alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
40550.

#### FULTON COUNTY v. ELLIOTT, Executor, et al.

Pannell, Judge.

The prior opinion in this case (109 Ga. App. 775, 137 SE2d 477), in Division 2 reversed the trial court for error in the charge relating to the method for determining the market value of the property taken, and in Division 3 held that another charge complained of contained an obvious slip of the tongue, but made no ruling on whether the error was harmful in view of the reversal on the other ground. The ground of reversal, on certiorari, was reversed by the Supreme Court, 220 Ga. 377 (139 SE2d 312), and it now becomes necessary to determine whether the charge containing the slip of the tongue was such error as to require the grant of a new trial. This charge is as follows: “Now, in this case it is your duty, in the determination of the case, to assess the value of the property taken and also assess the consequential damages to the property [not] taken, and, provided that nothing *681shall be so construed as to deprive the owner of the actual value of the property taken.” It is apparent that the word “not” should have been in the charge between the word “property” and the word “taken” as shown in brackets. As previously held, this is an obvious slip of the tongue on the part of the trial court, and in view of the full and complete charges relating to the question of damages and the assessment of consequential damages contained elsewhere in the charge, it is our opinion that the jury could not have been misled into awarding to the condemnee consequential damages to the property taken. It follows, therefore, that the trial judge did not err in overruling the motion for new trial of the condemnor.

Decided November 23, 1964.

*Harold Sheats, George Gillon, T. Charles Allen,*for plaintiff in error.

*Jones, Bird & Howell, Earle B. May, Jr., Robert L. Foreman, Jr.,*contra.

The former judgment of reversal is vacated and the judgment of the trial court is hereby

*Affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
#### STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Walter BRUMFIELD v. Frank C. BLACKBURN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary.

No. 67786.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 9, 1981.

In re Walter Brumfield, applying for writs of certiorari and review. Parish of East Baton Rouge. No. 6-74-2084, Section IV.

Denied.

CALOGERO and DENNIS, JJ., would grant the writ.
#### Ethelyn J. OWEN v. NEW ORLEANS CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.

No. 65114.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 4, 1979.

In re Ethelyn J. Owen, applying for cer-tiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit. Parish of Orleans. 371 So.2d 364.

Writ denied.

DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.
40773.

#### OGLETREE et al. v. CATHRALL.

Pannell, Judge.

It has been held that under *Code*§ 85-1609 relating to processioning “it will be seen that the protest allowed by law to be filed is to be returned to the clerk of the superior court, who is to enter the same on the issue docket as other causes, to be tried in the same manner and under the same rules as other cases”, and, “[t]his being so, the right of amendment existed at any stage of the cause, in all respects, whether in matter of form or of substance,” *Watson v. Bishop,*69 Ga. 51, 53 (2), and that an amendment to an ordinary petition, making as additional parties plaintiff persons who should have been joint parties plaintiff with the original plaintiff, is not subject to objection that it adds new and distinct parties plaintiff. *Code*§ 81-1303; *Wallace v. Brannen,*56 Ga. App. 856 (193 SE 901); *Eve v. Cross,*76 Ga. 693, 695 (2); *Taylor v. James,*109 Ga. 327 (4) (34 SE 674). However, in a processioning case the due return of the processioners “is in the nature of a judgment, and is prima facie binding until set aside, and under that view is admissible in evidence to shift the onus and if not successfully assailed, or acquiesced in, would, ... be conclusive to the extent of its legal force and effect,” *Rattaree v. Morrow, 71*Ga. 528, 531, on those who are parties at the time, and would not be so binding on those not parties at the time. It follows, therefore, that to allow new necessary parties, *Carmichael v. Jordan,*131 Ga. 514 (62 SE 810) to the application by amendment after the return of the processioners had been filed in the office of the ordinary, protest filed, and all papers transferred to the superior court, would create the anomalous situation of the return of the processioners being admissible in favor of one of the joint applicants as prima facie evidence of the correctness of the line run by the processioners, *Philpot v. Wells,*69 Ga. App. 489 (2) (26 SE2d 155), *Davis v. Terrell,*70 Ga. App. 478 (2) (28 SE2d 590), and not being admissible for such purposes as to the other joint applicants. Such a situation would create an insoluble problem of evidence and procedure, and we are, therefore, constrained to hold that the trial judge was correct in sustaining demurrers to the amendment making new parties to the application after the filing of the protest to the return of the processioners.

*101Decided July 1, 1964

Rehearing denied July 17, 1964.

*T. T. Molnar,*for plaintiff in error.

*Jesse G. Bowles,*contra.

Nothing ruled in *Earney v. Owen,*213 Ga. 412, 416 (99 SE2d 201), in which *Code*§§ 37-901, 37-904 and 37-905 were applied to a processioning proceeding, related to the adding of new parties to the application by amendment. Whether *Code*§ 37-901 applies to a processioning case in view of *Code*§ 81-102, providing that “nothing in the Uniform Procedure Act . . . shall repeal or affect the mode of any special statutory proceedings . . . nor other special proceedings of like nature . . . ,” it is not necessary to decide.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Felton, C. J., and Frankum, J., concur.*
qli2-1 12, 

RESOLUTION 

REQUESTING that the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator fully employ and 

enforce the Clean Air Act to reduce industrial carbon pollution. 

WHEREAS the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that climate change 

will cause negative public health impacts from direct temperature effects, extreme weather 

events, climate-sensitive diseases, air quality, and other health impacts; and 

WHEREAS the Union of Concerned Scientists predicts that higher temperatures from 

global warming will exacerbate ozone pollution, one of the main ingredients of smog; and 

WHEREAS, on days with high levels of smog pollution deaths from cardiovascular and 

respiratory causes increase, more people visit hospital emergency rooms for asthma, pneumonia 

and upper respiratory infections, and more adults miss work and more children miss school due 

to illness; and 

WHEREAS, the American Lung Association says nearly half of all Americans — 48 

percent — still live in areas with unhealthy levels of smog pollution; and 

WHEREAS the City of Charlottesville had 3 unhealthy air days from ground level ozone 

pollution (above 75 parts per billion in an eight hour period) in 2010; and 

WHEREAS, for four decades, the Clean Air Act has protected the air we breathe through 

a proven, comprehensive, successful system of pollution control that saves lives and creates 

economic benefits exceeding its costs by many times; and 

WHEREAS, between 1970 and 1990, the six main pollutants covered by the Clean Air 

Act were reduced by between 47 and 93 percent, and airborne lead was virtually eliminated; and 

WHEREAS, the Clean Air Act has produced economic benefits valued at $2 trillion or 30 

times the cost of regulation; and 

WHEREAS, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Massachusetts v. EPA (2007) that 

greenhouse gases are "air pollutants" as defined by the Clean Air Act and the Environmental 

Protection Agency has the authority to regulate them; and 

WHEREAS, the Clean Air Act can work immediately to curb greenhouse gas pollution 

without new climate legislation or in conjunction with new climate legislation; and 

WHEREAS, in 2006, Charlottesville Mayor David Brown, with the endorsement of the 

City Council, signed the Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement, which has now been signed by 

more than 1000 U.S. mayors; and 
WHEREAS, in 2007, the City Council adopted a 2025 Vision Statement for the City 

which incorporated goals for "A Green City," including a goal for clean air; 

BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Charlottesville, State of Virginia: 

Section 1. That the Council respectfully request the Administrator of the Environmental 

Protection Agency, Lisa P. Jackson, and President Barack Obama to fully employ and enforce 

the Clean Air Act to do our part to reduce carbon in our atmosphere to no more than 350 parts 

per million. 

Section 2. That a copy of this resolution be sent to Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator for the 

Environmental Protection Agency. 

Passed: 2012 

Mayor 

Attest: 

Clerk 

Submitted by Councilmember
#### Andrew E. PURNELL, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. AD-425.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Feb. 9, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1982.

Andrew E. Purnell, pro se, for petitioner.

Catherine L. Dickson, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida Parole & Probation Commission, Tallahassee, for respondent.

WENTWORTH, Judge.

This petition for writ of habeas corpus alleges that petitioner is entitled to a presumptive parole release date (hereinafter PPRD) of June 2, 1981, the date recommended by the hearing examiners since the Florida Parole and Probation Commission failed to notify him of his PPRD within 45 days of his initial parole interview. *See*§ 947.16(4), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the petitioner alleges that he is entitled to immediate release. For the reasons below, we find petitioner’s argument without merit and deny the petition.

On March 17,1981, petitioner received his initial parole interview and the hearing examiners recommended a PPRD of June 2, 1981. *See*§ 947.172(2), Florida Statutes. The petition, filed more than 45 days after the initial interview, alleged that the Parole *1123and Probation Commission had not yet established petitioner’s PPRD pursuant to § 947.16(4), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, this court issued a show cause order to the Parole and Probation Commission. The response to that order indicates that on May 13, 1981, prior to the time this petition was filed, the Parole and Probation Commission had established petitioner’s PPRD as June 30, 1988. Subsequently, the Parole and Probation Commission determined that petitioner should not be released until November 28, 1995. *See*§ 947.18, Florida Statutes.

Petitioner relies upon *James v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission,*395 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), for the proposition that the June 2,1981, date recommended by the hearing examiner is binding on the Parole and Probation Commission. Petitioner argues that the Parole and Probation Commission has violated § 947.16(4), Florida Statutes, and the rationale of *James*by applying aggravating factors more than 45 days after his initial interview. This argument is without merit. The rationale of *James*applies when the Parole and Probation Commission has set off indefinitely the establishment of an inmate’s PPRD for an impermissible reason, such as the lack of a pre-sentence investigation report, and when the Commission has not yet set a date for that inmate. We note that neither of these two conditions exists in the present case. The Parole and Probation Commission did not defer indefinitely the establishment of petitioner’s PPRD, and the Commission had established a PPRD for petitioner prior to the filing of this petition. Accordingly, petitioner’s reliance upon *James*is misplaced.

Petitioner’s remaining arguments are without merit. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

McCORD and LARRY G. SMITH, JJ., concur.
# C_2006011EN.01001201.xml

| 17.1.2006 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 11/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.1.2006

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 11/12

---

Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case COMP/M.4006 — Crédit Agricole/Banca Intesa/Nextra Investment Management)

(2006/C 11/13)

(Text with EEA relevance)

On 14 December 2005, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the common market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004. The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes. |
| --- | --- |

—

from the Europa competition web site (http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/). This web site provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes.

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M4006. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex) |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website under document number 32005M4006. EUR-Lex is the on-line access to European law. (http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex)

---
HomeNorth Korea

# North Korea

439 items

        -    Media Note  		U.S. Senior Official for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pak’s Trilateral Call with Republic of Korea (ROK) Special Representative Kim and Japanese Director General Namazu	  January 15, 2024 
        -    Press Statement  		Taking Action in Response to DPRK-Russia Ballistic Missile Transfers and Testing	  Antony J. BlinkenJanuary 11, 2024 
        -    Readout  		Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Cho	  January 11, 2024 
        -    Media Note  		Joint Statement on DPRK-Russia Ballistic Missile Transfers	  January 9, 2024 
        -    Media Note  		Joint Statement on the Trilateral United States-Japan-Republic of Korea Indo-Pacific Dialogue	  January 6, 2024 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – January 4, 2024	  Matthew MillerJanuary 4, 2024 WASHINGTON, D.C. 
        -    Press Statement  		Religious Freedom Designations	  Antony J. BlinkenJanuary 4, 2024 
        -    Department Press Briefing  		Department Press Briefing – January 3, 2024	  Matthew MillerJanuary 3, 2024Washington, D.C. 
        -    Media Note  		Joint Statement by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa Yoko, and Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Jin	  December 20, 2023 
        -    Media Note  		Deputy Special Representative for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pak’s Trilateral Call with Republic of Korea (ROK) Special Representative Kim and Japanese Director General Namazu	  December 19, 2023 

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#### § 800.231 Manufacture.

Solely for the purposes of column 2 of appendix A to this part, the term *manufacture* means to produce or reproduce, whether physically or virtually.
# C_2005281EN.01000301.xml

| 12.11.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 281/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

12.11.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 281/3

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(First Chamber)

of 8 September 2005

in Case C-512/03 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te 's-Hertogenbosch) in J.E.J. Blanckaert v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen (1)

1

(Direct taxation - Tax on income from savings and investments - Tax convention - Tax credits allowed only for persons insured under the national social security system)

(2005/C 281/06)

Language of the case: Dutch

In Case C-512/03: reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Gerechtshof te 's-Hertogenbosch ('s-Hertogenbosch Regional Court of Appeal) (Netherlands), made by decision of 4 December 2003, received at the Court on 8 December 2003, in the proceedings between J.E.J. Blanckaert and Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen — the Court (First Chamber), composed of K. Lenaerts, (Rapporteur) President of the Fourth Chamber, acting for the President of the First Chamber, N. Colneric, K. Schiemann, E. Juhász and M. Ilešič, Judges; C. Stix-Hackl, Advocate General; L. Hewlett, Principal Administrator for the Registrar, gave a judgment on 8 September 2005, the operative part of which is as follows:

Articles 56 EC and 58 EC must be interpreted as not precluding a law of a Member State under which a non-resident taxpayer who receives income in that State only from savings and investments and who is not insured under the social security system of that Member State cannot claim entitlement to tax credits in respect of national insurance, whereas a resident taxpayer who is insured under that social security system is entitled to those credits when his taxable income is calculated, even if he receives only income of that same kind and does not pay social security contributions.

---

(1)  OJ C 47 of 21.02.2004.

1

---
Editorial Note on Subpart R of Part 405
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subpart R of part 405 appear at 79 FR 55031, Aug. 22, 2014.

§ 405.1804 Matters not subject to administrative and judicial review under prospective payment. Neither administrative nor judicial review is available for controversies about the following matters: ( a ) The determination of the requirement, or the proportional amount, of the budget neutrality adjustment in the prospective payment rates required under section 1886(e)(1) of the Social Security Act.
( b ) The establishment of— ( 1 ) Diagnosis related groups (DRGs);
( 2 ) The methodology for the classification of inpatient discharges within the DRGs; or
( 3 ) Appropriate weighting factors that reflect the relative hospital resources used with respect to discharge within each DRG.
[49 FR 322, Jan. 1, 1984, as amended at 78 FR 75195, Dec. 10, 2013]
#### Mina Harris, Appellant, *v.*Louisiana Brown, Respondent.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term,

October, 1898.)

Lease — A collateral agreement to repair must be pleade'd — Counterclaim.

Where a referee finds that the expense of a new roof, placed on demised premises by the defendant, “ is not chargeable against the plaintiff under the covenant to repair contained in the lease between the parties hereto,” he cannot allow the expense, as a counterclaim, upon proof of an extrinsic collateral agreement between the parties, which is not pleaded.

Appeal from an order of the General Term of the City Court affirming a judgment rendered in favor of defendant upon the report of a referee.

*744Samuel F. Hyman, for appellant.

Charles Bradshaw, for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

It Was clearly error for the referee to allow, as part of the defendant’s ■ counterclaim, the cost of putting .a new roof on the demised premises. It was not within the issues, and objection on that ground was made at the trial. The counterclaim with respect to repairs rests exclusively on the covenant to repair contained in the lease.' The evidence was not sufficient to justify a claim that a new roof was necessary by reason of the dilapidation of the old one, nor did the referee award the sum allowed upon any such-theory but upon-proof of a collateral agreement between the parties entirely outside of the lease itself. He expressly finds the plaintiff’s fourth proposed finding, which reads:

“ That the charge'of $223.30 and interest for a new roof is not chargeable against the plaintiff under the covenant to repair con-' tained in the lease between the parties hereto; ” and in the body of his report he specifically states that this item is recoverable on the special agreement above referred to. As no such, agreement has been pleaded, no recovery thereon can be .had in this action.

In addition to this, errors, were committed in the course of the trial in the admission of evidence. ' Proof was given of the amount paid out by the defendant for repairs without any evidence being given as to the reasonableness of the amounts so paid. It may also well be questioned whether in some instances there .was sufficient proof of the existence of a neglect to repair' commensurate with the work done for .which- the defendant claims reimbursement.

Without adverting to other grounds on which a reversal is claimed, enough appears to call for' a new trial, which, under section 1011 of the O'ode of Civil Procedure, must apparently be had before another referee to be appointed by the court below. It is to be hoped that upon a new trial greater care will be observed by counsel in making their proofs and in observing the rules of evidence.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.

Present: Beekman, P. J.; Gildersleeve and Giegerich, JJ.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
Editorial Note on Part 410
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 410 appear at 62 FR 46037, Aug. 29, 1997.

§ 410.12 Medical and other health services: Basic conditions and limitations. ( a ) *Basic conditions.* The medical and other health services specified in § 410.10 are covered by Medicare Part B only if they are not excluded under subpart A of part 411 of this chapter, and if they meet the following conditions: ( 1 ) *When the services must be furnished.* The services must be furnished while the individual is in a period of entitlement. (The rules on entitlement are set forth in part 406 of this chapter.)
( 2 ) *By whom the services must be furnished.* The services must be furnished by a facility or other entity as specified in §§ 410.14 through 410.69.
( 3 ) *Physician certification and recertification requirements.* If the services are subject to physician certification requirements, they must be certified as being medically necessary, and as meeting other applicable requirements, in accordance with subpart B of part 424 of this chapter.
( b ) *Limitations on payment.* Payment for medical and other health services is subject to limitations on the amounts of payment as specified in §§ 410.152 and 410.155 and to the annual and blood deductibles as set forth in §§ 410.160 and 410.161.
[51 FR 41339, Nov. 14, 1986, as amended at 53 FR 6648, Mar. 2, 1988; 57 FR 33896, July 31, 1992]