“El Fenomeno Chavez:” 

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar 

by 

Jerrold M. Post 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 39 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

“El Fenomeno Chavez:” 

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar 

Jerrold M. Post 

March 2007 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 39 and previous papers in this series are 

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 39 

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The Internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://cpc.au.af.mil/

Contents 

 Page 

Disclaimer ........................................................................................................ ii 

About the Author ............................................................................................ iii

Executive Summary ..........................................................................................v

Introduction.......................................................................................................1 

Childhood and Education..................................................................................2 

Military Career Conceals Political Ambitions..................................................3 

The Path to Political Leadership .......................................................................4 

Chavez as President ..........................................................................................5 

Wielding the Oil Weapon .................................................................................7 

Chavez the Populist...........................................................................................9 

Chavez and the Media.......................................................................................9 

Hugo Chavez the Man ....................................................................................11 

Flamboyant Political Style..............................................................................11 

Narcissistic Personality...................................................................................12 

Paranoid Personality Features.........................................................................13 

Politically Adroit.............................................................................................15 

Episodic Flawed Decision-Making.................................................................15 

Hugo Chavez and Post-August Election Venezuela.......................................16 

Aspires to be leading Latin American Social Revolutionary..........................18 

New Military Doctrine....................................................................................24 

Basking Audaciously in the International Limelight ......................................26 

Outlook ...........................................................................................................30 

President for Life?...........................................................................................30 

“Socialism or Death!”.....................................................................................32 

Notes ...............................................................................................................35 
ii 

Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, 

Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. 
iii 

The Author 

Dr. Jerrold M. Post is a physician serving as Professor of Psychiatry, 

Political Psychology and International Affairs, and Director of the Political 

Psychology Program at The George Washington University. Dr. Post has 

devoted his entire career to the field of political psychology, coming to 

George Washington after a 21-year career with the U.S. Government where 

he founded and directed the Center for the Analysis of Personality and 

Political Behavior. At George Washington, he co-founded and directs the 

George Washington University Institute for Crisis and Disaster 

Management. Dr. Post received his B.A. magna cum laude from Yale 

College. After receiving his M.D. from Yale, where he was elected to 

Alpha Omega Alpha, honor medical society, he received post-graduate 

training in psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and the National Institute 

of Mental Health, and in international studies from Johns Hopkins. A 

practicing psychiatrist, he is a Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric 

Association, a member of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the 

Law, and the American College of Psychiatrists. Dr. Post has testified 

before Congress on numerous occasions and is a frequent commentator on 

national and international radio and television. His books include When 

Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King; Political 

Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred; Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of 

Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures; The Psychological 

Assessment of Political Leaders, with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill 

Clinton; and Leaders and Their Followers in a Dangerous World: The 

Psychology of Political Behavior. 

v 

“El Fenomeno Chavez:” 

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Hugo Chavez, the charismatic and controversial President of 

Venezuela, reached the ultimate seat of political power with his election as 

head of state in 1998. Carefully cultivating the image of an impoverished 

Venezuelan youth reaching the highest political office in Venezuela, 

Chavez has a devoted and loyal following among Venezuela’s lower class. 

Having survived several political crises, Chavez is a masterful political 

gamesman who zealously guards his power while maintaining a staunchly 

anti-American and anti-elite stance. This requires a delicate balancing act, 

as he gains strength from his oppositional stance to the Venezuelan elite 

and the West, especially the United States, whose financial resources are 

crucial to Venezuela’s economic survival. 

His outrageous and confrontational rhetoric, which increases during 

times of internal instability, has consistently worked to unite his followers 

in support of his leadership; he portrays himself as a modern day Simon 

Bolivar. It is this unquestioning support by Venezuela’s lower class that 

has enabled him to survive the slow destruction of Venezuela’s economy, 

internal discord, and ultimately a coup attempt in 2002. 

His internationally recognized victory in the August 2004 referendum 

has surely emboldened him. For this consummate narcissist, this victory 

would have been expected to have swollen his already swollen ego. The 

precipitous announcement on October 11, 2004, that royalties paid by 

foreign oil companies would be increased from 1 to 16.6 percent, 

represented “the second and true phase of the nationalization of the 

country’s oil” and that “we are no longer going to give our oil away,” 

reflects the defiant populist bravura of Chavez. As his hold on power 

becomes more absolute, so does his vision of himself as the savior of 

Venezuela. Hugo Chavez is likely to do whatever it takes to retain his 

hold on power in order to secure his place in history. 
vi 

Encouraged by the validation of his victory at the polls, Chavez has 

increasingly allied himself with, and publicly supported, major adversaries 

of the United States, including Iran, Syria, and North Korea, as well as 

Hamas. His self concept is not limited by the water’s edge, but he seems 

to see himself as a leading international defender of the poor and the weak 

against the powerful. This is the theme he exploited so effectively in 

winning the presidency of Venezuela. His support for terrorism has not 

been so widespread as that for rogue state leaders, with major support to 

his social-revolutionary comrades operating in neighboring Colombia. 

There are unconfirmed reports of early support for Al Qaeda, and such 

support could increase if he moves out in an increasingly messianic 

omnipotent direction. 

Chavez has revised Venezuela’s military doctrine, declaring the 

United States to be Venezuela’s prime enemy and that Venezuela would 

resort to the “war of the fleas” (terrorism and insurgency) against the 

United States, which helps explain his recent purchase of 100,000 AK103s from Russia. There are suggestions as well that he would pursue 

developing a nuclear capability, as Venezuela’s sovereign right. 

His over-the-top performance at the United Nations General 

Assembly contributed significantly to the defeat of Venezuela’s campaign 

to become Latin America’s representative to the Security Council, an 

example of Chavez’s tendency to get carried away when he is in the 

world’s spotlight, emphasizing that his judgment can falter at these times. 

His recent 63 percent victory in the 2006 presidential elections, in which 

election laws were clearly violated, can be expected to produce a wave of 

hubristic defiance. He is already acting as if he has supplanted Fidel 

Castro, his mentor and role model, as leader of the third world, behavior 

which will only intensify when Castro does finally pass from the scene. 

Chavez will probably attempt to stage a constitutional coup, rewriting the 

constitution to extend his stay in office, and would not leave office 

voluntarily if that fails. 

On the occasion of his inauguration, declaring “Socialism or death!” 

which was Castro’s defiant vow on the collapse of the Soviet Union, he 

stated his intention to establish Venezuela as a “socialist republic.” He 

announced plans to nationalize electric utilities, Venezuela’s major 

telephone company CANT, and four highly profitable foreign oil 

developments. Despite the resulting financial turmoil, and a corrupt 
vii 

inefficient managerial class, there is every reason to believe he will, in an 

accelerated fashion, follow the path of his model Fidel Castro as he seeks 

to consolidate his self-appointed role as Castro’s successor. 

1 

“El Fenomeno Chavez:” 

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolivar 

Jerrold M. Post2

Introduction 

“If you try to assess me by traditional canons of analysis, 

you’ll never emerge from confusion.” 

–Hugo Chavez statement to Larry Rohter of 

the New York Times, April 10, 1999. 

Hugo Chavez, the charismatic and controversial President of 

Venezuela, reached the ultimate seat of political power with his election as 

head of state in 1998. Like his hero Simon Bolivar, Chavez is a mestizo 

(mix of European, African, and indigenous blood) and spent his very early 

years in poverty. He has zealously clung to and cultivated the image of a 

lower-class child rising to the height of political power. This image has 

contributed to Chavez’s extraordinary popularity among Venezuela’s 

lower class. His MVR-200 political party receives its primary support 

from the lower class and alliances with other leftist parties. Since taking 

office in 1999, Venezuela has experienced intense political and economic 

chaos with estimates of his internal support ranging from 25 to 50 percent 

of the population. 

Chavez’s devout following of “Chavistas” often invoke “El fenomeno 

Chavez” (the Chavez phenomenon) in describing Chavez the man as well 

as his rise to power. It is this cult of personality which Chavez has so 

skillfully developed and maintained throughout his professional life that 

has greatly contributed to his continued power despite opposition from the 
2 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

upper class, the oil industry, media, labor unions, and elements of the 

military. Despite a fifty year tradition of democracy in Venezuela and his 

own election by the people in 1998, Chavez appears to view himself more 

as a revolutionary figure vested with certain responsibilities toward the 

lower class. He identifies himself with heroic Latin American figures 

such as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro and, in particular, seems to view 

himself as a modern day Simon Bolivar. 

Childhood and Education3

The son of two school teachers and the second of six sons, Hugo 

Chavez’s carefully maintained image of a background of extreme poverty 

is more myth than reality. His family moved to Barinas (the state capital) 

while he was still a child and their economic situation improved. But as a 

mestizo, he would have absorbed the psychology of the underclass, the 

resentment of the subaltern of the elite structure. 

His family originally came from the town of Sabaneta which Chavez 

described as a town “with only three dirt roads by the edge of a river,” 

where “people lived in dilapidated houses with dirt floors.”4 When the 

young Chavez finished the sixth grade, his family moved to the state 

capital of Barinas, where his family remains today, so that the Chavez 

children could further their education. 

While certainly not members of Venezuela’s upper class, the Chavez 

family was able to provide adequately for the children, and to ensure they 

received a solid education. According to a variety of sources, young 

Chavez was exposed to a wide range of activities at which he excelled. In 

addition to being a strong student, he was an outgoing and social child 

who was considered to be a talented musician, painter, and baseball player. 

He apparently enjoyed learning and spent a good deal of time reading, 

including encyclopedias, which his mother kept at the family home. 

Chavez grew up in a politically active family of devout Catholics 

during the apex of the socialist-communist movement in Latin American – 

the time of Che Guevera and Fidel Castro. Growing up in a politically 

charged family during a time of social activism greatly influenced young 

Chavez and contributed to his unique blend of nationalism and radical 

socialism. In interviews Chavez recalls an early interest in Simon Bolivar, 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 3 

the charismatic founding father of Venezuela, and politics – inspired, he 

claims, by his older brother Adan who was a devout Marxist. 

After rejecting the idea of attending the University of Los Andes, 

where his brother went, Chavez pursued his education at the Venezuelan 

Military Academy (VMA). A highly competitive and well respected 

institution, VMA offered Chavez the opportunity to play on one of the 

best baseball teams in the country. Having dreamed of a career in Major 

League Baseball, Chavez often claims this was a major consideration in 

his decision to attend the Venezuelan Military Academy. It is unclear why 

Chavez stopped playing baseball, but dropping out of baseball allowed 

him to concentrate almost exclusively on his military studies and 

intellectual development. His new focus became politics. 

Military Career Conceals Political Ambitions 

While he was successful in his military studies, it was the intrigue of 

politics that inspired passion in the young Chavez. Chavez had to hide his 

interest and extracurricular studies in Marxism, as in 1970s Venezuela, 

military officers interested in socialism were considered a threat to state 

security. Chavez’s older brother, Adan, an avowed Marxist who 

eventually became a University professor, mentored and encouraged his 

younger brother to pursue his unique vision of blending the revolutionary 

ideology of Simon Bolivar with modern-day socialism. It was during this 

time that Chavez developed his idea of “revolutionary takeover [based on] 

an alliance between civilian activists and military officers.”5

Following his graduation from Venezuelan Military Academy in 

1975, Chavez was deployed to jungle areas with the military to eliminate 

the remaining leftist insurgents. Chavez has routinely commented about 

how these experiences profoundly influenced him, forcing him to fight 

against his fellow leftist sympathizers, questioning “What am I doing 

here? On one side peasants in military uniforms torture peasant guerrillas, 

and on the other, peasant guerrillas kill peasants dressed in green...”6

 

This was, as Chavez himself states, his first existential crisis.7

Despite his inner turmoil, Chavez chose to remain in the military. It 

was during this time that he founded MBR-200 (Bolivarian Revolutionary 

Movement), a secret organization of officers with similar political 
4 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

leanings. The organization was officially established in 1983, the two 

hundred year anniversary of the birth of Simon Bolivar. For nearly ten 

years of his military career, 1980-1989, Chavez taught military history, 

leadership, and ethics to VMA cadets.8 Although he started studying for 

his Masters in Political Science at Simon Bolivar University, he never 

completed his studies. He attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, but the 

failed coup attempt in February of 1992 effectively ended his military 

career. 

The Path to Political Leadership 

The growing popular dissatisfaction with the Perez administration, 

exemplified by the 1989 food riots resulting in the deaths of hundreds of 

civilians, mobilized Chavez’s MBR-200 party, and three years later on 

February 4, 1992, Chavez led a failed coup attempt against the 

Venezuelan government. The coup attempt resulted in the deaths of 18 

persons and left 60 injured before Chavez gave himself up. Despite the 

fact that the details of the coup attempt remain unclear to this day, and that 

it failed, the role of Chavez in the event has become part of Venezuelan 

lore. The event has been recast as a case of Chavez leading his followers 

against a “false democracy” marked by corruption and resentment among 

Venezuela’s impoverished majority. It was this event that catapulted the 

young, previously unknown, soldier to the attention and admiration of 

many of the Venezuelan people. 

Although he had been sentenced to thirty years in prison for his role 

in the attempted coup, Chavez was pardoned and left prison after serving 

only two years and immediately began his political career. Showing 

remarkable resiliency, just three years after his release, in April 1997, 

Hugo Chavez announced his candidacy for President. His fiery antiestablishment rhetoric became the basis of his charismatic appeal and 

energized the Venezuelan population resulting in Election Day turnouts 

far surpassing any previous election. A gifted orator, Chavez united the 

nation’s political left wing and gave his followers a voice for their rage 

against a perceived corrupt and elitist system. With a commanding 56 

percent of the vote, Hugo Chavez was elected President in December 1998 

with a campaign platform that centered on giving prominence to the needs 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 5 

of impoverished and disenfranchised elements of Venezuelan society. The 

same year that Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela, his 

father was elected governor of the Barinas state. 

Chavez as President 

Since becoming president, through 2001, Chavez has visited his 

heroic model and revolutionary soul-mate Fidel Castro six times, the latest 

being a visit to an ailing Castro in a Havana hospital. In the summer of 

2000, as the only South American member and as the sitting president of 

OPEC,9

 Chavez visited many of the OPEC producing countries. In open 

defiance of the United States, on August 11, 2000, Chavez traveled to 

Baghdad and visited with then Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. He was 

the first head of state to visit Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. 

A year later, in August of 2001, Cuban leader Fidel Castro visited 

Chavez in Venezuela. He was received with full military honors and was 

awarded the Order of Angostura, Venezuela’s highest civil award, which 

commemorates the independence struggle of the South American 

liberator, Simon Bolivar. Chavez, a strong supporter of Castro, greeted 

the aging Cuban dictator saying, “We welcome the brother, the friend, the 

revolutionary soldier who has been an example of dignity for this entire 

continent, for the heavens and the sea.”10 He went on to “welcome this 

75-year-old youngster, the same Fidel as ever.” That Fidel occupies a 

special place in Chavez’s political psychology seems clear, suggesting he 

hopes to acquire his mantle of leadership, emulating Castro’s leadership 

style, i.e., winning popular support from the Venezuelan lower classes by 

confronting the “Norte Americanos” who are blamed for Venezuelan 

economic and social difficulties, just has Castro has so successfully 

portrayed the United States over the years. 

It is still an open question whether Chavez is drawn to Castro’s 

revolutionary ideology and person simply as a means of mobilizing 

domestic Venezuelan support for himself and his party, or whether he 

seriously aspires to spread revolution to other areas of Latin America such 

as his heroes Fidel Castro and Che Guevara attempted. He has been 

openly supportive of leftist candidates through South America, including 

Evo Morales, the newly elected President of Bolivia11 and the leftist 
6 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

candidate for President of Mexico, Lopez Obrador. It is interesting to note 

that his other hero, Simon Bolivar, between 1810 and 1824 took up the 

sword to free Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru 

from Spanish control. Bolivar, his hero, then became dictator over these 

areas. If he follows the Bolivar, Castro, Guevara models in international 

affairs he will be prone to support violence as a means to a revolutionary 

end. The jury is still out as to whether he will confine his activities to 

building domestic support by criticizing the United States and its Western 

Allies or whether he will cross the line and promote terror and 

revolutionary practice in the hemisphere outside his borders. 

In April 2002, Hugo Chavez faced the biggest crisis of his political 

life. Amidst falling popularity among most sectors of his constituency, 

along with his alienation of the business sector elites and labor leaders, 

strikes and protests erupted around the country. In retaliation for the 

violent outbursts against his government, Chavez ordered his troops to 

break up the demonstrations, using force if necessary. 

The bloodshed triggered a rebellion by the military and anti-Chavez 

demonstrators, culminating in a coup on April 12, 2002, which resulted in 

Chavez being captured and arrested in his own presidential palace. The 

interim government led by Pedro Carmona, head of the business leader’s 

association, claimed Chavez resigned. The coup was short-lived as 

Chavez supporters and loyalist troops rose up in protest against the capture 

of their leader. Lasting less than 48 hours, the coup was defeated and 

Chavez, who in fact had never resigned, was reinstated. Reflecting an 

ironic sense of symmetry and justice, Chavez, who likes to see himself as 

a fair and just leader, sentenced Carmona to two years in prison, the same 

amount of time he himself spent in prison following the attempted coup of 

1992 almost exactly ten years earlier. 

Chavez seemed to have gained momentum following the resolution of 

the coup. The base of his constituency—the poor and the lower class—

were energized around him and have insulated him from several attempts 

to bring him down since the 2002 coup (in 2003 more protests and strikes 

surfaced). In December 2002, in response to a popular uprising, four oil 

executives were fired by Chavez’s government. Describing the men as 

“rebels” and “subversives wearing ties,” Chavez used this move to control 

the protests and demonstrations. 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 7

In July 2004, Chavez led a call for a united South American economic 

bloc before economic relations outside of the region were developed. His 

speech criticized the Free Trade agreement that other South American 

countries (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) have with the United States. This 

confrontational and anti-American stance is in keeping with his modus 

operandi of intensifying his anti-American rhetoric as domestic instability 

increased. 

Chavez’s rule has led to a polarization of the country – those who see 

him as a spokesman for the poor, and those who regard him as a populist 

demagogue. He has continued to emphasize his beliefs that it is the people 

who must decide his future, although there was little doubt that he will 

ensure his own political survival, for in his mind Venezuela requires his 

leadership. 

After two petitions, Chavez finally faced a national referendum vote 

on August 15, 2004. The high oil prices had permitted Chavez to embark 

on a $17 billion social spending program. He campaigned that a “yes” 

vote in the referendum to recall would be a vote for American 

imperialism. Venezuela voted by a large margin—58 to 42 percent—to 

retain Chavez as president, a pivotal event and a powerful vindication for 

the pugnacious populist who had survived four strikes and a coup. Adding 

to his euphoric response was the affirmation of international observers 

including the Organization of American States and Jimmy Carter (and the 

Carter Center) that the election was fair, despite opposition claims that 

“they have perpetrated a gigantic fraud against the will of the people.” 

This was balm to Chavez’ threatened ego. And his response gave his 

victory a sacred significance: “The Venezuelan people have spoken, and 

the people’s voice is the voice of God.” He pledged that his government 

would continue with the so-called Bolivarian revolution.12

Wielding the Oil Weapon 

On October 11, 2004, in a surprise announcement with no warning, 

Chavez declared that Venezuela was increasing the royalties paid by 

foreign oil companies from the earlier 1 percent, implemented in order to 

attract foreign investors, to 16.6 percent. He called this “an act of justice 
8 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

and sovereignty” which “marked the second and true phase of the 

nationalization of the country’s oil.”13

The importance of Venezuela’s oil in the political arena was given 

added weight during a four-day visit to China in late December 2004. 

During that visit, Chavez announced that Venezuela’s oil and natural gas 

fields would be open to China. Under the terms of the agreement, Chinese 

companies would gain development rights to fifteen oil fields in eastern 

Venezuela and would be allowed to build oil refineries there. 

Further casting doubt on whether Venezuela would continue as a 

reliable source of oil for the United States, in early February 2006, Chavez 

signaled that his government was looking to sell as many as eight 

refineries in its American oil-refining operations. The refineries are 

owned by CITGO, the Houston-based subsidiary of Venezuela’s state 

owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela. 

Ever seeking opportunities to provoke the giant United States, Chavez 

agreed to provide eight million gallons of discounted heating oil to low 

income residents of the South Bronx from CITGO. The agreement was 

negotiated with U.S. Representative Jose Serano, an outspoken 

Congressional supporter of both Fidel Castro and Chavez. 

Hurricane Katrina gave Chavez another opportunity to mock the 

United States. On September 5, 2005, after Hurricane Katrina hit the 

United States, the Chavez administration offered aid to its “North 

American brothers.” In a rather brilliant public relations stroke, Chavez 

offered tons of food, water, and a million barrels of extra petroleum to the 

United States. He has also proposed to sell, at a significant discount, as 

many as 66,000 barrels of heating fuel to poor communities that were hit 

by the hurricane, and offered mobile hospital units, medical specialists, 

and power generators. (Castro made a similar “generous” offer.) As 

Chavez undoubtedly knew he would, President Bush declined this aid. 

On November 23, 2005, Venezuelan officials struck a deal with 

Massachusetts officials to provide cheap heating oil to low-income homes, 

sold at 40 percent below market price from CITGO petroleum. This was 

another slap at President Bush as the post-hurricane Katrina oil market 

significantly increased heating oil prices. 

Venezuela took control of two oil fields, one from France’s Total SA, 

the other from Italy’s Eni SpA, on April 3, 2006, after the companies 

refused to sign an agreement to turn the site over to a state-controlled joint 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 9 

venture, Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA). Exxon Mobil Corporation 

decided to sell their stakes among the 32 Venezuelan oil properties rather 

than go along with the new terms. 

In early April 2006, Chavez, who hosted the OPEC meeting on June 

1, 2006, in Caracas, indicated his intent to set the price of heavy crude oil 

at (U.S.) $50 a barrel. Doing so would redefine reserve oil supplies and 

give him the highest percentage of oil reserves, more so than anyone in the 

Middle East. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that the 

Venezuelan government controls 1.3 trillion barrels of oil – more than the 

entire declared oil reserves of the rest of the planet. Previously, heavy 

crude oil set at (U.S.) $20 a barrel was too expensive to process and was 

not counted in the reserves. 

Chavez the Populist 

Reminiscent of the land appropriation program of President Mugabe 

of Mozambique, in January 2005, Chavez promised to end what his 

government calls “latifundios,” estates of at least 5,000 hectares 

(approximately 12,500 acres) that remain idle, as part of a fast-moving 

land reform program. Chavez, playing to his peasant support, has trained 

his sights on 6.6 million acres of private holdings, leading to widespread 

concern by major farmers, worried that the government will seize their 

property. 

Chavez and the Media 

Ever sensitive to criticism, Chavez has sought to muzzle the critics. 

In December 2004, Chavez signed a law that permitted the government to 

censor news reports. The vaguely worded law stipulated that the news 

media could not disseminate reports that endanger national security or 

incite disruption of public order, and outlined 78 possible infractions. In 

passing this law, Chavez made the following observations: 

“Let’s say this, first of all we have to say something that 

John Paul II said. There is no freedom without limits. All 
10 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

freedom should be regulated in a way. You are free to go 

around Paris, but you need a document, right, or an identity 

card, otherwise you could go to prison. You could have a 

car which is your own car but that doesn’t mean you have to 

violate all traffic lights and the traffic code. Your freedom is 

limited. You can be the owner of a gun, you bought it, it is 

yours, but you cannot shoot people around, all right? 

So all freedom has limits, some constraints, it has to be 

regulated. It is the same with freedom of speech, the use of 

the media especially should be regulated. What we have 

done in Venezuela very recently is a law of social 

responsibility of radio and television. For instance a TV 

channel can not incite hatred, cannot incite a coup, that is a 

crime, and it happened in Venezuela when during the coup 

in April 2002 all the private TV channels were supporting 

the coup, and calling the people to take to the streets to go 

against the palace and to give orders to the leaders and they 

weren’t allowing the public to express themselves. They 

published a great lie, that I had renounced my post as 

President, and that was false. We are passing this law to 

save the freedom of speech of everyone.” 

Having muted the opposition, Chavez then sought a channel for his 

own views. In what embassy officials have dubbed “the Al Jazeera of 

Latin America,” Chavez initiated Televisora del Sur (Television Station of 

the South), a pan-Latin American television network based in Caracas, 

Venezuela. Intended to be a counter-weight to privately-owned networks 

such as CNN en Espanol, the network has taken on the slogan, “News 

from the South.” It is funded with U.S. $10 million provided by the 

countries that jointly own the network and will collaborate on technology 

and news content: Venezuela, 51 percent, (the controlling share), 

Argentina, 20 percent, Cuba, 19 percent and Uruguay, 10 percent. The 

newly elected populist president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, has agreed to 

buy a 5 percent stake. The news channel has 160 employees and 

correspondents throughout Latin America, based in Argentina, Brazil, 

Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, and Uruguay as well as in the 

United States. There is a distinctly anti-imperialist coloration to the news 

programs. 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 11 

Hugo Chavez the Man 

Chavez is described as warm and genuine with a friendly, engaging 

demeanor. His main vice appears to be espresso coffee – drinking up to 26 

cups a day and sleeping only two to three hours a night. (This excessive 

amount of caffeine consumption could be expected to contribute to 

irritability, feeling “wired,” and over-rapid decision-making.) He has no 

known medical problems other than reports of frequent and profuse 

nosebleeds as a cadet. He is a highly intelligent man, who despite his 

inflammatory rhetoric is, for the most part, in good touch with political 

reality. 

While Chavez apparently has many friends and has a busy social life, 

he has had difficulty in sustaining happy marriages or developing 

relationships with his children. In his mid-twenties Chavez married a not 

particularly attractive young woman from his hometown and had three 

children with her, two daughters and a son. Nancy, Chavez’s first wife, 

was from a poor family and was racially-mixed, dark and native in 

appearance, like Chavez himself. Little else is known about her or their 

relationship. They subsequently divorced in the late 1980s after 18 years 

of marriage. During nine of those years, he also pursued an affair with a 

young historian, Herma Marksman. Chavez sent his two daughters with 

Nancy to school in Cuba. 

Maria Isabel, Chavez’s second wife, is a stark contrast to Nancy. She 

is an attractive, fair-skinned blonde from an upper-class family of 

privilege. Chavez met her during his 1997 Presidential Campaign. They 

were married after she found out she was pregnant. This marriage has 

produced another daughter. Chavez and his second wife are now 

separated and he is reputed to have little contact with any of his four 

children or his single grandchild. 

Flamboyant Political Style 

Chavez is known for his outrageous and often unprovoked tirades 

against his opponents. His bellicose and often inappropriate public 

commentary suggests not a lack of regard for public opinion beyond his 
12 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

immediate supporters, but rather that he enjoys the attention such antics 

produce. His staunchly anti-American, anti-old establishment and antielite stance empowers his lower-class followers who identify with him, 

demonstrating in their eyes his ability to stand up to the resented elements 

of society, which they blame for their feelings of powerlessness. 

Narcissistic Personality 

Chavez is an authoritarian narcissistic leader who has dreams of 

glory, and can be overly sensitive to criticism. The arrogant certainty 

conveyed in his public pronouncements is very appealing to his followers. 

But under this grandiose facade, as is typical with narcissistic 

personalities, is extreme insecurity. When under stress, his defiance 

becomes more pronounced, as does his tendency to blame others for his 

own shortcomings. 

Chavez has cultivated a larger-than-life self-image, approaching 

messianic proportions, yet is not out of touch with political reality. 

However, at times he seems to become captive of his own inflammatory 

rhetoric. He certainly has a sense of entitlement about his position. 

Chavez has skillfully used religious rhetoric in this devoutly Catholic 

state. While he appears to believe he has a “mission” as the leader of 

Venezuela, it is more in the image of Simon Bolivar than Jesus Christ. 

But, since the election, Chavez has become increasingly seized with his 

messianic role, and likens himself to Christ. In an interview with Ted 

Koppel, (September 16, 2005) Chavez remarked: 

“I’ve been in revolt for years against ignominy, against 

injustice, against inequality, against immorality, against the 

exploitation of human beings. One of the greatest rebels, 

who I really admire: Christ. He was a rebel. He ended up 

being crucified. He was a great rebel. He rebelled against 

the established power that subjugated. That is what rebellion 

is; it’s rebellion out of love for human beings. In truth, that 

is the cause, the cause of love: love for every human being, 

for every woman, for every child, for every man, for every 

brother.” 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 13 

Paranoid Personality Features 

Chavez is a man who has built his career, and in many ways his life, 

on plots and subplots of political intrigue. At times he seemed 

surprisingly unconcerned with conspiracy theories and earlier had refused 

many of the standard security protocols of state leaders – he freely 

mingled with people during his political rallies and refused to wear a 

bulletproof vest. As a man of the people, he did not seem to be consumed 

by paranoid fantasies himself, but rather appeared to use the conspiracy 

theories of his followers as a tool in his leadership and manipulation, 

rather than being dominated by paranoid fears. 

But more recently he has been consumed with paranoid fears, 

suggesting his underlying insecurity. A member of the Colombian 

security service who was a member of the presidential detail on a state 

visit described the lengths to which Chavez went to protect himself as 

being unusual to the extreme, surrounding himself with a virtual phalanx 

of security guards, personally checking out every detail of his protection. 

On several occasions he has threatened retaliation for plots. In the 

September 2005 interview with Ted Koppel, Chavez stated with certainty 

that he had proof that the United States had plans to invade Venezuela. 

In mid-August 2005, Venezuela prepared to deport 16 of 133 

Colombians arrested outside Caracas who, Chavez charged, were paramilitary soldiers sent to assassinate him, charges ridiculed by Colombian 

diplomats. Several days later, on the 700 Club broadcast of August 22, 

2005, the Pat Robertson call for Chavez’ assassination did nothing to 

dampen his fears. 

“There was a popular coup that overthrew him [Chavez]. 

And what did the United States State Department do about 

it? Virtually nothing. And as a result, within about 48 

hours that coup was broken; Chavez was back in power, 

but we had a chance to move in. He has destroyed the 

Venezuelan economy, and he’s going to make that a 

launching pad for communist infiltration and Muslim 

extremism all over the continent. 

You know, I don’t know about this doctrine of assassination, 

but if he thinks we’re trying to assassinate him, I think that 
14 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

we really ought to go ahead and do it. It’s a whole lot 

cheaper than starting a war. And I don’t think any oil 

shipments will stop. But this man is a terrific danger ... 

This is in our sphere of influence, so we can’t let this 

happen. We have the Monroe Doctrine, we have other 

doctrines that we have announced. And without question, 

this is a dangerous enemy to our south, controlling a huge 

pool of oil, that could hurt us very badly. We have the 

ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that 

we exercise that ability. We don’t need another $200 

billion war to get rid of one, you know, strong-arm dictator. 

It’s a whole lot easier to have some of the covert operatives 

do the job and then get it over with.” 

These remarks, of course, produced a firestorm, with denials of any 

intent to assassinate from prominent Senators and indeed from President 

Bush himself.

Four days after these remarks, his paranoid fears heightened, Chavez 

suspended permits for foreign missionaries. And in October, he ordered a 

Christian missionary group working with indigenous peoples to leave the 

country after accusing its members of “imperialist infiltration” and spying. 

On February 2, 2006, Chavez announced that his government had 

ordered the expulsion of the American naval attaché, John Correa, at the 

U.S. Embassy in Caracas for spying. This was immediately followed on 

February 3, 2006, by remarks by Vice President Cheney, comparing 

Chavez to Hitler, that were not designed to ease Chavez’ paranoid fears. 

“I mean, we’ve got Chavez in Venezuela with a lot of oil 

money. He’s a person who was elected legally – just as 

Adolf Hitler was elected legally – and then consolidated 

power and now is, of course, working closely with Fidel 

Castro and Mr. Morales and others.” 

In retaliation for the expulsion of John Correa, the United States 

declared persona non grata and ejected Jenny Figueredo Frias, identified 

as chief of staff to the Venezuelan ambassador. Upon returning to 

Venezuela, Frias received a hero’s welcome. 

Defending against the Hitler metaphor, on February 4, 2006, Hugo 

Chavez told a rally of supporters on Saturday that U.S. President George 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 15 

W. Bush was worse than Hitler and vowed to buy more arms to defend his 

nation as diplomatic relations deteriorated after a week of tit-for-tat 

diplomatic expulsions. 

Chavez warned he could shut Venezuelan oil refineries in the United 

States and sell oil for the U.S. market elsewhere if Washington cuts off 

ties, although U.S. officials had made no suggestion they plan to break 

relations. 

All of this populist defiance played well to the followers of Chavez, 

who admired his courage in standing up to the giant United States. 

Politically Adroit 

Hugo Chavez is a skilled political manipulator, who is adroitly 

Machiavellian. His continual emphasis of his mission of championing of 

Bolivarian ideals, his oft stated pride in his being a mestizo, and his 

continuing emphasis on his own roots in poverty is employed to maintain 

his hold on power. 

To keep his followers engaged, he must continue the outrageous and 

inflammatory attacks on the United States, the Venezuelan elite and other 

perceived enemies. It would appear that while he does, in fact, believe in 

the essence of these world views, he also knows that they provide a 

platform for maintaining his popularity in Venezuela.

Episodic Flawed Decision-Making 

There are two circumstances when Chavez’s messianic personality 

adversely affects his decision-making, with a potential for flawed 

judgment – when he has just achieved a major success and when he 

perceives himself as failing. When Chavez is succeeding, he can become 

heady with success, feeling he is invulnerable. That the major increase 

from 1 to 16.6 percent in oil royalties followed his electoral success 

suggests that it may well have flowed from his being heady with success. 

When Chavez is failing, meeting setbacks, facing points of crisis – 

when his leadership is imperiled because of economic decline and loss of 

popular support – then his rhetoric and actions become bolder and more 
16 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

confrontational. Consistently, as instability in Venezuela rises, so too 

does his anti-American, anti-elite rhetoric and actions. 

In many ways, Chavez will respond to internal crisis by creating a 

crisis with the elites or the international community. This, in turn, then 

draws his supporters together, strengthening his internal base. Chavez 

sees himself as the very embodiment of Venezuela, so had the ineffective 

government led to a legitimate major defeat at the polls, this would have 

been psychologically intolerable for Chavez, who would have either 

declared martial law or arranged to reverse the electoral defeat. 

Hugo Chavez and Post-August Election Venezuela – 

Heady With Success 

Rather than allowing the August 2004 referendum to slow down or 

undermine his popularity, it seemed to embolden Chavez and solidify his 

base. Always appealing to the poor and impoverished of Venezuela, 

Chavez portrayed his margin of 58 percent to the opposition’s 42 percent 

of the electoral vote as a victory for the people despite American 

interference. With the Carter Center mission, led by former U.S. President 

Jimmy Carter, and the Organization of American States certifying the 

results shortly after voting, Chavez’s victory was internationally 

recognized. Although the opposition continued to cry foul, the United 

States quickly followed the international observers’ recommendations and 

recognized the results, firmly establishing Chavez’s control. 

The opposition based its claims of fraud on three specific points: (1) 

an exit poll supervised by an American polling company showed the 

opposition winning by 18 percent; (2) a pattern of polling stations where 

electronic voting machines returned identical results; and (3) in some 

districts there were fewer “yes” votes to recall Chavez than had been on a 

petition the previous year. Carter Center observers have addressed each of 

these points. First they call into question the accuracy of exit polls based 

on framing of questions, voters chosen to participate and ultimately the 

honesty of answers given to pollsters. There was extensive testing of the 

voting machines prior to the elections and Carter Center observers 

participated in post-election vote counting and believed in the accuracy of 

the count. They address the final point by saying that when it came time 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 17

to vote, despite what people had indicated on a petition a year prior, they 

could have changed their minds on voting day. Ultimately though, the 

recognition of the referendum results by the international observers 

undermined the opposition more effectively than Chavez himself could 

have done. 

Chavez moved quickly to take advantage of the momentum from the 

August referendum. He has announced a “new stage” of his Bolivarian 

revolution. The government is expanding the “electoral patrols” – 

neighborhood groups that had mobilized the pro-Chavez vote and there is 

increasing legislation to further limit civil rights throughout Venezuela. 

Freedom of speech and press are being severely restricted. Chavez has 

increased nationalization of industry with the establishment of a national 

airline, TV station and telecommunications industry. Chavez was on a roll. 

He put the large infusion of funds from oil revenues to work to 

solidify his political base. The foundation of Chavez’s support, the poor 

and disenfranchised, see results. There has been a massive increase in 

public spending. New medical clinics are being set up throughout the 

country. There are reports of upwards of 11,000 neighborhood clinics 

being established with assistance of Cuban doctors and medical 

equipment. There has been a “redistribution” of roughly 2.3 million 

hectares to 117,000 families throughout Venezuela. Secondary education 

is now available for more children than ever before. In addition to the 

three new university campuses functioning in 2003, there are reports of six 

more to be completed by 2006, through an increase of the education 

budget by almost 5 percent of the GDP from the previous government. 

With no real foundation for a viable economic model in Venezuela, 

the question becomes how are these reforms being financed? And, how 

long can it last? Hugo Chavez knows that his base constituency is the 

poor who are benefiting from these new programs. 

Venezuela’s state oil company, Petroles de Venzuela (PDVSA), saw 

massive changes as a result of a power struggle in 2003 resulting in 

Chavez taking control of the company and purging its senior management. 

Reports vary, but, in general, it seems that PDVSA’s production has 

decreased in the past year and private operators now account for about 

1 million barrels/day of the company’s output – a figure many expect to 

increase. 
18 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

With PDVSA unable to maintain the necessary production to finance 

Chavez’s plans, he is clearly in need of external multinational investment. 

The December 2004 agreement with China, which itself is increasingly 

avid for petroleum supplies, is in the service of that goal, and such 

ventures are expected to increase. 

Aspires to be leading Latin American Social Revolutionary, 

at Hazard to more Broad Support of Terrorism 

Chavez’s populist “in your face” anti-American stance has been 

rewarded by his victory at the polls. There is every reason to believe this 

stance will not only continue but will be intensified. Will he provide 

support to terrorist groups as a consequence of this leftist social 

revolutionary stance? To answer this question requires an examination of 

his core political personality. His style is one of open, overt defiance 

against the demonized enemy, the United States. This is what wins him 

points both domestically and internationally. His mentor and model is 

Fidel Castro, and he has watched carefully and admired the manner in 

which Castro has politically exploited his anti-Western defiance, including 

support to African separatist movements. His first two trips after his 

election were to meet with his mentor Castro, whose mantle of leadership 

as Latin American leftist leader he hopes one day to acquire, and to 

Saddam Hussein. The latter visit was designed to tweak the United States; 

it was a “thumb in the eye” of the United States, an act of public defiance, 

designed to appeal to his supporters. 

There are widespread reports he has supported the Colombian social 

revolutionary insurgency directly supporting the FARC in battles against 

the Colombian military, and there are scattered reports of both material 

and financial support to other insurgency/terrorist groups operating in the 

region. In particular, Venezuela is reported to have allowed both the 

FARC and the ELN to operate safe havens on Venezuelan territory. 

In the summer of 2000, Olga Martin, prominent FARC leader, spoke 

on the floor of Venezuela’s National Assembly and praised Chavez as a 

hero of the rebel movement and thanked the Venezuelan government for 

its “support.” Within weeks, the Colombian government reported 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 19 

confiscating more than 400 rifles and machine guns bearing the insignia of 

the Venezuelan armed forces. 

In February 2001, Jose Maria Ballestas, a leader of ELN, the other 

main Colombian social-revolutionary terrorist organization, was captured 

in Venezuela by Interpol. Although he was wanted for a 1999 airline 

hijacking, he was immediately released from custody by order of the 

Chavez government, which denied he’d been arrested. This led to a major 

diplomatic crisis with Colombia, which released a video of his capture to 

put to a lie the Venezuelan claim that he had not been arrested. 

To repair relations with Colombia, Chavez made a state visit in May 

2001, but had the effrontery to have as his chief body guard Diego Serna, 

a FARC member. Later that fall, Venezuela’s intelligence chief Jesus 

Urdaneta denounced Chavez for supporting the FARC, publicizing 

documents showing that the Chavez government offered fuel, money, and 

other support to the terrorists, including signed letters from a Chavez aide 

to provide support to the FARC. The signatory was later to become 

Chavez’ minister of justice. A group of female journalists released video 

shortly thereafter showing meetings between Venezuelan military leaders 

and FARC guerilla commanders. The Colombian Air Force also captured 

a Venezuelan plane loaded with ammunition intended for FARC terrorists. 

Particularly powerful confirmation of the Venezuelan-FARC 

connection was provided when a high ranking FARC commander, Ricardo 

Granada, known as FARC’s “foreign secretary,” was arrested on the 

Colombian border in December 2005. In Caracas, Granada had enjoyed 

Venezuelan citizenship and had participated in a “networking conference” 

in which Chavez, Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, and other socialist 

revolutionary leaders participated. Colombia has become increasingly 

frustrated with the apparent impunity of Venezuela when it has been 

harboring terrorist leaders. The arrest in Columbia in January 2005 and 

subsequent extradition to the United States of Simon Triubada, the nom de 

guerre of Ricardo Palmero, a high-ranking FARC terrorist, was a major 

blow to the FARC. Palmero is currently awaiting trial in the United 

States. During the trial, the details of Venezuela’s support for the FARC 

can be expected to become a major part of the prosecution case.14

Given reports that Venezuela has recently consummated an arms deal 

with Russia to provide 100,000 AK-103s, this raises questions whether 

this is for his military only or if some or a majority of these weapons have 
20 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

FARC and other insurgency/terrorist organizations as their ultimate 

recipient.15 The degree of support by the Chavez government is extremely 

strong and long standing. Indeed, Colombia’s efforts to counter this 

powerful insurgency will not succeed as long as Venezuela continues to 

play such a central role in providing sanctuary, weapons, and financial 

support to the FARC insurgents. 

There has also been at least one report of Chavez providing support to 

the Taliban. A Venezuelan military defector, Major Juan Diaz Castillo, 

formerly the pilot for Chavez, reported that Chavez transferred $1 million 

to the Taliban through Venezuelan ambassador to India, Walte Marquez, 

in New Delhi, designating $900,000 to Al Qaeda for its relocation efforts, 

and $100,000 to the then-Afghan government for food and clothing. 

Major Castillo was one of a group of disaffected Venezuelan military 

officers opposed to the extremities of the undemocratic actions Chavez 

was taking to hold on to power. Diaz has stated, “I must warn America 

about Chavez. He is a danger, not only to his own people but to the whole 

region.” Referring to the aid to Al Qaeda, Diaz indicated, “It was a way of 

telling Osama bin Laden that he had a friend in Hugo Chavez.” 

After the 9/11 attack, Chavez expressed admiration for the attacks in 

private, according to General Pedro Pereira, then the highest ranking 

general in the Venezuelan air force. “With 9/11, bin Laden showed the 

whole world that he was a force to be reckoned with. This impressed 

Hugo to no end,” the general recalled. On the day after the attack, Chavez 

supporters held a celebration in which they burned the American flag in 

the main square of Caracas. Diaz has indicated that after 2001, Chavez 

“wanted direct contact to all the major terror groups in the world.” Diaz 

and his colleagues have established a website, MilitaresDemacraticos.com, 

on which this report was disseminated. This report was widely 

disseminated on Venezuelan media, but, unlike the widely sourced reports 

of Venezuelan support to the FARC, there have been no independent 

confirmations of this report.16

“Hamas leaders will be received by Mr. Chavez with great pleasure,” 

Chavez indicated publicly on February 16, 2006. This followed Putin’s 

decision to undermine United States attempts to isolate the new Hamas 

government. Asked whether they would receive a Hamas delegation, Vice 

President Jose Vicente responded, “If they come, it will be a pleasure. 

They have a majority with the Palestinian people, they just won an 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 21 

election.” Chavez confirmed that it was ready to study Hamas appeals to 

the international community. The decision was seen as part of Chavez’ 

policy aimed to strengthen ties with Arab nations as part of efforts by the 

world’s No. 5 oil exporter to break its traditional political and economic 

reliance on the United States.17

Since assuming the presidency, Chavez has embarked on an 

interesting travel schedule, to say the least. In addition to the early trips to 

Cuba and Iraq, he has also traveled to Iran, Syria, North Korea, 

Zimbabwe, Belarus, China, and Libya—with the exception of China, a 

veritable who’s who of rogue leaders international. 

In a reflexive manner, Chavez has strongly publicly supported Iran’s 

right to develop a nuclear capability; Venezuela, along with Syria and 

Cuba, were the only countries to oppose the resolution to refer Iran to the 

United Nation Security Council at the February 2006 meeting of the 

International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. After meeting with 

former Iranian president Khatami in Caracas, Chavez stated, “Iran has 

every right, like many other countries have done, to develop its atomic 

energy and continue its research in this field.” (And if this is true for Iran, 

it is assuredly true for Venezuela.) Indeed, Iran has become increasingly 

important to Venezuela in its efforts to oppose American influence in the 

developing world. This strengthening of ties, including a number of 

recent joint commercial ventures, has led Iran to become Venezuela’s 

closest ally outside of Latin America. In Iran, where he appeared jointly 

with President Ahmadinejad in a late July visit on the occasion of which 

he was awarded the golden High Medallion of the Islamic Republic, 

Chavez made a number of statements strongly supporting Iran’s right to a 

nuclear program. 

Chavez was outspoken in his criticism of Israeli actions in Lebanon, 

which he characterized “being carried out in the style of Hitler, in a fascist 

manner.” According to Alberto Garrido, a historian who is writing a book 

on Venezuela’s ties to Muslim countries, “Geopolitically, the most 

important front for Chavez in the world at the moment is Iran. Chavez, 

together with his closest advisors, has defined the strategic alliance with 

Iran as a means with which to counter American power.”18

Khatami, speaking before the Venezuelan congress, referred to “the 

injustice of the great powers that try to control the world” and went on to 

deprecate the United States and its efforts that interfere “in other states 
22 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

under the pretext of fighting terrorism and try to force all of humanity to 

follow their monopoly of power.” Receiving Gholam-Ali-haddad Adel, 

speaker of the Iranian parliament, on a mission to discuss cooperation 

between Iran and Venezuela, the president of Venezuela’s national 

Assembly, Nicolas Maduro stated, “From our souls, we feel that our two 

nations are brothers, and that together with other peoples, we are carrying 

the flag of dignity and sovereignty, just as the North American empire (the 

United States) is beginning to decay.”19

The major psychological reward for Chavez derives from being seen 

as the pugnacious openly defiant champion of the little man in the manner 

of his identified hero Simon Bolivar or Juan Peron. His moves concerning 

rewriting petroleum contracts will be strengthened by the recent victory by 

his comrade in populist arms, Evo Morales, who has just nationalized 

Bolivian natural gas. The oil club is a heavy cudgel and Chavez may be 

tempted by his recent successes to move towards full nationalization of 

Venezuela’s oil industry. That he requires the support of Western oil 

companies for the optimal exploitation of his oil resources should inhibit 

such a move. But it did not for Qadhafi after the successful coup in Libya 

with the subsequent nationalization of Occidental Petroleum’s holdings in 

Libya, and if Chavez were to go on one of his grandiose rolls, such a move 

is not out of the question. He also provided verbal support to the populist 

leftist candidate for president of Mexico, former Mexico City mayor 

Lopez Obrador, who lost a very close 2006 election. 

Nor would it be surprising to see him open diplomatic relationships 

with the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. After all, 

Hamas, as Chavez now points out with pseudo-ingenuous glee, was 

elected legitimately, was it not? If he did so, Hamas might gain a foothold 

in Venezuela where its embassy and consulate might be useful to potential 

trouble-makers from the Jihadist camp. The main goals of such a move 

would be in the service of defying the United States, similar to the 

purposes of his early trip to visit with Saddam Hussein and his later 

expressions of solidarity and extensive trade agreements with Iran. This 

could also serve to consolidate his support at home and Venezuela’s 

solidarity with Arab oil-producing nations. His decision to visit North 

Korea in late July 2006, which was subsequently cancelled, is another 

example of his consistently warm embrace of the major adversaries of the 

United States. 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 23 

Despite his rubbing shoulders with leaders of states hostile to the 

United States, the question of whether Chavez would give wide-spread 

support for international terrorism is another matter. This has yet to be 

proven. That he has provided strong support for the FARC and ELN in 

Colombia is assuredly the case. But this may be a special case; note that 

Colombia has the closest ties to the United States of any state in the 

region, making Colombia even more of a target of Chavez. Colombia 

shares a common border with Venezuela, and these are insurgencies 

directed against Colombia, with a social-revolutionary ideology quite 

compatible with that of Chavez. 

But what of Al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad? Would he get 

involved in aiding such movements? Here the evidence is mixed and not 

so compelling. While Chavez can become heady with success and openly 

defiant in terms of his relations with such rogue states as North Korea and 

Iran, open support for Al Qaeda is another matter, and the often eccentric 

Chavez is not without prudence. He assuredly knows that for 

incontrovertible evidence to be provided that he is actively supporting the 

major identified opponent of the United States in the war on terror would 

have dire consequences. Would he covertly support them? While it is 

true that major support of an Islamic extremist group, even if antiAmerican, would not play well in the predominately Christian (Catholic) 

Venezuela20 and, given the clarity of the Bush doctrine concerning those 

who support terrorism, prudence would dictate a cautious path, Chavez 

has been on a defiant role. Chavez has manifested flaws in his judgment 

in the past, and when carried away with success, can feel invulnerable and 

messianic, and therefore he could well move in this direction. When he 

experiences support from Latin American allies for his anti-U.S. stance, 

this heightens the hazard for more extreme acts on his part. This suggests 

the importance of presenting him with very clear unambiguous U.S. 

diplomatic communications to warn him of the consequences of such 

actions if U.S. leaders get any warnings and indications that Chavez is 

moving in this direction. When he experiences support from Latin 

American allies for his anti-U.S. stance, this heightens the hazard for more 

extreme acts on his part.
24 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

New Military Doctrine 

Despite the long standing tradition of a requirement for retirement at 

age 55, President Chavez recently called back into military service 78 year 

old General Alberto Muller Rojas, who was one of Chavez’s professors in 

the military academy. He asked General Rohas to reformulate 

Venezuela’s military doctrine. (One is reminded of Osama bin Laden 

asking obedient clerics to provide fatwahs justifying Al Qaeda’s extreme 

actions.) In this new doctrine, which was released in the fall of 2005, 

there are three major points:21

1. The United States is the main enemy of Venezuela. 

2. In the asymmetric conflict, it would be a “war of the 

fleas,” i.e., an insurgency, low intensity conflict. 

It is unthinkable that an international political actor such as 

the North American state is today could be terrified by the 

conventional troops of an average power. But it is possible 

to frighten it with irregular or non-conventional forces that 

have the same effect that fleas have on the human 

organism. Many theorists refer to such a military action as 

the “war of fleas.” This “war of fleas” is referred to as such 

because of the irritation that is caused but also because of 

the infection they transmit. The irregular on nonconventional action causes this “itching”, [which amounts] 

not only to the effective damage of the capital and 

resources of the opponent, but also [to the introduction of] 

viruses that act on the nervous system, [or in this case] the 

centers of political decision [making] which eventually 

have the potential to annul the will of those who direct the 

actins of the attacker. For that reason, militarily, before a 

threat of that nature, the best strategy is not to bite with a 

little pressure or the bite of a small dog. The best practice 

is to nip with the venom of an insect. 

This doctrinal statement places Venezuela’s stated goal of producing 

more AK 103-style rifles, the weapon of choice for insurgencies and 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 25 

terrorists, in an interesting light, suggesting that Chavez has reworked the 

country’s defense doctrine to prepare for an “asymmetric war” like the one 

being fought in Iraq. Chavez has stated their intention to open a factory in 

2009 to begin producing the weapons, and has already purchased 100,000 

weapons to restock his military, which has about 75,000 soldiers. How 

many are intended to supply FARC, which he has supported in the past? 

How many represent his fears of a U.S. invasion and the need to arm an 

insurgency against the feared invasion? 

3. A nuclear capability to serve as deterrent to the feared 

United States attack is suggested if not explicitly stated. 

Chavez has strongly supported the rights of Iran as a 

sovereign nation to have a nuclear capability, and has 

explicitly given voice to Venezuela’s similar right. 

And he has addressed the asymmetry of the super 

powers and their stabilizing the international system by 

“the balance of terror.” 

The state of the world that we are leaving in a political 

sense and consequently in a military sense is the world of 

bipolarity dominated by the preeminence of the weapons of 

mass destruction, with special consideration of those that 

were used in the handling of nuclear technology...the 

capabilities of such production of such military 

talents...were concentrated in two centers of power, the 

U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.....[these so-called “superpowers”] 

stabilized the international system by means of the “balance 

of terror.” 

...There was a form of conduct that tended to impose in the 

hemisphere a “pax Americana” in the style of the “pax 

Romana” imposed by the Roman Empire of antiquity in the 

region of the Mediterranean River Basin. 

[The American interference] corresponded to interventions 

that caused an imbalance to impose submissive 

governments in the interests of Washington. 

...our military institution has been able throughout the 

twentieth century to maintain the peace between the classes 
26 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

and estates that form our political community. For that 

reason the military power that one should evaluate is the 

one that corresponds to the one that would possibly be used 

within the framework of a direct strategic threat by the real 

antagonist, the United States. 

Certainly nuclear power’s use [amounts to] general suicide 

for humanity, because the escalation that would be 

originated by a decision of this nature would be produce the 

total destruction of the biosphere ... 

War is for something more: the power and that on which 

power depends and with which power coincides, political 

freedom...War is not a simple confrontation of physical 

forces. It is mainly a confrontation of wills, which basically 

places it in the psychological terrain. 

The concept that American power rests on nuclear power, and the 

apparent fear that the United States would threaten Venezuela with its 

nuclear capability coupled with the assertion that, like Iran, Venezuela has 

the right of a sovereign nation to develop a nuclear capability and the 

paranoid propensities of Chavez does suggest the possibility that 

Venezuela could conclude that Venezuela must develop a nuclear 

weapons capability to deter the perceived threat from the United States. 

Basking Audaciously in the International Limelight 

Chavez could not resist the opportunity to strut upon the world stage 

in addressing the general assembly of the United Nations. Addressing the 

world body at its annual September meeting, Chavez, referring to 

President George W. Bush who had addressed the U.N. general assembly 

the day before, stated, “The devil came here yesterday.” And, crossing 

himself ostentatiously, he indicated, “And it smells of sulfur still today.” 

He went on to accuse Bush of having spoken “as if he owned the world” 

and said a psychiatrist should be called to analyze the statement. He held 

up Noam Chomsky’s book, Hegemony or Survival: The Imperialist 

Strategy of the United States, as recommended reading, quoting, “The 

hegemonic pretensions of the American empire are placing at risk the very 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 27

survival of the human species.” He also stated that the United States was 

“the first enemy” of its people, an apparent reference to the revised 

political/military doctrine summarized above. 

At a news conference in Harlem the next day, he showed the book 

again, and indicated he that he had to wash the book “with holy water 

because I put it in the same place that the devil put his papers.” In this 

press conference, the statements were if anything even more provocative 

than those at the United Nations. In addition to repeating comments about 

the devil and the smell of sulfur, he described President Bush as “an 

alcoholic, a sick man who suffers form feelings of inadequacy, but a very 

dangerous man because he has so much power.” 

These comments echoed ones he had made in March 2006 on his 

daily call in show, Hello, President. 

“You are a coward because you did not go to Iraq to lead 

your armed forces. It is very easy to command them from 

afar. If it occurs to you one day to invade Venezuela, I will 

be here waiting for you on the savannah, Mr. Danger. Mr. 

Danger you are a donkey ... You are killing children who 

are not to blame for your illnesses, for your complexes, 

kid.” 

The terminal illness of his mentor and role model Fidel Castro has 

stimulated Chavez, who is already behaving as if he has succeeded Castro 

in his role as leader of the Latin American left and as anti U.S. nonaligned movement leader. His behavior will intensify when Castro finally 

passes from the scene. 

It is interesting that Chavez states that “a psychiatrist should analyze 

the statement,” referring to Bush’s speech before the general assembly, 

and then proceeds in the press conference to characterize President Bush 

as “a sick man, who suffers from feelings of inadequacy, but a very 

dangerous man because he has so much power.” The author of this study 

is a psychiatrist, who has analyzed the statements of Chavez. If one 

substitutes “oil” for “power” in his characterization of President Bush, it 

would be a characterization of Chavez, who may be projecting his own 

fears and anxieties on President Bush, and then defending himself against 

the assumed retaliatory aggression. Chavez’s paranoid reactions do 

flourish at times. After his anti-Bush statements at the U.N. and in the 
28 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

press conference in Harlem, the next day, Chavez stated that “many 

concerned friends have called me (saying) that because I said ‘devil’ over 

there (at the United Nations) they have sentenced me to die. They will not 

kill me.”

In the press conference, which was the day after President 

Ahmadinejad, in his address to the general assembly, had defiantly 

expressed Iran’s intention to continue to pursue nuclear technology, 

Chavez, one of only three general assembly members (with Cuban and 

Syria) that broke from the wide consensus and supported Iran’s sovereign 

right to pursue a nuclear programs in defiance of the counterproliferation 

treaty, provocatively took up the nuclear cudgel as well. While 

disavowing intent to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Chavez stated 

that Venezuela would like to pursue the civilian use of nuclear energy as 

well. As with his support of Iran, this was couched as the sovereign right 

of his nation. Clearly enjoying the moment, he ended the news conference 

by saying, “I have a meeting with the axis of evil somewhere around here, 

so I have to go.” 

While Ahmadinejad did to be sure assert his continued resolve to 

pursue a nuclear program, he restrained his more provocative comments, 

not, for example giving voice to his often asserted statements concerning 

the “illegitimate nation of Israel” that “should be wiped from the face of 

the earth.” In contrast, Chavez was seen as over the top, clearly stimulated 

by the international spotlight, and not being able to restrain his more 

outrageous excesses, and, while it played well to some members of the 

audience, it assuredly damaged his international stature, and significantly 

contributed to the failure of Chavez’ active lobbying campaign for 

Venezuela to be the Latin American representative to the U.N. Security 

Council. Chavez became despondent and depressed after his U.N. loss, 

failing to show up at the Ibero-American Summit in Montevideo, glumly 

explaining, “my colleagues do not like me and they say I am bad news.” 

This, however, was a short-lived setback. 

In the fall 2006 presidential campaign for a second six-year term, 

Chavez scarcely mentioned his opponent, Manuel Rosales. Rather, the 

former baseball player made anti-U.S. populism central to his campaign 

stating, “We are confronting the devil – and we will hit a home run off the 

devil.” He managed the 2006 presidential election campaign in such a 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 29 

way to ensure that he would hit that home run and would secure an even 

larger margin of victory than that of President ‘Lula’ da Silva of Brazil. 

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) 

arrived in Venezuela in November 2006 to observe the election 

proceedings and received “numerous complaints regarding pressure 

exerted on public officials to vote for President Hugo Chavez, or to 

participate in his election campaign activities.”22 The general complaints 

were exemplified by a speech by Rafael Ramirez, the president of 

Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA (and concurrently Minister 

of Energy and Petroleum!), to his top management stating, “Here we are 

supporting [President] Chavez, who is our leader, who is the maximum 

leader of this revolution and we will do all that we have to do to support 

our President and those who do not feel comfortable with this orientation 

need to cede their position to a Bolivarian.”23 Indeed, reportedly several 

officials who objected to this clear violation of the law were discharged. 

According to the EU EOM report, there was “widespread institutional 

propaganda in favor of the President, and Candidate, Hugo Chavez,” despite 

the requirement in the election laws that “The media, both public and 

private, shall offer comprehensive and well balanced news coverage.” EU 

EOM found a six fold disparity between coverage for Hugo Chavez, with 

86 percent of the time devoted to candidates being for Chavez and that was 

uniformly positive, and only 14 percent for Rosales, and that was uniformly 

negative, scarcely “comprehensive and well balanced.” On the other hand, 

two privately owned television stations reflected the opposite bias. 

According to former member of the senior management within 

Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PDVSA, the registered voters 

increased from 11 million in the 1994 election to 16 million in the 2006 

election. Most of the new voters had illegally emigrated from Colombia, 

Panama, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic, and their status had then 

been legalized by Chavez. 

On December 3, 2006, Chavez received nearly 63 percent of the final 

vote (7.2 million votes out of about 12 million cast), exceeding “Lula’s” 

total. “It’s another defeat for the devil who tries to dominate the world. 

Down with imperialism! We need a new world!” This victory can be 

expected to be viewed by him as confirmation of his stature as worthy 

successor to Bolivar and Castro. 
30 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

Outlook 

Chavez continues to deride the international community, and to blame 

the state of poverty in his country on foreign investors. And yet he 

desperately needs them to invest in the Venezuelan oil industry. In the 

early 1990s, when Venezuela began privatization of its oil industry, 

numerous foreign investors were exempted from a national oil tax. 

Chavez has moved to enforce the “national oil exploitation tax” against all 

multinationals. This 16.6 percent tax, an increase from 1 percent, went 

into effect in early October 2004 and affected all multinational 

corporations operating in Venezuela. It is estimated that this tax would 

generate roughly $1.27 billion dollars annually for the Venezuelan 

government. While in the short-term most companies have agreed to pay 

this tax, it could affect the willingness of international companies to invest 

in Venezuelan oil development and ultimately the ability of Venezuela to 

produce enough oil to pay for Chavez’s domestic agenda. 

Chavez continues to invoke the image of Simon Bolivar, the great 

revolutionary. He remains close to Fidel Castro and has the support of 

much of the Arab world. He has been increasingly strong in support of 

Iran, which in turn has proven to be an important ally of Venezuela 

outside of Latin America. Chavez apparently has defined the strategic 

alliance with Iran as a means with which to counter American power. 

President for Life? 

His hold on power in Venezuela appears to be strengthening, as the 

opposition is weakened by Chavez’s public welfare programs that benefit 

the poor as well as by intensified legislation limiting internal dissent. As 

his hold on power becomes more absolute, so will his vision of himself as 

the savior of Venezuela. Seeing himself as the very embodiment of 

Venezuela, despite having said he would only serve two six-year terms, 

Chavez is likely to seek to extend his time in power, indeed could well 

move to become president for life, not unique in the Latin context. There 

are already suggestions that he will attempt to modify the Venezuelan 

constitution, in what would be in effect a constitutional coup, to permit his 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 31 

staying in office beyond the current two term limit. Should that fail, he 

may well decide that his country needs him. In those circumstances, it is 

unlikely that he would leave office peacefully. 

As the internal economy falters due to mismanagement and 

corruption, Chavez will increasingly turn to the oil multinationals as a 

source of income. The October 2004 oil exploitation tax is likely only the 

beginning. It is unlikely he will move in the near term to entirely 

nationalize the oil industry. However, if he is unable to finance the 

reforms he is pushing or faces any internal threat to his power, his first 

turn likely will be toward extracting more profits from the multinationals. 

Venezuela seized oil fields from France’s Total SA and Italy’s Eni SpA on 

April 3, 2006, after the companies refused to sign an agreement to turn the 

sites over to a state-controlled joint venture. This is but a first example of 

what can be expected to become increasing control of the oil industry by 

the authoritarian Chavez, all in the name of service to the poor and 

exploited Venezuelan people. 

There may be significant short-term benefit to multinationals if they 

invest in the Venezuelan oil industry. The long-term risks, though, will 

remain uncertain, and further increases in taxes cannot be ruled out. Other 

significant issues that will likely impact multinational investment 

decisions include the extent of any cross-border conflict with Colombia as 

the FARC and other groups expand their territory, and the degree to which 

any increased internal repression leads to violence in Venezuela and any 

disruption to oil production. 

Reminiscent of the younger Qadhafi, Chavez sees himself as a leader 

of international importance, appealing to the poor and underprivileged 

against the powerful nations, just as he appealed within Venezuela to the 

poor against the economic elite. He particularly relishes taking on the 

United States, which contributed to his motivations to find common cause 

with Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and China. When he develops a euphoric 

head of steam, this can lead to miscalculation, and his support of 

terrorism, limited for the most part to Colombian insurgencies and 

rhetorical support to the new Hamas-led government, could become less 

discriminating. Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that attention be 

continuously focused on Chavez and Venezuela as a possible source of 

terrorist organization support. Additionally, the United States 

Government would be well advised to make very clear to the Chavez 
32 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

government that serious consequences would follow the discovery of any 

link between Al Qaeda and Venezuela. 

But, for now, his major goal appears not to be to support covert 

terrorism, but rather to be seen as the open overt champion of the poor and 

underprivileged in Latin America and internationally, aspiring to inherit 

Castro’s mantle as third world leader. His 63 percent victory in the 2006 

election could be expected to produce a hubristic confrontational excess, 

and when Castro finally does pass from the scene, Chavez can be expected 

all the more vigorously to pursue his self anointed role as Castro’s 

successor. 

“Socialism or Death!” 

Indeed, it was not long in coming. In January 2007, Chavez 

announced plans to consolidate Venezuela as “a socialist republic.” He 

announced plans to nationalize Venezuela’s largest telecommunications 

company, CA Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela (CANT), the electrical 

utilities, and four highly profitable oil projects, run by foreign companies, 

Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Exxon Mobil. CANT, the only Venezuela 

company on the New York Stock exchange, with major foreign investors, 

including the New York-based Verizon corporation, precipitously dropped 

14 percent after the announcement by Chavez. Having called Jesus Christ 

“the greatest socialist in history,” Chavez declared on the occasion of 

being sworn in for his second six year term, “Fatherland. Socialism or 

death—I swear it.” 

This slogan was invoked by Fidel Castro in the winter of 1989.24 As 

economic and political pressures mounted and the Soviet Union and one 

Eastern European country after another yielded to the pressures to 

liberalize, Gorbachev urged Castro to open up the Cuban system and 

refrain from foreign revolutionary involvement. Instead Castro, declaring 

that “socialism is facing the worst crisis in its seventy-year history,” 

vowed “socialism or death!” He then declared “a special period in a time 

of peace,” resembling a war time mobilization. There were harsh 

shortages of basic foodstuffs and gasoline, severe rationing of food and 

petroleum, 200 thousand bicycles were ordered from China, and model 

agricultural communes were established in the country side. 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 33 

“Whether there is war or a special period in our country’s 

history, this is the most important time in our country’s 

history, and one of the most important in the world—even 

though a giant counterrevolutionary wave is taking over the 

world, we will struggle, resist and set an example—we will 

live for the revolution or we will die defending the 

revolution.” 

–FBIS, July 1990 

Despite the manor financial instability this produced in the market, 

there is every reason to believe that this will be but the opening volley in 

his committed march to creating a socialist state. He has already indicated 

his intention to nationalize the central bank. As Castro’s physical 

condition declines, his self-anointed successor seems increasingly to be 

emulating his mentor and attempting to establish his role not only as 

leader of the Latin American left but also a major international force 

resisting U.S. hegemony. 

In the service of consolidating his rule, he will shortly be announcing 

a new Bolivarian mission for the Venezuelan armed forces, the public 

version of the revised military doctrine he has already developed. The 

license for Radio Caracas TV has not been renewed, a further move 

towards government censorship. Preliminary moves are afoot to unify the 

multiparty political alliance and create single Socialist Party of Venezuela. 

All of these moves are consistent with the pattern set by Castro in Cuba. 

“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 35 

Notes 

1. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Laurita Denny in preparing 

this assessment. 

2. Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International 

Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program, the George Washington 

University. Tel. (301) 229-5536; e-mail jmpost@pol-psych.com. 

3. There is limited information available on the early life of Hugo Chavez. This 

section is a reflection of the information available to researchers at this time. 

4. Agustin Blanco Munoz, Habla el Comandate, (Caracas, Venezuela: Central 

University, 1998), 34. 

5. John Lee Anderson, “The Revolutionary: The president of Venezuela has a 

vision, and Washington has a headache,” The New Yorker, 6 September 2001. 

6. Gabriel Garcia Marques, “The two faces of Hugo Chavez,” (M. Fried, Trans) 

NACLA Report on the Americas: Report on Venezuela, Vol. XXXIII, No 6, May/June 

2000. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Also, serving as an instructor at VMA provided Chavez a stage from which to 

recruit officers and develop a following of protégés that he later exploited. 

9. Major oil companies in Venezuela: 

1. Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA) – government-owned; generates 1/3 of 

national GDP; monopolized the natural gas production in Venezuela. Dec 2, 

2002, PdVSA participated in a nationwide strike to call for a referendum on 

President Chavez. Over 18,000 PdVSA workers, who were involved in the 

anti-governments strikes, were “dismissed” by Chavez, severely affecting 

Venezuela’s oil production and almost leading to a full shutdown of PdVSA’s 

oil operations. Because Chavez follows strictly the OPEC guidelines, PdVSA 

has had to reduce production sites and therefore total capacity. 

2. Corporacion Venezolan de Petroleo (CVP) – subsidiary that is taking over 

33 PdVSA contracts – will manage the agreements. 

3. New investments – Petrobras Energia and Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 

have rights to open new drilling sites and use existing wells over the next 20 

years. 
36 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”

4. Private Investments – Major Foreign Oil Company Involvement where 

companies operate sites for a fee: BP, Chevron/Texaco, CNPC (China), 

ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Repsol-YPF, Shell, Statoil, Total Fina Elf, and 

Petro-Canada. 

5. Chevron – Chavez gives Chevron new license for off-shore gas exploration. 

The multinational firm “plans to invest $107 million this year and create 723 jobs,” 

according to Chavez, who noted that the gas that Chevron/Texaco produces will “be used 

to supply both domestic and foreign markets.” Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 

emeu/cabs/venez.html. 

10. “Castro visits Venezuelan ally,” BBC News Online, 12 August 2001, On-line, 

Internet, 6 March 2007, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/ 

1486212.stm. 

11. Juan Evo Morales Ayma, a dedicated socialist, who sees the U.S.-driven Free 

Trade Area of the Americas as colonialism, is reputed to be Bolivia’s first indigenous 

head of state since the Spanish conquest of that state over 450 years ago. He is a former 

coca leaf grower who heads the cocalero movement of such growers opposed to coca 

eradication efforts of the United States. 

12. Juan Forero, “Venezuela Votes by Large Margin to Retain Chavez,” New York 

Times, 17 August 2004, A1, 6. 

13. Iain Bruce, “Venezuela raises oil drilling tax,” BBC News Online, 11 October 

2004, On-line, Internet, 6 March 2007, available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-

/2/hi/hi/americas/373224.stm. 

14. Thor Halvorssen, “The Arrest of FARC Terrorist Ricardo Granda Sheds New 

Light on Hugo Chavez’s Ongoing Support of Terrorism,” Guerrilla Nation, 26 January 

2005, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from http://www.weeklystandard.com/ 

Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/177yckaw.asp. 

15. Christopher Brown, “The Growing Iran-Chavez Alliance,” Front Page 

Magazine, 12 April 2005, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from 

http://www.worldthreats.com/latin_america/Iran-Chavez%20Alliance.htm. 

16. Art Moore, “Defector: Chavez Gave $1 Million to al-Qaida,” World Net Daily, 

7 January 2003, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from 

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30350. 

17. “Venezuela Welcomes Hamas and Counts Iran as ‘Great Ally’,” Pravda, 16 

February 2006, On-line, Internet, 7 March 2007, available from 

http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/76016-Venezuela-0. 
“El Fenomeno Chavez” . . . 37

18. Simon Romero, “Venezuela, Tired of U.S. Influence, Strengthens Its 

Relationships in the Middle East,” New York Times, 21 August 2006, A7. 

19. “Chavez: Iran Has Right to Atomic Energy,” Aljazeera, 12 March 2005, Online, Internet, 8 March 2007, available from http://www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service. 

20. The exception might be in the predominantly Muslim population of Margarita 

Island, owned by Venezuela and located just off-shore in the Caribbean. 

21. Pensamiento Militar Venezolano, 2005, On-line, Internet, 8 March 2007, 

available from http://militarvenezuela2005.blogspot.com/. 

22. European Union Election Observations Mission Presidential Election Venezuela 

2006, Caracas, 5 December 2006, 3, On-line, Internet, 8 March 2007, available from 

http://www.eueomvenezuela.org/pdf/EUEOM_Venezuela_Presidential_Election_2006_P

reliminary_Statement.pdf. 

23. Gregory Wilpert, “Venezuelan Opposition Accuses Oil Company President of 

Illegal Campaigning,” Venezuelanalysis.com, 3 November 2006, On-line, Internet, 8 

March 2007, available from http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php/news.php? 

newsno=2127.

24. This discussion is drawn from Jerrold Post, “Fidel Castro: Aging Revolutionary 

Leader in an Aging Revolution,” Leaders and their Follower in a Dangerous World, 

(Ithica: Cornell Univ. Press, 2004), 204. 
38 . . . “El Fenomeno Chavez”