J-S17031-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF:

H.R.N., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: K.M.T., MOTHER

No. 2889 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order entered August 7, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000711-2017.

IN THE INTEREST OF:

R.R.N., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: K.M.T., MOTHER

No. 2891 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order entered August 7, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000517-2017.

IN THE INTEREST OF:

G.N., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA
J-S17031-18

- 2 -

APPEAL OF: K.M.T., MOTHER

No. 2894 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order entered August 7, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000518-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF:

L.R.N., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: K.M.T., MOTHER

No. 2897 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order entered August 7, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000519-2017.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 30, 2018

K.M.T. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders terminating her parental 

rights to her four children: L.R.N. (11 years old); G.N. (9 years old); R.R.N. 

(3 years old); and H.R.N. (3 months old).1 Her rights to her older three 

children – L.R.N., G.N., and R.R.N. – were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(a) (1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother’s rights to her youngest, H.R.N., 

____________________________________________

1 Ge.N, Father, also appeals, but his case is before a separate panel of this 

Court. See 2824, 2826, 2827, 2828, EDA 2017.
J-S17031-18

- 3 -

were terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a) (1), (2), (4), (5), (8) and 

(b). After careful review, we affirm as to the three eldest children, but reverse 

as to H.R.N.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are extensive, but 

they may be summarized as follows. The parties first came to the attention 

of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) in November 2009. Mother 

had taken L.R.N. to the hospital, alleging Father physically abused the child. 

The hospital found no evidence of physical abuse and the child was released 

the same day. At the hospital, however, Mother appeared to be under the 

influence of an unknown substance. Some combination of these two facts 

precipitated DHS involvement. Soon thereafter, DHS confirmed that Mother 

was prescribed Seroquel and Methadone. DHS developed a Safety Plan to 

relocate Mother and her children (L.R.N. and G.N.) to the Eliza Shirley Red 

Shield shelter. The family was discharged two weeks later in December 2009 

when Mother and the children failed to return to the shelter. Mother took the 

children to DHS. After Mother tested positive for benzodiazepines, DHS 

created a new safety plan where the maternal grandparents would serve as

caregivers to L.R.N. and G.N. In late December 2009, Mother was arrested 

for shoplifting. At that point, DHS obtained a protective custody order for the 

children, who remained in the care of their maternal grandparents.

In January 2010, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent. 

Father was ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol screen and a dual diagnosis 

assessment; the court found Mother received inpatient treatment at My 
J-S17031-18

- 4 -

Sister’s Place, where she was residing. The children joined Mother soon 

thereafter.

In June 2010, the children were again removed to the care of the 

maternal grandparents. Over the next year and a half, the juvenile court 

found the parents to be minimally compliant with their reunification goals. 

The parents eventually complied with the permanency plan, however; and in 

late December 2011, the children were reunified with their parents. The 

dependency case was then closed for nearly three years.

In November 2014, DHS received a report alleging that the parents left 

then-6-year-old G.N. and then-8-month-old R.R.N in the care of the eldest 

child L.R.N., who was 8 years old. A subsequent investigation revealed that 

Mother and Father were abusing OxyContin, Percocet, Klonopin and Xanax. 

There was limited food in the home. The home was dirty and cluttered with 

trash, thereby creating a fire hazard. The parents were also selling their food 

stamps, and asking neighbors for food and baby formula. L.R.N. was suffering 

from asthma; G.N. had Attention-Deficient Hyperactivity Disorder.

Although the children remained in the home, DHS discovered a number 

of concerns over the following year. Mother failed to provide the results of 

her drug tests to DHS’ service providers. Mother reported that armed 

neighborhood men had threatened to kill her family. Mother failed to enroll 

in mental health treatment. A DHS service provider had to assist Mother by 

transporting her and the children to their dental appointments; the two older 

children had 23 cavities between them. Mother did not ensure G.N. received 
J-S17031-18

- 5 -

his daily medication. During home visits, a service provider suspected Mother 

was under the influence. Mother was diagnosed with multi-personality 

disorder and bipolar disorder. The children were eventually adjudicated 

dependent for the second time in December 2015. 

At the ensuing permanency review hearing in March 2016, Mother 

appeared to be under the influence. Her lack of compliance with drug screens 

led to the children being placed out of her care. Mother’s compliance with 

DHS’ Single Case Plan was minimal throughout the following year. In April 

2017 Mother gave birth to H.R.N.; Mother had no prenatal care and DHS was 

evidently unaware she was pregnant. The new baby had low scores on the

Appearance, Pulse, Grimace, Activity Respiration (APGAR) scale. Although 

she previously had been prescribed Suboxone, Mother was purchasing and 

using the drug illegally at that time. The baby was treated at the hospital for 

Suboxone withdrawal symptoms. Upon her release from the hospital, H.R.N. 

was placed in the care of a maternal aunt. H.R.N. was adjudicated dependent 

on May 11, 2017. DHS filed its petition to terminate the parents’ rights as to 

the three eldest children on May 5, 2017; H.R.N.’s petition was filed on July 

11, 2017. On July 13, 2017 the three oldest children transitioned from their 

placement with maternal relatives to their pre-adoptive placement with

paternal aunt. It appears the baby, H.R.N., remained with a maternal aunt, 

but was also in the processing of transitioning to the same paternal aunt. 

On August 7, 2017, the trial court terminated Mother’s rights in the 

following manner: As to L.R.N., G.N., and R.R.N., Mother’s rights were 
J-S17031-18

- 6 -

terminated as to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). As to H.R.N., 

Mother’s rights were terminated as to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (4), (5),

and (8).

In her brief, Mother submits to us two questions:

1. Did DHS sustain the burden that Mother's rights should 

be terminated when there was evidence that Mother had 

completed and/or had been actively completing her 

permanency goals?

2. Was there sufficient evidence presented to establish that 

it was in the best interests of the child to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights?

Mother’s Brief, at 4.

Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is 

settled:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent 

evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, 

the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a 

petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court 

must accord the hearing judge's decision the same 

deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must 

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in 

order to determine whether the trial court's decision is 

supported by competent evidence.

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005). In termination cases, the 

burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are 

valid. Id. at 806. We have previously stated:
J-S17031-18

- 7 -

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing 

as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73–74 (Pa. Super.

2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm 

even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).

The termination of parental rights is controlled by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. 

Under this statute, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated process in which 

it initially focuses on the conduct of the parent under Section 2511(a). See In 

the Interest of B.C., 36 A.3d 601 (Pa.Super.2012). 

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
J-S17031-18

- 8 -

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

....

(4) The child is in the custody of an agency, having been 

found under such circumstances that the identity or 

whereabouts of the parent is unknown and cannot be 

ascertained by diligent search and the parent does not claim 

the child within three months after the child is found.[2]

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within 

a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

....

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8). Additionally, this Court “need 

only agree with [the trial court's] decision as to any one subsection in order 

____________________________________________

2 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(4) was only found to be grounds for termination as 

to H.R.N.
J-S17031-18

- 9 -

to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa.Super.2004).

For clarity’s sake, we divide our discussion between the older three 

children, whose terminations we affirm, and the youngest child, whose 

termination we reverse. 

We begin with the older three children: L.R.N.; G.N.; and R.R.N. Mother 

argues that the trial court erred because she had either completed or was in 

the process of completing her court-ordered reunification goals. But our 

review of the testimony reveals that in the three years since the DHS case 

was reopened, Mother’s compliance was minimal. See N.T., 8/7/17, at 32.

Mother did not provide any evidence that she complied with her drug 

screening. In fact, Mother was caught trying to falsify a drug test when it was 

discovered she brought a condom full of urine to the screen. Id., at 19. 

Because Mother appeared to be under the influence during her visits with the 

children, the court suspended the visits. Id., at 25; 34. Even after they 

resumed, Mother’s lack of participation in the reunification process did not 

warrant anything more than weekly, two-hour supervised visits. Id., at 44. 

Mother could not provide the caseworker with documentation that she sought 

mental health treatment. Mother testified that she is now employed as a 

caretaker, hired by the brother of her elderly charge. Id., at 96. However, 

that employment did not commence until July 1, 2017, around two months 

after DHS filed its termination petition. Section 2511(b) provides that the 

court may not consider any effort by the parent to remedy the conditions 
J-S17031-18

- 10 -

described in subsection (a)(8) if that remedy was initiated after the parent 

was given notice that termination petition had been filed. 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511(b); see also In re D.W., 856 A.2d 1231, 1234 (Pa. Super. 2004).

While the trial court found that DHS met its burden of proof under each 

of the four subsections of the termination statute referenced above, we can 

affirm the termination if we agree with the decision of any one of those

subsections. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, 

we agree with the trial court’s decision on subsection (a)(8).

In order to satisfy subsection 2511(a)(8), DHS must show the following 

three elements: (1) that the child has been removed from the care of the 

parent for at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the conditions which had led 

to the removal or placement of the child still exist; and (3) that termination 

of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Termination under subsection 2511(a)(8) does not 

require an evaluation of a parent's willingness or ability to remedy the 

conditions that led to placement of his or her children. In re Adoption of 

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also In re M.A.B., 166 

A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Here, the court gave Mother several years to remedy the conditions that 

led to the children’s repeated removals. The final removal occurred in March 

2016; thus, the twelve month time period was satisfied. Despite DHS working 

with her over many years, Mother failed to participate in any meaningful drug 

or mental health treatment. Her visitations were suspended because of 
J-S17031-18

- 11 -

apparent drug use. The visits she had were supervised. At the time of the 

termination, the conditions that led to these children’s removal still existed.

Finally, for the same reasons that will be discussed below regarding 2511 (b), 

the trial court concluded that termination would best serve the children’s 

needs and welfare. We agree. 

Having established that section 2511(a)(8) was a proper ground for 

terminating Mother’s parental rights, we must now determine whether 

termination would serve the children’s needs and welfare under section 

2511(b). See id.

Section 2511(b) provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must take into account 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, 

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed that 
J-S17031-18

- 12 -

the orphans' court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child 

bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

that bond. Id. However, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008).

While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect 

of the Subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an emotional bond does not 

preclude the termination of parental rights. Rather, the orphans' court must 

examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination “would 

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” As we explained 

in In re N.A.M.:

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should 

also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster 

parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court 

should consider the importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. 

Super. 2010). Moreover, we have found terminations to be proper despite 

the existence of a parent-child bond when the bond is not necessarily 

meaningful or healthy. In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 120 (Pa. Super. 2016); 

see In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the strong 
J-S17031-18

- 13 -

parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by itself serve as 

grounds to prolong foster care drift); see also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a parent's love of her child, alone, does not 

preclude a termination).

Since their last removal in March 2016, the three eldest children largely 

have been placed with family. At the time of the hearing, they had been 

placed with their paternal aunt, who is their pre-adoptive foster parent. Prior 

to that, they were with their maternal grandmother. Although there was no 

bonding evaluation conducted between the children and their paternal aunt, 

the aunt is someone the children know. Additionally, DHS caseworker testified 

that the children have adjusted well in the home. N.T., 8/7/17, at 74. The 

caseworker testified, and the trial court agreed, that although the two oldest 

children, L.R.N. and G.N., are bonded with Mother, this bond is not beneficial 

or necessary. The court also concluded that this bond is outweighed by the 

children’s need for stability and safety. We agree. The children – especially 

the oldest two children – have experienced a tumultuous childhood thus far. 

DHS involvement began 9 years ago. Since then, Mother has never 

maintained any prolonged sobriety. The children were removed multiple times 

and have had to endure various placements. Moreover, Mother had often 

neglected them to the point where their health suffered. When they finally 

got to a dentist, two of the children had nearly two dozen cavities between 

them. Apart from the physical effects of Mother’s neglect, their lack of 

permanency could have long-term consequences on their mental health. 
J-S17031-18

- 14 -

The children currently suffer from mental health issues which Mother 

has also failed to address; the social worker testified that Mother had not been 

involved in G.N.’s behavioral medication management nor has she been 

involved in his therapy. Because the children are placed with kin, we recognize 

that they will likely continue to have some contact with Mother. This should 

mitigate any adverse effect termination might have on the older children. See

In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 119-120 (Pa. Super. 2014). Additionally any 

adverse effects are wholly outweighed by the benefits of adoption. We find 

that the record supports termination of Mother’s parental rights as to L.R.N., 

G.N., and R.R.N. The needs and welfare of these three children will be served 

by the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

With respect to the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to youngest child, H.R.N., we must reverse. Initially, we recognize that 

the trial court’s termination under subsection (a)(4) may be based a clerical 

error. Section 2511(a)(4) provides: “The child is in the custody of the agency, 

having been found under such circumstances that the identity or whereabouts 

of the parent is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search and 

the parent does not claim the child within three months after the child is 

found.” This section does not apply to the facts of this case. Perhaps the 

termination provision was included in DHS’s petition to terminate the parental 

rights of the “Unknown Father.” See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(c) (“If the petition 

does not identify the father of the child, it shall state whether a claim of 

paternity has been filed under Section [5103] (relating to paternity)). 
J-S17031-18

- 15 -

Curiously, DHS sought – and the trial court granted – termination of the rights 

of an unnamed father, despite the fact that Father acknowledged paternity of 

H.R.N., and despite the fact that he and Mother were purportedly married at 

the time of H.R.N.’s birth. We can surmise no other explanation for this finding 

other than a clerical error. However, the law does not sever the parent-child 

bond on this basis. 

Similarly inappropriate are the court’s findings as to Sections 

2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). Each of these provisions have timing requirements 

before termination is appropriate; the statutory requisite timeframe outlined

for Sections 2511(a)(1) and (5) is six months, and for Section 2511(a)(8), it 

is 12 months. At the time of the termination hearing, H.R.N. was only three 

months old, and, thus, could only have been without parental care for a period 

of approximately 3 months. We conclude that the trial court erred when it 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to H.R. N. under these provisions. This 

leaves only Section 2511(a)(2) as an appropriate ground for termination.

As we stated above, if we were to conclude that Section 2511(a)(2) is a 

suitable ground for termination, we could affirm the trial court’s decision to 

terminate despite the defects in its analysis regarding the other subsections 

discussed above. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(requiring only one basis under 2511(a) to affirm the termination of parental 

rights). However, we are constrained to reverse on this ground as well. 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 
J-S17031-18

- 16 -

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 327 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting In re Adoption 

of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015. “The grounds for 

termination due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited 

to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may include acts 

of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” Id.

We readily acknowledge that as to the three older children, years’ worth 

of facts allowed the trial court to conclude that Mother engaged in this sort of 

repeated and continued misconduct. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). The 

record is replete with examples of Mother’s inability to parent those children.

But when it comes to H.R.N., the history of Mother’s misconduct only began

at H.R.N.’s birth three months prior.

Significantly, unlike some of the other subsections of 2511(a),3the 

legislature did not impose any minimum timeframe for termination under 

subsection 2511(a)(2); nor do we. We are not deciding that three months is 

too short of a time period for a parent to demonstrate “repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” to care for a child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(2). Rather, we are constrained to reverse in this case because the 

record is devoid of any real discussion of H.R.N. or Mother’s reunification 

____________________________________________

3

 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (4), (5), (6), (8).
J-S17031-18

- 17 -

efforts since H.R.N.’s birth. The DHS Petition to terminate parental rights to 

H.R.N. was largely an afterthought. We gleaned that the child was adjudicated 

dependent in May, shortly after Mother tested positive for the substances she

abused during her pregnancy. The trial court also found that Mother did not 

seek prenatal care. But our review of the record indicates that the trial court 

scheduled only one permanency review hearing between the adjudication 

hearing in May 2017 and the termination hearing in August 2017. The record 

shows that this one hearing was scheduled for July 2017 and was then 

continued because the trial judge was unavailable. During the termination 

hearing in August 2017, the testimony of the DHS witness focused primarily 

on the facts surrounding the three older children. Further testimony revealed 

that Mother had tested both positive and negative for controlled substances 

since H.R.N.’s birth. These facts are insufficient to prove, especially by clear 

and convincing evidence, that Mother’s misconduct was repeated and 

continued with respect to H.R.N. Because we reverse as to the Section 

2511(a) analysis, we need not discuss the trial court’s conclusions as to the 

bifurcated Section 2511(b) analysis.

We are aware of the fractured state that our decision leaves this family, 

just as we are aware that the ultimate outcome might be the same, and 

Mother’s parental rights may eventually be terminated. To be clear, nothing 

we have said here disturbs the trial court’s order placing H.R.N. with her 

siblings in the care of the paternal aunt. Without evidence, however, we are 

reduced to mere speculation, which can never justify bypassing the 
J-S17031-18

- 18 -

heightened due process afforded to parents engaged in the juvenile court

system.

Orders affirmed in part, reversed in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/30/18