U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–010 

" ! SENATE 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–295 

Calendar No. 551 

COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 

ACT OF 2016 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 2517 

TO REQUIRE A REPORT ON UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO 

COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, AND FOR OTHER 

PURPOSES 

JULY 11, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

JONI ERNST, Iowa 

BEN SASSE, Nebraska 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

CHRISTOPHER R. HIXON, Staff Director 

GABRIELLE D’ADAMO SINGER, Chief Counsel 

ELIZABETH MCWHORTER, Senior Professional Staff Member 

GABRIELLE A. BATKIN, Minority Staff Director 

JOHN P. KILVINGTON, Minority Deputy Staff Director 

MARY BETH SCHULTZ, Minority Chief Counsel 

HARLAN C. GEER, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 551 

114TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2nd Session 114–295 

COMBAT TERRORIST USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACT OF 2016 

JULY 11, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. JOHNSON, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 2517] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 2517) to require a report on 

United States strategy to combat terrorist use of social media, and 

for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably 

thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill, as 

amended, do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 5 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 6 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 6 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 7 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 7 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of S. 2517, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social 

Media Act of 2016, is to require the President to provide Congress 

with the strategy of the United States to combat terrorists’ and terrorist organizations’ use of social media. The bill also requires the 

President to provide Congress with a report and evaluation of the 

United States’ efforts, to date, to combat terrorists’ and terrorist organizations’ use of social media. 


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1See generally, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, THE WHITE HOUSE 20 (2015), available at 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_securitystrategy.pdf. 2 E-mail correspondence between HSGAC Comm. staff and FBI Congressional Affairs Liaison, 

May 23, 2016 (on file with Comm. staff). 3See generally, Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=83C519E9- 

9310-4587-B00F-07179D39C0AD [hereinafter Threats to the Homeland]. 4Threats to the Homeland (statement of James Comey, Director, The Federal Bureau of Investigation at 1). 5Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, The George 

Washington University Program on Extremism (Dec. 2015), https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/ 

cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/ISIS%20in%20America%20-%20Full%20Report_0.pdf. [hereinafter 

ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa]. 6Threats to the Homeland (statement of Nicholas Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center at 2). 7See generally, The Ideology of ISIS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2016); Terrorism Gone Viral: Attack in Garland, Texas and Beyond: Hearing Before H. Homeland Sec. Comm., 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Michael B. 

Steinbach, Assistant Director, the Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at http:// 

docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20150603/103513/HHRG-114-HM00-Wstate-SteinbachM20150603.pdf; see also ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa at 3–4, 31. 8STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM, THE INTERNET, AND THE HOMEGROWN TERRORIST THREAT (Comm. 

Print, May 8, 2008), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf. 9S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong., Special Report, Ticking 

Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort 

Hood Attack, 7, 18–9 (Feb. 2011); see also J.M. Berger & Jonathan Morgan, The ISIS Twitter 

Census: Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter, The Brookings 

Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World No. 20 (2015), available at http:// 

www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/ 

II. BACKGROUND AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION

In 2015, President Barack Obama identified the following groups 

as the preeminent security threat to our country: Al Qaeda, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and their affiliates.1

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), approximately 250 Americans have either traveled, or attempted to travel, 

to Syria and Iraq.2

Homegrown violent extremists are also increasingly conducting 

simple, opportunistic attacks at home.3 In the wake of international efforts to deter foreign fighters from joining ISIS in Iraq 

and Syria, the terrorist group’s message is ‘‘if you cannot travel, 

kill where you are.’’ 4 This makes the approximately 900 ISIS-inspired individuals the FBI was investigating throughout the country in late 2015 especially alarming.5 From two or three homegrown violent extremist attacks a year in 2009, the number of 

these incidents jumped to a dozen just five years later in 2014, and 

more than doubled in 2015.6

Examples of recent incidents include attacks in 2009 in Little 

Rock, Arkansas and Ft. Hood, Texas; bombings at the Boston Marathon in Boston, Massachusetts and shootings in Chattanooga, 

Tennessee in 2013; shootings in Garland, Texas and San 

Bernardino, California in 2015; and the attack in Orlando, Florida 

in 2016.7

Spreading a poisonous ideology via the Internet 

In May 2008, Committee staff published a report titled Violent 

Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist 

Threat warning about the increased frequency with which United 

States-based militants are active online.8 The internet allows 

groups like ISIS to distribute their poisonous ideology unbound by 

national borders, requiring homeland security efforts to consider 

countering this ideology online.9 The 9/11 Review Commission deVerDate Sep 11 2014 07:38 Jul 12, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR295.XXX SR295

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isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Transcending Organization: Individuals and the ‘Islamic State’ 

(2014). 10 9/11 REVIEW COMMISSION, THE FBI: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY

(Mar. 2015), available at https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homelandin-the-21st-century. 11Threats to the Homeland (statement of Jeh Johnson, Secretary, Dep’t of Homeland Security). 12 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44110, THE ISLAMIC STATE’S ACOLYTES AND

THE CHALLENGES THEY POSE TO U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT (2016). 13 Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 

20–21 (Feb. 2013), available at http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ 

Feb2013_CT_StratComm.pdf; Carsten Bockstette, Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques, European Center for Security Studies at 5 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/ 

occPapers/occ-paper_20-en.pdf; Gregory L. Keeney & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Identifying and 

Structuring the Objectives of Terrorists, CREATE Homeland Security Center (Aug. 2009), available at http://research.create.usc.edu/cgi/ 

viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=nonpublished_reports. 14 JOANNA NATHAN & ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI, DECODING THE NEW TALIBAN: INSIGHTS FROM THE

AFGHAN FIELD 23–42 (2012) (explaining that the extensive efforts undertaken by the Taliban 

to frame the fight as jihad imply that they view the legitimacy conveyed by these words as a 

critical source of strength in their fight); WILL MCCANTS, THE ISIS APOCALYPSE: THE HISTORY, 

STRATEGY, AND DOOMSDAY VISION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 56 (1st ed. 2015) (explaining that 

Osama bin Laden was so frustrated with Western media’s shortening of Al Qaeda’s full name, 

Qa’idat al-Jihad, to a word that had nothing to do with Islam that he considered changing the 

group’s name to one that would force the media and United States government to acknowledge 

the Islamic nature of the group and reinforce his narrative that the West was at war with 

Islam.). 15Office of the Director of Nat’l Intelligence, Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi (Oct. 

2005), available at http://fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/dni101105.html. 16 U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks of Alberto Fernandez, Coordinator for the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications, Conference at the Newseum (Dec. 2013), available at http:// 

www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/218606.htm. 17Overview: Profiles of Individual Radicalization in United States-Foreign Fighters (PIRUS– 

FF), START Consortium (Apr. 2016), available at https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/ 

START_PIRUS-FF_InfographicSeries_April2016.pdf. 18 Id. 19 Id. 

scribed the online radicalization efforts of these groups as ‘‘an unprecedented challenge’’ that ‘‘transcends geographic boundaries and 

demographics.’’ 10

Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has 

testified before this Committee that terrorist groups use the internet to ‘‘inspire individuals to conduct attacks within their own 

homelands.’’ 11 Between 2014 and June 2016, homegrown violent 

jihadists plotted 76 total plots in the United States.12

Groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda value strategic communication as 

integral to the advancement of their political agendas.13 It allows 

them to establish legitimacy through historical or religious narratives that resonate with target audiences and potential supporters.14 Al Qaeda’s current leader once stated, ‘‘We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.’’ 15 An American citizen who once served as a 

terrorist group commander, propagandist, and recruiter further 

elaborated on this stance that ‘‘[t]he war of narratives has become 

even more important than the war of navies, napalm, and 

knives.’’ 16

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) notes that ‘‘the internet played an 

increasingly pivotal role’’ in the radicalization of foreign fighters.’’ 17 In 2002, just 37 percent of Americans attempting to travel 

to join terrorist groups were influenced by the internet in some 

way,18 compared to 83 percent in 2015.19 Furthermore, as the 


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20 Id. 21 Inside the Mind of ISIS: Understanding Its Goals and Ideology to Better Protect the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. 

(2016) (statement of Jessica Stern, Boston University); see also Jihad 2.0: Social Media in the 

Next Evolution of Terrorist Recruitment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement of Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Foundation for 

Defense of Democracies). 22 Cristina Archetti, Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in 

the Digital Age, Terrorism Research Institute (2015), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/ 

index.php/pot/article/view/401/html. 23 J.M. Berger & Jonathon Morgan, The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter, The Brookings Institute (Mar. 2015), http:// 

www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/ 

isis_TWITTER_census_berger_morgan.pdf; see also Global Engagement, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/TheGEC (approximations as of June 8, 2016). 24William D. Casebeer & James A. Russell, STORYTELLING AND TERRORISM: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE ‘COUNTER-NARRATIVE STRATEGY,’ IV, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary 

Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School (Mar. 2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nps/ 

casebeer_mar05.pdf; see also Michael Jacobson, Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases 

of Terrorist Dropouts, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Jan. 2010), http:// 

www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/learning-counter-narrative-lessons-from-casesof-terrorist-dropouts; Naureen Chowdhury Fink & Jack Barclay, Mastering the Narrative: 

Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations, Center on Global Counterterrorism (Feb. 2013), http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Feb2013_CT_ 

StratComm.pdf; Alberto M. Fernandez, Here to Stay and Growing: Combating ISIS Propaganda 

Networks, The Brookings Institute (Oct. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/ 

papers/2015/10/combating-isis-propaganda-fernandez/is-propaganda_web_english.pdf. 

internet’s influence has increased, the average time from initial 

radicalization to the decision to travel has decreased from approximately 16 months in 2002 to less than 10 months in 2015.20 The 

window of opportunity for intervention before criminal action is diminishing. 

Inadequate Federal response 

Despite this accelerating and increasing threat to the homeland, 

numerous experts have testified before this Committee that the 

United States currently lacks a comprehensive strategy to combat 

and counter terrorist narratives online.21 It may be the case that 

no message is powerful enough to neutralize this threat. However, 

identifying narrative themes that influence homegrown violent extremists can inform an alignment of words and deeds that undercut perceived inconsistencies often exploited by terrorist propaganda.22 A Federal review of terrorist narratives for these themes 

and a subsequent national strategy to combat and counter those 

narratives will ensure consistency among United States policies, 

actions, and words. 

Whereas the Center for Global Engagement’s Twitter account 

has only garnered approximately 26,600 followers and sent approximately 12,000 tweets, pro-ISIS accounts (numbering anywhere 

between 46,000 and 90,000 in over 100 countries) collectively share 

an average of 133,422 tweets per day to a much larger audience of 

followers.23 Despite its rebranding and efforts to identify a successful counter-narrative, the Center for Global Engagement is still trying to develop a narrative as viral as those spread by extremist organizations such as ISIS.24

Requiring a national strategy to counter online radicalization 

In the 2011 ‘‘Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering 

Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 

States,’’ this Administration committed to creating a strategy to 


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25THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT

VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES, THE WHITE HOUSE 20 (2011), https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf. 26See generally Countering Online Radicalization in America, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 7 

(Dec 2012), available at http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org /wp-content/uploads/sites/default /files/ 

BPC%20 _Online%20Radicalization %20Report.pdf. 27See generally NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, THE WHITE HOUSE 20 (2015), https:// 

www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 

counter online radicalization.25 The Administration has not yet provided such a strategy.26

Accordingly, S. 2517, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media 

Act of 2016, requires the Administration to provide Congress with 

a comprehensive strategy aimed at aligning Federal efforts to disrupt and counter violent extremist messaging online. The bill also 

requires the Administration to provide a report to Congress that 

not only details the role social media plays in domestic and foreign 

radicalization, but also evaluates current government efforts to 

combat and counter terrorists’ use of social media. 

The required national strategy to counter online radicalization 

should be informed by a study of a wide range of terrorists’ and 

terrorist organizations’ online recruitment efforts and, if possible, 

include organizations and individuals that adhere to a range of 

ideologies. While a national strategy will aim to counter all terrorist online radicalization, it should prioritize preventing violent 

extremism and terrorism that is inspired by Al Qaeda, ISIS, and 

their affiliates.27 In addition, in an effort to clarify ambiguous national security related terms of art, S. 2517 notably defines the 

term ‘‘radicalization’’ for the first time in Federal statute. 

Finally, S. 2517 protects the First Amendment rights of Americans engaged in constitutionally-protected behavior while demanding the guidance necessary to build an effective, whole-of-government approach to counter online radicalization. Included in both 

the report and evaluation is a requirement that the Administration 

assess the impact that efforts to combat terrorists’ use of social 

media may have on the civil rights and civil liberties of United 

States persons not engaged in terrorist activities. The national 

strategy to counter online radicalization should be crafted to ensure 

the civil rights and civil liberties of United States persons are protected as required by current law. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Chairman Ron Johnson and Senator Joni Ernst introduced S. 

2517 on February 9, 2016, which was referred to the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senator Cory Booker joined as a cosponsor on February 11, 2016. 

The Committee considered S. 2517 at a business meeting on February 10, 2016. Chairman Johnson offered one amendment to define ambiguous terms of art and strengthen civil rights and civil 

liberty protections for United States persons. The Committee 

adopted the amendment and ordered the bill, as amended, reported 

favorably, both by voice vote. Senators present for both the vote on 

the amendment and the vote on the bill were: Johnson, McCain, 

Portman, Paul, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, 

Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, Booker, and Peters. 


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Similar legislation, H.R. 3654, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social 

Media Act of 2015, passed the House of Representatives by voice 

vote and under suspension of the rules on December 16, 2015. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Section 1. Short title 

This section provides the bill’s short title, the ‘‘Combat Terrorist 

Use of Social Media Act of 2016.’’ 

Section 2. Definitions 

This section defines ‘‘appropriate congressional committees,’’ ‘‘domestic terrorism,’’ ‘‘international terrorism,’’ ‘‘radicalization,’’ and 

‘‘United States person.’’ 

Section 3. Report on strategy to combat terrorist use of social media 

Section 3 requires the President to transmit to the appropriate 

Congressional committees a report on terrorists’ and terrorist organizations’ use of social media and efforts of the United States to 

combat such use. The report is required to evaluate the role of social media in radicalization and assess the impact that efforts to 

combat terrorists’ use of social media may have on the civil rights 

and civil liberties of United States persons not engaged in terrorist 

activities. The report is to be transmitted no later than 90 days 

after enactment of S. 2517. 

Section 3 also requires the President to submit to the appropriate 

Congressional committees an evaluation of the United States’ efforts to combat the use of social media by terrorists and terrorist 

organizations and recommendations for improvements. This evaluation is required to assess the impact of such efforts on the civil 

rights and civil liberties of United States persons who are not engaged in terrorism. This evaluation is to be submitted within 180 

days of enactment. 

The report and evaluation required under this section shall be 

submitted in an unclassified form, and may include a classified 

annex to protect intelligence sources and methods. 

Section 4. Policy and comprehensive strategy to counter terrorists’ 

and terrorist organizations’ use of social media 

Section 4 requires the President to submit a comprehensive 

strategy to counter the use of social media by terrorists and terrorist organizations. This strategy must be submitted within 180 

days of enactment, in an unclassified form, and may include a classified annex to protect intelligence sources and methods. 

Section 5. Prohibition on New Regulatory Authority 

Section 5 makes clear that the bill does not provide the President 

or any Federal department or agency with authority to promulgate 

regulations or set standards for non-Federal entities. 

V. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of 

the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill and determined that the bill will 

have no regulatory impact within the meaning of the rules. The 


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Committee agrees with the Congressional Budget Office’s statement that the bill contains no intergovernmental or private-sector 

mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA) and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

VI. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

MARCH 18, 2016. 

Hon. RON JOHNSON, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 2517, the Combat Terrorist 

Use of Social Media Act of 2016. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Mark Grabowicz. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 

S. 2517—Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2016 

S. 2517 would require the President, within 90 days of the bill’s 

enactment, to submit to the Congress a report on terrorists’ use of 

social media and an overview of current efforts to counter those activities. Within 180 days of the bill’s enactment, the President 

would be required to submit to the Congress a comprehensive 

strategy to counter terrorists’ use of social media and an evaluation 

of current efforts to combat such use of social media. Based on the 

cost of similar activities, CBO estimates that implementing the bill 

would cost less than $500,000 over the 2017–2021 period; such 

spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated 

amounts. 

Because enacting S. 2517 would not affect direct spending or revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that 

enacting the legislation would not increase net direct spending or 

on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

S. 2517 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

On January 13, 2016, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 

3654, the Combat Terrorist Use of Social Media Act of 2015, as 

passed by the House of Representatives on December 16, 2015. The 

two pieces of legislation are similar and CBO’s estimate of the 

budgetary effects are the same. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Mark Grabowicz. The 

estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

Because this legislation would not repeal or amend any provision 

of current law, it would make no changes in existing law within the 


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meaning of clauses (a) and (b) of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 

Standing Rules of the Senate. 

Æ 


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