UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROSCOE ABELL, a/k/a Scoe, a/k/a Big Bra,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

District Judge. (3:07-cr-00061-FDW-1)

Submitted: September 23, 2010 Decided: November 10, 2010

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James S. Weidner, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF JAMES S. WEIDNER, JR., 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Roscoe Abell pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 

distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams 

or more of cocaine base, 500 grams or more of cocaine, 

marijuana, and Ecstasy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

846 (2006), and two counts of distribution of cocaine base and 

aiding and abetting, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(C) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The district court 

imposed an enhanced statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 240 

months’ imprisonment based on a prior felony drug conviction. 

The district court also imposed a supervised release term of 

fifty years.

On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), noting no meritorious issues 

for appeal, but questioning the constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 851, whether the sentence was properly enhanced based on a 

prior felony drug conviction, and the reasonableness of the 

sentence imposed. In a pro se supplemental brief, Abell 

likewise contests the reasonableness of his imprisonment term, 

as well as the fifty-year supervised release term. Abell also 

argues for retroactive application of legislation addressing 

sentencing disparities for cocaine powder and cocaine base. 

Finding no reversible error, we affirm. We remand, however, for 

correction of a clerical error in the judgment.
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that the 

district court substantially complied with the requirements of 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and ensured that Abell’s plea was knowing 

and voluntary. We also conclude that the 240-month sentence and 

fifty-year supervised release term imposed by the district court 

were procedurally and substantively reasonable. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (review of sentence is for 

abuse of discretion). 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We have considered the claims asserted in counsel’s 

brief and Abell’s pro se supplemental brief and conclude they 

are without merit. We therefore affirm Abell’s conviction and 

sentence. Although we affirm Abell’s conviction and sentence, 

we remand so that the written judgment can be corrected to 

reflect the distribution of cocaine base offenses in Counts 

Sixteen and Seventeen to which Abell pled guilty and was 

sentenced.*

 * The written judgment incorrectly recites that Abell was 

found guilty in Counts Sixteen and Seventeen of possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base. Because both possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base and distribution of cocaine 

base are offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and carry the 

same penalties, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), the clerical error in the 

judgment did not affect Abell’s sentence or otherwise prejudice 

him.

 We grant Abell’s motion to amend his notice of 
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direct appeal, but deny his “Motion to Receive Jenks and Brady 

Materials,” and “Motion to Compel Discovery from Attorney.”

This court requires that counsel inform Abell, in 

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Abell requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such filing would 

be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Abell. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED