be an ìapplication of straight chloride or the mixture of calcium chloride and 

sodium chloride at the rate of 240 pounds per lane mileî (condition 2). Under conditions 

where the temperature is below 25o F, the pavement should be plowed until the shoulders 

and lanes are clear. Once the temperature rises to 28 to 34o F, ìThe application of sodium 

chloride at the rate of 240 pounds per lane mile may be necessary to prevent icingî 

(condition 3). The Maintenance Manual also provides guidelines for plowing and 

retreating the roadway. Appendix B contains additional information from the New York 

and Massachusetts maintenance guidelines.

In studying the use of abrasive (sand) and chemical (salt) mixtures, AASHTO 

found that abrasives only temporarily increase road traction. According to AASHTO, 

ìThe sole function of abrasives is to improve traction, which may be short-lived because 

traffic will rapidly disperse abrasives and additional frozen precipitation will cover the 

application treatment.î AASHTO cites a conclusion by the Ontario Ministry of Transport 

that ìthe highway sections treated with straight salt required fewer applications than 

sections treated with salt/abrasives mixtures, while achieving the same level of service.î25

The FHWA Manual of Practice for an Effective Anti-icing Program26 states that 

abrasives do not support the fundamental objectives of anti-icing27 or deicing, though 

some conditions warrant the use of abrasives, such as when temperatures are so low as to 

slow chemical action or when snow or ice is strongly bonded to the pavement. It explains 

that the sole function of abrasives is to increase the coefficient of friction, and that this 

benefit is likely to be short-lived due to the effects of traffic. The manual further states that

There is generally no advantage gained from the routine use of abrasives in an 

anti-icing program. When anti-icing operations have successfully prevented or 

mitigated the hazards of packed snow, for example, straight abrasives applications 

will provide no significant increase in friction or improvement in pavement 

condition. Further, a mix of abrasives and chemical will usually be no more 

effective as an anti-icing treatment during snowstorms than the same amount of 

24 Massachusetts Highway Department, Maintenance Manual, Chapter 5, Division 4 (Boston, MA: 1996).

25 AASHTO, 81ñ82.

26 FHWA, 6.

27 Anti-icing refers to the timely application of a chemical freezing-point depressant to prevent the 

formation or development of bonded snow and ice.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

chemical placed alone. It even appears that the use of abrasives in the mix can be 

detrimental to the effectiveness of the chemical. Because of the cost associated 

with both application and clean-up of roads and drainage facilities, and because of 

the potential airborne dust problem accompanying their use, abrasives 

applications should not be a routine operation of an anti-icing program.

The Massachusetts guidelines mention the use of sand only when necessary during 

spot treatments under condition 2, upon completion of plowing and continuous treatment 

with straight salt. The New York Highway Maintenance Guidelines include specific 

comments regarding the use of mixtures of abrasives (salt) and chemicals.28 New York 

cautions that abrasives reduce the effectiveness of salt. Further, the guidelines state that 

Although snow and ice surfaces that have been treated with abrasives are safer 

than untreated snow or ice surfaces, they are not as safe as bare pavement. Traffic 

quickly diminishes the effect of abrasives and frequent re-application is necessary. 

This adds significantly to the overall cost and still provides a less safe surface than 

the bare pavement that could have been achieved with pure salt.

In 2001, the Iowa Department of Transportation and the Iowa Research Board 

examined the use of abrasives for winter maintenance. The State concluded that 

ìabrasives applied to roads where significant traffic travels at high speeds [above 30 mph] 

are swept off the road rapidly, remaining in place (and providing friction enhancement) for 

somewhere between 10 and 100 vehicle passages, at most.î29

Work Zone Construction

The 4:50 a.m. and 5:01 a.m. accidents occurred in a work zone on I-95. Signs 

displaying ìconstruction work zone, reduce speed to 45 mphî were located approximately 

4,525 feet in advance of the northbound accident scene on the outside shoulder and 

median. A regulatory ìspeed limit 45î sign30 was also located approximately 2,413 feet in 

advance of the accident scene. The actual construction area began about 660 feet south of 

the exit 24 northbound off-ramp and ended about 340 feet north of the exit 24 on-rampóa 

total distance of 3,983 feet. Construction began on March 26, 2001, and is scheduled for 

completion in late 2005.

According to ConnDOT, the goals of the Fairfield construction project were to 

eliminate the grass median and provide full shoulders (emergency breakdown lanes), to 

install concrete median barriers and improved drainage facilities, and to rehabilitate the 

concrete pavement and bridge decks. The construction project was divided into three stages.

28 NYSDOT, 19. 

29 W. A. Nixon, The Use of Abrasives in Winter Maintenance: Final Report of Project TR 434, IIHR 

Technical Report No. 416 (Ames, IA: Iowa Department of Transportation and Iowa Research Board, 2001) 21.

30 The purpose of a regulatory sign is to inform highway users of traffic laws or regulations and to 

indicate the applicability of legal requirements that would not otherwise be apparent. Federal Highway 

Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), (Washington, DC: FHWA, 2003).
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

Stage 1 construction was approximately 70 percent complete at the time of the 

accidents. It included work within the right shoulder in both directions of travel, including 

parapet31 modifications on two existing bridges and reconstruction of the right shoulder in 

some areas. This work required placement of a portable concrete barrier along the right 

shoulder, beginning before each bridge, to protect the affected work zones. During stage 1, 

a decision was made to resurface the northbound and southbound lanes of I-95. The 

resurfacing of the highway was not expressly indicated in the preconstruction plans 

approved by ConnDOT.

Prior to the initiation of stage 1, a 32-inch-high permanent concrete barrier was 

situated along the left edge of the southbound shoulder of I-95. It was embedded into the 

roadway pavement structure and incorporated drainage slots to allow water to reach the 

catch basins in the center of the median. According to ConnDOT, the location of the 

barrier created a problem because the existing asphalt overlay was to be milled,32 leaving a 

depression of 5 inches or more. The drainage slots in the permanent barrier would have 

been too high to allow water to drain properly, subjecting the roadway to flooding during 

rainstorms. 

Milling of the existing pavement was shown on the maintenance and protection of 

traffic plans, but the plans did not include details on how to handle the permanent median 

barrier during the milling operation. ConnDOT decided to remove the barrier to prevent 

the possibility of flooding and to place a portable concrete barrier away from the road and 

in the center of the 26-foot-wide depressed earthen median.

The portable concrete barrier consisted of 20-foot-long, 32-inch-tall concrete 

segments. The base of each segment was 24 inches wide, and the top was 6 inches wide. 

Each segment weighed 8,000 pounds and was connected to adjacent segments using a pinand-loop joint. Unlike the embedded permanent barrier, the portable concrete barrier was 

not anchored to the surface of the earthen median. The AASHTO Roadside Design Guide

gives no guidance on the placement of portable concrete barriers on unpaved surfaces. It 

does state that ìroadside barriers perform most effectively when they are installed on 

slopes of 1 foot vertical to 10 foot horizontal (1/10 feet) or flatter.î33 Safety Board 

investigators measured the median cross-slope and found that it was flatter than the 

specified parameter, varying from 1/12 feet to 1/15 feet.

Furrow marks in the northbound median indicated that the 1996 Freightliner 

tractor flatbed semitrailer struck the concrete median barrier at an angle of about 23o. The 

vehicle overturned and overrode the 32-inch-high barrier, deflecting the five overturned 

barrier segments as much as 3 feet toward the southbound lanes. One segment was visibly 

cracked and separated down the middle. Postaccident photos of the damaged concrete 

barriers revealed that the pins holding segments together were severely deformed; in most 

31 A parapet is a low protective wall or railing along the edge of a raised structure.

32 Milling is the process of mechanically removing asphalt.

33 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Roadside Design Guide

(Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2002) 5-31.
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

cases, the pins remained within the loops. The double loops were deformed marginally but 

remained attached to each barrier segment.

The type of portable concrete barrier used at the accident site was the standard size 

for the separation of traffic. A standard median barrier is generally considered to be a 

32-inch-high concrete barrier capable of withstanding a collision with a 4,400-pound truck. 

A high-performance median barrier is generally considered to be at least 42 inches tall and 

capable of withstanding a collision with a 17,400-pound single-unit truck, as specified in 

National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 350.34 Appendix C 

summarizes the testing requirements for standard and high-performance concrete barriers.

Although the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide does not give specific guidance or 

warrants on the use of high-performance median barriers versus standard median barriers, 

it does provide the following general guidelines:35

As with roadside barriers, most median barriers have been developed, tested, and 

installed with the intention of containing and redirecting passenger vehicles and 

pickup trucks. Some highway agencies have identified locations where heavy 

vehicle containment was considered necessary and have designed and installed 

high-performance median barriers having significantly greater capabilities than 

commonly used designs. Factors most often considered in reaching a decision on 

such barrier use include:

ï High percentage or large average daily number of heavy vehicles.

ï Adverse geometrics (horizontal curvature).

ï Severe consequences of vehicular (or cargo) penetration into opposing 

traffic lanes.

At the time of the Fairfield accidents, the contractor had not started stage 2 of the 

highway construction project, which included reconstruction of the median and left 

shoulder of I-95 north. This work consisted of shifting traffic 3 to 6 feet from the existing 

median and placing a portable concrete barrier along the entire left shoulder; excavating 

the existing median; installing a new 45-inch-high permanent concrete barrier; replacing 

the median decking on the two bridges; paving the median/left shoulder; and removing the 

portable concrete barrier.

Stage 2 would have required the contractor to move the portable concrete barrier 

from the center of the median back to the left edge of the southbound shoulder. An 

additional portable concrete barrier would have been needed on the left edge of the 

34 The NCHRP was created to conduct research in acute problem areas that affect highway planning, 

design, construction, operation, and maintenance. FHWA policy requires the use of devices on the National 

Highway System that have been successfully tested in accordance with the guidelines contained in NCHRP 

Report 350. National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Recommended Procedures for the Safety 

Performance Evaluation of Highway Features, NCHRP Report 350 (Washington, DC: Transportation 

Research Board, National Research Council, 1993) 16.

35 AASHTO Roadside Design Guide, Section 6.3, 6-2.
Factual Information 27 Highway Accident Report

northbound shoulder. The purpose of the two rows of barriers was to protect workers 

during construction of the 45-inch-high permanent concrete median barrier.

Following the accidents, ConnDOT implemented a policy for reviewing and 

approving construction revisions. The policy requires that revisions to a construction 

contract (such as resurfacing main travel lanes, paving shoulders, adding drainage, adding 

signage and delineation, or installing temporary pavement to improve cross-slopes) be 

implemented only after review and approval by the ConnDOT Offices of Construction and 

Engineering. Information submitted for review must include details of the revision, 

justification, exact location, approximate costs, and completion date.

Stage 3 consisted of removing the portable concrete barrier along the left edge of 

I-95 south, applying roadway base materials, and paving the median/left shoulder.

Lighting

According to an FHWA study, roadway lighting ìprovides improved visibility for 

users of roadways and associated facilities. It reduces crashes by helping drivers obtain 

sufficient (visual) information . . . [and] supplements vehicle headlights, when 

warranted.î36 Highway lighting was not operational on the northbound or southbound 

lanes of I-95 at the time of the accidents, as verified by a CSP video, witness statements, 

and pictures taken immediately following the events. 

The lighting outage was due to a construction accident that had occurred between 

midnight and 12:30 a.m. on January 17, at bridge 99, located 1 mile north of the Fairfield 

accident site. An excavator being loaded onto a flatbed trailer had hit a light pole, which 

fell across the three southbound lanes and tripped the southbound circuits, extinguishing 

lights from the Grasmere substation northward to bridge 99, a distance of approximately 

8,297 feet. A total of 86 light poles were affectedó35 on I-95 south, 33 on I-95 north, and 

18 along the exit ramps. By 9:00 a.m. that morningówithin 4 hours of the Fairfield 

accidentsóa contractor had fixed the damaged wiring of the downed light pole. The 

highway lights for the northbound and southbound lanes were turned on at the Grasmere 

substation by 10:30 a.m. The accidents involving the 1996 Freightliner and the Chevrolet 

occurred approximately 3,205 feet north of the substation.

The State of Connecticut holds contractors liable for damage they cause to any part of 

the highway, including appurtenances, slopes, pavements, and structures.37 At the time of the 

Fairfield accidents, the State had no standards or procedures that addressed how soon 

highway lights had to be repaired. ConnDOT had no written policy requiring a contractor to 

notify the agency when an illumination system was damaged. ConnDOT stated that it had an 

informal policy that lighting repairs be completed within 3 days, though it was not enforced. 

36 P. Hasson and P. Lutkevich, ìRoadway Lighting Revisited,î Public Roads, Vol. 65, No. 6 (May/June 

2002). See <tfhrc.gov/pubrds/02may/07htm>, July 14, 2005.

37 Connecticut Department of Transportation, Standard Specifications for Roads, Bridges, and Incidental Construction, Form 815, Article 10.00.07 (Hartford, CT: ConnDOT, 1995) 456.
Factual Information 28 Highway Accident Report

Following the accidents, ConnDOT added a special provision to its standard 

specifications that requires a contractor to immediately notify the agency of a lighting outage 

or pole knockdown. The contractor is responsible for repairing the lighting system before the 

normal nighttime turn-on of the lights. If this cannot be achieved, the lighting must be 

operational prior to the next normal nighttime turn-on, within a maximum of 24 hours.

Variable Message Signs

ConnDOT had placed 17 variable message signs (VMSs) along the I-95 corridor. 

(See appendix D for sign placement.) Eleven signs were located on I-95 north, and six 

were located on I-95 south. Northbound, the nearest VMSs were located approximately 

3.1 miles (VMS #55) and 4.67 miles (VMS #54) in advance of the 1996 Freightliner and 

Chevrolet accident sites, respectively. At the time of the two accidents, these two signs 

were not in use and did not display any messages.

The 1996 Freightliner accident occurred about 4:50 a.m.óat which time the 

Bridgeport Operations Center was notified that the left and center southbound lanes of 

I-95 were blocked. The center was not informed that the semitrailer also obstructed the left 

northbound lane. The operations center activated 23 VMSs on I-95 south; I-91; Routes 1, 

8, 15, and 80; and State Road 796. Table 7 shows the messages that were displayed at 

approximately 5:01 a.m. on VMS #75, #76, and #77, the southbound signs closest to the 

accident site. 

Table 7. Variable message signs displayed on I-95 south at 5:01 a.m., January 17, 2003. 

The signs alternated between frames 1 and 2.

VMS No. Message frame 1 Message frame 2

75, 76, 77 I-95 Closed Fairfield

at exit 24 Use alternate route

The Bridgeport Operations Center received a 911 call at 5:01 a.m. regarding a 

northbound accident blocking the left and center lanes of I-95, at exit 24. It took steps to 

activate VMS #55 and #54 at 5:06 a.m. By 5:21 a.m., the two signs displayed messages 

warning of the accident. (See table 8.) According to ConnDOT, the delay in display of the 

northbound sign messages was a result of the VMS software system still completing the 

earlier command to activate the 23 southbound signs. The VMS system took 

approximately 31 minutesófrom 4:50 to 5:21 a.m.óto activate all 23 southbound signs, 

at which time the northbound signs were activated.

Table 8. Variable message signs displayed on I-95 north at 5:21 a.m., January 17, 2003. 

The signs alternated between frames 1 and 2.

VMS No. Message frame 1 Message frame 2

55 Accident at exit 24 Left and center lanes

closed

54 Accident Fairfield

at exit 24 (no message)
Factual Information 29 Highway Accident Report

The VMS software system in place at the time of the Fairfield accidents was about 

10 years old. It did not allow the simultaneous change of sign messages in both directions of 

travel. In January 2004, ConnDOT installed an expanded traffic management system at the 

Newington Operations Center to allow sign messages on the I-95 corridor to be modified 

simultaneously in both directions of travel. According to the ConnDOT Highway Operations 

Director, the new VMS system can broadcast messages to a total of 25 signs in both 

directions of travel within 5 minutes. The time required for the system to simultaneously 

activate each sign increases as the number of VMSs increases beyond 25.38 ConnDOT 

expects to have a similar system installed at the Bridgeport Operations Center by early 2006.

Incident Management

The flares that the 1996 Freightliner driver reportedly saw on I-95 north had been 

placed there by the CSP to warn motorists away from a 3:56 a.m. accident involving an 

overturned vehicle in the median. Messages posted on VMS #54 and #55 provided 

additional warningsóìAccident exits 23ñ24î and ìLeft lane closedîófrom 3:59 a.m. until 

the scene was cleared about 4:43 a.m. According to the CSP officer, she had parked her 

patrol car behind the overturned vehicle in the left lane and set out five flares in a diagonal 

pattern. The officer had used the wire support legs at the base of the flares to set them 

upright in the roadway. After the first set of flares had burned out, the officer moved her 

vehicle northward about 45 feet and placed two more flares side by side in the middle of the 

left lane, perpendicular to the direction of travel. The officer recalled that the sign for exit 25 

was plainly visible when she sat in her car. She also remembered that when she left the 

accident scene, she drove diagonally across the lanes of the interstate so that she would be 

able to use the exit 25 ramp.39 Based on the officerís description of her location, she had 

arranged the second flare pattern about 435 feet north of where the 1996 Freightliner 

crossed the median. (See figure 11.) 

The two abandoned flares were located in the left lane of I-95 north; the 1996 

Freightliner driver was traveling in the center lane. A wide right curve preceded the approach 

to the flares, and Safety Board investigators examined the possibility that the curvature of the 

roadway caused the driver to perceive the flares as being in his lane. Based on sight distance 

measurements, investigators determined that the driver would have been between 1,033 and 

1,063 feet (about 0.2 mile) from the flares when they appeared to be directly in front of him.

A ConnDOT safety training bulletin for its personnel and contractors provided 

guidance on extinguishing flares. The bulletinówhich was not intended for use outside 

the agencyóstated that, ìBefore leaving the scene, make sure that lit flares have burned 

completely. If not and the remaining flare length permits, extinguish them by tapping the 

burning end on the pavement, separating the burning portion from the rest of the flare.î 40

The CSP was not aware of this bulletin.

38 Telephone interview, Highway Operations Director, Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations, 

ConnDOT, July 6, 2004.

39 The entrance for exit 25 was about 330 feet north of the officerís location.

40 Connecticut Department of Transportation, Safety Training Topic of the Week, Reflectors, Emergency 

Flares, and Strobe Lights, Bulletin 17 (Hartford, CT: ConnDOT, 1996).
Figure 11. Diagram of flare placement.

Area where 1996 Freightliner 

crossed center median 

Area where Chevrolet 

collided with flatbed 

semitrailer 

Initial flare pattern: 

five flares set 

diagonally across 

left lane 

357'

55'

45' 25'

Second flare pattern: 

two flares set 

mid-point in 

left lane 

Area where 1996 Freightliner 

crossed center median 

Factual Information 30 Highway Accident Report
Factual Information 31 Highway Accident Report

The CSP Training Academy provides cadets with guidelines on establishing a flare 

pattern. The guidelines mention that the proper way to extinguish a flare is to rub it against 

the ground and stick it into dirt if possibleónot to step on it. The guidelines specify that 

spiked flares41 should be removed when a scene is cleared; they do not say that other types 

of flares should also be extinguished and removed.

According to the CSP, it does not train officers on incident management 

procedures. The State incident management policy42 is outlined in a two-page document 

that calls on the public and private sectors to work together to mitigate the impact of 

traffic incidents. It includes no specific guidance on managing highway incidents. The 

Connecticut State Traffic Commission Regulations,43 which set the standard for traffic 

control devices in the State, include no guidance on properly clearing an incident area so 

that it is safe for traffic.

The FHWAís MUTCD defines the Federal standards applicable to the installation 

and maintenance of traffic control devices on all streets and highways. Title 23 CFR Part 

655 requires State traffic control procedures to substantially conform within 2 years to the 

latest edition of the MUTCD. According to the construction administrator of ConnDOT, 

the Connecticut State Traffic Commission Regulations were approved by the FHWA as 

being in ìsubstantial conformanceî to the MUTCD.

The latest edition of the MUTCD, published in November 2003, contains a new 

section on ìControl of Traffic Through Traffic Incident Management Areas.î Chapter 6I44

defines a traffic incident as ìan emergency road user occurrence, a natural disaster, or other 

unplanned event that affects or impedes the normal flow of traffic.î It defines a traffic 

incident management area as an area of a highway where temporary traffic controls (TTC) 

are imposed by authorized officials in response to a traffic incident. According to Chapter 6I:

The primary functions of TTC at a traffic incident management area are to move 

road users reasonably safely and expeditiously past or around the traffic incident, 

to reduce the likelihood of secondary traffic crashes, and to preclude unnecessary 

use of the surrounding local road system.

Chapter 6I divides traffic incidents into three general classes, based on duration: 

ï Major traffic incidents are expected to require more than 2 hours of incident 

management. 

ï Intermediate traffic incidents have a duration of 30 minutes to 2 hours.

ï Minor traffic incidents have a duration of less than 30 minutes. 

41 A spiked flare has a spike on its end, which allows it to be embedded in the ground. This type of flare 

was not used for the 3:56 a.m. accident.

42 This State policy was approved on November 5, 1992, by ConnDOT, the Connecticut Department of 

Motor Vehicles, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, and the Connecticut Department 

of Public Safety (which includes the CSP).

43 The FHWA has approved these regulations as being in ìsubstantial conformanceî to the MUTCD.

44 MUTCD, Chapter 6I, Section 6I.01, 6I-1.
Factual Information 32 Highway Accident Report

The discussion of intermediate traffic incidents includes the following guidance: ìWhen 

flares are used to initiate TTC at traffic incidents, more permanent traffic control devices 

should replace them as soon as practical. Both the flare and its supporting device should 

then be removed from the roadway.î45

Motor Carrier Information

The driver of the 1996 Freightliner was working as an owner/operator for Arrow 

Trucking Company, an interstate for-hire common carrier of building and oilfield 

materials. The company, which is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, began business in 1968 and 

has terminals in Alabama, California, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas. Because the driver was 

contracted to Arrow Trucking, the company reported his safety information and relevant 

owner/operator data under its motor carrier number. 

Roadside inspection data for the 24 months prior to January 19, 2003, indicated that 

Arrow Trucking had 2,625 vehicle inspections, resulting in 596 out-of-service 

determinationsóa 22.7-percent rate. The data also indicated 3,824 driver inspections, with 266 

out-of-service determinationsóa 7.0-percent rate. The 2003 national average out-of-service 

rates were 22.9 percent for vehicles and 6.78 percent for drivers.46 The U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) 12-month recordable accidents47 for Arrow Trucking indicated 67 

accidents, with an accident rate48 of 0.57, compared to the national average of 0.75.49

Prior to the accidents, Arrow Truckingís most recent Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA) compliance review resulted in a satisfactory rating (October 

1994). A compliance review is an on-site examination of records and operations to 

determine whether the motor carrier meets the safety criteria outlined in 49 CFR Part 385. 

The review covers hours of service, driver qualification, vehicle inspection and maintenance, 

financial responsibility, accidents, hazardous materials, and roadside vehicle out-of-service 

rate. Motor carriers are rated ìsatisfactory,î ìconditional,î or ìunsatisfactory.î Carriers with 

an unsatisfactory rating must improve to satisfactory or conditional within 60 days or be 

barred from operating commercial vehicles. Additionally, carriers with an unsatisfactory 

rating are prohibited from contracting or subcontracting transportation services with Federal 

agencies. Stricter compliance regulations apply to motor carriers transporting hazardous 

materials or carrying 15 or more passengers in addition to the driver. 50

45 MUTCD, Chapter 6I, Section 6I.03, 6I-3.

46 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Safety and Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) System.

47 As defined by FMCSR 390.5, an accident is an occurrence involving a commercial motor vehicle 

operating on a highway in interstate or intrastate commerce that results in a fatality, injury, or disabling 

damage to one or more vehicles requiring tow from scene.

48 Accident rate is determined by a motor carrierís recordable accidents per million miles traveled in the 

most recent 12-month period.

49 See <www.fmcsa.dot.gov/rulesregs/fmcsr/regs/385appnB.htm>, July 14, 2005.

50 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, A Motor Carrierís Guide to Improving Highway 

Safety: Education and Technical Assistance Program (Washington, DC: FMCSA, 2002).
Factual Information 33 Highway Accident Report

The FMCSA conducted another compliance review of Arrow Trucking after the 

Fairfield accidents, which resulted in a conditional rating. This determination was based 

on violations that included, among others: 

ï Failing to preserve a driverís record of duty status supporting documents for 6 

months, 

ï Scheduling a run that would necessitate the vehicle being operated at speeds in 

excess of those prescribed, and 

ï Failing to require the driver to prepare a driver vehicle inspection report. 

Appendix E provides a complete list of violations. Arrow Trucking has since 

corrected these deficiencies. On August 12, 2003, the FMCSA reaudited Arrow Trucking 

and issued the carrier a satisfactory rating.

The Safety Board examined the bill of lading, driverís logs, and trip receipts for 

the 1996 Freightliner driverís accident run and found no indication that the trip was 

scheduled in a way that would require him to exceed speed limits or violate 

hours-of-service regulations.

Tests and Research

Conspicuity Testing

The circular light covers and samples of the retroreflective tape mounted on the 

side of the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer were sent for photometric analysis 

to the FHWA Arens Photometric and Visibility Laboratory (PVL) at the Turner-Fairbank 

Highway Research Center. A section of the headlight lens from the Chevrolet was also 

sent to the PVL.

The PVL examined the retroreflectivity51 of the tape and the relative 

transmissivity52 of the Chevrolet headlight lens. Measurements were taken both prior to 

and after cleaning the components. It was determined that dirt on the headlights reduced 

their luminous intensity by about 45 percent. In spite of dirt on the headlights and the tape, 

PVL measurements showed thatówhen the tape was illuminated by the headlights at 

distances of up to 558 feet under a background luminance of 100 candelas per square 

meter53óthe white and red portions of the tape would have provided luminance that was 

24 times and 10 times, respectively, the level required for detection with certainty. 

51 Retroreflectivity is the ability of a surface to return light to its source.

52 Transmissivity is the ability of a material to transmit light.

53 Luminance is a measure of the amount of light emitted or reflected by an area or surface. This level 

of luminance is roughly equal to ambient light 10 minutes after sunset. It is representative of a high average 

level of nonuniform luminance along the roadway at night.
Factual Information 34 Highway Accident Report

If a driver traveling at a reference speed of 52 mph detected the tape at a distance 

of 558 meters, he or she would have had at least 7 seconds to perceive and react to the 

presence of the flatbed semitrailer in the left lane. Based on the luminance measurements 

and the positions of the semitrailer and the Chevrolet prior to the crash, as determined 

through vehicle and highway evidence, the PVL determined that the combination of 

high-beam headlights and retroreflective tape on the side of the trailer provided a clearly 

detectable signal for a normally observant and alert driver.

Speed Testing

To better understand the dynamics of the second accident, Safety Board 

investigators calculated the Chevroletís speed at impact with the 1996 Freightliner flatbed 

semitrailer using tire marks found at the accident scene,54 linear and rotational forces 

applied to the semitrailer upon impact, SDM deceleration readings, and evidence gathered 

during deceleration testing of an exemplar vehicle. Several methods were used to arrive at 

a speed estimate, including equations for determining Delta-V for in-line and 90o 

collisions; quadratic equations; and vector sum analysis to visually display the total 

momentum within the collision, impulse vectors, and principal direction of force. The 

calculations indicated that the speed of the Chevrolet ranged from 43 to 45 mph; vector 

and momentum analyses indicated a speed of 47 to 49 mph.

Deceleration Testing

On January 22, 2003, Safety Board investigators and the CSP conducted tests to 

help determine the deceleration rate of the Chevrolet as it traveled through the median, 

unpowered, after colliding with the flatbed semitrailer (postcollision separation to final 

rest). The test vehicle was a Ford Expedition SUV, which is similar to the Chevrolet in 

size and weight. The deceleration tests were conducted under two scenarios: with the test 

vehicleís engine off and the transmission in gear and with the engine off and the 

transmission in neutral. The procedure used to gather data was as follows:

1. The vehicle was accelerated to a specified speed.

2. It was steered into the center median to a path parallel to the median barrier.

3. The vehicle ignition was turned off.

4. The vehicle was allowed to coast along the median to a point parallel to the 

final rest position of the Chevrolet.

5. It was steered back onto the roadway and brought to a stop.

The deceleration test trials were conducted at 20, 30, and 40 mph. The test results 

showed an average peak deceleration of 0.039 g and an average deceleration of 0.033 g. 

These values were used to determine the initial speed of the Chevrolet prior to impact and 

its postcollision speed.

54 The tire marks were created as the vehicle separated from the flatbed semitrailer while traveling 

across the pavement to the northeast into the concrete median barrier.
Factual Information 35 Highway Accident Report

Flare Testing

On February 18, 2003, Safety Board investigators and the CSP tested the type of 

flares used at the 3:56 a.m. accident to evaluate their burn time. Two randomly selected 

flares were ignited simultaneouslyóone flare was placed horizontally on the ground, and 

the other was oriented vertically using the attached built-in metal stand. The horizontally 

oriented flare burned for about 23 minutes and 50 seconds. The vertically oriented flare 

burned for about 22 minutes. It was noted that the flames were bright red for most of the 

combustion. About 19 minutes into the vertical flareís life cycle, as the flare burned down 

to the band that held the built-in metal stand, the flame color changed to a dull yellow. 

Previous Safety Board Actions

Barrier and Heavy Truck Compatibility

The Safety Board addressed the compatibility of heavy trucks and guardrails in a 

White Plains, New York, accident investigation.55 About 12:30 a.m. on July 27, 1994, a 

tractor cargo-tank semitrailer loaded with 9,200 gallons of propane (a liquefied petroleum 

gas) was traveling east on I-287 in White Plains. The truck drifted across the left lane onto 

the left shoulder and struck the guardrail. The front head of the tank hit a column of the 

Grant Avenue overpass at a 90o angle, consistent with a vehicle rollover. 

The tractor and the semitrailer separated; the front head of the tank fractured, 

releasing the propane, which vaporized into gas. The resulting vapor cloud expanded until 

it found a source of ignitionóat which time, according to an eyewitness, a fireball rose 

200 to 300 feet. The tank was propelled northward about 300 feet and landed on a frame 

house, engulfing it in flames. The driver was killed, 23 people were injured, and fire 

spread throughout an area within a radius of approximately 400 feet.

The median barrier at the accident site was a heavy post blocked-out W-beam 

barrier. The top of the rail was 27 inches above ground. Although a passenger car could 

have negotiated the barrier design features without experiencing stability problems, the 

Safety Board determined that the accident truckówith its high center of gravity and lower 

rollover thresholdócould not. The truck might have been redirected if a 42-inch-high 

performance barrier had been in place closer to the edge of the shoulder or if the slope had 

been relatively flat from the edge of the shoulder. 

55 National Transportation Safety Board, Propane Truck Collision With Bridge Column and Fire, White 

Plains, New York, July 27, 1994, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-95/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1995).
Factual Information 36 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board concluded that ìthe minimum AASHTO guidelines for the 

geometric design of highways are not always satisfactory for heavy trucks, especially 

those with high centers of gravity . . . highways that are heavily traveled by trucks should 

be designed for them.î The Safety Board issued the following safety recommendation to 

the FHWA:

H-95-32

Require that highway geometric design and traffic operations of the 

National Highway System be based on heavy-truck operating 

characteristics.

In March 1997, the FHWA responded by stating that it was in basic agreement 

that consideration must be given to heavy vehicles in the development of standards for 

the National Highway System. As such, it was supporting research under the NCHRP 

and had its own research program to develop the analysis tools and bases for highway 

standards that address the effects and requirements of heavy vehicles. It was also 

supporting the ongoing AASHTO efforts to develop corresponding standards and 

guidelines. In December 2004, the FHWA updated the Safety Board on its progress and 

stated that it had distributed a resource document, entitled Supplemental Guidance on 

Safe Accommodation of Heavy Vehicles on U.S. Highways, to its field offices. This 

document references the recent NCHRP Report 505, Review of Truck Characteristics as 

Factors in Roadway Design, and elaborates on truck barrier information in the Roadside 

Design Guide. 

The FHWA believes that its Supplemental Guidance should raise each Stateís level 

of awareness of the continuing need to weigh both the likelihood and consequences of 

large truck crashes at selected highway locationsóboth for new construction as well as 

reconstruction projects. In addition, the FHWA has suggested to AASHTO that it consider 

incorporating information from the Supplemental Guidance into the next edition of the 

Roadside Design Guide.

The Safety Board agreed that the FHWA Supplemental Guidance should help 

increase State awareness of the possibility and consequences of large truck crashes 

when considering either new construction or reconstruction projects. The Safety Board 

also welcomed the recommendation that information from the Supplemental Guidance

be included in the next edition of the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide. The Safety 

Board classified Safety Recommendation H-95-32 ìClosedñAcceptable Alternate 

Action,î recognizing that the FHWA response did not meet the full intent of H-95-32. 

The Safety Board expressed concern that this issue would resurface in future accident 

investigations. 

Seat Belt Usage

In March 1997, the Safety Board held a public forum on safety improvements in 

societal attitudes about buckling up, better evaluation of seat belt usage, better air bag design, 

and evaluation of changes to air bags. As a result of this forum, the Safety Board adopted a 
Factual Information 37 Highway Accident Report

series of recommendations on air bags and automobile occupant restraint.56 One of the 

recommendations was addressed to the Governors and legislative leaders of the 50 States 

and U.S. Territories and to the Mayor and Chairman of the Council of the District of 

Columbia: 

H-97-02

Enact legislation that provides for primary enforcement of mandatory seat 

belt use laws, including provisions such as the imposition of driver license 

penalty points and appropriate fines. Existing legal provisions that insulate 

people from the financial consequences of not wearing a seat belt should be 

repealed. 

Connecticut is one of 21 States to have enacted primary seat belt laws. It requires 

that all front-seat passengers and back-seat passengers under 16 years be belted. A fine of 

$15 is levied for each infraction. In correspondence in 2003, the Safety Board encouraged 

Connecticut to pursue legislation that would require all vehicle occupants to use seat belts 

regardless of age, hold unbelted occupants legally responsible for their injuries, and 

impose significant fines and driver license penalty points for seat belt law violations. 

Pending further action by Connecticut, the Safety Board has classified Safety 

Recommendation H-97-02 ìOpenóAcceptable Response.î

56 National Transportation Safety Board, Proceedings of the National Transportation Safety Board 

Public Forum on Air Bags and Child Passenger Safety, Report of Proceedings NTSB/RP-97/01 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1997).
38 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

In the Fairfield accident investigation, the Safety Board considered the following 

factors that may have caused or contributed to the severity of the initial and subsequent 

crashes: driver performance, survivability, highway snow and ice treatment, use and 

placement of median barriers, absence of highway lighting, VMS operation, and incident 

management. These causal and contributory issues are analyzed following a brief 

discussion of factors that were determined not to be causal to the accidents. 

Exclusions

Toxicology

The results of postaccident testing of the 1996 Freightliner driver and the 

Chevrolet driver for the presence of alcohol and 12 drugs, including illicit and common 

licit drugs with known performance-impairing effects, were negative. The Safety Board 

concludes that neither alcohol nor drug use was a factor in either accident. 

Vehicle Factors

Safety Board investigators examined both the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed 

semitrailer and the Chevrolet for mechanical defects that might have led or contributed to 

the 4:50 a.m. or 5:01 a.m. accidents. Neither vehicle showed evidence of component 

failures that might have caused the accidents. Although the Chevrolet was equipped with a 

brush guard, the impedance of light emittance from the headlights was negligible because 

only one of the smaller bars was directly over the headlight lenses. The Safety Board 

concludes that mechanical conditions did not cause or contribute to the accidents 

involving the 1996 Freightliner and the Chevrolet.

Motor Carrier Factors

At the time of the accident, the FMCSA had rated Arrow Trucking Company 

ìsatisfactory,î based on a 1994 compliance review. The company had a 12-month 

recordable accident rate of 0.57, compared with the national average of 0.75. The motor 

carrierís roadside inspection out-of-service rates for drivers and vehicles did not deviate 

significantly from the national averages. 

Following the Fairfield accidents, the FMCSA conducted another compliance 

review of Arrow Trucking, which resulted in a conditional rating based on scheduling runs 

that necessitated the vehicle being operated in excess of the speed limit and failing to 
Analysis 39 Highway Accident Report

preserve a driverís record-of-duty status supporting documents for more than 6 months.57

However, the Safety Board investigation of the Fairfield accidents found that both the 

1996 Freightliner driverís 72-hour history and Arrow Truckingís scheduling practices 

were in line with Federal hours-of-service regulations. The Safety Board concludes that 

motor carrier operations were not a factor in the accidents involving the 1996 Freightliner 

and the Chevrolet. The FMCSA reaudited Arrow Trucking in August 2003 and issued the 

carrier a satisfactory rating.

Emergency Response

According to the Bridgeport Operations Center logs, the CSP was dispatched to 

the 4:50 a.m. accident at 4:56 a.m. However, because the operations center was not told 

that the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer blocked the left lane of I-95 north, law 

enforcement and emergency vehicles were sent to the southbound lanes onlyówhere the 

Freightliner tractor came to rest. The operations center received a call about the 

northbound accident at 5:01 a.m. and immediately informed the units responding to the 

4:50 a.m. accident. Responders apportioned resources to both accidents, which were 

treated as one event. 

According to operations center logs, the CSP arrived at the accident scene at 

5:12 a.m., followed by the Fire Department and EMS at 5:18 a.m. The last passengers 

from the accident vehicles were transported to one of three hospitals by 6:10 a.m. 

Emergency responders reported that they were hampered by incomplete information about 

the initial accident involving the 1996 Freightliner and by the icy roadway conditions. The 

Safety Board concludes that the emergency response was satisfactory, despite the lack of 

prior information about blockage of the northbound left lane and the icy roadway 

conditions. 

Accident Discussion

About 4:50 a.m. on January 17, 2003, light snow was falling near Fairfield, 

Connecticut. The driver of a 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer was negotiating a 

wide right curve in the center lane of I-95 north near exit 25, at a driver estimated speed of 

50 mph, when he lost lateral control. This loss of control may have been due to the truck 

encountering black ice while in a wide right curve, as the driver contends, or to an evasive 

maneuver by the driver to avoid lighted flares in the roadway ahead, as he stated on-scene 

to the driver of the 2001 Freightliner. The CSP had left the flares burning after clearing a 

3:56 a.m. accident. 

57 Two previous Safety Board reports discuss the time between compliance reviews and the process by 

which carriers are selected for reviews: (a) National Transportation Safety Board, Motorcoach Run-Off-theRoad Accident, Tallulah, Louisiana, October 13, 2003, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-05/01 

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 2005). (b) National Transportation Safety Board, Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Road 

and Overturn, Victor, New York, June 23, 2002, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-04/03 (Washington, 

DC: NTSB, 2004).
Analysis 40 Highway Accident Report

After the driver lost lateral control, the 1996 Freightliner rotated counterclockwise 

and entered the median near MP 26.6, struck and overrode a portable concrete barrier, and 

then collided with a southbound 1997 Dodge sedan. The Dodge was struck from behind by 

a southbound 2001 Freightliner tractor/refrigerated trailer combination unit, which 

subsequently struck the 1996 Freightliner. The three vehicles came to rest in the 

southbound lanes. During the accident sequence, the 1996 Freightliner tractor separated 

from the flatbed semitrailer and rolled onto its right side. The rear portion of the semitrailer 

came to rest partially obstructing the left lane on the northbound side of the highway.

Approximately 11 minutes after the initial accident, a 1999 Chevrolet Tahoe SUV 

with nine occupantsótraveling northbound in the left laneócollided with the side corner of 

the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer. The semitrailer intruded into the passenger 

compartment of the Chevrolet, fatally injuring the driver and three passengers in the left and 

center rear seats. Photometric tests of the retroreflective tape on the left rear side of the 

semitrailer suggested that the vehicle should have been visible to an alert driver, who would 

have had enough time (at least 7 seconds) to perceive and react to its presence on the roadway. 

Driver Issues

1996 Freightliner Driver

The Safety Board examined the possibility of driver fatigue as a factor in the initial 

and subsequent Fairfield accidents. According to the logs of the 1996 Freightliner driver, 

he had been off duty for 39 hours prior to departing Mocksville, North Carolina, on 

January 16, 2003. He was on duty for 8.75 hours on January 16 before going off duty and 

resting for 8 hours. His logs for January 17 indicate that he began driving at 1:15 a.m. and 

had been driving for 3 hours and 21 minutes before the accident. As detailed in table 4, 

though there are discrepancies between the driverís logs and receipts, they do not indicate 

that the driver was in gross violation of the Federal hours-of-service regulations, which, at 

that time, limited driving to 10 hours per day and required a minimum 8-hour rest period.

The 1996 Freightliner driver was operating his vehicle at a time of day when 

fatigue and the physiological pressures to sleep are greatest.58 Fatigue stemming from 

circadian factorsóeven in the absence of sleep deprivationóhas been found to reduce 

vigilance, impair the processing of information, and slow reaction time.59 Although the 

driver had rested prior to commencing his trip, psychophysiological factors related to his 

circadian rhythm could have predisposed him to fatigue. If he saw flares in the roadway 

from the earlier 3:56 a.m. accident, fatigue may have affected his decision-making ability, 

resulting in an inappropriate evasive response. This scenario corresponds to the 2001 

Freightliner driverís comment that the 1996 Freightliner driver said that he ìpanickedî 

upon seeing the flares.

58 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Drowsy Driving and Automobile Crashes, DOTHS-808-707 (Washington, DC: NHTSA, 1998).

59 DOT-HS-808-707.
Analysis 41 Highway Accident Report

Although fatigue cannot be ruled out as a factor in the 4:50 a.m. accident, there is 

more support that weather-related road conditions were the principal cause of the driverís 

loss of lateral control. Prior to crashing into the median, the driver traveled on an overpass 

and negotiated a wide right turn at a self-reported speed of 50 mph. The temperature was 

below freezing, and it was snowingóconditions conducive to the accumulation of ice on 

the surface of the overpass. A string of weather-related accidents on the northbound and 

southbound lanes of I-95, including other jackknifed tractor-semitrailers, further suggests 

that roadway conditions were poor. 

Several witnesses reported skidding on the roadway in the vicinity of the accident 

site. However, the 1996 Freightliner driver stated that he had not experienced any skidding 

or loss of control prior to the accident and, thus, he may not have realized the condition of 

the roadway until he lost control. In postaccident interviews with the CSP and Safety 

Board investigators, the driver attributed his loss of control to the presence of black ice on 

the roadway. The Safety Board concludes that the 1996 Freightliner driver lost control of 

his vehicle, probably as a result of traveling at a speed too great for the existing conditions 

of ice and snow on the roadway surface.

Chevrolet Tahoe Driver

Fatigue is more likely a contributor to the subsequent accident involving the 

Chevrolet. The driverís sleep schedule during the week of the accident was dictated 

primarily by fraternity rush activities, which lasted from 9:00 p.m. to between 3:00 and 

5:00 a.m. and occurred throughout the school week. Witness statements indicated that the 

driver was usually in bed by 3:00 a.m. and woke up to attend classes each morning. At the 

time of the accident, the Chevrolet driver had been awake for over 18 hours and was 

driving at a time when he would normally be asleep. The early morning hours are a time of 

day when most individuals experience a decrease in the level of psychophysiological 

arousal associated with circadian rhythm. In addition, statements from surviving 

passengers imply that most, if not all, were asleep during the drive from New York City, 

which suggests a low level of stimulation within the Chevrolet.

Photometric tests of the retroreflective tape on the 1996 Freightliner flatbed 

semitrailer indicated that the tape should have been visible to the Chevrolet driver for at 

least 7.6 seconds before the collision, which was sufficient time to have induced an 

avoidance response. The accident scene on I-95 south may have distracted the driver. 

However, studies suggest that alert drivers generally do not divert their gaze from the path 

of travel for more than 2 or 3 seconds at a time.60 Therefore, it seems more likely that the 

Chevrolet driverís vigilance was affected by microsleep or inattention brought on by 

60 T. Dingus, D. McGehee, M. Hulse, S. Jahns, N. Manakkal, M. Mollenbauer, and R. Fleischman,

TRAVTEK Evaluation Task C3, Camera Car Study, Project Report, FHWA-RD-94-076 (Washington, DC: 

FHWA, 1995).
Analysis 42 Highway Accident Report

fatigue. Research indicates that response lapses resulting from microsleep61 may occur as 

fatigue or pressure for sleep increases with time and circadian rhythm.62

A witness stated that the Chevrolet driver did not appear to brake or swerve to 

avoid the flatbed semitrailer. Although the absence of roadway lighting might have limited 

the driverís ability to fully recognize the scene ahead, some sort of avoidance maneuver 

would have been expected had he detected an unknown object in his lane of travel. The 

Safety Board concludes that the Chevrolet driver probably did not perceive the flatbed 

semitrailer in the left lane of I-95 north due to a combination of fatigue, distraction from 

the median crossover accident in the southbound lanes, and the absence of artificial 

highway lighting. The Safety Board will advise the North American Interfraternity 

Conference, the National Pan-Hellenic Conference, the National Pan-Hellenic Council, 

and the National Association of Latino Fraternal Organizations of the importance of 

developing and implementing activity-scheduling policies that eliminate or reduce the 

operation of motor vehicles by fatigued drivers.

Survivability

Interviews and physical evidence indicated that only the Chevrolet driver and the 

front passenger were wearing seat belts. The seven passengers in the rear seat and cargo area 

were not restrained, though seat belts were available for three rear-seating positions. The 

cargo area was not designed to carry passengers, though it is legal to do so in Connecticut. 

The Chevrolet airbag did not deploy. SDM data indicated that the Chevrolet 

decelerated 29 mph over a span of 272.5 milliseconds. This relatively long crash pulse is 

consistent with an underride accident,63 in which ìsoftî components of the vehicle (such 

as the hood, A-pillar, and roof) are engaged. The deployment of the airbag would not have 

affected survivability because of the intrusion of the flatbed semitrailer into the Chevrolet 

passenger compartment.

Although the surviving passenger in the front seat was seriously injured, the lap/ 

shoulder safety belt sufficiently restrained him to prevent fatal impact with the windshield, 

roof, and dashboard. The driver succumbed to massive head injuries, but the three fatally 

injured passengers in the rear seats may have survived had they been properly restrained 

and had the vehicle not been overloaded. The Chevroletís impact with the 1996 

Freightliner flatbed semitrailer threw the passengers up and forward, resulting in serious 

facial, cranial, and upper torso injuries. One passenger seated on the left side of the back 

61 Microsleep is a period of sleep generally lasting from 3 to 15 seconds. V. L. Tirunahari, S. A. Zaidi, 

R. Sharma, J. Skurnick, and H. Ashtyani, ìMicrosleep and Sleepiness: A Comparison of Multiple Sleep 

Latency Test and Scoring of Microsleep as a Diagnostic Test for Excessive Daytime Sleepiness,î Sleep 

Medicine, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2003): 63ñ67.

62 C. D. Wylie, T. Shultz, J. C. Miller, M. M. Mitler, and R. R. Mackie, Commercial Motor Vehicle 

Driver Fatigue and Alertness Study, Project Report, FHWA-MC-97-002 (Washington, DC: FHWA, 1996).

63 In an ìunderrideî crash, a portion of a passenger vehicle slides under another vehicle.
Analysis 43 Highway Accident Report

seat was partially ejected. The Safety Board concludes that the likelihood of occupant 

survival would have significantly improved if the Chevrolet had been occupied by a 

maximum of five persons, rather than nine, and if all occupants had been wearing seat 

belts.

Connecticut is one of the more progressive States with regard to primary seat belt 

laws. According to the National Center for Statistics and Analysis of the National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), in 2004, belt use in primary States was 

11 points higher than in secondary States (84 percent versus 73 percent). However, the 

primary seat belt law in Connecticut applies only to front-seat passengers and to rear-seat 

passengers between 4 and 16 years of age. The fine for each infraction is only $15, which 

probably is not prohibitive enough to encourage compliance by all roadway users. 

Nationwide, it is estimated that safety belts save 13,000 lives each year, while 7,000 die 

because they did not use belts.64

Earlier this year, Connecticut legislators considered requiring safety belt usage in 

all seating positions regardless of age; however, they did not pass this bill into law. The 

Safety Board encourages Connecticut to reconsider applying its primary seat belt law to 

both front and back seating positions. Therefore, the Safety Board is reiterating Safety 

Recommendation H-97-02 to the Governor and legislative leaders of Connecticut, urging 

them to enact legislation that provides for primary enforcement of mandatory seat belt use 

laws, including provisions such as the imposition of driver license penalty points and 

appropriate fines, and to repeal existing legal provisions that insulate people from the 

financial consequences of not wearing a seat belt.

Highway Conditions

ConnDOT Maintenance District #3, section #33, Stratford maintenance facility, 

was responsible for treating the heavily traveled section of I-95 where the Fairfield 

accidents occurred. In the late evening of January 16, 2003, after being notified of a 

weather report calling for flurries and light snow with accumulations of up to 1 inch, the 

section #33 supervisor sent two trucks with a 7:2 sand and salt mixture to treat the 

roadway between exits 18 and 31. According to the ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines, a 

7:2 mixture is an application of 1,264 pounds of sand and 300 pounds of salt per two-lane 

mile.65

The ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines state that a 7:2 sand and salt mixture can 

be used on multiple-lane roadways in lieu of straight salt when a complete assignment of 

trucks (100-percent coverage) has not been dispatched, as was the case on January 17. 

Between 1:00 and 4:00 a.m., the two trucks made two applications to the northbound and 

southbound lanes of I-95. Despite these roadway treatments, witnesses reported that they 

64 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Initiatives to Address Safety Belt Use (Washington, 

DC: NHTSA, 2003) 6.

65 ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines, 10.
Analysis 44 Highway Accident Report

continued to experience hazardous driving conditions that morning, and some even 

reported that they saw no evidence that I-95 had been treated.

ConnDOT maintenance districts base roadway treatment decisions on the 

ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines, which address only 100-percent treatment coverage. 

They provide no written instructions for determining when conditions require full 

treatment versus lesser action, nor do they include information on 25- or 50-percent 

coverage applications. Lacking direction from the guidelines, the section #33 supervisor 

had to make a subjective decision about roadway treatment and coverage, and he may not 

have adequately considered the weather, traffic, and other roadway-related factors to 

ensure safety on I-95. 

Despite the roadway treatment ordered by the supervisor, as many as 18 other 

accidents reportedly occurred on I-95 in the vicinity of the Fairfield collisions between 

midnight and 4:50 a.m. on January 17. The persistence of such hazardous conditions 

suggests that, by failing to provide formal guidance, ConnDOT left the section #33 

supervisor ill-equipped to make critical roadway snow and ice treatment decisions. 

The ConnDOT guidelines cannot be considered an LOS program because they do 

not specify treatment strategies for different levels of storm severity. Other highway 

authorities have determined that officials need more detailed guidance when making snow 

and ice treatment decisions. Both AASHTO and the FHWA advocate that LOS programs 

provide such assistance. In general, LOS programs are designed to provide increased 

precision and thoroughness in developing and applying appropriate snow and ice 

treatments on roadways. AASHTO recommends that State highway maintenance officials 

establish LOS programs to provide a framework for making treatment decisions. 

According to AASHTO, the LOS determination should be based on analyzing a number of 

preestablished factors, which may include road classification, traffic data, and available 

personnel and resources, as well as special circumstances and conditions affecting the 

roadway.

Both New York and Massachusettsówhich border Connecticut and have similar 

winter weatheróhave LOS programs. Under New Yorkís regular LOS, precipitation with 

a high ice content, which was the case at the Fairfield accident area during the early 

morning hours of January 17,66 would probably have called for an initial application of 

225 pounds of straight salt per mile per lane. The New York LOS also provides guidance 

on followup applications, depending on various factors, including observation of 

conditions and the roadwayís response to treatment. 

The Massachusetts LOS program has three service conditions. Condition 2 would 

probably have applied to the situation on I-95 in the vicinity of the Fairfield accidents. The 

weather reports and observations for the Fairfield area indicated that temperatures were in 

the range of 20o F, with light precipitation, resulting in roadway ice. Condition 2 is defined 

as, ìAir temperature 20 degrees Fahrenheit to 32 degrees Fahrenheit, pavement wet or 

66 The regular LOS would have applied, despite the fact that the roadway was treated between 10:00 p.m.

and 4:00 a.m., because I-95 had an ADT volume greater than 50,000.
Analysis 45 Highway Accident Report

icing precipitation, rain, snow, sleet, or freezing rain. Under this condition, ice is likely to 

form on the pavement.î67 For condition 2, the initial treatment specified is ìstraight 

chlorideî or a mixture of calcium chloride and sodium chloride at the rate of 240 pounds 

per lane mile. The LOS also specifies additional action based on results of the initial 

application.

The Safety Board cannot definitively state that the applicable treatments specified 

under the New York and Massachusetts LOS programs would have sufficiently improved 

roadway conditions to have prevented the January 17 accidents along this section of I-95. 

However, both of these State LOS programs would have identified icing as the main 

roadway problem and would have prescribed specific treatments. Had the ConnDOT 

Snow and Ice Guidelines included an LOS program addressing factors such as 

temperature, precipitation rate, and traffic flow, the supervisors may have made a more 

accurate assessment of roadway conditions and decided to employ more intensive or 

different treatments than the minimal application of a 7:2 sand and salt mixture.

Also, the New York and Massachusetts LOS programs both provide guidance on 

reassessing and readdressing roadway conditions after the initial application. A written 

program based on LOS would have provided the ConnDOT supervisors with criteria for 

evaluating the effectiveness of treatment, which might have led to a modification in 

coverage. The ConnDOT maintenance crew drivers observed at least one weather-related 

accident during their runs, and the CSP reported that roadways continued to be slippery 

despite treatment. Had the ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines included an LOS program 

calling for evaluation of the effectiveness of roadway treatment, the supervisors may have 

initiated 50-percent treatment coverage, rather than 25 percent. Such remedial action 

could have improved roadway conditions. The Safety Board concludes that a 

well-designed LOS program would have guided ConnDOT supervisors in selecting a 

predetermined treatment option designed to address specific roadway conditions, such as 

moderate snow and ice, and would have helped them evaluate the effectiveness of 

treatment. 

Evidence suggests that the specific response measure ConnDOT selectedó

application of a 7:2 mixture of sand and saltówas not the optimal choice for the light 

snow and icy roadway conditions prevailing on I-95 near Fairfield in the early morning 

hours of January 17. According to AASHTO and the FHWA, abrasives only temporarily 

improve roadway traction because they are rapidly dispersed by traffic and can be covered 

by additional precipitation. AASHTO studies indicate that fewer applications of straight 

salt are required than of a mixture of abrasives and salt to achieve the same level of 

roadway improvement. Moreover, the FHWA Manual of Practice for an Effective 

Anti-Icing Program indicates that abrasives do not aid in deicing pavement and that 

combining abrasives with chemicals can reduce the efficiency of treatment.68 As noted 

above, for the conditions that applied at Fairfield, both the New York and Massachusetts 

67 Massachusetts Highway Department, Maintenance Manual, 42.

68 See <www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/mopeap/mop0296a.htm>, July 14, 2005.
Analysis 46 Highway Accident Report

LOS programs would have called for the application of straight salt rather than a mixture 

of abrasives and salt.

The snowfall on the night of January 16ñ17 was light, which probably influenced 

ConnDOTís decision to initiate minimum (25 percent) treatment coverage. However, over 

time, even light snowfall could have overlaid the 7:2 mixture and reduced the capacity of 

the sand to provide traction. Also, though traffic was not heavy during the early morning 

hours, the traveling speed was likely sufficient to rapidly disperse the minimal amount of 

7:2 mixture applied. CSP transcripts and witness statements indicated thatódespite 

roadway treatmentóthe pavement remained slippery and hazardous, and accidents 

continued to occur. The Safety Board concludes that the sand and salt mixture that 

ConnDOT used to treat the light-to-moderate snow and icy roadway conditions prevailing 

in the early morning hours of January 17, 2003, was not as effective as straight salt 

because such a mixture tends to be more rapidly dispersed by high-speed traffic. The 

Safety Board believes that ConnDOT should develop an LOS program in accordance with 

FHWA and AASHTO guidance and incorporate the program elements, including a 

discussion of the limited usefulness of abrasives for roadway treatment, into the Snow and 

Ice Guidelines. 

The Safety Board will also inform AASHTO of the circumstances of this accident 

and will advise the association to encourage its members to implement LOS programs that 

use the most effective snow and ice treatment materials for given weather, roadway, and 

traffic conditions in accordance with the FHWA Manual of Practice for an Effective 

Anti-icing Program and the AASHTO Guide for Snow and Ice Control.

Median Barrier

When the driver of the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer lost control of 

his vehicle near MP 26.6, the truck entered into a counterclockwise skid toward the 

unpaved and depressed highway median. It collided with and overrode a 32-inch-high 

portable concrete barrier system. The collision overturned and laterally deflected five 

barrier segments toward the south and visibly cracked one segment. The Safety Board 

examined issues associated with the type of barrier used at the accident site and its 

placement on an unpaved surface.

In 2002, heavy trucks accounted for between 26 and 28 percent of the 125,300 

vehicles that traveled daily on the accident segment of I-95. However, the 32-inch-high 

standard portable concrete median barrier in use at the accident site was designed only to 

redirect cars and private-use trucks under 4,400 pounds. Safety Board investigators 

calculated that the 1996 Freightliner, including the compressors and the flatbed 

semitrailer, weighed over 42,000 pounds and had a center of gravity approximately 4 

inches higher than the top of the median barrier. In addition: 
Analysis 47 Highway Accident Report

ï The cross-slope of the depressed median placed the truck at an angle, which 

increased its propensity to roll toward the barrier, creating an unstable 

condition. 

ï The unembedded barrier allowed the truck to tip and override it.

High-performance median barriers at least 42 inches high are heavier than standard 

portable barriers and are designed to redirect heavy trucks, such as the 1996 Freightliner. 

These barriers exceed the center-of-gravity height of heavy trucks, making them less likely 

to overturn or be overridden during a collision, such as that which occurred in Fairfield. 

However, there is no specific guidance regarding the use of such barriers. 

The AASHTO Roadside Design Guide provides general information on standard 

and high-performance median barriers, but it does not include specific warrants for 

deciding when high-performance barriers are applicable (such as accident history, 

roadway geometry, ADT volume, or percentage of heavy truck traffic). As a result, States 

may not be aware of the safety benefits of high-performance barriers. The Safety Board 

concludes that the AASHTO Roadside Design Guide lacks specific guidance on the use of 

high-performance barriers, making it difficult for State transportation agencies to 

determine the circumstances, such as those present in the Fairfield accidents, in which 

such barriers should be used. The Safety Board believes that AASHTO should establish 

warrants in the Roadside Design Guide regarding the selection and use of 

high-performance barriers, including 42- and 50-inch concrete barriers, that are capable of 

redirecting heavy trucks.

The Safety Board previously addressed the incongruity between heavy trucks and 

roadside barrier design guidelines in the White Plains, New York, accident investigation 

report, in which it recommended that the FHWA ìrequire that highway geometric design 

and traffic operations of the National Highway System be based on heavy-truck operating 

characteristicsî (Safety Recommendation H-95-32).69

Since the issuance of this recommendation, crash tests have been conducted on 

high-performance permanent concrete bridge railings of 42 inch height or greater, using a 

79,400-pound van-type tractor-trailer and an 80,120-pound tanker-type tractor-trailer. 

Although the FHWA has not issued specific warrants on the use of high-performance 

barriers, the agency did issue a memorandum to its regional administrators to encourage 

States to use these barriers on urban freeways, on other freeway systems with significant 

volumes of heavy vehicles, on sharp curves, on interchange ramps with lower design 

speeds, and for shielding bridge piers susceptible to damage from heavy vehicle impacts.

The FHWA requires that barriers used on the National Highway System be 

successfully tested in accordance with the crash test guidelines contained in NCHRP 

350.70 The Safety Board welcomes the progress that has been made in the testing and 

promotion of permanent high-performance barrier systems. However, specific warrants on 

69 NTSB/HAR-95/02.

70 NCHRP Report 350, 7.
Analysis 48 Highway Accident Report

the use of portable barrier systems are still lacking, and the Fairfield accidents 

demonstrate the need for expanded impact test scenarios. 

At the location of the Fairfield accidents, the portable concrete median barrier was 

placed on an unpaved surface and was not anchored to the ground. Even though 

contractors commonly place portable concrete barriers on unpaved surfaces for the short 

term to complete highway construction projects, no impact tests have been carried out to 

measure the effectiveness of this practice. Moreover, no impact tests have been conducted 

on any type of portable high-performance barrier on unpaved surfaces. The AASHTO

Roadside Design Guide gives little guidance on the placement of portable concrete 

median barriers on unpaved surfaces. 

The mass of a portable concrete barrier and the frictional properties between it and 

the underlying surface can be critical in preventing movement or overturn. But until 

impact testing is conducted on barriers placed on unpaved surfaces, it will be difficult to 

quantify the manner in which the frictional properties or slopes of unpaved surfaces affect 

barrier performance. The Safety Board concludes that the current Federal impact testing 

parameters for portable concrete median barriers are inadequate because they do not 

account for the use of the barriers on unpaved surfaces. The Safety Board believes that the 

FHWA should conduct crash testing of standard and high-performance portable concrete 

median barriers on unpaved surfaces to determine whether they meet the test level criteria 

of NCHRP Report 350, Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance Evaluation 

of Highway Features. Upon completion of FHWA testing of standard and highperformance portable concrete median barriers on unpaved surfaces, as requested above, 

AASHTO should provide clear guidance in the Roadside Design Guide on the placement 

of portable concrete median barriers on unpaved surfaces. 

The roadway resurfacing project ongoing in January 2003ófor which the portable 

concrete barrier was placed in the center of the medianówas not part of the original 

ConnDOT construction plans. Because ConnDOT had no procedure for reviewing 

revisions to projects under construction, a traffic control plan had not been drawn up for 

the resurfacing project. Had the project been included in a traffic control plan and 

reviewed by a highway engineer, an alternative may have been identified that would have 

avoided relocating the median barrier to an unpaved and sloped surface for which it was 

not designed. 

For example, the resurfacing project could have been accomplished in two stages:

ï Resurfacing the northbound lanes first, while keeping the median barrier 

located along the left edge of the southbound shoulder. 

ï Relocating the median barrier to the left edge of the northbound shoulder prior 

to resurfacing the southbound lanes. 

This two-stage approach would have required the barrier to be moved only once 

and would have prevented the flooding that might occur from milling the adjacent 

roadway. Figure 12 shows a cross-section of the positioning of the portable concrete 
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

barrier prior to the Fairfield accidents. Figure 13 illustrates how a two-stage process would 

have avoided placing the barrier on the unpaved median.

Figure 12. Cross-section of positioning of portable concrete barrier at time of accidents.

Earthen median

Paved

shoulder

Paved

shoulder

Two inside southbound 

traffic lanes

Two inside northbound 

traffic lanes

32-inch-high 

temporary barrier 

Actual location of

temporary concrete barrier

Figure 13. Cross-section of I-95 illustrating exemplar stages 1 and 2 of resurfacing 

project. (Not to scale. View limited to two inside lanes for clarity.)

Earthen median

Southbound

shoulder

Northbound

shoulder

Two inside southbound 

traffic lanes Two inside northbound 

traffic lanes

 Temporary barrier

Earthen median

Southbound

shoulder

Northbound

shoulder

Two inside southbound 

traffic lanes

Two inside northbound 

traffic lanes

Temporary barrier 

Resurfacing

operation

STAGE 1

STAGE 2

Resurfacing

operation

As a result of the Fairfield accidents, ConnDOT has adopted a procedure for 

reviewing and approving revisions to construction projects. This new procedure requires 

that the Offices of Construction and Engineering explicitly approve any proposed revision 

to a construction contract. All construction revision submissions must include reasons for 

the change, proposed procedures, affected locations, cost estimates, and a completion 

date. Requiring that highway engineers, knowledgeable in State and national guidelines, 

review proposed revisions to construction projects should mitigate practices that 

contradict, or are not covered by, established guidelines for highway construction. 
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

Although a two-stage construction project might have been more expensive and 

required more time, it would have kept the median barrier on a flat paved surface, for 

which it was designed. Had a review procedure been in place or the two-stage resurfacing 

process described above been implemented, the portable concrete barrier would have been 

located on the shoulder of I-95 north during resurfacing of the southbound lanes, and not 

on the depressed earthen median. It is not possible to determine whether the 1996 

Freightliner would have overridden a standard median barrier on the northbound shoulder, 

but at least the barrier would have been located on a flat paved surface, and it may have 

been more effective in redirecting the tractor flatbed semitrailer. The Safety Board 

concludes that had ConnDOT had a procedure in place for reviewing and approving 

revisions to construction projects, a traffic control plan could have been developed that 

would not have required relocating the median barrier to an unpaved surface for which it 

was not designed and on which it may have been less effective. 

Highway Lighting

Due to a construction mishap that occurred between midnight and 12:30 a.m. on 

January 17, 2003, the highway lights on either side of I-95 at the accident site were 

inoperable. ConnDOT Standard Specifications71 stated that the contractor was responsible 

for the repair or replacement of highway safety lighting in a construction work zone 

whenever the damage was caused by the contractorís operations or negligence. The 

specifications did not require that the contractor notify ConnDOT of lighting outages or 

pole knockdowns or provide a time frame for the completion of repairs. According to 

ConnDOT, the contractor was expected to repair damage to highway illumination as soon 

as practically possible, but neither the specifications nor the construction contracts 

provided clear or binding guidance.

It is not clear to what extent the lack of roadway lighting contributed to the 

collision between the Chevrolet and the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer. Based on 

Safety Board examination of the lighting filaments of the Chevrolet headlamps, the high 

beam headlights were on. Reflectivity analyses indicated that the retroreflective tape on 

the semitrailer should have been visible to the Chevrolet driver from a distance that would 

have allowed him to slow down and maneuver his vehicle around the obstruction. 

However, the purpose of roadway lighting is to improve visibility by supplementing 

vehicle headlights and to allow drivers to obtain sufficient visual information.72 Roadway 

lighting would have illuminated a larger area of the roadway than a vehicleís headlights 

alone and may have helped an alert driver interpret an obstruction. The Safety Board 

concludes that the absence of roadway lighting may have affected the Chevrolet driverís 

ability to recognize and avoid the flatbed semitrailer obstructing the left lane of I-95 north.

71 Connecticut Department of Transportation, Standard Specifications for Roads, Bridges, and 

Incidental Construction, Form 815, Section 10.00.07 (Hartford, CT: ConnDOT, 1995) 456.

72 Patrick Hasson and Paul Lutkevich, ìRoadway Lighting Revisited,î Public Roads, Vol. 65, No. 6 

(May/June 2002).
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

Since the accident, ConnDOT has added a special provision to its Standard 

Specifications for Roads, Bridges, and Incidental Construction requiring a contractor to 

immediately notify the agency of a lighting outage or pole knockdown and to repair the 

outage within 24 hours. The Safety Board recognizes that this provision would not have 

changed the circumstances of the Fairfield accidents. However, the requirement does 

improve the procedures in place and the communication between ConnDOT and its 

contractors regarding the timeliness of lighting repair.

Variable Message Signs

The initial accident involving the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer 

occurred about 4:50 a.m. The 911 call received by the Bridgeport Operations Center at 

that time described the accident as occurring in the left and center lanes of I-95 south, but 

did not mention that the back of the semitrailer also blocked the left lane of I-95 north. The 

operations center took steps to update the 23 southbound VMSs on I-95 and connecting 

routes to warn motorists of the accident. The VMS system took 31 minutes, from 4:50 to 

5:21 a.m., to update these signs. 

About 5:06 a.m., after learning of the subsequent accident involving the Chevrolet, 

the Bridgeport Operations Center programmed the northbound VMSs to warn motorists of 

the accident. However, because the VMS system could not simultaneously modify 

messages in both directions of travel, the system did not display the warnings until 

5:21 a.m., after all of the southbound signs had been updated. Given the lag time 

associated with updating the message system, even if the operations center had received 

complete information on the initial Freightliner accident, the VMSs on I-95 north are 

unlikely to have been updated in time to benefit the Chevrolet driver. The Safety Board 

concludes that the length of time required for updating the VMSs, and the limitations of 

the antiquated system in simultaneously modifying messages in both directions of travel, 

compromised ConnDOTís capability of providing real-time safety-critical traffic 

information to motorists. 

The sluggishness of the VMS system in place at the time of the accidents clearly 

decreased its effectiveness in providing real-time traffic information to the traveling 

public. In January 2004, ConnDOT installed an expanded traffic management system at its 

Newington Operations Center that allows sign messages on the I-95 corridor to be 

modified simultaneously in both directions of travel.73 This new VMS system can modify 

up to 25 VMSs within 5 minutes.

Using the estimated speed of the Chevrolet and the update rate of the new VMS 

system, Safety Board investigators determined that if ConnDOT had had the new traffic 

management system in place before the accidents, the Chevrolet driver would have had an 

opportunity to see the northbound VMS #55 message, ìAccident at exit 24, left and center 

73 Highway Operations Director, Bureau of Engineering and Highway Operations, Connecticut 

Department of Transportation, telephone interview, July 6, 2004.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

lane closed.î Because VMS #55 was located about 3.1 miles in advance of the accident 

scene, the Chevrolet driver would have had about 4 minutes of notice and might have been 

able to avoid the flatbed semitrailer in the left lane.

Incident Management

At 3:56 a.m. on January 17, 2003, a vehicle overturned on I-95 north, about 400 

feet northeast of where the 1996 Freightliner tractor flatbed semitrailer would override the 

median barrier and cross into the southbound lanes almost 1 hour later. An on-scene CSP 

officer stated that she had parked her patrol car behind the overturned vehicle and 

arranged five flares in a diagonal pattern in the left lane. After the first set of flares had 

burned out, the officer positioned two more flares behind her vehicle. The accident scene 

was cleared around 4:43 a.m., with the two flares still burning on the roadway. The flares 

continued to burn for several minutes. It was these flares that the 1996 Freightliner driver 

reportedly attempted to avoid. The driver of the 2001 Freightliner tractor/refrigerated 

trailer involved in the southbound accident with the 1996 Freightliner stated that he, too, 

had seen the flares burning on I-95 north.

The 1996 Freightliner driver was negotiating a wide right curve while in the center 

lane when he reportedly saw the flares and ìpanicked,î as he explained to the 2001 

Freightliner driver at the time. However, the 1996 Freightliner driver also blamed black 

iceóand not the flaresófor initiating the 4:50 a.m. accident. 

To explore the possibility that the flares played a role in this accident, the Safety 

Board examined whether the curvature of the roadway led the 1996 Freightliner driver to 

perceive the flares as being in his lane. Measurements of sight distance indicated that the 

driver would have been roughly 1,050 feet from the flares when they appeared to be 

directly in front of him. According to the driver, he was traveling about 50 mph at the time 

of the accident, or about 73 feet per second. Given these numbers, it would have taken him 

about 14 seconds to reach the flares, which was more than enough time to assess the 

situation and safely maneuver around the obstacle. However, the Safety Board cannot be 

certain when the driver saw the flares; in addition, situational factorsósuch as the absence 

of highway lighting, weather conditions, and the state of the flares themselvesómight 

have influenced his identification and perception of the flares. Even so, the CSP should 

have removed the flares from the 3:56 a.m. accident scene as part of prudent incident 

management protocol; leaving the flares to burn out posed a danger to motorists.

In the course of examining whether the flares contributed to the 4:50 a.m. accident, 

Safety Board investigators learned that the CSP did not have an incident management 

policy and did not train its officers on incident management procedures. Connecticut had 

adopted a two-page incident management policy in 1992 that called for coordination 

among State agencies, including ConnDOT and the Department of Public Safety, in which 

the CSP resides. However, the State did not develop an accompanying process or 

guidelines for the agencies to follow in the event of a traffic incident. 
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

A formally documented incident management process that specifies the roles of 

each agency and the procedures to be followed under particular weather, traffic, and 

incident situations could lead to a swifter and safer response. Had such a process been in 

place on January 17, 2003, the CSP might have followed more thorough procedures for 

safely clearing the scene after the 3:56 a.m. accident, including proper disposal of the 

flares.

In November 2003, the national MUTCD was amended to include a chapter on the 

control of traffic through incident management areas. Among the primary functions of 

traffic incident management is to move road users quickly and safely around an incident 

and to reduce the likelihood of secondary traffic accidents. The new chapter contains 

guidelines for managing different levels of incidents, along with traffic control procedures 

to promote expediency and safety. 

The process outlined in the MUTCD would be a useful addition to the Connecticut 

State Traffic Commission Regulations, which contain the State traffic control standards. 

This information would also help increase CSP awareness of proper incident management 

procedures. The Safety Board concludes that a formally documented incident 

management process would assist the CSP and other State agencies in more effectively 

conducting and coordinating activities and thereby reduce the occurrence of secondary 

accidents, such as the Chevroletís collision with the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer. 

The Safety Board believes that ConnDOT should revise its State Traffic Commission 

Regulations to include the control of traffic through traffic incident management areas, as 

described in the MUTCD. Additionally, the Safety Board believes that ConnDOT should 

work with the Connecticut Department of Public Safety to provide coordinated training on 

traffic incident management for both its own staff and that of the CSP. 
54 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Neither alcohol nor drug use was a factor in the accidents involving the 1996 

Freightliner and the Chevrolet, and neither mechanical conditions nor motor carrier 

operations caused or contributed to either accident.

2. The emergency response was satisfactory, despite the lack of prior information about 

blockage of the northbound left lane and the icy roadway conditions.

3. The 1996 Freightliner driver lost control of his vehicle, probably as a result of 

traveling at a speed too great for the existing conditions of ice and snow on the 

roadway surface.

4. The Chevrolet driver probably did not perceive the flatbed semitrailer in the left lane 

of Interstate 95 north due to a combination of fatigue, distraction from the median 

crossover accident in the southbound lanes, and the absence of artificial highway 

lighting.

5. The likelihood of occupant survival would have significantly improved if the 

Chevrolet had been occupied by a maximum of five persons, rather than nine, and if 

all occupants had been wearing seat belts.

6. A well-designed level-of-service program would have guided Connecticut 

Department of Transportation supervisors in selecting a predetermined treatment 

option designed to address specific roadway conditions, such as moderate snow and 

ice, and would have helped them evaluate the effectiveness of treatment.

7. The sand and salt mixture that the Connecticut Department of Transportation used to 

treat the light-to-moderate snow and icy roadway conditions prevailing in the early 

morning hours of January 17, 2003, was not as effective as straight salt because such 

a mixture tends to be more rapidly dispersed by high-speed traffic.

8. The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Roadside 

Design Guide lacks specific guidance on the use of high-performance barriers, 

making it difficult for State transportation agencies to determine the circumstances, 

such as those present in the Fairfield accidents, in which such barriers should be used.

9. The current Federal impact testing parameters for portable concrete median barriers 

are inadequate because they do not account for the use of barriers on unpaved 

surfaces.
Conclusions 55 Highway Accident Report

10. Had the Connecticut Department of Transportation had a procedure in place for 

reviewing and approving revisions to construction projects, a traffic control plan 

could have been developed that would not have required relocating the median barrier 

to an unpaved surface for which it was not designed and on which it may have been 

less effective.

11. The absence of roadway lighting may have affected the Chevrolet driverís ability to 

recognize and avoid the flatbed semitrailer obstructing the left lane of Interstate 95 

north.

12. The length of time required for updating the variable message signs, and the 

limitations of the antiquated system in simultaneously modifying messages in both 

directions of travel, compromised the Connecticut Department of Transportationís 

capability of providing real-time safety-critical traffic information to motorists.

13. A formally documented incident management process would assist the Connecticut 

State Police and other State agencies in effectively conducting and coordinating 

activities and thereby reduce the occurrence of secondary accidents, such as the 

Chevroletís collision with the 1996 Freightliner flatbed semitrailer.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the 4:50 a.m. accident was the 1996 Freightlinerís loss of lateral stability, probably due to 

the operator driving too fast for conditions and to the presence of black ice on the 

roadway. Contributing to the accident were the inadequate roadway treatment provided by 

the Connecticut Department of Transportation in response to inclement weather and also 

its failure to provide a median barrier capable of preventing crossovers by heavy vehicles.

The probable cause of the 5:01 a.m. accident was the failure of the Chevrolet driver to 

identify and avoid the flatbed semitrailer due to fatigue, in conjunction with the distraction 

from the median crossover accident in the southbound lanes.
56 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the 

following safety recommendations:

New Recommendations

To the Federal Highway Administration:

Conduct crash testing of standard and high-performance portable concrete 

median barriers on unpaved surfaces to determine whether they meet the 

test level criteria of National Cooperative Highway Research Program 

Report 350, Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance 

Evaluation of Highway Features. (H-05-27)

To the Connecticut Department of Transportation:

Develop a level-of-service program in accordance with Federal Highway 

Administration and American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials guidance and incorporate the program elements, 

including a discussion of the limited usefulness of abrasives for roadway 

treatment, into the Snow and Ice Guidelines. (H-05-28)

Revise your State Traffic Commission Regulations to include the control of 

traffic through traffic incident management areas, as described in the 

Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 

Devices. (H-05-29)

Work with the Connecticut Department of Public Safety to provide 

coordinated training on traffic incident management for both your own 

staff and that of the Connecticut State Police. (H-05-30) 

To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Establish warrants in the Roadside Design Guide regarding the selection 

and use of high-performance barriers, including 42- and 50-inch-high 

concrete barriers, that are capable of redirecting heavy trucks. (H-05-31)
Recommendations 57 Highway Accident Report

Upon completion of Federal Highway Administration testing of standard 

and high-performance portable concrete median barriers on unpaved 

surfaces, as requested in Safety Recommendation H-05-27, provide clear 

guidance in the Roadside Design Guide on the placement of portable 

concrete median barriers on unpaved surfaces. (H-05-32)

Reiterated Recommendation 

The National Transportation Safety Board also reiterates the following 

recommendation:

To the Governor and legislative leaders of Connecticut:

Enact legislation that provides for primary enforcement of mandatory 

seatbelt use laws, including provisions such as the imposition of driver 

license penalty points and appropriate fines. Existing legal provisions that 

insulate people from the financial consequences of not wearing a seat belt 

should be repealed. (H-97-02)

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

MARK V. ROSENKER ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS

Acting Chairman Member

DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Member

Adopted: November 16, 2005

59 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of the Fairfield, 

Connecticut, accident on January 18, 2003. An investigative team was dispatched with 

members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia; and Arlington, Texas, offices. 

Groups were established to investigate highway, vehicle, and survival factors; motor 

carrier operations; and human performance.

The Federal Highway Administration, Connecticut Department of Transportation, 

Connecticut State Police, Yale University, General Motors Corporation, Freightliner 

Corporation, Arrow Trucking Company, BH Trucking Company, Fontaine Trailer 

Company, M. DeMatteo/Brunalli Construction Company, and DMJM+Harris were parties 

to this investigation. 

No public hearing was held; no depositions were taken.
60 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B

Snow and Ice Removal Guidelines

FHWA Anti-Icing Program

According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Manual of Practice 

for an Effective Anti-icing Program:

1

The extent to which maintenance services will be provided to a road section is 

determined by management by the assignment of a level of service. The LOS will 

largely be determined by the importance of the road, and hence the average daily 

traffic.

The FHWA also studied the use of abrasives (sand)/chemical mixtures:2

Further, a mix of abrasives and chemical will usually be no more effective as an 

anti-icing treatment during snowstorms than the same amount of chemical placed 

alone. It even appears that the use of abrasives in the mix can be detrimental to the 

effectiveness of the chemical. Because of the cost associated with both application 

and clean-up of roads and drainage facilities, and because of the potential airborne 

dust problem accompanying their use, abrasives applications should not be a 

routine operation of an anti-icing program.

AASHTO Guide for Snow and Ice Control

The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

(AASHTO) Guide for Snow and Ice Control recommends that State highway maintenance 

officials responsible for snow and ice control establish a level-of-service (LOS) program:3

Because of the need for continued mobility and safety on the roads, it is important 

that snow and ice control programs establish a level of service that satisfies the 

customers and is attainable with available budget and resources. Level of Service 

(LOS) refers to operational guidelines establishing maintenance activities 

associated with the prevention and removal of snow and ice from roadways. LOS 

may establish a prescribed end-of-storm condition, intermediate stages acceptable 

while obtaining that condition, or the frequency of snow and ice control 

maintenance operations. LOS results from an analysis of:

ï agency snow and ice control policy;

ï road classification;

1 Federal Highway Administration, Manual of Practice for an Effective Anti-icing Program: A Guide 

for Highway Winter Maintenance Personnel (Washington, DC: FHWA, June 1996) 3. See 

<www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/mopeap/mop0296a.htm>, July 14, 2005.

2 FHWA, 6.

3 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Guide for Snow and Ice 

Control (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1999) 5.
Appendix B 61 Highway Accident Report

ï traffic data;

ï maintenance coverage time periods defined for various operations, 

including clean-up operations;

ï equipment types and amounts;

ï location of facilities;

ï personnel rules and regulations;

ï materials used; and

ï special circumstances and conditions.

AASHTO also studied the use of abrasives (sand)/chemical mixtures and stated that:4

Abrasives or a mix of abrasives and chemicals are commonly used for many snow 

and ice control operations. The sole function of abrasives is to improve traction, 

which may be short-lived because traffic will rapidly disperse abrasives and 

additional frozen precipitation will cover the application treatment.

The advantages and disadvantages of abrasives must be understood. Advantages 

include low first costs; some immediate, although temporary, increased traction 

on slippery surfaces; potential usage at low temperatures when some chemicals 

are ineffective; and visible evidence of road crew actions. Disadvantages of 

abrasives include frequent reloading due to low distance of coverage per 

truckload; reapplication required due to traffic and precipitation; adverse effects 

on cars such as damage to windshields and body finishes; significant cleanup 

efforts of roads and drainage facilities following storms and the winter season; 

adverse effects on the air quality through increased airborne particulate matter 

(PM problem); and adverse effects on watercourse ecosystems.

The problem resulting from the use of mixtures of abrasives and chemicals is 

challenging. The Ontario Ministry of Transport concluded that mixing salt with 

abrasives above the level needed to prevent stockpile freezing improves neither 

the abrasive qualities of straight sand nor the deicing qualities of straight salt. In 

addition, they found the highway sections treated with straight salt required fewer 

applications than sections treated with salt/abrasives mixtures, while achieving 

the same level of service.

The FHWA T&E 28 study found that a mixture of abrasives and chemical applied 

during snowstorms as an anti-icing treatment will be no more effective than the 

same amount of chemical placed alone. The study findings suggest that the use of 

abrasives in the mix can be detrimental to the effectiveness of the chemical and 

that abrasives applications should not be routine operations of an anti-icing 

program because of the negative attributes associated with its use.

4 AASHTO, 81ñ82.
Appendix B 62 Highway Accident Report

Connecticut Snow and Ice Guidelines

In a partial coverage storm, the Connecticut Department of Transportation 

(ConnDOT) recommends the use of a 7:2 mixture of sand and salt. According to the 

ConnDOT Snow and Ice Guidelines:

5

Seven (7) parts of sand to 2 parts of salt will be the primary mix on all two-lane 

highways and ramps. (Highwaysñ1264 pounds sand and 300 pounds salt per twolane mile; Rampsñ1685 pounds sand and 400 pounds salt per two-lane mile.) This 

mix may also be applied to the multi-lane system at the same rate as the two-lane 

system at the beginning of the storm when the complete assignment of trucks 

[has] not been called out or if conditions warrant. Such applications will be in lieu 

of straight salt, not in addition to straight salt.

The Snow and Ice Guidelines recommend echelon6 plowing for six-lane routes. 

Echelon plowing requires a full callout of trucks (100-percent coverage):7

Two trucks of the echelon group shall apply salt to the entire run. One truck will 

spread a 4-cubic yard load of salt on the centerline of two lanes at the rate of 432 

pounds per two-lane mile for a distance of 20 miles. The second truck will spread 

a 2-cubic-yard load of salt on the third lane at the rate of 216 pounds per two-lane 

mile for a distance of 20 miles. When abrasives are required, trucks 3 and 4 shall 

each spread a 5.5-cubic-yard load of straight sand to one-half the run (10 effective 

two-lane miles) at the rate of 1430 pounds per two-lane mile; the fifth truck shall 

apply a 5.5-cubic-yard load of straight sand to the third lane at the rate of 715 

pounds per two-lane mile.

New York State Snow and Ice Guidelines

The New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) Highway 

Maintenance Guidelines, Snow and Ice Control, recommends snow control goals given 

the constraints of operational resources and the character of the snow event:8

The snow control goals will vary with traffic volume and other considerations. 

Furthermore, the level of service provided will vary with the snow control goals 

determined to be appropriate given the existing conditions. Regular level of service 

should be provided on all classes of highway between 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. 

Monday thru Friday, and at all times on highways having Average Daily Traffic 

(ADT) of 50,000 vehicles per day or more. Modified level of service should be 

provided on all highways except those having ADTs of 50,000 vehicles per day or 

more in all time periods except those defined under ìregular level of service.î

5 Connecticut Department of Transportation, 2002/2003 Snow and Ice Guidelines, Bureau of 

Engineering and Highway Operations, Office of Maintenance (Hartford, CT: ConnDOT, 2002) 10.

6 For echelon plowing, the trucks are arranged in a staggered formation along the lanes.

7 ConnDOT, 14.

8 New York State Department of Transportation, Highway Maintenance Guidelines, Snow and Ice 

Control (Albany, NY: NYSDOT, 1993) 8ñ9.
Appendix B 63 Highway Accident Report

Snow Control Goals, Regular Level of Service9

Highway class Accumulation at which 

plowing should begin (inches)

Elapsed time after event end that full width 

of pavement should be plowed (hours)

A1 0.50 to 2.50 1.5

A2, B, C 1.00 to 3.00 2.0

D 1.50 to 4.00 3.0

Snow Control Goals, Modified Level of Service

Highway class Accumulation at which 

plowing should begin (inches)

Elapsed time after event end that full width 

of pavement should be plowed (hours)

A1 0.75 to 3.00 2.0

A2, B, C 1.50 to 3.50 3.0

D 2.00 to 4.50 4.0

NYSDOT recommends specific guidelines for the application of salt for light-tomoderate accumulating snow and rapidly accumulating dense snow:10

Light to moderately accumulating normal snowñThe initial application shall be 

225 pounds of salt per mile, per lane. Follow-up applications shall be as 

necessary, and at 115 pounds of salt per mile, per lane. If the pavement 

temperature is over 30 degrees Fahrenheit and/or traffic volume is high, the initial 

application rate may be reduced.

Rapidly accumulating dense snow, freezing rain, pack, glaze and sleet (high ice 

content)ñThe initial application shall be 270 pounds of salt per mile, per lane. 

Follow-up applications shall be as necessary, and the rate of application will vary 

with the observed condition of the snow or ice on the pavement surface. If surface 

is still glazed or packed, the follow-up application shall be 270 pounds of salt per 

mile, per lane (the same as the initial application). If the surface is mealy or 

slushy, the follow-up application shall be 115 pounds of salt per mile per lane.

The Highway Maintenance Guidelines offer the following guidance on the use of 

abrasives (sand)/chemical mixtures:11

The use of ìsweetenedî mixtures like 50-50 (1 part abrasives and 1 part salt) is 

wasteful and inefficient. If spread at the normal application rate for abrasives, this 

mixture will place 40% more salt on the road than a normal application of pure 

salt. The effectiveness of that salt is reduced by the presence of the abrasives.

Abrasives, overall, are more costly (based on initial application, reapplication, 

cleanup and other factors) and less safe to use than salt (if abrasives were used 

9 Class A1 denotes expressways with low average running speeds, with traffic volumes that reach or 

exceed design capacity, such as the Long Island Expressway. Class A2 denotes expressways with high 

average running speeds and a one-way design hourly volume of 500 or more vehicles per hour. Class B 

denotes major State highways with a one-way design hourly volume from 200 to 500 vehicles. Classes C 

and D denote minor State highways with a one-way design hourly volume of less than 200 vehicles or with a 

very low traffic volume, respectively.

10 NYSDOT, 17.

11 NYSDOT, 19.
Appendix B 64 Highway Accident Report

where salt would otherwise work). Abrasives are applied at 3-1/3 times the rate of 

salt. When the cost of necessary salt in the abrasives and mixing costs are 

considered, the per application cost of abrasives is about equal to that of salt.

Although snow and ice surfaces that have been treated with abrasives are safer 

than untreated snow or ice surfaces, they are not as safe as bare pavement. Traffic 

quickly diminishes the effect of abrasives and frequent re-application is necessary. 

This adds significantly to the overall cost and still provides a less safe surface than 

the bare pavement that could have been achieved with pure salt.

Massachusetts Highway Department Maintenance Manual

The Massachusetts Highway Department Maintenance Manual describes three 

basic snow or ice conditions and the procedures to be followed under each:12

Condition 1: Air temperature 25 degrees Fahrenheit to 34 degrees Fahrenheit 

and rising. Pavement wet. Precipitation snow, sleet or freezing rain. This 

condition may prevail until the temperature rises through and above the critical 

zone (28 degrees Fahrenheit to 34 degrees Fahrenheit), in which case the 

precipitation will gradually change to rain and the chance of packing or icing will 

diminish as the storm progresses. The temperature may, however, level off at a 

temperature within the critical range, in which case packing or icing will take 

place. Actual temperatures and precipitation should be checked periodically with 

the forecast. The initial treatment should be the application of straight chloride at 

the rate of 240 pounds per lane mile. If the temperature moves at a rapid rate 

through the critical zone, further applications may be necessary in storms of long 

duration. If the temperature levels off below the critical zone and the storm 

continues in the form of snow and packing is imminent, it may be necessary to 

commence plowing and to retreat the potential pack areas with deicing chemicals.

Condition 2: Air temperature 20 degrees Fahrenheit to 32 degrees Fahrenheit, 

pavement wet or icing precipitation rain, snow, sleet, or freezing rain. Under this 

condition, ice is likely to form on the pavement. There is a distinct possibility that 

the precipitation will turn to snow even though it may start as rain. The initial 

treatment is the application of straight chloride or the mixture of calcium chloride 

and sodium chloride at the rate of 240 pounds per lane mile as soon as possible. If 

this treatment is effective, the pavement will remain wet or will be covered with a 

slush according to the degree to which the temperature falls. If a slush develops, it 

should be removed and/or chemically treated before it is hardened by freezing or 

by traffic. Subsequent treatment, when required, should consist of another 

application of chlorides or plowing, whichever is indicated. Spot sanding with 

treated sand may be necessary at the conclusion.

Condition 3: Air temperature below 25 degrees Fahrenheit, pavement dry, 

precipitation snow. Obviously this condition calls for plowing when sufficient 

accumulation occurs, followed by chemical treatment. Plowing should continue 

for the duration of the storm and until pavement and shoulders are clear. If the 

temperature rises through the critical zone (28 degrees Fahrenheit to 34 degrees 

Fahrenheit), the application of sodium chloride at the rate of 240 pounds per lane 

mile may be necessary to prevent icing.

12 Massachusetts Highway Department, Maintenance Manual, Chapter 5, Division 4.
65 Highway Accident Report

Appendix C

NCHRP Crash Test Criteria

Permanent Concrete Barriers

The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 3501

gives the full-scale crash test criteria for the safety performance of highway features, 

which include longitudinal barriers (or concrete barrier shapes).

NCHRP Report 350 evaluated longitudinal barriers based on six test levels. In 

general, the lower test levels (TL-1, TL-2, and TL-3) are applicable for evaluating 

longitudinal barriers to be used on lower service level roadways and certain types of work 

zones, while the higher test levels (TL-4, TL-5, and TL-6) are applicable for higher 

service level roadways or at locations that demand a special high-performance barrier. 

TL-3 is the standard level to which most crash-tested barriers have been approved 

by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for use on U.S. highways. NCHRP 

Report 350 defines

ï TL-3 as a 4,400-pound pickup truck that is crash tested into a 32-inch-high 

concrete barrier at a speed of 60 mph and an impact angle of 25o. 

ï TL-4 as a 17,600-pound single-unit truck that is crash tested into a 32- or 

42-inch-high concrete barrier at a speed of 50 mph and an impact angle of 15o.

ï TL-5 as a 79,400-pound van tractor-trailer that is crash tested into a 42-inchhigh concrete barrier at a speed of 50 mph and an impact angle of 15o.

ï TL-6 as a 79,400-pound tanker-type tractor-trailer that is crash tested into a 

90-inch-high concrete barrier at a speed of 50 mph and an impact angle of 15o. 

Only one concrete barrieróthe Texas T5 modified barrieróhas been approved and tested 

for TL-6.

Table C-1 identifies the types of barriers (bridge railings) that have been crash 

tested with a tractor-trailer and approved under NCHRP Report 350 at TL-5 and TL-6.2

1 National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Recommended Procedures for the Safety 

Performance Evaluation of Highway Features, NCHRP Report 350 (Washington, DC: Transportation 

Research Board, National Research Council, 1993).

2 The FHWA Web site for NCHRP Report 350 discusses the types of bridge railings that have been 

crash tested with a tractor-trailer. See <safety.fhwa.dot.gov/fourthlevel/hardware/bridgerailings.htm>, 

July 14, 2005.
Appendix C 66 Highway Accident Report

Table C-1. Barriers crash tested and approved at TL-5 and TL-6.

Barrier 

Height 

(inches) Test vehicle

Impact 

speed 

(mph)

Impact 

angle 

(degrees)

NCHRP 350 

test level

42-inch vertical 42 50,050-lb tractortrailer 51.4 16.2 TL-5

Concrete 

parapet 42 79,400-lb van tractortrailer 50 14.5 TL-5

New Jersey 

Turnpike heavy 

vehicle 

42 80,180-lb tractortrailer 52.1 16.5 TL-5

Texas T5 

modified 90 80,120-lb tanker-type tractor-trailer 51.4 15 TL-6

Texas Type HT 

(modified T5) 50 80,080-lb truck 48.4 14.5 TL-5

42-inch F-shape 42 50,000-lb tractortrailer 52.2 14 TL-5

The crash tests performed for the barriers identified in table C-1 were done on a 

flat paved surface when accelerating the tractor-trailer to the desired speed to provide for 

unrestricted trajectory of the vehicle following impact. The barriers were anchored to the 

surface during the tests.

The performance level of each test vehicle varied with each crash test. The 

50,050-pound tractor-trailer rolled over when crash tested into the 42-inch-high vertical 

concrete parapet. The 80,080-pound truck rolled over when crash tested into the Texas 

type HT (modified T5) barrier. Under TL-5 and TL-6, the crash test criteria in NCHRP 

Report 350 allow the vehicle to roll over.

Portable Concrete Barriers

Table C-2 identifies the types of 42-inch-high portable concrete barriers that have 

been crash tested and approved under NCHRP Report 350 at TL-3 and TL-4. None of the 

portable concrete barriers (at 32 or 42 inches high) were crash tested with tractor-trailers. 

The tests were performed with the barriers resting on a flat paved surface. The barriers 

were connected to each other either by a channel or a pin-and-loop design; however, they 

were not anchored to the paved surface. The barriers were connected and arranged in a 

series of 20. The crash test criteria under NCHRP Report 350 allow the test vehicle to 

penetrate the barrier, but it may not roll overónor can the barrier cause excessive forces 

on the vehicle occupants.
Appendix C 67 Highway Accident Report

Table C-2. Barriers crash tested and approved at TL-3 and TL-4.

Barrier 

Height 

(inches)

Test 

vehicle/agency

Impact 

speed 

(mph)

Impact 

angle 

(degrees)

NCHRP 350 

test level

42-inch-tall

F-shape 42

17,400-lb single-unit 

truck/Oregon 

Department of 

Transportation

50 15 TL-4

42-inch-tall

F-shape 42

4,400-lb pickup 

truck/Oregon 

Department of 

Transportation

60 25 TL-3

The connection between the 42-inch-tall F-shape portable concrete barriers 

consisted of two sets of two perforated C-shape steel channels with the open sides 

alernately positioned such that one leg of each channel fit between the legs of the mating 

channel on the adjacent barrier segment. The barriers were not connected by a pin-andloop design.
68 Highway Accident Report

Appendix D

Variable Message Sign Placement

I-95 North

VMS No. Town Location

50 Mamaroneck, NY North of exit 18A

51 Greenwich South of exit 3

52 Stamford South of exit 9

53 Norwalk South of exit 14

54 Westport South of exit 19

55 Fairfield North of exit 19

Scene of accident Exit 24

57 Stratford North of exit 31

58 Milford North of exit 36

59 West Haven South of exit 43

60 New Haven South of exit 46

61 East Haven At exit 51

I-95 South

VMS No. Town Location

73 Branford South of exit 53

74 New Haven South of exit 51

75 Milford North of exit 40

76 Milford North of exit 36

77 Stratford South of exit 31

Scene of accident Exit 24

78 Fairfield South of exit 21
69 Highway Accident Report

Appendix E

Arrow Trucking 2003 Compliance Review

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration conducted a compliance review 

of Arrow Trucking following the Fairfield accidents. The review resulted in a 

ìconditionalî rating, with the following violations:

1. Using a substance abuse professional without required credentials.

2. Failing to ensure that random drug testing dates are reasonably spread 

throughout the calendar year.

3. Failing to maintain drug testing records for 1 year.

4. Allowing a driver with a suspended license to operate a commercial motor 

vehicle.

5. Failing to keep an accident register in the form and manner prescribed.

6. Failing to maintain copies of all accident reports.

7. Using a driver whose medical examination is recorded on an unauthorized 

medical examination form.

8. Using a driver not medically examined and certified during the preceding 24 

months.

9. Failing to maintain a note relating to annual review of the driverís driving 

record.

10. Failing to maintain a list or certificate relating to violations of motor vehicle 

laws.

11. Scheduling a run that would necessitate the vehicle being operated at speeds in 

excess of those prescribed. (critical violation)

12. Requiring or permitting a driver to drive more than 10 hours.

13. Requiring or permitting a driver to drive after having been on duty 15 hours.

14. Requiring or permitting a driver to drive after having been on duty for 70 hours 

in 8 consecutive days.

15. False reports of records of duty status.

16. Failing to require a driver to prepare record of duty status in the form and 

manner prescribed.

17. Failing to require a driver to forward the original of the record of duty status 

within 13 days of completion.
Appendix E 70 Highway Accident Report

18. Failing to preserve a driverís record of duty status supporting documents for 6 

months. (critical violation)

19. Failing to keep maintenance records that identify the vehicle.

20. Failing to have a means of indicating the nature and due date of inspection and 

maintenance operations to be performed.

21. Failing to require a driver to prepare a driver vehicle inspection report. (critical 

violation)

22. Using a commercial motor vehicle not periodically inspected.

23. Using a commercial motor vehicle not periodically inspected in accordance 

with minimum standards.