J-S20001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.P., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2712 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered September 20, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001518-2019

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2020

Appellant, S.P. (“Mother”), appeals from the shelter care order entered 

on September 20, 2019, concerning her minor son, T.C. (“Child”), who was 

born in July of 2019. In the order, the trial court found that it was not currently 

in Child’s best interests to be returned to his parents’ house.1 The order also

referred Child for a medical exam and skeletal scan. After review, we conclude 

that the September 20, 2019 shelter care order is not appealable. 

Accordingly, we are constrained to quash Mother’s appeal.

The trial court summarized the background of this matter as follows:

On September 19, 2019, the [Philadelphia] Department of 

Human Services [(“DHS”)] filed a petition seeking to obtain an 

Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) to remove Child from the 

____________________________________________

1 J.C. (“Father”) did not file an appeal from this order, nor did he participate 

in this appeal.
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custody of his [p]arents. Seventeen (17) months earlier, on April 

27, 2018, DHS received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

report in reference to ... Child’s older sibling [(“Sibling”), who was 

born in April of 2018]. ... Sibling had tested positive for marijuana 

at birth. On July 27, 2018, DHS received a Child Protective 

Services (“CPS”) report alleging the Sibling had been taken to St. 

Christopher’s Children’s Hospital, where it was determined that ... 

Sibling had a fractured skull along with other serious injuries. On 

July 30, 2018, DHS obtained an OPC for ... Sibling. On November 

9, 2018, the trial court adjudicated ... Sibling dependent and 

determined that ... Sibling was the victim of child abuse 

perpetrated by [Mother and Father]. The evidence indicated that 

Sibling had suffered serious unexplained injuries, which included 

(1) a displaced parietal skull fracture; (2) subdural hematoma; 

(3) parenchymal hemorrhage; (4) swelling of the brain and (5) 

fractured ribs. A detailed description of ... Sibling’s injuries is 

contained in a Consultation Report dated July 24, 2018[.] ... As 

stated, this evidence was also used to find [Mother and Father] to 

be the perpetrators of child abuse. A finding of aggravated 

circumstances versus [Mother and Father] was also entered. ... 

Sibling was placed in foster care and remains in foster care under 

the jurisdiction of the trial court.

[Child] was born [in July of 2019]. On September 19, 2019, 

[DHS] requested an OPC for Child based on the abuse that ... 

Sibling had suffered at the hands of [Mother and Father]. The 

underlying Application for Order for Protective Custody made a 

direct reference to the need for an OPC was based upon ... Sibling’s 

prior injuries. The OPC also referenced that the trial court ordered 

that ... Child be removed from [Mother and Father’s] care based 

upon the findings in ... Sibling’s case. ...

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/20, at unnumbered 2-3.

A shelter care hearing was held on September 20, 2019. Mother and 

Father were present and represented by counsel. Child was represented by a 

guardian ad litem (“GAL”).

2

 DHS presented the testimony of DHS social 

____________________________________________

2 The Defender Association of Philadelphia Child Advocacy Unit was appointed 

GAL/counsel for Child on September 20, 2019. Order Appointing Counsel, 

9/20/19. 
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worker, Melinda Brown. Subsequent to the hearing, the court lifted the OPC 

and ordered Child’s temporary commitment to DHS to remain in place. The 

trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence presented that the

return of Child to the parents was not in Child’s best interests. The court 

further found that to allow Child to remain in the parents’ home was contrary 

to Child’s welfare, and that DHS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. 

Lastly, at the request of the GAL, and over the objection of Mother, the court 

referred Child for a medical exam and skeletal scan. Shelter Care Order, 

9/20/19; N.T., 9/20/19, at 14-16. In its opinion, the trial court provided the 

following reasoning: 

During the Shelter Care Hearing on September 20, 2019, the trial 

court correctly relied upon prognostic evidence regarding ... 

Sibling and the [p]arents’ history of abuse to determine that it 

would be contrary to the ... Child’s welfare that he remain in the 

home of Mother and Father. ... DHS placed ... Child with his 

[g]randparents, who live in the same neighborhood as the 

[p]arents. The evidence demonstrated that ... DHS made 

reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of ... Child and that the 

placement with the [g]randparents was appropriate. ...

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, on multiple occasions, 

has held that prognostic evidence is admissible in dependency 

proceedings. In the Interest of R.W.J., 826 [A.2d 10] (Pa. Super. 

2003), the Superior Court held that a trial court may adjudicate a 

child based on legitimate prognostic evidence that shows the 

safety of the child is in jeopardy. Consequently, in the instant 

case, the history of child abuse perpetrated by the [p]arents upon 

... Sibling justified the removal of ... Child from the [p]arents’ 

custody and use of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion 

by the trial court.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/17/20, at 3-4.
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Thereafter, through appointed counsel, Mother filed an appeal on 

September 20, 2019, along with a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Without leave of court, 

Mother filed an amended concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

on September 22, 2019.3 Mother also filed a motion for reconsideration on 

September 22, 2019, which was denied on October 17, 2019, after a hearing.

Following the aforementioned shelter care hearing, DHS filed a 

dependency petition on September 23, 2019. After several continuances, an 

adjudicatory hearing was held on November 12, 2019, and the trial court 

entered an order adjudicating Child dependent and finding that it is in Child’s 

best interests to be removed from his parents’ home. Order of Adjudication 

and Disposition, 11/12/19. 

Mother did not file an appeal from the November 12, 2019 order. 

Rather, as we noted above, Mother filed an appeal from the September 20, 

2019 shelter care order, and she raised the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its 

discretion in finding that [DHS] met its burden to prove that 

[Child] should be removed from his parents’ care.

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in making the 

pre-placement finding required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(b)(2) of 

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3 As the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure do not provide for the filing 

of an amended or second concise statement absent leave of court, we do not 

consider this second statement. Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 

798, 802 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2007). 
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the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, by determining that [DHS] made 

reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for the 

removal of [Child] from his parents’ care.

3. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its 

discretion where it ordered that [Child] undergo a bone scan[.]

Mother’s Brief at 3.4

Our standard of review is as follows:

[T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an 

appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 

record, but does not require the appellate court to accept 

the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. 

Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted); see also In 

re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015). 

Prior to reaching the merits of Mother’s issues, we must determine 

whether we have jurisdiction to decide the instant appeal. Specifically, we 

must assess whether the September 20, 2019 shelter care order is a final, 

appealable order. DHS, as well as Child’s GAL, argue that the order in question 

____________________________________________

4 Although we conclude that the September 20, 2019 order is not an 

appealable order, we point out that Mother did not challenge the order for a 

bone scan in her original Rule 1925(b) statement. See Krebs v. United 

Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that a failure to 

preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved of the appellate 

brief results in a waiver of those issues).
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is not final or otherwise appealable, i.e. as a collateral, order.

5

 DHS’s Brief at 

15-17; GAL’s Brief at 12-17. After review, we agree.

It is well settled that “[a]n appeal lies only from a final order, unless 

permitted by rule or statute.” Stewart v. Foxworth, 65 A.3d 468, 471 (Pa. 

Super. 2013); see also In the Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. 

Super. 2019). Generally, a final order is one that disposes of all claims and 

all parties. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). However, in the context of dependency, we 

have stated as follows:

“[D]ue to dependency’s unique nature, the fact that further 

proceedings are contemplated is not dispositive of the finality of 

the order. In the Interest of J.L., 216 A.3d 233, 2019 WL 

3295100, at 3 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019). In the dependency context, 

the court “must examine the practical consequences of the order 

to determine if the party challenging it has effectively been put 

out of court.” In re Interest of M.B., 388 Pa. Super. 381, 565 

A.2d 804, 806 (1989). 

J.M., 219 A.3d at 652. Moreover:

Based upon the two-step procedure contemplated by the Juvenile 

Act for declaring a child dependent (i.e., an adjudication followed 

by a disposition, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c)), this Court has held 

that it is the dispositional order following a dependency 

adjudication that is a final appealable order. In the Interest of 

C.A.M., 264 Pa. Super. 300, 399 A.2d 786 (1979). 

Id., at 651-652.

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5 DHS and the GAL argue that because the September 20, 2019 order is not 

final or otherwise appealable, Mother’s appeal should be dismissed or 

quashed. DHS’ Brief at 17; GAL’s Brief at 17. Mother did not respond to these 

arguments.
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Instantly, Mother’s appeal is from the shelter care order, not a

dispositional order subsequent to adjudication; therefore, it is not a final 

order. J.M., 219 A.3d at 651-652. Therefore, we turn to whether the order 

in question is otherwise appealable.

An appeal may be taken from: an interlocutory order appealable by

right; an interlocutory order appealable by permission; or from a collateral 

order. J.M., 219 A.3d at 650 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 311, 312, and 313). Herein, 

we observe that the September 20, 2019 order is not an order delineated as 

an interlocutory order appealable by right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311, and 

Mother did not seek permission to appeal the order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 312. 

Therefore, we examine whether it is a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

313. 

“A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main 

cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review 

and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b); 

J.M., 219 A.3d at 655; In re J.S.C., 851 A.2d 189, 191 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

Critically, “[o]ur Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 be interpreted 

narrowly so as not to swallow the general rule that only final orders are 

appealable as of right. To invoke the collateral order doctrine, each of the 

three prongs identified in the rule’s definition must be clearly satisfied.” J.M., 

219 A.3d at 655 (quoting In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 335 (Pa. Super. 2011)).
J-S20001-20

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Specifically, as to the first prong, we have stated:

[A]n order is separable from the main cause of action if it is 

entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case and if it can 

be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying 

dispute. [K.C. v. L.A., 633 Pa. 722, 728, 128 A.3d 774, 778 

(2015)] (citing Commonwealth v. Blystone, 632 Pa. 260, 119 

A.3d 306, 312 (2015)); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 

(1949) (We hold this order appealable because it is a final 

disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the 

cause of action and does not require consideration with it.); Barak 

v. Karolizki, 196 A.3d 208, 218 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citing Ben v. 

Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 552 (1999) (The element 

of separability requires that the merits of the appeal must be 

resolvable without analysis of the substantive claims in the 

underlying lawsuit.)). Although [appellate courts] tolerate a 

degree of interrelatedness between merit issues and the question 

sought to be raised in the interlocutory appeal, the claim must 

nevertheless be conceptually distinct from the merits of plaintiff’s 

claim. Blystone, 119 A.3d at 312 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

One of the complications with the collateral order doctrine 

as applied to dependency matters is what precisely constitutes the 

main cause of action. This Court has not been consistent with that 

determination. In [In re Tameka M., 534 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 

1987)], which is a child welfare agency’s appeal from an order 

mandating that the agency reimburse the foster parents of a 

dependent child for preschool tuition, an en banc panel of this 

Court offered a narrow interpretation of the main cause of action. 

After reviewing the purposes behind the Juvenile Act, this Court 

concluded that the main cause of action consists of a dependency 

determination and disposition, a conclusion this Court believed 

was reinforced by the fact it is the dispositional order that 

constitutes a final, appealable order. Tameka M., 534 A.2d at 

786. 

J.M., 219 A.3d at 655-656 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, the September 20, 2019 shelter care order does not 

satisfy the first prong of the aforementioned test requiring that the order is 
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separable from and collateral to the main cause of action. Rather, the salient 

issue surrounding both the shelter care order and the subsequent adjudication 

of dependency is Child’s best interests and whether those interests were 

served by Child’s removal from his parents’ home. Shelter Care Order, 

9/20/19; Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 11/12/19. Accordingly, the 

September 20, 2019 order in question is not a collateral order, and it is not 

appealable.6

Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the September 20, 2019

order was appealable, Mother would not be entitled to relief. We note that 

both DHS and the GAL further assert that Mother’s appeal is moot.7 DHS’s

Brief at 13-15; GAL’s Brief at 17-22. We likewise deem Mother’s appeal moot. 

As noted, the certified record reflects that the trial court entered an order of 

adjudication and disposition on November 12, 2019, adjudicating Child 

dependent and finding it in Child’s best interests to be removed from his 

____________________________________________

6 We recognize that the shelter care order also relayed that legal custody of 

Child was transferred to DHS. Shelter Care Order, 9/20/19. However, given 

the procedural posture of this case at the time the order was entered and 

pursuant to J.M., we do not conclude that the custody language made the 

shelter care order appealable. The subsequent adjudication and dispositional 

order, which was the appealable order, specifically directed the transfer of 

legal custody to DHS. Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 11/12/19, at 2. 

Thus, the shelter care order did not put Mother out of court. Mother was not 

in jeopardy of losing her right to appeal the transfer of legal custody upon the 

entry of the shelter care order; it was the subsequent adjudication and 

dispositional order which made final and appealable, inter alia, the transfer of 

legal custody to DHS. J.M., 219 A.3d at 655-656.

7 Mother does not respond to this argument.
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parents’ home. Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 11/12/19. Mother did 

not appeal this order.

As a general rule, 

an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of the 

judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot. An issue 

can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due to 

an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an 

intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an 

opinion of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue 

before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court 

cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect. 

In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002).

The instant appeal presents a situation involving an intervening change 

in the factual posture of the case. After entry of the September 20, 2019 

order, the trial court subsequently adjudicated Child dependent, with a 

contemporaneous dispositional order. No appeal was filed. Accordingly, the 

September 20, 2019 order is no longer in effect. Therefore, there is not a 

controversy. Now that Child had been adjudicated dependent with a 

disposition, there is no legal remedy for Mother concerning the September 20, 

2019 order, and the issue is moot. 

Based on all of the foregoing, we conclude that the September 20, 2019 

order is not an appealable order. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider Mother’s claims, and the appeal must be quashed. Additionally, even 

were we to conclude that we have jurisdiction, we would conclude that 

Mother’s claims are moot; accordingly, there is no controversy. For these 
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reasons, we quash Mother’s appeal from the September 20, 2019 shelter care 

order.

Appeal quashed. 

 Judge Stabile joins this Memorandum.

 Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/20