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NTSB

Permit No. G-200

Highway/Marine Accident Report

U.S. Towboat Robert Y. Love

Allision With Interstate 40 Highway Bridge 

Near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma

May 26, 2002

NTSB/HAR-04/05

PB2004-916205 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7654 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted August 31, 2004 Washington, D.C. 20594
National Transportation Safety Board. 2004. U.S. Towboat Robert Y. Love Allision With

Interstate 40 Highway Bridge Near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma, May 26, 2002. Highway/Marine

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-04/05. Washington, DC.

Abstract: About 0745, on May 26, 2002, the towboat Robert Y. Love, pushing two empty asphalt tank

barges, was traveling northbound on the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System, near

Webbers Falls, Oklahoma. As the tow approached the Interstate 40 highway bridge at mile 360.3, it veered

off course and rammed a pier 201 feet west of (outside) the navigation channel. The impact collapsed a

503-foot section of the bridge, which fell into the river and onto the barges below. According to witnesses,

highway traffic continued to drive into the void in the bridge created by the collapsed spans. When traffic

stopped, eight passenger vehicles and three truck tractor-semitrailer combinations had fallen into the river

or onto the collapsed portions of the bridge. The accident resulted in 14 fatalities and 5 injuries and caused

an estimated $30.1 million in damage to the bridge, including the operation of detours, and $276,000 in

damage to the barges.

The major safety issues discussed in this report include the captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures

for such an event; bridge protection, including risk assessment; and mitigation of loss of life, including

motorist warning systems. As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes

recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Highway Administration, and the American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine,

pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board

Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study

transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board

makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and

statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also

may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To

purchase this publication, order report number PB2004-916205 from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports

related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. 
iii Highway Accident Report

Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii

Factual Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Robert Y. Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Highway Vehicles on Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Recreational Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Crew Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Captain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Captain’s 72-Hour History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Highway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Bridge Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Bridge Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Bridge Sufficiency Ratings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Postaccident Toxicology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Medical Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Survival Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Global Positioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Sight Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Time Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Licensed Operators’ Hours of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Towboat Operator Incapacitation Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Alerter Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

American Waterways Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Coast Guard-AWO Safety Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Motorist Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Bridge Safety and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

The Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Contents iv Highway Accident Report

Captain’s Incapacitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Allision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Allision Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Safe Transit Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Bridge Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Motorist Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Previously Issued Recommendation Classified in This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Appendixes

A: Investigation and Public Hearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

B: Vessel Impact Force Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

C: Previous Recommendations on Safe Transit Procedures, 

Bridge Vulnerability and Protection, and Motorist Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
v Highway Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials

ADT average daily traffic count

ARTCO American River Transportation Company

ASTM American Association for Testing and Materials

AWO American Waterways Operators

BEC Blubaugh Engineering Company

BMS bridge management system

CAMI Civil Aerospace Medical Institute

CEMS Crew Endurance Management System

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

EMS emergency medical service

EPS electrophysiological study

FDOT Florida Department of Transportation

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

GPS global positioning system

I-40 Interstate 40

I-40 bridge Interstate 40 highway bridge

ICD implantable cardioverter defibrillator

ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

Louisiana DOTD Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development

LMR Lower Mississippi River

LRFD load and resistance factor design

M-KARNS McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System

MMT Magnolia Marine Transport Company

MUTCD Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

NBI National Bridge Inventory

ODOT Oklahoma Department of Transportation

PCP phencyclidine

PI point of intersection

RCP Responsible Carrier Program
Acronyms and Abbreviations vi Highway Accident Report

SHM Structural Health Monitoring

STRAHNET Strategic Highway Network

UMR Upper Mississippi River

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

U.S.C. United States Code

Vessel Collision Guide

Specifications Guide Specification and Commentary for Vessel 

Collision Design of Highway Bridges

WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984
vii Highway Accident Report

Executive Summary

About 0745, on May 26, 2002, the towboat Robert Y. Love, pushing two empty

asphalt tank barges, was traveling northbound on the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River

Navigation System, near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma. As the tow approached the Interstate

40 highway bridge at mile 360.3, it veered off course and rammed a pier 201 feet west of

(outside) the navigation channel. The impact collapsed a 503-foot section of the bridge,

which fell into the river and onto the barges below. According to witnesses, highway

traffic continued to drive into the void in the bridge created by the collapsed spans. When

traffic stopped, eight passenger vehicles and three truck tractor-semitrailer combinations

had fallen into the river or onto the collapsed portions of the bridge. The accident resulted

in 14 fatalities and 5 injuries and caused an estimated $30.1 million in damage to the

bridge, including the operation of detours, and $276,000 in damage to the barges.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the Robert Y. Love’s allision with the Interstate 40 highway bridge and its subsequent

collapse was the captain’s loss of consciousness, possibly as the result of an unforeseeable

abnormal heart rhythm. Contributing to the loss of life was the inability of motorists to

detect the collapsed bridge in time to stop their vehicles.

Major safety issues identified in this accident include:

• The captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures for such an event; 

• Bridge protection, including risk assessment; and

• Mitigation of loss of life, including motorist warning systems.

As a result of this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board makes

recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Highway Administration, and the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.

1 Highway Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

About 0745,1 on May 26, 2002, the towboat Robert Y. Love, pushing two empty

asphalt tank barges, was traveling northbound on the McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River

Navigation System (M-KARNS),2 near Webbers Falls, Oklahoma. As the tow approached

the Interstate 40 highway bridge at mile 360.3, it veered off course and rammed a pier 201

feet west of (outside) the navigation channel. The impact collapsed a 503-foot section of the

bridge, which fell into the river and onto the barges below. According to witnesses, highway

traffic continued to drive into the void in the bridge created by the collapsed spans. When

traffic stopped, eight passenger vehicles and three truck tractor-semitrailer combinations had

fallen into the river or onto the collapsed portions of the bridge. The accident resulted in 14

fatalities and 5 injuries and caused an estimated $30.1 million in damage to the bridge,

including the operation of detours, and $276,000 in damage to the barges.

Robert Y. Love

At 0340 on May 19, 2002, the towboat Robert Y. Love departed Decatur, Alabama,

mile 299, Tennessee River, en route to Catoosa, Oklahoma, pushing ahead two empty

297-foot-long asphalt tank barges (MM-60 and MM-62), side by side (108 feet total

width), with a draft3

 of 1 foot. (See figures 1 through 3.) On board were the licensed

master (captain) and pilot4 and four unlicensed crewmembers—a chief engineer, two

mates, and one deckhand. On May 21, a third empty barge, MM-54B, was added to the

tow at mile 4, Tennessee River; on May 22, MM-54B was removed from the tow at

Rosedale Fleet, mile 585, LMR.5 (See figure 3, locations 2 and 3.) On May 23, the tow

entered M-KARNS at mile 599, LMR, heading northwest toward Catoosa on the Verdigris

River, mile 444.8, M-KARNS. (See figure 3, locations 4 and 5, and figure 4.)

1 All times in this report are central daylight time based on the 24-hour clock.

2 On U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) river navigation charts, river miles along the

M-KARNS are measured from mile 0, where the M-KARNS enters the Lower Mississippi River (LMR),

westward for 444.8 miles to the head of navigation on the Verdigris River at Catoosa, Oklahoma. The

M-KARNS flows southeastward from the Rocky Mountains in Colorado and enters the LMR at mile 599.

(All miles are statute miles of 5,280 feet.) USACE controls the use and administration of the structures

(bank protection, shore facility permits, regulation of water flow, and operation of the lock and dams).

3 Draft refers to the depth measured from the waterline to the lowest immersed part of hull or bottom of keel.

4 In accordance with standard marine terminology for river towboats, the terms captain and pilot are used

to differentiate between the two licensed operators who navigate a vessel. The captain is the senior licensed

operator of uninspected towing vessels and is in charge of the vessel. The captain stands the 0600-1200 and the

1800-2400 watches, and the pilot stands the alternate watches; the watch schedule may vary depending on

company policy or boat operator’s preference. Each operator is required to have a U.S. Coast Guard (Coast

Guard) license as master of uninspected towing vessels for the waters on which the vessel operates.

5 For navigation purposes, the Mississippi River is divided into the LMR and the Upper Mississippi

River (UMR). The LMR extends north from the Gulf of Mexico to the confluence of the Ohio River. The

UMR extends north from the Ohio River to the head of navigation at Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Factual Information 2 Highway Accident Report

Figure 1. Towboat Robert Y. Love. (Source: Magnolia Marine Transport Company)

Figure 2. Schematic of towboat Robert Y. Love and barge tow.
Factual Information 3 Highway Accident Report

On May 25, about 1840, while the tow was at lock 13 (near Van Buren, Arkansas),

mile 292.8, M-KARNS, the alternate captain departed on vacation and was relieved by the

regular captain. The regular captain took the navigation watch about 1910 and was

relieved at the end of the watch by the pilot about 2245 on May 25. On May 26, about

0530, the pilot was, in turn, relieved by the captain.

Figure 3. Map showing origin, selected locations, and destination of tow.
Factual Information 4 Highway Accident Report

About 0700 on May 26, the on-duty deckhand went to the wheelhouse to clean the

deck. Afterward, he had a conversation with the captain for about 25 to 30 minutes and

left the wheelhouse. The deckhand later stated that the captain “didn’t seem like he was

sick or anything wrong with him or anything.” The captain instructed the deckhand to

awaken the relief mate (mate) because the vessel was approaching lock 16, mile 366.6,

which was about 1 hour away.6

 (See figure 4.)

The mate stated the deckhand awakened him about 0725. The deckhand then

placed some trash in the bin on the stern7

 of the towboat and emptied the mop water in the

engineroom sink. When the deckhand returned to the galley, the mate was there, and they

were talking and drinking coffee when they felt an impact and the refrigerators and other

galley equipment fell to the deck. They said they then heard a “big bang,” went outside the

galley, and saw a tractor-semitrailer and a pickup truck drive off the Interstate 40 (I-40)

Figure 4. McClellan-Kerr Arkansas River Navigation System from Fort Smith, Arkansas, 

to head of navigation at Catoosa, Oklahoma.

6 According to 33 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 207.275, two deckhands—in this instance, a relief

mate and a deckhand—are required to be on the tow to handle lines while the tow maneuvers through the lock.

7 In marine usage, the stern of the boat is the rear, and the bow is the front.
Factual Information 5 Highway Accident Report

highway bridge (I-40 bridge) and land in the water. They also saw a collapsed section of

the bridge deck hanging at an angle from the bridge and resting on the bow end of the

barges in the tow. (See figures 5 through 7.)

Figure 5. View of accident scene from downstream (southern) approach to bridge.

Figure 6. View of accident scene from edge of remaining eastbound span.

Pier 1

Pier 4 Pier 5

Navigation channel
Factual Information 6 Highway Accident Report

The captain stated that after he told the deckhand to awaken the mate, he watched

to make sure the deckhand walked safely down the stairs from the wheelhouse, then

returned his attention to maneuvering the tow. The captain reported that the last thing he

remembered before the accident was aligning the tow to pass under the I-40 bridge main

navigation span (between piers 4 and 5) and passing a green navigation buoy (channel

marker) to port8 approximately 0.35 miles from the bridge.9

After the accident, the captain stated that his unconsciousness occurred “all at

once” and further stated, “I remember looking out to the side of the buoy and then

looking back at the bridge, and after that I don’t remember nothing.” His first

recollection after the allision10 was being in a crouched position between the operator’s

chair and the vessel control console and realizing that his head and arm were wet from

the soft drink he had placed on the console. (See figure 8.) He stated he could not visually

focus on anything at first nor “get oriented right.” He managed to get to a fully standing

position to be able to see over the console and out of the wheelhouse window. After he

saw the highway bridge deck collapsed onto the deck of the barges, he sounded five

blasts on the vessel’s whistle (a mariner’s danger signal). While still experiencing

problems focusing upon what was happening, he recalled seeing an 18-wheeler, and

possibly a pickup truck, go off the bridge. He said that he then “started blowing the

[towboat’s] whistle again, just to try to get somebody’s attention to stop...[the traffic] on

the bridge.” He further explained that though he was familiar with the boat, he had to

Figure 7. Accident damage.

8 In marine usage, port is left and starboard is right.

9 The Coast Guard had placed the green unlighted buoy on the left (upbound) side of the channel,

about 0.05 mile (about 260 feet) to the left of the sailing line on the USACE chart, near mile 359.5, or

approximately 0.35 miles (about 1,850 feet) downstream, from the bridge.

10 In marine usage, allision refers to a moving ship striking a stationary ship or other stationary object.

Interstate 40 at the Arkansas River

(not to scale)

N

97 27

G

YY

R

L

L

L

L

M

Barge

Barge

Tug

West riverbank

East collapsed

bridge span

West collapsed

bridge span

Damaged bridge

columns (piers 2 & 3)

MM-60

MM-62

56°
Factual Information 7 Highway Accident Report

“fumble around for the general alarm11 to get it set off.” The captain could not recall the

allision. He said that he had applied a few degrees of left rudder to align the tow for

passage through the bridge navigation span and that when he regained consciousness, the

rudder was still in the left position.

The mate who was on duty indicated that he ran from the galley to the wheelhouse

and when he got to the door, the captain was saying, “make them stop, why won’t they

stop coming [referring to the vehicles on the bridge].” The captain asked the mate, the first

person to arrive in the wheelhouse, to send a distress message to the Coast Guard. The

mate made the call on the VHF-FM radio (channel 16) and then telephoned the company

office on the company cellular telephone to report the allision. The radio distress call was

heard and logged at 0745, simultaneously, by the watchstander at Coast Guard Group

Lower Mississippi River (Group LMR), Memphis, Tennessee, and by the lock operator at

lock 15, mile 336.2. (See figure 4.)

11 The general alarm is an internal emergency alarm system, activated from the wheelhouse, that sounds

throughout the towboat to warn the crew of an urgent situation on board the vessel.

Figure 8. Robert Y. Love wheelhouse, showing captain’s chair and console.
Factual Information 8 Highway Accident Report

The remainder of the crew heard the towboat’s whistle sound, followed by the

sounding of the general alarm bell. While making routine engine room rounds, the chief

engineer heard the bell. He reported hearing the accident about 0750 and that the impact

caused him to fall to one knee. He immediately returned to the engineroom to check void

spaces for flooding and was in the engineroom for 10 to 15 minutes. The engineer stated

that he did not notice any engine speed changes before the accident and that had the

engine speeds changed before the accident, he would have easily noticed the change.

The pilot and the other mate were off duty and asleep in their quarters during the

allision. The pilot, who was in his bed when he felt a bump, heard the towboat’s whistle

sounding and then heard the general alarm sound. He looked out of his window (his room

was on the port side of the main deck, aft) and saw the bridge deck lying on the barges. He

said he immediately ran out of the deckhouse and went to the head of the tow to check the

condition of the barges. About 45 seconds to a minute and a half later, after checking the

tow, the pilot arrived in the wheelhouse and found: “The captain was visibly shaken...He

was standing, and he was in tears, shaken.” The pilot then relieved the captain from watch

and the mate from handling communications. The mate and the pilot stated that the captain

told them that he had passed out, that he did not hear or see the impact, and that the last

thing that he remembered was seeing the deckhand walk out of the wheelhouse.

The pilot stated he heard people in the water yelling for help, so he directed the

mate and chief engineer to put the vessel’s motorboat into the water to determine whether

they could render assistance. The mate and chief engineer searched for survivors for about

30 minutes, saw a recreational boat rescue one person, and then returned to the towboat

without rescuing anyone.

Highway Vehicles on Bridge

Eleven vehicles carrying 19 occupants either collapsed with or drove off the

bridge. A tractor-semitrailer driver stated that he had been heading westbound on the

bridge at 70 mph and had his windows up. He was traveling in the right lane, and no other

vehicles were around him. He stated that as he came up over the rise in the bridge, the

roadway was gone and the next thing he recalled seeing was a large exposed bridge

support pillar. He then recalled being in the water and trying to grab debris to stay afloat.

Some nearby boaters threw him a cushion and then picked him up in their boat. He said he

could hear another man yelling for help and saw another boat pick up that man. An

eastbound pickup truck drove off the bridge and hit the collapsed bridge span but stopped

before driving into the water. (See figure 9.) The pickup’s two occupants were rescued

from the bridge. Nine other vehicles either went down with the spans that collapsed or

drove off the bridge.
Factual Information 9 Highway Accident Report

Recreational Boats

At the time of the accident, a fishing tournament was underway out of Webbers

Falls (2.6 river miles upstream of the I-40 bridge). One of the contestants observed the

Robert Y. Love and tow headed to the west bank of the river, outside the main navigation

span. He indicated that after the tow struck the bridge supports, the span collapsed

immediately. Another pair of contestants, who were upriver of the bridge when they heard

a loud boom, observed a section of the bridge span collapse and a number of vehicles enter

the water. The operator of this boat said that he saw at least one vehicle fall with the bridge

and he then accelerated his boat toward the bridge, and reached the area in about 20

seconds. He also stated that he saw two more vehicles drive off the bridge and called 911,

reaching the Muskogee Police Department. After the call, he saw five more vehicles drive

off the bridge. He indicated that most, if not all, of these vehicles came from the

westbound lanes. When the boat was about 30 to 40 yards upstream, he fired a flare from a

hand-held flare pistol toward the bridge, in front of a tractor-trailer truck traveling from

the east side of the bridge to the west side, to warn the driver of the danger. The

truckdriver stopped, before reaching the edge of the collapsed span, partially jackknifing

on the roadway. Vehicles behind this truck stopped before reaching the tractor-trailer

Figure 9. Eastbound pickup that drove off bridge onto collapsed span but stopped before 

driving into void.
Factual Information 10 Highway Accident Report

truck. The same recreational boat then rescued a person in the water near the bow of one

barge. The boat occupants saw two other recreational boats, also from the tournament;

each of them rescued a person from the water. In all, three survivors were rescued from the

water. The recreational boats took the three survivors to a boat ramp at Webbers Falls,

where they waited for emergency medical service (EMS) personnel to arrive on scene.

Emergency Response

At 0748, the Muskogee Police Department received the first of approximately 25

calls regarding a bridge collapse at I-40 and the Arkansas River with several vehicles in

the water. Seven local police departments12 responded, as well as the Oklahoma

Highway Patrol and the Muskogee Police Department. Six ambulances responded; the

first arrived on scene at 0756. In addition, 17 local fire departments,13 10 EMS

departments,14 8 emergency management agencies,15 7 State agencies,16 and 7 Federal

agencies,17 for a total of 58 local, State, and Federal agencies, responded to this

accident.

After receiving the distress call from the Robert Y. Love, the watchstander at

Coast Guard Group LMR sent an urgent marine information broadcast at 0746 over

VHF-FM radio channel 16 advising mariners of the accident. He then used the Group’s

bridge allision checklist and contacted the Arkansas State Police, who advised that they

had called the Muskogee Police Department and had other units en route to the bridge at

0747. The Coast Guard watchstander then notified the 8th Coast Guard District office,

New Orleans, Louisiana, which is the next senior operational command over the Coast

Guard Group LMR. He also notified the Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, Memphis,

12 Muskogee County Sheriff’s Department sheriff and deputies, Gans Police Department, Gore Police

Department, Checotah Police Department, McIntosh County Sheriff’s Office, Tulsa Police Department, and

Fort Gibson Police Department.

13 Muskogee Fire Department, Ash Creek Fire Department, Fort Gibson Fire Department, Wilburton

Fire Department, Porum Fire Department, Warner Volunteer Fire Department, Norwood Fire Department,

Sallisaw Fire Department, Spring Valley Fire Department, Keota Fire Department, Texanna Fire

Department, West End Fire Department, Checotah Fire and Emergency Management, Tulsa Fire

Department, Vian Fire Department, Onapa Fire Department, and the Oklahoma City Fire Department.

14 Muskogee County, Fort Gibson, Warner, Haskell, Cherokee County, Sequoyah County, Northeast

Oklahoma Underwater Recovery, Washington County Rescue, Vian First Responder, and McIntosh Office

of Emergency Services.

15 Muskogee City Emergency Operations Center, Muskogee County Emergency Management, Grove

Emergency Management, Washington County Emergency Operations Center, Cherokee County Emergency

Management, Haskell County Emergency Management, Pittsburg County Emergency Management, and

Sequoyah County Emergency Management.

16 Oklahoma Department of Public Safety Communications, Oklahoma Department of Transportation,

Oklahoma Office of Emergency Management, Oklahoma National Guard, State Medical Examiners Office,

Department of Environmental Quality, and Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigations.

17 USACE, the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service, the Coast Guard Gulf Strike Team, the U.S. National Guard, and the National

Weather Service.
Factual Information 11 Highway Accident Report

Tennessee, which is responsible for marine safety activities on the Arkansas River. At

0846, the Captain of the Port, Memphis,18 ordered the river closed to vessel traffic from

mile 357 to 363, Arkansas River. At 1100, the Captain of the Port, Memphis, issued a

safety marine information broadcast advising mariners that diving operations for vehicles

and occupants were being conducted at the I-40 bridge, mile 360.3, Arkansas River. The

broadcast further directed search and rescue units to “transit the area at the slowest safe

speed possible and transit with extreme caution.”

Injuries

The following table is based on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s

injury criteria, which the National Transportation Safety Board uses in accident reports for

all transportation modes.

Table 1. Injuries. 

Damage

The Robert Y. Love did not sustain any damage. Its barges sustained a total of

$275,554 in repair costs (barge MM-60, $113,478; barge MM-62, $162,076). The barge

repairs were completed on July 15 and 22, 2002, respectively.

The impact collapsed a 503-foot section of the bridge and two piers. During the

repair to the bridge, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) operated a

separate detour for the I-40 traffic in both directions. The westbound detour was 8 miles

and added an additional 4 miles to the trip. In addition, traffic had to negotiate four rightangle turns and traverse two railroad crossings19 while passing through two small cities.

The eastbound detour was about 78 miles and added an additional 30 miles to the trip.

18 The commanding officer at the Marine Safety Office, Memphis, is also designated by the

Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, as Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection (for regulating the commercial

marine industry by conducting inspections and investigations) and Captain of the Port (for conducting

pollution control and port safety duties).

Injury type Drivers Passengers Vessel crew Total 

Fatal 7 7 0 14 

Serious 2 1 0 3 

Minor 2 0 0 2 

None 0 0 6 6 

Total 11 8 6 25 

Title 49 CFR 830.2 defines fatal injury as “any injury which results in death within 30 days of the accident” and serious 

injury as “an injury which: (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date 

the injury was received; (2) results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) 

causes severe hemorrhages, nerve, or tendon damage; (4) involves any internal organ; or (5) involves second- or thirddegree burns, or any burn affecting more than 5 percent of the body surface.” 
Factual Information 12 Highway Accident Report

According to ODOT, numerous bridges along the detour route had to be repaired and

monitored to accommodate the interstate commercial traffic volumes. The bridge

reopened for traffic on July 29, 2002, 65 days after the accident. ODOT estimated that the

total cost of the bridge repairs, including operating the detours, was $30.1 million.

Crew Information

The Robert Y. Love had a crew of six, including the captain and the pilot, who both

held licenses in accordance with U.S. law. The remainder of the crew was not required to

hold a Coast Guard license.

Captain

The captain, age 60 at the time of the accident, began his marine career on the

Mississippi River in November 1957 and for about 40 years had been working in various

capacities on board inland towing vessels operating on the Western Rivers20 of the United

States. He started as a deckhand, serving in that capacity through the 1960s before being

assigned to the wheelhouse for training as a vessel operator. On May 21, 1973, he obtained

his original Coast Guard license as operator of uninspected towing vessels.21 In 1991, he

went to work for Magnolia Marine Transport Company (MMT), the owner of the Robert

Y. Love, serving as a pilot, relief captain, and captain of its vessels. He had been the

captain of the Robert Y. Love since February 22, 2001. At the time of this accident, he held

a Coast Guard license as an operator of uninspected towing vessels upon the Great Lakes

and Inland Waters with a radar observer (unlimited) endorsement. His current license had

been issued in December 1997 and was due to expire in December 2002. In December

1997, he completed a radar observer (unlimited) training course to renew the radar

endorsement on his license, as required by Coast Guard regulations.

19 About 18 to 20 trains per day traversed these rail crossings; the trains were more than 100 cars long

and loaded with coal destined for an electrical generating facility.

20 The Western Rivers consist of the Mississippi River and all of its tributaries and connecting

waterways, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterways, and the other navigable river systems that empty into the Gulf

of Mexico.

21 The Towing Vessel Licensing Act of July 7, 1972, requires that all commercial vessels 26 or more

feet long engaged, or intended to be engaged, in the service of towing be under the direction and control of

persons licensed by the Coast Guard.
Factual Information 13 Highway Accident Report

Captain’s 72-Hour History

The captain’s activities and hours of rest before the accident, based upon

information collected during Safety Board interviews with both the captain and the crew,

are summarized in figure 10 and in tables 2 and 3.

Figure 10. Captain’s automobile travel preceding accident.

St. Louis

Hermann

Van Buren

Vicksburg Florence

78 miles

484 miles

54 miles

54 miles

368 miles
Factual Information 14 Highway Accident Report

Table 2. Captain’s 72-hour history.

Table 3. Captain’s hours of rest in 72 hours before accident.

Date Time Event 

0500 Onboard Jennie Dehmer on the Missouri River. Woke up and had ice 

water. 

0600-1100 Went to the wheelhouse and remained there, speaking with the relief pilot. 

1100 Ate lunch. 

1200 Went to bed. 

1600 Woke up, showered, and ate. After eating, went to the wheelhouse to 

speak to the relief pilot. 

May 23, 2002 

2300 Went to galley for a snack and a glass of tea and then went to bed. 

0500 Woke up, went to galley for a glass of water, and then to wheelhouse. 

1045 Ate lunch, went to wheelhouse, and then went to bed. 

1430 Woke up to prepare to leave the Jennie Dehmer.

1600 Departed the Jennie Dehmer at Hermann, Missouri, and drove 78 miles to 

the St. Louis airport with two crewmembers. 

May 24, 2002 

1900 Dropped off one crewmember; the other took over driving. 

0300 Arrived in Vicksburg, Mississippi, switched from the company car to a 

personal car, and continued to the captain’s home (484 miles from St. Louis 

airport to Vicksburg, Mississippi). 

0415 Arrived at captain’s home in Florence, Mississippi (54 miles from Vicksburg 

to Florence). 

0500 Went to bed. 

0830 Woke up and ate some fruit. 

1010 Left Florence and drove 54 miles to Vicksburg. 

1115 Departed Vicksburg en route to lock 13 (near Van Buren, Arkansas). 

1840 Met the Robert Y. Love at lock 13 (approximately 368 miles from 

Vicksburg). 

1910-1915 Assumed watch aboard the Robert Y. Love.

2230-2245 Relieved by the pilot. 

May 25, 2002 

2315-2330 Went to the galley for a snack, took two Benadryl®

 capsules for a sinus 

headache, and then went to bed. 

0500 Woke up and went to galley for a soft drink. 

0515-0520 Began watch. 

0700-0730 Had a 25- to 30-minute conversation in the wheelhouse with the deckhand, 

who had been cleaning. Captain instructed the deckhand to leave the 

wheelhouse to wake up mate. 

May 26, 2002 

0745 Allision of the Robert Y. Love and tow with the I-40 bridge. 

Rest period Date Times Hours of rest 

1 May 23 1200 to 1600 4.0 

2 May 23-24 2300-2330 to 0500 5.5-6.0 

3 May 24 1100-1130 to 1430 3.0-3.5 

4 May 25 0500 to 0830 3.5 

5 May 25-26 2315-2330 to 0500 5.5-5.75 

Total 21.50 –22.75 
Factual Information 15 Highway Accident Report

The captain stated that his duty (work) rotation was 30 days on and 15 days off and

that he had stood the normal captain’s watches of 0600-1200 and 1800-2400 since coming

to the towboat Robert Y. Love in 2001. He further stated that “after 44 years,” he was

accustomed to the “6-on/6-off” duty schedule used on river towboats.

Operations

MMT owns and operates 16 towboats and about 60 barges and has been in the

inland towing business for 32 years, according to the company’s Director of Operations. It

employs about 220 people, of whom 185 are vessel employees; the other 35 serve in

shoreside management and other positions. The company’s primary business is

transporting products such as asphalt or black oil through the Mississippi River system

and intracoastal waterways of the Gulf of Mexico.

According to company officials, MMT vessels performed 711 round trips on

inland waterways during the fiscal year ending June 30, 2004. 

Vessel Information

The Robert Y. Love was a conventional twin-screw, diesel-driven, uninspected,22

inland river towboat. The vessel was constructed of steel, 104 feet long, and had a beam

(width) of 30 feet. It had an operating draft of 7 feet 9 inches and had a displacement23 of

444.5 long tons (a long ton equals 2,240 pounds). The vessel was built in 1955 by the

Nashville Bridge Company and the Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Company, Mobile,

Alabama. Its first owner, the Canal Barge Company, named the vessel Caroline. In 1991, the

vessel was sold to its present owner, MMT, Jackson, Mississippi, and renamed. In 1992, the

vessel’s main engines were replaced, increasing the horsepower from 1800 to 2400 rpm.

The Robert Y. Love had a retractable or variable-height wheelhouse that could be

raised or lowered using a hydraulic ram system. In waterways where wheelhouse height was

not restricted by bridge vertical clearance or other structures, the wheelhouse could be raised

to the highest position for greater visibility. When necessary for the vessel to pass under a

bridge with limited vertical clearance or to avoid waiting for a bridge to open, the wheelhouse

could be lowered to a point where the lowest eye height was about 16 feet and the top of the

wheelhouse was 17.5 feet above the waterline. Maximum eye height with the wheelhouse in

the raised position was 29.5 feet; the overall maximum height with antennas extended

vertically was 43 feet. At the time of the accident, the wheelhouse was in the raised position.

22 An uninspected vessel is not subject to Coast Guard inspection under 46 United States Code

(U.S.C.). The following categories of vessels are subject to inspection: freight vessels, nautical school

vessels, ships, offshore supply vessels, passenger vessels, sailing school vessels, seagoing barges, seagoing

motor vessels, small passenger vessels, steam vessels, tank vessels, fish processing vessels, fish tender

vessels, Great Lakes barges, and oil spill response vessels.

23 Volume or weight of the fluid displaced by a vessel.
Factual Information 16 Highway Accident Report

The wheelhouse was equipped with two VHF-FM radiotelephones, a single sideband radio, radar, a global positioning system unit, swing meter, depth sounder, steering

controls, and engine controls. The vessel also had a steering rudder aft and flanking

rudders24 forward of each of the two propellers.

The Director of Marine Engineering for MMT reported that the Robert Y. Love had

been through its annual drydocking in March 2002. The company and crew conducted

hull, steering machinery, engine, and electrical equipment inspections. They reported that

the results were satisfactory.

The double-hull tank barges MM-60 and MM-62 built in Ashland City, Tennessee, in

1999, were owned by the MMT and had identical dimensions: 297.5 feet long, beam of 54.0

feet, and an empty draft of 1 foot. According to the barge’s “Strength and Stability

Calculations,”25 at a draft of 1 foot, MM-60 had a displacement of 402.6 long tons and

MM-62 had a displacement of 427.4 long tons. Each barge had eight cargo tanks, four to port

and four to starboard, separated by a centerline bulkhead. Each barge had a 6-million-BTU

thermal fluid heater on deck, aft. The barge sterns were box-shaped and the bows were raked

to present a streamlined underwater shape to reduce water resistance. Each had a gross

tonnage of 1,619 and a maximum loaded draft of 11.5 feet. Both vessels had last been

inspected and issued a 5-year certificate of inspection by the Coast Guard Marine Safety

Office, St. Louis, Missouri, on August 23, 2001. The vessels were certified to carry up to

25,800 barrels26 of Grade A through Grade E cargoes.27 The cargo thermal fluid heaters were

allowed to be operated only when the vessels were carrying Grade E cargoes, such as asphalt.

Postaccident inspection of the tow revealed a large indentation on the port side of

the bow of barge MM-60. The indentation in the headlog, 10 feet from the corner, was 2

feet wide and 1 foot deep. (See figures 11A and 11B.)

Waterway Information

The Arkansas River is part of the M-KARNS, which is operated by USACE. The

M-KARNS begins in Arkansas at the confluence of the White River, mile 599, LMR. It

continues west on the man-made Arkansas Post Canal and then up the Arkansas River, into

Oklahoma (see figure 4) to mile 395, at the junction of the Verdigris River at Muskogee,

and then onward to the Verdigris River to the head of navigation at Catoosa, mile 444.8. 

24 Also known as backing rudders, these are usually smaller rudders installed forward of the propeller and

used for maneuvering when the propellers are turning astern, regardless of the actual movement of the towboat.

25 Trinity Marine Product, Ashland City Yard, Trinity Tag 96025, Hulls 4342 and 4343, March 2, 1999.

26 A barrel equals 42 U.S. gallons.

27 Flammable or combustible substances as defined by American Society for Testing and Materials

(ASTM) Standard D323. Grade E cargo is any combustible liquid having a flashpoint of 150o F or above.

The ASTM standard defines asphalt as an example of a Grade E combustible liquid.
Factual Information 17 Highway Accident Report

Figure 11. Port side of headlog of barge MM-60 showing the indentation made by south 

column of pier 3.

Figure 12. Overhead view of indentation.

Figure 11A.

Figure 11B.
Factual Information 18 Highway Accident Report

Construction of the M-KARNS began in May 1952; the system became

operational in 1970. Each year, approximately 12 million tons of commodities are

transported on the waterway.28 Total domestic tonnage on all U.S. internal waterways is

about 620 million tons per year.29

The waterway has 17 locks and dams, 12 in Arkansas and 5 in Oklahoma, that step

the water levels up a total of 420 feet in elevation. Thirty-eight bridges cross the

waterway. USACE maintains a minimum 9-foot channel depth on the system, and the

Coast Guard marks the river with buoys and daymarks.30

From mile 357 of the M-KARNS, about 3 miles downriver from the I-40 bridge,

the channel makes a gradual right turn of approximately 70 degrees over a distance of

about 1 mile. The channel then straightens out for about a mile and then makes a slight left

turn of about 10 to 15 degrees, about 0.40 miles from the bridge. 

The Robert S. Kerr Lock and Dam (lock 15), mile 336.2, is 24.1 miles below

(downstream of) the I-40 bridge. The Webbers Falls Lock and Dam (lock 16), mile 366.6,

is 6.3 miles upstream of the I-40 bridge. (See figure 4.) According to USACE officials,

average barge traffic at each of the two locks in the vicinity of the accident site is about

three tows per day.

River currents in the M-KARNS are negligible most of the year because the water

levels in the system are controlled by a series of dams, which regulate the release of water

into the system. The area between two successive dams is known as a pool. The USACE

District Office at Tulsa, Oklahoma, determined that at the time of the accident the pool

elevation was 459.37 feet (normal pool is 458 feet), and the current speed at the bridge

was about 2 mph.

According to USACE M-KARNS navigation charts, the I-40 bridge has a

300-foot-wide main navigation span and a vertical clearance above normal pool of 62.4

feet. The captain of the Robert Y. Love stated that he had been through the I-40 bridge

hundreds of times and that it was an easy bridge to navigate. He explained that once lined

up, a little right rudder would be required to steady the tow before placing the rudder

amidships (zero rudder angle) and passing under the navigation span.

28 According to USACE, major commodities include iron and steel, chemical fertilizer and other

chemicals, petroleum products, sand/gravel and rock, coke and coal, soybeans, and wheat and other grains

<http://www.swl.usace.army.mil/navigation/commod.html>.

29 USACE Waterborne Commerce Statistics Center 

<http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/ndc/wcsc/wcsc00/fordom.pdf>.

30 According the Coast Guard’s U.S. Aids to Navigation System, a daymark is an identifying sign

on a beacon (fixed navigational aid) that makes the beacon more readily visible in daylight

<http://www.uscgboating.org/safety/aton/system.htm>.
Factual Information 19 Highway Accident Report

Highway Information

I-40 and the I-40 bridge are owned and operated by ODOT. I-40 is an east-west,

rural, principal arterial, controlled access, interstate highway. At the accident site, I-40 is a

two-way, four-lane, divided highway. The design speed and posted speed limit were 70

mph, and the minimum-posted speed limit was 40 mph. The 2001 average daily traffic

count (ADT) for both directions was 19,200 vehicles. Commercial vehicles accounted for

27 to 33 percent of the ADT during 1997 and 1999.

The concrete bridge deck had a 36-inch-high concrete barrier separating the east and

westbound lanes. The traffic lanes were 12 feet wide, with 3-foot-wide inside and outside

shoulders. At the immediate approach to the bridge, the highway was asphalt, with a

33-inch-high concrete barrier separating the eastbound and westbound traffic lanes. The

approach lanes were also 12 feet wide, with 4.5-foot-wide inside shoulders and 15-foot-wide

outside shoulders. The traffic lanes were divided by painted stripes approximately 11 feet

long and spaced every 20 feet. A 4-inch-wide retroreflective painted solid yellow edgeline

delineated the inside shoulder, and a 4-inch-wide retroreflective painted solid white edgeline

delineated the outside shoulder. The painted lines met the line width and space requirements

specified in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD).31

The eastbound lanes were level approaching the 1,989-foot-long bridge and

transitioned into a 900-foot sag vertical curve32 with a 3-percent grade to the point of

intersection (PI) of a 1,444-foot vertical curve. (The PI of the curve was 632 feet from the

west end of the bridge and 1,356 feet from the east end of the bridge.) At the PI of the

vertical curve, the grade became a 2.2-percent downgrade that transitioned into a 900-foot

sag vertical curve at the end of the bridge.

Bridge Information

The I-40 bridge was built in 1967 and spanned the Arkansas River at M-KARNS

mile marker 360.3. Bridge plans indicate that the I-40 bridge project33 began 2 miles west

of the Arkansas River and extended east in Muskogee and Sequoyah Counties, Oklahoma,

over the Arkansas River.

The Secretary of the Army approved the State of Oklahoma’s bridge permit on

October 22, 1963, for the location and plans of a bridge to be constructed across the

Arkansas River near Webbers Falls. According to the permit, the structure was to be 1,989

feet long, with the main span providing a vertical clearance of 52 feet above flood stage

and a horizontal clearance of 322 feet between the main piers. The remainder of the spans

provided a vertical clearance of approximately 50 feet and a horizontal clearance between

the piers of approximately 125 feet.

31 The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) approved the MUTCD as the standard for all streets

and highways in accordance with 23 U.S.C., Sections 109 (b), 109 (d), 402 (a), and 23 CFR 1204.4.

32 A vertical curve provides a smooth transition from one roadway grade to another; this transition may

be a sag vertical curve (dip) or crest vertical curve (hill).

33 Federal-aid project number I-40-6 (99) 288.
Factual Information 20 Highway Accident Report

The I-40 bridge was a twin-girder, continuous-span bridge consisting of 13

concrete deck sections that were 7.5 inches thick and supported by steel girders and a steel

superstructure that was, in turn, supported by 12 reinforced concrete piers and 2 bridge

abutments. Piers 1 through 4 were west of the main channel, and piers 5 through 12 were

east of the main channel. Piers 4 and 5 constituted the concrete piers for the main spans

and navigable channel. Table 4 lists the dimensions (in feet) of the piers, including the

footings, columns, and pier caps; figure 12 illustrates these pier components.

Table 4. Bridge pier components (in feet).

Pier 

number 

Footing Column 

(section 1) 

Column 

(section 2) 

Column 

(section 3) 

Pier cap 

1 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 20 6 x 30 5 x 32 5 x 66 x 7.5 

2 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 21 6 x 30 5 x 34.5 5 x 66 x 7.5 

3 12 x 18 x 6 7 x 21.83 6 x 30 5 x 37.16 5 x 66 x 7.5 

4 24 x 55 x 7 10 x 49 x 27.33 8 x 47 x 24 6 x 45 x 23.25 6 x 66 x 12 

5 24 x 55 x 7 10 x 49 x 27.33 8 x 47 x 24 6 x 45 x 24.16 6 x 66 x 12 

6 12 x 18 x 6 7 x 19.83 6 x 30 5 x 37.16 5 x 66 x 7.5 

7 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 19 6 x 30 5 x 34.5 5 x 66 x 7.5 

8 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 19 6 x 30 5 x 32 5 x 66 x 7.5 

9 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 18.25 6 x 30 5 x 29.25 5 x 66 x 7.5 

10 12 x 17 x 6 7 x 16.83 6 x 30 5 x 27.16 5 x 66 x 7.5 

11 12 x 17 x 6 6 x 20.83 6 x 23 5 x 23.66 5 x 66 x 7.5 

12 12 x 17 x 6 6 x 21.08 6 x 23 5 x 20.91 5 x 66 x 7.5 

Notes: 

1. Measurements are provided as diameter and length or width, length, and height, as applicable. 

2. At piers 1 through 3 and 6 through 12, each column was interconnected to adjacent columns by use of a web wall (34 

feet x 2 feet x 22 feet). With the exception of the interconnection at the main channel piers 4 and 5, the web wall does not 

have any structural integrity and is used solely to keep drifting debris from accumulating between the pier columns. 
Factual Information 21 Highway Accident Report

The navigational aids attached to the I-40 bridge consisted of red lights (360

degrees) and red reflectors affixed to the steel girders, marking the location of the main

span piers for north and southbound shipping traffic, and green lights and green reflectors,

marking the center of the main span. In addition, red navigation lights and red reflectors

were affixed to the pier protection cells. At the time of the accident, a green unlighted

buoy, located about 0.35 miles from the bridge, marked the upbound, left side of the

channel. (See figure 13.) This buoy was placed about 0.05 miles (264 feet) to the left of

the recommended sailing line on USACE’s waterway chart. 

Figure 13. Pier components.

Footing

Section 1

Section 2

Section 3

Pier cap

Superstructure

Web wall

Figure 12.
Factual Information 22 Highway Accident Report

Figure 14. Location of navigational aides on bridge and on upbound channel marker (buoy). 97 27

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

W

S

G

YY

R

23 16

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S 78 48

L

L

L

L

L

S

S

S

G

S S

S

S

W

S

S

SE

S

S

G

S

S

S

S G

M

Barges

Tugboat

(moved from pre-impact position)

Pier 3

Pier 2

Green navigation

buoy

Riverbank

Riverbank

Red navigation light

Green navigation light

Red navigation light

N

I-40

Pier protection

cells Pier 5

Pier 4

Figure 13.
Factual Information 23 Highway Accident Report

Pier Protection. The channel piers (piers 4 and 5) on the north, or upstream side,

of the bridge had protection cells to shield them from vessel impact. (See figures 14 and

15.) The 41.38-foot-diameter pier protection cells had a horizontal clearance, measured at

right angles to the axis of the channel, of 296 feet and a top elevation of 476 feet. They

consisted of sheet piling driven to bedrock and filled with quarry-run stone from the top of

natural ground to the top of the cell. Additional protection consisted of 10-inch by 18-inch

by 89-foot-long treated timbers attached to the inside face of piers 4 and 5. No other pier

protection systems were installed at the bridge.

Figure 15. Upstream (northern) view of I-40 bridge showing pier protection cells at piers 

4 and 5. (Source: ODOT)

Figure 16. Pier protection cell on upstream side of channel pier 5.

Protection cell at pier 4

Protection cell at pier 5

16.5 feet

41.38 feet

Pier 5

Figure 14.

Figure 15.
Factual Information 24 Highway Accident Report

According to ODOT, the pier protection system for the main channel was installed

in 1984 following previously unreported bridge strikes that resulted in damage that was

discovered during bridge maintenance and substructure inspections. Bridge shift detection

survey data and maintenance reports indicated that superficial cracks had been observed

and recorded on the north (upstream) side of pier 4 during maintenance procedures on

September 1, 1977. The report of a subsequent bridge inspection, performed by Blubaugh

Engineering Company (BEC) in June 1980 for ODOT, also noted this superficial damage

to pier 4 and included comments that this pier had been hit from the north side and had

several cracks. BEC recommended that the cracks be filled with an epoxy grout to prevent

further deterioration of the pier. Bridge repairs, consisting of structurally rebonding

cracks, delaminations, and hollow planes in the Portland cement concrete structures with

an epoxy resin (epoxy injection), were completed during repair projects in June 1983 and

November 1991 and included piers 2 and 4. ODOT submitted an application to the Coast

Guard on November 9, 1982, requesting approval to install pier protection cells at the

channel piers of the I-40 bridge, Arkansas Waterway, mile 360.3; construction of the pier

protection cells was completed on October 9, 1984.

Before this accident, ODOT did not have a bridge-vessel impact risk assessment

program, nor was it required to. As of December 2002, the FHWA’s National Bridge

Inventory (NBI) recorded 32 bridges in Oklahoma that have navigation controls, meaning

that they require a bridge permit (91 percent were built between 1951 and 1990, and 63

percent were built between 1960 and 1970). Since this accident, ODOT has hired a

consultant to evaluate bridges at 12 river crossings using the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Guide Specification and

Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges34 (Vessel Collision Guide

Specifications).

Bridge Standards. In the 1960s, when the I-40 bridge was designed and built,

lateral load requirements for bridge design followed the 1961 and 1965 editions of the

AASHO35 Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges. These standards required the

following lateral loads to be used in the design of bridge piers: wind loads on the

substructure and superstructure, wind loads on the live load (traffic), centrifugal forces

from the live load for curved structures, temperature forces, forces from stream current,

floating ice and debris, earth pressure as applicable, longitudinal force from the live load,

and seismic forces. According to ODOT, except for centrifugal forces and ice floes, the

I-40 bridge was designed for the lateral loads specified in the 1961 and 1965 standards.

Such loads can produce transverse or longitudinal forces on the piers or a combination of

transverse and longitudinal forces. At the time of the allision, lateral load requirements

followed the 2002 AASHTO Standard Specifications for Highway Bridges.

36 None of these

standards required that lateral loads caused by vessel impacts be considered.

34 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Guide Specification and

Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1991).

35 The American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) became AASHTO in the 1970s.

36 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Standard Specifications for

Highway Bridges, 17th ed. (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 2002).
Factual Information 25 Highway Accident Report

When AASHTO published its Vessel Collision Guide Specifications in 1991, the

FHWA recommended their use for bridge design. These specifications recommend

probability-based risk analysis and discuss several analytical methods for selecting a

design vessel, based upon vessels that typically navigate a waterway. To identify bridges

that must continue to function after impact from a design vessel, the specifications

recommend classification of bridges as either “critical” or “regular,” based on

social/survival and security/defense criteria. Critical bridges include transportation routes

to essential facilities such as hospitals, police and fire stations, communications centers,

and bridges crucial for national defense that are part of the Strategic Highway Network

(STRAHNET), including interstate and Federal-aid primary routes. The I-40 bridge would

be classified a critical bridge based upon its being part of STRAHNET. 

In 1993, AASHTO adopted the load and resistance factor design (LRFD)37

specifications for new bridges; the LRFD specifications incorporated the 1991 Vessel

Collision Guide Specifications. According to the FHWA, the full compliance date for the

LRFD is October 2007. (In other words, after October 2007, the LRFD specifications

become the official bridge specifications for federally funded bridge construction.) The

lateral load requirements in the LRFD include those listed above for the standard

specifications and include vehicle and railway collision forces, as well as vessel impact

forces.

Experience Using 1991 AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications in

Florida and Louisiana. The NBI lists 551 Florida bridges with navigation controls (72

percent of which were built between 1951 and 1990) and 261 Louisiana bridges with

navigation controls (75 percent of which were built between 1951 and 1990). A number of

vessel impacts with bridges have occurred in these States, including the ramming of the

Sunshine Skyway Bridge by the Liberian tanker Summit Venture in Tampa, Florida, in

1980,38 the striking of the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in New Orleans, Louisiana, by

large tows in 1964,39 1974,40 and 1984,41 and the striking of the Judge William Seeber

Bridge in New Orleans by a tow and empty hopper barge in 1993.42 Both States currently

use the AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications and the 1994 LRFD

specifications. 

37 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, AASHTO LRFD Bridge

Design Specifications, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1994).

38 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge by the Liberian Bulk

Carrier Summit Venture, Tampa Bay, Florida, May 9, 1980, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-81/03

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1981).

39 Tony M. Ducote and Zolan Prucz, “Vessel Collision Vulnerability of Bridges—Louisiana’s Role and

Perspective,” Proceedings of the 1999 International Bridge Conference (Pittsburgh, PA: Engineers’ Society

of Western Pennsylvania, July 1999). 

40 National Transportation Safety Board, safety recommendation letter to the Greater New Orleans

Expressway Commission, January 8, 1975, regarding Safety Recommendations H-74-40 through –42,

notation 1423.

41 Ducote and Prucz.

42 National Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Towboat Chris Collision With the Judge William Seeber

Bridge New Orleans, Louisiana, May 28, 1993, Highway-Marine Accident Report NTSB/HAR-94/03

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994).
Factual Information 26 Highway Accident Report

According to the Florida bridge engineer responsible for bridge-vessel impact risk

analysis, for the past 15 years, the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) has

designed all new bridges over navigable water using the AASHTO Vessel Design Guide

Specifications and customized risk analysis software.43 This software, based upon the

AASHTO specification, measures the probability of vessel impact, using vessel data

gathered by USACE for all waterways in Florida. The University of Florida’s Bridge

Software Institute has also developed structural analysis software (FBPier) to determine

the plastic structural strength capability of bridge piers subject to vessel impacts. The

Florida bridge engineer responsible for vessel impact risk analysis indicated that the

average engineering costs to perform vessel impact risk analysis using the structural

analysis software should be about the same as those for scour assessments, or

approximately $40,000. 

In addition, during spring 2004, FDOT measured barge impact forces directly in

conjunction with the replacement of the State Route 300-Saint George Island Causeway

near Apalachicola, Florida. After the new bridge was open to traffic, Florida test crashed a

hopper barge into the older structure at various speeds to obtain direct measurements via

instrumentation of the lateral forces imparted to the bridge piers. The purpose of such

testing, according to Florida bridge engineers, is to obtain “reliable and accurate barge

impact-load data for use in bridge design, retrofit, and evaluation” and to ensure that “the

lateral impact loads used for design are effective but do not result in unnecessarily

expensive bridge designs.”44 FDOT has completed its physical testing and is analyzing the

results. According to the Florida bridge engineer responsible for vessel impact risk

analysis, lateral loads computed using the Vessel Collision Guide Specifications can

increase the cost of bridge substructures by a factor of 2 to 5.

Louisiana has also developed methods to determine the vulnerability of bridges to

vessel impact. In 1984 and 1988, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and

Development (Louisiana DOTD) and the FHWA-sponsored research that led to the

development of the Vessel Collision Guide Specifications.

45 Later, after the 1993 Judge

William Seeber Bridge accident in New Orleans,46 the Louisiana DOTD started a program

to determine the vulnerability to vessel impact of Louisiana bridges over navigable water.

The Louisiana DOTD selected 56 of the State’s almost 200 bridges over navigable

waterways and, working with contractors, examined these bridges to determine the

vulnerability to vessel impact and collapse using the criteria in the 1991 Vessel Collision

Guide Specifications and the 1994 LRFD bridge specifications. The bridge evaluation

found that approximately 50 percent of the bridges examined had vulnerability “above

established acceptable risk levels” for main piers, approach bents, and superstructure

components. Recommended remedies included both physical protection (pier

43 Vessel Impact Analysis, version 3.05, was developed by the University of Florida for FDOT and is

accessible from the FDOT software library <http://www.dot.state.fl.us/structures/proglib.htm>.

44 Gary Consolazio, Ronald A. Cook, Henry T. Bollman, and J. Darryll Dockstader, “Barge Impacts on

Bridges” TR News 221 (July-August 2002) 29.

45 Ducote and Prucz.

46 NTSB/HAR-94/03.
Factual Information 27 Highway Accident Report

strengthening and pier protection) and preventive measures (installing aids to navigation

and limiting the speed of large ships). For instance, the report recommended pier

strengthening for one of the channel piers, a two-column bent, of a bridge that crosses the

Mississippi River in New Orleans, at an estimated cost of $500,000.

Bridge Management Systems

Bridge management systems (BMSs) are an outgrowth of the NBI and bridge

inspection procedures established after the 1967 Silver Bridge collapse47 and are one of six

State management systems once mandated48 by the Intermodal Surface Transportation

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). According to AASHTO, a BMS combines management,

engineering, and economic inputs to help determine the best actions to take on all bridges

in a network over time. A BMS helps engineers and decision makers determine when and

where to spend bridge funds so as to “enhance safety, preserve existing infrastructure, and

serve commerce and the motoring public.”49

Bridge Sufficiency Ratings 

The FHWA calculates computer-generated bridge sufficiency ratings for all U.S.

bridges based on National Bridge Inventory and inspection data submitted by State and

local agency bridge inspectors. The sufficiency rating is a numerical rating for a bridge

based on its structural adequacy and safety, its serviceability and functional obsolescence,

and its essentiality for public use.50 (See figure 16.) Ratings range from 0 (worst) to 100

(best) and are indicative of a bridge’s sufficiency to remain in service. The FHWA uses

sufficiency ratings in determining which bridges are eligible for Federal-aid funds.

Deficient bridges with sufficiency ratings less than 50 are eligible for complete

replacement, and deficient bridges with sufficiency ratings less than 80 are eligible for

rehabilitation. The sufficiency rating does not include vulnerability to vessel impact.

The June 2001 sufficiency rating for the I-40 bridge was 67. According to the

FHWA’s 2001 NBI data, the average age of the 1,177 interstate bridges in Oklahoma is 37

years, and the average sufficiency rating is 76.2. Nationwide, the average age of the

55,263 interstate bridges is 34 years, and the average sufficiency rating is 85.7.

47 National Transportation Safety Board, Collapse of the U.S. 35 Highway Bridge, Point Pleasant, West

Virginia, December 15, 1967, Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-71/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB,

1971).

48 The use of a formal BMS is now optional, as outlined in 23 CFR Part 500 and as amended by the

National Highway System Act of 1995.

49 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Guidelines for Bridge

Management Systems (Washington, DC: AASHTO, 1993) 2.

50 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Recording and Coding Guide

for the Structure Inventory and Appraisal of the Nation’s Bridges, FHWA-PD-96-001 (Washington, DC:

FHWA, 1995) appendix B.
Factual Information 28 Highway Accident Report

According to ODOT, three bridge inventory items had the most significant effect

on the I-40 bridge sufficiency rating: ADT (item 29), substructure (item 60), and bridge

roadway width (item 51). Further, according to ODOT, if the ADT (item 29) were reduced

to 132 or less, the sufficiency rating could be increased by almost 13 points. If the

substructure rating (item 60), which is now 5, were 6 or more, the sufficiency rating would

increase by 11 points.51 Finally, the bridge roadway width (item 51) should equal the

approach roadway width. The I-40 bridge is 64 feet wide and the roadway approaching it

is 84 feet wide, thereby lowering the bridge’s sufficiency rating by 6 points. 

Figure 17. FHWA sufficiency rating factors. (Source: FHWA)

51 According to ODOT, the substructure rating was reduced to 5 because of erosion, with undermining

of the west abutment, and spalling, with exposed reinforcing, on some of the pier caps.

Figure 16.
Factual Information 29 Highway Accident Report

A bridge inventory item’s effect on the sufficiency rating is calculated as a

percentage, and its value thus varies depending on the bridge’s overall sufficiency rating. For

example, if a sufficiency rating is 67, a change in the length of the detour route may change

the sufficiency rating by 2.7 points. If a sufficiency rating is 98, the same change in the

length of the detour route would affect the sufficiency rating by 0.1 points. Table 5 shows the

bridge inventory items that reduced the I-40 bridge’s sufficiency rating from 100 to 67.

Table 5. I-40 bridge sufficiency rating reductions.

Meteorological Information

Observations from the Oklahoma Climatological Survey’s Webbers Falls automatic

environmental monitoring station 2.2 miles upriver from the accident site showed that at

0745 the air temperature was 64o F, the relative humidity was 92 percent, and the winds were

variable at 3 to 5 mph. Sunrise was about 0610. In addition, at 0753, the National Weather

Service station at Muskogee Davis Field, about 18 miles northwest of the accident site,

reported overcast conditions with surface visibility of 10 miles. According to the captain of

the Robert Y. Love, the skies were partly cloudy and visibility was clear.

Medical and Pathological Information

Postaccident Toxicology

As required by both 46 CFR 16.24052 and company policy,53 toxicological testing

was conducted on the captain following the accident. At 1115, a blood sample was taken

52 Title 46 CFR 16.240 requires that the company perform toxicological testing on any crew involved in

a “serious marine incident.” Title 49 CFR 40.85 specifies the five drugs for which the laboratory tests.

53 Vessel Operations Procedures Manual—Section 4, subsection “Policy,” heading “Drug and Alcohol

Policy.”

Bridge 

inventory 

item 

number 

Item description I-40 bridge Best results Reduction Cumulative 

sufficiency 

rating 

Item 19 Detour length 9 miles 5 miles or less 0.1 99.9 

Item 29 ADT 21,610 132 or less 12.9 87.0 

Item 51 Bridge roadway 

width 

64 feet 84 feet 

(roadway 

width) 

6.0 81.0 

Item 58 Deck rating 5 7 or more 1.0 80.0 

Item 59 Superstructure 

rating 

6 7 or more 0.0 80.0 

Item 60 Substructure rating 5 7 or more 11.0 69.0 

Item 100 Defense highway 

designation 

STRAHNET Not 

STRAHNET 

2.0 67.0 
Factual Information 30 Highway Accident Report

from the captain at the Muskogee Immediate Care Clinic and, at the request of Safety

Board investigators on scene, a split sample of the blood specimen was sent to the Civil

Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for testing. The captain

tested negative for the five illicit drugs: marijuana, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidines

(PCPs), and amphetamines.54 Testing results were also negative for benzodiazepines,

barbiturates, antidepressants, meprobamate, methaqualone, and nicotine.

At 1345, a urine sample was also collected at the Muskogee Immediate Care

Clinic. The samples were sent to the Clinical Reference Laboratory in Lenexa, Kansas, by

Federal Express. Testing was negative for marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites,

phencyclidine, opiates metabolites, and amphetamines. Further, alcohol was not detected

in either the captain’s blood or urine specimens.

The CAMI testing detected a low level of the antihistamine diphenhydramine55 in

both the captain’s blood (0.009 ug/ml) and urine (0.083 ug/ml). The captain stated that he

had occasional sinus problems and carried Benadryl® with him for use when needed; he

noted he had taken two Benadryl® capsules to treat a sinus headache the night before the

accident. The captain stated that he did not drink alcohol and was not taking any

prescription medicines at the time of the accident. Inquiries made at pharmacies near the

captain’s home revealed no prescriptions filled for him in the 90 days before the accident.

Postaccident drug tests were also conducted on the other crewmembers on duty at

the time of the allision. Urine samples were taken from the deckhand, the chief engineer,

and the mate on May 28, 2002, at 0945, 0950, and 0955, respectively. The samples were

tested for the five illicit drugs mentioned earlier in this section; test results were negative.

No postaccident alcohol testing was conducted on the other crewmembers, nor was it

required because they were not on duty during the accident.

Medical Information

The Safety Board reviewed the captain’s preaccident medical records, including

Coast Guard medical records, employer medical records, personal medical records,

hospital records, pharmacy records, and health insurance records. They revealed treatment

for short-term illnesses and injuries, with complete resolution of symptoms.

In 1992, the captain underwent a nonfasting measurement of total cholesterol and

triglycerides in conjunction with a Coast Guard-required physical examination for license

renewal. The values were elevated, but no additional evaluation of this report was noted. The

captain’s most recent Coast Guard-required physical examination for license renewal,

performed November 3, 1997, indicated no medication use and no abnormal physical

findings. The captain stated that he did not have a history of heart or vascular disease, heart

surgery, dizziness or fainting, or periods of unconsciousness. The examination form also

54 “Dangerous drugs” are further referenced in the Coast Guard regulations at 46 CFR 4.06-40, 46 CFR

5.35, and 46 CFR 5.59, and are defined at 46 CFR 16.105. The regulations at 46 CFR 113 require testing for

marijuana, cocaine, opiates, PCPs, and amphetamines.

55 An over-the-counter sedating antihistamine commonly used to treat allergic conditions, often known

by the trade name Benadryl®.
Factual Information 31 Highway Accident Report

indicated that the captain’s vision was corrected to a visual acuity of 20/20.56 His field of

vision was found to be 180° and his color vision was normal. When asked about his hearing,

the captain stated that he had his hearing checked frequently and that he had lost 10 to 15

percent of his hearing. The captain’s physical exam found his hearing to be normal.

Following this accident, the captain was admitted to a local regional medical center

for examination, observation, and comprehensive medical testing. Heart function was noted

to be normal on stress testing and echocardiography. A nuclear medicine imaging study

performed in conjunction with the stress test was reported as negative for significant

reduction in blood flow.57 All testing results were essentially normal, except for total

occlusion of the mid-left circumflex coronary artery discovered on cardiac catheterization.

Later, the captain was admitted to a hospital nearer his home, where he underwent a

diagnostic electrophysiology study (EPS),58 in which serious abnormal heart rhythms were

generated, and also underwent subsequent implantation of an implantable cardioverter

defibrillator (ICD) because of, according to the captain’s cardiologist, his “inducible

ventricular flutter59 with known coronary disease” and “recent syncope.’’60 The Safety Board

reviewed posthospitalization records prepared by the captain’s cardiologist, which showed

that the captain’s implantable cardioverter defibrillator had not delivered any defibrillation

shocks in the 23 months following its implantation. In that time, the defibrillator had

recorded two episodes (June 21, 2002, [5 beats] and October 13, 2003, [5 beats]) of

nonsustained ventricular tachycardia.61 In addition, the device recorded four episodes of

sustained tachycardia62 during a 25-minute period on February 23, 2004. The episodes lasted

between 22 seconds and 1.6 minutes, and the most rapid average ventricular heart rate for

these four episodes was 182 beats per minute. Three of these episodes resulted in the

pacemaker function of the device operating in an attempt to reduce the heart rate. The

cardiology records did not note any symptoms of dizziness or loss of consciousness.

The captain described his health as good; he reported that he had recently suffered

some dizzy spells at home, which he attributed to overexertion from yard work. He also

had sustained a dizzy spell and nausea while on board the towboat Jennie Dehmer on the

56 20/20 refers to Snellen acuity, a measure of the ability to identify an object (typically a letter) of a

certain size at a specified distance. Visual acuity of 20/20 is considered “normal” vision.

57 Such imaging, performed in conjunction with stress testing, is highly predictive of both the absence

of significant coronary artery disease and a low risk of cardiac death; cardiac catheterization is usually not

required. (See R.A. Nishimura, R.J. Gibbons, and A.J. Tajik, “Noninvasive Cardiac Imaging:

Echocardiography and Nuclear Cardiology,” Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine, 15th ed., eds. E.

Braunwald and others [New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001]). 

58 A procedure in which electric stimuli are applied to the inside of the heart to try to cause abnormal

heart rhythms.

59 A serious abnormal heart rhythm caused by the electric stimuli applied during the EPS study noted above.

60 Syncope is a loss of consciousness resulting from an interruption of blood flow to the brain and refers

here to the captain’s episode of incapacitation that immediately preceded the accident. 

61 A short series of rapid abnormal heartbeats that does not progress to a continuing abnormal heart rhythm.

62 An elevated heart rate that persists beyond several seconds. The recorded information from the

device was insufficiently detailed to determine whether these episodes represented the serious abnormal

rhythm of ventricular tachycardia or some other type of rhythm (including normal heart rate response to

stress) that would result in an elevated heart rate.
Factual Information 32 Highway Accident Report

Wednesday (May 22, 2002) before this accident, while preparing lunch for the crew. He

said that after he lay down, his rest was interrupted twice by phone calls. He stated that

when called for watch about 1700, he felt “fine.”

Survival Aspects

Eleven vehicles carrying 19 occupants either collapsed with or drove off the

bridge. Occupant protection use and injuries within each vehicle were as follows:

Vehicle 1—2002 Honda Odyssey EX. The driver’s air bag deployed. The

35-year-old male driver sustained fatal blunt trauma injuries. During recovery operations,

he was found without the seat belt buckled across his lap. The passenger compartment was

extensively crushed and destroyed.

Vehicle 2—2001 Dodge 3500 Pickup Quad Cab. Both front air bags deployed.

Two female occupants, one 49 years old and the other 47 years old, drowned. During

recovery operations, they were both removed from the severely mangled passenger

compartment; their seat belts were not fastened.

Vehicle 3—2001 Dodge Ram 2500 Laramie SLT. Both front air bags deployed.

The belted 59-year-old male driver sustained minor injuries. The 58-year-old female

passenger drowned. During recovery operations, she was removed from the passenger seat

with her seat belt fastened.

Vehicle 4—2001 Dodge Dakota Quad Cab SLT Pickup. Both air bags deployed.

The belted 67-year-old male driver sustained serious injuries (compression fractures of the

L2 and L3 vertebrae). The belted 68-year-old female passenger sustained serious injuries

(a 10th left rib lateral fracture and an upper-right-arm hematoma).

Vehicle 5—1999 Ford Expedition XLT. Both air bags deployed. The 30-year-old

male driver, who was found during recovery operations with seat belt unbuckled,

drowned. The 29-year-old female passenger, who was removed during recovery

operations from the passenger seat with her seat belt fastened, also drowned. A 3-year-old

female, reportedly traveling in a car seat, drowned; her body was found floating 50 feet off

the river bank, approximately 0.5 mile south of the recovery barge.

Vehicle 6—2001 Volvo Truck. The driver’s air bag deployed. The belted 39-year-old

male driver drowned.

Vehicle 7—1999 Freightliner Truck Tractor-Semitrailer. The vehicle did not

have an air bag. The belted 37-year-old male driver sustained serious injuries (a fractured

right ninth rib, multiple abrasions, and facial lacerations and contusions).

Vehicle 8—2002 Chevrolet 1500 Ex-Cab. Vehicle damage prevented

investigators from determining whether the air bag deployed. Both the belted 49-year-old

male driver and the belted 49-year-old female passenger drowned.
Factual Information 33 Highway Accident Report

Vehicle 9—2001 Dodge Ram 2500. Both air bags deployed. The 58-year-old

male driver, found with the unbuckled seat belt across his body, drowned. The unbelted

57-year-old female passenger also drowned.

Vehicle 10—1997 Ford Crown Victoria. Both front air bags deployed. Both the

belted 51-year-old male driver and the belted 50-year-old female passenger drowned.

Vehicle 11—Mack Truck Tractor-Semitrailer ABF. The vehicle did not have an

air bag. The belted 62-year-old male driver sustained minor injuries (a nose laceration,

bilateral knee abrasions, forearm abrasions, and head and chest blunt trauma).

Tests and Research

Vessel

The vessel’s chief engineer stated that he observed the steering system to be

operating normally before the accident. Following the accident, Safety Board investigators

examined the Robert Y. Love’s port and starboard steering systems. Investigators tested the

system controls from both the wheelhouse control station and the local control station in the

steering gear room. The system operated within established parameters; the swing rate for

the rudders was approximately 9 seconds for each hydraulic unit operating independently,

and the rudders operated over their full range, left and right, without difficulty. 

The vessel’s chief engineer stated that he observed the propulsion system to be

operating normally before the accident. Following the accident, the main propulsion engines

were observed to be operating normally at idle conditions; the unstable barge-bridge

on-scene situation precluded more thorough examination of the engine control system. 

No one noted oil leaking from any of the vessels in the tow. The Coast Guard Gulf

Strike Team was on scene until July 13, 2002, monitoring the situation in the event of a

pollution incident.

The Robert Y. Love was not fitted with a voyage data recorder, nor was it required

to be. 

Global Positioning System

The navigation global positioning system (GPS) unit (Furuno model GP 31),

located in the wheelhouse, was removed from the Robert Y. Love and shipped to the Safety

Board’s Research and Engineering laboratory for extraction of saved track data. The

Furuno model GP 31 is a standard, bridge-mounted unit consisting of a display, soft key

controls, and a 12-channel receiver. This GPS unit can store latitude and longitude

information for 950 predefined waypoints63 and also define and store information for up to

63 A waypoint is a particular location on a voyage. Waypoint memory is typically used to store locations

that have particular significance, such as a landmark or a particular navigational point of reference.
Factual Information 34 Highway Accident Report

50 routes, each comprising up to 30 predefined waypoints. It can store latitude and

longitude information for up to 1,000 track log points in a separate area of memory. The

track log data points represent “snapshots” of the current position of the GPS unit, taken

and automatically stored at programmable preset intervals.

The GPS unit saved latitude and longitude positions, but not time information.

Postaccident activation of the unit revealed that (1) the unit was set to acquire and store

track data once every 0.12 miles, (2) data were sent to both serial ports 1 and 2 using

version 2 of the National Marine Electronics Association communication protocols, and

(3) GPS latitude and longitude information was recorded using the World Geodetic

System 1984 (WGS 84) geodetic reference.64

Investigators saved, transferred to waypoint memory, and downloaded from the

GPS unit 181 plotter track log points, plotting the downloaded track data against both

digital and print source maps, including an aerial photograph of the Arkansas River taken

by ODOT. They also plotted Coast Guard-supplied latitude and longitude coordinates for

the buoys marking the channel onto the ODOT-supplied aerial photograph. (See figure 17.)

64 WGS 84 is the international standard most commonly used in portable and hand-held GPS navigation

units and computer-based mapping software. 

Figure 18. GPS track of the Robert Y. Love and tow as plotted on ODOT aerial photograph of upbound approach to I-40 bridge. (Source: Safety Board, with input from ODOT

and Coast Guard)

Main channel

Buoy

Tow's track

Figure 17.
Factual Information 35 Highway Accident Report

Sight Distance

Safety Board investigators interviewed three of the four surviving highway vehicle

drivers. They reported traveling at speeds ranging from 57 to 75 mph. Two of the drivers

reported vehicles in front of them “disappearing”; both thought the vehicles had driven

over the “crown” or “rise” of the bridge. The third driver stated that he was unaware of any

bridge problems until he passed over a “rise” and saw that the bridge was out. One of the

drivers stated that he applied his brakes, but was unable to stop before driving off the edge.

Safety Board investigators also conducted a physical examination of the roadway,

including photographs and videotapes of both the eastbound and westbound approaches to

the collapsed bridge section. The videotapes and photographs were taken every 50 feet

from eye heights representative of passenger cars (42 inches above the ground) and

tractor-semitrailers (94.5 inches above the ground). In addition, accident skid marks in the

westbound lanes of I-40 were identified, the longest measuring 170 feet.

The first point of possible perception is the first time and place that a hazard can be

perceived by a normal, unimpaired driver. After physically examining the approaches to

collapsed sections of bridge and reviewing photographs and videotapes, investigators

determined the first points of possible perception for the missing bridge section to be as

shown in table 6.

Table 6. Sight distances for approaches to void in bridge.

Time Distance

On August 21, 2002, Safety Board investigators recreated the approach to the I-40

bridge in a Coast Guard auxiliary vessel traveling 6.7 mph,65 which represented the

accident vessel’s average speed. It took approximately 4 minutes to travel the distance

from the upbound channel marker (shown in figure 13) to the bridge.

I-40 direction Vehicle type Distance (feet)

Eastbound Passenger 200

Eastbound Tractor-semitrailer 300

Westbound Passenger 150

Westbound Tractor-semitrailer 350

65 From 0410, the departure time from lock 15 (mile 336.2) until 0745, the time of the allision with the

I-40 bridge (mile 360.3), the Robert Y. Love and tow averaged 6.7 mph.
Factual Information 36 Highway Accident Report

Other Information

Licensed Operators’ Hours of Service

The hours of service or hours “on watch” per day for the licensed towboat

wheelhouse watch personnel (the captain and the pilot) are specified at 46 U.S.C. 8104(h),

which states that “an individual licensed to operate a towing vessel may not work for more

than 12 hours in a consecutive 24-hour period except in an emergency.” A licensed

operator on a towing vessel can work any combination of hours, as long as that person is

not on watch for more than 12 hours in any 24-hour period. 

Not included in the 12-hour work period is standby time, for example, when the vessel

is underway, but not moving or waiting to move through a lock or waiting for a tow to be

formed. Also not included in the 12-hour work period is the operator’s commuting time to a

vessel. No regulation or requirement specifies the hours of rest a licensed, uninspected towing

vessel operator must have before reporting on board to assume or relieve a watch.

According to MMT, the company complies with the hours-of-service law limiting

licensed wheelhouse personnel (captain and pilot) to 12 hours of work in a consecutive

24-hour period. The company does not limit a captain’s or pilot’s prevoyage commuting

distance or time. Inland towing companies normally provide the crew with vehicles to use

for their commute, but they do not provide drivers.

Towboat Operator Incapacitation Accidents

The Coast Guard’s Accident/Incident Database for 1999 to 2003 contained three

towboat accidents in which the towboat operator’s incapacitation was identified as the

causal factor.

• On February 11, 1999, the pilot of the towboat Gale C passed out and the tow

became entangled in trees along the bank of the LMR. The unconscious pilot

was taken to a hospital; he was later diagnosed with diabetes.

• On November 4, 1999, the pilot of the towboat Carol P suffered a stroke. The

tow struck a revetment (embankment) on the right bank of the LMR, damaging

2 of 20 loaded barges.

• On March 31, 2003, the pilot of the towboat Don File fell from the helm chair

and injured the back of his head. As he was lifting himself back into the chair,

the chair’s arm broke, and he fell to the deck, rendering himself unconscious.

The tow and eight barges allided with a small fleet of barges, loaded with

stone, at mile 586.2 on the Ohio River.

Alerter Systems

After the I-40 bridge accident, segments of the marine inland towing industry

developed alerter systems for use on inland towing vessels. Two systems are being

evaluated by the industry. One of the systems continuously monitors steering rudder
Factual Information 37 Highway Accident Report

movements while the tow is underway. It is designed to sound an audible alarm in the

wheelhouse if the steering levers are not moved within a given time period. (The systems

installed so far use a 2-minute period.) If the captain or pilot on duty does not answer the

wheelhouse alarm within 30 seconds, secondary alarms are activated in the captain’s and

pilot’s cabins and in a centrally located crew area. At least one company, American River

Transportation Company (ARTCO), has installed this system on all 30 of its line-haul

towboats and 30 tug or harbor boats. According to ARTCO, the crews like the system and

the wheelmen accept it. As of December 2003, MMT, the owner of the Robert Y. Love, had

installed the system on five of its towboats and was evaluating its performance for

possible installation on the remainder of its fleet. MMT told Safety Board investigators in

June 2004 that this system has been installed on its entire fleet of 16 towboats. 

A second type of system currently available detects the physical movements of the

operator in the wheelhouse. If no movement is detected in the wheelhouse, the system

sounds an alarm to alert the crew. The detection system extends no closer than about 2 feet

from the deck, so that a person who had collapsed but still was thrashing around on the

deck would not prevent the alarm from sounding. At least one major inland towing

company, the Kirby Corporation, has installed this system on its towboats; a company

representative stated that the system has performed satisfactorily.

American Waterways Operators

The American Waterways Operators (AWO) is a national association representing

the inland and coastal tugboat, towboat, and barge industry in the United States. Each year,

more than 5,000 tugboats and towboats and more than 25,000 barges carry some 800

million tons of cargo along the Nation’s inland and coastal waterways, or about 15 percent

of all U.S. freight. The AWO represents about 75 percent of the industry nationwide,

which accounts for about 85 percent of the ton-miles of towed traffic. Association

members include more than 375 companies and operate more than 25,324 vessels.

In 1994, the AWO instituted a safety management system for its members in the

tugboat, towboat, and barge industry known as the Responsible Carrier Program (RCP).

The RCP establishes voluntary company safety and environmental protection practices

that exceed Government standards in areas that include comprehensive crew training,

vessel maintenance procedures, and equipment requirements. Further, the RCP requires

that a qualified outside auditor periodically assess the adequacy of the program and the

company’s compliance. All AWO members must have an approved and active RCP. At the

time of the accident, MMT, the owner of the Robert Y. Love, had an approved and active

RCP and was a member of the AWO.

Coast Guard-AWO Safety Partnership

Allison Work Group. After this accident, the Coast Guard-AWO Safety

Partnership66 convened a working group to determine what could be done to correct

problems related to bridge allisions. As part of its research, the group reviewed the Coast
Factual Information 38 Highway Accident Report

Guard marine accident database for the years 1992 to 2001 to identify bridge allisions

involving inland towing vessels and barges. The group found 2,692 bridge allisions

involving towing vessels and barges from a tow or breakaway barges, as shown in table 7.

Table 7. Distribution of 2,692 bridge allisions among 559 

bridges from 1992 to 2001.

66 Central to the structure of the Coast Guard-AWO Safety Partnership is the National Quality Steering

Committee, which comprises senior Coast Guard and industry leaders

<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/nmc/ptp/ptpart/awo.htm>.

Frequency of allisions Number of bridges 

170 1

91-100 2

81-90 0

71-80 1

61-70 2

51-60 0

41-50 9

31-40 1

21-30 10

11-20 19

10 5

9 7

8 10

7 10

6 14

5 24

4 25

3 45

2 89

1 285
Factual Information 39 Highway Accident Report

Using USACE’s latest data for the year 2000, the working group calculated a ratio

of 6 bridge allisions for every 10,000 towing vessel trips. It grouped the 2,692 bridge

allision accidents into five severity classes, as shown in table 8.

Table 8. Bridge allision severity groups.

The working group also conducted a statistical analysis of the database, which

yielded information about the most frequently hit bridges, the bridges that sustained the

most damage, and the bridges scheduled for alteration or removal under the TrumanHobbs Act.67 The group found no record of any previous allision with the I-40 bridge. The

working group concluded in its report,68 “Analyses of the allisions by vessel

characteristics (e.g., length, horsepower, etc.), time of day of the accident, and occurrence

of a pollution incident showed no correlations or patterns suggesting fruitful areas for

further study.”

Rather than analyze all 2,692 cases individually, the Group opted to examine 473

cases, constituting all of the cases from severity classes 3 and 4 and a random sample from

the other severity classes. Of the 473 cases, the working group analyzed causal factors

analysis on 459,69 of which one case cited operator incapacitation as the initiating event

for an accident. The resulting analyses indicated that 90 percent of allisions were caused

by human performance errors, primarily faulty decision-making; 5 percent, by equipment

failures; and 5 percent, by undetermined causes. 

In discussing the results of this study with Safety Board staff, the AWO’s president

stated that the analyses did not show a causal link between the accident data and operator

fatigue, manning levels, or the use of over-the-counter medications; the AWO president

also stated that he recognized that the data were incomplete with regard to human factors

issues. To provide future analysts with more detailed information than was available in

most of the cases reviewed by the working group, the working group’s report

recommended that the Coast Guard implement a special investigative effort for bridge

67 Enacted June 21, 1940, the act, as amended (54 Stat. 497; 33 U.S.C. 511-523), provides authority to

the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to alter or remove obstructive bridges across the navigable waters of

the United States.

68 Report of the U.S. Coast Guard–American Waterways Operators Bridge Allision Work Group, May

2003. 

69 The group deemed 14 cases unusable for analysis because of missing files or data entry problems.

Severity class Number of accidents Results 

0 1,702 No damage 

1 610 Damage $1 to $25,000 

2 220 Damage $25,001 to $100,000 

3 99 Damage $100,001 to $500,000 

4 61 Damage over $500,000 or loss of life,* or 

injury/injuries, missing persons, or oil spilled 

*Three of the accidents resulted in fatalities. 
Factual Information 40 Highway Accident Report

allision incidents in which the preliminary investigation showed human factors issues as a

possible causal factor. The report further recommended that Coast Guard and AWO

analysts regularly evaluate the data from these completed investigations and report their

findings to the National Quality Steering Committee of the Coast Guard-AWO Safety

Partnership. The working group also recommended that the Coast Guard and AWO work

jointly to:

• Identify vulnerable bridges requiring measures to prevent and/or mitigate

allisions, taking into consideration the costs and benefits of requiring

additional protection.

• Develop best practices for transiting bridges vulnerable to allision, and train

operators in these practices.

• Require route familiarization, posting,70 or a check-ride before permitting an

operator to navigate alone under a vulnerable bridge.

• Improve Coast Guard-industry information sharing on near-misses.

• Require that the towing industry implement Crew Endurance Management

Systems (CEMSs).71

• Accelerate the removal and alteration of “unreasonably obstructive” bridges

under the authority of the Truman-Hobbs Act.72 The working group’s report

noted, “More than 900 bridge allisions—34 percent of all allisions between

1992-2001—occurred at bridges under order to be altered or on the TrumanHobbs backlog priority list.”

The working group also recommended that the Coast Guard Research and

Development Center use this report as a basis for future studies on synergistic

combinations of actions resulting from the recommendations above.

70 Western River term for the process of familiarizing a licensed pilot with specific sections of a river

under the supervision of an experienced, licensed pilot. Once a pilot is considered qualified to navigate a

section of river, he or she is considered “posted.”

71 This process, derived from the CEMS originally developed for the Army Safety Center in the early

1990s, allows companies to produce work and rest management plans that optimize alertness and

performance during duty hours and subsequently develop a crew endurance plan that meets their specific

needs. The CEMS coordinates a network of interrelated factors such as (1) company mission (for example,

provide transport for oil companies); (2) equipment limitations (for example, type of vessel, and onboard

crew facilities); (3) environmental factors (for example, voyage duration, noise, and light levels); (4)

crewmembers’ physiological and psychological limitations; and (5) crew rest and work hours policies. 

72 This authority is delegated to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. The Commandant,

represented by the Chief, Office of Bridge Administration (G-OPT), manages the alteration program for

unreasonably obstructive bridges, including providing planning, programming, and budgeting; legal

interpretations; and technical engineering assistance. The laws relating to unreasonably obstructive bridges

across the navigable waters of the United States are contained in the following statutes: (1) The Rivers and

Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, section 18 (30 Stat. 1153; 33 U.S.C. 502); (2) The Bridge Act of 1906,

sections 4 and 5 (34 Stat. 85; 33 U.S.C. 494-495); and (3) The Act of June 21, 1940, as amended (TrumanHobbs Act), (54 Stat. 497; 33 U.S.C. 511-523).
Factual Information 41 Highway Accident Report

Recent Developments. In November 2003, the AWO held a joint meeting of the

AWO Interregion and Coastal Safety Committees in Baltimore, Maryland. At this

meeting, participants discussed safety issues that affect the marine towing industry, such

as the safety of bridge transits and towing vessel operator incapacitation.

Discussions during the joint meeting of these safety committees indicated that

inland marine training facilities in Houston, Texas, and Paducah, Kentucky, have

incorporated incapacitation scenarios in their towboat crewmember training simulations.

In addition, the AWO safety committees have developed procedures for inclusion in RCP

practices concerning operator incapacitation and bridge transit procedures. These

procedures include provisions for on-duty personnel to check the wheelhouse hourly, or

before navigating through bridges or through restricted or narrow channels, to ensure that

the wheelman is alert and in control of the vessel; they also contain actions to be taken

when a wheelman is found incapacitated. The AWO Board has not yet taken an official

position on the wheelhouse monitoring and bridge transit procedures; its evaluation is

ongoing. 

Crew endurance management, which provides the ability to maintain performance

within safety limits while enduring job-related physical, psychological, and environmental

challenges. CEMS demonstration projects are underway in at least eight companies and on

40 towing vessels, and 150 CEMS “coaches” have been trained, according to the AWO. In

addition, the Coast Guard has, for a number of years, been working with the towing

industry, through the AWO and its member companies, in demonstration project(s) using

CEMSs on towing vessels. This project aims to develop a system for managing the risk

factors that can lead to human error and performance degradation in maritime work

environments. One goal of this project is to ensure sufficient hours of uninterrupted sleep

for watchstanders within the existing hours of duty. 

The Coast Guard is now required to report to Congress on CEMS initiatives. On

August 9, 2004, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 became Public

Law 108-293, which amends section 409, “Hours of Service on Towing Vessels” as

follows:

(b) Demonstration Project. Prior to prescribing regulations under this section the

Secretary shall conduct and report to the Congress on the results of a

demonstration project involving the implementation of Crew Endurance

Management Systems on towing vessels. The report shall include a description of

the public and private sector resources needed to enable implementation of Crew

Endurance Management Systems on all United States-flag towing vessels.
Factual Information 42 Highway Accident Report

Motorist Warning Systems

About 0210 on September 15, 2001, the towboat Brown Water V, pushing four

barges,73 struck the Queen Isabella Causeway, which connects South Padre Island to the

mainland in Cameron County, Texas.74 The allision caused two spans of the 2.37-mile-long

causeway to collapse. Ten passenger vehicles either fell with the collapsing sections or

drove off the end of the remaining roadway structure, resulting in eight fatalities. A third

adjacent section of the bridge collapsed later that day. Bridge repair costs totaled

approximately $14.2 million, including $2.3 for demolition, $4.8 million for

reconstruction, and $7.1 million for ferries to provide temporary transportation.

Weather conditions reported at 0210 by Brownsville International Airport, 18 miles

southwest of the accident site, were as follows: 7 miles of visibility, temperature 74° F,

peak wind gusts out of the south-southeast (160°T) at 18.2 knots (21 mph), no

precipitation, and clear skies. According to the Coast Guard, the water current across the

flats of the Laguna Madre Bay was approximately 4 to 5 mph, running from the southeast

toward the northwest, almost in line with the channel. 

The collapsed causeway, with a 2001 ADT of 23,069, was the only vehicular link

from South Padre Island to the mainland. Opened to traffic in 1974, it was constructed

solely with State funds and spanned the Laguna Bay at the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway at

mile marker 667.4 at Port Isabel, Texas. The main channel span, at piers 35 and 36, had a

horizontal clearance of 275 feet between the fender systems and a vertical clearance of 73

feet. The channel piers had pier protection. The tow struck the unprotected pier 32, 175

feet west of the channel. (See figures 18A and 18B.)

73 The barges had a draft of approximately 9 feet, the overall length of the tow was 851.1 feet, and the

combined weight of the vessels and their cargo was 9,030.9 tons. The Brown Water V was propelled by 600

horsepower.

74 NTSB docket number HWY-01-I-H036.
Factual Information 43 Highway Accident Report

Figure 19. Channel piers and damaged piers and collapsed section.

Figure 20. Pier protection on east channel pier.

Figure 18A.

Figure 18B.
Factual Information 44 Highway Accident Report

After the 2001 accident, the Texas Department of Transportation installed an early

warning collapse detection system. The $850,000 system, which became operational in

March 2004, consists of fiber-optic cable, “STOP WHEN FLASHING, DANGER”

warning signs, red flashing signals placed every 500 feet along the bridge in both

directions, and gates at both ends of the causeway. If the cable is severed, the signals

located before the break are designed to flash red, and the signals beyond the break are

designed not to flash, allowing traffic to clear the bridge. In addition, the system is to

automatically place calls to law enforcement agencies and the Coast Guard. 

Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, New Orleans, Louisiana. The Lake

Pontchartrain Causeway in New Orleans, Louisiana, has a motorist information/warning

system, operated by the Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission, consisting of a

marine radar system that scans the lake for targets, warning the bascule bridge operators if

a vessel is within 1 mile of the bridge (prohibited zone). According to the Commission,

bridge operators can contact the vessel by marine radio and, if necessary, activate the

hazard incident lighting system yellow flashers spaced every 4/10 mile for the length of

the 24-mile bridge. Variable message signs are placed every 3 miles at the crossovers. The

system is used to warn motorists of accidents on the bridge as well as potential bridge span

failures.

Police dispatch personnel, who also monitor marine frequencies and post warning

messages on the variable message signs, are notified of any incident. If a potential threat

to the bridge structure exists, traffic is stopped at the toll plazas and the drawbridge

(16-mile marker). Police units are dispatched to the projected impact area to close the

lanes in both directions. The Coast Guard is notified for enforcement action in the

prohibited zone.

Sunshine Skyway Bridge, Tampa Bay, Florida. The Sunshine Skyway Bridge in

Tampa Bay, Florida, has a motorist warning system that consists of digital message signs

to warn motorists of high winds on the bridge. No other types of motorist advisory

systems currently operate on the bridge. According to FDOT, the Sunshine Skyway

Bridge has a continuity warning system that would advise FDOT and the highway patrol

of a major discontinuity in the bridge. FDOT characterized this system as being less than

totally dependable. 

Technical Guidance. On February 11, 1983, the FHWA issued Technical

Advisory T5140.19, “Pier Protection and Warning Systems for Bridges Subject to Ship

Collisions.” Although this advisory and the Vessel Collision Guide Specifications describe

motorist warning systems, neither document provides guidance on their use.

Related Bridge Sensor Research. Alabama A&M University, using

nanotechnology, has designed fiber-optic sensors for concrete overpasses and bridges that

can alert engineers to stresses and damage caused by loads and weather. In addition, West

Virginia University has equipped the 1,000-foot Star City Bridge over the Monongahela

River near Morgantown, West Virginia, with finely tuned sensors to measure minuscule,

visually undetectable changes in steel girders and support structures, in piers and

abutments, and in concrete and reinforcing bars. In addition, New Mexico State University
Factual Information 45 Highway Accident Report

researchers have embedded optical sensors in an I-10 overpass in Las Cruces, New

Mexico, and in an I-40 bridge over Rio Puerco west of Albuquerque, New Mexico, to

measure stress and strain in the concrete beams.

According to the FHWA, recent research on short-term monitoring instrumentation

has been successful, and the agency is working to improve the ability of long-term

monitoring instrumentation to withstand weather conditions.75 The FHWA further notes

that, as part of the Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) approach to obtaining quantitative

information for efficient infrastructure assessment and management, research in recent

years has focused on moving from traditional bridge inspection methodologies relying on

visual inspection to the application of sensing technology. In March 2004, the FHWA

established a “Virtual Team for Structural Health Monitoring,” consisting of FHWA

bridge engineers and representatives from State highway agencies, academia, and

industry, to advance SHM. 

Bridge Safety and Security

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, the National

Cooperative Highway Research Program and the AASHTO Task Force on Transportation

Security developed A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset

Identification and Protection.76 Some of the guide’s proposed countermeasures for bridge

protection include built-in monitors on bridges, cameras for surveillance, motion sensors

or other active devices, column protection, advance warning systems, and barriers around

bridge piers.

In September 2003, the FHWA/AASHTO Blue Ribbon Panel on Bridge and

Tunnel Security completed another study, Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel

Security, requested by the AASHTO Task Force on Transportation Security. It discusses

eight types of threats: low-tech and high-tech conventional explosives, for example, shape

charges; explosively formed penetrating devices, such as kinetic energy penetrators; lowtech, hand-held cutting devices; truck- or barge-size conventional explosives; chemical or

biological agents released in tunnels; incendiary conventional explosives; hazardous

materials releases in tunnels; and intentional ramming by ship or barge.

75 March 17, 2004, telephone conversation with FHWA bridge engineers.

76 A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection,

National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project 20-07/Task 151B (Vienna, VA: Science

Applications International Corporation, Transportation Policy and Analysis Center, May 2002).
Factual Information 46 Highway Accident Report

In a recent white paper, “Bridges for the 21st Century, Focus Area Bridge Safety,

Reliability and Security,” the FHWA states: 

It is common knowledge that our bridges are deteriorating at a faster rate than we

can fix them...there simply aren’t enough resources to continue conducting

business as usual...it is essential to develop innovative, revolutionary solutions to

rebuild our infrastructure. The goal...is to ensure safety of bridges and structures

against all manmade and natural hazards....A research program needs to be

implemented which develops breakthrough innovations, new structural systems

and rapid construction/reconstruction practices and systems that become the

standard, and produces long-lived facilities to counteract the effects of

earthquakes, scour, wind, overloads, collisions, and terrorist attacks.

The paper discusses natural threats to bridges, such as seismic events, hydraulics

and hydrology, and wind, and manmade threats to bridges, such as terrorist acts, bridge

overloads, vessel impacts, and fire. The paper also notes: “The most vulnerable locations

for major damage to a bridge over water are the piers. Our code does not consider

carefully enough collisions with barges and other commercial or enemy craft.”
47 Highway Accident Report

Analysis

General

This analysis first identifies the factors and conditions that the Safety Board was

able to exclude as neither causing nor contributing to the accident. It then provides a brief

overview of the accident events, followed by a detailed discussion of these major safety

issues: the captain’s incapacitation and countermeasures for such an event; bridge

protection, including risk assessment; and mitigation of loss of life, including motorist

warning systems. 

Exclusions

The captain of the Robert Y. Love was tested for alcohol and illegal drugs about 3.5

hours after the allision, and the results for both were negative. The captain had held an

uninspected towing vessel operator’s license for almost 30 years, had extensive towing

experience on the inland waters of the United States, and was familiar with the accident

area. The weather was mild, river conditions were calm, and skies were clear. The barge

tow was small, the barges were empty, and no external forces or conditions, such as high

winds, rain, fog, or high current, were present that would have increased the captain’s

workload in controlling the movement of the tow. The river’s contour for lining up the tow

to pass through the navigation span of the bridge did not require excessive maneuvering;

further, the relatively wide navigation span (296 feet), the barge tow’s width of 108 feet,

and the 2-mph current conditions would have made for an uncomplicated passage through

the navigation span. 

The towboat had sufficient horsepower for control of the barge tow. Postaccident

inspection of the towboat revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have caused the

tow to veer off course from the navigation channel. Fishing tournament witnesses

immediately rescued vehicle occupants in the water, and the first of 58 local, State, and

Federal agencies responded in 8 minutes. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the

captain was not impaired due to alcohol or illegal drugs. Further, neither the weather nor

the mechanical condition of the towboat nor the captain’s qualifications, experience,

familiarity with the river, or workload contributed to the accident. Finally, the emergency

response was adequate and timely. 

The Safety Board examined the captain’s 72-hour history to determine whether

fatigue was a factor in his incapacitation before the tow struck the bridge. In the 3 days

before the accident, the captain experienced significant disruption to his work-related

sleep patterns. On May 24, 2002, he reduced his normal (6-hour) afternoon sleep by 3

hours. The captain remained awake during the night of May 24 and into the morning of

May 25, completely missing one sleep period. On the morning of May 25, the captain
Analysis 48 Highway Accident Report

went to bed at the time he would normally be waking up and slept for 4 hours. In addition,

he shared driving an automobile with another person for approximately 10 hours while

traveling to meet the Robert Y. Love, remaining awake through his entire afternoon sleep

period. Assuming an average of 5.5 hours of sleep obtained during each off-watch period,

the captain’s unusual sleep patterns in 72 hours before the accident resulted in a sleep debt

of about 10 to 11.5 hours. 

Research has shown that sleep loss compromises daytime functions; virtually

everyone experiences reduced performance efficiency when not sleeping adequately.77

Even modest sleep reduction, as little as 1 hour per night, can accumulate over time,

progressively increasing daytime sleepiness.78 Also, small reductions in sleep, as little as 2

hours, can result in measurable changes in vigilance.79 The Safety Board determined,

based on the captain’s altered sleep pattern in the 72 hours before the accident, that

although the captain had complied with both company policy and Federal regulations

regarding hours of service, he was sleep-deficient at the time of the accident. 

The captain had been working (on duty on board the vessel) for only about 6 of the

24 hours immediately preceding the accident. He had stood watch the evening before and

slept for at least 5 hours before going on watch the morning of the accident. However,

although the captain had slept before the accident, the amount of sleep that he received

was insufficient to compensate for the deficit incurred while traveling, and he was

therefore sleep-deficient. When examining the circumstances of the captain’s loss of

consciousness, investigators relied heavily on his statements, notably that his loss of

consciousness occurred “all at once.” His last recollection before the allision was

preparing for passage under the bridge. He described being out of his chair, crouched on

the floor, and below the level of the vessel control console upon regaining consciousness

and further stated that he had trouble with his vision and could not “get oriented right.”

The captain’s description of his loss of consciousness and recovery are atypical of a

fatigue or “falling asleep” incident. Additional factors, such as his recent conversation

with the deckhand and the time of day also argue against falling asleep. Therefore, the

Safety Board concludes that the captain’s incapacitation was probably not a result of his

falling asleep. 

The captain said he had taken Benadryl® the evening before the accident, more

than 8 hours before the accident occurred. The very low levels of the medication detected

in the captain’s blood following the accident are consistent with his statements.

Diphenhydramine (commonly known by the trade name Benadryl®) is an over-the-counter

77 Meir H. Kryger, Thomas Roth, and William C. Dement, eds., Principles and Practice of Sleep

Medicine, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 1994). 

78 W.C. Dement and C. Fisher, “Experimental Interference With the Sleep Cycle,” Canadian

Psychiatric Association Journal Vol. 8 (1963): 400-405.

79 (a) R.T. Wilkinson, R.S. Edwards, and E. Haines, “Performance Following a Night of Reduced

Sleep,” Psychonomic Science Vol. 5 (1966): 471-472; (b) D.F. Dinges, F. Pack, K. Williams, K.A. Gillen,

J.W Powell, G.E. Ott, C. Aptowicz, and A.I. Pack, “Cumulative Sleepiness, Mood, Disturbance, and

Psychomotor Vigilance Performance Decrements During a Week of Sleep Restricted to 4-5 Hours per

Night,” Sleep, 20(4) 1997: 267-277; and (c) T. Roehrs, E. Burduvali, A. Bonahoom, C. Drake, and T. Roth

“Ethanol and Sleep Loss: A ‘Dose’ Comparison of Impairing Effects,” Sleep, 26(8) 2003: 981-985. 
Analysis 49 Highway Accident Report

antihistamine with sedative effects, often used to treat allergy symptoms. In over-thecounter doses, the medication commonly results in drowsiness and has measurable effects

on performance of complex cognitive and motor tasks. Reduced performance has been

demonstrated even in individuals who report feeling normal after taking the drug.80

Regular use results in some tolerance to the sedative effects of the medication, though

certain performance decrements persist. Studies have reported significant subjective

sedation 6 hours following a maximal over-the-counter dose of diphenhydramine81 and

significant reduction in sleep latency (the time it takes to fall asleep in a quiet

environment) for at least 7 hours following a maximal over-the-counter dose of

diphenhydramine.82 However, the concentration of diphenhydramine in the blood of the

towboat captain was much less than the average concentrations reported in the latter study,

consistent with taking a less-than-maximal dose of the medication (depending on the

specific preparation, the amount of diphenhydramine contained in a single capsule or

tablet could be 12.5 or 25 mg). At least one other study suggests that sedation would be

unlikely at this blood concentration.83

The Safety Board concludes that although the captain’s performance may have

been subtly impaired by the low level of diphenhydramine in his blood, and he may have

been more prone to falling asleep as a result of taking the medication, neither factor was

likely to have accounted for his incapacitation. 

The Accident

The Robert Y. Love was traveling on the M-KARNS waterway to Catoosa,

Oklahoma, with two empty barges when the tow struck the I-40 bridge. The captain was

alone on watch in the wheelhouse, navigating the 1274.5-long ton tow at an average speed

of 6.7 mph. The captain told investigators that the last thing he remembered was passing

the buoy to port and using “a few degrees” of left rudder to align his tow through the main

navigation span of the bridge. At 6.7 mph, the Safety Board estimated the transit time

from the buoy to the bridge to be about 4 minutes.

80 See, for example, John M. Weiler M.D. and others, “Effects of Fexofenadine, Diphenhydramine, and

Alcohol on Driving Performance,” Annals of Internal Medicine (2000) 132: 354-363, in which the effect 2.5

hours after a 50-mg dose of diphenhydramine is noted to be worse than the effect of an 0.10 blood alcohol

level. 

81 J.R. Glass, B.A. Sproule, N. Herrmann, D. Streiner, and U.E. Busto. “Acute Pharmacological Effects

of Temazepam, Diphenhydramine, and Valerian in Healthy Elderly Subjects,” Journal of Clinical

Psychopharmacology (June 2003) 23(3): 260-268. 

82 T. Roehrs, A. Zwyghuizen-Doorenbos, and T. Roth, “Sedative Effects And Plasma Concentrations

Following Single Doses Of Triazolam, Diphenhydramine, Ethanol and Placebo,” Sleep 16(4) 2003:

301-305. 

83 S.G. Carruthers, D.W. Shoeman, C.E. Hignite, and D.L. Azarnoff, “Correlation Between Plasma

Diphenhydramine Level and Sedative and Antihistamine Effects,” Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics

(April 1978) 23(4): 375-382. 
Analysis 50 Highway Accident Report

Captain’s Incapacitation

The captain described an episode of sudden loss of consciousness lasting several

minutes, in which he fell, but not completely, because of the limited space between the

vessel control console and the deck. He regained consciousness slowly, and remained

confused for a short period of time after regaining consciousness. Such an incident is

entirely consistent with an episode of syncope, in which blood flow to the brain is

interrupted for any of a variety of reasons. This interruption results in loss of

consciousness and falling. Normally, after such a fall, an individual is in the horizontal

position, allowing blood to flow to the brain and recovery to occur quite rapidly. However,

the captain was supported in a crouched position as a result of the limited space in which

to fall, and this position did not permit an immediate return of blood flow to his brain.

Extensive postaccident testing did not reveal an obvious cause for the captain’s loss of

consciousness, though the finding of coronary artery disease on cardiac catheterization

(without any impairment of heart function) led physicians to recommend an EPS, in which

electric stimuli are applied to the inside of the heart to try to cause abnormal heart

rhythms. Serious abnormal rhythms were generated, and on the basis of the captain’s loss

of consciousness that led to the accident, the presence of coronary artery disease, and an

abnormal EPS, the captain’s cardiologist recommended that an ICD be placed in the

captain. It is notable in this case, however, that invasive studies (cardiac catheterization,

and EPS) were pursued despite a negative noninvasive evaluation. In particular, given the

captain’s normal nuclear medicine stress test, it would not have been unusual to forgo

invasive cardiovascular testing in a typical clinical setting. Had the captain undergone the

noninvasive studies without a history of loss of consciousness, invasive testing almost

certainly would not have been pursued.

A prolonged serious abnormal heart rhythm can result in an episode of syncope.

However, despite several short episodes of abnormal heart rhythms recorded by his ICD

since implantation, the captain has not had any further episodes of syncope nor required

any shocks from the device. Syncope can have causes other than abnormal heart rhythms.

Examples include vasovagal syncope (the common faint); postural hypotension (when

rising too quickly); carotid sinus hypersensitivity (in response to pressure on an area of the

neck); heart attack, congestive heart failure and other heart problems; and certain types of

migraines. However, no evidence conclusively indicates that any one of these mechanisms

actually caused the captain’s episode, and, notably, in as many as 50 percent of cases, no

specific cause of syncope can be identified.84 Although the captain had a few short

episodes of mild dizziness on occasion before the accident, he not unreasonably attributed

these episodes to overexertion, did not suffer any lasting ill effects, and did not report any

loss of consciousness, near-loss of consciousness, or any other symptoms that could be

attributed to the typical causes of syncope. These episodes were apparently not

noteworthy enough for the captain to seek medical attention.

The Safety Board therefore concludes that the captain experienced a sudden loss of

consciousness, possibly as the result of an abnormal heart rhythm. The Safety Board also

84 V.M. Voge, J.D. Hastings, and W.E. Drew, “Convulsive Syncope in the Aviation Environment,”

Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine (December 1995) 66(12):1198-204. 
Analysis 51 Highway Accident Report

concludes that the captain had no apparent symptoms of clinical significance prior to the

accident, and a reasonable clinical evaluation of the captain before the accident was

unlikely to have detected the medical conditions that were discovered through

postaccident testing. 

The Allision

After the captain’s incapacitation, the vessel continued in a left turn and struck pier

3, about 201 feet west of the navigation channel, at an approximately 56-degree angle.

(See figure 19.) The Safety Board calculated the kinetic energy of the tow to be 4,498.79

kip-ft (1,000 foot-pounds). (See appendix B for detailed calculations.) Pier 3 was not, nor

was it required to be, designed to withstand a concentrated horizontal load of that

magnitude,85 and therefore collapsed. The spans on either side of pier 3 collapsed with it,

damaging pier 2 and causing the west column and web wall to collapse. (See figure 20.) In

total, 503 feet of bridge deck fell into the river and onto the barges. 

85 Except for centrifugal forces and ice floes, the I-40 bridge was designed for the lateral loads specified

in the 1961 and 1965 standards. For further information, see “Bridge Standards” under Bridge Information

in the Highway Information section of this report.

Figure 21. Estimated track of towboat Robert Y. Love as it approached I-40 highway 

bridge.

SCALE

Miles

0 0.5

40

Figure 19.
Analysis 52 Highway Accident Report

Highway traffic continued to drive off the bridge into the void after the bridge deck

collapsed. A participant in the nearby fishing tournament observed a section of the bridge

collapse and several vehicles enter the water. He called 911 and fired a flare from a handheld flare pistol toward the bridge in front of a tractor-semitrailer traveling westbound to

warn the driver of the danger. The truckdriver stopped before reaching the edge, partially

jackknifing his truck and blocking the bridge to following highway traffic. By the time

roadway traffic had stopped, eight passenger vehicles and three tractor-semitrailer truck

combinations had fallen into the river or onto collapsed portions of bridge span. The

Safety Board concludes that the quick-acting fisherman who fired the warning flare to

alert motorists on the bridge probably prevented further loss of life. 

Figure 22. Impact of barge MM-60 with south column of pier 3.

7.2 feet

22.8 feet

84.6 feet

MM-60

Figure 20.
Analysis 53 Highway Accident Report

Allision Prevention

Wheelhouse Alerter Systems 

In this accident, the captain of the Robert Y. Love was incapacitated as the result of

an unforeseen medical event. When he lost consciousness, he was alone in the

wheelhouse, a not atypical condition aboard U.S. inland towing vessels. The deckhand on

duty had just departed the wheelhouse and gone below deck to awaken the mate for duty

and to perform routine maintenance tasks. At the time of the accident, the mate had just

been awakened, and the engineer was making his rounds of the engineroom. Thus,

although three other crewmembers were awake and moving about the vessel in the

minutes before the accident, none of them were in the wheelhouse when the captain lost

consciousness. The Safety Board estimates the captain became incapacitated about 4

minutes before the impact with the bridge.86 Had a method been available to alert

crewmembers to the problem in the wheelhouse, they could have investigated and

possibly taken action that might have prevented the accident. 

Since this accident, segments of the marine inland towing industry have been

evaluating wheelhouse alerter systems for use on inland towing vessels. These systems,

which have already been installed on some towing vessels, are designed to sound an alarm

should the vessel operator either fail to move the rudder or fail to physically move for a

predetermined period of time. The lack of such movements would indicate the strong

possibility that the operator is, for some reason, incapable of making them and would

summon assistance to the wheelhouse to investigate the cause.

If the Robert Y. Love had been equipped with such a system on the day of the

accident, other crewmembers on board the vessel may have been alerted to a problem in

the wheelhouse and may have been able to prevent this accident. Therefore, the Safety

Board concludes that the presence of either another crewmember in the wheelhouse or a

wheelhouse alerter system might have resulted in timely action that could have prevented

this accident.

Although the number of reported incapacitation accidents is small, the

consequences can be catastrophic. The Safety Board considers alerter systems to be a

promising safety improvement and concludes that wheelhouse alerter systems may

provide an effective means of preventing operator incapacitation and operator fatigue

accidents in the future. 

The Safety Board is aware of three companies that are, independently of one

another, evaluating the effectiveness of these devices. Although the Board recognizes

industry’s initiative in developing and evaluating these devices, a coordinated effort

inclusive of all aspects of the industry would provide the degree of uniformity needed to

ensure a comprehensive evaluation. The Coast Guard Research and Development Center

86 The captain told investigators that the last thing he remembered was being abreast of the buoy and

lining up for the bridge. At 6.7 miles per hour, the Safety Board estimated the transit time from the buoy to

the bridge to be about 4 minutes.
Analysis 54 Highway Accident Report

has the technical staff and experience to evaluate these systems. In light of the Coast

Guard’s responsibility for safety on the navigable waters of the United States, the ongoing

safety partnership between the Coast Guard and the towing industry, and the possible

safety improvement that these alerter systems offer, the Safety Board believes that the

Coast Guard Research and Development Center should evaluate the utility and

effectiveness of wheelhouse alerter systems on inland towing vessels for preventing

accidents. The Safety Board hopes that the Coast Guard will work with the towing

industry in implementing this recommendation.

Safe Transit Procedures

The Safety Board has addressed the issue of safe transit procedures in several past

accident investigations. As a result of the 1983 City of Greenville and the 1984 Erin Marie

accidents,87 the Safety Board made recommendations to USACE regarding navigational

guides for mariners navigating the Western Rivers.88 As a result of the 1993 Chris allision

with the Judge William Seeber Bridge in New Orleans, the Safety Board recommended

that the Coast Guard, in cooperation with USACE, the Board of Commissioners, and

bridge owners, review the conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal,

identify hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the canal and lock system, and

implement measures to reduce those hazards.89

Despite such initiatives, bridge allisions involving towing vessels continue to

occur, often with catastrophic consequences. In the past 10 years, 70 people90 have died in

such accidents, all third parties who happened to be crossing the bridge at the time of the

accident. The Coast Guard-AWO Work Group reported that 68 percent of bridge allisions

were caused by poor operator decision-making. Consequently, remedial action to prevent

or to reduce the frequency of bridge allisions involving towboats must focus not only on

the physical characteristics of waterways but also on measures to improve the ability of

towing vessel operators to make sound decisions. 

Current initiatives to address such human performance issues include the Coast

Guard-AWO Bridge Allision Work Group’s development of navigation “best practices”

for transiting bridges vulnerable to allision and the promotion of CEMSs and the CEMS

87 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Poplar Street Bridge by the Towboat M/V

City of Greenville and its Four-Barge Tow, St. Louis, Missouri, April 2, 1983, Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MAR-83/10 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1983) and Ramming of the Poplar Street Bridge by the

Towboat M/V Erin Marie and its Twelve-Barge Tow, St. Louis, Missouri, April 26, 1984, Marine Accident

Report NTSB/MAR-85/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1985).

88 Safety Recommendations M-83-96 and M-85-26. See appendix C for more information on these and

related recommendations.

89 NTSB/HAR-94/03, Safety Recommendation M-94-10. See appendix C for more information on this

and related recommendations.

90 The Judge Seeber Bridge accident (NTSB/HAR-94/03) resulted in 1 fatality; the Big Bayou Canot

Bridge accident (National Transportation Safety Board, Derailment of AMTRAK Train No. 2 on the CSXT

Big Bayou Canot Bridge Near Mobile, Alabama, September 22, 1993, Railroad-Marine Accident Report

NTSB/RAR-94/01 [Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994]) resulted in 47 fatalities; the Port Isabel-Padre Island

Bridge accident (NTSB docket number HWY-01-I-H036) resulted in 8 fatalities; and the I-40 bridge

accident resulted in 14 fatalities. 
Analysis 55 Highway Accident Report

demonstration project. The Safety Board commends the AWO and Coast Guard for their

efforts to improve operator performance and concludes that the recommendations of the

Coast Guard-AWO Bridge Allision Work Group to improve operator performance and

lessons learned from the ongoing CEMS demonstration project, when implemented,

should both enhance the safety of towing vessel operations and reduce bridge allision

accidents. 

Bridge Protection

In the 1960s, when the I-40 bridge was designed and built, pier protection was not

required by State or Federal design standards or by USACE’s permit process. Following

completion of the M-KARNS in 1970, commercial vessel traffic began operating near the

bridge. During subsequent bridge inspections in 1977 and 1980, ODOT found that the

channel piers had experienced superficial damage, indicating that the piers were

vulnerable to vessel impact. Consequently, in 1982, the ODOT submitted an application to

the Coast Guard requesting permission to install pier protection cells91 on the north side of

the channel piers to address these problems, though no requirement existed to do so. At

that time, the bridge community still lacked standards or guidelines for bridge protection,

though, by then, the Coast Guard had completed a study92 on bridge protection, and the

1980 Sunshine Skyway Bridge accident93 in Florida had heightened awareness of the

vulnerability of bridge piers to vessel impact. 

Although ODOT installed pier protection cells inside the navigation channel, the

I-40 bridge accident occurred outside the navigation channel. Such occurrences

demonstrate that most bridges over navigable water can be struck either within or outside

the regular navigation channel by barge tows and individual commercial vessels, thus

increasing the complexity of bridge protection. Another such accident involved the Queen

Isabella Causeway,94 when the Brown Water V and tow struck an unprotected pier 175 feet

west of the navigation channel. Four additional accidents95 investigated by the Safety

Board involved vessels that rammed approach piers outside the navigation channel, and

another involved an allision with a railroad bridge far from the navigation channel.96

However, protecting all substructure components of all bridges from vessel

impacts would be an enormous task. The vulnerability of a given bridge to vessel impacts

depends on the bridge design, location, current conditions, water depth at the bridge

support(s), and the width and vertical clearance of the span(s). The I-40 bridge had 12

91 ODOT completed construction of the protection cells in 1984. 

92 U.S. Coast Guard, The State of the Art of Bridge Protective Systems and Devices, USCG Contract

CG-71955-A (Washington, DC: USCG, November 1978).

93 NTSB/MAR-81/03.

94 NTSB docket number HWY-01-I-H036.

95 USCG/NTSB/MAR-74/04, NTSB/MAR-78/01, NTSB/MAR-81/03, and NTSB/HAR-94/03.

96 NTSB/RAR-94/01.
Analysis 56 Highway Accident Report

piers in the water, and the draft of the empty barges in this accident was 1 foot, making

most of the piers accessible and therefore vulnerable to vessel impacts. According to

ODOT, in today’s dollars, providing protection cells costs about $300,000 per pier in labor

and materials. ODOT also noted that installing protection cells at all piers of the I-40

bridge would cost approximately $6.8 million. The I-40 bridge is just one of Oklahoma’s

11 highway crossings on the M-KARNS; six of these 11 crossings have parallel bridges,

for a total of 17 bridges with 74 piers in the water. To place a protection cell on both the

upstream and downstream sides of the piers and one in between each parallel bridge on the

M-KARNS alone would require 128 protection cells at a cost of $39.7 million.97

The M-KARNS is just one waterway in one State. Nationwide, Coast Guard

records show more than 18,000 highway and railroad bridges spanning about 26,000 miles

of commercially navigable waterways. The NBI lists 2,844 highway bridges requiring a

bridge permit. Many of these bridges have multiple piers that are vulnerable to vessel

impact. The Safety Board concludes that because of the cost, replacing or constructing

pier protection for each existing bridge pier vulnerable to vessel impact nationwide may

not be reasonable. 

Bridge engineers have a tool to effectively assess a given bridge’s risk (and

acceptable risk) for vessel impact. The AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications

provide guidelines for determining a bridge’s risk to impact by assessing vessel and

vehicle traffic characteristics and the ability of the bridge to withstand the impact. These

guidelines have been incorporated in the LRFD bridge standards, which, after 2007, will

become the mandatory standards for all new Federal-aid bridge construction. Florida, with

many bridges over water, is already using the LRFD standards for new bridge design.

Louisiana, after the 1993 Judge William Seeber Bridge accident,98 embarked on a

program using the AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide Specifications to evaluate existing

bridges over navigable water. After the I-40 bridge accident, ODOT hired a consultant to

evaluate bridges at 12 river crossings using the AASHTO Vessel Collision Guide

Specifications. Although these standards can and are being used to evaluate the

vulnerability of existing bridges to vessel impacts and vehicle collisions, they are not

mandatory. To adequately protect the motoring public, bridge owners should be required

to evaluate an existing bridge’s vulnerability to vessel impact. 

Demands on the limited funds in the bridge program are many. According to the

NBI, the average age of the more than 590,000 bridges in the United States is 40 years.

Approximately 28 percent of these structures are considered deficient, but funding is not

available for replacement or rehabilitation.99 The FHWA sufficiency rating system is a

method of measuring one bridge’s needs against another when qualifying for limited

Federal-aid funds. Currently, the relative risk of a bridge to extreme events such as vessel

97 ODOT estimates include $38.4 million for materials and labor and an additional $1.3 million in

mobilization costs.

98 NTSB/HAR-94/03.

99 Raymond McCormick, “Lengthening the Span of Bridge Service Life,” TR News, No. 228

(Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, September-October 2003).
Analysis 57 Highway Accident Report

or vehicle impacts; flooding, including scour and debris loading; seismic events; and,

more recently, terrorist attacks, is not part of the sufficiency rating formula. Tools to

design new bridges and to evaluate existing bridges for protection against these events are

available to bridge engineers through scour assessment methods, the debris loading

specification,100 seismic risk methodology, and the Vessel Collision Guide Specifications.

Once the relative risks of extreme events are established, this information can be included

in a bridge’s sufficiency rating and used to prioritize rehabilitation or replacement,

balancing the many different needs of State bridge programs, while not ignoring

conditions that can lead to catastrophic events. 

The Safety Board therefore concludes that including the relative risk of extreme

events in bridge sufficiency ratings and in priority for rehabilitation and replacement

would help provide a more accurate assessment of a bridge’s risk to collapse and loss of

life. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FHWA should revise its sufficiency

rating system, which prioritizes bridges for rehabilitation and replacement, to include the

probability of extreme events, such as vessel impact. 

The Safety Board has been working since the 1970s to address the vulnerability of

bridges to vessel impact. The Safety Board identified bridge vulnerability as a safety issue

in its investigation of the 1972 SS African Neptune allision with the Sidney Lanier Bridge

at Brunswick, Georgia,101 and in its investigation of the 1977 towboat Carolyn and barge

allision with the Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel.102 The design of bridge protection

devices was addressed in the investigations of the 1977 SS Floridian allision with the

Benjamin Harris Bridge in Hopewell, Virginia,103 the 1980 Summit Venture allision with

the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay, Florida,104 and the 1996 Julie N allision with

the Million Dollar Bridge in Portland, Maine.105 The Safety Board’s report on its

investigation of the Mauvilla allision with the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge addressed

100 National Research Council, Transportation Research Board, National Cooperative Highway

Research Program Report 445, Debris Forces on Highway Bridges (Washington, DC: National Academy

Press, 2000).

101 Safety Recommendation H-72-48 in National Transportation Safety Board, SS African Neptune:

Collision With the Sidney Lanier Bridge at Brunswick, Georgia, on November 7, 1972, With Loss of Life,

Marine Accident Report USCG/NTSB/MAR-74/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1974). See appendix C for

more information on this and related recommendations.

102 National Transportation Safety Board, Tug Carolyn and Barge Weeks No. 254, Chesapeake Bay

Bridge and Tunnel, September 20-21, 1972, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-74/02 (Washington, DC:

NTSB, 1974). 

103 Safety Recommendation H-78-02 in National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the

Benjamin Harrison Bridge by the SS Floridian Near Hopewell, Virginia, February 24, 1977, Marine

Accident Report NTSB/MAR-78/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1978). See appendix C for more information

on this and related recommendations.

104 NTSB/MAR-81/03, Safety Recommendations M-81-15 and -20. See appendix C for more

information on these and related recommendations.

105 Safety Recommendation M-98-84 in National Transportation Safety Board, Postaccident Testing for

Alcohol and Other Drugs in the Marine Industry and the Ramming of the Portland-South Portland (Million

Dollar) Bridge at Portland, Maine, by the Liberian Tankship Julie N on September 27, 1996, Special

Investigation Report NTSB/SIR-98/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB 1998). See appendix C for more

information on this and related recommendations.
Analysis 58 Highway Accident Report

bridge risk assessment.106 The vulnerability of existing bridges to vessel impact was

discussed extensively in the Safety Board’s report of the 1993 towboat Chris allision with

the Judge William Seeber Bridge in New Orleans, Louisiana,107 which included

recommendations to the FHWA and to AASHTO. Recommendation H-94-8 to FHWA was

superseded in 1997 (see appendix C); the recommendation to AASHTO was as follows:

H-94-9

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, broaden the

application of risk-assessment and management programs to existing highway

bridges. Such programs should include, among other things, a formal

assessment of the vulnerability of bridges to vessel collision and collapse. 

On December 8, 1994, AASHTO responded, noting that this recommendation was

under active consideration by the Standing Committee on Highways’ Subcommittee on

Bridges and Structures and would be discussed in depth at the May 1995 meeting of the

subcommittee. In its June 20, 1995, reply, the Safety Board acknowledged the above and

classified Safety Recommendation H-94-9 “Open—Acceptable Response.” 

At a meeting with Safety Board staff on March 30, 2004, AASHTO indicated that

it is investigating additional countermeasures as part of its work on the security and

vulnerability assessments of the transportation systems. The Water Transportation

Committee also discussed this issue with Safety Board staff at its July 2003 meeting and

said it will work with the Standing Committee on Highways’ Subcommittee on Bridges

and Structures on risk assessment issues.

The Safety Board is disappointed that after 10 years AASHTO has not yet addressed

the vulnerability of existing bridges to vessel impact and collapse. In a July 20, 2004, letter

to AASHTO, the Safety Board indicated Safety Recommendation H-94-9 remains classified

“Open—Acceptable Response.” However, given that the intent of Safety Recommendation

H-94-9 is covered by the recommendation issued in this report to revise the sufficiency

rating system, Safety Recommendation H-94-9 is reclassified “Closed—Superseded.”

Motorist Warning Systems

Bridge protection is a multitiered process. Available countermeasures range from

providing physical protection against vessel impacts (pier strengthening and pier

protection) to instituting measures to prevent allisions from occurring (installing aids to

navigation and improving operator decision-making). However, when such

countermeasures are unavailable, methods that mitigate the loss of life following a vessel

impact, such as motorist warning systems, become necessary.

106 NTSB/RAR-94/01, Safety Recommendations I-94-3 and -4. See appendix C for more information on

these and related recommendations.

107 Safety Recommendations H-94-8 and -9. See appendix C for more information on these and related

recommendations.
Analysis 59 Highway Accident Report

In this accident, 11 vehicles either fell with the collapsed sections of the bridge or

drove off the bridge and into the void. The surviving drivers indicated that they could not

see the void in the bridge in time to avoid driving into it. The Safety Board examined the

available sight distance for both passenger cars and tractor-semitrailers on the east- and

westbound approaches to the void in the bridge. The sight distances ranged from 150 to

350 feet; the minimum total stopping distance108 at 70 mph for passenger cars was 622 feet

and for tractor-semitrailers was 726 feet. The minimum total stopping distance for a

tractor-semitrailer traveling at 57 mph (self-reported by one driver) was 514 feet. These

total stopping distances are greater than the maximum estimated distance of 350 feet for

the first point of possible perception, indicating that some drivers involved in this accident

did not have sufficient time to stop their vehicles after detecting the collapsed sections of

the bridge. In light of the statements of surviving drivers, estimates of the point of first

possible perception, and calculations of total stopping distance, the Safety Board

concludes that the drivers in this accident did not have adequate time to detect, identify,

and respond to the hazard posed by the collapsed sections of the bridge. 

An effective motorist warning system, mounted on or near the bridge and capable of

alerting motorists to the bridge failure or directing vehicles to stop, might have prevented

some of the vehicles, the majority of which were traveling westbound, from driving off the

I-40 bridge. The recreational boater who fired the flare pistol said that he saw at least one

vehicle fall with the bridge and that his boat then accelerated toward the bridge and

reached the area in about 20 seconds. He also stated that he saw two more vehicles drive

off the bridge and called 911; after the call, he saw five more vehicles drive off the bridge

before shooting the flare. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much time elapsed between

the collapse and the time the truck stopped and blocked the westbound approach. Because

westbound vehicles, traveling at 57 to 75 mph, could have traversed the 1,500 feet from the

east end of the bridge to the void in 13 to 18 seconds, it can be argued that had warning signs

been activated within a few seconds, several of the westbound vehicles probably would have

had time to react to the warning signs and stop before driving off the bridge. 

As stated earlier, it is difficult to estimate exactly how much time elapsed between

the collapse and the time the truckdriver saw the flare, stopped, and blocked the

westbound approach with his truck. Further, only by coincidence did the recreational

boater witness the accident and have the presence of mind to fire a warning flare. The first

emergency responder arrived within 8 minutes of notification of the accident, so, certainly,

in the absence of a fishing tournament or other witnesses to the bridge collapse, an

effective warning system would have stopped additional vehicles from driving off the

bridge. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that an effective motorist warning system

on the I-40 bridge might have mitigated the loss of life in this accident. 

The Texas Department of Transportation installed such a system after the 2001

Queen Isabella Causeway Bridge accident,109 in which 10 vehicles either collapsed with

the bridge or drove off the void, resulting in 8 fatalities. This early warning collapse

108 Includes perception/reaction and braking distances.

109 NTSB docket number HWY-01-I-H036.
Analysis 60 Highway Accident Report

detection system, which became operational in March 2004, consists of fiber-optic cable,

which, if severed, activates flashing lights to warn motorists of danger ahead. As noted

earlier, protecting all bridges against all events is not possible. However, in the case of

long bridges with many vulnerable piers, such as the Queen Isabella Causeway, or bridges

with curvature that results in sight distance limitations, such as the I-40 bridge, it is critical

to protect the motoring public by installing automatic bridge failure detection and warning

devices. 

The Safety Board has addressed the installation of bridge motorist warning

systems in previous accident investigations involving the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway,

Sunshine Skyway Bridge, and Sidney Lanier Bridge.110 The Board is aware of at least one

discontinuity warning system that has been installed since these accidents, the one on the

Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Florida, which FDOT has characterized as being unreliable.

The FHWA is working to improve the reliability of such systems, specifically the ability

of long-term monitoring instrumentation to withstand the conditions typically found on

bridges, through its March 2004 Structural Health Monitoring initiative and through

continuing intelligent transportation systems programs. The development of reliable longterm sensing technology is critical in protecting the motoring public, and the Safety Board

encourages the FHWA to continue its efforts to provide reliable motorist warning systems. 

Once a reliable long-term detection system has been developed, the FHWA should

encourage the States to deploy this technology in comprehensive motorist warning

systems; such systems could also be used on bridges vulnerable to collapse from other

circumstances such as scour, seismic events, and terrorist attack. The Safety Board

therefore believes that the FHWA should develop an effective motorist warning system to

stop motor vehicle traffic in the event of a partial or total bridge collapse. In addition, the

Vessel Collision Guide Specifications describe motorist warning systems and reference

the 1983 FHWA technical advisory; however, neither the specifications nor the technical

advisory provide guidance on the use of motorist warning systems. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes that once an effective motorist warning system has been developed,

AASHTO should provide guidance to the States on its use. 

110 (a) National Transportation Safety Board, safety recommendation letter to the Greater New

Orleans Expressway Commission, January 8, 1975, notation 1423, Safety Recommendation H-74-42;

(b) NTSB/MAR-81/03, Safety Recommendations M-81-18 and -19; and (c) USCG/NTSB/MAR-74/04,

Safety Recommendation H-72-48. See appendix C for more information on these and related

recommendations.
61 Highway Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. The captain was not impaired due to alcohol or illegal drugs. Further, neither the

weather nor the mechanical condition of the towboat nor the captain’s qualifications,

experience, familiarity with the river, or workload contributed to the accident. Finally,

the emergency response was adequate and timely.

2. The captain’s incapacitation was probably not a result of his falling asleep.

3. Although the captain’s performance may have been subtly impaired by the low level

of diphenhydramine in his blood, and he may have been more prone to falling asleep

as a result of taking the medication, neither factor was likely to have accounted for his

incapacitation.

4. The captain experienced a sudden loss of consciousness, possibly as the result of an

abnormal heart rhythm. 

5. The captain had no apparent symptoms of clinical significance prior to the accident,

and a reasonable clinical evaluation of the captain before the accident was unlikely to

have detected the medical conditions that were discovered through postaccident

testing.

6. The quick-acting fisherman who fired the warning flare to alert motorists on the

bridge probably prevented further loss of life.

7. Wheelhouse alerter systems may provide an effective means of preventing operator

incapacitation and operator fatigue accidents in the future.

8. The recommendations of the U.S. Coast Guard-American Waterways Operators

Bridge Allision Work Group to improve operator performance and lessons learned

from the ongoing Crew Endurance Management System demonstration project, when

implemented, should both enhance the safety of towing vessel operations and reduce

bridge allision accidents. 

9. The presence of either another crewmember in the wheelhouse or a wheelhouse

alerter system might have resulted in timely action that could have prevented this

accident.

10. Because of the cost, replacing or constructing pier protection for each existing bridge

pier vulnerable to vessel impact nationwide may not be reasonable.

11. To adequately protect the motoring public, bridge owners should be required to

evaluate an existing bridge’s vulnerability to vessel impact.
Conclusions 62 Highway Accident Report

12. Including the relative risk of extreme events in bridge sufficiency ratings and in

priority for rehabilitation and replacement would help provide a more accurate

assessment of a bridge’s risk to collapse and loss of life.

13. The drivers in this accident did not have adequate time to detect, identify, and respond

to the hazard posed by the collapsed sections of the bridge.

14. An effective motorist warning system on the Interstate 40 highway bridge might have

mitigated the loss of life in this accident.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the Robert Y. Love’s allision with the Interstate 40 highway bridge and its subsequent

collapse was the captain’s loss of consciousness, possibly as the result of an unforeseeable

abnormal heart rhythm. Contributing to the loss of life was the inability of motorists to

detect the collapsed bridge in time to stop their vehicles.
63 Highway Accident Report

Recommendations 

New Recommendations

As a result of this accident, the Safety Board makes the following safety

recommendations:

To the U.S. Coast Guard:

Direct the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center to evaluate the

utility and effectiveness of wheelhouse alerter systems on inland towing vessels

for preventing accidents. (M-04-3)

To the Federal Highway Administration:

Revise your sufficiency rating system, which prioritizes bridges for rehabilitation

and replacement, to include the probability of extreme events, such as vessel

impact. (H-04-29)

Develop an effective motorist warning system to stop motor vehicle traffic in the

event of a partial or total bridge collapse. (H-04-30)

To the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Once an effective motorist warning system has been developed, provide guidance

to the States on its use. (H-04-31)

Previously Issued Recommendation Classified in This Report

Safety Recommendation H-94-9, previously issued to the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, is reclassified from “Open—Acceptable

Response” to “Closed—Superseded” by Safety Recommendation H-04-29.

H-94-9

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, broaden the application

of risk-assessment and management programs to existing highway bridges. Such

programs should include, among other things, a formal assessment of the

vulnerability of bridges to vessel collision and collapse. 
Recommendations 64 Highway Accident Report

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS CAROL J. CARMODY

Chairman Member

MARK V. ROSENKER RICHARD F. HEALING

Vice Chairman Member

DEBORAH A. P. HERSMAN

Member
65 Highway Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation and Public Hearing

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified of this accident from media

coverage and the National Response Center on Sunday, May 26, 2002. An investigative

team was dispatched that included members from the Washington, D.C.; Atlanta, Georgia;

Arlington, Texas; and Denver, Colorado, offices. 

Parties to the investigation included the Federal Highway Administration, the U.S.

Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Justice, the State of Oklahoma, and Magnolia

Marine Transport Company. 

The Safety Board investigated the accident under the authority of the Independent

Safety Board Act of 1997, according to Safety Board rules. No public hearing was held.
66 Highway Accident Report

Appendix B

Vessel Impact Force Calculations

Displacement for MM-60 (402.6 long tons1) + MM-62 (427.4 long tons) = 830 long tons

830(2,240/2,205) = 843.18 metric tonnes2

1 A long ton equals 2,240 pounds.

2 A metric tonne equals 2,205 pounds.

Displacement for the barges

Width—54 feet 

NOT to SCALE 

2 feet

59 feet

Waterline 1—foot draft

70 feet

Length—297.5 feet

Displacement calculations for the towboat

Width—30 feet 

NOT t o SCALE

7.75 

feet 

D

B

A C 

104 feet

A = (1.75 feet) (38 feet) (30 feet) = 1,995 cf 

B = 1/2bh (30) = 1⁄2 (25) (6) (30) = 2,250 cf A+B+C+D = 15,956.25 cf 

C = (39) (7.75) (30) = 9,067.50 cf = 444.50 long tons 

D = 1⁄2 (7.75) (23.5) (30) = 2,643.75 = 451.56 metric tonnes 
Appendix B 67 Highway Accident Report

Displacement for the tow

Barge 1 + Barge 2 + towboat = 843.18 + 451.56 = 1,294.74 metric tonnes

Kinetic energy of a moving vessel3

3 American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Guide Specification and

Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges Volume I: Final Report (Washington, DC:

AASHTO, 1991)16-18.

KE = [CH W (V)2 ] CH = 1.05 and 

 V = 6.7 mph = 9.83 fps

 W= displacement tonnage

KE = [(1.05) (1,294.74) (9.83)2]

KE = 4,498.79 kip-ft

29.2

29.2
68 Highway Accident Report

Appendix C

Previous Recommendations on Safe Transit Procedures, Bridge 

Vulnerability and Protection, and Motorist Warning Systems

Sidney Lanier Bridge, Brunswick, Georgia—November 7, 1972

The SS African Neptune rammed a span adjacent to the draw of the Sidney Lanier

Bridge in Brunswick, Georgia, and 450 feet of the bridge collapsed into the Brunswick

River.1

 Eight passenger cars and two tractor-semitrailers fell with the bridge, resulting in

10 fatalities and 8 persons hospitalized. 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended that

the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the American Association of State

Highway Officials,2

 and the International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association:

H-72-48

Establish policies and standards to insure that traffic control devices (gate,

signals, signs, and pavement markings) are installed on movable bridges at

locations which halt traffic on a section of the bridge that is not subject to

impact by large marine vessels. Such positioning of warning systems will

prevent vehicles from being on those portions of such bridges which may

collapse when they are struck by a marine vessel. 

On January 1, 1980, the Safety Board classified H-72-48 “Closed—No Longer

Applicable.”

1 National Transportation Safety Board, SS African Neptune: Collision With the Sidney Lanier Bridge

at Brunswick, Georgia, on November 7, 1972, With Loss of Life, Marine Accident Report

USCG/NTSB/MAR-74/04 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1974). 

2 The American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO) became the American Association

of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) in the 1970s.
Appendix C 69 Highway Accident Report

Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, New Orleans, Louisiana—August 1, 1974

On August 1, 1974, the towboat, M/V Miss Andy, pushing four barges (two

abreast), struck the east span of the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway in New Orleans,

Louisiana;3

 252 feet of the bridge collapsed into the water. Two motor vehicles plunged

into the lake through the void created by the collapsed deck, resulting in three fatalities.

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board issued a safety

recommendation letter on January 8, 1975, in which it asked the Greater New Orleans

Expressway Commission to:

H-74-42

Install a warning system on those sections of the Lake Pontchartrain

causeway that are vulnerable to impact by errant marine vessels. The

system should activate automatically to warn motorists of danger ahead,

should the causeway span collapse. 

On January 1, 1980, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation H-74-42

“Closed—No Longer Applicable.” 

Benjamin Harrison Bridge, Hopewell, Virginia—February, 24, 1977 

The SS Marine Floridian, a bulk sulphur carrier, rammed the support pier between

the bridge’s northern approach causeway and its northern tower span and continued under

the span until the vessel’s starboard bridge wing struck the span.4 The bridge tender was

slightly injured while evacuating the bridge; no other injuries occurred. Total property

damage was estimated to be $8.5 million. 

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended that

the FHWA:

H-78-2

Work with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop specifications for the design of

dolphins, fenders, and other energy absorption and/or vessel redirection

devices for the protection of both bridge and vessel during an accidental

impact. Issue these design specifications along with guidelines and

requirements for the placement of dolphins, fenders and energy absorption

and redirection devices.

3 National Transportation Safety Board, safety recommendation letter to the Greater New Orleans

Expressway Commission, January 8, 1975, notation 1423.

4 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Benjamin Harrison Bridge by the SS

Floridian Near Hopewell, Virginia, February 24, 1977, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-78/01

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1978). 
Appendix C 70 Highway Accident Report

The FHWA responded that the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) had sponsored a

study on state-of-the-art bridge protective systems and devices and that the FHWA had

submitted the specifications developed in this study to AASHTO for consideration as

AASHTO specifications. On December 5, 1984, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation H-78-2 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Sunshine Skyway Bridge, Tampa, Florida—May 9, 1980

The Liberian bulk carrier Summit Venture rammed a support pier of the western

span of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay, Florida.5 The support pier was

destroyed and about 1,297 feet of the bridge deck and superstructure fell from a height of

about 150 feet into the bay. A Greyhound bus, a small pickup truck, and six automobiles

fell into the bay, and 35 persons died. Repair costs were estimated at about $30 million for

the bridge and about $1 million for the Summit Venture. 

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended

that the Coast Guard:

M-81-15

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, develop

standards for the design, performance, and location of structural bridge pier

protection systems which consider that the impact from an off-course

vessel can occur significantly above as well as below the water surface.

M-81-16

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, conduct a study

to determine which existing bridges over the navigable waterways of U.S.

ports and harbors are not equipped with adequate structural pier protection.

M-81-17

Distribute a copy of the results of the U.S. Coast Guard’s studies regarding

bridge and pier protection systems to each appropriate member of the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials.

Safety Recommendation M-81-15. On April 13, 1987, the Coast Guard

responded that it, in cooperation with the FHWA, had developed a computer program

addressing this recommendation and made the program available to AASHTO. On

September 4, 1987, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-81-15

“Closed—Acceptable Action.” 

Safety Recommendation M-81-16. On September 22, 1981, the Coast Guard

responded that it did not concur with this safety recommendation, noting, “We do not have

5 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge by the Liberian Bulk

Carrier Summit Venture, Tampa Bay, Florida, May 9, 1980, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-81/03

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1981).
Appendix C 71 Highway Accident Report

the authority to determine the adequacy of any structural bridge protection system.” On

May 4, 1982, the Safety Board responded that it could not accept the Coast Guard’s reason

for not acting on this recommendation. The Board further asked for the Coast Guard’s

interpretation of Section 101 (7) of the 1972 Ports and Waterways Safety Act, as

applicable to the issue of bridge pier protection. The Board also stated, “We do not view

the Coast Guard’s role as administrator of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and the

Federal bridge permit program as [limiting] highway bridge protection measures to those

involving vessel operations.” On April 13, 1987, the Coast Guard responded: 

The Coast Guard does not concur with this recommendation. As we stated in our

previous response to this recommendation, we do not have the authority to

determine the adequacy of any structural bridge protection system. Therefore, no

further action on this recommendation is anticipated.

Consequently, on February 17, 1987, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation M-81-16 “Open—Unacceptable Action.” The Safety Board later

reclassified Safety Recommendation M-81-16 “Closed—Unacceptable Action” as a result

of its investigation of a 1987 allision involving the Sidney Lanier Bridge.6 

Safety Recommendation M-81-17. On April 13, 1987, the Coast Guard indicated

that criteria for the design of bridge piers to withstand vessel impacts had been sent to

AASHTO. The Coast Guard also noted that the FHWA had prepared and distributed a

technical advisory on this subject. On September 4, 1987, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendation M-81-17 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Also as a result of its investigation of the accident involving the Sunshine Skyway

Bridge,7 the Safety Board recommended that the FHWA:

M-81-18

Develop standards for the design, performance, and installation of bridge

span failure detection and warning systems.

M-81-19

Establish criteria to evaluate the need for installing bridge span failure

detection and warning systems on existing and proposed bridges.

M-81-20

In cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, develop standards for the

design, performance, and location of structural bridge pier protection

systems which consider that the impact from an off-course vessel can occur

significantly above as well as below the water surface.

6 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Sidney Lanier Bridge by the Polish Bulk

Carrier Ziemia Bialostocka, Brunswick, Georgia, May 3, 1987, Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-88/03

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1988).

7 NTSB/MAR-81/03.
Appendix C 72 Highway Accident Report

M-81-21

In cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard, conduct a study to determine

which existing bridges over the navigable waterways of U.S. ports and

harbors are not equipped with adequate structural pier protection.

M-81-22

Use the results of the study conducted under Safety Recommendation

M-81-21 to advise appropriate bridge authorities of the benefits of

installing additional pier protection systems.

Safety Recommendation M-81-18. The FHWA’s responses on August 14, 1981,

and February 25, 1983, indicated that the FHWA sent a memorandum to the field offices

stating that the most practical existing span failure warning system is an electrical

conductor system attached to the bridge that activates warning systems when its

continuity is disrupted by span failure or collapse. In addition, the FHWA developed a

technical advisory, “Pier Protection and Warning Systems for Bridges Subject to Ship

Collisions,” dated February 11, 1983, providing information on the advantages and

disadvantages of alternate types of warning systems, the design of bridge span detection

warning systems, and the warrants for the need for such systems on Federal-aid highway

projects. On May 4, 1983, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-81-18

“Closed—Acceptable Action.” 

Safety Recommendation M-81-19. The FHWA’s responses on August 14, 1981,

and February 25, 1983, indicated that the FHWA had provided guidance for warrants for

open-span failure warning systems in a December 8, 1980, memorandum to FHWA

regional administrators, “Motorist Warning Systems on Bridges Subject to Ship

Collisions.” The memorandum stated that decisions to install such systems should be

based upon: (1) the type and frequency of shipping on the waterways; (2) the location and

arrangement of the bridge piers in relation to the navigable channel and the resulting

vulnerability of the piers to vessel impacts; (3) other factors (such as fog, channel

geometrics, wind, and river currents) that may create navigational problems in the vicinity

of the bridge; and (4) the volume of highway traffic using the bridge. The FHWA further

stated that these warrants were also included in the February 11, 1983, technical advisory,

as noted in its response to Safety Recommendation M-81-18. On May 4, 1983, the Safety

Board classified Safety Recommendation M-81-19 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”
Appendix C 73 Highway Accident Report

Safety Recommendation M-81-20. On March 5, 1984, the FHWA indicated that

because of the low probability of vessel-bridge impacts, the extraordinary costs required

to design bridge piers to withstand the impact of large ships, and the limited funds

available to carry out the national bridge program, it and the Coast Guard had agreed

rather than to design all water piers in navigable waters to withstand the full impact loads

of modern vessels, they would instead evaluate each bridge crossing on a case-by-case

basis to determine the degree of pier protection necessary. The FHWA noted that the

following guidance has been made available for this evaluation:

• Standards for pier protection systems that are being evaluated by an AASHTO

task force; and

• A report containing information on bridge pier design prepared by the Marine

Board of the National Research Council (Ship Collisions With Bridges) and

distributed to all FHWA field offices and State highway agencies through a

memorandum on November 30, 1983. This memorandum requests that field

offices fully address the potential problems of vessel-bridge impacts in

ongoing Federal-aid projects through the Coast Guard/FHWA coordination

procedures associated with Coast Guard bridge permits for navigable water

crossings. The FHWA further stated that the Marine Board report noted above

discusses the fact that the impact of an off-course vessel can occur significantly

above, as well as below, the water line. 

On December 5, 1984, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation

M-81-20 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Safety Recommendation M-81-21. On March 5, 1984, the FHWA responded

that, as noted in its response to Safety Recommendation M-81-20, pier protection

evaluations must be made on a case-by-case basis. The FHWA also stated that it had

anticipated that the November 1983 study, Ship Collisions With Bridges, mentioned in its

response to Safety Recommendation M-81-20, would address this safety recommendation

but that this report did not specifically identify existing bridges in navigable waters with

inadequate structural pier protection. 

The FHWA further responded that it did not have the resources to conduct the

requested study; it noted, however, that all highway bridges, including bridge piers and

fendering systems, were being inspected on a regular basis by their respective State and

local highway agencies. On October 30, 1984, the FHWA issued a memorandum to field

offices instructing them to ensure that State inspections of bridges over navigable waters

continued to include an assessment and evaluation of bridge piers and fendering systems

for structural integrity, as provided for in the Bridge Inspector’s Training Manual. 

On April 19, 1985, the Safety Board requested additional information from the

FHWA regarding: (1) inspection criteria to be used by State highway bridge inspectors, (2)

qualifications of State inspectors, and (3) methods to be used by State inspectors to

evaluate pier protection overall. On July 16, 1985, the FHWA replied:
Appendix C 74 Highway Accident Report

In response to Item 1, as noted in earlier responses, there is no universal standard

which can be developed to determine whether a given pier protection system is

needed or whether an existing one is adequate. Such determination must be made

on a case-by-case basis considering the waterway usage. However, general criteria

and procedures can be developed and then modified for individual State

requirements. These criteria should be developed where appropriate by the

individual in charge of the State’s bridge inspection program in conjunction with

those responsible for pier protection design.

The bridge inspector, through site inspections, can identify and provide

information on the type, size, location and condition of pier protection systems.

However, in many instances, he will not have sufficient data, training, or

experience to evaluate the adequacy of the system. A judgment as to adequacy of

a system should more appropriately be made by the State bridge engineer, through

an evaluation of the inspection data, in conjunction with other available

information.

A publication listing all bridges over the navigable waters of the United States is

available to the States. This listing identifies those bridges where pier protection

systems must at least be considered.

The State of Louisiana has developed a manual titled Criteria For: The Design of

Bridge Piers with respect to Vessel Collision in Louisiana Waterways. Although

specifically prepared for Louisiana, the manual provides in-depth procedures for

analyzing and designing bridges to minimize vessel collisions. This manual has

been distributed to all States through the AASHTO Highway Subcommittee on

Bridges and Structures and was discussed at the national meetings held in 1985.

The manual was referred back to the subcommittee for further review and

development for consideration and later adoption as national standards.

In response to Item 2, the National Bridge Inspection Standards (NBIS) are very

specific on bridge inspector qualifications. The requirements of a graduate

engineer or a combination of experience and training assure that qualified

inspectors will obtain accurate information on the type, size, location, and

condition of any existing pier protection system. 

In response to Item 3, the information provided by the bridge inspector will be

used with other available information on the stream characteristics, location of

channel piers, type and volume of river traffic, etc., to analyze each site for

required pier protection. Engineering judgment must be used in assessing the risk

versus the consequences of bridge pier collisions along with the cost effectiveness

in the development of possible pier protection systems.

In summary, the qualified bridge inspector will provide the needed site-specific

information. This inspection data will be used with other available State criteria,

or with criteria developed by others, to analyze and develop any needed pier

protection systems. Even though national standards have not yet been adopted,

they are under development through the appropriate AASHTO committee. The

Louisiana criteria provided to each State could serve as an interim guide pending

further development of national criteria. 
Appendix C 75 Highway Accident Report

On November 19, 1985, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation

M-81-21 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.”

Safety Recommendation M-81-22. On March 4, 1984, the FHWA responded that

it would continue to assess the integrity of pier protection systems through the national

bridge inspection program. According to the FHWA, the results of each bridge inspection

were provided to the appropriate bridge authorities for their review and subsequent action

to correct identified deficiencies, and the inspection and review of bridge piers and fender

systems through the national bridge inspection program would accomplish an ongoing

review of the structural integrity of existing pier protective systems. The FHWA also

stated that as additional technical information became available concerning the evaluation

of pier protection systems on existing bridges, it would include it to the extent practicable

in the ongoing national bridge inspection program.

The FHWA also noted that Federal-aid highway funds could be used to cover the

costs of warranted warning and pier protection systems for bridges on all public highways,

if such costs were associated with bridge projects funded under the Highway Bridge

Replacement and Rehabilitation Program. On April 19, 1985, the Safety Board classified

Safety Recommendation M-81-22 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.”

Poplar Street Bridge, St. Louis, Missouri—April 2, 1983

The towboat City of Greenville, pushing four barges laden with crude oil, struck a

pier of the Poplar Street Bridge, which crosses the Upper Mississippi River between St.

Louis, Missouri, and East St. Louis, Illinois.8 At least one barge was ruptured by the

impact, and crude oil was released and ignited almost immediately. Three barges broke

loose and floated downriver. One barge sank about a mile from the bridge, a second barge

collided with barges moored at a chemical barge loading facility, and the other barge

collided with a grain barge loading terminal. The facilities sustained severe damage. The

burning oil ignited several fires along about 2 miles of waterfront on the Illinois side of the

river and polluted approximately 10 miles of the river. One person was injured as a result

of this accident. The damage to the barge loading facilities, the grain barges, and their

cargos; the damage and loss of cargo to the tow of the City of Greenville; and the cost of

the oil cleanup operations were estimated to be about $9 million. As a result of its

investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended that the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE):

M-83-96

Develop and publish a navigation guide or guides for mariners navigating

the Western Rivers similar in format to the United States Coast Pilot.

8 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Poplar Street Bridge by the Towboat M/V

City of Greenville and its Four-Barge Tow, St. Louis, Missouri, April 2, 1983, Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MAR-83/10 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1983).
Appendix C 76 Highway Accident Report

On June 29, 1984, USACE responded, “[T]he primary responsibility for safe

navigation on the inland waterways lies with towboat pilots, who in addition to being

experienced and well-trained need to have a through knowledge of the waterway being

traveled.” While it agreed such a publication could be a useful tool, USACE stated that it

did not believe that publishing such a guide was appropriate, since publishing was not a

logical extension of USACE’s duties. USACE indicated it would continue the practice of

advising mariners, through local notices to navigation interests, of conditions on the rivers

that could affect navigation, such as shoaling, river stages, and outdraft conditions at

locks. On June 26, 1985, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-83-96

“Closed—Reconsidered.”

Poplar Street Bridge, St. Louis, Missouri—April 26, 1984

The towboat Erin Marie, pushing 12 barges laden with grain downriver in high

water conditions, struck a pier of the Poplar Street Bridge, which crosses the Upper

Mississippi River between St. Louis, Missouri, and East St. Louis, Illinois.9

 Several barges

broke free and floated downriver, striking a fleet of 23 barges, breaking them free from

their moorings, and causing them to float free downriver. The barges in turn struck other

fleeted barges and shoreside facilities. More than 150 barges and vessels were broken free

of their moorings and cast adrift in the river. The total damages to barges, cargo, fleeting

areas, and barge loading facilities was estimated at $3 million. No one was injured. As a

result of its investigation, the Safety Board recommended that USACE:

M-85-26

In the next edition of the Upper Mississippi River Navigation Charts,

provide supplemental large scale charts for harbor areas, and areas difficult

to navigate due to current conditions, sharp bends, or restricted navigation

clearances; and areas having a higher-than-average accident rate or where

there are recurrent major accidents. Incorporate on all charts the location of

fleeting areas and other important waterside features. 

On December 30, 1992, USACE replied that it:

(1) prepares notices to navigation interests and regularly coordinates with the

Coast Guard on unusual channel conditions, (2) identifies important waterside

features (including fleeting areas) on its navigation charts, [and that] (3) barge

fleeting areas and harbor features are presented in map and tabular form, and (4)

bridge configurations are shown in profile with dimensions and clearances.

However, large-scale maps for harbor areas are not provided. 

On March 4, 1993, the Safety Board acknowledged that USACE provides

mariners with all of the requested information except for large-scale maps of harbor areas

and classified Safety Recommendation M-85-26 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.”

9 National Transportation Safety Board, Ramming of the Poplar Street Bridge by the Towboat M/V

Erin Marie and its Twelve-Barge Tow, St. Louis, Missouri, April 26, 1984, Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MAR-85/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1985).
Appendix C 77 Highway Accident Report

Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick, Georgia—May 3, 1987

On May 3, 1987, the Polish Bulk carrier Ziemia Bialostocka rammed the Sidney

Lanier Bridge,10 resulting in about $1.4 million in damage to the bridge and causing a

4-month bridge closure at an additional estimated cost of $7.9 million. As a result of its

investigation, the Safety Board recommended that the State of Georgia:

M-88-25

Modify the fenders on the Sidney Lanier Bridge to protect the bridge from

minor impact of large vessels.

M-88-26

Review the fenders on other Georgia bridges and modify the fenders to

protect bridges from minor impacts of large vessels.

Safety Recommendation M-88-25. On January 18, 1989, the State of Georgia

indicated that a study was underway to determine whether the Sidney Lanier Bridge

should be replaced and noted that the damaged fendering system had been repaired.

On March 23, 1989, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-88-25

“Open—Acceptable Response.” On May 20, 1993, the State of Georgia indicated, based

upon its study and Coast Guard analysis, that Congress had designated the Sidney Lanier

Bridge an “obstruction to navigation”11 and committed to a 50-percent share in the

replacement of the bridge. On July 20, 1993, the Safety Board noted that it was pleased

work had begun on a replacement for the Sidney Lanier Bridge and that the new bridge

design would incorporate “island” bridge protection. Accordingly, Safety

Recommendation M-88-25 was classified “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Safety Recommendation M-88-26. On January 18, 1989, the State of Georgia

indicated that only two of its bridges (the Sidney Lanier Bridge in Brunswick and the

Talmadge Bridge in Savannah) had a potential for impact by oceangoing vessels. The

State of Georgia further noted that the new Sidney Lanier Bridge would have “island”

bridge protection and that none of the new Talmadge Bridge’s supporting substructures

would be in water deep enough to support oceangoing vessels. On March 21, 1989, the

Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation M-88-26 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

10 NTSB/MAR-88/03.

11 A requirement for eligibility for funding under the The Act of June 21, 1940, as amended (TrumanHobbs Act), (54 Stat. 497; 33 U.S.C. 511-523).
Appendix C 78 Highway Accident Report

Judge William Seeber Bridge, New Orleans, Louisiana—May 28, 1993

The towboat Chris, pushing the empty hopper barge DM 3021, collided with a

support pier of the eastern span of the Judge William Seeber Bridge over the Industrial

Canal in New Orleans.12 The impact severed bent 21, causing two approach spans and the

two-column bent to collapse onto the barge and into the shallow waters of the canal. Two

automobiles carrying three people fell with the four-lane bridge deck, resulting in one

death and serious injuries to two persons. As a result of this accident, the canal was closed

to navigation traffic for 2 days, and the bridge was closed to vehicular traffic for 2 months.

The accident resulted in approximately $2 million in damage to the bridge and $7,000 in

damage to barge DM 3021. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety

Board recommended that the FHWA:

H-94-8

In cooperation with the American Association of State Highway

Transportation Officials, broaden the application of risk-assessment and

management programs to existing highway bridges. Such programs should

include, among other things, a formal assessment of the vulnerability of

bridges to vessel collision and collapse. 

On March 27, 1997, the FHWA suggested that Safety Recommendation H-94-8 had

been superseded by Safety Recommendations I-94-3 and -4 (from the 1993 Bayou Canot

Railroad Bridge accident). On October 7, 1997, the Safety Board agreed with the FHWA and

classified Safety Recommendation H-94-8 “Closed—No Longer Applicable/Superseded.”

Also as result of this investigation, the Safety Board recommended that AASHTO:

H-94-9

In cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration, broaden the

application of risk-assessment and management programs to existing

highway bridges. Such programs should include, among other things, a

formal assessment of the vulnerability of bridges to vessel collision and

collapse. 

On December 8, 1994, AASHTO responded, noting that this recommendation was

under active consideration by the Standing Committee on Highways’ Subcommittee on

Bridges and Structures and would be discussed in depth at the May 1995 meeting of the

subcommittee. In its June 20, 1995, reply, the Safety Board acknowledged the above reply

and classified Safety Recommendation H-94-9 “Open—Acceptable Response.” 

At a meeting with Safety Board staff on March 30, 2004, AASHTO indicated that

it is investigating additional countermeasures as part of its work on the security and

12 National Transportation Safety Board, U. S. Towboat Chris Collision With the Judge William Seeber

Bridge New Orleans, Louisiana, May 28, 1993, Highway-Marine Accident Report NTSB/HAR-94/03

(Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994).
Appendix C 79 Highway Accident Report

vulnerability assessments of the transportation systems. The Water Transportation

Committee also discussed this issue with Safety Board staff at its July 2003 meeting and

said it will work with the Standing Committee on Highways’ Subcommittee on Bridges

and Structures on risk-assessment issues.

In a July 20, 2004, letter to AASHTO, the Safety Board indicated Safety

Recommendation H-94-9 remains classified “Open—Acceptable Response.” However,

given that the intent of Safety Recommendation H-94-9 is covered by the

recommendation issued in this report to revise the sufficiency rating system, Safety

Recommendation H-94-9 is reclassified “Closed—Superseded.”

Also as a result of its investigation of the accident involving the Judge William

Seeber bridge, the Safety Board recommended that the Coast Guard:

M-94-10

Coordinate a cooperative effort with the United States Army Corps of

Engineers, the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, and

bridge owners to review conditions and practices in the Inner Harbor

Navigation Canal, identify hazards to the safe transit of vessels through the

canal and lock system, and implement measures to reduce those hazards.

In correspondence dated February 14, 1995, and September 23, 1996, the Coast

Guard indicated that it had been working with USACE and the city of New Orleans. The

Coast Guard also stated that during the repair of the Judge William Seeber Bridge, pier

protection had been installed and that pier protection was planned for the Florida Avenue

Bridge.

On March 20, 1997, the Safety Board noted that it had learned USACE was

planning a new lock in the industrial canal that should eliminate many of the problems

associated with the existing lock. The Board further noted that it believed the construction

of a larger lock would attract larger tows and not necessarily reduce the hazards associated

with the existing lock and asked the Coast Guard how it would address the last part of

Safety Recommendation M-94-10, requesting that it identify hazards to the safe transit of

vessels through the canal and lock system and implement measures to reduce those hazards. 

On April 3, 2001, the Coast Guard responded that USACE had a lock replacement

and Inner Navigation Canal Improvement project underway that would necessitate

modification of the Claiborne Avenue Bridge (Judge William Seeber Bridge) and

replacement of the Claude Avenue Bridge. The Coast Guard further stated that a TrumanHobbs Act rehabilitation/alteration project was in progress on the Florida Avenue Bridge.

The Coast Guard noted that these improvement projects were based on the results of a

national bridge survey completed in 1996. The Coast Guard also stated that the bridges

over the waterway had sufficient clearances and pier protection to meet the reasonable

needs of land and water traffic without undue hazards and stated that it found no

compelling need to implement additional measures to ensure the safe transit of vessels

through the canal and lock system.
Appendix C 80 Highway Accident Report

In its reply, the Safety Board acknowledged that the Coast Guard had provided

information regarding actions that it had taken to improve the safety of navigation in the

canal, had studied the hazard conditions in the canal, and had taken what it believed to be

appropriate action to mitigate those hazards. Accordingly, on February 2, 2002, the Safety

Board classified Safety Recommendation M-94-10 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”

Big Bayou Canot Railroad Bridge Near Mobile, Alabama—September 22, 1993

About 2:45 a.m., the towboat Mauvilla, pushing six barges, struck and displaced

the Big Bayou Canot railroad bridge near Mobile, Alabama.13 Eight minutes later,

AMTRAK train 2, the Sunset Limited, en route from Los Angeles, California, to Miami,

Florida, with 220 persons on board, struck the displaced bridge and derailed. The three

locomotive units, the baggage and dormitory cars, and two of the six passenger cars fell

into the water. The fuel tanks on the locomotive units ruptured, and the locomotive units

and the baggage and dormitory cars caught fire. Forty-two passengers and 5 crewmembers

were killed; 103 passengers were injured. The towboat’s four crewmembers were not

injured. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended

that the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT):

I-94-3

Convene an intermodal task force that includes the Coast Guard, the

Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, and

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to develop a standard methodology for

determining the vulnerability of the Nation’s highway and railroad bridges

to collisions from marine vessels, to formulate a ranking system for

identifying bridges at greatest risk, and to provide guidance on the

effectiveness and appropriateness of protective measures. 

I-94-4

Require that the Federal Railroad Administration and the Federal Highway

Administration, for their respective modes, use the methodology developed

by the intermodal task force to carry out a national risk-assessment

program for the Nation’s railroad and highway bridges. 

On April 24, 1997, the DOT responded that an intermodal task force had

completed a screening of bridges across navigable waters that are particularly vulnerable

to damage by commercial marine traffic. The DOT further stated that the task force used

10 major risk factors in determining which bridges may need new or enhanced bridge

fendering and lighting systems and that the task force, especially the Federal Railroad

Administration, relied upon the Coast Guard’s screening and evaluation to prioritize

improvements for navigation at the bridge sites. 

13 National Transportation Safety Board, Derailment of AMTRAK Train No. 2 on the CSXT Big Bayou

Canot Bridge Near Mobile, Alabama, September 22, 1993, Railroad-Marine Accident Report NTSB/RAR94/01 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1994).
Appendix C 81 Highway Accident Report

The Safety Board replied that although the methods used and the program

established by the intermodal task force were less vigorous than the Safety Board

expected, the program would reduce the risk of marine vessel impacts with bridges over

navigable waters. Consequently, on October 27, 1998, the Safety Board classified Safety

Recommendations I-94-3 and -4 “Closed—Acceptable Alternate Action.” 

Million Dollar Bridge, Portland, Maine—September 27, 1996

The 540-foot-long Liberian tankship Julie N, carrying a cargo of heating oil,

collided with the south bascule pier of the Portland-South Portland Million Dollar

Bridge.14 Although no injuries occurred, the accident resulted in a 33-foot-long hole in the

vessel’s hull beneath the waterline. About 4,000 barrels of oil spilled into the harbor. The

vessel sustained about $660,000 in damage, and the cost for cleanup of the oil was

approximately $43 million. Repairs to the bridge were about $232,000. As a result of its

investigation of this accident, the Safety Board recommended that the FHWA:

M-98-83

Inform State highway departments of the circumstances of the accident and

recommend that the States evaluate the adequacy of fendering systems at

bridge piers where the systems were not designed for the type and size of

vessel currently using the waterway and may not be adequate to protect the

bridge and take corrective action as necessary. 

On August 27, 1998, the FHWA responded that it would inform State

transportation departments of the circumstances of the Million Dollar Bridge accident and

reinforce its previous guidance to the States regarding this matter. On October 21, 1998,

the Safety Board acknowledged that the FHWA had issued a memorandum to the FHWA

field offices recommending that the States evaluate the adequacy of fendering systems at

bridge piers where the systems were not designed for the type and size of vessels currently

using the waterway and take corrective action, as necessary, in accordance with their

overall, ongoing Bridge Management System Programs, and consequently classified

Safety Recommendation M-98-03 “Closed—Acceptable Action.” 

14 National Transportation Safety Board, Postaccident Testing for Alcohol and Other Drugs in the

Marine Industry and the Ramming of the Portland-South Portland (Million Dollar) Bridge at Portland,

Maine, by the Liberian Tankship Julie N on September 27, 1996, Special Investigation Report

NTSB/SIR-98/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 1998).
Appendix C 82 Highway Accident Report

Also as a result of its investigation, the Safety Board recommended that AASHTO:

M-98-84

Inform State highway departments of the circumstances of the accident and

recommend that the States evaluate the adequacy of fendering systems at

bridge piers where the systems were not designed for the type and size of

vessel currently using the waterway and may not be adequate to protect the

bridge and take corrective action as necessary.

On April 17, 2000, AASHTO responded that the FHWA memorandum had been

distributed to the AASHTO Standing Committee on Highways’ Subcommittee on Bridges

and Structures (consisting of State bridge engineers) and had been discussed at its May

1999 meeting. On June 27, 2000, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation

M-98-84 “Closed—Acceptable Action.”