alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2005171EN.01002901.xml

| 9.7.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 171/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.7.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 171/29

---

Action brought on 20 April 2005 by Jean-Louis Giraudy against the Commission of the European Communities

(Case T-169/05)

(2005/C 171/48)

Language of the case: French

An action against the Commission of the European Communities was brought before the Court of First Instance of the European Communities on 20 April 2005 by Jean-Louis Giraudy, residing in Paris, represented by Dominique Voillemot, lawyer.

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the Commission's decision of 21 February 2005 inasmuch as it does not acknowledge the faults of the Press D-G and rejects his complaint; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Commission's decision of 21 February 2005 inasmuch as it does not acknowledge the faults of the Press D-G and rejects his complaint;

| — | declare that those faults have caused actual and quantifiable damage, and that there is a causal link between those faults and the damage; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that those faults have caused actual and quantifiable damage, and that there is a causal link between those faults and the damage;

| — | declare lawful, in consequence, financial compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant and fix the compensation for the non-material damage suffered at the sum of EUR 500 000; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare lawful, in consequence, financial compensation for the damage suffered by the applicant and fix the compensation for the non-material damage suffered at the sum of EUR 500 000;

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

At the material time, the applicant was Head of the Commission's Office in France. As a result of allegations made against him concerning supposed irregularities adversely affecting the European Union's budget, the European Anti-Fraud Office (the OLAF) carried out an operation at the headquarters of the Commission's Office on 18 November 2002. The next day the applicant was transferred to Brussels and forbidden all contact within the Commission or without.

The applicant also claims that a press release issued by the Commission on 21 November 2002 and widely circulated gave rise to considerable publicity unfavourable to him in the media. According to the applicant, the OLAF's report of 6 May 2003 concluded that the allegations against him were groundless.

By this action the applicant seeks to obtain compensation for the damage caused him by those acts. In support of his action he claims that he was transferred unlawfully, without justification and in breach of the presumption of innocence. He also claims that the Commission's spokesman did not observe the confidential nature of the inquiry and made public statements liable to damage his reputation. Finally, he claims that certain allegations concerning him were made by the Director General of the Press Directorate-General, of the flimsiness of which the latter must have been aware.

---
HomeNauru

# Nauru

34 items

        -    DipNote: Military and Security  		Governance of the Seas: Assistance to Pacific Island Partners	  September 28, 2022 
        -    Readout  		Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Nauru Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Jeremiah	  September 14, 2022 
        -    Report  		2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nauru	  June 2, 2022 
        -    Report  		2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nauru	  April 12, 2022 
        -    Press Statement  		Nauru National Day	  Antony J. BlinkenJanuary 28, 2022 
        -    Report  		2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Nauru	  May 12, 2021 
        -    Report  		2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Nauru	  March 30, 2021 
        -    Funding Opportunity Announcement  		DRL – Promoting Investigative Journalism and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Pacific Island Countries	  February 16, 2021 
        -    Press Statement  		Nauru National Day	  Antony J. BlinkenJanuary 30, 2021 
        -    TIAS  		Nauru (20-1203) – Investment Incentive Agreement	  December 3, 2020 

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§ 412.276 Timing of MGCRB decision and its appeal. ( a ) *Timing.* The MGCRB notifies the parties in writing, with a copy to CMS, and issues a decision within 180 days after the first day of the 13-month period preceding the Federal fiscal year for which a hospital has filed a complete application. The hospital has 15 days from the date of the decision to request Administrator review.
( b ) *Appeal.* The decision of the MGCRB is final and binding upon the parties unless it is reviewed by the Administrator and the decision is changed by the Administrator in accordance with § 412.278.
[55 FR 36766, Sept. 6, 1990, as amended at 64 FR 41541, July 30, 1999]
HomePortuguês...Declaração do secretário Antony J. Blinken sobre pedidos de mandado de prisão advindos do Tribunal Penal Internacional

# 									Declaração do secretário Antony J. Blinken sobre pedidos de mandado de prisão advindos do Tribunal Penal Internacional							

Traduções em português

20 de Maio de 2024

DECLARAÇÃO DO SECRETÁRIO ANTONY J. BLINKEN20 de maio de 2024Pedidos de mandado de prisão advindos do Tribunal Penal Internacional 

Os Estados Unidos rejeitam fundamentalmente o anúncio feito hoje pelo procurador do Tribunal Penal Internacional (TPI) de que ele está solicitando mandados de prisão para funcionários israelenses de alto escalão, juntamente com mandados de prisão para terroristas do Hamas.

Rejeitamos a equivalência entre Israel e o Hamas apresentada pelo procurador. É vergonhosa. O Hamas é uma organização terrorista brutal que realizou o pior massacre de judeus desde o Holocausto e ainda mantém dezenas de pessoas inocentes como reféns, incluindo americanos.

Além disso, os Estados Unidos têm deixado claro, desde muito antes do conflito atual, que o TPI não tem jurisdição sobre esta questão. O TPI foi estabelecido por seus Estados-partes como um tribunal de jurisdição limitada. Esses limites estão enraizados em princípios de complementaridade, que não parecem ter sido aplicados aqui, devido à pressa do procurador em obter esses mandados de prisão, em vez de permitir ao sistema jurídico israelense uma oportunidade plena e apropriada para prosseguir. Em outras situações, o procurador adiou as investigações nacionais e trabalhou com Estados visando lhes dar tempo para investigar. O procurador não concedeu a mesma oportunidade a Israel, que tem investigações em curso sobre alegações contra o seu efetivo.

Existem também questões processuais profundamente preocupantes. Apesar de não ser membro do Tribunal, Israel estava preparado para cooperar com o procurador. Na verdade, havia a expectativa de que o próprio procurador visitasse Israel já na próxima semana com o intuito de discutir a investigação e ouvir o governo israelense. A equipe do procurador deveria desembarcar hoje em Israel a fim de coordenar a visita. Israel foi informado de que eles não embarcaram no voo por volta do mesmo tempo em que o procurador foi à televisão a cabo anunciar as acusações. Essas e outras circunstâncias põem em dúvida a legitimidade e a credibilidade dessa investigação.

Fundamentalmente, essa decisão não ajuda em nada, e poderá comprometer os esforços em curso para se chegar a um acordo de cessar-fogo que libere os reféns e aumente a assistência humanitária, que são os objetivos que os Estados Unidos continuam a perseguir incansavelmente.

----

Veja o conteúdo original: **https://www.state.gov/warrant-applications-by-the-international-criminal-court/**

*Esta tradução é fornecida como cortesia e apenas o texto original em inglês deve ser considerado oficial.*

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#### Jo Ann MESSINA, Appellant, v. Jack MEZRAH and Byron N. Metts, Appellees.

No. 74-891.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 19, 1975.

Appeal dismissed.
PUBLIC LAW 106–527—NOV. 22, 2000 114 STAT. 2515

Public Law 106–527

106th Congress

An Act

To adjust the boundary of the Natchez Trace Parkway, Mississippi, and for other

purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) PARKWAY.—The term ‘‘Parkway’’ means the Natchez

Trace Parkway, Mississippi.

(2) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary

of the Interior.

SEC. 2. BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT AND LAND ACQUISITION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall adjust the boundary of

the Parkway to include approximately—

(1) 150 acres of land, as generally depicted on the map

entitled ‘‘Alternative Alignments/Area’’, numbered 604–20062A

and dated May 1998; and

(2) 80 acres of land, as generally depicted on the map

entitled ‘‘Emerald Mound Development Concept Plan’’, numbered 604–20042E and dated August 1987.

(b) MAPS.—The maps referred to in subsection (a) shall be

on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Director

of the National Park Service.

(c) ACQUISITION.—The Secretary may acquire the land described

in subsection (a) by donation, purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange (including exchange with the State of

Mississippi, local governments, and private persons).

(d) ADMINISTRATION.—Land acquired under this section shall

be administered by the Secretary as part of the Parkway.

SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF LEASING.

The Secretary, acting through the Superintendent of the Parkway, may lease land within the boundary of the Parkway to the

city of Natchez, Mississippi, for any purpose compatible with the

Parkway.

16 USC 460 note.

16 USC 460 note.

16 USC 460 note.

Nov. 22, 2000

[S. 2020]

114 STAT. 2516 PUBLIC LAW 106–527—NOV. 22, 2000

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S. 2020:

SENATE REPORTS: No. 106–332 (Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 146 (2000):

July 27, considered and passed Senate.

Oct. 30, 31, considered and passed House.

Æ

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are

necessary to carry out this Act.

Approved November 22, 2000.

16 USC 460 note.
#### Vestus Elbert PRUITT, Jr., Appellant, v. August Owens PRUITT, Appellee.

No. 78-1548.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

April 24, 1979.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1979.

Coleman R. Rosenfield and Stuart Meisel, Ft. Lauderdale, L. J. Cushman, Miami, for appellant.

*814Michael P. Maguire and Michael R. Friend, Miami, for appellee.

Before PEARSON and KEHOE, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.

KEHOE, Judge.

Appellant, movant below, brings this appeal from an order entered by the trial court, incorporating a report of the general master, denying jurisdiction to determine certain property rights after a divorce decree between the parties had been entered. The general master found that the property rights of the parties were determined as of the date of the final decree and that no post-decree order may now be entered affecting or determining the property rights of the parties. Under the facts of this cause as reflected by the record, we agree with this proposition, particularly as it relates to the parties’ Texas property. See, e. g., *Finston v. Finston,*37 So.2d 423 (Fla.1948); *Bowen v. Bowen,*347 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and *Sistrunk v. Sistrunk,*235 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). However, we believe that the trial court erred when it awarded attorney’s fees to appellee in regard to appellant’s motion. See, e. g., *Patterson*v. *Patterson,*348 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); and *Schwebkne v. Schwebkne,*347 So.2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, the order appealed is affirmed, except, to the extent that it awarded attorney’s fees to appellee, it is reversed.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
I

104TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3124

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the amount of

depreciable business assets which may be expensed, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 20, 1996

Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. HERGER, Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania, Mr. BREWSTER, Mr. STOCKMAN, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. CANADY

of Florida, and Mr. BARR of Georgia) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase

the amount of depreciable business assets which may

be expensed, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. INCREASE IN EXPENSE TREATMENT FOR

4 SMALL BUSINESSES.

5 (a) GENERAL RULE.—Paragraph (1) of section

6 179(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to

7 dollar limitation) is amended by striking ‘‘$17,500’’ and

8 inserting ‘‘$50,000’’.
2

•HR 3124 IH

1 (b) INCREASE IN AMOUNT OF SECTION 179 PROP2 ERTY AT WHICH PHASEOUT BEGINS.—Paragraph (2) of

3 section 179(b) of such Code (relating to reduction in limi4 tation) is amended by striking ‘‘$200,000’’ and inserting

5 ‘‘$300,000’’.

6 (c) INCREASE IN SECTION 280F LIMITATION ON

7 AUTOMOBILES WHICH ARE EXPENSES UNDER SECTION

8 179.—

9 (1) Paragraph (1) of section 280F(d) of such

10 Code is amended to read as follows:

11 ‘‘(1) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 179.—

12 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in

13 subparagraph (B), any deduction allowable

14 under section 179 with respect to any listed

15 property shall be subject to the limitations of

16 subsections (a) and (b), and the limitation of

17 paragraph (3) of this subsection, in the same

18 manner as if it were a depreciation deduction

19 allowable under section 168.

20 ‘‘(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR AUTOMOBILES.—

21 In the case of any deduction allowable under

22 section 179 with respect to a passenger auto23 mobile, the limitation under subsection (a) for

24 the 1st taxable year of the recovery period shall

25 be increased by $15,300.’’
3

•HR 3124 IH

1 (2) Subparagraph (A) of section 280F(d)(7) of

2 such Code is amended—

3 (A) by striking ‘‘subsection (a)’’ and in4 serting ‘‘subsections (a) and (d)(1)(B)’’, and

5 (B) by striking ‘‘such subsection’’ and in6 serting ‘‘such subsections’’.

7 (3) Subclause (II) of section 280F(d)(7)(B)(i)

8 of such Code is amended by inserting ‘‘(October of

9 1995 in the case of the dollar amount contained in

10 subsection (d)(1)(B))’’ after ‘‘October of 1987’’.

11 (d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

12 this section shall apply to property placed in service in

13 taxable years beginning after December 31, 1995.

Æ
Editorial Note on Part 414
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 414 appear at 60 FR 50442, Sept. 29, 1995, and 60 FR 53877, Oct. 18, 1995.

§ 414.42 Adjustment for first 4 years of practice. ( a ) *General rule.* For services furnished during CYs 1992 and 1993, except as specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the fee schedule payment amount or prevailing charge must be phased in as specified in paragraph (d) of this section for physicians, physical therapists (PTs), occupational therapists (OTs), and all other health care practitioners who are in their first through fourth years of practice.
( b ) *Exception.* The reduction required in paragraph (d) of this section does not apply to primary care services or to services furnished in a rural area as defined in section 1886(d)(2)(D) of the Act that is designated under section 332(a)(1)(A) of the Public Health Service Act as a Health Professional Shortage Area.
( c ) *Definition of years of practice.* ( 1 ) The “first year of practice“ is the first full CY during the first 6 months of which the physician, PT, OT, or other health care practitioner furnishes professional services for which payment may be made under Medicare Part B, plus any portion of the prior CY if that prior year does not meet the first 6 months test.
( 2 ) The “second, third, and fourth years of practice“ are the first, second, and third CYs following the first year of practice, respectively.
( d ) *Amounts of adjustment.* The fee schedule payment for the service of a new physician, PT, OT, or other health care practitioner is limited to the following percentages for each of the indicated years: ( 1 ) First year—80 percent
( 2 ) Second year—85 percent
( 3 ) Third year—90 percent
( 4 ) Fourth year—95 percent
[57 FR 42493, Sept. 15, 1992, as amended at 58 FR 63687, Dec. 2, 1993]
# C_2005330EN.01000701.xml

| 24.12.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 330/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.12.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 330/7

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Fourth Chamber)

of 27 October 2005

in Case C-165/05: Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (1)

1

(Failure of a Member State to fulfil obligations - Free movement of persons - Workers - Spouses - Requirement of a work permit for spouses who are nationals of non-member countries)

(2005/C 330/13)

Language of the case: French

In Case C-165/05 Commission of the European Communities (Agent: G. Rozet) v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (Agent: S. Schreiner) — action under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfil obligations, brought on 8 April 2005 — the Court (Fourth Chamber), composed of J.N. Cunha Rodrigues (Rapporteur), acting as President of the Fourth Chamber, K. Lenaerts and E. Levits, Judges; J. Kokott, Advocate General; R. Grass, Registrar, gave a judgment on 27 October 2005, in which it:

Commission of the European Communities

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

| 1. | Declares that, by imposing in its legislation an obligation on nationals of non-member countries married to migrant workers from the European Union to obtain a work permit and by failing to bring its legislation into line with Community law, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Declares that, by imposing in its legislation an obligation on nationals of non-member countries married to migrant workers from the European Union to obtain a work permit and by failing to bring its legislation into line with Community law, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community;

| 2. | Orders the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 132 of 28.05.2005.

1

---
# C_2006011EN.01000901.xml

| 17.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/9

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.3996 — Industri Kapital/Kwintet)

(2006/C 11/07)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 16 December 2005, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3996. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M3996. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex)

---
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Finnish Permanent State Secretary Salovaara

# 									Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Finnish Permanent State Secretary Salovaara							

Readout

Office of the Spokesperson

April 3, 2023

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Finnish Permanent State Secretary Jukka Salovaara today.  The Deputy Secretary congratulated Finland on its plans to become NATO’s newest Ally on April 4 and on completing free, open, and fair April 2 parliamentary elections.  The Deputy Secretary and State Secretary reiterated their belief that Sweden is ready to join the Alliance now.  They reaffirmed our strong, continuing support to Ukraine and underscored the importance of our close bilateral relationship.

Tags

Bureau of European and Eurasian AffairsDeputy Secretary of StateFinlandNorth Atlantic Treaty OrganizationOffice of the Spokesperson

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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. METROPOLITAN DISPOSAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-3161.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted July 7, 1986.

Decided Sept. 2, 1986.

*1274-1278John J. Powers, III, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.

John S. Ransom, Ransom, Blackman & Simson, Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant.

Before WALLACE, FERGUSON, and NORRIS, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Metropolitan Disposal Corporation (MDC) appeals its conviction of criminal contempt for willfully failing to comply with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum and willfully violating the district court’s order to produce certain business documents. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

MDC contends that the district judge erred as a matter of law in concluding that reckless disregard of the subpoena and order to produce documents supported a conviction of criminal contempt. The district judge, however, did not find MDC guilty of criminal contempt based on reckless disregard. Rather, the district judge considered all of the evidence, *see United States v. Metropolitan Disposal Corp.,*622 F.Supp. 1262 (D.Or.1985), and properly inferred from the evidence that MDC willfully violated the subpoena and order. *See United States v. Baker,*641 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.1981). We conclude that the district judge’s finding of willfulness was not clearly erroneous. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.